Tecnologa Contra Incendios

Fire Technology, 59, 1883–1924, 2023
Ó 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
Manufactured in The United States
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10694-023-01409-4
Minimization of Risk by the Controlled

Replacement of Fire Detectors
Sebastian Festag *, ZVEI (German Electro and Digital Industry Association)

- Safety and Security Division, Fire Alarm System Expert Group, Lyoner
Street 9, 60528 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Received: 16 December 2021/Accepted: 5 April 2023/Published online: 4 May 2023
Abstract. Fire detection and fire alarm systems (FDAS) have the function of warn-
ing people swiftly of the hazards of a fire and thus permitting rapid rescue, protecting
material assets (particularly where unattended), ensuring operational processes, and
preventing fires from spreading, i.e. ensuring early and effective firefighting. In attain-
ing these objectives, installed FDAS contribute substantially to fire protection. In this
context, automatic fire detectors have the function of detecting fires early, swiftly and
reliably. Fire detectors are sensor systems and form part of a wider safety system.
They are exposed to numerous environmental conditions specific to their use and,
like other socio-technical systems, undergo natural ageing processes which limit their
service lifespan. Owing to the numerous risks that arise when a fire detector fails or
its function is impaired, the continuous serviceability of a FDAS must be ensured.
This requires controlled replacement of fire detectors. In some countries, this is
ensured by standards. This paper explains the need for controlled replacement of fire
detectors and the associated causes and effects, with reference to the example of Ger-
many and the provisions of DIN 14675-1. The paper explains, in terms of practical
relevance and with reference to examples, the basic concept of preventing possible
failure of a technical safety system in order to assure its protective function in the
event of a hazard occurring, together with the range of essential causes and effects.
Keywords: Fire detectors, Risk minimization, Function test and replacement, Standard, Reliability
1. Introduction
The behaviour of technical systems in the event of failure is subject to numerous
influencing factors and is randomly distributed. The failure phenomena cannot
therefore be determined precisely, but must be viewed as stochastic processes (see
[1–3]). This is particularly critical with respect to technical safety systems, because
the random variable comes into play in two respects: firstly the probability of a
hazard (e.g. a fire) occurring, and secondly a possible failure of the protective sys-
tem itself (see [4, p. 481]) in which the protective function may not be assured
when a demand is made upon it. Sensors are used in numerous systems for safety
purposes, for example in production plants, vehicles and robots.
*Correspondence should be addressed to: Sebastian Festag, E-mail: fes@hekatron.de
1
1884 Fire Technology 2023
In many safety applications, the system automatically assumes a safer state in

the case of failure (fail-safe mode). By contrast, fire detectors must not assume the
safe system state, as they have no functional redundancy and as a result their
function in the safe system state will no longer be fulfilled. Although failure is
very rare, when it does occur it is often life-threatening or is highly likely to cause
at least other harm, whether to persons, the environment, image, or to cultural,
material and non-material property (see [5]). To prevent such harm, preventive
measures—in which technical, organizational, behavioural and environmental fac-
tors interact—are implemented in safety engineering (e.g. [5–8]). The function test1
and the replacement of fire detectors constitute such a preventive measure. These
measures are still not fully appreciated and their purpose continues to be chal-
lenged in some quarters. Likewise, misunderstandings still arise concerning the
arrangements for replacing fire detectors [9, 10]. This paper explains the complex
issue of risk minimization with reference to the example of controlled replacement
of fire detectors, as governed in Germany by the DIN 14675-1 standard. The
example serves to explain, with real-case relevance, the basic concept of precau-
tion against possible failure of a technical safety system, to ensure the protective
function should a hazard occur, and the range of causes and effects. [11]
2. Purpose, Structure and Normative Principles of a FDAS

In the European Economic Area, a FDAS consists of a group of components gov-
erned by the EN 54 series of standards which, as defined in EN 54-1 (2021-08, p.
9), are capable of automatically detecting and signalling a fire and triggering fur-
ther automatic measures [12]. The essential components of a FDAS are defined in
EN 54-1 (2021-08, p. 7) as automatic fire detectors, alarm installations and fire
control and indication equipment, or are described in [13] as the fire control and
indication equipment and its periphery. Installed FDAS are systems planned
specifically for an intended project and installed in the building. They are tested in
accordance with the national regulations, in Europe ideally as systems against
EN 54-13:2017 + A1:2019. FDAS in Europe must meet the requirements of the
harmonized product standards of the EN 54 series, which were developed in
response to mandate M/109 and based on the Construction Products Regulation
(2011/305). Provided the construction products concerned meet these requirements
and are certified by a notified body, they can be marked with the CE mark and
traded freely within the European Economic Area (further European directives
and national transposition instruments must also be observed). The handling and
use of FDAS, from planning, engineering, assembly and installation, commission-
ing and acceptance through operation and maintenance up to modification and
extension, is regulated specifically at national level by means of application stan-
dards.
1
The function test in this context differs from the ‘‘function check-out’’ to EN 13,306:2018–02, which
defines the action taken after maintenance actions (usually carried out after down state) to verify that the
item is able to perform the required function [11].
Minimization of Risk by the Controlled Replacement... 1885
In Germany, the applicable standard in this case is DIN 14675-1:2020-01 [14],

supplemented by DIN VDE 0833-1 [15] and DIN VDE 0833-2 [16]. The require-
ments for the service provider are covered by DIN 14675-2 [17], and for system
interconnection by DIN 14674:2010-09. Annex 14 of the Model Administrative
Provisions—Technical Building Rules (MVVTB) [18] states clearly that provided
DIN 14675-1 is observed in conjunction with DIN VDE 0833-1 and DIN VDE
0833-2, the building authority requirements concerning planning, dimensioning
and execution of FDAS are generally deemed met (presumption of conformity).
This implies that where the standards are not followed, evidence must be fur-
nished that the protection objectives of the building regulations are met.
FDAS have the function of warning people swiftly and reliably of the hazards
of a fire, thus permitting rapid rescue, protecting material assets (particularly
where unattended), ensuring operational processes, and preventing fires from
spreading, i.e. assuring early and effective fighting of the fire (see [19]). When a
fire detector detects a fire, the signal is relayed to the fire control and indication
equipment, which processes the signal and then alerts the emergency service (e.g.
the fire service) via the automatic transmission device. At the same time, it
unlocks the fire service key safe. This enables the fire service to access the build-
ing. Inside the building, orientation for the fire service is provided by the fire ser-
vice peripherals (e.g. by means of the fire service panel, which displays which
detector group or fire detector has been triggered, and thus serves to localize the
site of the fire).
At the same time as the fire service is alerted, fire control systems are activated,
where such systems are installed in the building. These control, for example,
acoustic and visual alarms (with the possibility of organizing alerts for orderly
evacuation in the event of an alarm incident), smoke and heat extraction systems,
fire extinguishing systems, lift evacuation controls or dynamic escape route guid-
ance. By these means, FDAS contribute to attainment of the required protection
objectives. These objectives are formulated in a fire protection concept which is
based either on a requirement of the building regulations, or a risk assessment. In
the majority of cases, fire detection is a requirement for numerous other fire pro-
tection measures, and is the primary function of fire detectors. Automatic fire
detectors constitute non-encapsulated sensor systems. In Europe, such systems
detect fires based on typical fire characteristics in accordance with the EN 54 ser-
ies. Fire detectors conforming to EN 54-7:2018-10 are often used. These are point
fire detectors that detect smoke particles by means of scattered light, transmitted
light or ionization. In some cases fire detectors employing other measuring princi-
ples, in isolation or in combination, are used (Table 1 shows an overview of auto-
matic fire detector types).
The arrangements for installation and operation of FDAS are set out in Ger-
many in the application standard [14] and in [15, 16]. These standards also con-
tain requirements governing maintenance, including regular inspections and the
controlled replacement of fire detectors. The main focus of the arrangements for
controlled replacement of fire detectors is regular testing of their function in order
to prevent their random failure. The possible outcome of a function test is
replacement of a fire detector—in particular one with an optical sensor cham-
Table 1
European Standards for Automatic Fire Detectors
Standard Description Fire characteristic
EN 54-5:2018-10 Heat detectors Temperature

EN 54-7:2018-10 Point smoke detectors employing scattered light, Smoke
transmitted light or ionization
EN 54-10:2002-05 Flame detectors Flame
EN 54-12:2015-10 Line detectors employing transmitted light Smoke
EN 54-20:2009-02 Aspirating smoke detectors Smoke
EN 54-22:2020-07 Resettable line-type heat detectors Temperature
EN 54-26:2015-11 Carbon monoxide detectors Carbon monoxide
EN 54-28:2016-07 Non-resettable line-type heat detectors Temperature
EN 54-29:2015-06 Multi-sensor fire detectors; point detectors using a Smoke
combination of smoke and heat sensors Temperature
EN 54-30:2015-11 Multi-sensor fire detectors; point detectors using a Carbon monoxide
combination of carbon monoxide and heat Temperature
sensors
EN 54-31:2016-12 Multi-sensor fire detectors; point detectors using a Smoke
combination of smoke, carbon monoxide and Carbon monoxide
optionally heat sensors Temperature
ber—when proper operation of the FDAS and attainment of the required protec-
tion objectives is no longer guaranteed. The standard specifies three procedures
for the function test and replacement of fire detectors. One procedure involves a
periodic test of a fire detector’s serviceability in compliance with the standard:
(a) If a fire detector’s serviceability is tested annually by means of test method

specified by the manufacturer in order to check and verify the response beha-
viour specified by the manufacturer in accordance with the relevant part of the
EN 54 series of standards, the fire detector can remain in use until an imper-
missible nonconformance is detected [14, p. 33].
The standard sets out two further procedures each of which makes provision
either for fixed replacement cycles for the fire detectors, or alternatively for fac-
tory testing and repair in accordance with the cycles2:
(b) Point fire detectors with drift compensation or automatic calibration setup
with indicator in the event of excessive deviation may remain in service for up
to eight years in cases where the serviceability of the fire detector has been
demonstrated but testing in situ is unable to determine whether the response
behaviour is within the manufacturer’s specified range. At the end of this ser-
2
With respect to factory testing, the standard notes that the components (e.g. fire detectors) are subject
to inspection by the manufacturer. This test determines whether the response behaviour etc. of the fire
detectors still meets the requirements placed on the product by the standard. It is practicable to replace the
fire detectors in the property with loan products or substitute detectors whilst this inspection is being
conducted, in order to assure operation of the FDAS. It is now also common practice for contracts under
private law to provide for the replacement of fire detectors with tested fire detectors. This can be governed
by a maintenance contract.
vice period, these fire detectors must be replaced or subjected to factory test-
ing and repair.
(c) Point fire detectors without drift compensation or automatic calibration func-
tion and which cannot be checked in situ to determine whether the response
behaviour is within the manufacturer’s specified range must be replaced or
subjected to factory testing and repair at the end of a service period not
exceeding five years.3
In procedure (a), the focus of the function test is the annual inspection in situ of
each fire detector by means of a test procedure specified by the manufacturer [14,
p. 33]. The technical specifications of the EN 54 series must be met for this pur-
pose; as yet however, no manageable test equipment is known that satisfies all the
normative provisions [12]. In this procedure, the fire detector under test must be
replaced temporarily by a substitute detector in order for the protection objective
of the FDAS to be fulfilled for the duration of the test procedure. Should the fire
detector under test fail to meet the specified criteria during the test, it must be
replaced. Procedure (a) is rarely used in practice for the reasons stated.
This may change however as a result of technical progress. Procedures (b) and
(c) each provide a choice of two strategies for function testing. First, defined,
schedulable replacement cycles for fire detectors are specified which implicitly take
into account the ageing of the detectors, including their electronic components, in
their environment over the course of their service period. A point fire (smoke)
detector with drift compensation or automatic calibration setup must be replaced
after no more than eight years (procedure b). Should it not possess a drift com-
pensation or automatic calibration facility, it must be replaced after five years
(procedure c). Alternatively, the fire detector can also undergo factory inspection
and repair rather than being replaced directly. Fig. 1 shows the process steps
according to the procedure (b and c) involving factory testing and repair (top) or
direct replacement of the fire detectors (bottom).
Replacement makes the process relatively safe, schedulable and efficient, i.e.
with savings in time and costs. Should remote access to FDAS—which is evi-
dently the trend (see [20])—become the norm in the future, checking of fire detec-
tors’ serviceability on the one hand and their compliance with standards on the
other could be further simplified or partly automated (it will however probably be
difficult to check all ambient conditions remotely).
3
The standard further states that for detectors with multiple sensors—even when their smoke sensor has
been deactivated and subsequently activated—the age of the fire detector must be checked and the detector
replaced if necessary in accordance with the specifications of points a) to c). If, in the case of automatic fire
detectors, the sensor chamber is cleaned in situ or parts of the sensor chamber or the entire sensor chamber
are replaced, it must be ensured and demonstrated that, following cleaning or replacement of the sensor
chamber, the response behaviour of the automatic fire detector lies within the range specified by the
manufacturer in accordance with the relevant part of the DIN EN 54 series of standards.
Figure 1. Procedure for replacement of a fire detector according to

DIN 14,675 (11.5.3) with a factory test (top) and direct replacement
of fire detectors (bottom).
3. Development of the Standard for Replacement of Fire

Detectors
The arrangement for replacing fire detectors in Germany is set out in DIN 14675-
1:2020-01, which also specifies regular inspections and further arrangements for
maintenance. Table 2 shows development of the relevant passage of DIN 14675-1
over recent years.
As can be seen from the summary, the 2003 edition of the standard already
contained a clause concerning the maintenance4 of FDAS. Function testing and
replacement of fire detectors were added in the 2006 edition. Further detail
amendments based on observations made in the field up to that point were made
in the 2012 and 2018 editions.
Ensuring the continuous availability of FDAS is a priority for attaining the
protection objective. The rationale behind the arrangements for function testing
and replacement of fire detectors is that these devices are often found in buildings
that have been in use for decades, and their serviceability is doubtful [21]. At the
same time, numerous false alarms (i.e. fire alarms in the absence of any sign of an
actual fire at its presumed location [22])—mostly at the same premises5—are bur-
4
Based on EN 13306:2018-02, maintenance is understood to be all measures that serve to maintain or
restore the functional state of a system. Maintenance consists of servicing, inspection, repair and
improvement (see [5, 29]).
5
[22, pp. 119–126] shows, based on a detailed analysis of 2827 deployments of a fire service (to 539
actual fires), that 29.57% of false alarms are triggered by FDAS at 5.64% of the objects. In other words,
the fire service is called out multiple times to false alarms at the same objects. The result is confirmed from
the field and is symptomatic of improper planning and use of FDAS (see [63]).
Table 2
Excerpts from DIN 14675 Relevant to the Replacement of Fire
Detectors, with Date of Appearance (Unofficial Translation)
DIN 14675-1
Addendum 1:2014-
2003-11 A1: 2006-12 2012-04 12 2018-04
11 Mainte- 11 Maintenance 11 Maintenance 1 Additional infor- 11 Maintenance

nance mation
11.5 Inspection schedule 11.5 Inspection 11.5 Inspection
and tests for inspection, schedule and tests schedule and tests
maintenance and servic- for inspection, for inspection,
ing maintenance and maintenance and
servicing servicing
No informa- 11.5.3 Replacement of 11.5.3 Replace- 1.1 Concerning 11.5.3 Replace-
tion on fire detectors ment of fire detec- 11.5.3, Replace- ment of fire detec-
detector Provisions concerning tors ment of fire detectors
replace- detector replacement Provisions tors Provisions
ment a) Annual inspection concerning Additional concerning
b) Automatic point fire detector information for detector
detectors with drift replacement point smoke replacement
compensation: within Additional detectors and Note that
8 years comment: the sensor detector
c) Automatic point fire NOTE: It is chamber/sensor replacement
detectors without recommended system of serves to ensure
drift compensation: that the aspirating smoke the proper
within 5 years requirements of detectors for the operation of a
this section also definition of a FDAS and
be applied to factory test attainment of
FDAS placed in the required
service prior to protection
December 2006 objective
densome for the fire service (see Sects. 6.7.3 and 6.8). Besides addressing the dan-
ger of aged fire detectors failing to trigger an alarm in the event of a fire because
they are no longer serviceable, the aim was to reduce false alarms (which was not
attainable for example solely by regular inspections [21]).
In a study involving several manufacturers [23], experience gained in countries
other than Germany showed that the tripping sensitivity of fire detectors may
deviate significantly from the limit values found in standards, depending on the
service life. To overcome these issues, function testing and replacement of fire
detectors in Germany was included in the standard in 2006 by the efforts of the
responsible working committee at DIN with the participation of experts and the
stakeholders (e.g. fire services, operators, installers, test institutes, manufacturers
and researchers) and the public within a normal procedure for creation/revision of
a DIN standard. A recent study [24] suggests that the arrangements specified in
DIN 14675-1 are fulfilling their objective (see Sect. 6.7). Experience from the field
also confirms that the standard has led over the years to considerable improve-
ments to quality in the planning, installation, operation and maintenance of
FDAS (see Sect. 6.7).
4. Basic Reliability Theory

The failure behaviour of technical systems6 is randomly distributed [1]. A failure
in this context is a violation of boundary conditions relating to reliability [25]. This
means that in the event of a failure, the technical system or an individual compo-
nent of it no longer fulfils the function expected of it (see [26, p. 8]). All system
failures affect reliability, but only some trigger safety–critical requirements, namely
when a failure gives rise to a potential hazard (see [25, p. 5]). Failure of a fire
detector gives rise to the possible risk of a fire not being detected swiftly. In the
present context, the system is one that fulfils safety requirements.
With respect to failures of technical systems, a distinction is drawn between
total lifespan and service lifespan; this distinction is illustrated by Fig. 2.
Figure 2 shows the cause and effect relationships between the different total and
service lifespans from the perspective of a technical system/part. The total lifespan
covers the period from production of the product or system through to its dis-
posal. The actual service lifespan however does not begin until the product is
placed in use, i.e. the point in time at which the user actually uses it (this includes
second and third uses of the system by passing on or resale). The total and service
lifespan of parts is defined by analogy. For parts however, the service life and use-
ful life begins earlier than that of the system, because a part of a system is pro-
duced at an earlier point in time. As a result, both the total and service lifespans
of parts are longer. By their very nature, the total and service lifespans of systems
are directly related to the failure behaviour of the system itself and its compo-
nents. They indicate how long a technical system can be used for a specific appli-
cation with tolerable performance losses. The service lifespan is dimensioned in
consideration of numerous factors (such as load, wear reserve, inspection, repair
and maintenance, the technologies used, ambient conditions, aesthetics and chang-
ing values). Maintenance measures generally enable the service lifespan to be plan-
ned, even if it cannot be determined exactly (see [27, p. 31]). For systems fulfilling
safety–critical requirements, service lifespans are usually dimensioned conserva-
tively.
The failure rate curve of systems is divided into three bands (see Fig. 3) and is
familiar, at least as a concept, as the ‘‘bathtub curve’’ (see [1, p. 56, 29, p. 531, 30,
p. 354 f., 31]).
In the first band of the curve, the failure rate is relatively high: early failures or
teething problems occur. In the second band, the curve remains at a relatively low
level, with few faults (random failures) occurring. This is the service lifespan, char-
acterized by mission-related failures [30, p. 325]. In the third and final band, the
6
Here, technical systems are referred to synonymously with devices or products. A system or device
consists of several components or constituent parts. The smallest components that cannot be broken down
further are referred to here as components or elements.
Figure 2. Differentiation between the total and service lifespans of

technical systems (see [28, p. 600]).
failure rate curve rises again as a result of ageing and wear and tear failures.
Whereas the early failure phase is attributable primarily to quality defects (such as
failure of parts, planning errors and material faults, design, production or applica-
tion defects), the wear failure phase is caused by wear and ageing of the system
and its components under the influence of the ambient conditions. For products
from series production, the first phase becomes shorter as time progresses owing
to improvements to eliminate teething troubles, whereas the useful lifespan
remains constant.
According to [29, p. 531], systems, components or parts should ideally be
replaced before the failure curve begins to rise again, in order to counteract the
wear and ageing failures as much as possible. In this context, the wear and ageing
of technical systems depends in turn on the conditions of use and numerous
mutually influencing factors. For this reason, the timing of the onset of the third
phase at which wear increases can often not be anticipated exactly. The failure
phenomena are consequently described as stochastic processes (see [1–3]). Where
ambient influences play a subordinate role in the functioning of a system, and if a
sufficient number of identical systems with comparable conditions are considered,
the distribution of failures over time follows the Weibull distribution and can be
calculated with relatively high accuracy. For obvious reasons, this cannot be dis-
cussed in detail here (see [1, 25, 30]). The conditions under which fire detectors are
operated generally only partly meet the conditions for such calculations.
Systems are also typically assessed against numerous criteria, such as safety,
reliability and environmental requirements, performance and handling characteris-
tics, and cost requirements [25, p. 4]. Theoretically, the aim at the system’s design
stage is for all parts to be designed for a similar service lifespan (see [27, p. 31]),
and for this design lifespan to end before the failure curve in Fig. 3 begins to rise
Figure 3. Typical failure rate curve for technical systems (‘‘bathtub

curve’’).
again. This guarantees the system’s function and prevents wear failures whilst
avoiding the cost of an unnecessary wear reserve. A balance between the assess-
ment criteria can thus usually be achieved (see [27, p. 31]). This is difficult to
implement in practice owing to many influences not being known. The service
lifespan of a system for example is geared to its intended use, which in turn is
influenced by other factors such as legal and normative provisions, conditions of
use, the availability of spare parts, maintenance intervals and the quality of main-
tenance, and further performance characteristics such as design, updates,
repairability, mechanical and electronic robustness and the use of various tech-
nologies (see [27, p. 31]). These requirements are related to each other. The adjust-
ment of the lifespan is discussed controversially (e. g. [32]).
The total lifespan of a system is divided into a manufacturing phase and a ser-
vice phase. Its use ends with final outage and disposal. The service lifespan can
generally be extended by maintenance measures, particularly repair [27, 29], which
Figure 4. Course of the wear reserve over time [27, p. 289] and see
[33].
extend the wear process. The maintenance measures can be classified according to
the course of the wear reserve, see Fig. 4.
The wear and tear of a system and of its components begins when the system is
placed in use. Wear and tear is understood as degradation of the reserves for the
possible fulfilment of function under defined conditions which an item under con-
sideration possesses by virtue of its manufacture or restoration by way of repair
(see [29, p. 526 f.]). The wear reserve is a part of the utilization reserve. When the
utilization reserve approaches a tolerance limit, its course must be counteracted by
maintenance and repair measures, causing the course of the curve to be changed
and the utilization reserve to be raised again. This process repeats itself. It cannot
be repeated indefinitely however, since at some point the wear and tear inevitably
affects too many systems or components.
Maintenance measures include measures that do not counteract loss of an exist-
ing wear reserve but merely prevent or reduce further degradation. Conversely,
inspection affects neither the wear reserve, nor its degradation. Inspection determi-
nes and evaluates the point on the curve that has been reached, not merely that
the end of the curve has been reached. For this reason, inspection intervals are
based on the typical or anticipated curve progression. All measures contributing
to interrupting the course of the wear reserve over time and restoring it fall under
repair measures, such as replacement of affected systems or their components (see
[29, p. 527]). The wear reserve can be increased to above 100% of the initial state
by repairs involving additional improvements (such as the use of more modern
products).
Table 3
Examples of Replacement, Test and Calibration Cycles for Technical
Systems
Replacement cycle Time interval Source
Water meters (calibration interval = replace- 5 years—hot Section 34 of the German Measure-
ment) water meters ment and Calibration Regulation
6 years—cold (MessEV)
water
meters
Speech diaphragms, demand valve diaphragms 6 years vfdb RL0804
and exhalation valves of full-face masks and
demand valves used by the fire services
Fire extinguishing sprays 39 months EN 16,856:2020–06 Clause 5.8
Test cycle Time interval Source
Replacement devices 1 year Section 14 Paragraph 2 of the German

Industrial Safety and Health Regulation
(BetrSichV) (Annex 3 Sect. 1 of the Betr-
SichV)
Earth-moving and road construc- 1 year Section 14 Paragraph 2 of the German
tion machinery, special civil engi- Industrial Safety and Health Regulation
neering machinery (BetrSichV) (Annex 3 Sect. 1 of the Betr-
SichV)
Mobile electrical equipment, exten- 6 months Technical Rules for Industrial Safety
sion and connecting cables (TRBS), Annex 4 [39]
Electrical installations and fixed 4 years Technical Rules for Industrial Safety
equipment (TRBS), Annex 4 [39]
Fire extinguishers 5 years—internal Section 16, BetrSichV
inspection
10 years—strength
test
Motor vehicles (general roadwor- 2 years German Road Traffic Licensing Regula-
thiness inspection, e.g. TÜV) tions (StVZO), Appendix VIII (Sect. 29,
Paragraph 2)
Calibration cycle Time interval Source
Electricity meters (cali- 16 years—meters with Section 34 of the German Measurement and Cali-
bration interval) rotating disc bration Regulation (MessEV)
8 years—electronic
meters
Traffic speed monitors 1 year Section 34 of the German Measurement and Cali-
bration Regulation (MessEV)
Table 4
Typical Total Lifespans of Technical Systems (According to [40] and
[41])
Product category Total lifespan [years] Source
Condensing boiler (oil/gas) 20 [40]

Heat pump 15–20 [40]
Fan coil units 15 [40]
Air-conditioning units 15 [40]
Washing machines 12 [41]
Notebooks 10 [41]
Smartphones 2.5 [41]
TVs 13 [41]
5. Test, Calibration and Replacement Cycles in Different

Sectors
Technical systems differ in their reliability7 (see [1, 34–36]). Reliability is under-
stood to mean quality for a defined time span [1]; the time span can also be speci-
fied in terms of a number of operating cycles. The behaviour of a system in terms
of its reliability is thus by definition dependent on its total/service lifespan. Regu-
lar function testing, calibration, and replacement of function-critical systems and
components at specified cycles are common protection strategies. They forestall
stochastic failure of a safety–critical system during its intended total/service lifes-
pan [1].
Table 3 shows examples of test, calibration and replacement cycles of technical
systems.
One of the most familiar control cycles in Germany can be found in the road
traffic legislation: the German Road Traffic Licensing Regulation (StVZO)
requires motor vehicles to undergo a safety inspection every two years [37]. Water
meters must be recalibrated every 5 or 6 years to ensure their full serviceability.
The situation is similar for traffic speed monitors; in this case, the interval is just
one year. The calibration cycle of electricity meters differs according to their type
or operating principle. Electricity meters employing a rotating disc can be used for
16 years without calibration; those employing an electronic counter must be recali-
brated after only eight years [38]. The German Technical Rules for Industrial
Safety (TRBS) also list a number of maximum permissible inspection intervals in
accordance with the relevant legislation [39]. The procedure of function testing,
calibration and replacement of components relevant to function is therefore seen
to be common practice for technical systems.
It is well known that technical systems and their components and functions fail
over the course of the systems’ total/service lifespan. Table 4 shows examples of
7
In accordance with DIN 40,041, reliability is the quality of an item in terms of its suitability to meet the
reliability requirements during or after a specified period of time under specified conditions of use, or part of
the quality with regard to the behaviour of the item during or after specified periods of time under specified
conditions of use [36].
Table 5
Typical (Mean) Total Lifespans of Technical Systems (see [42])
Median of the total lifespans in Median of the total lifespans in

Product category years, 2000 years, 2005
Compact fluorescent lamps 7.4 7.7

Flat screen TVs 10.0 10.0
Vacuum cleaners 8.1 8.0
Tumble dryers 14.5 14.3
Refrigerators 14.2 14.0
Dishwashers 10.7 10.5
Small IT appliances and acces- 4.5 4.4
sories
Tools 9.8 9.6
Mobile phones 4.8 4.6
Washing machines 12.2 11.7
Notebooks 4.3 4.1
Kettles 7.0 6.4
Appliances with printing func- 9.0 8.2
tion
Microwave ovens 10.9 9.4
Small consumer electronics and 9.4 7.8
accessories
the lifespans of technical systems taken from studies—including social influences

(see [33, 40] and [41]). As can be seen from the table, it is an inherent characteris-
tic of technical systems that they fail over time. Construction components have a
total lifespan of 20 years or more according to [33], whereas the total lifespan of a
smartphone is less than 10 years [41]. A distinction must however be drawn here
between the lifespan of a device being reached after a certain time due to failure,
and replacement of a device due to the use of new, more modern systems.
A 2014 publication [42] states the (average) total lifespans of technical systems
with reference to the median values (see Table 5). The study from which these val-
ues were derived determined the medians of the lifespans within a given product
group between the years 2000 and 2005. This enabled trends to be determined in
lifespans over time; the values for consumer electronic products, mobile phones,
etc., from the years 2000 and 2005 are however not particularly up to date.
Table 5 shows that in 2000, the median lifespans of the system groups listed in
the study [42] ranged from 4.3 to 14.5 years, with an average of 9.1 years.
In 2005, the median lifespans ranged from 4.1 to 14.3 years, with an average of
8.7. The study [42] thus indicates, based upon a comparison of the lifespans
between 2000 and 2005, that the trend is for the average lifespan across almost all
technical systems to decline. In other words, despite technical progress and new
legislation, the study shows that the total lifespan of the technical systems anal-
ysed is decreasing. At the same time, a steady increase in the number of functions
of many products and devices leads to their being replaced by more modern and
more powerful products, even where they are far from having reached the end of
their usefulness purely from a technical perspective. It is unclear to what extent
Figure 5. International overview of provisions for replacement

cycles of fire detectors.
generalizations can be made in this respect. However, with regard to the replace-
ment of fire detectors, we can conclude that new technologies do not give rise to a
particular and pressing need for the service lifespan to be extended.
As Fig. 5 shows, legal or normative provisions for the function testing and
replacement of fire detectors exist in numerous countries. Replacement cycles are
in most cases 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12 years. At 5 and 8 years, the current provisions
in Germany are in the mid-range of this span. Numerous countries follow these
provisions, offering various options for function testing and replacement of fire
detectors. At the same time, the provisions governing fire detectors differentiate
according to whether the detectors feature drift compensation and an automatic
calibration facility, as recommended in a recent study [24]. This study also indi-
cates that the replacement cycles for fire detectors specified in the stan-
dard—which in the interests of practicability are identical across the entire range
of uses of fire detectors—are reasonable, as failure need not be anticipated at this
point in time.
6. Technical and Normative Causes and Effects

The essential causes and effects with respect to the function test and replacement
of fire detectors set out in the standard are presented below.
6.1. Attainment of the Protection Objectives for a FDAS Must be Assured

by Its Function
The protection objective of a FDAS—and by extension of an automatic fire detec-
tor—is to save human lives, to protect environmental, material and cultural assets,
and to prevent interruption of operations and harm to image, particularly where

no persons are present when a fire occurs. The systems further have the objective
of permitting swift and effective fighting of fires. A further purpose of FDAS is to
prevent or contain the spread of a fire by detecting it at an early stage and trig-
gering further technical fire protection measures [43, 44]. The purpose of fire
detectors is to detect fires as they arise. They are therefore an elementary compo-
nent of a FDAS. In a figurative sense, they are the sensory organs of the FDAS,
and assume the primary task of detection by identifying fires quickly and reliably
by means of characteristic parameters, processing these parameters logically, and
relaying the signals to the fire control and indication equipment. Fire detectors are
safety–critical protective devices, and must be functional at all times in order to
fulfil their task and that of a FDAS. Owing to their intended use, they must not
simply assume the safe state.8
6.2. The Provisions of Legislation and Standards Must be Fulfilled

FDAS, like fire protection in general, are subject to comprehensive requirements,
which are necessary and must be met. The protection objectives of preventive fire
protection are set out in Sect. 14 of the German Model Building Regulation
(MBO). This regulation requires premises to be maintained in such a way that the
incidence of a fire and the spread of fire and smoke are prevented and the rescue of
people in the event of a fire is possible. Attainment of the fire protection objectives
requires a large number of further provisions in other areas of legislation to be
observed, in addition to the provisions of the building codes. The fire protection
objectives must be ensured permanently.
It is in the interests of all parties to the planning, construction, operation and
maintenance of buildings to ensure that the requirements relating to fire protec-
tion are properly met and to be able to demonstrate that this is the case should
any doubt exist. For reasons of statutory liability, it is therefore crucially impor-
tant that proof is furnished of the necessary and ongoing serviceability of a FDAS
as required, and of attainment of the protection objectives.
For this purpose the manufacturer guarantees that under normal conditions, the
requirements pertaining to fire detectors as set out in the legislation and standards
are satisfied. The prevailing view is that DIN 14675-1 embodies generally accepted
good practice in this context. Such a standard may, for example, serve as a point
of reference for determining the scope of legal duties to maintain safety, and as
8
Technical safety systems are classified into three classes for safety in the event of failure. Many systems
have a ‘‘fail safe’’ mode in which they signal a faulty state and switch to the safe state (e.g. tripping of a
fuse). Other systems rely on the ‘‘fail functional’’ mode. In this case, they switch in the event of a fault to a
downgraded (safe) mode and must be repaired promptly; alternatively, if the system cannot be repaired
promptly, it must be switched to the safe state after a certain time and maintained this state (e.g. transport
systems; in the case of aircraft and drones, restricted continued operation in the event of a fault is essential;
many automatic systems can be manually overridden for this reason). Systems of this type often require
high redundancy or overdimensioning. Systems with the highest safety regime have a ‘‘fail operational’’
mode. In the event of a fault, operation of such systems can be maintained and the fault can often be
rectified during running operation. Systems of this kind are usually designed with multiple redundancy;
one or more subsystems/control channels can therefore fail without giving rise to a hazard (see [51, pp. 93-
125]).
the yardstick for negligence in the event of tortious, fault-related liability claims
under Section 823 (1) of the German Civil Code (BGB). The same applies to the
standard of due diligence relevant under criminal law. The indicative effect also
follows from the fact that standards are presumed to reflect generally recognized
good practice. In addition, violations of the provisions of DIN standards, in this
case the replacement intervals, may facilitate evidence favouring the injured party
in a procedural context. Should injuries to life and limb occur as a result of a fire
and it be established that these would not have occurred had the intervals for the
replacement of fire detectors as stipulated in DIN 14675-1 been observed, the
building operator might face not only claims for damages under civil law but also,
under certain circumstances, criminal liability for negligent bodily injury or negli-
gent homicide, in each case by omission. In view of these potential liability risks,
building operators often have a legal interest, and an associated economic interest,
in observing the replacement intervals of DIN 14675-1. In addition, should main-
tenance measures be neglected, they can be enforced by the regulatory authorities
if fire protection regulations under the building legislation are violated and an
actual danger9 exists in the sense of the building legislation.
6.3. Extending the Service Lifespan Increases the Probability of Failure

By their nature fire detectors, like any technical system, exhibit randomly dis-
tributed failures and ageing effects. These are to be avoided by preventive mea-
sures in accordance with generally accepted good practice, in order to prevent
impairment of function in the event of demand. The response behaviour of fire
detectors has been shown to change over the service lifespan in comparison with
new fire detectors [45]. Fire detectors may as a result no longer comply with the
normative requirements and possibly not even fulfil their intended function, result-
ing in attainment of the protection objectives being at risk. A change in the ser-
vice lifespan influences the probability of failure of the fire detector. Extending the
replacement interval increases the probability of failure and jeopardizes assurance
of the protection objectives. Shortening the service lifespan reduces the probability
of failure; however, it increases the outlay for maintenance of the system, which
often conflicts with the economic interests of the building operators and may
reduce the acceptance of such measures.
A difficulty here is that the exact function of the failure curve of fire detectors
in terms of the service lifespan and the exact point in time at which failures are to
be expected owing to wear are—for the reasons stated—not known. In the
absence of further considerations, an increase in the service lifespan, i.e. extension
of the replacement intervals, will thus inevitably lead to an unknown increase in
the probability of failure of the fire detectors under the given underlying condi-
9
Whether an actual hazard exists is a question to which there is no generic answer; this can be
determined only by an investigation conducted by experts on a case by case basis. In this context, it is
evident that case law in the field of fire protection tends not to set the threshold of the actual danger very
high. According to Münster Higher Administrative Court, the outbreak of a fire can be expected at
practically any time [100]. Fire protection measures are therefore precautionary protective provisions
[101]. For this reason, case law presupposes for the purpose of risk assessment that a fire has already
occurred (see [102], Para. 44 of Sect. 14).
Figure 6. Cause-and-effect relationships between the service

lifespan of a fire detector and the factors influencing it.
tions (e.g. country-specific standards and ambient conditions). Furthermore, in

view of the number of fire detectors in use, even a seemingly low failure rate
translates in absolute terms into numerous failures that could endanger human
life. The associated increase in risk runs contrary to the protection objective of a
technical safety system. Since the use of fire detectors often involves the safety of
persons, this must not be left to chance.
6.4. The Service Lifespan Plays a Decisive Role in the Complex Cause-and-
Effect Relationships of a FDAS
Numerous internal and external influencing factors affect the response behaviour
of fire detectors in the course of their service lifespan. The serviceability is conse-
quently a function of the particular usage parameters and environment [27, p. 31].
Fig. 6 shows schematically, in simplified form, the causes and effects between the
various usage parameters of a fire detector.
A change in a component or influencing factor is related to numerous other fac-
tors. Equally, a change in the service lifespan influences numerous other factors,
or requires them to be changed as a function of the service lifespan. The actual
causes and effects have for the most part not been adequately studied. Examples
are those between the service lifespan, the design of parts and the conditions of
use, such as certain air humidities, dust loads or ambient temperatures. While this
is just one detail of many, it illustrates the difficulty of estimating the impacts of
system changes in consideration of the service lifespan.
Not only fire detectors are part of a complex safety system and cause-and-effect
structure, they are also exposed to the influences of numerous and many-faceted
boundary conditions. The controlled replacement of fire detectors is a key element
in managing this complex set of technical, organizational (e.g. normative and

legal) and human (e.g. the people involved) system components and the various
ambient conditions, by which the necessary reliability of such a system is continu-
ously assured. Furthermore, safety considerations demand a conservative
approach to determining the service lifespan of a fire detector. This is necessary
because to ensure its highest possible availability, the system’s service lifespan is
usually determined by the component with the shortest service lifespan.
The response behaviour of fire detectors depends on the product (i.e. detector)
type concerned, its measuring principle, its level of technical development and its
component parts. The parts are influenced in turn by other parts and by ambient
conditions such as temperature, humidity and airborne substances, the algorithms,
the type and number of the measurement parameters, and the locations of use
with their particular and in some cases varying ambient conditions such as the
dirt and dust load, temperature, temperature changes and temperature rise, air
velocities, the influence of electromagnetic fields, and deposits caused by insects.
To these are added factors such as the load on the system or its components, the
wear reserve, the maintenance intervals of the FDAS and its components, and the
quality of maintenance (see [46]). Factors such as technological change in general,
fashion and aesthetics, changing values, and other external ambient influences
may also be relevant and have a bearing on the service lifespan of a fire detector,
and should be taken into account.
Overall, it can be stated that changing one ‘‘setting’’ within the complex cause
and effect system of a fire detector in turn changes numerous other settings in the
system, or already presupposes that they have been correctly set.
6.5. The Components and Their Ageing Influence the Service Lifespan
Function testing and replacement of fire detectors address the fact that electronic
parts age over their service lifespan. This ageing process is inherent to the system
and circumstances, and is not disputed. It concerns both the component itself, and
the conditions under which it is used.
The consequences of different failure rates of various parts, and how these in
turn affect the failure rates of devices and systems, vary widely. The failure rate of
parts varies from between 10–5 and 10–3 (means only every few years a failure
occurs) for sheathed terminal connections to between 100 and 102 for electronic
devices. Devices such as transformers exhibit failure rates from 10–3 to 101, and
electric valves from as much as 102 to 104 (means several failures occur per year).
The failure rate of large electronic systems ranges from 104 to 105. A Redundant
design of a system or relevant components significantly reduces the failure rate [1,
p. 93, 47].
Different fire detectors and different products are available that employ different
individual components. Components of fire detectors include circuit boards, pho-
toelectric elements, light-emitting diodes, capacitors, transistors, relays, resistors,
heat sensors and microprocessors, all of which differ in their ageing properties and
thus in their probabilities of failure. Typical failure rates for transistors, for exam-
ple, are 1.5 9 10–2, and for resistors 9.5 9 10–5. Fire detectors and all components
of which they are composed are inherently subject to wear, which is influenced by
their individual operating conditions. For example, the components are subject to
soiling and corrosion stresses caused by the conditions of use. Over many years,
this also affects fire detectors with automatic drift compensation[24].
In order to illustrate the impact upon a component’s service lifespan, the exam-
ple of the total lifespan of a battery is used. This clearly shows the influence of
the usage parameters (battery temperature, battery current and depth of dis-
charge) [48, p. 38].
Owing to the many different and mutually interdependent ageing mecha-
nisms of a rechargeable lead battery, quantitative estimation of the ageing
behaviour is seen to be possible only to a limited extent, even with the use
of detailed model calculations [48, p. 38]. At an average current, an
increase in the operating temperature from 30 °C to 40 °C reduces the
cycle life by 25%. Increasing the mean discharge current leads to a
decrease in cycle life. At the given temperature of 30 °C, doubling the
current reduces the cycle life by approximately 7.5% [48, p. 40].
This example illustrates the mutual dependencies within a technical system, the
effects of changing one parameter or component upon the system as a whole, and
the fact that system characteristics such as service lifespan depend on the ambient
conditions. Since a fire detector consists of numerous individual parts and these
parts age for the most part differently, the individual parts inevitably deviate from
each other in their ageing behaviour. This must be taken into account during
analysis of the system as a whole, and is often resolved by means of safety factors.
In other safety applications, such as military applications and in nuclear technol-
ogy, high degrees of availability are a given requirement: depending on the fail-
safe category, it is common in such applications for multiple or high redundancy,
diversity or de-meshing to be implemented (see [1, 49, 50, p. 79]) or for the sys-
tems to be heavily overdimensioned (see [51]). In aerospace for example, redun-
dant and multiple redundant designs and locks are used for the fault mode [52, p.
276].
Natural ageing of the individual parts depends not only on the ambient condi-
tions but also on what parts are used. Different component and supplier qualities
can therefore have just as much influence on ageing as the algorithms or technolo-
gies employed. It can also be assumed that the different measurement principles
employed by the fire detectors and the use of different technologies to measure
various parameters result in corresponding differences in natural ageing.
6.6. The Ambient Conditions Substantially Influence the Service Lifespan

Fire detectors are non-encapsulated systems. They consequently interact with their
environment, and the sensors are exposed to a range of ambient influences. These
also influence the natural ageing effect of systems and components. Stresses of an
environmental nature include dust, aerosols, insects, water vapour, electromag-
netic radiation, thermal and cyclic electrical stresses, dark current, diffusion pro-
cesses, microorganisms, and apparently also good hygiene conditions [45].
Furthermore, indoor ambient conditions can have a strong impact on the ageing
of the fire detector. These include temperatures and temperature fluctuations,
meteorological influences (e.g. solar radiation), atmospheric humidity and air
velocity (i.e. air circulation). The fire detector can be exposed to these conditions
for different durations and at different intensities. The ambient influences are
likely to vary in their effects upon a FDAS as a whole; different fire detectors in
the same FDAS will therefore be affected differently, and consequently age differ-
ently. The service lifespan of a fire detector thus depends to a large extent on the
site of its use and the environmental conditions prevailing there.
Changes in a building’s use, alterations to the building or other influences in it,
which in some cases arise spontaneously, have an influence upon a fire detector’s
ageing behaviour and thus upon its service lifespan. Since it is now common for a
building to be used for different purposes in the course of its life cycle, the ageing
of a fire detector may be affected by changes in the use of the building, such as
the re-purposing of a warehouse as a workshop, resulting in the ambient condi-
tions varying significantly. Similarly, the ageing of a fire detector during the life
cycle of a building will be affected by alterations, construction sites or redecora-
tion work.
The reliability of a given fire detector product cannot be guaranteed uncondi-
tionally as such, as too many ambient conditions and the use of the products con-
cerned are relevant factors. The protection objectives of a FDAS must be ensured
at all times.
6.7. Replacement of Fire Detectors as Provided in Standards has Proved

Effective Empirically
Experience to date shows that the current provisions of DIN 14675-1 concerning
function testing and replacement of fire detectors have proved effective since their
introduction, and that their effects are expected to increase in the coming years.
The provision was first added to the standard in December 2006; some 15 years of
experience have therefore now been gained.
No major fires have been reported in recent years in which a FDAS and the
provisions under discussion here failed. In addition, studies conducted in recent
years have revealed on the one hand a high availability (see [46, 53, 54]) and on
the other a high efficacy of FDAS (see [43, 55–58])—provided the systems are
planned, installed, commissioned and maintained in accordance with the stan-
dards. At the same time, a reduction in the false alarm rates of FDAS over sev-
eral years has been documented (see [22, 59–62, p. 139, 64–66]). A recent study
[24] specifically addressing the replacement of fire detectors also indicates that the
corresponding provisions of DIN 14675-1 are expedient (Table 6).
The figures reveal no failures of fire detectors up to a service lifespan of
10 years (this is conditional upon fire detectors being located in a clean environ-
ment, since the study tested fire detectors used only in offices, universities and
hotels). In contrast to the study, DIN 14675-1 covers all areas of application of
fire detectors and governs them uniformly across all environments. The only dis-
Table 6
Failure Rates of Fire Detectors as a Function of Years in Use ([24],
modified)
Class [age] Fire detectors tested [no] Fire detectors outside the limit values [no] Failure rate [%]
0–10 years 13 0 0
10–20 years 137 11 8
20–30 years 204 22 11
tinction made is between fire detectors with and without drift compensation,
which is reflected by the replacement interval of 8 or 5 years respectively; the
results of the study suggest that this distinction is reasonable.
6.7.1. FDAS Complying with the Standards Have a High Level of Availability Like
other technical systems of this type, FDAS exhibit a probability of failure. For
systems that can be repaired (such as a FDAS), this is termed availability; for sys-
tems that cannot be repaired (such as a fire detector) it is termed the probability
of failure (see [1]). The failure of fire detectors has been investigated in various
studies. The few systematic studies that have been conducted, particularly with
regard to the ageing of fire detectors, failed to produce clear, robust and general-
izable results (see Section 6.16). When FDAS are considered as an entire system,
availability serves as a characteristic reliability parameter describing the failure sit-
uation. The availability depends upon the probability of failure of the system.
This comprises the failure behaviour of individual components, maintenance and
the operating/ambient conditions; technical, human, organizational and environ-
mental factors interact in this context.
The failure behaviour of individual components is characterized primarily by
failure of parts as a result of ambient influences. This is dependent on, for exam-
ple, the materials used in manufacture of the component, the method of construc-
tion, the product type and the manufacturing quality (and also on the ambient
influences as described in Sect. 6.6). The quality of the service provider responsible
for planning and commissioning the system, and its use and handling during oper-
ation, also have a significant influence on its availability. The availability of stan-
dards-compliant FDAS in use which were commissioned and maintained by
certified installers has been examined by a differentiated study [46] and referenced
to the results of existing studies (see [67–72]). The availability averaged across the
FDAS under analysis is 99.9636% [46], and confirms results obtained in previous
studies [67] and [68]—both of which make reference to a significantly higher num-
ber of FDAS studied, but which neglected to provide detailed information on the
conditions of use. As regular surveys [73] show, the availability of FDAS is signif-
icantly lower in the cross-section of all systems in use, owing to defects. From the
difference it can be concluded that systems employing high-quality products and
installed, operated and maintained in accordance with the standards have an
availability that is on average 15% higher [46]. A conclusion can be drawn from
this finding with respect to high-quality maintenance, including function testing
Figure 7. Availability over 10 years of FDAS studied [46].
and replacement of fire detectors. These measures have the aim of ensuring high
availability of systems [15]. This objective is achieved, as can be seen in Fig. 7
from the distribution of the availability values of the systems analysed in detail
over the systems’ service lifespan. The confidence interval spans the first (25%) to
third (75%) quartiles of the reference data and is shown by the grey area. The
minimum and maximum values are shown as grey dots. The black dots show the
median of the systems over the studied duration of operation.
It can be seen that the availability of the systems over the years is stable, but
above all that the frequency of faults decreases owing to the influence of the sys-
tems’ maintenance. (However, the number of systems analysed decreases over the
duration of operation, since full documentation of the required system values was
available for only a few installations.)
6.7.2. Standards-Compliant FDAS are Effective A study by fire services of 5016

alarms to building fires [43] involving 1220 actual building fires enables the statis-
tical effectiveness of FDAS to be deduced. The FDAS in this case are installed
systems connected to the fire services in accordance with the TABs (technical con-
ditions for connection). Although the form of data collection does not permit any
direct conclusions regarding the effectiveness of replacing fire detectors, it can
however be determined for the FDAS overall, which includes their maintenance
and the arrangement for replacement of fire detectors. For this purpose, the distri-
butions of the criteria of damage caused by fires (estimated damage to property,
spread of fire and smoke, extinguishing water consumption etc.) to which the fire
service was alerted by FDAS (with both automatic fire detectors and manual call
Figure 8. Effectiveness of FDAS with a range of evaluation criteria

[74].
points) are compared with those for reference fires to which the fire service was
alerted manually (i. e. by mobile phone and landline telephone) [43]. Of the build-
ing fires surveyed, 861 were actual fires to which the fire service was alerted manu-
ally and on which information on the resulting fire damage was available. In
further 175 fires, FDAS were installed. The difference in the damage distributions
can now be used to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the FDAS
based on various damage criteria. FDAS primarily have an influence on the pro-
tection of persons and property. Owing to the low number of cases involving
harm to persons, the study does not yet permit any conclusions in this respect.
However, sufficient data are available on the estimated scale of damage, the
spread of fire and smoke, the accessibility of escape and rescue routes and the
consumption of extinguishing water.
Fig. 8 shows the effectiveness of FDAS with reference to these criteria. Fig. 8a
illustrates that the property damage estimated by the fire services for fires in
which the alarm was raised by FDAS is lower than for fires in which the alarm
was raised manually (the estimated property amage was less than e1,000 in 86%
of the former vs. 69% of the latter cases). This is despite buildings equipped with
a FDAS generally being of more complex construction and thus having a higher
potential for damage. In cases of fire where a FDAS was triggered, the fire was
confined to one property or device in 88% of cases at the time at which the fire
service arrived (see Fig. 8b). By comparison, this was the case for only 72% of the
reference fires. It is also seen that in the reference fires, the smoke had spread
comparatively further (in the dwelling, in the stairwell or over several floors) by
the time the fire service had arrived, as shown in Fig. 8c. In particular, the escape
Figure 9. Decrease over time in false alarms received by a fire

service [22].
routes are less likely to be usable by the time the fire service arrives (58%) com-
pared to cases of fire signalled by a FDAS (79% of 198 cases). FDAS also have
an influence on the consumption of extinguishing water (see Fig. 8d): in fires to
which the fire service was alerted manually, over 500 L of extinguishing water
were consumed in 18% of the cases, whereas this was necessary in only 3% of the
cases in which a FDAS had been triggered automatically. The study of the effec-
tiveness of FDAS underlines their relevance to safety, and suggests that FDAS
satisfy the function required of them at the present time. However, this can be
achieved only if they function properly and their reliability—including that of the
fire detectors—is assured. For systems compliant with the standards, this is evi-
dently the case.
6.7.3. False Alarm Rates of FDAS are Decreasing False alarm rates for FDAS
have been declining for some years now, at least in certain regions in which this
has been studied (see [59, 62, 63, 66, 75, 76]). When such a trend is determined, it
should be noted that the number of false alarms triggered by FDAS should be
placed in relation to the number of installed systems connected to the fire services
[22]. Fig. 9 shows by way of example that since 2006, based on data from one fire
service, the false alarms per connected FDAS have been falling.
The standards in force support this development and are proving effective in
reducing false alarms. Provisions in standards governing maintenance have been
in place since 2003, those governing replacement of fire detectors since 2006. More
attention has been paid to them since these dates. These provisions can be expec-
ted to have had a greater effect since 2011/2014.
6.8. Besides Attainment of the Protection Objectives, the Avoidance of False

Alarms is also Important
The more sensitive fire detectors are, the more prone they are to triggering false
alarms in response to phenomena resembling an actual fire. This can be coun-
tered, at least in part, with algorithms, selection of fire detectors, use of multiple
fire parameters etc., which make the fire detectors less prone to false alarms with-
out impairing their response to a fire. Such approaches are increasingly becoming
the norm. Despite these developments, false alarms caused by FDAS are burden-
some for fire services and lead to unnecessary costs. They tie up personnel and
material resources of the emergency services, which are needed elsewhere. In addi-
tion, it can be assumed that more frequent false alarms can lead to the warning
effect upon those affected being impaired in the event of an actual demand case,
as confidence in the alarms decreases with increasing false alarms. [77]. The great-
est proportion of false alarms caused by FDAS is accounted for deceptive alarms
by systems functioning as intended but being triggered by phenomena similar to
an actual fire [22]. Further categories of false alarm are alarms caused by technical
defects, unintentional alarms (raised in good faith or error) and malicious alarms
[64]. Alerting of the fire service limits the course of the damage. Nevertheless, the
perception is that the disadvantages of false alarms predominate. False alarms
also occur in other areas or with other technologies, where however they are less
controversial. Examples are intrusion alarm systems, tsunami early warning sys-
tems, personal scanners at airports, and systems in disease diagnostics, in informa-
tion exchange in media or politics.
Various measures to counteract false alarms triggered by FDAS have been in
place for several years (see [24, 59, 75, 76]) and have already led to a reduction in
false alarms. For example, coincidence detection, the maintenance and replace-
ment of fire detectors have been introduced, and new technologies and product
standards have become established. Professional planning of FDAS is also a
major factor in the avoidance of false alarms (such as selection of a suitable fire
detector in consideration of the conditions of use) [64]. Organizational measures,
such as the tasking of certified installers with professional planning, installation
and maintenance of the systems, also have a relevant impact on the incidence of
false alarms.
It can be assumed that the frequency of false alarms will be reduced by the pro-
visions of DIN 14675-1 governing function testing and replacement of fire detec-
tors, since this results in maintenance playing a systematic role and soiled, aged
fire detectors being replaced by new (more modern) fire detectors (possibly even
with newer algorithms or an intelligent combination of fire characteristics).
Recommendations contradicting such standards can be observed in isolated
cases in the field and may be viewed critically. In deviation from the provisions of
DIN 14675-1, [78] for example proposes that regular replacement should not be
scheduled or conducted and that smoke detectors should remain in operation until
they increasingly fail to trip during the test. The rationale here is that the
owner/operator is able to meet the required level of protection without necessarily
having to take precautions against all conceivable, remote possibilities of damage
occurring; it is argued that he need only take the precautions that are necessary
and reasonable to eliminate the hazard in consideration of the particular circum-
stances. [76] also states that soiled smoke detectors do not in any way jeopardize
attainment of the protection objectives; rather, soiled smoke detectors present a
risk of false alarms. The philosophy here is thus that false alarms triggered by
phenomena resembling an actual fire should ultimately be tolerated for reasons of
economic expediency, or exploited as an indicator of the need to replace fire
detectors. This should be viewed critically with respect to the associated, possibly
avoidable call of the fire service and erosion of the warning effect of an alarm
upon users of the building. Were this approach to be adopted and fire detectors
not be replaced until they begin triggering false alarms, the cost of not carrying
out maintenance in compliance with the standards would be borne by wider soci-
ety.10 [79] even states that an increased ‘‘false alarm rate’’ does not pose any
immediate hazard, since dealing with it lies within the responsibility of the user
and his own plant fire services and permanently manned positions. To date, false
alarms, and especially deceptive alarms triggered by phenomena resembling an
actual fire, have generally been paid for by the party causing them. The cost-effi-
ciency of this approach is questionable because it implies that when an inspection
has determined that the failure rate of the smoke detectors (in the case of more
than three false alarms from the affected detector array) is increasing as a function
of age, the entire affected detector array at the property concerned should be
replaced in order to avoid false alarms. This would result in numerous fire detec-
tors being replaced early. The reasonableness and cost-effectiveness of such an
approach as an alternative to controlled replacement of fire detectors as provided
for in the standard is questionable. The most important point however is that
soiled fire detectors jeopardize attainment of the protection objectives of a FDAS,
and by its nature, the probability increases with increasing service lifespan.
6.9. Attainment of the Protection Objectives Must Not be Jeopardized

by Overextension of the Service Lifespan
The replacement cycles specified in DIN 14675-1 for the fire detectors under con-
sideration here are binding in Germany equally for all products and brands—in
particular for fire detectors with an optical sensor chamber. The requirements for
the products are consequently the same for all manufacturers. Regulating replace-
ment cycles, for example on the basis of the manufacturer’s specifications, would
lead to the service lifespan of a fire detector and consequently attainment of the
targets of protection becoming a variable. It would be anticipated that the service
lifespan—as a parameter in commercial competition—would be progressively
extended and possibly overextended. In fact, this overextension would be proba-
ble, since—as already described—the failure curve of fire detectors is described
stochastically over time and is not known precisely. This approach would thus
10
To put this in perspective: the costs of a false alarm depend on the personnel and material resources
required for the deployment, and its required duration [64]. In Germany, a false alarm costs between e600
and e1200, depending on the procedures of the local authorities. In Switzerland and Sweden, it is esti-
mated to be up to e2000 [55].
have a negative impact on the risk situation since, firstly, fires may not be detec-
ted sufficiently early owing to the lack of sensitivity of the fire detectors, and sec-
ondly, the availability of FDAS could then decrease with increasing service
lifespan owing to the increasing probability of wear-related failures, or could
cause the maintenance effort elsewhere to rise. This may affect attainment of the
protection objectives.
6.10. Defined Replacement Cycles Constitute Harmonized and Manageable

Solutions Across All Areas of Application
The provisions of DIN 14675-1 governing function testing and replacement of fire
detectors also specify uniform replacement cycles for all applications, which makes
implementation of the standard practicable. Regulating the replacement cycles dif-
ferently according to the conditions of use and areas of application would give
greater consideration to the actual circumstances, but would at the same time
make implementation of the requirements more complicated in practise. Further-
more, definition of the application would be dynamic and often contentious, since
many applications change over time and are also not always clear. In times of
increasing mixed use and re-purposing of buildings to reduce land use, this point
of discussion is likely to become even more important. Even disregarding this
issue however, differentiation in the standard according to application is likely to
be complicated. By contrast, the normative arrangement of DIN 14675-1 and the
possibility of replacing the fire detectors after fixed cycles constitutes a manage-
able solution, notwithstanding the complexity of the operating mechanisms of a
fire detector.
Since initial experience shows the normative arrangements to be proving effec-
tive, it can further be assumed that boundary conditions that can be influenced
will be made subject to this parameter. This is borne out by examples in other
areas: in the demand planning of fire services, the resources required by a fire ser-
vice are planned on the basis of certain scenarios and levels of target attainment,
for which various methodological approaches exist [80]. The principle can be
described in simpler terms as follows:
A key metric in demand planning for fire services is for ten emergency
personnel to arrive on the scene of a critical residential fire within 9:30
minutes. This is the response time as defined in the legislation of the Ger-
man regions. The metric differs between the German regions, and even
stricter deadlines are often set for works fire services: where air traffic
requirements (IATA) are applied for example, the response time is 2 or 3
minutes (see [81]). These objectives are achievable, resulting in low dam-
age [43], but the effort required is commensurate. Whatever the value of
the response time, the specification will become established over time,
and its status as a target value will lead to it being achieved for the most
part. The other variables are adjusted to the target. In response to the
question of how long it takes for 10 emergency personnel to arrive on
the scene of a critical residential fire, the answer would be approximately
9:30 minutes. This is the case because 9:30 minutes is the value laid down
as a fixed target during planning. Were five minutes to be specified in

planning, this would be attained in the course of time, but of course with
the use of greater resources.
The situation is similar for fire detectors. Were the standard to require replace-
ment after three or ten years rather than five or eight, these values would be
reached over time, but would require the fire detectors and the system associated
with them to be designed for the most part differently (see [80, 82]). This may
have an impact on design, costs and, as a result, operator acceptance.
6.11. Complexity, Technological Progress and the Digital Transformation

Influence the Service Lifespan of a FDAS
Developments in society as a whole, including technical progress, are dynamic
processes. This must be taken into account for attainment of the protection objec-
tives. For this reason, proven specifications must be scrutinized to determine whe-
ther they are still suitable. However, proven approaches may be supplemented or
modified [8] only if it can be guaranteed that other methods—in the broadest sen-
se—can be used for equivalent attainment of the protection objectives.
Technical systems are subject to their own developments. These are not always
known or sufficiently researched, since they often consist of numerous components
for which the same applies. As shown in Table 5, the total and service lifespans of
some technical systems have in fact been decreasing over recent years. At the same
time however, it can be seen that at least for some of the technical systems, pro-
ven test, calibration or replacement cycles have been retained (see Table 3). This
has been explained with reference to the example of motor vehicles, which for dec-
ades have been subject to regular safety inspections every two years [37]. Some
developments are likely to result in the probabilities of failure falling; conversely,
other developments will contribute to an increase. In this context, new technolo-
gies are also playing a part in the developments, and influence the service lifespan
of a system in unknown ways. For example, the use of information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) and software is playing an increasing role. Such system
components have developed at great pace. It should be noted that the probability
of errors increases with the shortening of innovation cycles, simply as a result of
the exponential increase in the number of lines of program code in the increas-
ingly complex programs, if an approximately constant stability of the operating
systems and programs is assumed [83]. According to [84, p. 75], conventional
computer operating systems can be expected to have 1 to 3 errors per 1,000 lines
of program code. For safety applications, computer software is considered
stable if it contains fewer than 0.5 errors per 1,000 lines of program code [85, p.
66 f.]. Modern operating systems possess several million lines of program code
(and rising), which increases the absolute error frequency enormously. In view of
the sum of these and similar developments, it is difficult to forecast the future
trend in service lifespan of a technical system such as a fire detector, even merely
regarding whether the duration is becoming shorter or longer.
In addition, compatibility is a significant factor in technical systems and is
increasingly influenced by the software. This also applies to FDAS and to fire
detectors. The hardware and software compatibility of a fire detector or FDAS

can be assumed to influence the service lifespan of a fire detector.
6.12. The Different Applications Place Specific Demands on the Service

Lifespan of the Technologies Employed
Fire detectors must be checked for serviceability and replaced in a controlled pro-
cedure according to DIN 14675-1 not only where part of a FDAS; they are also
found in hold-open systems.11 Similar conditions apply to hold-open systems with
regard to maintenance, function testing and replacement of smoke switches. The
provisions are set out in DIN 14677-1 and state the same replacement periods for
smoke switches as those in DIN 14675-1 for fire detectors, whose application
spectra are also often similar.
Provisions also exist for smoke alarm devices (smoke alarms), which are gov-
erned in similar terms in DIN 14676-1 and—as already mentioned—at interna-
tional level [86, 87] (see Fig. 6). Smoke alarms must be replaced or undergo
factory testing and repair not later than 10 years ± 6 months after commissioning
[88, p. 14]. The different replacement intervals for smoke alarms and fire detectors
of a FDAS are not contradictory, but reflect differences in circumstances. First,
the service lifespan depends on the application. Smoke alarms are intended for use
in residential buildings, apartments and rooms with similar purposes, in which rel-
atively low levels of environmental pollution are to be expected; this is in contrast
to the entire range of industrial and commercial applications covered by
DIN 14675-1 and DIN 14677-1. Conversely, FDAS are used for the full or partial
protection of premises and buildings, in particular non-residential buildings of any
type and use [89]. Smoke alarms are stand-alone devices—which in some cases
may also be networked with each other—and among other things possess defined
triggering criteria. Part of the triggering and evaluation logic of fire detectors in a
FDAS is located in the fire control and indication equipment. This enables the fire
detectors to be adjusted separately (in order for example to enable them to react
to slowly developing fires) and to be readjusted. The algorithms in this case are
more complex, and commissioning, use and maintenance of the fire detectors is
more complicated. The function chain of a FDAS also implies shorter replace-
ment cycles in such applications. The fire detectors of a system detect smoke and
gases from fires, heat and flames for the purposes of early fire detection. They
transmit signals to the fire control and indication equipment, where they are pro-
cessed and may trigger an extensive program of action. By contrast, smoke alarms
detect only smoke from a fire (possibly taking account of the temperature or tem-
perature gradient, or CO) and are also used for early fire detection so that persons
present are warned and leave the endangered area, and can alert emergency ser-
vices.
11
Hold-open systems are used on smoke and fire protection closures that are to be held open contin-
uously during operation. Their purpose is to prevent the spread of smoke and fire, particularly on escape
routes, by ensuring that the smoke or fire protection closures are closed immediately and safely in the event
of fire. A hold-open system consists of at least one fire detector, a tripping device, a hold-open device and a
power supply [18].
In short, the conditions of use, functionalities and consequences of the signal

from a fire detector of a FDAS differ from those of a smoke alarm and thus form
the rationale for different normative requirements.
6.13. The Human Factor Influences the Service Lifespan

At numerous points, human behaviour has an influence on fire protection, the
function of a FDAS and, ultimately, the response behaviour and service lifespan
of a fire detector. The complexity of this influence is such that the various influ-
ences cannot be regulated. They nevertheless influence the failure modalities and
make the systems complex (see Sect. 6.4).
The human influence extends from selection of a building’s location and design
to the neighbourhood and other underlying socio-cultural conditions, the available
and required capital in relation to the purchase price of the land, construction
costs, the interest rate, the willingness of the bank and possibly investors to lend,
and the use of an architect and his or her work [90]. Human beings further influ-
ence the risk situation through the manufacture and use of building materials, fur-
nishings and technical systems, planning and erection, operation, maintenance and
the proper use of fire protection measures, and the consideration given to foresee-
able misuse [91]. The human factor has a serious influence on the quality and ser-
vice lifespan of fire detectors during the construction and maintenance of a
building, selection of the fire protection measures and planning of a FDAS by the
parties responsible for electrical planning (see [91]). The right fire detectors must
for example be chosen for the particular location in consideration of the objective.
Parameters such as these influence the service lifespan of a fire detector. The speci-
fic influence of the human factor is underestimated in fire protection and in the
narrow context described in the present paper, even though events such as fires,
their side effects and the performance of the measures depend upon it [91].
Human beings play a role in numerous ways with regard to the serviceability of a
fire detector and its service lifespan. These influences are difficult to foresee and
regulate.
6.14. Replacing Fire Detectors is More Reliable in the Long Term

than Factory Testing and Repairs
DIN 14675-1, Sub-clause 11.5.3 provides multiple options for addressing the wear
and ageing of the fire detectors by function testing and replacement. Sub-clauses
11.5.3 (b) and (c) both describe specified replacement cycles for fire detectors,
according to whether or not the devices feature drift compensation. The standard
also makes provision for the fire detector to be checked by means of a factory
inspection and repair and thus remain in use if appropriate, rather than being
replaced by a new fire detector. While the service lifespan of a fire detector can be
extended by factory testing and factory repair, it nevertheless remains finite. In
addition, this replacement process will probably result in the fire detector con-
cerned ceasing to meet the requirements of the relevant EN 54 standard earlier
than a new fire detector. This time difference is difficult to plan for. The protec-
tion objectives of a FDAS can therefore be attained more reliably by replacement

of the fire detector with a new item than by replacement with a used fire detector.
6.15. Replacement of Fire Detectors Raises a Range of Sustainability

Aspects
The normative provisions of DIN 14675-1 concerning function testing and
replacement of fire detectors raise issues of sustainability and environmental pro-
tection at several points:
Firstly, replacement of fire detectors after a defined number of cycles consumes
natural resources to made in the first place and produces waste electrical equip-
ment that must be disposed of properly and pollutes the environment. This pri-
marily concerns the disposal of plastics and small electrical parts. These should
however be regarded as valuable materials, as they can be reused following their
use in fire detectors for the manufacture of other products or broken down into
raw materials.
Secondly, the overall maintenance of a FDAS is geared towards the conducting
of regular inspections and checks on the serviceability of certain components, with
only those parts being replaced that no longer meet the requirements and do not
possess redundancies. This in turn saves resources. This approach is also compati-
ble with the key points of the European ‘‘Green Deal’’, whose objective is the use
of lower-emission technologies and sustainable products. It is intended to encour-
age companies to offer reusable, durable and repairable products [92]. The Euro-
pean Ecodesign Directive also extends the principle of energy efficiency to
material/resource efficiency and applies, for example, to electric light sources and
ventilation equipment [93].
Thirdly, it should also be noted that replacing fire detectors means replacing old
devices with new products. As a result, less environmentally harmful substances
could be used, as the requirements concerning the use of materials and hazardous
substances have become stricter over recent decades. (For example, the ionization
smoke detectors widely used in Germany up to the 1990s have been replaced in
the past two decades by smoke detectors employing scattered light, which do not
make use of low-level radioactive substances.) Product innovation cycles are also
resulting in more modern systems being used. If components with lower energy
consumption are used in these products, the result—assuming energy consumption
is consistent over the service lifespan—is a reduction in overall energy consump-
tion. At the same time, fire detectors corresponding to the latest state of the art
are used for replacement, thereby furthering technical progress.
Fourthly, the procedure for direct replacement of a fire detector is probably
associated with lower CO2 emissions than that of factory testing and repair (see
Fig. 1; procedure top vs. procedure bottom), since transport journeys are avoided
and the process is faster. The replacement of fire detectors must therefore be con-
sidered critically from the point of view of sustainability, but is at the same time
associated with positive developments.
6.16. Studies Do Not Yield Conclusive Findings on Adjustment

of the Replacement Intervals for Fire Detectors
A series of studies have been conducted into the failure modalities of fire detectors
as a function of ageing (see [24, 34, 35, 94–98, pp. 103–150, 99, pp. 310–312]). A
selective review of these studies [26] shows that few systematic studies have been
conducted of this aspect. The studies all exhibit certain weaknesses with regard to
the failure mechanisms of fire detectors as a function of age, and fail to deliver
clear, robust and generalizable results. Some of them do not deal with fire detec-
tors (see [34, 35, 99]), i.e. fire detectors of a fire detection and alarm system (see
[94, 97]). The studies into the ageing of fire detectors are as follows:
A British study into the ageing of fire detectors [24] currently provides the most
up-to-date results. The aim of this study was to investigate the optimum replace-
ment intervals for optical smoke alarm detectors and smoke detectors by means of
repeatable test methods. For this purpose, measurements were carried out in the
first stage on ten new smoke alarm detectors and ten new smoke detectors (five
with and five without drift compensation) in a laboratory environment with the
use of Trutest smoke detector test equipment, in order to establish sensitivity ran-
ges (calibration tests). In the second stage, the Trutest equipment was used to test
86 smoke alarm detectors (aged 0–12 years) and 107 commercial smoke alarms
(aged 0–30 years) in a field study in commercial and residential environments. The
study took several brands of fire detector into account which differed in their sen-
sitivities owing to their designs (the different parts and lifespans were however not
investigated). The study shows that the sensitivity of smoke alarm detectors and
smoke detectors increases with age and that older fire detectors are associated
with a slightly increased probability of false alarms. The results show noncompli-
ance with the permissible limits from the tenth year onwards in clean environ-
ments. Since tests were performed only in relatively clean environments, it can be
deduced from this that, considered across all applications, a replacement of the
fire detectors in the eighth year at the latest would appear appropriate. Further-
more, the study states that different replacement intervals should apply for fire
detectors depending upon whether they feature drift compensation, as is already
set out in DIN 14675-1. One drawback of this study is that only smoke detectors
in offices, universities and hotels were tested; the validity of the results is therefore
limited. It is also unclear what type of aerosols were employed in the test method.
The use of other methods to calculate the limit values from the calibration yields
different results, and the number of tested fire detectors per age group is low
(however, this raises the question of how the random sample must be composed
in order to deliver meaningful results capable of withstanding a safety and legal
assessment in the event of doubt).
[95] is an anonymized study into the influence of ageing upon the sensitivity of
fire detectors. The study employed test procedures in accordance with EN 54. The
evaluation criteria used were the directionality, repeatability (response of a fire
detector to a repeated demand) and reproducibility (response behaviour of a ran-
dom sample of several identical detectors). The paper concludes that the direction-
ality exhibits no ageing effects. With respect to the reproducibility, significant but
differing ageing effects upon the fire detectors occur from the ninth year onwards.
Sensitivities are both increased (higher probability of false alarms) and decreased
(alarms delayed or possibly not being triggered at all). In addition, the trigger
value is observed to drift by up to 20% over the life of the fire detectors from the
value for brand-new fire detectors. The drawback of this study is that here too,
only fire detectors used in relatively clean environments (office buildings) and a
statistically inadequate number of detectors per detector age group were tested.
A Finnish study [94] investigated the response behaviour of smoke alarm detec-
tors in relation to pyrolysis wood fires. The smoke alarm detectors studied were
collected randomly and comprised 17 optical smoke alarm detectors and 53 ion-
ization smoke detectors. The detectors ranged in age from 2 to 33 years. The
study shows that the response time increased with increasing age. Soiling (e.g. by
dust, insects, condensates) had an interference effect upon the ageing effect. The
results are limited in their validity and transferability, since ionization smoke
detectors are no longer used in many countries, and the number of detectors stud-
ied was also small.
It can be summarized that none of the studies produces clear, robust and gener-
alizable results. The general observation is that the probability of failure of fire
detectors is a function of the service lifespan. An exact function over the service
lifespan was however not deduced. In addition, both decreases and increases in
the fire detectors’ sensitivity were observed over the service lifespan. The former
resulted in a fire being detected with a delay or not at all; the latter in the proba-
bility of false alarms being increased. The studies do not provide any evidence to
support amending the current provisions of DIN 14675-1 and the replacement
intervals for fire detectors. On the contrary: it can be inferred from the results of
the latest study that the provisions are expedient.
7. Conclusion and Outlook

By their nature fire detectors, like any other technical system, exhibit randomly
distributed failures and ageing effects. These are to be avoided by preventive mea-
sures in accordance with generally accepted good practice, in order to prevent
function being impaired in the event of demand. Since fire detectors are non-en-
capsulated systems, interactions with the environment play a major role. Besides
ageing of the components, fogging caused by chemicals used in components, envi-
ronmental contamination etc. also has an effect on the response behaviour of fire
detectors—particularly optical fire detectors—which can lead to false alarms on
the one hand and delayed triggering in the event of a fire on the other [97]. To
address this, procedures for function testing and controlled replacement of fire
detectors have been set out in Germany in DIN 14675-1, Sub-clause 11.5.3, in
consideration of experience gained in other countries.
Experience gained to date with this arrangement shows that FDAS compliant
with the standard exhibit very high availability, which is retained over the course
of the service lifespan by maintenance measures. This is a condition for the effec-
tiveness of FDAS. The availability can also be demonstrated for FDAS installed
and maintained in compliance with standards. In addition, no major fires have

been reported in recent years in which a FDAS and the arrangements under dis-
cussion here failed.
The replacement of function-critical components is normal practice and is not
particular to FDAS. Conversely, if fire detectors are not replaced by way of con-
trolled arrangements, opportunity costs are incurred in terms of protection against
liability and of the reliability and safety of the FDAS and its protection objec-
tives. The tenor of the provisions for function testing and controlled replacement
of fire detectors is for safety to be prioritized over economy, risk to be minimized,
and planning supported.
Over the years, DIN 14675-1 has resulted in considerable enhancements to the
planning, installation and operation of FDAS. This view is shared in the field.
The evidence from the few studies conducted into the ageing of fire detectors is
that the provisions of DIN 14675-1 are expedient. Clear, robust and generalizable
results are however not available, as all studies also exhibit certain weaknesses.
The probability of failure of fire detectors suitable for the ambient conditions as
an exact function of their service lifespan is not known. This is due primarily to
the heterogeneous conditions of use and differences between detector types and
various parts, which in turn vary according to the environment. Owing to the
complex cause and effect mechanisms, it is difficult to make reliable observations
on the failure behaviour of fire detectors over their service lifespan which, in cases
of doubt, would even stand up to a safety and legal evaluation.
It is becoming apparent that accessing fire detectors remotely through FDAS
with remote capabilities will become more established in the future. In the course
of this process, remote checking both of fire detectors’ serviceability and of their
compliance with normative requirements will also become more relevant and will
further simplify the process. At the same time, this development mitigates against
some of the current obstacles to obtaining observations. The new technologies
resulting from this development will enable the fire detector’s serviceability to be
checked remotely. Establishing its efficacy against the requirements of the EN 54
series of standards and giving consideration to certain ambient conditions is how-
ever not straightforward.
The controlled replacement of fire detectors and thus upholding of the norma-
tive requirements will not only contribute to reducing false alarms, but also ensure
that the protection objectives of FDAS are attained in the long term. Further
research is needed; the evidence already available should however be considered
carefully.
Annex
Distribution Proportion
Alarm Alarm raised Alarm Alarm raised
raised manually (land- raised manually (land-
by line and mobile by line and mobile
FDAS phone) FDAS phone)
Criterion [n] [n] [%] [%]
Est. material Damage e < 1000 131 537 85.6 69.0

damage Damage e < 10,000 20 154 13.1 19.8
Damage e < 100,000 2 74 1.3 9.5
Damage e < 500,000 0 10 0.0 1.3
Damage e < 1,000,000 0 2 0.0 0.3
Damage e > 1,000,000 0 1 0.0 0,1
Not quantifiable 22 83 – –
Total 175 861 100 100
Spread of the Object/device 162 637 87.6 71.5
fire One room 18 161 9.7 18.1
Several rooms 3 27 1.6 3.0
Dwelling 0 13 0.0 1.5
One floor 1 13 0.5 1.5
Several floors 0 10 0.0 1.1
One fire compartment 0 9 0.0 1.0
Several fire compart- 0 2 0.0 0.2
ments
Stairwell 1 4 0.5 0.4
Complete building 0 15 0.0 1.7
Spread to another 0 0 0.0 0.0
building
Total 185 891 100 100
Spread of None, negligible 94 404 51.1 46.8
smoke Room, shaft 53 139 28.8 16.,1
Group of rooms, dwell- 18 156 9.8 18.1
ing
Entire floor 6 45 3.3 5.2
Stairwell 3 48 1.6 5.6
Hallway 7 24 3.8 2.8
Several floors 3 47 1.6 5.4
Total 184 863 100 100
Smoke layer visible in 23 168 – –
escape route?
Escape route usable? 570 152 – –
Extinguishing No extinguishing water 128 305 71.1 34.6
water con- < 500 l 47 419 26.1 47.5
sumption < 2.500 l 4 110 2.2 12.5
> 2,500 l 1 48 0.6 5.4
Total 180 882 100 100
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Fire Technology, 59, 1883–1924, 2023

Minimization of Risk by the Controlled

Sebastian Festag *, ZVEI (German Electro and Digital Industry Association)

Received: 16 December 2021/Accepted: 5 April 2023/Published online: 4 May 2023

*Correspondence should be addressed to: Sebastian Festag, E-mail: fes@hekatron.de

In many safety applications, the system automatically assumes a safer state in

2. Purpose, Structure and Normative Principles of a FDAS

In Germany, the applicable standard in this case is DIN 14675-1:2020-01 [14],

Standard Description Fire characteristic

EN 54-5:2018-10 Heat detectors Temperature

(a) If a ﬁre detector’s serviceability is tested annually by means of test method

Figure 1. Procedure for replacement of a fire detector according to

3. Development of the Standard for Replacement of Fire

11 Mainte- 11 Maintenance 11 Maintenance 1 Additional infor- 11 Maintenance

4. Basic Reliability Theory

Figure 2. Differentiation between the total and service lifespans of

Figure 3. Typical failure rate curve for technical systems (‘‘bathtub

Replacement cycle Time interval Source

Test cycle Time interval Source

Replacement devices 1 year Section 14 Paragraph 2 of the German

Calibration cycle Time interval Source

Product category Total lifespan [years] Source

Condensing boiler (oil/gas) 20 [40]

5. Test, Calibration and Replacement Cycles in Different

Median of the total lifespans in Median of the total lifespans in

Compact ﬂuorescent lamps 7.4 7.7

the lifespans of technical systems taken from studies—including social inﬂuences

Figure 5. International overview of provisions for replacement

6. Technical and Normative Causes and Effects

6.1. Attainment of the Protection Objectives for a FDAS Must be Assured

and to prevent interruption of operations and harm to image, particularly where

6.2. The Provisions of Legislation and Standards Must be Fulﬁlled

6.3. Extending the Service Lifespan Increases the Probability of Failure

Figure 6. Cause-and-effect relationships between the service

tions (e.g. country-speciﬁc standards and ambient conditions). Furthermore, in

in managing this complex set of technical, organizational (e.g. normative and

6.6. The Ambient Conditions Substantially Inﬂuence the Service Lifespan

6.7. Replacement of Fire Detectors as Provided in Standards has Proved

Figure 7. Availability over 10 years of FDAS studied [46].

6.7.2. Standards-Compliant FDAS are Eﬀective A study by ﬁre services of 5016

Figure 8. Effectiveness of FDAS with a range of evaluation criteria

Figure 9. Decrease over time in false alarms received by a fire

6.8. Besides Attainment of the Protection Objectives, the Avoidance of False

6.9. Attainment of the Protection Objectives Must Not be Jeopardized

6.10. Deﬁned Replacement Cycles Constitute Harmonized and Manageable

as a fixed target during planning. Were five minutes to be specified in

6.11. Complexity, Technological Progress and the Digital Transformation

detectors. The hardware and software compatibility of a ﬁre detector or FDAS

6.12. The Diﬀerent Applications Place Speciﬁc Demands on the Service

In short, the conditions of use, functionalities and consequences of the signal

6.13. The Human Factor Inﬂuences the Service Lifespan

6.14. Replacing Fire Detectors is More Reliable in the Long Term

tion objectives of a FDAS can therefore be attained more reliably by replacement

6.15. Replacement of Fire Detectors Raises a Range of Sustainability

6.16. Studies Do Not Yield Conclusive Findings on Adjustment

7. Conclusion and Outlook

and maintained in compliance with standards. In addition, no major ﬁres have

Est. material Damage e < 1000 131 537 85.6 69.0

21. Berger H (2021) Persönliche Kommunikation per Mail an den Arbeitsausschuss.

Beispiel von Smartphones, Notebooks, Waschmaschinen, Fernsehgeräten und E-Bikes

58. Festag S (23.04.2021) Die Wirksamkeit von Brandschutzmaßnahmen im industriellen

93. Ökodesign-Richtlinie (2012) Richtlinie 2012/27/EU des Europäischen Parlaments und

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