THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS

Author(s): C. Beard
Source: Professional Memoirs, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, and Engineer
Department at Large , JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1919, Vol. 11, No. 55 (JANUARY-
FEBRUARY, 1919), pp. 47-64
Published by: Society of American Military Engineers

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.1
Translated from the French

By

Capt. C. Beard,
Engineers, U. S. Army.

The taking of Liege and Namur, the easy investment of the

entrenched camps at Anvers, - all fortified places organized under
the direction of one of the most renowned military engineers, the
Belgian General Brialmont, - the brief resistance of several French
and Russian fortified places (Maubeuge, Manonvillers, Brest-
Litovsk, . . .) gave rise to many commentaries, more numerous
because certain of the places were counted as among the strongest
of Europe.
Though some commentators went to the extreme of proclaiming
the failure of permanent fortifications, others, citing the heroic
defence of Verdun and that of Przemyśl, contested such radical
judgment.
It has been deemed of interest to summarize several articles
which have appeared in the foreign press among the military
journals.
I. One of these articles, entitled "New and Old Reflections
Upon the Value of Permanent Fortifications and Defensive
Organizations,' ' may reflect in part the ideas of our enemies;
it was published in the "Swiss Journal of Artillery and Engi-
neering." ( Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Artillerie und
Génie.)
II. A second article which appeared in the "Memoirs of
iThis article, which is a translation of a bibliographic review of the
subject made by a French writer, is presented in view of the importance of
the topic. It may serve to give to the interested reader a more definite
notion of the relative rôle played in the late war by permanent and field
fortifications, and will at least serve to put him in touch with the opinions
of the future of the art of fortification as held by some foreign military
writers. No responsibility is taken for the opinions expressed, and the
article is presented solely as a review of the current literature of the sub-
ject. - Translator's note.
47

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48 the future of permanent fortifications.

the Spanish Military Engineers' ' (Memorial de I

del Ejercito), under the title of "Reflections Upon
Fortifications," gives a somewhat restricted discus
question.
III. Finally, in a paper published by the "Bulletin of the
Hollandish Society for the Study of Military Science" ( Organ
der Vereeniging ter beoefenning de Kryswetensshap) , and
bearing as title : 4 ' The Importance of the Organization of the
Ground in Open and Position Warfare"; the author has
summed up the conditions which future permanent fortifi-
cations should fulfil.
I.

The Monograph in the Swiss Journal is evidently inspired by

an article which appeared in Germany, in the ' ' Military-Technical
Review for Officers of all Branches" (Kriegtechnische Zeitschrift
für Offiziere aller Waffen), and also by a work published in the
same country: "Consequences of the World War" (Folgerungen
aus dem Weltkrieg), the author of which is Major General von
Freytag-Loringhoven, General Staff of Garrison Troops.
He refers to an article which appeared in the Field Artillery
Journal, U. 8. A., and which seems to be an article emanating
from the War College, General Staff, U. S. Army.
In common with the German Military Technical Review, the
Swiss article commences by defining what is to be understood by
the "modernity" of permanent fortifications:
"A fortress can not claim modernity unless -
"Its works, as much by their location as by their grouping,
conform to permanent tactical principles;
"Its facilities for combat, from the point of view of artillery
and engineering, and its sources of supply, give it an indisputable
superiority over the enemy artillery and engineers :
"Its works possess, by reason of their construction, a passive
force of resistance, superior to the forces with which the attack is
provided ;
"Its combative power is such that the assailant can not over-
come it with the means at his disposal. ' '
These principles presented, the Swiss articles, still following the
German version, criticise severely the rôle played by fortified
places during the war.
"Neglecting the element of surprise due to the unexpected use

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 49

of a 420 mm. shell," says the article, " neither the masonry
the turret armor were able to oppose a continuous resistance to t
destructive means actually employed in the siege, for the fortre
which _were besieged had been built for a number of years, an
could not be considered from any point of view as 'modern.'
From the tactical viewpoint, their organization did not present
the characteristics of other than an out-of-date scheme, and showed
other faults also . . . Similarly, from the technical viewpoint,
the fortresses were not first-class, neither in point of concreting
nor in point of armoring."
The article adds that these fortified places, - which in the
second half of the 19th century, were capable, by their resistive
strength and integral means of combat, of defying the assault of
any assailant, - were found to be antiquated upon the appearance
of rifled mortars, and became more and more antiquated, as the
destructive effects of the artillery was increased. In this connec-
tion the article cites the case of Anvers, and it brings to notice
that it is precisely the strength of the above mentioned places
which was responsible for the impetus given to the development
of the artillery.
The article explains as follows the causes of stagnation in the
development of fortifications, to keep pace with that of the artillery.
"The art of fortification was obliged to seek new means of
resisting the power of the assailant, which was increasing more and
more; little by little armor became an important factor in the con-
struction of fortresses. But the page had been long since turned.
The strength of defenses having given impetus to the creation of
new means of attack, the proper hour had been passed. It was now
the means of attack which governed the requisite strength of forti-
fications. . Thus this interaction between the means of attack and
the strength of defenses, reduced the question of the construction
of fortifications to one of money, and since the requisite sums
became exceedingly large, the parliaments of all the countries of
Europe raised with difficulty the credits which were demanded of
them, so that finally military engineers were forced to continually
adopt compromise measures.
If in politics and in financial economics, the above is to be
tolerated, such is not the case from the military point of view:
In war only the best and most certain have value: "Insufficien-
cies and compromises must be avoided since compromise only serves
to increase insufficiency."

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50 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

The German writer in the Military Technical Review , oppose

his opinion vigorously to that of some who, taking example fro
what happened at Plevna, think that permanent fortifications c
now be replaced with simple trenches and who express themselv
thus:
"See the trenches upon the field of battle, they cost nothing,
they require nothing, and they render more service to their con-
structors than fortresses. ' '
Evidently, trenches can well, in certain cases, supplement per-
manent fortifications, but they never can replace the latter, and the
writer adds:
"When it is demanded that fortresses be abandoned as such, -
located in some cases without reason throughout the land, and
existing only because they have existed for centuries, even though
they have no longer any reason for existence, - it is indeed proper.
Fortresses can be accorded value only when they fit into the whole
scheme of defense of a country, and only when they are really
modern. But since political formations and military ideas are sub-
ject to change, the defensive system of a country , instead of being
founded upon fixed conditions , must be prepared for all eventu-
alities ģ"
After opposing himself as above to those who believe in the
failure of permanent fortifications, the author gives vent to some
ideas on the subject of the modern fortifications of a region.
While upholding the utility of isolated fortifications constructed
near the frontiers with a view of fulfilling a special purpose, he
sets forth the principle that today, particularly with frontiers
largely exposed naturally, there is no longer an effective support
for the field armies and for the absolute defense of the country
except as provided by a system of fortifications built in liaison
with extended obstacles, passive, impassable, natural, or -artificial,
and placed as near as possible to these fortresses.
To this end it will be neceessary as a means of permanent forti-
fication, to arrange in advance, battle terrain, in which the offen-
sive can be freely developed, but where the enemy offensive will
meet with a shattering check. The most essential condition would
be to have solid flanks. If there are natural obstacles available,
this condition would be perfectly fulfilled, otherwise it would be
necessary to create them, either by a system of artificial water
courses, or by the reforestation of vast zones of woodland which

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 51

would extend between the prepared zones of operation, and w

constitute in extended depth an impenetrable thicket. Better
woodland and swamp might be combined, with the object in
that between the prepared zones of operation would lie regio
passable to troop movement. It follows naturally that this 'sy
of defense should be carried as near to the frontier as the tactical
situation will permit, in order to save as large a portion of the
country from enemy devastation.
' ' If a recognized master of the art of fortification has said that
field fortification 'is tactics written upon the ground,' it is a truth
so exact that it may be applied for the strongest reasons to perma-
nent fortifications, for the statement has no other meaning than
the following : ' The permanent fortifications of a system prepared
in advance, should be adapted to the exigencies of tactics, just as
well as should be the positions taken on the field of battle through
the medium of nonpermanent works.' "
It follows that all formal designs, all reminiscent thought of a
diagrammatic layout should be rejected.
"The military engineer should know what are the problems to
be solved in the zone considered, following which he decides,
according to the tactical object and the nature of the terrain, the
location and kind of organization which should be adopted. From
the technical point of view he will have certain principles to
observe., All constructions which take into account these principles
will be correct, if they are adaptable to the terrain in the least
apparent manner. It follows then that the military engineer must
endeavor to disembarrass himself of the old formulas, and adapt
himself to new methods . . . Under actual circumstances, where
formidable methods of artillery attack must be reckoned with, as
well as aerial and engineer operations, there is no longer any old
type possible,- to the rear with the old and superannuated."
Having thus presented the conditions of the problem of fortifi-
cation, the author enters into the details of execution.
"It will be decided, in each particular case, how much should
be prepared in advance, offensive and defensive battle positions,
having supported flanks. Groups of fortifications as well as lines
of fortifications will be considered, as both of these methods of
fortification are justified in use if there is a close relation between
their tactical rôle and the terrain . . .
"In both cases, in order to hold stubbornly the zone of opera-

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52 THE future of permanent fortifications.

tions, and economize the defensive forces, it will be ne

try and build strong works, well armed, capable of sus
assault, solid and capable of giving rise to effective line
These works will be the skeleton of the whole series of fortifica-
tions; it should not be possible to force one of them until several
of the ones in between have been taken. They will serve as support
points for local combat, and the intermediate positions will rest
upon them as upon solid pillars. These positions will be organized,
partly in advance, partly by the troops charged with the defense.
Occupied by the infantry they will serve as protection to the com-
bat batteries which would have been constructed, either in time of
peace, - well armored, - or as open emplacements, by the troops
themselves. ' '
' ' If lines of fortifications are adopted to resist stubbornly upon
the most exposed points, a checkerboard disposition of the works
might, according to circumstances, render good service, because
thus is obtained reciprocal support and also the greatest possible
resisting force. It will be necessary to build redoubts which must
remain intact, - when the enemy, having broken through the ad-
' anced lines, presents himself before them.
In insisting upon the necessity of getting away from all formal
designs and dimensions, and to base the design solely upon the
necessities of the case, and upon results of recent experiences
the author brings out that the fundamental principles for the
organization of modern strong points are as follows :
Strong points should :
1. Permit a crushing fire upon the enemy in close combat, and
also up to the extreme limits of close combat ;
2. Give fire crossing with that of adjacent works, and be pro-
vided with batteries and flanking organs ;
3. Present a strong resistance in casa of assault ;
4. Forbid to the enemy his occupation of such works as he
might overcome.
In that which concerns the first principle, there are no other
means, in the actual case, than the following :
a. Protect all the defensive forces by heavy armorings.
b. Make invisible the combat organizations.
On this subject, the German writer, author of the article in
the Militarij Technical Review for Officers of All Arms , make
the following comments :

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 53

' £ In works which are provided with an unprotected firing p

pet, it will be necessary during the bombardment which prec
the assault to keep the garrison in bombproof quarters. This
garrison, as soon as the artillery displaces its fire, will rush to man
the parapets to resist the expected assault. The men will issue but
slowly from the narrow passageways to the subterranean shelters,
hermetically sealed, and provided with tortuous passages to protect
the occupants from the blast of explosion of mortar shells of large
calibre. According to the length of parapet demolished by pro-
jectiles, the condition of the parados and traverses, and the shelters
beneath the parapet which will have been demolished, the rapid
occupation of the firing crest will be difficult and the control of the
officers over the men, and their control of the fire, will be made
almost impossible.".
"If the garrison is brought to the parapet by a feint, and while
there is showered with heavy trench mortar projectiles, it will be
obliged, in a decimated condition, to again seek its shelters through
a labyrinth of shell holes, only to be soon recalled to the defense
by a new alarm. ' '
"And if by a single round reaching its objective, a shelter is
demolished with its occupants, a certain irreplaceable portion of
the defending troops is lost,"
' ' Troops, thus thoroughly demoralized will falter at the moment
of assault."
"Moreover the protection secured by fire from neighboring
works, is impossible at a time when friend and foe may come under
it at the same time. On the contrary when the attacking artillery
has gained fire superiority it is the defensive infantry with its
machine guns which becomes of first importance. It is indeed these
troops who have in their hands the decision. ' '
"It follows therefore that the strength of the defending troops
must not be diminished by premature losses, and it must be in a
condition to steel its nerves when the enemy advances to the
attack. ' '
' ' The duty of the military engineer is to organize the works in
such a way that the defender, not yet demoralized, but intact, can
ccme into action at the opportune moment, and the defender then
is sufficient unto his task if he is well armed. If he is denied
proper weapons at the decisive moment, he can not be counted
upon. ' '

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54 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

In conclusion, to meet these requirements adequately, there i

only one definite means:
'Everything armored, no more open emplacements. ' '
"For this a great deal of money is necessary, and this money
must be appropriated if fortifications are desired which are rea
capable of resisting."
The author examines the question of armoring, which is of cou
susceptible of several solutions.
"It is possible in sheltered work to conceive an armored galle
taking the form of the work, and designed to shelter the infant
ai d the automatic weapons. Such a disposition is perhaps the mo
advantageous for the control of fire ; and it requires for the wo
themselves only moderate dimensions. But under the actual circu
stances, destructions must be localized, and even a solid partitio
ing will not accomplish this object. In addition, armored gallerie
do not lend themselves easily to concealment. In all cases, it is
more advantageous to build a large number of armored machine
gun emplacements, dissimulated in thickets so as not to be very
easily located. Preliminary trials, carefully undertaken, will reveal
whether these emplacements should be built to rotate, to be fixed,
or to be built with a shuttered embrasure. Here, again, the ques-
tion of expense plays an important rôle, and a solution involving
the least expense is not the one necessarily to be chosen, but rath-
er the one which gives the best results."
"The weapons intended for close defense should similarly be
placed in armored turrets, made invisible from the outside, and lo-
cated unequally throughout the works. ' '
"If," adds the author, to whom the notions are accredited,
"these dispositions are well taken, such a work could be located
neither from above nor from afar, as a work of fortification. It is
necessary that the enemy have merely an impression of a terrain
somewhat gullied, and partly covered with trees and thickets."
From all this, the conviction becomes absolute that the contest
between projectiles and armor - which has so far been decided in
favor of the projectile - may continue to evolve. "The man who
invents the weapon will know also how to forge the shield."
After having stated that the employment, ever increasing, of
aitillery with flat and curved trajectory and of large caliber, has
caused the transformation into organizations of rather permanent
character, the works built at the start of the war with the resources

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 55

of modern industry - Lieutenant General von Freytag-Loringh

Chief of Staff of Garrison Troops, German Army, proceeds t
press himself as follows with regard to permanent fortificati
"The surprising results of the fire of our curved trajec
mortars, against Belgian fortresses and later against Russian f
tresses, has given rise to the thought that in the future the r
forced trench would replace the fortress. ' '
"What is really the truth, is that fortresses not modern in
now recognized sense of the word, should be deliberately aband
as such ; as must also the idea that the possession of a place mu
assured by fortifications. That idea has long since been relegat
to oblivion. As far back as 1809 Napoleon wrote in his notes u
the defense of Italy: "Like the artillery fortresses are not
which alone can fulfil their missions ; their properties must ac
ingly be supplemented , and given the correct employment
"In 1806 he (Napoleon) gave expression to the idea that for-
tresses depend upon the same principles as the disposition of troops.
Fortresses should assist in operations, and as the nature of them
can not be foretold with certainty, it would seem as though the work
could only be built advantageously during a war, and then only
where needed. ' ' This is going too far. The recommendation is not
made that solid supporting poirits be not established in advance at
peints where it is intended a stand should be made.
"In that which concerns the strength these works should have,
the fortifications on the Eastern frontier of France, and above all,
those at Verdun and the Moselle line, give us important data."
' ' To call - as did those who in 1814 argued against an invasion
of France - the fortresses of her Eastern frontier, feebly occupied
and built at long intervals apart, 'the unattackable frontier of
France,' was a gross exaggeration. It became a truth a century
later. The powerful effects of our heavy artillery at Verdun, dur-
ing the attacks, did not render the works easy of assault ; which is a
proof that fortifications, carefully located and dissimulated, where
the nature of the ground is favorable, can have, now as before, a
very large value."
' ' On the other hand, it seems to be out of date to fortify the big
cities. They have long since lost their importance as central nucleii
for systems of fortifications, and in future they will not be able to
claim the rôle, except in the cases where they constitute canton-
ments in the fortified zone."

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56 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

It will be necessary later to guarantee the security of ce

frontier zones by means of a series of permanent fortificati
in time of peace, and to these will be added, at the opening
tilities, other works, the material for which will be prepar
advance. It will not be necessary to create a continuous "Lime"1
which would only permit of a stratified defensive, such as was
imposed upon us in this war by circumstances, but only a series of
fortified strong points, not in the nature of fortified place, but
rather as important portions of the terrain, well organized in ad-
vance.

ť ' The world war has, in part, confirmed anew the

the attack only has decisive importance, and that the
be toward a war of movement rather than a war of p
"On the other hand, the world war has shown the
strength of a defensive, supported by well organized
a conclusion of tremendous importance to us (the Ge
our geographically central position."
The memoirs from the War College of the Americ
Staff, which was analyzed by the ßwiss Journal of A
Engineering give, in that which concerns the future
fortifications, the following opinion:
"The fortification of the future should encompass a
tory in such a way that it secures to troops and artill
est liberty of movement. For this there is no need o
armor in the forts, which is exposed to view. Perma
ments for weapons will be established only at impor
prevent the enemy from then installing pieces of sti
ber. In these subterrahean batteries should be installed mobile
pieces, which will be defiladed as much as possible from enemy ob-
servation, to prevent their being taken under a direct fire. It must
be borne in mind that a long resistance can not be made unless the
garrison, - as much from the point of view of the defensive troops
as from that of mobile artillery with which they are provided, -
is sufficiently strong to prevent the enemy from forcing the lines
or from penetrating into the cities or places it is desired to pro-
tect. It seems that from the teachings of the present war that
iThe "Lime" was, during the period "when the Romans occupied what
was then Gaul, a huge protective wall, uniting the middle Rhine with the
upper Danube and encircling a large portion of Wurtemberg and of Baden,
strong points for the defense, not in the nature of fortified cities, but rather
of fortifications of important portions of the terrain.

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 57

trenches with mobile troops and artillery offer better prote

than fortresses constructed according to a formal scheme.

ii.

The article which appeared under the initials C. B. in the

Memoirs of the Spanish Military Engineers recognized first of
all that it is premature to deduce lessons or conclusions from the
events of the war because the elements with which we form our
judgments are still scarce, and generalizations on conclusions
arising from a particular case should be avoided, so that errors of
deduction will not be committed.
It must be remarked that the sources of information are some-
what confused. These are official reports, frequently tenacious,
the greater part of the time lacking veracity in that they exagger-
ate that which is favorable, and attenuate that which is unfavorable,
or the notes of correspondents who are complete strangers to the
military profession. From the standpoint of the national defense,
the belligerents are compelled not to divulge during the course
of operations reports or information of a certain class.
Under these circumstances it is best before drawing conclusions,
about the future of permanent fortifications, to await the conclu-
sion of hostilities, so as to have at hand all information which
will permit the formation of a correct judgment. But, never-
theless, it is not forbidden to give consideration to such material
as is available and which is applicable to the questions which may
present themselves.
First of all, the author judiciously remarks that in order for
systems of permanent fortifications to become useless it would be
necessary that, at the same 'time, all causes which necessitate a
defense at all price of certain localities whose situation or resources
make them desirable to the enemy, should disappear.
In this group are found the large centers of traffic near the
frontiers which are necessary to facilitate mobilization ; naval bases
where are concentrated the elements indispensable to maritime
defense : but in addition to these localities, situated on the borders
of the state, there exist in the center of the country important
positions which it is necessary to defend and today, among these,
it is not possible to forget, by reason of the progress of aviation,
the establishments destined for the production of war munitions
which, although distant from the frontiers, are none the less ex-
posed to aerial attack.

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58 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

The choice of positions, which necessitates for their de

recourse to permanent fortifications, because they are expos
the attack of the enemy from the moment of commencemen
hostilities, should emanate from the authorities who are resp
ble for the studies for the National Defense. It is a strategic
problem the solution of which depends upon the topography of the
country, upon international politics, and upon financial considera-
tions. It is work of preparation for war, which should be done
in time of peace.
The execution of the work, as is natural, is incumbent upon
the military authority which discusses and proposes all matters
regarding the armament and protection of chosen points by carry-
ing out the prescriptions of the military regulations concerning
such matters. This authority should study simultaneously the
different aspects of the problem from the tactical point of veiw,
and from that of the artillery and the engineers.
The writer undertakes to show that under none of these aspects
can it be held that permanent fortifications give an unsatisfactory
solution and that there is no longer any other recourse than to
commit them to oblivion.

(a) The problem from the tactical point of view necessitates

a study of the terrain, without which an adaptation of the defen-
sive elements to the ground is impossible. Where it is a question
of a field work or a permanent work, the terrain is the governing
feature : It is a tyrant to whose demands we must yield, but with
a certain amount of caution.
In this adaptation to the ground, the individual who is in
charge, can succeed with relative economy in increasing the ad-
vantage of the position, and decreasing its inconveniences; it is
therein that is found the true art of the engineer. In certain cases
this adaptation is not easy. It is clear that it is complicated by the
increase in range of the artillery, and in general, by the advances
in perfection of armament; but it is facilitated in turn by the
greater liberty conceded to the engineer by modern principles of
fortification: no more complicated problems of providing defilade,
but good sense and intuition replace formula and routine.
On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that the improve-
ment of the artillery, even though it has complicated defensive
works by requiring of, them better protection, has also contributed
to a simplification of the general outline of fortifications. For

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 59

example, the bastioned fronts - which during the Eighteenth C

tury and the commencement of the Nineteenth were the obsessio
of French military engineers - presented the great inconvenien
of rigidity due to the fixed relations between their constituent
lines. This fact explains that during the period considered,
problem of fortification was, so to speak, a problem of geomet
so that neither modifications nor progress were manifested.
It was to this stagnation of the art of fortification which m
be attributed without doubt, - in the above period, - the lim
progress or even lack of progress of the artillery, the two bein
closely interconnected.
Polygonal fortifications marked an advance by breaking away
from the formality which had characterized permanent fortifi
tions; it established a certain independence between the firi
crest and the flanking organs and most important, permitted t
separation of the defense at close quarters from that at long ran
But the factor which brought about a revolution in the art o
permanent fortification was the introduction of rifled artillery
The progress resulting therefrom made it impossible to keep th
civil population of an integrally fortified city beyond the ra
of enemy artillery. For this reason it became necessary to b
separate forts placed at intervals depending upon the range
cannon; these isolated forts replaced the towers, the bastions an
the flanking capponiers; courtines no longer were continuous an
were marked by intermediate works and by batteries. The heigh
of wall became negligible and in certain cases was entirely s
pressed. For these reasons permanent fortification was freed
from all geometric considerations governing its trace, and the
principle of separation of the defense at close quarters and that
at long range being established,, as well as the existence of a
mobile artillery, the problem of the location and the tracing of
fortified places no longer differs widely from the principles gov-
erning the siting of field fortifications. The one difference, and
it is not a strong one, is that in the case of permanent fortifications
the line of defense is a closed perimeter and in the case of field
fortifications it is constituted by a front more or less sinuous.
Therefore, in that which concerns the siting there is no longer
any reason for not applying to permanent fortifications the prin-
ciples which govern the siting of field fortifications.
(b) The author proceeds then to discuss the qualities of the

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60 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

artillery. He calls attention to the fact that in an attack on a

fortified place, the . artillery plays the most important rôle : if one
of the combatants possesses over the other an incontestable super-
iority due to the number of his pieces, to their qualities or the
superior instruction of his personnel, the contest will be promptly
decided in his favor.
It may happen at the start of a war that there will exist the
element of surprise in that one of the belligerents will make use
of matériel of a new and unknown character and with which com-
petition will be impossible. Fortifications are constructed to en-
able a resistance to this eventuality, and this in itself is for them
an important function.
Finally, in general, the improvement of the artillery precedes
that of fortification : fortifications are then the consequences of
these advancements, and it is much easier to change the armament
of an army than it is to make important changes in the construc-
tion of fortified places. These changes frequently are only made
imperative by costly experiences which reveal the faults which
must be remedied. But there is no reason why the improvement
of the artillery should not be useful to the defense as well as to
the attack. Truly, pieces of large caliber may well be installed in
prepared emplacements, under better conditions than in improvised
emplacements, and the mobility of the pieces will be conserved as
well in the first as in the second case.

(c) This established, it remains to know if it is possible, by

means of what may be called military architecture, to give to the
structures a sufficient strength. Herein occurs the intervention
of the engineers. It has been observed that in actual war, the
extemporized works constructed upon the different fronts during
the course of a campaign, have necessitated for their destruction
extensive and prolonged bombardment. But it is very evident
that if the permanence of armies in their respective positions
upon a stabilized front has enabled these works to be solidly con-
structed, the conditions for this will be still more favorable if they
are constructed in peace time when it is possible to apply even
more efficiently the means and materials for their construction.
It is the eternal contest between the projectile and the armor
which, along these lines, causes the author to observe that the im-
provement in naval guns has not caused the elimination of armored
ships, but has rather led to the increase in their strength by giving

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 61

their armor greater thickness; and by utilizing improvemen

its metallurgy giving metals of greater resistance. In particu
the armored battleship is a floating fortress. If upon the sea
use of these floating fortresses has not been abandoned, ther
no reason why, in the operations of land warfare they shoul
so be abandoned.
On the other hand, while in the art of naval construction the
engineer has used, up to now, only metals for the protection of
ships, the military engineer may employ materials of a more fre-
quent occurrence, by using cement alone, or cement combined with
steel, earth work, sand and masonry of all kinds. Thanks to the
employment of ordinary concrete and of reinforced concrete, it is
no longer necessary to solve complicated problems of stereotomy.
On the other hand, it has never been necessary to construct
indestructible works, and the strength of fortified places has al-
ways been limited; thus in a good many cases, these places have
been sufficiently strong to successfully play the rôle assigned to
them, and those which have succumbed to the attack were not al-
ways surrendered on account of a fault in their construction, but
owing to other causes which had a powerful influence upon their
defense.

It is not doubted that when it be possible to study in great de-

tail the defensive works executed by the belligerents, it will be
possible to form a competent judgment upon the worth of the
different materials employed ; by reason of the experience acquired
thus and also from tests made in peace time, a set of conclusions
will be drawn which will permit the development of a type of con-
struction sufficiently resistant to withstand the fire of modern ar-
tillery, but the principle must be well established that in a war-
fare of position, as well as in naval combat, the principle defensive
rôle belongs to the artillery ; thus, in order that its efficiency be as
great as possible, fortifications must provide for artillery, the pro-
tection needed: a powerful artillery, insufficiently protected by
cover, may be annihilated by another artillery, inferior in strength
but perfectly emplaced. Given equality of ballastic properties, a
good overhead cover for an army's artillery may be, and perhaps
always will be, a deciding factor in combat.
In conclusion, the author is of the opinion that it is impossible
to affirm that the present war will involve as a conclusion, the
abandonment of permanent fortifications, the efficiency of which
depends on diverse factors which cannot be exactly stated.

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62 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

According to him, the layout, the armament, and the mean

protection are not different for permanent works than are t
employed, - with excellent results, - for field works which pe
manent fortifications approach in character by reason of the
which has been spent upon their construction.
He feels in sum, that there will always be sensitive points ne
ing protection : either at the frontiers, the pivotal defensive po
or in cities, the factories and arsenals - accessories of the nati
defense, - which are exposed to aerial bombardment.
As final conclusions, the author expresses himself thus:
"To abandon permanent fortifications and announce their
uselessness because certain places, for reasons which are not yet
well known, did not fulfill their rôles, is a simple matter."
"But when sufficient material will be at hand to form a com-
petent judgment, it will certainly be seen that the modern methods
of combat complicate the problem. These methods will necessitate
studies and experiments which will serve as a base from which to
arrive at a solution in harmony with the progress of artillery and
aviation. ' '

ť ' History repeats itself. Since the first introduction of artillery

up to the present time several centuries have passed and almost
unbelievable progress has been realized. Keeping pace with this,
the art of fortification has evolved, and has presented protective
elements which, although they do not attain the state of ultimate
resistance, oblige the enemy to employ all his offensive means and
may make him pay dearly for his progress. This, of course, is
precisely the purpose of fortification.
in.

In studying ť ' The importance of the organization of the groun

in position and open warfare" the author of the monograph pub-
lished in the "Bulletin of the Hollandish Society for the study of
Military Science," goes into the question of permanent fortifica-
tions, basing his conclusions upon the teachings of the war, an
expresses the opinion that the following points may be considere
established. ;
(1) "In that which
value of tactical p
(2) "The conduct of
ment of the existin
isolated fortresses.
tions cannot be con

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 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 63

dimension and with geometrically disposed elements must give p

to studied organizations of the ground following recognized tac
tical principles; to this end recourse will be had to systems of
fortifications, reinforced or strengthened by the employment of the
powerful resources which are furnished by modern technical prac-
tice/ '

(3) "The general organization of permanent fortifications must

in the future coincide with organizations of fortifications in the
field. All permanent or field fortifications should also be based
upon the following principle: Increase in tactical value of the
terrain by means of the employment of modern technical resources .
"Summing up; the utilization of the factors; time , strength
and technical resources , as well as the possibility of deploying the
entire power of technical practice, to the aid of tactical operations,
will permit, with permanent organizations of the ground, to obtain
a passive power of resistance much greater than by recourse simply
to field fortifications."
On the strength of these considerations, the author adds :
"From the foregoing I conclude that the construction of forts in
the future is strongly recommended."
Further along, dwelling upon the rôle of permanent fortifica-
tions :

"I am convinced that the events of this war have brought out
that better use of the existing fortifications might have been made
to support the operations of the armies in the field. To form a
judgment upon the value wdiich these works might have had, the
way in which they were utilized should be examined, as well as
their general organization, and the nature of the materials em-
ployed in their construction." ¡
"It is not to be doubted that permanent organizations, posi-
tions constructed almost completely in time of peace, will take in
future a new place in the defense of a territory than up to the
present time they have taken. Above all, they are indispensable
to a small country in order that its field army may always be
effectively in a condition to restrain the offensive of a great power.
In this respect the lesson which was furnished by fortifications
on the eastern frontier of Belgium must not be forgotten. Not yet
ready for combat purposes, they were not in a condition to stop the
formidable attack of the Germans, which fact had a great influence
upon the ulterior progress of the war."

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64 THE FUTURE OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

CONCLUSION.

The studies which have been presented have only relative

and the opinions which are given cannot be considered as def
but it may be stated that they all affirm the rôle which per
fortifications will play in the future. The following is certa
true. If certain fortresses which existed at the commencement of
hostilities were not able to oppose to the enemy the resistance which
was expected of them; perhaps they were not entirely abreast of
the progress realized by the artillery and of the revision of tactical
science which resulted therefrom ; but above all their function was
not sufficiently adapted to the general conditions of modern battle.
The contest is not yet terminated between the projectile and
the armor. There is no reason to believe that by paying the price
it will not be possible in the future to construct fortifications
capable of withstanding the attack of projectiles of large caliber;
but the word of Napoleon, already quoted in this article, remains
true : ' ' Like cannons, fortresses are arms which alone cannot fulfill
their missions." ■
In detail, the author
their opinion. They a
of tactical principles,
are of fundamental im
tions as for those bui
The American article
ion that factories wo
tected by permanent
enemy aircraft.
The German writers
particular cases, the f
In that which concer
preparation of offens
passive obstacles, natu
to protect the greates
devastation by the en
It may be stated tha
none other than those enunciated with us by General Séré de
Rivières. After 1870, it was under his direction that the defensive
barrier of our eastern frontier was established. This barrier in-
complete as it was in 1914, without doubt was not without influence
upon the enemy in the grave decision which he took of violating
Belgian neutrality; this in spite of the formidable siege material
with which he was provided, to enable him to force this barrier.

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