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Indonesia1
Abstract
This paper analyzes the bank’s behavior in selecting its portfolio composition and its
impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission process in Indonesia. We
employ an analytical model of the banking portfolio behavior based on microeconomic
theory to understand how banks’ portfolio behavior in maximizing its profit links to the
efficacy of monetary policy. This study finds that micro banking condition and prudential
regulation affects the effectiveness of monetary policy. This study also finds structural
changes in banks and borrowers have altered the smoothness and effectiveness of
monetary policy to encourage the economic growth and hindered the process of economic
recovery. As perception on risk has large impact in supporting the effectiveness of the
monetary policy, effort to reduce risk through the formation as credit bureau, credit
guarantee scheme, and rating agencies is critical as it will improve transparency and
availability of debtor information. The need for better coordination and harmonization
between macro and micro policies would be beneficial.
1
Presented in International Seminar “Financial System Reform and Monetary Policies in Asia”, Sep, 15-16
2006, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan.
This paper is part of the research papers in the Directorate of Economic Research and Monetary Policy –
Bank Indonesia. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views
of Bank Indonesia.
2
Doddy Zulverdi, Senior Economist. Author’s, address: IMF, Washington DC, email :DZulverdi@imf.org,
dzulverdi@bi.go.id. Tel +1-202-623-9088 (O), Tel +1-703-685-0553 (R), Mobile: +1-202-3900-879
3
Iman Gunadi, Economist, Author’s address: Directorate of Economic Research and Monetary Policy,
Bank Indonesia, Jl. M.H. Thamrin no. 2, Jakarta, Indonesia, email: imangunadi@bi.go.id,
IXG025@bham.ac.uk.
4
Bambang Pramono, Economist. Author’s address: Directorate of Economic Research and Monetary
Policy, Bank Indonesia, Jl. M.H. Thamrin no. 2, Jakarta, Indonesia Tel. +62-21-381-8869, Fax. +62-21-
3502030 (F), email: bpramono@bi.go.id.
I. Background
It is widely known that banks plays determinant role in financing economic development.
This is so because banks are more superior compare to other financial institution in coping with
asymmetric information and high cost operation in financial intermediary activities (Stiglitz &
Greenwald 2003). By its nature, banks are capable to deal with different types of borrowers,
surpassing asymmetric information problems. This phenomenon is even more true for
institutions has been impeded by inadequate institutional infrastructures and weak investor basis.
During 2001 – 2004 the flows of credit from the banking sector contributed on average about
77% of total financing from major financial institutions (banks, bond market, and stock market).
As a result, the rise and fall of banks in Indonesia would have strong correlation with the
Bank portfolio composition plays an important role in explaining the monetary policy
transmission (Silber 1969 & Beckhart 1940). Within banks’ portfolio, a special attention has been
given to banks’ credit. The growing awareness of the importance of credit in the monetary policy
transmission process is driven among others by concerns over the impact of financial sector
weaknesses, bank failures, non-performing loans (NPLs), and credit rationing on the effectiveness
of the transmission process (see e.g., Blinder [1987], Bernanke and Blinder [1988], Brunner and
Meltzer [1988]). In the past, monetary literature had paid little attention to the role of credit due
to the emergence of monetarist thinking and the overriding influence of Keynesian thought on
“Liquidity Preference” that stresses the importance of money rather than credit (Gertler [1988]).
Current stream of monetary policy paradigm has acknowledged the importance of supply and
demand of credits.
Within this context, this paper analyzes the bank’s behavior in selecting its portfolio
composition particularly as an intermediary agent and its impact on the effectiveness of monetary
1
policy transmission process in Indonesia. We begin with a historical overview of the development
of banking sector and monetary policy in Indonesia. We then proceed with a brief explanation of
the model being used in analyzing the banks’ behavior. Based on this framework, we conduct an
empirical simulation that will compare banks’ behavior and its impact on the effectiveness of
monetary policy before and during the post-crisis period. Lastly, we conclude how changes in
banks portfolio behavior could alter the efficacy of monetary policy and provide need for some
policy recommendations.
sectors, holding 80% of total bank assets. State-owned banks acted almost as a sole credit
provider to the real sector and played as agent of development by channeling significant amount
of government subsidized loans. These state-owned banks were heavily regulated as such that
interest rate determination was controlled by the government to an artificially low level, hence
In such condition, monetary policy was conducted by implementing the use of direct
control instruments. The Central Bank employed direct monetary instruments such as imposing
ceiling on lending rates and the volume of loans, injecting subsidized credits, and endorsing
selective foreign exchange control, whereas the exchange rate regime was relatively fixed.
Supported by windfall profit from oil boom, this was marked as the era of government-led growth
lasting in the 70s and 80s with an average growth rate of 7.5% per year.
Due to the world recession and the dramatic drop of oil price in early 1980’s, the
government had changed the development strategy. As the current account deficit widened thus
threatening the external position’s of the country and GDP growth dropped to 2.3% in 1982 from
2
an average of 7-8% from preceding years, the government took a sweeping adjustment measures.
As the first instance, the government devalued the Rupiah by 38% to correct the external
imbalance by stimulating non-oil exports. Furthermore, the government realized that it could no
longer act as the main engine of growth as fiscal sustainability was under pressure. Following this
situation, government postponed some large projects and gradually shifted its dominant role as
development agent to the private sector. Therefore, government had introduced a number of
deregulation policy packages in the financial sector to encourage the promotion of banking sector
and the financial sector in order to tap private saving and channeling it to private investments
The first financial deregulation was introduced in June 1983 (PAKJUN 83), involving three
aspects, i.e: (1) abolishing credit ceiling that had been used as a means of monetary control and
introducing indirect monetary instruments, (2) reducing the injection of liquidity credit provided
by Bank Indonesia, and (3) granting freedom to state-owned banks to set up their own interest
rates and allowing more opportunities to all banks to mobilize deposits from the public. ConseAS
aresult, the share of private banks in lending increased rapidly, funded by deposit mobilization,
Furthermore, another policy package was issued in October 1988, known as PAKTO 1988,
aimed at promoting non-oil exports and at enhancing banks and non-banks’ efficiency, improving
the efficacy of monetary policy, and creating conducive climate for the capital market
development. These measures effectively marked the new and liberalized financial environment
era, abandoning the financial repression regime. On the banking front, this deregulation package
facilitates easier openings of new banks and their branches. Within two years, licenses to open 73
new commercial banks and 301 branches were issued. Since then, banking activities increased
substantially in terms of assets (Figure 2.1). The other important aspect of this package including
3
their funds at private banks and the possibility for banks to merge along with efforts to reduce
credit risks.
180 $ bn
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Figure 2. 1. The Development of Banks’ Assets
As the deregulation measures have provided better foundation for banking development
along with improvement in banking competitions, it gave the opportunity for the Central Bank to
launch a more market based indirect monetary policy instruments. During 1983-84, minimum
reserve requirement was set down from 15% to 2% and the open market operations mechanism
was improved through the auctions of two monetary instruments, namely the central bank
certificate (SBI) and money market securities (SBPU). Unfortunately, the pace of banking sector
developments was far too fast, and capacity building in the area of supervision was lacking.
Consequently, the enforcement of prudential regulations was inadequate while intervention into
the Central Bank policy was pervasive. As a result, this environment has created widespread
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, leading banks to excessive credit expansion, largely
In order to prevent the economy from overheating, in January 1991 a tight monetary
policy was taken by ordering major state-owned enterprises to switch their deposits into SBI, the
central bank certificate, and banks’ access to offshore borrowings were constrained. As a result,
inflation rate was brought under control to 4.9% at the expense of soaring interest rate. In
4
addition, exchange rate band was also widened, hindering negative impact of short-term inflows
and lessened dependency of banks in foreign exchange transaction to Bank Indonesia. In addition,
in February 1991 more comprehensive prudential banking principles were imposed and banks
were suggested to merge or to consolidate. Unfortunately, the expected wide scale banking
consolidation never took place due to lack of commitment by bank owners. Banks kept on
pumping supply of credit to the economy excessively. Despite the improvements in prudential
regulations and banking supervision, businessmen still found loopholes in getting new credits.
Trilion
1200,00
1000,00
800,00
600,00
Excess Supply
Loan
Loan Capacity
400,00
200,00
0,00
Aug-83
Aug-84
Aug-85
Aug-86
Aug-87
Aug-88
Aug-89
Aug-90
Aug-91
Aug-92
Aug-93
Aug-94
Aug-95
Aug-96
Aug-97
Aug-98
Aug-99
Aug-00
Aug-01
Aug-02
Aug-03
Aug-04
Aug-05
The financial reforms in Indonesia since 1983 have encouraged intermediary functions of
the banking system. Banking system had succeeded in supporting strong economic development
for more than a decade prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This was reflected in the numbers
of bank loans and banks’ loan capacity that had cosistently increased5 (figure 2.2). From 1983
5
Loan capacity is defined as total liabilities less reserve requirements, cash in vault, and capital.
5
until the crisis struck in July of 1997, banks’ loans and loan capacity increased from Rp12,83
trilllion and Rp16,61 trillion to Rp340 trillion and Rp383 trillion respectively.
Following a contagion effect from Thailand and South Korea the large depreciation in the
exchange rate led to an external debt crisis as most domestic firms could not service their
liabilities to international and domestic banks. As the same time, severe liquidity problems rising
from increased burdens of firms servicing external debts, coupled with the overall worsening of
public confidence eroded. The closures of 16 banks without a proper deposit guarantee scheme
To prevent another cycle of bank rush, the government announced the blanket guarantee
scheme which effectively guaranteed the payment of all type of banks liabilities by the
Government. After the government introduced a blanket guarantee on deposits on January 27,
1998 in which all depositors and creditors of all domestic banks were to be completely protected,
the public responded positively, the exchange rate appreciate and deposits began flowing back
Nevertheless, the currency crisis and external debt crisis managed to evolve into a full-
blown corporate crisis that led to a deterioration of banks’ asset quality and an increase non-
performing loans (NPLs). The amount of non performing loans increased from average Rp28
trillion in prior crisis period to Rp84 trillion afterwards. During the crisis, non performing loans
reached their highest figure, moving from Rp100 to Rp 300 trillion (figure 2.3). In this period, a
large increase in non performing loans indicated an increase in the probability of default.
Therefore banks tended to do hasten internal consolidation to improve their asset quality rather
6
Trillio Rp
800
700
NPL's
600 Loan
500
400
300
200
100
0
Jan-94
Nov-94
Jul-96
May-97
Mar-98
Jan-99
Nov-99
Jul-01
May-02
Mar-03
Jan-04
Nov-04
Sep-95
Sep-00
Sep-05
Figure 2.3. Bank’s Loan and NPLs
The severe crisis put the banking performance at its nadir. The increase risk of
bankruptcy led to liquidity problems which further became insolvency problems, eroding banks’
capital and their ability to function the role of financial intermediary in the economy. As a result
the amount of loans has reduced, particularly since 1999. The lag between the time of the crisis
and the notable impact on loan issuances was partially due to the effect of a previous banks’ loan
commitments before the crisis period and the weakening rupiah that led the value of foreign
currency loans increased in terms of rupiah. Drops in loans issuances without a subsequent
banks ration their loans due to reduced net worth and a higher risk of bankruptcy. Agung et al
(2001), and Zulverdy et al (2004), found a strong indication that there was a credit crunch
phenomenon in Indonesia. Unwillingness of banks to issue loans could also be reflected in the
negative interest rate between deposit rates and loan rates (figure 3). During the period from
August 1997 to May 1999, banks did not permit their loan rates to exceed their deposit rates as
7
%
70
40
30
20
10
0
Jan-94
Jan-95
Jan-96
Jan-97
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Figure 2.4. Loan and Deposit Rates
Monetary Funds (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Banks (ADB) introduced a
recapitalization program for domestic banks in March 1999. Using a minimum capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) criteria of 4 percent and feasibility of banks’ business plans, efforts were aimed at
determining which banks were still viable and met the requirements for recapitalization program,
To finance the costs for bank recapitalization program, the government issued bonds to
the central bank in exchange for funds needed by the government to inject additional capital into
banks, and at the same time the central bank resold the bonds to the recapitalized banks. Hence
the balance sheets of the recapitalized banks showed government bond holdings in their asset side
and government equity participation in their liability side. Specific measures were also
implemented for restructuring the non-performing loans of the banking sector. For the
recapitalized banks and banks taken over by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA),
8
non-performing loans were removed from their balance sheets and transferred to the IBRA as an
The recapitalization program has changed banks’ balance sheets. On the asset side, the
main composition of bank funds shifted from loans to government bonds (figure 4). Prior to
crisis, around 70% of bank’s portfolio were in loans and only less then 10% in the form of liquid
assets (with SBI around 1% and other securities asset about 8,9%) and no government bonds.
After the recapitalization process in 2000, loans decreased to 33%, while banks’ holding of
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Loans SBI Govt. Bonds Interbank Securities and Others
The ability of the banking system to generate loans has to this date not fully recovered
from the impact of the crisis. Many problems, both internal and external, still remain such as the
high risk of the business sector and the relatively slow progress on firms’ restructuring, causing
9
banks to choose safe securities (government bonds and SBI) over extending loans. Such a
situation more closely resembles the activities of mutual funds than fully functioning commercial
banks.
A study by Pramono (2004) found that during period of 1999 to 2003 there has occurred
sustained excess demand in the loans market, showing the continuation of the existence credit
crunch in Indonesia6. Using Stiglitz and Greenwald’s model, this study also found that the
bankruptcy risk could explained the mechanism through which the credit crunch existing in
Indonesia.This study also found that the existence of the credit crunch has implication for
monetary policy. Due to the credit crunch, a tight monetary policy has more impact than
expected.
Despite the success to control inflation rate, tight monetary policy taken in the period of
crisis has also amplified banks’ unwillingness to extend loans and contributed to less supply of
loan. In contrast, a loose monetary policy taken in the aftermath of the crisis and recently has not
induced banks to extend loans. A decrease in the interest rate does not immediately affect
restructured firms and they remain unable to get loans for some time. Loose monetary policy does
not necessarily restore banks’ willingness to supply loans as long as banks remain concerned with
Further study by Zulverdi et. al, 2004a found the indication of a reversed situation from
credit crunch during crisis to a period of excess loan supply. The excess supply was particularly
pronounced among existing (good) borrowers. Considering that finding new good borrowers is a
difficult issue for banks particularly when have to meet many prudential regulations under the
banking restructuring program, banks compete to keep their good borrowers by increasing the
supply of loan commitment to them. However, due to unfavorable business prospects, the use of
6
The credit crunch defines as a credit rationing situation due to supply constraints caused by a sharp
decline in bank loan supply
10
new loans limited. This situation led to an increasing trend of undisbursed loans reflecting the
slow progress of corporate restructuring and the high-risk premium imposed by banks on their
loans.
loans and economic output. The lack of loan availability has constrained monetary policy to
encourage the economic growth and hindered the process of economic recovery until recently.
The effectiveness of monetary policy transmission has not improved as reflected in the slow
response of loan rates to reduction in SBI and the widening spread between loan and deposit rates
(Graph 2.6). The effect of lose monetary policy after the crisis was over has not significantly
increased the loan supply as banks’ loan portfolios are still low as reflected from the Loan to
Deposit ratio that has slowly increase, recorded at 502% by end of 2004 far below pre crisis level
of 82%.
Due to credit rationing and the market’s collapse, lowering interest rates does not
immediately help restructured firms get new loans and does not necessary restore banks’
willingness to supply loans. Banks still could not predict about the bankruptcy risk and are
reluctant to bear the risk, therefore the unwillingness of banks to supply loans remains. Banks still
behave in risk averse manner and are reluctant to extend loans. They prefer to put their funds into
safe places such as SBIs and government bonds rather than to extend loans.
11
%
80
70
30
20
10
0
Jan-94
Jan-95
Jan-96
Jan-97
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Figure 2. 6. Interest Rate Development
Based on work by Zulverdi et al (2004 b), we develop a static partial equilibrium model
as an analytical framework to understand how banks’ portfolio behavior in maximizing its profit
links to the efficacy of monetary policy. Simplifying the model, we assume that Indonesian
Asset Liabilities
Excess Reserve (incl. cash in vault) Saving and Demand Deposits
Reserve Requirement
Time Deposits
Loans
Government Bonds Capital
SBI and FASBI (central bank certificates)
Net Inter-bank Money Market
As intermediary institutions, banks collect fund from surplus spending units with a
certain cost and distribute it to deficit spending units by imposing a certain interest rate as bank’s
earning. Aside of deposit interest cost, banks also face contemporaneous transaction costs that
12
assumed in the form of quadratic function in both asset and liabilities side. Imposing these costs
will lead to an interdependent relationship between asset and liabilities which means a change in
asset lead to a change in liabilities and vice versa (see Elyasiani, 1995). Banks objective function
I ∞
Max ∑∑β
i t=0
t +1
π ti+ 1 (3.1)
π ti+1 =
N O M
∑ (r in
Lint )(1 − η tin ) + rPti Pt i + ∑ rStio S tio + ∑ rBtim Btim + rFti Ft i Interest revenues
Lt
n o m
Q Interest Expenses
− ∑ rDtiq Dtiq − rTti Tt i
q
N α Lin in 2 α Pi O
α io M
α im Marginal costs of holding assets &
∑ ( Lt ) + ( Pt i ) 2 + ∑ S ( S tio ) 2 + ∑ B ( Btim ) 2
liabilities
n 2 2 o 2 m 2
−
α i Q
α iq
α i
α i
+ F ( F i ) 2 +
2
t ∑ 2
D
( D t
iq 2
) +
2
T
(Tt
i 2
) +
2
x
X t
i 2
( )
q
• Bank assets should be equal to its liabilities at all times (equation 3.2).
∑L in
t + Pt i + ∑ Stio + ∑ Btim + Ft i + X ti − ∑ Dtiq (1 − ρ D ) − Tt i (1 − ρT ) − K ti = 0 (3.2)
• Demand for loans is a linear function with negative relationship to loan interest rate
(equation 3.3).
• Supply of time deposit and saving deposit are both a linear function with positive relationship
to time deposit rates and saving deposit rates, respectively (equation 3.4 and 3.5).
13
Tt i = ct + d t rti (3.5)
• Banks always maintain a certain level of excess reserve (in cash and in accounts at the
X ti = ρ Xi (∑ D t
iq
+ Tt i ) (3.6)
• The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) imposed by Bank Indonesia limits banks behavior in
maximizing their profit. As a risk-averse investor, bank could calculate risk-weighted asset
(RWA) on loan higher than that imposed by the Central Bank. (equation 3.7)
(γ ∑ L
1
in
t )
+ γ 2 Pt i + γ 3 ∑ Stio + γ 4 ∑ Btim + γ 5 Ft i Ω it ≤ K ti (3.7)
• Interest rate on monetary instruments, SBI and FASBI are exogenous and set up by Bank
Solving this optimization problem will give some clues about how changes in monetary
policy affects banks’ portfolio, and furthermore, explain how the monetary policy is transmitted
via banks. The followings are some important findings that related to banks’ response to a change
∂L f 1 − Ωγ 1
= − < 0 (3.8)
∂rS (1 − η ) + α L f 1 − Ωγ 3
As the theory predicts, the volume of loans ( L ) has a negative relationship with policy
rates ( rs ). A reduction of policy rates, for example, will shift allocation of funds from
central bank certificates (SBI) into loans. Equation 3.8 indicates that monetary policy
14
transmission will be less effective (as reflected in lower sensitivity of loan volume to
changes in policy rates) if borrowers are less sensitive to interest rates ( f is lower), CAR
( Ω ) is high, banks’ perception on default risks is high (as reflected in high risk weighted
assets on loans ( γ 1 )7, marginal cost of managing loans ( α L ) are high, and non-
As long as banks continue to perceive high loan risks in contrast to low risk on holding
new debtors. Therefore, lowering loan risk perception would be expected to encourage
banks to expand lending and discourage them from dominant holding of SBIs.
∂rL 1 1 − Ωγ 1
= > 0 (3.9)
∂rS 2(1 − η ) + α L f 1 − Ωγ 3
Loan rates ( rL ) have a positive relationship with policy rates (equation 3.9). Monetary
policy transmission will be less effective (as reflected in lower sensitivity of loan rates to
changes in policy rates) when banks’ perception on default risk is high, CAR is high, and
The negative impact of higher default risks on the effectiveness of monetary policy
policy. In the recession (economic crisis) when default risk tends to be high, a loose
monetary policy would not be optimally followed by a decrease in loan rates (an increase
7
It should be noted that banks’ risk perception can be also endogenous with respect to changes in policy
rates. However, it is easy to present cases where banks may have formed its risk perception based on the
instability and uncertainty of social and political situation (eg. in a country like Indonesia), independently
on the changes in policy rates by the central bank.
15
in loan volume). In contrast, during the expansion period in which default risk is
loan rates (a decrease in loan volume). In this environment, a tight monetary policy may
Impacts of a Change in Policy Rates on Spread between Loan Rates and Time Deposit Rates
∂ (rL − rD ) η + (1 − η )( ρ D + ρ X ) − Ωγ 1
= (3.10)
∂rS (1 − η )(1 − Ωγ 3 )
• Equation 3.10 indicates that when banks’ perception on default risks ( γ 1 ) and CAR ratio
( Ω ) are substantially high relative to non performing loan ratio (η ), reserve requirement
ratio ( ρ D ), and excess reserve ratio ( ρ X ), policy rate will have a negative impact on the
spread between loan rates and deposit rates. Therefore, in an easing monetary condition,
• This negative relationship reflect a situation when banks’ opportunity cost of extending
credit is larger than the opportunity cost of holding non productive fund (NPLs + reserve
requirement + excess reserve). In this situation, bank tends to move loan rates slower than
deposit rates.
Based on the above analytical results, we have run an empirical simulation for
Indonesia’s case by calibration some of the parameters of the model. We divide the simulation
8
Kato et al (1999), for example, has proved empirically the existence of this phenomenon in Japan.
16
into three period: 1) pre-crisis (1996.01-1997.06), 2) Crisis (1997.07-1999.06), and post crisis
Monetary Transmission via Banking Channel during the Peak of the Crisis Period
There are strong indications that the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission via
banking channel had been significantly lower during the peak of the crisis period. They
are evidences of smaller sensitivity of loan rates to changes in SBI rates ( ∂rL / ∂rS )
during the crisis as compared to pre-crisis period. Two major factors are responsible for
this condition. First, economic crisis and its impact on mounting NPLs had increased
banks’ perception on default risks very significantly. This factor had reduced banks’
willingness to increase loan rates as a respond to higher policy rate as it would worsen its
9
Considering that there is no structural changes in the banking sectors during the period of 2004 to 2005,
the use of this period as the representative of the post crisis period is valid.
17
NPLs. Second, as most borrowers experienced huge solvability problems, they became
more sensitive to loan rate changes (the slope of loan demand, f , increased). This factor
reduced banks’ ability to increase loan rate without losing their good customers. Both
factors were so dominant that they overshadowed the incentive to increase loan interest
As borrowers were more sensitive to loan rate changes and banks suffered huge losses
from higher NPLs, the negative impact of higher policy rates on loans volume ( ∂L / ∂rS )
As default risks were substantially high, the opportunity cost of extending credit was
higher than the opportunity cost of holding idle fund (fund “trapped” in bad debts,
reserve requirement, and excess reserves). These made loan rates less sensitive to policy
rates relative to deposit rates. Consequently, the increase in SBI rates increased deposit
∂ [rL − rD ]
rates much faster than the increase in loan rates < 0 , creating negative
∂rS
interest margin.
The improvement of monetary policy transmission has been very slow during post-crisis
period. The sensitivity of loan rates to policy rates changes ( ∂rL / ∂rS ) increased only
slightly, and still smaller than the sensitivity during pre-crisis period. Although banks’
perception on default risk has improved significantly, banks are still very cautious as
evidenced by higher CAR ratio than the level required by regulation. The positive income
effect of smaller NPLs has also reduced the incentive for banks to fully respond any
18
changes in policy rates. Both factors have resulted in slower decline of loan rates than the
The sensitivity of loan volume to policy rate changes ( ∂L / ∂rS ) has been declining
during post-crisis period. It is even lower than the sensitivity during pre-crisis period.
Banks are still very cautious in extending credit as evidenced in higher CAR ratio. In
addition to that, smaller NPLs ratio has reduced banks’ loses significantly. This situation
has reduced the need from banks to increase loan supply to cover losses from NPLs. On
the other hand, as borrowers are not suffering from solvability problem so heavily as
during peak crisis, their demand for loans are less sensitive to interest rate changes.
Consequently, as monetary authority reduced the policy rates to boost aggregate demand,
the increase in loan volume is relatively slower than if the same policy were conducted
As banks are still maintaining higher CAR, the opportunity cost of extending credit is
still higher than the opportunity cost of holding idle fund (which is declining as NPLs are
smaller). This makes loan rates still less sensitive to policy rates relative to deposit rates.
Consequently, lower SBI rates reduce deposit rates faster than loan rates.
IV. Conclusion
Structural changes in banks and borrowers leads to changes in the monetary policy
transmission. Micro banking condition and regulation affects the effectiveness of monetary
policy. Since the source of financing of firms in Indonesia is largely tied to bank credit, the slow
growth of supply of banks’ loans has constrained monetary policy to encourage the economic
19
Banks’ willingness to extend loan is affected by external condition and the monetary
policy as well as the banking regulation. The monetary and banking policy could affect the
banking behavior not only through changes in interest rate but also through changes in constrain
and incentives (Stiglitz, 2003). For example, the contraction in monetary policy during crisis
period led to further increases in bankruptcy risk which in turn worsened the risk of default on the
existing loans and finally led to a further decrease in banks’ net worth and willingness to extend
loans. The imposition of CAR requirement has also contributed to a decrease in banks’
willingness to supply loans. This situation leads banks tend to put their excess liquidity in low
From the analysis above, it has shown that one of the serious problems facing the banking
community in Indonesia is the asymmetric information. Risk perception, even though has been
declining, is still relatively high among bankers in Indonesia which may have led them to be
(overly) cautious. To overcome this problem, there is an apparent need to initiate efforts that can
provide more information regarding credit-worthiness of the borrowers while at the same time
trying to continue boosting the real side of the economy, if banks are willing to approve new
loans.
In order to overcome with the problem of asymmetric information in the banking sector,
• As perception on risk has large impact in supporting the effectiveness of the monetary
policy, effort to reduce risk through the formation as credit bureau, credit guarantee
scheme, credit rating, as well as law enforcement need to be improved. These policies
• The authorities could also provide more information regarding potential promising
economic sectors. Considering the pervasive asymmetric information in the credit market
20
for small and medium enterprises, the introduction of credit guarantee scheme can also be
• To improve the knowledge in assessing risks, banks should be supported to invest more
confidence and reduce the perception of default risk. As stated by Stigltiz, 2003 we needs
banking behavior;
Therefore, the authority needs to take various steps that include incentive and
constrain
• As both monetary policy and banking regulations gain its positive impact on loan
performance, the need for better coordination and harmonization between macro and
• Increasing the role of non-bank financial markets and increased competition in financial
promoting a sound and efficient non bank financing and thus reducing downward rigidity
21
Appendix:
22
Bibliography
Agung, Juda. 1995. “Monetary Aggregates and Monetary Policy In A Changing Financial
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