A Tale of Four Augusts PDF

KILIC BUGRA KANAT
T he Syrian conflict that began as a

revolution quickly descended into a major humanitarian disaster with the
KILIC BUGRA KANAT
Assad regime’s increasing use of force and the militarization of the dis-
pute between the regime and the opposition. The country is witnessing
A TALE OF FOUR AUGUSTS
a gloomy reality on the ground and there is little evidence to suggest any
OBAMA’S SYRIA POLICY

breakthrough in the near future. The ever-growing death toll, thousands of
documented cases of war crimes and systematic torture, the use of weapons
of mass destruction and the rise of radical groups have all failed to stir a
robust American response. This book provides a synopsis of the past four
years of U.S. policy in Syria. It brings together the major turning points of
this policy since the beginning of the Arab Spring.
REVISED AND ENLARGED SECOND EDITION
9 786054 023790
A Tale of Four Augusts
Obama’s Syria Policy
A Tale of Four Augusts
Obama’s Syria Policy
K I L I C B U G R A K A N AT
S E TA
Ankara 2016
KILIC BUGRA KANAT | Kilic Bugra Kanat is an Assistant Professor of Political Science
at Penn State University, Erie and a research director at the SETA Foundation at Wash-
ington, D.C. He received his doctoral degree in Political Science from Syracuse Uni-
versity. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Syracuse University and
a master’s in International Affairs from Marquette University. He completed his un-
dergraduate education in the International Relations Department of the Middle East
Technical University. Dr. Kanat also holds a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Middle
Eastern Affairs and Certificate of Advanced Graduate Study in Conflict Resolution. His
research interests include foreign policy decision-making, foreign policy change, and
domestic politics and foreign policy interaction. He was also selected for the Future
Leaders Program of Foreign Policy Initiative. Dr. Kanat’s writings have appeared in
Foreign Policy, The Diplomat, Insight Turkey, Middle East Policy, Arab Studies Quarter-
ly, Mediterranean Quarterly, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, and Journal
of Muslim Minority Affairs. He is a columnist for Daily Sabah. He is also co-editor of
an edited volume – History, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey – published by the
SETA Foundation.
SETA Publications 7
First Published in 2015
Second Edition Published in 2016
ISBN: 978-605-4023-79-0
© 2016 SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi
All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Cover: Ümare Yazar
Layout: Erkan Söğüt
Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme
ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., September 2016
SETA Publications
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Tel:+90 312.551 21 00 | Fax :+90 312.551 21 90
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Cover Photo: US President Barack Obama speaks about Syria from the Rose Garden at the White House in
Washington, DC, on August 31, 2013. AFP / Jim Watson
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS7
INTRODUCTION9
ONE THE BUSH YEARS

(2001-2008) 17
TWO THAWING RELATIONS BEFORE THE ARAB SPRING

(FEBRUARY 2009-MARCH 2011) 33
Stability in Iraq 53
Middle East Peace 59
Non-Proliferation 67
THREE THE ARAB SPRING THUNDERS THROUGH SYRIA

(MARCH 2011-AUGUST 2011) 79
FOUR OBAMA CALLS FOR ASSAD’S REMOVAL

(AUGUST 2011-AUGUST 2012) 97
FIVE OBAMA’S RED LINE

SIX A NEW CALCULUS

SEVEN FIGHTING AGAINST ISIS

(AUGUST 2014 - AUGUST 2015) 171
EIGHT RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

(AUGUST 2015) 197
TIMELINE OF U.S.-SYRIA RELATIONS

(OCTOBER 2008 TO APRIL 2016) 217
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Erol Cebeci for his support during the writing of this book. Kadir
Ustun’s comments and edits have been very helpful. Sally Judson and Sonya Khattak
edited several versions of this study. I also warmly thank Erica Hanichak and Lesley
Dudden for their contribution to the book through their extensive research. Erica
Hanichak’s insight into the evolution of the administration’s Syria policy was invaluable.
INTRODUCTION
The Syrian conflict began as a revolution but quickly descended into a

major humanitarian disaster. The Assad regime’s increasing use of force and
the militarization of the dispute between the regime and the opposition
created the space for a protracted conflict that would attract a number of
outside influences. The emergence of ISIS and its expansion in Iraq further
complicated the conflict and changed the nature of foreign intervention in
Syria. The longevity and complexity of this civil war has led the internation-
al community to abandon the country as the result of growing reluctance
by Western countries, including the U.S., to engage in the conflict despite
the gross violation of human rights and constant breach of international
norms and principles. Despite different initiatives and “cessation of hos-
tilities agreements” the country is still witnessing a gloomy reality on the
ground. There is little evidence to suggest that true breakthroughs toward
lasting peace are possible in the near future. The ever-growing death toll,
thousands of documented cases of war crimes and systematic torture, the
use of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of radical groups have all
failed to stir a robust American response. Although diplomatically the U.S.
has participated in negotiations and mediation attempts, it avoided a direct
engagement. U.S. policy remained largely unchanged between the start of
the conflict, and August 2014, when two American journalists, James Foley
and Steven Sotloff, were violently beheaded by the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). Even then, President Obama’s strategy only entailed plans to
“degrade” and “destroy” ISIS, with very little reference to the future of Syria
or the Assad regime. Although some argue that the fight against the ISIS
has been successful,1 there are too many question marks about the overall
success of the operations at this point. And although another round of talks
1
Mark Thompson, “U.S. Bombing of ISIS Oil Facilities Showing Progress,” Time, December
13, 2015, ”http://time.com/4145903/islamic-state-oil-syria/.
10 / I ntroduction
started in the Geneva II talks in January 2014, it immediately became clear

that these talks would also be insufficient.
So far, President Obama’s new strategy has been almost unanimously
considered ineffective to eliminate ISIS from the region. It fails to provide
comfort and peace for the Syrian people and stability to the region. Even
after the airstrikes began, very little had changed in the lives of ordinary
Syrians. In many ways, the situation continues to deteriorate. The for-
mation of the international coalition was not meant to end the brutality
of the Assad regime, which is the root cause of the emergence and rise of
radical groups in Syria, but rather continues to focus solely on eliminating
ISIS. In the meantime Europe has been brought to its knees by the ma-
jor humanitarian crises stemming from the outpouring of refugees from
the region. Today even the most optimistic analysts in Washington, D.C.
project that U.S. policy will only change after the departure of the Obama
administration in 2016 and the election of a new president. For many that
we interviewed in Washington, D.C., including observers of U.S. foreign
policy on Syria, journalists and former members of the administration, the
most significant determinant of U.S. policy on Syria has been the opin-
ion of President Obama’s inner circle, a few close advisers. The position
of these individuals closely matches the worldview and foreign policy vi-
sion of President Obama, who, along with his inner circle, determined the
U.S.’s Syria policy, sometimes without consulting major figures and actors
in the absence of any interagency process.
The Syrian public feels that it has been forsaken by the U.S. given
its apparent neglect or even deliberate abandonment despite President
Obama’s statement that “Assad must go” in August 2011. The unfortunate
trajectory of U.S. foreign policy in Syria emerged after five Augusts of in-
action, indecisiveness and a lack of strategy. The policy inefficiencies of the
White House have greatly contributed to the deterioration of the situation
on the ground, bringing Syria into the nightmare scenario that fright-
ened and worried many actors in the region. The Assad regime has flouted
international human rights norms and deployed SCUD missiles, barrel
A TA L E O F FO U R A U G U S T S : O B A M A’ S SY R I A P O L I C Y / 11
bombs, chemical weapons, and committed crimes against humanity and

war crimes against its own citizens. Although the extent of the tragedy has
surpassed that experienced in Rwanda and the lawlessness nearly mirror-
ing the situation in Somalia, the U.S. administration was unable to foresee
the possible security fallouts from Syria until ISIS became a major threat.
This book provides a overview of the past seven years of U.S. policy
in Syria. It brings together the major turning points of this policy since
the birth of the Arab Spring and the policies embraced by different actors
since 2009. The first section is dedicated to explaining President Obama’s
attempt to restore ties with the Syrian government after the 2008 Pres-
idential Election. This effort was undertaken as an attempt to resolve
the foreign fighters problem facing Iraq at the time. A second goal of
this effort was to launch a subsequent peace process between Arab states
and Israel as well as address the the issue of weapons of mass destruction
facing the region. Despite opposition from both Congress and segments
of foreign policy elite in Washington, President Obama appointed an
ambassador to Damascus and official talks were launched during his
first two years in office. The shift in policy resulted in a gradual increase
in the level of discussions between U.S. and Syrian officials. However,
this process was disrupted by the Arab Spring and the Assad regime’s
heavy-handed response to the outbreak of demonstrations in his country.
The use of force by the regime during demonstrations and the increasing
number of casualties that resulted drove the U.S. to change its course of
action in its relations with Syria.
Assad’s brutal crackdowns on peaceful demonstrations prompted Pres-
ident Obama to issue what would become the token statement of his Syria
policy, “For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President
Assad to step aside.”2 At that time, this was interpreted as a first step to-
wards a comprehensive action plan to displace the regime in Syria, which
2
Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, “Assad Must Go, Obama Say,” The Washington Post, Au-
gust 18, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go-obama-says/2011/08/18/
gIQAelheOJ_story.html.
12 / I ntroduction
would include using force against the regime and aiding rebel groups.
However, this expectation soon proved to be misguided, as the U.S. in-
stead entrenched itself in a policy of indecision and inaction. It appeared
that the message “Assad must go” was given to avoid missing the possible
overthrow of the regime and in the name of “being on the right side of
history,” rather than as the product of a real policy planning process.
Another major turning point occurred when President Obama made
a statement in August 2012 in response to a question about the rumors
that the Assad regime was moving chemical weapons. He stated that U.S.
policy towards the conflict would be revised should there be any attempt
or evidence that the Syrian regime was prepared to use or had already been
found to have used chemical weapons. He said, “We have been very clear
to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground that a red line
for us is when we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving
around or being utilized. That would change my calculus...That would
change my equation…We’re monitoring that situation very carefully. We
have put together a range of contingency plans.”3 This statement was again
interpreted as a sign that the U.S. was prepared to take decisive action to
stop the Assad regime, this time from employing chemical weapons. How-
ever, U.S. posturing following the statement proved unable to deter the
Assad regime from deploying such weapons. Following President Obama’s
“red line” statement several reports surfaced confirming the use of chem-
ical weapons by the Assad regime against the opposition and civilians in
different parts of Syria. The first attack was reported in December of 2012,
but it did not garner a significant response from the U.S. Thus, the regime
was undeterred from carrying out further usage of chemical weapons.4
3
James Ball, “Obama Issues Syria a ‘Red Line’ Warning on Chemical Weapons,” The Wash-
ington Post, August 20 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-
issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-
09036bcb182b_story.html.
4
Robert Johnson and Geoffrey Ingersoll, “‘Poison Gas Bombs’ in Syria Could Force US In-
tervention,” Business Insider, December 24, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/assad-report-
edly-using-chemical-weapons-homs-syria-rebels-2012-12.
Gradually the intensity of the regime’s chemical attacks became unignor-

able and finally, in 2013, the U.S. intelligence confirmed that the chemical
weapon were indeed being used by the regime.. Deputy National Security
Advisor Ben Rhodes stated in a press conference, “Following a deliberative
review, our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used
chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against
the opposition multiple times in the last year.”5
The third significant shaper of the administration’s Syria policy oc-
curred when the Assad regime used chemical weapons in the town of
Ghoutta near Damascus in August 2013, exactly a year after President
Obama’s “red line” statement. The international community stood poised,
expecting a rapid U.S. reaction that would include punitive military
strikes and hasten the overthrow of the Syrian regime. However, President
Obama’s initial statements underlined that military strikes would not tar-
get the regime and the mission in question would not be aimed at over-
throwing the Assad regime. Instead, President Obama explained that any
U.S. military action would be limited to destroying the capability of the
Syrian regime to launch subsequent chemical weapon attacks. Even then,
many analysts signaled that the U.S. administration was very reluctant to
take the necessary steps to achieve this limited goal. President Obama’s
decision to seek Congressional approval, in the wake of British Prime Min-
ister Cameron’s resolve to seek authorization from the UK parliament, was
seen as a further sign of this reluctant position. Later, U.S. policy quickly
took a U-turn a direct result of Russian diplomatic intervention. President
Obama decided to refrain from launching an attack, to the dismay of the
international community and an angered Syrian opposition. As it will be
argued below, this judgement frustrated both the Syrian opposition and
U.S. allies in the region. Frustrations stemmed from the confusion created
5
Ben Rhodes, “Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Commu-
nications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use,” Statement, June 13, 2013 (online
by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-.
14 / I ntroduction
by the President’s unfulfilled policies and the lack of a communication or

deliberation with U.S. allies during the decision-making process.
Meanwhile, radical groups were gaining further ground in Syria. While
the U.S. ignored calls for action from the international community, ISIS
surpassed other rebel groups in Syria in numbers and capabilities and
launched operations to destabilize Iraq. At the beginning of 2014, when
asked about the potential impact of radical groups in Syria and particu-
larly those who were affiliated with Al-Qaeda, President Obama referred
to them as a “jayvee team” and clearly underemphasized the disruptive
impact that the group would ultimately generate in the region. With its
capture of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, in June 2014 ISIS proved
to the world that it was no jayvee team, but instead a new contender in the
Middle East ground game. When the group laid siege to Erbil, the U.S.
quickly acted to protect U.S. servicemen and civilians in the city. Later in
August 2014, when ISIS beheaded two American journalists, the Obama
administration formally announced a plan to form an international coali-
tion to “degrade” and “destroy” ISIS.
Since then, the ISIS strategy degraded but so far has been unable to
eliminate the group or its infrastructure in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. strat-
egy to fight against ISIS now includes a partnership with Kurdish YPG
forces in Syria on the ground, as well as moderate Arab opposition groups.
There have been multiple conflicting statements and insinuations about
the U.S. position on the future of the Assad regime. Some statements by
Secretary Kerry have indicated the readiness of the U.S. to accept a solu-
tion with Assad remaining in Syria as part of a transitional process.6 These
statements have garnered criticism from observers of U.S. policy owing
to the confusion they have generated.7 Different initiatives launched by
6
Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, “Has Kerry Opened the Door for Syria's Assad To Stay?” De-
fense News, December 17, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/war-in-syria/2015/12/17/
kerry-hints-assad-may-stay-syria-russia-isis/77430660/.
7
Daniel McAdams, “White House Schizophrenia – Kerry: ‘Assad Can Stay’; Obama: ‘Assad
Must Go’,” Global Research, December 20, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/white-house-
schizophrenia-kerry-assad-can-stay-obama-assad-must-go/5497123.
the U.S. and its allies, including a train and equip program, have failed
to bring any meaningful change in the situation on the group. Ultimate-
ly, the train and equip program was “put on hold” in Fall 2015 by the
Obama administration.8
In addition to the continued state of military disarray in Syria, the
summer of 2015 brought forward one of the most important humanitar-
ian crises in recent decades. Thousands of Syrian refugees have fled to Eu-
rope in search of a safe haven. Many of these refugees have perished during
this journey towards Europe. Pictures of drowned children, particularly
images of young Alan Kurdi, have significantly shaped public opinion in
the Western countries. However the impact of this development to the
policies of the countries was limited.
In August of 2015 Russia formally launched its intervention into the
Syria conflict. According to a document released in August 26, 2015, Rus-
sia signed an agreement with the Syrian regime that would allow Russia to
deploy troops in Syria. According to this agreement, “Russian military per-
sonnel and shipments can pass in and out of Syria at will and aren’t subject
to controls by Syrian authorities…. Syrians can’t enter Russian bases with-
out Russia’s permission. And Russia disclaims any responsibility for damage
caused by its activities inside Syria.”9 Beginning in late August, news blogs
and twitter users started to post information and images confirming Rus-
sian military deployment in Syria. Russia initially denied the reports of its
deployment and later characterized the deployment of troops as an act of
8
Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort
to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” The New York Times, October 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html?_r=0.
9
Michael Birnbaum, “The secret pact between Russia and Syria that gives Moscow carte
blanche,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worl-
dviews/wp/2016/01/15/the-secret-pact-between-russia-and-syria-that-gives-moscow-carte-
blanche/.
16 / I ntroduction
military assistance for humanitarian aid purposes.10 Later in September,

Russia began launching airstrikes against opposition forces in Syria. Grad-
ually, Russia increased its airstrikes and became another factor the U.S.
had to contend with in its Syria policy. It spawned a major debate in U.S.
about the effectiveness of the U.S.’ intelligence capabilities on the ground
as well as the administration's Syria policy.11 The previously much discussed
prospect of creating safe zone or ISIS-free zone in Syria ground to a halt as
Russia inflicted a de-facto no fly zone over the north of the country.
The following chapters will examine U.S. policy in Syria over the last
seven years within this framework of five different turning points. Chapters
1 and 2 provide context for the Obama administration’s treatment of the
Syrian civil war by analyzing the status of relations in the years preceding the
conflict. They conclude that the Obama administration worked cohesively
to try to reverse former-President George W. Bush’s deliberate antagonizing
of the Syrian regime and to launch a rapprochement with Assad to achieve
its main goals in the Middle East. Chapters 3 through 7 address U.S.-Syrian
relations since the Arab Spring. The last chapter will assess what changes, if
any, stakeholders may expect in U.S. Syria policy during the Obama admin-
istration’s remaining period and if there is any chance for the next president
to play a more effective role in the resolution of this conflict.
10
Simon Tomlinson, Will Stewart, and Jenny Stanton, “What IS Russia sending to Syria?
Moscow admits delivering 'military supplies but no extra troops' to Assad – as U.S. warns build-up
compares to Putin's incursion in Crime,” Daily Mail, September 10, 2015, http://www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-3229223/Just-Russia-sending-Syria-Moscow-admits-delivering-military-sup-
plies-Assad-dodges-claims-Putin-deploying-extra-ground-troops.html.
11
“Congress reportedly investigating possible intel lapses over Russian presence in Syria,” Fox
News, October 8, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/10/08/congress-reportedly-in-
vestigating-intel-lapses-over-russia-in-syria-as-nato.html.
ONE THE BUSH YEARS
(2001-2008)
“
U.S. foreign policy under George
W. Bush represented one of the most
complicated periods of U.S.-Syrian
relations in recent history.
U.S. foreign policy under President George W. Bush
represented one of the most complicated periods of U.S.-Syrian relations.
Following 9/11, relations between the two countries became increasingly
complex. The Bush administration’s willingness to target not only terror-
ist organizations, but also states that were allegedly sponsoring terrorist
attacks generated a high degree of anxiety in Syria. In his address to the
nation on the night of September 11, 2001, President Bush stated that
the United States “will make no distinction between the terrorists who
committed these acts and those who harbor them.”12 This was an im-
portant issue for Syria as it had been on the U.S.’ list of states sponsoring
terrorism since 1979, stemming from its direct and/or logistical support
for different groups, including Hezbollah. Thus President Bush’s state-
ment raised the prospect that the Syrian regime would become a target in
the U.S. led global war on terror. However, the Syrian government acted
quickly to prevent such a situation and join the U.S. War on Terror; pro-
viding valuable intelligence on a number of different groups emerging in
the Middle East.
According to former American military and diplomatic officials, by
early 2002, Syria had became one of the CIA’s most effective intelligence
allies in the fight against terrorism in the region.13 The Syrian regime had
successfully compiled a large amount of intelligence about al-Qaeda fight-
12
George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” September 11, 2001
(online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project) http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057.
13
Seymour M. Hersh, “The Syrian Bet,” The New Yorker, July 28, 2003, http://www.newyo-
rker.com/magazine/2003/07/28/the-syrian-bet.
20 / T he B ush Y ears (2001-2008)
ers, cells and recruiters operating in the Middle East and Europe. Syrian
intelligence was extremely valuable for U.S. counter-terrorism operations,
especially in Germany. Furthermore, Syria also began providing access for
the FBI and CIA to launch intelligence-gathering operations within Syria,
in cities such as Aleppo. Some of the information provided by the Syri-
an regime to the U.S. was actionable intelligence. According to Seymour
Hersh, Syrian intelligence reportedly detected that al-Qaeda was preparing
an attack similar to its 2000 attack on the USS Cole against the U.S. Navy
in Bahrain,. Syria provided the news to the U.S., effectively aiding the
U.S. in thwarting the attack. In addition to providing intelligence, Syria
also assisted the U.S. in preventing an attack on an American target in the
Canadian capital, Ottawa.14 The country also became an important des-
tination for suspected terrorists detained by U.S. forces. .15 A great many
of these detainees were transferred to Syria in order to be interrogated
and tortured by Syrian officers within the extraordinary rendition pro-
gram. These Syrian officers would that then sent any information acquired
through interrogations to the U.S. government.16
In the early phase of the War on Terror, the Syrian regime turned a po-
tential crisis with the U.S. into an opportunity. At the end of the day, the
regime in Damascus seized the situation that arose in the aftermath of the
9/11 as a chance to improve relations with the U.S.. The War on Terror
would prove extremely instrumental to end the international isolation of
the Syrian regime and even as a mechanism to convince the U.S. to remove
Syria from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism.17 This would allow
14
Hersh, “The Syrian Bet.”
15
Fisher, Max, “A staggering map of the 54 countries that reportedly participated in the CIA’s
rendition program,” The Washington Post, February 5, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/05/a-staggering-map-of-the-54-countries-that-reportedly-partici-
pated-in-the-cias-rendition-program/
16
Ian Cobain, “CIA Rendition: More than a Quarter of Countries ‘Offered Covert Sup-
port,’” The Guardian, February 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/
cia-rendition-countries-covert-support.
17
Hersh, “The Syrian Bet.”
the Syrian regime to earn international legitimacy and to be considered a

“normal nation” in a crisis-ridden Middle East. Additionally, if leveraged
properly, the Syrian regime saw that it could label domestic dissents—
in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria— as terrorists and gain
international support for its operations against these groups. This would
strengthen the government, as a tool of deterrence, vis-à-vis any groups
that dared to stand against the Syrian regime.
However, things did not go as smooth as the Syrian regime hoped. The
new relationship grew sour following the U.S. invaded Iraq. Syria opposed
the operation, and after it became clear that the U.S. would not go back
on its decision, Syria ceased intelligence sharing with U.S. agencies effec-
tively ending its cooperation with the U.S. against Al-Qaeda. Syria did
move alongside the U.S. to vote in favor of UN Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 1441, demanding that Iraq permit the renewal of the UN su-
pervisors’ work. However, this support was explained by Damascus as an
attempt to stop the warfare between Iraq and the U.S. rather than a po-
sition taken in partnership with the U.S..18 Damascus was openly against
any military attack against or invasion of Iraq. The leaders of the regime,
including President Bashar al-Assad and Foreign Minister Faruq al-Sahara,
openly denounced the invasion plan. During an interview, Assad stated,
“No doubt the U.S. is a superpower capable of conquering a relatively
small country, but the U.S. and Britain are incapable of controlling all of
Iraq.”19 Meanwhile, Syria’s Grand Mufti, Ahmad Kaftaru, asked Muslims
to “ use all means and martyrdom operations to defeat the American, Brit-
ish and Zionist aggression on Iraq.”20 At the same time, the Syrian regime
18
Moshe Ma’oz, “Washington and Damascus: Between Confrontation and Cooperation,”
United States Institute of Peace Special Report 146 (2005): http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
sr146.pdf.
19
Raymond Hinnebusch, “Defying the Hegemon: Syria and the Iraqi War,” (paper presented
at the European Consortium on Political Research conference, Budapest, Hungary, September
2005) https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/school-of-international-relations/mecacs/workingpa-
pers/defying_the_hegemon.pdf.
20
Ibid.
22 / T he B ush Y ears (2001-2008)
let the public freely criticize and demonstrate against the American inter-
vention. During this period, the Syrian regime seriously feared that once
the U.S. was done with its mission in Iraq, the administration would turn
to Syria as its next target. 21
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion, relations between the
two countries deteriorated.22 First, reports showed that Syria was allowing
foreign fighters to transit through its territories into Iraq.23 Intelligence
agencies reported that almost 80 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq flew
through Damascus to join the insurgency.24 These fighters joined insur-
gent groups, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which posed the most
substantial challenge to U.S. efforts to stabilize the country. Although the
Syrian government denied any link with these groups,25 employees of the
U.S. Embassy in Damascus reported that they often witnessed pro-al-Qae-
da rallies in front of the embassy compound, a situation that they believed
could only occur with the tacit consent of the Syrian regime.26 Moreover,
in 2004, the Bush administration handed the Syrian government a list of
34 operatives based in Syria that were suspected of involvement in the in-
surgency in Iraq as well as in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Syrian govern-
ment detained only one of these operatives, fostering the growing distrust
of Damascus in Washington.27 After mounting pressure in February 2005,
Syria handed over the stepbrother of Saddam Hussein and deported a
21
Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the
United States After the Iraqi War,” CRS Report for Congress, January 10, 2005, http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/42483.pdf.
22
Wallsh, “Syrian Alliance Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era.”
23
BS
24
Peter Baker, Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House (New York, Anchor Press,
2014), 557.
25
Syria fights allegations it aids Iraq insurgency, NBC News, December 28, 20014,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6763729/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/syria-fights-allega-
tions-it-aids-iraq-insurgency/#.Vx_Y8KtKrlg
26
Anonymous, interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.
27
Robin Wright, “U.S. and UN Step Up Pressure on Damascus,” The Washington Post, Feb-
ruary 16, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26044-2005Feb15.html.
number of foreign fighter recruiters to North African countries.28 Howev-

er, that was not enough to persuade the U.S. that Syria was “a reliable ally”.
Bush administration officials disagreed over how to counter the flow of
fighters into Iraq from Syria. David Petraeus, proposed traveling to Da-
mascus and personally confronting Bashar al-Assad face-to-face. Journalist
Peter Baker cited Petraeus’ colloquial description of Assad’s actions: “You’re
basically allowing poisonous snakes to have a nest in your country with the
understanding they only bite the neighbors’ kids and sooner or later that
backfires and they end up biting your kids and then they do worse.” Assad
signaled that he was willing to meet with Petraeus in an effort to gain some
degree of legitimacy, despite the awkwardness of the President meeting
with the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, which were considered in-
vaders by the same regime. However, officials at the White House refused
to engage in dialogue with the Syrian regime at such a high level without
Damascus taking significant steps towards meeting U.S. demands.29 The
more hawkish members of the administration, including then Deputy
National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, went a step further by arguing
that dialogue was futile and recommending military strikes on the airport
in Damascus to cripple the flow of foreign fighters.30 Although the Bush
administration did not attack the Damascus airport, there were limited
military strikes by the U.S. inside Syria. For instance, in June 2003, U.S.
troops attacked a convoy of military vehicles within Syrian territory, which
resulted in the death of Syrian soldiers, infuriating the Syrian regime and
creating further dismay in Damascus.31
The issue of foreign fighters was not the sole predicament between the
two countries regarding Iraq. After the occupation of Iraq by U.S. forces
and the subsequent foundation of a new Iraqi government, numerous ad-
28
Hinnebusch, “Defying the Hegemon.”
29
Michael Gordon, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq from George W. Bush
to Barack Obama (New York: Vintage Press, 2014), 462.
30
Baker, 558.
31
Ma’oz, “Washington and Damascus.”
24 / T he B ush Y ears (2001-2008)
ditional factors began to generate new complications. The two countries

disagreed over the newly created and U.S.-supported Iraq Governing
Council. Syria opposed its structure, campaigning to rally the opposition
against it. However, the Syrian government eventually voted to recog-
nize the Iraqi Governing Council and restored its diplomatic relations
with Iraq. However, the low level intensity crisis between Syria and U.S.
persisted. There were disagreements between Baghdad and Damascus
over the fate of Iraqi funds transferred to Syria prior to the invasion. The
Iraqi Governing Council requested that the funds be returned from Syria
while the Syrian government insisted that they were payments for Syrian
businessmen.32 In response to this growing crisis between the neighbor-
ing countries, President Bush signed HR 1828, The Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Act. This act imposed penalties on Syria “un-
less it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupa-
tion of Lebanon, ceases the development weapons of mass destruction,
(WMD), and has ceased supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in
Iraq.”33 These sanctions included bans on selling military items and dual
use items to Syria. Additionally, in the late phase of the Iraq War, the
White House Freedom Agenda, along with the Bush administration’s at-
tempts to overthrow authoritarian regimes and build democracies in the
Middle East, became increasingly concerning for the Syrian regime.34
For many in Damascus, this new agenda created the expectation that the
U.S. would target additional Arab states with authoritarian governments
following the fall of the Saddam regime.
While the developments in Iraq and increasing tensions between Syria
and the U.S. generated a significant impasse, the assassination of Rafik
al-Hariri, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, on February 14, 2005
32
Hinnebusch, “Defying the Hegemon.”
33
Prados and Sharp, “Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States After
the Iraqi War.”
34
“Fact Sheet: President Bush's Freedom Agenda Helped Protect The American People,” The
White House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda/.
brought relations between the two countries to a new low.35 For de-
cades, the U.S. and Western countries requested that the Syrian regime
pull its troops from Lebanese soil. However, with the Iraqi crisis, pressure
to withdraw the troops reached a new high. Although Syria pulled some of
its troops in 2003, a significant number of soldiers remained in Lebanon
with the capacity to play a significant role in the country. Later in 2004,
under the leadership of the U.S., the UN Security Council passed Resolu-
tion 1559 formally calling on Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.36
However, Syria did not comply and continued to intervene in Lebanese
domestic affairs, leading to the resignation of al-Hariri in protest. After a
few months later, he was assassinated in Beirut in February 15th, 2005.
The United States, along with most Western countries at the time,
believed Syria was accountable for the assassination and ratcheted up
criticism of the Assad regime. In a news conference, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice claimed that U.S. national security interests had begun
to diverge significantly from those of the Syrian government. “The Syri-
an government is unfortunately on a path right now where relations are
not improving but are worsening,” she noted.37 The administration was
careful not to link the Syrian government directly with the assassination,
but most statements from high-ranking U.S. officials subtly implicated
Damascus. Secretary Rice again signaled Syria’s culpability in an address
to the international community: “When something happens in Lebanon,
Syria needs to help to find accountability for what has happened there.
There is a part of the destabilization that takes place when you have the
kind of conditions that you do now in Lebanon thanks to Syrian inter-
ference.”38 The days following Hariri’s assassination the U.S. government
withdrew its Ambassador Margaret Scobey. The Syrian ambassador to
35
Jeremy Sharp, “Syria: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, April
26, 2010, 13; Hersh, “The Syrian Bet,” 7.
36
Ma’oz, “Washington and Damascus.”
37
Wright, “U.S. and UN Step Up Pressure on Damascus.”
38
Ibid.
26 / T he B ush Y ears (2001-2008)
U.S. Imad Moustapha played down this decision by calling it was a nor-
mal diplomatic procedure.39 For the U.S. this was a more serious decision
than the Syrians understood.
The Hariri assassination altered the American understanding of the
Levant. decision-makers would thereafter find it impossible to ignore Syr-
ia’s role in Lebanese instability. Tension with Syria escalated in the weeks
following this declaration as Assad showed little remorse for his country’s
involvement in the Hariri assassination or in Lebanon’s failed attempts
at democratic consolidation. Former Syrian regime official Bassam Bara-
bandi wrote that Assad had ordered his subordinates to do whatever nec-
essary to obstruct investigations, whether by stalling the legal process,
using Hezbollah to apply pressure on Lebanon, or fomenting violence in
Iraq as a way to distract the international community.40 Borrowing a page
from his father’s playbook, Assad encouraged regional instability to create
problems for which he was the only solution, thereby making his regime
more relevant to global powers. Still, Assad’s posturing did not convince
the White House that he no longer posed a threat to the Freedom Agen-
da. Instead, Lebanon’s reaction to Syrian interference in the wake of the
Hariri assassination only served to embolden the Bush administration’s
condemnation of Assad and commitment to its program of democracy
promotion.41 President Bush demanded that Syria disentangle itself from
Lebanese politics, calling for the country to “withdraw its troops and se-
cret services from Lebanon so as to allow Lebanon’s upcoming elections
to be held freely.”42 The U.S. was joined by France and the UN in its calls
39
Lakely, James & Betsy Pisik, “U.S. recalls envoy from Syria,” The Washington Times, Feb-
ruary 16, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/feb/16/20050216-123423-
9641r/?page=all
40
Bassam Barabandi and Tyler Jess Thompson, “Inside Assad’s Playbook: Time and Terror,”
MENA Source (Atlantic Council blog), July 23, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/me-
nasource/inside-assad-s-playbook-time-and-terror.
41
Baker, 383.
42
Andrew Tabler, In the Lion’s Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington’s Battle with Syria
(Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2011), 84.
for Syria to back down, which proved effective on March 5, 2005, when
Assad announced that Syria would implement its gradual and organized
withdrawal from Lebanon.43 Though Syrian capitulation on the issue of
troop withdrawal demonstrated a modicum of good faith, Assad’s ongo-
ing support of Hezbollah prevented any meaningful progress on the status
of U.S.-Syria relations.
Syria’s reported nuclear activities remained the third source of tension
in bilateral relationship. As Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates de-
scribed in his memoirs, reports from Israeli intelligence services in spring
2007 uncovered compelling evidence that North Korea was aiding Syria
in building a facility capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weap-
ons. This information generated a great discussion among U.S. officials on
strategies to push Syria to halt its nuclear program. According to Gates’
account, some officials in the administration, such as Vice President Dick
Cheney, believed that U.S. interests were best served by launching mil-
itary strikes on the facility: not only would strikes destroy the facility
and cripple the program but they would also send a powerful signal to
the other countries with nuclear aspirations, especially Syria’s ally, Iran.44
There were others, like Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams,
who advocated leaving a military response up to Israel, who was eager to
demonstrate its military might after its failure to conclusively end its war
with Lebanon in 2006.45 Still, others advocated doing nothing because
they believed the U.S. had enough problems fighting the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and should not start a third, particularly when the Bush ad-
ministration was facing heavy criticism for the faulty intelligence that led
to the invasion of Iraq. Moreover, these officials were reticent to cooperate
militarily with Israel against an Arab country for fear of inflaming regional
43
A Death in the Middle East: Hariri's Murder Casts Uncertain Future for Lebanon,” Spiegel,
February 24, 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/a-death-in-the-middle-east-hariri-s-mur-
der-casts-uncertain-future-for-lebanon-a-343485.html.
44
Robert Gates, Duty : Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. New
York, 2014), 384.
45
Baker, 552.
28 / T he B ush Y ears (2001-2008)
tensions. One final camp, which included Secretary of Defense Robert

Gates, advocated implementing a diplomatic initiative that would push to
dismantle the facility without the use of force.46 Nevertheless, these policy
debates became a moot point when Israel decided to strike the facility
unilaterally. It is still unclear how much the U.S. knew prior to the attacks,
but it was a welcome solution.
In the midst of all of these crises, some individuals in the Bush admin-
istration began to advocate for unilaterally attacking Syria on the basis of
its nuclear facilities and/or because of its active support for the insurgency
in Iraq. Bilateral relations were minimal despite some level of dialogue to
stop the flow of foreign fighters. During this period, the U.S. did every-
thing in its power to undermine the Assad regime. It was clear that the
country was experiencing a number of serious challenges. The imposition
of harsh economic sanctions and the withdrawal of the U.S. ambassador
had greatly alienated Syria, which was already facing growing international
reproach. President George W. Bush rejected domestic and international
pressure to engage Syria as a way to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process
because he feared such a move would undermine Syria’s global isolation.47
Instead, he declared that “it would be counterproductive” to engage Syria
in talks, as “Syria knows exactly what it takes to get better relations.”48
During this period, all three branches of the U.S. government were act-
ing in concert to isolate the Syrian regime. Congress passed the 2003 Syria
Accountability and Restoration of Lebanese Sovereignty Act, which had dam-
aging repercussions on the Syrian regime’s economy. The White House
also declared a national emergency in respect to Syria in May 2004, which
harshened economic sanctions in reaction to Syria’s support for different
46
Gates, 387.
47
International Crisis Group, “Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations,” Middle East Report No
63, April 10, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-pales-
tine/063-restarting-israeli-syrian-negotiations.aspx.
48
Barrack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Global War on Terror,” April 20, 2007
(online by U.S. Department of State) http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/83362.htm.
armed groups in the Middle East.49 The same year, the Department of
Treasury designated the Commercial Bank of Syria “a financial institution
of primary money laundering concern” and passed another set of sanctions
against Syria.50 This new set of sanctions had a significant impact on the
economic relations of Syria. It limited “Syria’s ability to carry out activities
involving U.S. currency or repatriate its oil revenues while simultaneously
dissuading foreign entities from commercial dealings with Syria.”51 Tar-
geted sanctions were implemented to freeze the financial assets of Syrian
agencies and high-level officials. These sanctions, combined with President
George Bush’s declaration of democracy promotion and freedom agen-
da, transformed the nature of the countries’ relationship. Syria no longer
merely viewed U.S. actions as hostile, but considered them an existential
threat. Likewise, the Bush administration regarded Assad’s government a
“rogue regime” capable of endangering U.S. national security interests.
There were several exceptions to the U.S. policy of isolating Syria during
this period, including several meetings between U.S. officials and their
Syrian counterparts. One significant visit was conducted by Nancy Pelosi,
who assumed the position of the Speaker of the House of Representatives
after the midterm elections in 2006. In April 2007, Congresswoman Pe-
losi, despite some protests and opposition from the Bush administration,
visited Damascus as part of a Middle East tour.52 Following her meetings,
Congresswoman Pelosi underlined U.S. concerns about Syrian support for
Hamas and Hezbollah and expressed the necessity of launching a peace pro-
49
BS. P.61
50
BS. P 62
51
International Crisis Group, “Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities,” Middle
East Report No. 83, February 11, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20
East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/83engagingsyriausconstraintsan-
dopportunities.ashx.
52
Shadid, Anthony, “Pelosi Meets Syrian President Despite Objections From Bush,”
The Washington Post, April 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2007/04/04/AR2007040401351.html
30 / T he B ush Y ears (2001-2008)
cess between Israel and Syria.53 However, despite these statements, the trip
was harshly criticized by the Bush administration. President Bush affirmed
that visiting Damascus in such a critical juncture meant sending mixed mes-
sages to the international community. He also stressed that there had been
several other similar attempts by officials from different branches of govern-
ment; however, those failed owing to the fact that the Assad regime did not
take any meaningful steps in areas of international concern.54
Just days before the U.S. presidential elections in November 2008,
another development strained relations between the two countries. After
tensions between the two peaked over the flow of foreign fighters into
Iraq, the U.S. unilaterally attacked several targets within Syria under the
premise that they were preventing recruitment and training support for
the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. On October 26, 2008, U.S. Special Forc-
es launched an operation in the Syrian town of Abu Kamal in an effort to
destroy key logistic networks that facilitated the passage of foreign fight-
ers from Syria into Iraq.55 Special Forces targeted Badran Turki Hishan
al-Mazidih, also known as Abu Ghadiya, who was known to be a Syrian
commander of AQI. According to U.S. sources, Abu Ghadiya “oversaw
a network of training camps, including those run by more secular for-
mer Baath insurgents; he also met regularly with Syrian military intel-
ligence officials, including Asif Shawkat, the country’s intelligence chief
and brother-in-law to President Bashar al-Assad.”56 Connecting the Syri-
an government with al-Qaeda was viewed as a serious accusation against
Damascus. Unsurprisingly, the Syrian regime strongly denied the allega-
53
Hassan M. Fattah and Graham Bowley, “Pelosi Meets with Syrian Leader,” The New
York Times, April 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/world/middleeast/04cnd-pe-
losi.html?_r=0.
54
“Bush Criticizes Pelosi’s Trip to Syria,” The New York Times, April 3, 2007, http://www.ny-
times.com/2007/04/03/world/americas/03iht-web-0403bushap.5128610.html.
55
Ian Black and Ewen MacAskill, “US Forces Kill Eight in Helicopter Raid on Syria,” The
Guardian, October 26, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/27/syria-helicop-
ter-attack.
56
Gordon et.al, 230.
tions. Eight people were killed in this unprecedented U.S. incursion into
Syrian territory; however, Syrian sources denied Abu Ghadiya’s presence
in Abu Kamal and instead accused the U.S. of violating its sovereignty
and perpetrating state terror.57 Although some news networks accused the
Syrian government of cooperating with the U.S. by allowing the attack on
the Abu Ghadiya network, this information was never confirmed, leading
many to consider the attack a serious escalation in U.S. hostility towards
Syria.58 In response to the attack, the Syrian government summoned
the U.S. chargé d’affaires, Maura Connelly, and subsequently shut down
U.S.-operated facilities such as language schools and cultural centers.59
Friction between the U.S. and Syria after the Abu Kamal raid inflamed
existing tensions and made it clear by 2008 that the bilateral relationship
had reached the nadir of its history.
57
Ann Scott Tyson and Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Calls Raid a Warning to Syria,” The
Washington Post, October 28, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2008/10/27/AR2008102700511.html; “US Helicopter Raid Inside Syria,” BBC News, Oc-
tober 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7692153.stm.
58
Dominic Waghorn, “Syria ‘Gave Green Light For Raid,’” Sky News, October 28, 2008,
http://news.sky.com/story/644001/syria-gave-green-light-for-raid.
59
“US Helicopter Raid Inside Syria.”
TWO THAWING RELATIONS
BEFORE THE
ARAB SPRING
(FEBRUARY 2009-MARCH 2011)
“
The U.S. hoped to encourage
Syria to deny foreign fighters safe
passage into Iraq, to distance itself
from Iran, and to contribute more
constructively to the Arab-Israeli
peace negotiations by cutting
funding to Hamas and Hezbollah.
"In terms of the Syrian-American relationship,
the United States is committed to a dialogue
based on mutual interest and mutual respect and
a solid foundation for discussion of our shared
goals and of real differences...”60
U.S. Envoy George Mitchell, July 26, 2009
Prior to stepping foot in the Oval Office, it was reported

that a group of scholars and policymakers “affiliated” with the incom-
ing administration visited a series of Middle Eastern countries, includ-
ing Syria to assess the perception of the U.S. and the expectations of the
new administration. The report presented to the White House at the
culmination of this trip showed that the delegation had several meet-
ings, including meetings with the Syrian officials. An important part
of these meetings was focused on the possible impacts of the election
of President Obama to the White House on the region and exploring
the potential policy implications of this new period. However accord-
ing to a report on Al-Ahram, the conversations also revealed some of
the possible policy preferences the new administration would have re-
garding Syria. This very early report argued that there was a high de-
gree of optimism amongst Syrian scholars and policymakers about the
election of President Obama. The report mentioned that “The Syrians
are hopeful that the visit would influence Obama's future Middle East
policy and pave the way for rapprochement. Recalling the ping-pong
diplomacy that brought the US and China closer decades ago, Syrian
“Obama's Middle East envoy steps up diplomatic push in Syria,” The Guardian, July 26,
60
2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/26/george-mitchell-syria-peace-talks.
3 6 / T hawing R elations B efore T he A rab S pring ( F ebruary 2009- M arch 2011)
interlocutors voiced the hope that Syrian-US relations would soon be

on the mend.”61
Although the ping pong diplomacy analogy is somewhat extreme in this
situation, the hopes of the Syrians were not totally baseless. It is true that
the question of relations with Syria was not on the radar of the Washington
crowd in 2008. In the reports published to provide policy guidance for the
new president by Washington think tanks, the issue of Syria did not receive
much attention.62 However, U.S.-Syrian relations would be a part of other
foreign policy priorities of President-elect Obama in the Middle East. The
president-elect was most interested in ensuring a smooth U.S. withdraw-
al from Iraq, containment of Iran’s regional ambitions and a comprehen-
sive Middle East Peace program.63From his early days in office, President
Obama signaled that the Syria file would be important for him. Key players
of his foreign policy team from different agencies, including Assistant to
the President of National Security Affairs James Jones, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, and Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
John Kerry— were all tasked with paying close attention to Syria with the
aim off of establishing ties with the Syrian government and leveraging them
to reach the President’s foreign policy objective in the Middle East.
Almost all of Obama’s foreign policy team believed that establishing
direct communication with the Syrian government was the only way to
convince Bashar al-Assad to cooperate with U.S. interests. According
to reports, these administration officials believed that “it will be more
palatable for American voters for Mr. Obama to launch his rogue nation
outreach effort with Damascus rather than Iran and that dealing with
the mullahs in Tehran would be much easier if they could no longer rely
61
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/Archive/2008/923/re6.htm
62
For an example of this see http://carnegieendowment.org/files/obama_middle_east.pdf .
Also in this report Syria was not considered a major policy area although Israeli-Syrian track in the
Middle East Peace was emphasized. See http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/saban-cfr/
restoring_the_balance_summaries.PDF
63
Anonymous , interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.
on knee-jerk support from Syria.” 64 Specifically, the new administration

hoped to encourage Syria to deny foreign fighters safe passage into Iraq,
to distance itself from Iran, and to contribute more constructively to the
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations by cutting funding to Hamas and Hez-
bollah.65 In the long term, Syria’s support of these U.S. foreign policy
endeavors was thought to be a critical component of realizing the Obama
administration’s goal to gradually disengage from the conflict-prone pol-
itics of the region. Though the Obama administration faced pushback
from lawmakers in Washington and the American public about strength-
ening relations with Syria, it hoped that the Syrian government would be
receptive to warmer relations. However, after decades of tension between
the two countries, the first steps would be hard to take. For President
Obama and his administration, this first step would have to be resuming
diplomatic relations at a time when they were at their frostiest.
President Obama, having very little leverage over Syria absent diplo-
matic representation and economic trade, had to forge a new path for
U.S. engagement in the Middle East. During his first days in office media
outlets reported that President Obama was considering how best to start
this process. The Telegraph reported that “one source, who has discussed
foreign policy directly with Mr. Obama in the last two weeks, has revealed
that the President "is spending a lot of time thinking about Syria and how
to improve relations."66 He even began to discuss strategies with different
U.S. allies around the world. According to the same report “he believes the
key to improving the political situation in the Middle East is to peel Syria
away from its longstanding alliance with Iran, rather than to immediate-
ly start negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear weapons programme.”67
64
Shipman, Tim, “Syria will be first rogue state to get Barack Obama charm offensive,”
The Telegraph, January 24, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/baracko-
bama/4331776/Syria-will-be-first-rogue-state-to-get-Barack-Obama-charm-offensive.html
65
Steven Heydemann, interview by Kilic Kanat, January 2015.
66
Shipman, Tim, “Syria will be first rogue state to get Barack Obama charm offensive”
67
ibid.
Thus President Obama openly started to draw the link between Syria and
other issue areas in the Middle East.
In Syria the feelings and expectations about the new administration
became increasingly optimistic. Syria welcomed the Obama administra-
tion in 2009 with an eagerness for engagement unparalleled in the history
of the countries’ bilateral ties.68 Assad had viewed the 2008 presidential
election as an opportunity to change the course of the countries’ relation-
ship.69 Upon President Obama’s victory and without any sign of immedi-
ate rapprochement, Assad still expressed content with the election results.
In a statement after the elections, Assad revealed that he was actually fol-
lowing the U.S. elections quite closely and emphasized, “We are happy
that [Obama] has said that diplomacy—and not war—is the means of
conducting international policy.”70 The U.S. elections were important not
only due to President Obama’s emphasis on diplomacy, but also because
they marked the end of an administration that was known for its predispo-
sition to use direct military intervention to change regimes.
Immediately after the election, articles and commentaries started to ap-
peared in the Syrian media, which was known to be controlled by the Assad
regime, favoring the idea of establishing better relations with the U.S. Under
the leadership of Assad and with the strict censorship of the Syrian media,
it was inconceivable to think that these pieces could have been published
without the approval or consent of the Syrian regime. They showed that the
regime was willing to influence public opinion to gain support for its envi-
sioned renewed relations with the U.S. The regime did not wish to hear any
alternative viewpoints that would challenge the regime’s stance on this issue.
In one of the notable pieces, Sami Moubayed, the editor-in-chief of Forward
Magazine, wrote of the benefits of improving relations, yet qualified his op-
timism with ten requirements that the Obama administration would have
68
Seymour Hersh, “Syria Calling,” The New Yorker, April 6, 2009, http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2009/04/06/syria-calling, 2.
69
Ibid.
70
Hersh, “Syria Calling,” 10.
to meet in order to normalize relations. These requirements were: 1) the

reinstatement of the U.S. ambassador to Syria and thus formal restoration of
diplomatic relations; 2) the end of the U.S. government’s anti-Syria rheto-
ric, which was prominent during the Bush administration; 3) recognition by
U.S. authorities of Syria’s cooperation on assisting along the Iraqi border to
halt the flow of foreign fighters and the insurgency; 4) U.S. cooperation to
address the problem of the growing number of Iraqi refugees in Syria; 5) the
abolition of sanctions and the Syria Accountability Act (E.O. 13338), and
thus the normalization of economic relations between the two countries;
6) the facilitation of indirect Syrian-Israeli talks; 7) recognition of Syria’s
central role in resolving conflicts in the Middle East; 8) counterterrorism
assistance; 9) an apology to the Syrian regime and compensation for the
2008 helicopter raid on the Abu Kamal village; and 10) the normalization
of people-to-people diplomacy and distribution of visas to Syrian students
who wish to study in the United States.71 Although the magazine article
did not cite or quote any Syrian foreign ministry official, experts interpreted
the stated conditions as having been put forward by the Assad regime. After
establishing Forward Magazine, Moubayed, formerly an ordinary journalist,
was appointed by the Assad regime to serve on the “U.S.-Syria Working
Group.” In an article discussing Moubayed’s appointment, Andrew Tabler
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy pointed out that Mou-
bayed had been dispatched to Washington later “to exchange views with
a number of policy think tanks and former U.S. officials with the goal of
narrowing the gap between the two positions” in July 2008.72
Despite the conditions that were circulated in the public, through
which the Syrian regime tried to imply that the U.S. stood to benefit
more from the reinstatement of relations than Damascus, Syria had also
71
Sami Moubayed, “Abu Hussein’s Invitation to Damascus,” Asia Times, November 7, 2008,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JK07Ak02.html.
72
Tabler, Andrew J., “Will Mitchell’s Trip Bypass Damascus?” The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy - Policywatch 1506, April 13, 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/poli-
cy-analysis/view/will-mitchells-trip-bypass-damascus
had much to gain from building stronger lines of communication with

the U.S. For instance, according to U.S. officials, Assad’s top priority in
2008 was to relieve Syria’s economy from sanctions imposed during the
Bush era. The sanctions were undermining not only the economy of the
Syrian state but also regime’s domestic legitimacy. The White House was
well aware of this vulnerability and used it as leverage in its interactions
with the regime. From the very beginning, President Obama sought to
ease the burden of sanctions on Syria’s trade and commercial relations—
especially in high-tech industries where the commercial aviation and in-
formation technology sectors had been hard hit. These sanctions, which
were crippling the Syrian economy, risked fomenting domestic instability
in the context of the emerging global financial crisis and could threaten
the Assad regime’s survival.73 Assad thought that easing relations with the
U.S. and improving the country’s economic conditions would strengthen
his standing in the country. The economic benefits were not the only
windfall that Assad anticipated from the thawing of relations. He also
wanted to rescue his country from the international isolation it had faced
in the aftermath of 9/11 and especially following the assassination of
Rafiq al-Hariri. U.S. officials interpreted this move as Assad’s way of
expanding his country’s areas of diplomatic influence so as to include the
U.S. Political engagement in all forms, even photo opportunities, were
highly emphasized over economic or security cooperation at the outset
of communication.74
However, after the first steps of détente were initiated, both parties
understood the nature of the new dynamique differently. In 2008, Syria
regarded its foreign policy with a sense of what one U.S. official called “tri-
umphalism”; the country had survived its painful disentanglement from
Lebanese politics after the Hariri assassination and also accrued great po-
73
74
Anonymous, interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.; See also Seymour, “Syria Calling.”
litical capital in the Arab world when it resisted the U.S. invasion of Iraq.75
The country’s warming relations with Turkey and France, absent of appar-
ent preconditions, contributed to its pretension, making the Assad regime
believe that it was negotiating with the United States from a position of
strength. Most important, however, Syria outlasted the economic sanc-
tions, heated regional politics, and near-military clashes during the Bush
era. President Obama’s 2008 campaign, which was based on his character-
ization as the “anti-Bush” candidate, provided hope to the international
community and in particular Syria that his election would mark the end of
the “military adventures” of U.S. foreign policy. During one round of the
2007 presidential debates, Obama promised that he would meet uncon-
ditionally with the leaders of the traditional pariah states in U.S. foreign
policy, including Iran, Syria, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba. In that
debate, he argued that “the notion that somehow not talking to countries
is punishment to them—which has been the guiding diplomatic principle
of this administration—is ridiculous."76 Thus, President Obama’s election
was considered a victory for a new foreign policy approach of engagement
as well as for Syria’s hope of better bilateral relations.
Yet, while Syria was enjoying some form of triumphalism, U.S. State
Department officials believed that it demonstrated hubris in its bargain-
ing position with the U.S. According to embassy officials in Damascus,
the regime’s confidence reflected a naive understanding of the U.S.’ polit-
ical flexibility and intentions in its bilateral relationship with Syria.77 De-
spite President Obama’s willingness to launch a new initiative on Syria,
he still faced significant political and technical impediments that would
75
Anonymous, interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.; See also Tabler, In the Lion’s Den, 218;
Alon Ben-Mei, “Above the Fray: Syria Reasserts it Centrality to Peace,” Jerusalem Post, October
22, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Above-the-Fray-Syria-reasserts-its-cen-
trality-to-peace.
76
“Fact Check: Would Obama meet ‘unconditionally’ with Iran?” Political Ticker (CNN
blog), September 25, 2008, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/09/25/fact-check-would-
obama-meet-unconditionally-with-iran/.
77
“Kerry - Assad: Improving the U.S.-Syria Relationship,” WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks Cable 160,
February 27, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DAMASCUS160_a.html.
make a quick rapprochement difficult. First of all, the full weight of Con-
gress was against Syria at the time. Members of Congress were reactive to
Syria’s support and tolerance for foreign fighters flowing freely from Syria
to Iraq, which contributed to the increasing number of American casu-
alties in the war in Iraq. Some members of the Congress signaled dissent
with the new agenda even before the beginning of the talks between U.S.
and Syria, when there were talks about the upgrade of the EU’s relations
with Syria. While the U.S. was pursuing its hardline policy towards Syria,
some members of the EU were signaling for a change in their Syria pol-
icy. Starting in the Summer 2008, French President Sarkozy began this
change during his visit to Damascus, which formally ended the isolation
of Syria from the EU. During a press conference with Assad, President
Sarkozy stated that, “This is how we're going to rebuild our new relations
with Syria, by trying to understand each other, by not compromising
our principles and by reestablishing trust."78 In December of the same
year, British Foreign Minister David Miliband paid a visit to Damascus
to meet with Assad. During this meeting it was announced that British
government would re-establish high level intelligence ties with the Syr-
ian government.79 Negotiations also increased regarding an association
agreement between the EU and the Syrian government.80 Some within
the U.S. Congress reacted harshly toward these debates. Congresswoman
Ros-Lehtinen, the Ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, responded to these debates by stating, “a potential associa-
tion agreement formalizing ties between Syria and the European Union
would reward Syria at a time when it continues to evade questions re-
78
Ibrahim, Alia,”French President, on Visit to Syria, Calls for Improved Ties Between Na-
tions,” The Washingotn Post, September 4, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2008/09/03/AR2008090303873.html
79
Schenker, David, “Decoupling Syria from Iran: Constraints on U.S.-Syrian Rapproche-
ment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2008, http://www.washingtoninsti-
tute.org/policy-analysis/view/decoupling-syria-from-iran-constraints-on-u.s.-syrian-rapprochement
80
Schenker, David, “The EU and Syria Move Closer,” The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy- Policy #1439, December 11, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/the-eu-and-syria-move-closer
garding its illicit nuclear program and ties to Iran and militant Islamist
groups. The agreement would elevate Syria’s diplomatic relationship with
the EU to the level enjoyed by other Mediterranean countries.”81 This
demonstrated that the upgrade of relations of the U.S. was not going to
be an easy task for the President.
Furthermore, despite the Obama administration’s willingness to restore
ties with a nation that could play an important role in the attainment
of U.S. goals in the region, President Obama’s foreign policy was already
failing to increase its degree of engagement with Middle Eastern coun-
tries. There was an absence of a long-term strategy regarding relations with
Syria, despite the fact that restoring ties with Damascus held tactical and
operational significance for U.S. policy in the region. This raised questions
about the real objective or outcome of the U.S. strategy in Syria. In fact,
engagement with Syria at this critical juncture was crucial for the military
disengagement from Iraq however, in the final analysis, it was still periph-
eral to U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Congress certainly was not heartened by Syria’s suspension of indirect
talks with Israel in reaction to Operation Cast Lead against Gaza in 2008.
Moreover, Syria’s nuclear activity at al-Kibar put the White House in an
awkward position regarding its nonproliferation priorities, as Syria refused
to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) inves-
tigations. If Assad proved uncooperative in his discussions with the U.S.,
the administration would be forced to consider re-committing its resourc-
es elsewhere to achieve its regional goals.82 That is not to say that U.S.
officials did not value Syria; on the contrary, former Ambassador to Israel
Martin Indyk described Syria as the linchpin for dealing with both Iran
and Israel-Palestine. Former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Damascus
in December 2008, just after the U.S. elections, also raised awareness in
81
“Accord with Syria Ignores Continued Deception, Obstruction,” House Committee on For-
eign affairs Presss Office, December 4, 2008, “Ros-Lehtinen Says Hasty EU http://archives.repub-
licans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/story/?891
82
regards to the place of Syria in U.S. policy towards the Middle East and
the future of bilateral relations between these two countries. Syrian me-
dia’s coverage of the visit was particularly impressive and raised optimism
about the prospects of bilateral relations, as did the return of the U.S.
ambassador to Damascus.83 Furthermore, not all members of the Congress
were against the improvement of ties with the state of Syria. During the
transition period between administrations, a group of Congressmen from
the Armed Services Committee also visited Damascus and met with Assad.
The main topic was again the future of relations between the U.S. and Syr-
ia. Assad shared his optimism and high expectations for the future of bi-
lateral relations between the two countries during the meeting.84 However,
these high-level visits and exchanges of opinion and the optimism among
some about the future of bilateral ties did not not automatically make the
task at hand easier for the Obama administration.
Efforts to repair ties and cooperate with Syria commenced almost
immediately following Pres. Obama’s inauguration in 2009. The pres-
ident requested that U.S. adversaries, including Syria, “unclench their
fists” and accept engagement with the United States.85 This was the first
step toward the idea of restoring diplomatic ties and opening discussions
with the rogue regimes of the international system. Though Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton centered her focus on the Asia Pacific following in-
dications that major policy issues in the Middle East would be addressed
by the White House and Department of Defense, President Obama de-
cided to utilize some resources of the State Department to engage with
83
“Special Media Reaction Report: Jimmy Carter’s Visit to Damascus,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks
Cable 886, December 16, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DAMASCUS886.html.
84
“Codel Smith: Assad Positive on New Bilateral Relations,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks Cable 94,
February 1, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DAMASCUS94.html.
85
“Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” The New York Times, January 20, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Syria and asked her to launch an initiative of engagement.86 According

to Andrew Tabler, President Obama imparted two guiding principles for
engagement with Syria. The first was for the State Department to pursue
engagement with Syria in order to fulfill President Obama’s campaign
promise to engage America’s rivals. Second, the warming relations were
not to be allowed to threaten in any way U.S. allies in Lebanon, who
feared a Hezbollah victory in the June 2009 elections. Other than these
stipulations, the State Department was given relative freedom to deter-
mine the terms of engagement.87
At the outset of the rapprochement, the administration acted cohe-
sively and cautiously, choosing to test the diplomatic waters in February
2009. As a gesture of goodwill to the Syrian government, the Depart-
ment of Commerce allowed the country’s national airliner, Syrian Air, to
procure an export license for Boeing 747 spare parts.88 The shortage of
spare parts in the Syrian aviation industry was considered one of the most
destructive dimensions of the economic sanctions. It not only risked pas-
sengers’ lives and generated a confidence problem for a state-owned en-
terprise, but it also created a prestige problem for the Syrian government.
As such, the end of these sanctions was a huge relief for the Syrian gov-
ernment. Of course, President Obama also faced significant criticism and
challenges from Congress about this decision. Following this sanction
relief, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen made another statement arguing
that the decision “rewards a regime of proliferation concern responsible
for U.S. deaths in Iraq, political assassinations, and regional turmoil.”89
She continued, “less than a year ago, on May 8th, the national emergency
86
Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, “Backstage Glimpses of Clinton as Dogged Dip-
lomat, Win or Lose,” The New York Time, February 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/
us/politics/in-behind-scene-blows-and-triumphs-sense-of-clinton-future.html?pagewanted=all.
87
Tabler, In the Lion’s Den.
88
Sharp, “Syria: Background and U.S. Relations,” 3.
89
“Ros-Lehtinen Says White HOuse decision to waive Sanctions on Syria Rewards Extremist
Regime and Undermines U.S. Interests,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs Press Office, February
12, 1009 http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/story/?915
with respect to Syria was extended because the actions of the Syrian re-
gime were deemed to constitute ‘a continuing unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.’ Has Syria altered its behavior significantly in the last 8 months to
merit a reward from the new Administration?”90
However, despite these criticisms the Obama administration stayed
the course on its Syria policy. Shortly after the relief of some sanctions,
Secretary Clinton exchanged a few words with Syrian Foreign Minister
Walid Moallem in Egypt during a foreign ministerial meeting, arranging
for future discussions between Syria and the U.S. that would includ-
ed Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Moustapha, National Securi-
ty Council Middle East Director Daniel Shapiro, and Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman.91 At the very
beginning, it was reported that Asst. Secretary Feltman’s inclusion in the
talks dampened Syria’s enthusiasm for rapprochement. As the former
U.S. ambassador to Beirut, he had made many enemies in Damascus for
his sharp criticism of Syria’s role in Lebanese politics, particularly after
the Hariri assassination. Reportedly, in February’s meeting, Asst. Secre-
tary Feltman raised topics that antagonized Syrian officials, including
Syria’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, interference in Lebanon, its
nuclear weapons program, and human rights issues.92 Thus, Asst. Secre-
tary Feltman’s appointment and the February meeting made for a rocky
start for warming relations.
Following the meeting in Washington, Secretary Clinton announced
that Feltman and Shapiro would travel to Damascus in March for talks
with the regime. The initial steps of the rapprochement took place with
90
ibid.
91
Spillius, Alex, “Hillary Clinton and Syrian counterpart shake hands as relations look to
improve,” The Telegraph, March 3, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/mid-
dleeast/syria/4930142/Hillary-Clinton-and-Syrian-counterpart-shake-hands-as-relations-
look-to-improve.html
92
David Kenner, “Tough Love for Syria from Obama,” Passport (Foreign Policy blog), March
3, 2009, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/03/tough_love_for_syria.
the participation of different agencies from the U.S. government. During

this process, Congress, despite the continuation of opposition of some,
also played an active role in efforts to impact the direction of policy toward
Syria. Senator Kerry, who had been a longtime supporter of diplomatic
engagement with the Assad regime, paid a visit to Damascus shortly before
the arrival of Feltman and Shapiro. He laid the groundwork by visiting
Assad on his home turf to discuss parameters of engagement. After his
conversation with the Syrian leader, Senator Kerry expressed optimism
about Assad’s commitment to repairing Syria’s relations with the West. Ac-
cording to Senator Kerry, Assad seemed ready to change the course of his
country and to politically engage with the Western world.93 Senator Ker-
ry’s observations about Assad created a sense of hope among the pro-en-
gagement officials in the United States. Feltman and Shapiro capitalized
on these sentiments by broaching a number of controversial topics, rang-
ing from the stabilization of Lebanon and the revival of Middle East Peace
talks to the containment of the civil war in Iraq.
The visit was, for many, an attempt to push Syria away from its part-
nership with Iran and a window of opportunity for Assad to reconnect
with the Western world.94 However, in every step of the process, the
U.S. reminded the attentive public of the potential problems that they
may encounter throughout the engagement. There was a high degree
of skepticism among Syria analysts at the State Department about the
sincerity of Assad’s steps. For instance, just before Feltman and Shap-
iro’s visit, Secretary Clinton tried to temper the public’s expectations
for improvements in bilateral relations with Syria; nonetheless, policy
analysts still considered the effort to be an announcement of a para-
digmatic change in U.S. policy towards the region and a great progress
in engaging adversaries in the Middle East. Feltman and Shapiro were
93
Kerry - Assad: Dividing Iraq and Unifying Iran,” WikiLeaks Cable 158; “Kerry - Assad:
Improving the U.S.-Syria Relationship,” WikiLeaks Cable 160.
94
David S. Cloud, “U.S. to Send Two Envoys to Syria,” Politico, March 4, 2009, http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0309/19550.html.
the highest-ranking administration officials to visit Syria since Deputy

Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s visit in 2005. Shortly after the an-
nouncement, they traveled to Damascus and conducted talks with FM
Moallem, as well as presidential advisor Bouthaina Shaaban and Deputy
Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad. Officials from both countries publicly
described the meetings as very constructive and said that they had found
“common ground” to serve as the foundation for future improvements
in bilateral relations.95
The developments that followed this meeting proved that the steps
taken to restore diplomatic ties and launch talks for cooperation in the
region had been fruitful. Upon the conclusion of the U.S. trip, Assad gave
a number interviews to international news networks, during which he an-
nounced that he was prepared to play a constructive role in the Middle East
Peace Process. There were also direct references to relations with the United
States. In one of the interviews, he openly stated that he wanted to meet
with President Obama in-person to discuss issues of mutual concern and
interest. However, despite this public announcement, the White House
believed that it was too early to provide Assad with such an opportunity
to gain legitimacy.96 The Obama administration decided to continue talks
with Syria through Shapiro and Feltman and wait for the regime to take
significant steps before engaging in higher-level meetings. Nevertheless, the
February 2009 trip to Damascus paved the way for Syria to make a clear
break from the political isolation it experienced during the Bush-era.97
Following the Feltman and Shapiro visit, a delegation from the Senate
and House of Representatives, led by Senator Benjamin Cardin, visited
Damascus. During this visit, Assad received the members of the delega-
tion, who conveyed U.S. concerns about the burgeoning rapprochement.
Several issues were tabled, including Iran’s nuclear program, human
95
96
97
Bilal Y. Saab, “On a New Footing: U.S.-Syria Relations,” Brookings Institution, March 19,
2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/03/19-syria-saab.
rights abuses in Syria, the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations, the elections

in Lebanon and the issue of Syrian support for terrorist groups. A leaked
cable from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus revealed the disagreement
between the U.S. delegation and Assad on these issues. According to
the cable, Assad acknowledged that the issues were of serious concern
for both countries; however, he requested that the delegation approach
those issues from the Syrian perspective. For instance, Assad totally re-
jected the matter of Syria’s support for foreign fighters. For him, Syria
had nothing to gain from providing safe haven for foreign fighters and
helping them organize attacks in Iraq. In addition, when Senator Cardin
asked about the government’s relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah,
Assad responded by stating that both of these groups were elected repre-
sentatives of the people in Gaza and Lebanon and that they were among
the realities of regional politics. Assad also rejected the delegation’s crit-
icisms about human rights abuses in the country by arguing that Syria
had made significant progress in human rights and that this point could
not be discussed in the region while people in Gaza and Palestinian refu-
gees were suffering under very harsh conditions.98
Feltman and Shapiro returned to Damascus in May 2009 for fur-
ther talks with the Syrian regime. Although observers interpreted Syria’s
warm reception of the visit as a positive step toward implementing the
U.S.’s policy of engagement, the actual content of the talks was kept
strictly confidential. Speculation mounted that the talks addressed mat-
ters such as reinvigorating the Syrian-Israeli track of the Middle East
peace efforts and engaging the country in matters of non-proliferation.
Yet, some scholars, such as Syria expert Joshua Landis, were skeptical of
these musings, arguing instead that President Obama sent Feltman and
Shapiro to Damascus in order to signal the administration’s resolve to
the policy’s strongest opponents, especially Israel. The timing of the visit
98
“President Assad and Codel Cardin Discuss a Nuclear Iran, Peace Process, Terrorism and
Human Rights,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks Cable 179, March 10, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/ca-
ble/2009/03/09DAMASCUS179.html.
was key. According to Landis, “[Obama] may want Israel to understand

that it cannot make an end run around the President by going to Con-
gress or the American Jewish community. During the week that AIPAC is
meeting in Washington and senior Israeli statesmen are in town, Obama
may simply be saying, ‘I am in charge of U.S. foreign policy. I can en-
gage Syria if and when I want.’”99 Assuming Landis’ premise was valid,
Feltman and Shapiro’s summer visit marked another major break from
the Middle East policies of President Obama’s predecessor. It seemed that
President Obama would follow a more nuanced approach in his vision of
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The geopolitical context of Feltman and Shapiro’s May visit to Syria
was quite different than that during their first visit. In that second meet-
ing, U.S. officials again met with Syrian FM Walid Moallem in what they
described as “constructive and comprehensive” meetings.100 While han-
dling this process, the Obama administration was also trying to respond
to concerns from Syria-skeptics arguing that such a full-scale engagement
with the regime could be considered a reward for Syria. Some observers
of Middle East politics in Washington, D.C. warned the administration
against creating this perception. However, in an interview with Al Jazeera,
Feltman made it clear that “[Obama] believes that talking should not be
considered a reward—talking should be the means to achieve objectives.”101
Publicly, Feltman purported that the visit marked progress but noted, “…
this is part of a process and we’ll see how it develops...I’m sure the Syrians
will be looking at choices we will be making in the future, just as we’ll be
looking at choices that Syria is making.”102 During a briefing following
99
“What is Feltman Doing in Damascus,” Syria Comment (blog), May 7, 2009, http://www.
joshualandis.com/blog/what-is-feltman-doing-in-damascus/.
100
Tabler, In the Lion’s Den.
“US Talks in Syria ‘Constructive,’” Al-Jazeera, March 10, 2009, http://www.aljazeera.com/
101
news/middleeast/2009/03/20093713536371310.html.
102
“Teleconference by State’s Feltman in Damascus, Syria,” March 7, 2008 (online, IPP Digital,
US Embassy), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2009/03/20090309124703eai-
fas9.014308e-03.html#axzz39x9r9Atm.
the trip Feltman stated that the administration would be willing to pursue
progress on this issue, stating “You know, it’s our view that we would be
using engagement like this consistent with the President and Secretary’s
desires to meet key objectives bilaterally, regionally, internationally. And
it’s our view that, you know, Syria can play an important, constructive
role in the region. And so Dan Shapiro’s and my visit here today was an
opportunity to basically start achieving objectives by using diplomacy and
dialogue as one of our tools.”103 These statements demonstrated a cautious
optimism toward the future of rapprochement between the two countries.
Cables leaked shortly thereafter revealed the true nature of the discus-
sions, which were actually quite different than public pronouncements. Ac-
cording to the cables, Syrian officials conveyed extreme disappointment in
the way that the United States had approached the process of engagement.
Syrian officials had felt that they had made concessions on Iraq and Leba-
non and received little in return for their efforts. FM Moallem expressed his
skepticism about U.S commitment to repairing bilateral relations. Despite
Syria’s proximity to the Arab-Israeli conflict and its potential role as a play-
er in the issue, U.S. Special Envoy on Middle East Peace George Mitchell
bypassed the country on his tour of the Middle East, instead choosing to go
to more peripheral countries like Morocco for negotiations.104
More importantly, President Obama renewed the notorious Syria Ac-
countability Act—continuing strict sanctions for the country’s state spon-
sorship of terrorism—just as Feltman and Shapiro left for their visit.105 In
a letter to Congress, President Obama explained this decision to extend
sanctions. He said that it was predicated on Syria’s ongoing efforts to pro-
103
Feltman, Jeffrey D., “Special Briefing: Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman Briefs on Meet-
ings With Syrian Officials,” U.S. Department of State, March 7, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2009/03/120122.htm
104
“Feltman-Shapiro Meeting in Damascus: Israeli-Syrian Peace Issues,” WikiLeaks,
Wikileaks Cable 359, May 21, 2009, http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=208124.
105
“Feltman-Shapiro Meeting in Damascus: FM Muallim Questions US Commitment to
Real Engagement,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks 335, May 12, 2009, http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.
php?id=206592.
mote instability through terrorism, proliferation and insurgency in Iraq.106

Nonetheless, the move jeopardized improvements in the U.S.-Syrian re-
lations. FM Moallem followed up his criticism with a touch of hope that
not all was lost, adding that he would consider moving forward with the
negotiations as long as the United States offered a tangible increase in its
level of commitment to restore ties with Syria. FM Moallem suggested
that as a show of good faith, the U.S. should signal to French, German and
Spanish aerospace companies that they could export and service Airbus
and Dassault planes without fear of U.S. reproach.107 Yet, this idea was
rebuffed by Washington, who believed that offering the Syrian ambassador
to Washington greater mobility of travel was concession enough barring
greater buy-in from the Syrian government.
A subsequent high-level meeting was arranged between Syrian and
U.S. officials, this time in Washington, D.C. Syrian Deputy FM Faisal
al-Miqdad was invited to the American capital to meet with U.S. State
Department officials. This was the first high-level visit by a Syrian official
to the U.S. in eight years. The negotiations on sanctions against Syria
were the main point of order on the agenda. Little information was re-
vealed about the content and outcome of these meetings. FM Moallem
released a statement signaling optimism. He also pointed to the difficul-
ties and problems with mutual trust in the process. He stated, “The agen-
da is clear; it is continuing the Syrian-U.S. dialogue to normalize bilateral
relations. There are, of course, many obstacles and suspicions after an
eight-year suspension of contacts. The gap must be bridged. We cannot
expect or pin large hopes on a first meeting to accomplish this mission.
This is a continuing process and this is part of the dialogue. Therefore, we
view this step as important.”108
106
Laura Rozen, “Peace Envoy Mitchell to Damascus?” The Cable (Foreign Policy blog), June 3,
2009, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/03/peace_envoy_mitchell_to_damascus.
107
“Feltman-Shapiro Meeting in Damascus: Syria Wants Help with Civil Aviation Waivers,”
WikiLeaks, Wikileaks Cable 344, May 14, 2009, http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=206978.
108
Despite the problems and tensions aired during the meeting, the fact
that the two countries had begun to engage in dialogue was considered
a major step in improving the relationship. The most significant turning
point in relations came in the form of a letter from President Obama to
Assad in August 2009. Although the content of the letter was never made
public, the letter allegedly demonstrated the commitment of the Obama
administration to pursue its engagement with the regime in Syria.109 After
multiple high-level meetings, the priorities of the Obama administration
became clear: bilateral relations would be improved on the grounds of
Iraq, the Middle East Peace Process and nuclear non-proliferation. In this
sense, the letter was the successful completion of this period and the intro-
duction of full-scale engagement. Against this backdrop, an analysis of all
three aspects of the new framework for engagement are discussed below.
STABILITY IN IRAQ
Promoting stability and security in Iraq was one of the main motivations
for the Obama administration to reignite its relationship with Syria. The
issue had previously been raised by the Iraq Study Group report, a bipartisan
group appointed by the Congress to assess and evaluate the situation in Iraq
during the war. In this report Syria was pinpointed as one of the sources of
trouble that the U.S. was facing in Iraq. It was argued that “Syria is playing
a counterproductive role. Iraqis are upset about what they perceive as Syrian
support for efforts to undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is
not so much to take active measures as to countenance malign neglect: the
Syrians look the other way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their
border into Iraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria.
Like Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq.”110 The
report also argued that the Syrians had indicated their desire for dialogue
109
Andrew Tabler, “Syria Clenches Its Fist,” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2009, http://www.for-
eignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/28/syria_clenches_its_fist.
110
Baker, James A., III, & Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, “The Iraq Study Group Report,
Baker Institute, December 5, 2006, https://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/news/8a41607c/iraq-
studygroup_findings.pdf
with the U.S. In its recommendations, the report suggested that mending
ties with countries like Syria could play an important role in the trajectory of
the conflict in Iraq, stating that “Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at
a low point, both countries have important interests in the region that could
be enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to
move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s....Syria
can make a major contribution to Iraq’s stability in several ways.” 111 A num-
ber of expectations were similarly outlined by the study group:, 1-) “Syria
can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work
together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem
the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.” 2-) “Syria
can establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis.” and 3-) “Syr-
ia can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.”112 However,
these recommendations were not welcomed by President Bush who instead
asserted that “it would be counterproductive at this point to sit down with
Syrians, because Syria knows exactly what it takes to get better relations.”113
These recommendations were later taken into account by the incoming
administration. President Obama, anxious to withdraw U.S. troops from
Iraq, was frustrated with Syria’s permissive attitude toward foreign fighters,
and for allowing them to use Syria as a passage into areas under U.S. oc-
cupation. The White House recognized the need to co-opt Syrian support
on this critical issue if it was going to deliver on the promises the incoming
President had made during the election. Assad was also aware of this expec-
tation of the Obama administrations and sought to take advantage of the
situation by signaling his willingness to help ease the withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Iraq.114 Therefore, Feltman and Shapiro pressured Syrian offi-
cials in May to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. They first named
four fighters known to be operating in Syria, requesting that the regime
111
ibid.
112
ibid.
113
Seymour Hersh, “Syria Calling,”
114
prevent their illegal activity. They next suggested that the Syrian government
address the issue of foreign fighters more broadly. In both instances, the
U.S. attempted to use a system of carrots and sticks to persuade the Syrian
regime to engage in more concrete steps against foreign fighters.
During these negotiations U.S. officials constantly reminded their Syr-
ian counterparts that a stable Iraq would be beneficial not only for the
Iraqi people, but also for Syria, which shares an important border with
its neighbor. In particular, economic relations between the two countries
could provide a win-win situation for the region and help raise econom-
ic prosperity within Syrian society. Additionally, U.S. officials were also
sending a stark warning to the Syrian officials that an unstable Iraq had
the potential to turn into a theater of sectarian insurgency, leading to the
nation’s disintegration into different factions.115
The priority of the Iraqi border was apparent at each and every phase
of the conversations held between U.S. and Syrian officials. Special Co-
ordinator Fred Hof maintains that President Obama held very strong
directives about securing the border between Syria and Iraq. President
Obama impressed upon Damascus—through envoys, letters, and mes-
sages—that any concession, such as easing of sanctions or increased trade
would depend on Syrian cooperation on this matter.116 Cables from the
U.S. Embassy in Damascus to Washington, D.C. show that State De-
partment officials were closely watching the coverage of the high-level
visits from the U.S. in Syrian newspapers. The cables reveal that U.S.
officials were particularly disturbed by the triumphalism emerging in the
state-controlled media in the aftermath of the Congressional visit. One
cable went so far as to suggest that U.S. officials should support the only
private newspaper in Syria by providing talking points in order to amplify
Washington’s message for the Syrian public.117
115
Andrew Tabler, “Syria Clenches Its Fist,” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2009, http://www.for-
eignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/28/syria_clenches_its_fist.
116
117
“Re-engaging Syria: Entering the Syrian Spin,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks Cable 142, February
19, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DAMASCUS142.html.
Despite pressures, FM Moallem reportedly responded dubiously to

calls to close the border during the meeting. According to him, the matter
was not an issue of political will but rather of the security capacity at the
Syrian-Iraqi border. FM Moallem requested that the U.S. provide tech-
nical assistance and military equipment, including night vision goggles
for the Syrian military. According to some in the State Department, the
lack of military equipment was just an excuse for the Syrian regime. They
asserted that the reality of Syrian support for the insurgency in Iraq was
more complicated and providing military assistance was a wrong step to
take. However, President Obama went forward and complied with certain
demands put forth by the Syrian regime.118
Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence began taking concrete measures to pre-
vent the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through Syria by investigating
source countries in different parts of the world in an effort to create ef-
fective cooperation. Through this cooperation, the U.S. was able to ef-
fectively block insurgents from source countries before they arrived in
Damascus. This led to a dramatic decline in the number of foreign fight-
ers sourced from Damascus. This situation, without much effort by the
Syrian regime, decreased the tension between the two countries about in-
surgents in Iraq.119 As such, the U.S. introduced a military element to the
rapprochement, suggesting the institutionalization of a security program
with Iraq to heighten the impregnability of the border.120 U.S. officials
offered to send a delegation from the U.S. Central Command (CENT-
COM) to Damascus in order to discuss the potential for security cooper-
ation.121 With a little help from Senator Kerry to smooth rocky relations
between the two countries, Secretary Clinton and FM Moallem spoke
118
119
Ibid.
120
“May 7 Feltman-Shapiro Meeting in Damascus: FM Muallim Questions US Commit-
ment to Real Engagement,” Wikileaks Cable 335.
121
“May 7 Feltman-Shapiro Meeting In Damascus: FM Muallim Noncommittal On
U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi Security Cooperation,” Wikileaks, Wikileaks Cable 342, May 14, 2009, http://
cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=206976.
over the phone in June to set a timetable for visits by the CENTCOM
delegation and Special Envoy George Mitchell.122
On June 12, 2009, the delegation from CENTCOM visited Damascus
to discuss border security as well as attempts to stop the flow of foreign
fighters. During meetings, the possibility of creating specific mechanisms
for a joint effort to sustain a peaceful border between Syria and Iraq was
heavily discussed.123 The CENTCOM delegation proposed a trilateral bor-
der monitoring group with Syria and Iraq to encourage burden-sharing
and improve relations between the countries. The proposal included joint
assessments of several critical Syrian-Iraqi border crossings and the forma-
tion of a working group aimed at providing border security.124
A follow up meeting between the parties took place in August. The
CENTCOM delegation, joined by high-ranking civilian officials, again
proposed to begin a joint assessment of the border postings, providing a
clear timetable for the task. Syrian officials agreed to discuss the matter but
obstinately resisted yielding concessions, believing that they should be re-
warded with a high-level diplomatic visit or the restoration of the U.S. am-
bassador merely for agreeing to the talks.125 However, following the talks,
the parties reached a tentative agreement to form a tripartite committee.
Soon afterward, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki of Iraq visited Damas-
cus in order to seal the tripartite agreement for border security.126 High
expectations surrounded PM Maliki’s meeting with Assad, which had the
potential to facilitate a smooth execution of U.S. goals in Iraq. However,
the debate proved moot as bad blood between Syria and Iraq ultimately
poisoned the deal. Historically, Syrians distrusted PM Maliki, and Iraqis
122
David Ignatius, “Breakthrough with Syria, Real Clear Politics, June 3, 2009, http://www.
realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/03/breakthrough_with_syria_96789.html.
123
“Border Security: U.S. Delegation Takes First Step with Sarg,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks
Cable 426, June 21, 2009, http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=213187.
124
Ibid.
“Codel Kaudman-President Assad Meeting May 28,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks Cable 337,
125
May 29, 2009, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09DAMASCUS377.html.

126
Tabler, “Syria Clenches Its Fist.”
held contempt for Syria’s support of exiled Baathists. Yet any hope of a
security deal shattered when bombs exploded in Baghdad in August 2009,
and Iraqi officials immediately accused the Syrian government of har-
boring those responsible for the attacks. Iraqi PM Maliki demanded that
Damascus surrender two ex-Baathists; Syria withheld and simultaneously
implemented a strong border control to block the flow of fighters entering
Iraq from its territory. Later, the crisis deepened when the Iraqi govern-
ment broadcast a video of a confession of an al-Qaeda fighter who claimed
to be trained by Syrian intelligence in Syria.127 When the Syrian regime
refused to extradite the two former Baathists without concrete evidence
of their guilt, Baghdad withdrew its ambassador from Damascus. This de-
cision had an adverse impact on the relations between the two countries,
and destabilized the tripartite arrangement.128 Several different explosions
in Baghdad followed this episode, further straining relations. After a series
of bombings on October 25 in Baghdad, new allegations emerged about
the role of the former Iraqi Baathists operating freely in Damascus. Al-
though denied by the Syrian regime, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry as well as
Iraqi embassy officials in Damascus stated that they had witnessed the free
movement of former regime elements in Syrian cities.129
By September 2009, the administration recognized that the trilateral
discussions were dead in the water and began to look for a viable alter-
native to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to its relationship with
Syria beyond security cooperation, chiefly through water management,
law enforcement reform and NGO development. The assumption held
by U.S. officials was that Washington could entice Assad’s government
127
Christopher M. Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz and Jeremy Sharp,
“Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Services, October 6, 2009,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33793.pdf.
128
Mona Yacoubian, “Syria and the New Iraq: Between Rivalry and Rapprochement in
Iraq,” in Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and Reordering of Power,
eds. Henry J. Barkey, Scott B. Lasensky, and Phebe Marr. (Washington, DC: United States In-
stitute of Peace, 2011).
“Iraqi Embassy Reports Worsening Syrian Iraqi Relations,” WikiLeaks, Wikileaks Cable
129
820, November 24, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09DAMASCUS820.html.

to cooperate by engaging with it in areas of technical interest to boost

“routine interaction.” Conversations about “dangling” the prospect of few-
er sanctions and greater public diplomatic engagement were also under
consideration. In fact, six months after its first interaction with the Syrian
government, the Obama administration began strategizing for the next six
months. Preparation included diving into issues less related to military and
security and more at the diplomatic-level. However, the plan also made
it clear that the priorities of the administration, particularly the foreign
fighter dilemma, remained at the top of the agenda. The Middle East Peace
Process and the nuclear dossier came only after this significant issue.130 As
part of the continuation of diplomatic engagement, Deputy FM Faisal
Miqdad visited Washington, D.C. for meetings in September. This was the
first time a Syrian envoy had visited Washington in eight years. That said,
the parties failed to reach a consensus about the steps needed for the first
phase of further negotiations between Syria and the U.S.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Syrian-Israeli track of the peace process collapsed in 2000, and was
subsequently totally abandoned, especially following the Second Intifa-
da that year. Tensions between Tel Aviv and Damascus further increased
when Israel targeted Palestinian units inside Syria in 2003 during the Ain
es Saheb airstrikes. It was the first of such attacks inside Syria since the
end of the October War in 1973. Meanwhile, U.S. support for the Israeli
attacks strained the already fragile relations between the U.S. and Syria. In
the aftermath of the Israeli offense, President Bush justified the attacks as
self-defense, stating that the U.S. would itself resort to the same strategy
to deal with potential threats in Syria.131 These developments damaged
the prospects of Israeli-Syrian relations, specifically the peace process, and
130
“Re-engaging Syria: Toward a Six-Month Plan,” WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks Cable 671, Sep-
tember 10, 2009, http://www.dazzlepod.com/cable/09DAMASCUS671/?q=09damascus671.
131
International Crisis Group, “Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities.”
degraded U.S. policy in the region.132 This issue became increasingly pe-
ripheral to U.S. foreign policy.
During the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006, the crisis between Damascus
and Tel Aviv reached an even higher level. In several instances, Syrian offi-
cials signaled that Syria might enter the war on Hezbollah’s side. They also
allowed the Iranian government to provide supplies for Hezbollah forces
through Syrian territory. Negotiations between Syria and Israel restarted
with the mediation of Turkey. This was significant in two ways. On the
one hand, it was considered the first major step towards the resolution of
the problem since the Clinton administration’s attempted to mediate the
dispute. On the other hand, the negotiations created a potential resolu-
tion to Syria’s isolation from the international community. According to
some, the negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and
Assad were not completely welcomed by the Bush administration. In fact,
President Bush discouraged PM Olmert from resuming negotiations with
Syria until the Assad regime implemented the steps outlined by the U.S.
government. The Assad regime had signaled at different instances that it
was willing to renew the negotiations under the mediation of the Unit-
ed States, but the Bush administration ignored these invitations. Despite
Washington’s opposition for the launching of this process, negotiations
were announced in May 2008 and the U.S. was not able denounce or
oppose it.133 Ultimately, this process was unable reach its final goal of gen-
erating a long-term and sustainable peace between Syria and Israel because
it was interrupted with the start of Operation Cast Lead by the Israeli
Defense Forces in December 2008.
The Obama administration viewed its engagement with Syria as a way
to reinvigorate the stalled Middle East Peace negotiations. The aftermath
of the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel left the region incredibly
132
Itamar Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relation-
ship as a U.S. Policy Issue,” Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution,
Analysis Paper no. 19 (March 2009).
133
International Crisis Group, “Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities.”
unstable. Israel felt threatened in facing an unconventional challenge from

a non-state group; Hezbollah was better equipped militarily and more po-
litically involved in the region than the Lebanese state; and Iran began
more aggressively pursuing its nuclear program. By courting Syria, U.S.
and Israeli officials believed that they could diminish Assad’s alliance with
Iran and Hezbollah and in turn blunt their influence.134 The renewed in-
terest in the MEP Israel-Syria track would serve to demonstrate a strong
U.S. resolve and improve U.S. credibility in other areas of involvement in
the Middle East. President Obama first signaled his intention to deal with
this issue in his Cairo Speech in June 2009. Both his statements on the
peace process and on the future of U.S.-Middle East relations signaled a
new era for U.S. policy toward the region.
Syria, both in its previous messages as well as during early contacts with
the Obama administration, expressed its readiness to work with the U.S.
on the MEP talks. In conversations with Senator John Kerry in February
2009, Assad indicated his willingness to cooperate on the MEP initiative,
calling the U.S.’ stance on the matter “Syria’s most important concern.”135
In the following days, Assad became more vocal about relations with Is-
rael. For instance, he offered a “cold peace” to Israel and requested U.S.
mediation in order to resolve the dispute between Syria and Israel. In these
statements, he also suggested that a direct line of communication between
President Obama and himself would be more constructive in the resolu-
tion of several problems between the countries.136 During a May 2009
U.S. congressional visit to Damascus, Assad made it clear that he was anx-
ious to make peace with Israel: “If we don’t achieve something now while
134
Isabel Kershner, “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks Involved Golan Heights Exit,” The New
York Times, October 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/middleeast/secret-is-
rael-syria-peace-talks-involved-golan-heights-exit.html?_r=0.
135
“Senator Kerry: Syria Willing to Help Achieve Palestinian Unity,” Haaretz, February 21,
2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/senator-kerry-syria-willing-to-help-achieve-palestinian-unity-
1.270630; See also “Kerry - Assad: Dividing Iraq and Unifying Iran,” Wikileaks Cable 160.
136
Tabler, In the Lion’s Den, 222-223.
Obama is President, it will be difficult in the future.”137 Seymour Hersh, in

an article in New Yorker, also emphasized Assad’s position. According to
him “in his email after the Gaza War, Assad emphasized that it was more
than ever “essential that the United States play a prominent and active role
in the peace process.” What he needed, Assad said, was direct contact with
President Obama; a conference would not be enough. “It is most natural to
want a meeting with President Obama,” he maintained138 Although it was
well known that the Assad regime was eager to reclaim the Golan Heights
in order to satisfy a decades-long political promise and boost domestic
support, according to some analysts like Joshua Landis, the main objective
of Assad was different in this case. Landis argued “My guess is that Syria
will grudgingly go down the road of accepting U.S. sponsored reconcili-
ation with Israel — not because it believes Israel will give it a pot of gold
– the Golan, but rather, in the hope that the United States will shell out
some trinkets. The trinkets will be the easing of U.S. sanctions and more
normalized relations with Washington, normal enough that is, that other
nations will be able to trade and invest in Syria without inhibition.”139
This strategy were also discussed by different branches of the U.S. admin-
istration. Though U.S. State Department officials questioned whether “the
carrot of a Golan track will be an effective incentive” to encourage Syria
to change other aspects of its foreign policy, the administration ultimately
decided to push forward with negotiations in 2010.140
Though not considered a priority, the Obama administration still
placed the peace process on its foreign policy agenda. Although the most
public and debated dimension of the process was the Palestinian-Israeli
track, many members of the administration considered the Syrian-Israeli
track to be just as important as a prerequisite for the stability of the Middle
137
Codel Kaufman-President Assad Meeting May 28,” Wikileaks Cable 377.
138
Landis, Joshua, “Ire over US Sanctions Causes Poicy Review in Damascus,” Syria Comment,
139
May 13, 2009, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/page/101/

140
“Kerry - Assad: Dividing Iraq and Unifying Iran,” Wikileaks Cable 160.
East. During the rapprochement with Syria, the Obama administration

considered the possibility of a sustainable peace deal between Syria and
Israel that would contribute to the stabilization of politics in the region.
Special Envoy George Mitchell and Special Coordinator Fred Hof made
multiple trips to Damascus during this period. For the Syrian government,
Special Envoy Mitchell’s visit was particularly anticipated. The fact that
he had skipped Damascus on his first Middle East tour had been a huge
disappointment in Syria. After the meeting with Assad, Special Envoy
Mitchell’s tone echoed his position in past meetings with Syrian officials.
He stated that reinstating negotiations between Syria and Israel was one of
the near-term goals of the U.S. and that President Obama was determined
to facilitate comprehensive peace in the region. He also underscored that
U.S.-Syrian relations were pivotal in providing ground for a more con-
structive role for the Syrian government in the region.141
A month after this visit, on July 26, Special Envoy Mitchell made a fol-
low up trip to Damascus to hold a second round of talks with Assad. After
the meetings, Special Envoy Mitchell stated, once again, that both Syria
and the U.S. were committed to providing a comprehensive peace that
would contribute to stability and security in the region.142 Though Special
Envoy Mitchell did not illuminate which specific topics were debated, he
claimed that the United States was “trying to develop...bilateral issues that
we have with the Syrians” and noted, “[T]he United States is committed
to a dialogue based on mutual interest and mutual respect and a solid
foundation for discussion of our shared goals and of real differences, where
they occur.”143 Purportedly, these shared goals included counterterrorism
and stability in Iraq as well as progress in the peace process.144
During this period, a cable from Damascus to Washington, D.C. was
141
“Mitchel Cites Syria’s Role in Mideast Peace Efforts,” The New York Times, June 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14mitchell.html.
142
“Obama’s Middle East Envoy Steps Up Diplomatic Push in Syria.”
143
Ibid.
144
“Kerry - Assad: Improving the U.S.-Syria Relationship,” WikiLeaks Cable 160.
leaked that discussed the status of Turkish-Syrian relations. The document

revealed that the U.S. was worried about the possible adverse effects of
improved Syrian-Turkish relations on Washington’s influence over Damas-
cus as well as on an emerging peace process. It goes on to suggest that
Turkish criticisms towards Israeli policies aided the Syrian government by
emboldening the regime and eliminating the incentive for Syria to halt
its relations with groups such as Hezbollah or to distance itself from Iran.
Furthermore, increasing Turkish support for Syria was reducing the pros-
pect for achieving peace in the region. According to the cable, “Turkey's
methodical deepening of relations with Damascus offers Syria a strategic
buffer against international pressure and a ready mediator willing to help
Syria mend strained relations with neighbors... At the moment, the SARG
is seeking to characterize Turkish-Israeli tensions as a show of Turkish soli-
darity with Syria and Palestinians.”145 The cable continues:
“While the US and Turkey generally share the same overriding objectives
of regional comprehensive peace and stability, Turkish officials here stiffen
when we broach the possibility of closer US-Turkish cooperation to influ-
ence Syria on specific issues (e.g., Iran or Lebanon). Given Ankara’s jealous
approach to Syria, one that applies equally to French and EU efforts to engage
Damascus, our challenge is to nudge the deepening of Syrian-Turkish relations
toward strategic Syrian choices necessary for achieving shared objectives, even
if we differ with Ankara on tactical approaches.”146
U.S. officials working on the Syria portfolio were also mentioned in the
same cable as arguing that Turkey was the best hope for the U.S. to keep
Syria away from Iran.
There was a serious discussion within the U.S. administration if mend-
ing ties with Syria would produce the desired distancing of ties between
Syria and Iran. This issue had been raised earlier by past members of the
U.S. administrations. For instance, Martin Indyk was quoted in Seymour
Hersh’s article on Syria writing in his memoirs that “There is a deep diver-
145
“Turkish Support Emboldens Assad But Provides Best Hope for Coaxing Syria from Iran,”
Wikileaks, Wikileaks Cable 759, October 28, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09DA-
MASCUS759.html.
146
Ibid.
gence between Iran and Syria, captured in the fact that at the same time
as Iran’s president threatens to wipe Israel off the map, his Syrian ally is
attempting to make peace with Israel… Should negotiations yield a peace
agreement, it would likely cause the breakup of the Iranian-Syrian axis.”147
According to Hersh, Indyk also suggested similar things to him during
their interviews. According to Hersh, Indyk answered a question about
this “linkage” by saying that “It will not be easy for him to break with
Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran, but he cannot get a peace deal unless he does.
But, if he feels that things are moving in the Middle East, he will not want
to be left behind.”148 Other analysts, such as Howard Scheweber also put
forward similar arguments According to Scheweber, “relations with Syria
are the key. Here’s just one reason: if Syria can be brought on board with
a peace effort, Iran no longer has direct supply lines into Lebanon. Mean-
while, Syria has itself been supporting Hamas in Gaza (hence its role in
negotiating the release of Shalit) as well as meddling in Lebanon. But while
Syria has been notoriously difficult to deal with in the past, there is no
reason in principle why progress cannot be made. Assad is an opportunist,
not a mad ideologue, and certainly not a religious fanatic.”149
While the U.S. was planning to engage in peace negotiations and bring
the parties to the table, several developments generated renewed crisis in
the region. One such event was the November 2009 Israeli military seizure
of a cargo ship in the Mediterranean Sea. The vessel was allegedly carry-
ing nearly 600 tons of weapons from Iran bound for Hezbollah militants
through Syria. This raid led to mutual accusations from both sides. In a
televised statement, FM Muallem called the Israeli commandos conduct-
147
Hersh, Seymour M., “Syria Calling: The Obama Adinistration’s chance to engage in
a Middele East peace,” The New Yorker, April 6, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2009/04/06/syria-calling
148
ibid.
Schweber, Howard, “Iran and the Syrian Gambit,” Huffington Post, May 25, 2011, http://
149
www.huffingtonpost.com/howard-schweber/iran-and-the-syrian-gambi_b_221505.html
ing the raid pirates and denied that the ship was carrying weapons.150 Ef-
forts to contain the crisis followed in December 2009 in the form of a visit
to Damascus by Fred Hof, the Special Coordinator for Regional Affairs.
Special Coordinator Hof met with Syrian FM Muallem who, despite the
crisis, repeated Syria’s willingness to engage in peace talks with Israel. Ac-
cording to a cable about the meeting, FM Muallem stated that U.S. in-
volvement in direct negotiations launched with the facilitation of Turkey
was a “practical necessity.” However, in order for the U.S. to be considered
an honest broker by the Syrian side, FM Muallem requested improve-
ments in U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations. As a first step to reignite relations
and as a sign of U.S. goodwill, FM Muallem proposed that the U.S. allow
the Qatari government to transfer an Airbus 340 to Syria.151
Later in 2010, Tel Aviv and Damascus engaged in a heated debate over
the peace process, directing threats against one another. First, during a visit
by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Assad told reporters that Israel was not
serious about achieving peace, and that in fact, the policies of the Israeli
government were pushing the region to war. Following this statement, FM
Moallem said that Israel should not test the determination of Syria and
threatened to move the war to Israeli cities. Immediately following these
statements, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned the Syrian
government that in any war with Israel, the Assad family would lose power.
He claimed, “I think that our message must be clear to Assad. In the next
war not only will you lose, you and your family will lose the regime. Neither
will you remain in power, nor the Assad family.”152 Although such state-
ments were common occurrences between the two countries, the fact that
they came during a time when President Obama and the U.S. government
150
Charles Levinson and Josh Mitnick, “Israeli Navy Seizes Weapons Believed to be for
Hezbollah,” The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2009l, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB125732536158927651.
151
“Special Coordinator Hof ’s December 16 Meeting with FM Muallim,” Wikileaks,
Wikileaks Cable 868, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09DAMASCUS868.html.
Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Minister Adds Heat to Exchange With Syria,” The New York Times,
152
February 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/middleeast/05mideast.html.

were trying to mediate between the two countries created tension not only
between Syria and Israel, but also in U.S. relations with both nations.
From the fall of 2010 up until the spring of 2011, the White House
tasked Special Coordinator Fred Hof and Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for the Central Region Dennis Ross with engaging
in shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Tel Aviv, which began at a
time when the Palestinian peace track was at a standstill.153 This process
was kept very quiet; outside the White House, only a handful of top State
Department officials were kept abreast of the program’s progress.154 Dis-
cussions were largely predicated on Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan
Heights in exchange for a Syrian disengagement from Iran.155 The meet-
ings never reached the finely detailed stage of determining the demarcation
of the border, the timeline for Israeli troop withdrawal, and exact security
arrangements.156 Still, American officials indicated that negotiators were
rapidly approaching an agreement. Reportedly, Special Assistant Ross told
the administration that Syria was willing to limit its communication with
Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, give up its claims to the Sea of Galilee and
work with the U.S. on counterterrorism issues. In return, Israel report-
edly agreed to return the Golan Heights, cooperate on water issues and
normalize relations with Syria by exchanging ambassadors immediately.157
Officials entered the spring of 2011 quite optimistic about the status of the
Israel-Syria track of the MEP negotiations.
NON-PROLIFERATION
Another dimension of U.S. policy towards Syria at this time entailed
153
Kershner, “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks Involved Golan Heights Exit.”
154
155
Kershner, “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks Involved Golan Heights Exit.”
156
Aluf Benn, “Assad’s Israeli Friend,” Haaretz, March 28, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/
opinion/assad-s-israeli-friend.premium-1.512146;
157
Anonymous, interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.; See also Tabler, In the Lion’s Den and
“Report: U.S. in secret talks with Syria over peace accord with Israel,” Haaretz, January 1, 2011,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-u-s-in-secret-talks-with-syria-over-
peace-accord-with-israel-1.334635.
the issue of controlling weapons of mass destruction. This was a significant

element of U.S. foreign policy, both for its overall international security
strategy as well as for its its policy toward the Middle East, in particular its
relations with countries seen as contributing to proliferation. Even before
becoming president, President Obama had outlined his vision of interna-
tional security and politics in a commentary in Foreign Affairs, stating that
the nuclear non-proliferation and elimination of weapons of mass destruc-
tion program would be a significant part of his foreign policy. According
to him, “America must lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons
and material at vulnerable sites within four years—the most effective way
to prevent terrorists from acquiring a bomb.”158 Later in his inauguration
speech, his message to regimes about unclenching their fists was consid-
ered a message to Iran to terminate its nuclear program. Some elements of
the U.S.’s rapprochement with Syria had to do with the Obama adminis-
tration’s decision to deal with nuclear weapons. Solving the Syrian nuclear
problem would be considered a first step and a test case to deal with the
nuclear program of Iran. Those in the bureaucracy who wanted the U.S.
to fix its relations with Syria also benefitted from this argument and con-
sidered the resolution of the nuclear issue a significant part of the package.
The nuclear issue and non-proliferation efforts were less public yet still
important avenues for greater cooperation between the U.S. and Syria.
The IAEA had been hounding Syria since the existence of the al-Kibar
nuclear facility near Deir al-Zour became public knowledge in 2007. Re-
ports alleged that the government built the facility with help from North
Korea in order to produce nuclear weapons. The facility was destroyed by
Israeli airstrikes the same year but IAEA tests in 2008, only begrudgingly
allowed by Syria following a failed effort to conceal the evidence, still
detected a high-level of chemically processed uranium in the soil. After
this discovery, the IAEA was barred from conducting any more investi-
158
Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 86, No. 4 (July/August
2007), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62636/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership
gations.159 As such, Syria joined its ally Iran on the IAEA’s blacklist, es-
pecially after the IAEA announced in 2011 that there was evidence Syria
intended to produce weapons.160
The State Department believed that engaging Syria on a non-prolifera-
tion track might prove to be a promising track of U.S.-Syrian cooperation.
However, the impact of the Israeli strikes generated an increasing degree
of skepticism on the part of the Syrian government about any further co-
operation with any Western country on the issue of its nuclear program.
In order to overcome this impasse, the U.S. offered to conduct a “special
inspection” of nuclear sites and assist Syria. The offer was not stated very
vocally. In fact, the non-proliferation issue had never proved to be central
to the bilateral relationship—that is, until Ambassador-Designate Robert
Ford raised the concept in his confirmation hearing in March 2010.161
After stating that Syria had so far refused to cooperate with international
organizations in regards to their policies on the nuclear issue, Ambassador
Ford emphasized the significance of continued engagement. He stated that
“I do not think that the Syrians will change their policies quickly. Finding
avenues of cooperation with Syria will be a step-by-step process that will
require patience and steady commitment to our principles. And the Syri-
ans could be very helpful if they perceive how their interests are best served
by working with us and the international community.”162
What Ambassador Ford was trying to achieve by raising the nuclear
issue was to find an alternative rationale for the restoration of ties with
the Syrian government and hence, upgrade diplomatic relations between
the two countries to an ambassadorial level.163 During this process, some
thought that the United States should encourage Syria to cooperate with
159
“Al-Kibar,” NTI, December 6, 2013, http://www.nti.org/facilities/461/.
160
Tabler, In the Lion’s Den, 220.
161
162
Ford, Robert, “Statement of Robert Ford Ambassador-Designate to the Syrian Arab Re-
pubilic,” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2010, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/FordTestimony100316a1.pdf
163
the IAEA to abate the agency’s onerous demands or else risk losing its re-
cent warm reception from the international community. Others believed
Syria might move on the Arab-Israeli process to distract the international
community from the investigation.164 Either way, increased engagement
on non-proliferation would underscore President Obama’s stated foreign
policy goal of non-proliferation, isolate Syria’s ally Iran, and act as a confi-
dence-building measure between the United States and Syria.
In 2010, the State Department quietly began negotiations on this mat-
ter Assad initially rejected the notion of such engagement and warned
diplomats not to put him “in (Iran’s) nuclear basket (sic).”165 He made it
difficult for U.S. officials when he invited Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Hasan Nasrallah for a banquet to demonstrate that
there was “no space between Syria and Iran.”166 Despite such public rela-
tions nightmares, those closest to Ambassador Ford reported that he made
great progress on the issue of non-proliferation, though details still lacked
as to what such progress entailed.167 Officials remained optimistic about
negotiations with Syria in the months leading up to the Arab Spring.
Between 2010 and the outbreak of the Arab Spring, despite some set-
backs, relations between Syria and the U.S. steadily improved. In Febru-
ary 2010, President Obama announced that Ambassador Ford would be
his choice for Ambassador to Syria. In the same month, Undersecretary of
State William Burns met with Assad in Damascus and stated that it was
a very useful meeting for both sides, demonstrating a level of enthusiasm
for the future of bilateral relations.168 More significantly, Syrian Intelli-
gence Chief General Ali Mamlouk joined some of the meetings. Accord-
164
Andrew Tabler, “How to React to a Reactor,” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2014, http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/66214/andrew-j-tabler/how-to-react-to-a-reactor.
165
“Kerry - Assad: Improving the U.S.-Syria Relationship,” Wikileaks Cable 160.
166
167
168
Khaled Yacoub Oweise, “Syria's Assad holds security talks with U.S. official,” Reu-
ters, February 17, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/17/us-syria-usa-burns-idUS-
TRE61G32Z20100217.
ing to a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, General Mamlouk

signaled that the U.S. and Syria could cooperate not only to provide bor-
der security between Iraq and Syria, but also to discover other potential
aspects of a security partnership in different realms in the Middle East.
During the meeting, he also reportedly suggested the necessity of cooper-
ation between Syria and the U.S. on intelligence and security.169 However,
the Obama administration kept the details of the meetings confidential,
avoiding any premature statements about the future of relations. During
a hearing in the Senate, Secretary Clinton responded questions about the
prospects of relations with Syria with the list of several items serving as
the backbone of the negotiations. She stated, “Just recently, Undersecre-
tary Bill Burns had very intense, substantive talks in Damascus, and we
have laid out for the Syrians the need for greater cooperation with respect
to Iraq, the end to interference in Lebanon, and the transport or provision
of weapons to Hezbollah, a resumption of the Israeli-Syrian track on the
peace process, which had been proceeding through the offices of the Turks
the last years, and generally, to begin to move away from the relationship
with Iran, which is so deeply troubling to the region as well as to the Unit-
ed States. There are many specifics under each of those big-ticket items
that we have discussed with the Syrians, and we are going to resume am-
bassadorial-level representation, but these issues have to be addressed con-
tinually.”170 Probably among the most significant of these items was the
reference to Iran and the U.S.’s willingness to keep Syria away from Iran.
A day after this statement, during a meeting with President Ahmadinejad,
Assad declared that there was no distance between Iran and Syria, to the
public dismay of Washington.171
169
“Syrian Intelligence Chief Attends CT Dialogue with S/CT Bejamin,” Wikileaks, Wikileaks
Cable 159, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10DAMASCUS159.html.
170
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Testimony before the Senate Appropriation Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, President's Proposed Budget Request for FY2011
for the Department of State and Foreign Operations, Hearing, February 24, 2010, http://www.state.
gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/02/137227.htm.
171
The diplomatic thaw continued following these developments. In

March 2010, a hearing was conducted at the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the nomination of Robert Ford for Syria. During this
meeting, Ambassador Ford listed five main issues that would constitute
the administration’s agenda in Syria: 1) getting Syria to be helpful in stabi-
lizing Iraq; 2) getting Syria to stop helping terrorist groups and to be more
respectful of Lebanese sovereignty; 3) securing Syria’s support for the peace
process; 4) securing the Syrian government’s cooperation with the IAEA;
5) encouraging greater respect for human rights in Syria.172 It was an am-
bitious set of priorities and Ambassador Ford was cautious in responding
to questions, avoiding raising expectations about the future of relations.
During the hearing, he underlined the significance of changing the rela-
tions between Syria and Iran. He stated, “While we and our friends in the
region are working to mitigate Iran’s influence, Syria has helped promote
Iran’s destabilizing policies...I do not think that the Syrians will change
their policies quickly. Finding avenues of cooperation with Syria will be
a step-by-step process that will require patience and steady commitment
to our principles.”173 Following this, Senator Kerry, who was chairing the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during Ambassador Ford’s hearing,
visited Damascus to meet with Assad.
Amidst the diplomatic thaw, tensions also surfaced as a direct result of
several steps taken by Syria. In April 2010, the Israeli government accused
the Syrian regime of delivering SCUD missiles to Hezbollah. According to
Israeli officials, these were accurate long-range missiles, which could put
Israeli cities in grave danger. Although Syria strongly denied these accusa-
tions, Republican Senators signaled that they would delay the confirmation
of Ambassador Ford if the SCUDS were really transferred from Syria to
172
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador to Syria Nomination Hearing, Hearing,
March 16, 2010, Available online at: http://www.c-span.org/video/?292552-1/ambassador-syr-
ia-nomination-hearing.
173
Ibid.
Hezbollah.174 Following this threat, the State Department released a state-

ment condemning any transfer of arms, especially ballistic missiles from
Syria to Hezbollah. Soon after, Syrian officials were summoned by the State
Department to request an explanation for concerns raised by the Israeli gov-
ernment.175 Later in a statement Feltman defended the decision of President
Obama to continue its engagement with Syria. He stated that the Obama
administration believes diplomacy can influence Syria’s behavior and said
“An ambassador is not a reward; it’s a tool.” According to him, just like its
relations with the leaders of Iran and Hezbollah, Syria’s president also need-
ed to have some form of relationship with the Obama administration.176
Once again, the Obama administration continued the rapprochement
with Syria. Shortly after the crisis over the SCUD missiles, Feltman attended
a subsequent congressional hearing and highlighted the necessity of continu-
ing to restoring diplomatic relations with Syria. He claimed that rebuilding
relations with Syria was particularly important to stabilize a region where U.S.
men and women were actively serving. Feltman argued his country should
utilize all assets at its disposal to convey messages about certain issues directly
to the Syrian regime.177 Shortly after, Secretary Clinton clarified the necessity
for the U.S. to continue diplomatic engagement with Syria. She noted that
this engagement was not a form of reward for the Syrian regime.178 Until the
official appointment of the U.S. Ambassador to Damascus in January 2011,
these diplomatic interactions continued between the two countries. Despite
little improvement in these critical issue areas, the Obama administration opt-
ed for the continuation of rapprochement with Syria.
174
Ethan Bronner, “Israel Says Syria Gave Missiles to Hezbollah,” The New York Times,
April 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/world/middleeast/15israel.html?adxnn-
l=1&adxnnlx=1416157255-Inhe9kK6dxNFqzUR+N37dA.
175
Mark Landler, “U.S. Speaks to Syrian Envoy of Arms Worries,” The New York Times, April
19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/20syria.html?_r=2&.
176
http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-defends-syria-envoy-plan-despite-reports-of-scud-trans-
fer-1.284639
177
178
Ibid.
On the eve of the revolutions in the Middle East, President Obama

worked within his administration’s centralized structure of decision-mak-
ing while still engaging in a deliberative process with his cabinet and
national security staff in order to craft U.S. policy on Syria.179 Through
this consultation, the administration was able to secure the endorsement
of all key players in the government for diplomatic engagement.180 The
only significant exception of this process was witnessed in the beginning
of direct communication with Syrian officials. Some State Department
officials were concerned about the possible perception of the U.S.’s at-
tempt to mend ties with Damascus by the Syrian regime. According to
them, the Syrian regime, from the outset, was cooperating only to gain
some legitimacy and to relieve itself from economic sanctions. They were
also certain that the Syrian regime held a dishonest position on border
security between Syria and Iraq. Moreover, they were convinced that
the Syrian government would turn this rapprochement into a sort of
a triumph and were skeptical about whether the Assad regime would
fulfill its promises.181 In addition, there were some groups within U.S.
that were also unhappy with rapprochement between Syria and the U.S.
Joshua Landing in his blog wrote that “The Neocon anti-Syrians are
coming out in full force in an effort to stop engagement between Syria
and the U.S. The pretext is the Iraqi dust up with Damascus over the
car bombings in Baghdad last month. Maliki accused Syria of protecting
the perpetrators and has demanded Syria hand over a list of ex-Baathist
officials living in Syria. Damascus responded that there is no proof of
the Iraqi accusations. Syrian officials claim that far from trying to de-
stabilize Iraq, they have every interest in helping to stabilize it now that
179
For more detail on President Obama’s management style, see James Pfiffner, “Decision
Making in the Obama White House,” Presidential Studies Quarterly (June 2011), GMU School of
Public Policy Research Paper No. 2011-13.
180
Schenker, David, “Who Decides on the Levant in Washington?,” The Washington Instiute
for Near East Policy, October 6, 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
who-decides-on-the-levant-in-washington
181
American troops are on the way out. ”182 This resistance later manifested
itself during the appointment hearing of Ambassador Ford. However, at
the insistence of the officials at the higher echelons of the administra-
tion, most naysayers acquiesced to the process. The avid involvement of
the Secretary of State and her deputies, the National Security Council
(NSC), and even the Senate, as represented by Senator Kerry, demon-
strated President Obama’s willingness to encourage the creative develop-
ment of policy to achieve U.S. objectives.183
The independent reports about the U.S.- Syria relations also raised
some significant degree of skepticism about the future of the relations. The
ICG expressed the necessity for caution in the improvement of relations in
a two part report. It was stated that:
“President Obama’s effort to re-engage was always going to be a pains-
taking and arduous task of overcoming a legacy of mutual mistrust. Syrian
doubters have their counterparts in Damascus, who are convinced Washington
never will truly accept that the Arab nation can play a central regional role. The
administration’s slow and cautious moves are not necessarily a bad thing. There
is need for patience and realism. The region is too unstable for Damascus to
move abruptly; relaxation of U.S. sanctions is tied to Syrian policies toward
Hamas and Hizbollah that are hostage to a breakthrough with Israel for which
conditions do not seem ripe. Neither side is ready for a leap, and both have
domestic and foreign skeptics with whom to contend.
But the pace is less worrying than the direction. The temptation in Wash-
ington seems to be to test Syrian goodwill – will it do more to harm the Iraqi
insurgency, help President Abbas in Palestine or stabilise Lebanon? On its own,
that almost certainly will not succeed. The U.S. is not the only one looking for
evidence. So too is Syria – for proof that the risks it takes will be offset by the
gains it makes. The region’s volatility drives it to caution and to hedge its bets
pending greater clarity on where the region is heading and, in particular, what
Washington will do.”184
Landis, Joshua, “Is the Syrian-US Engagement at an End?” joshualandis.com, Thursday,

182
September 17th, 2009 http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/page/93/

183
David Ignatius, “Kerry’s Unusual Role in Mediating U.S.-Syria Relations,” The Washington
Post, June 1, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2009/06/_the_long-stalled_
us_diplomati.html.
184
International Crisis Group, “Reshuffling the Cards? (I): Syria’s Evolving Strategy,” De-
cember 14, 2009 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Af-
rica/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/92_reshuffling_the_cards__i__syrias_evolving_strategy.pdf
The report also recommended some caution in regards to the future

trajectory of relations between Syria and U.S.
“A wiser approach would be for the U.S. and Syria to explore togeth-
er whether some common ground could be found on regional issues. This
could test both sides’ intentions, promote their interests and start shaping the
Middle East in ways that can reassure Damascus about the future. On Iraq,
it may not truly exercise positive influence until genuine progress is made
toward internal reconciliation. The U.S. could push in that direction, test
Syria’s moves and, with the Iraq government, offer the prospect of stronger
economic relations with its neighbour. Syria claims it can press Hamas to
moderate views but only if there is real appetite in the U.S. for an end to
the Palestinian divide. Both could agree to try to immunise Lebanon from
regional conflicts and push it to focus on long-overdue issues of governance.
Given the current outlooks and suspicions in Damascus and Washington,
these are all long shots. But, with little else in the Middle East looking up, it
is a gamble well worth taking.”185
In the second part of this report the ICG expressed further caution for
the bilateral relations. Accordingly,
“It always was unrealistic to expect that the mere call for or initiation of
engagement would overcome years of mistrust, divergent conceptions for the
region and conflicting alliances. Right now, a productive process is needed, not
immediate, dramatic results. But there is not even that…
The most realistic measure of success is not whether the U.S. and Syria
achieve a quick breakthrough. At best, that will take time and will have to
await changes in the region and real progress toward Israeli-Syrian peace. The
test, rather, is whether they can move the relationship far enough so that it
might resist crises that, almost inevitably and always unexpectedly, will arise.”186
President Obama’s Syria policy was tested with the emergence and rise
of people’s movements in different parts of the Arab world. After the revo-
lutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and the spread of the wave of protests
to Yemen and Bahrain, analysts anticipated similar developments in Syria.
The Assad regime responded to such speculation very early on by sug-
gesting that the Syrian political and social structures were fundamentally
different from those of neighboring countries experiencing revolutions.
In both the national and international press, Assad stressed the difference
185
International Crisis Group, “Reshuffling the Cards? (I): Syria’s Evolving Strategy,”
186
Ibid.
between Syria and other states in the Middle East. During an interview
with The Wall Street Journal, Assad stated,
“We have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab countries but
in spite of that Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked
to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence be-
tween your policy and the people's beliefs and interests, you will have this vac-
uum that creates disturbance. So people do not only live on interests; they also
live on beliefs, especially in very ideological areas. Unless you understand the
ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand what is happening.”187
Assad’s optimism was also mirrored among the members of the U.S.
government as the wave of protests were drawing near Syria.
187
“Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894.
THREE THE ARAB SPRING
THUNDERS THROUGH SYRIA
(MARCH 2011-AUGUST 2011)
“
The U.S. administration began
to think that it could no longer
negotiate with Assad.
“The Syrian people have shown their courage in
demanding a transition to democracy. President
Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transi-
tion, or get out of the way.”188
President Obama, May 19, 2011
The Arab Spring struck at an inopportune time for the Obama

Administration, which intended to reorient U.S. foreign policy from the
unstable Middle East to the burgeoning markets of the Asia Pacific.189 Up-
risings in the Arab world precluded Obama’s ability to complete that pivot.
They also pressured the United States to become more deeply invested
in the turmoil economically and politically. By the time the Arab Spring
reached Syria in March 2011, the bandwidth of the United States’ foreign
policy commitments were stretched thin across North Africa as a result
of the previous uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.190 In February, the
United States had called for its ally, Hosni Mubarak, to “stand down” just
days after turmoil struck in Egypt. This call was heeded when as Mubarak
was forced out of office by the military in mid-February. By mid-March,
the United States had done the same for the Libyan leader, Muammar
Gadhafi, only this time using its own force to back opposition forces. This
188
Barack Obama: “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,” May
19, 2011 (online by The White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa%20.
189
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, http://for-
eignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.
190
82 / T he A rab S pringT hunders T hrough Syria ( M arch 2011- A ugust 2011)
intervention was conducted via NATO and endorsed by the UN.

When uprisings broke out in Syria in March, the Obama administra-
tion approached the situation with greater caution than it had the earlier
uprisings. The reluctance to get involved was most tangibly felt via Senator
Kerry’s approach after the first wave of protests hit Syria. Senator Kerry,
who was at that point one of the point men of the Obama administration
on Syria, tried to be optimistic about the course of the developments. In
an address at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he said
that he still expected Assad to take steps towards political reform and move
forward in its engagement with America and its allies. He stated, “my
judgment is that Syria will move; Syria will change, as it embraces a legit-
imate relationship with the United States and the West and economic op-
portunity that comes with it and the participation that comes with it.”191
United States restraint toward Syria occurred for several reasons. First,
as for many other regional and global actors, Syria was expected to be less
susceptible to the Arab Spring because of its social and political structure.
After the peaceful transition of power from Hafiz al-Assad to Bashar, many
analysts thought that al-Assad the son had completed the Assad family’s
ultimate consolidation of power and had firm control over the country.
After the Hama massacres in 1982 and decades of repression, many did
not expect the opposition to organize and oppose Assad’s consolidated and
seemingly revolution-proof regime.192
In the run-up to the first demonstration in Syria, different analyses
asserted that Syria would not follow the same trajectory as Egypt. One
analysis published in Time Magazine, it was stated that:
Middle East watchers, perhaps more hopeful than informed, point to a
new facebook page — The Syrian Revolution 2011 — which has garnered
191
Josh Rogin, “Kerry: It’s Time to Give Up on Assad the Reformer,” The Cable (Foreign
Policy blog), May 10, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/10/kerry_it_s_
time_to_give_up_on_assad_the_reformer.
192
Stephanie Gaskell, “Interview with Ryan Crocker: Assad will Prevail ‘Yard by Bloody
Yard,’” Defense One, August 5, 2013, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/08/ryan-crocker-
id-go-syria-heartbeat/68132/.
15,000 fans in the scant week it has existed, as proof that Assad's regime is the
next to go. But don't expect the successor of the 47-year-old regime, which he
inherited from his father in 2000, to be packing his bags anytime soon. Syria
may suffer the same political alienation, economic dislocation and corruption
that plagues most of the region's regimes, but its government also holds a
unique position that sets it apart from the others: that of a pariah state. Assad's
Syria is the only country in the Arab world that is not beholden to Western
influence or support.193
Another analysis by Bassam Haddad raised similar points about the

legitimacy of the regime. He questioned Assad legitimacy on the basis of
the government’s stance against Israel and the U.S. He also mentioned the
fluidity of the situation on the ground, writing:
Discussions of Syria’s vulnerability to internal protests often posit Da-
mascus’s resistance status to explain why Syria will be spared: i.e., that be-
cause of Syria’s confrontational stance toward Israel and the United States’
brutal policies in the region, the regime enjoys a form of Arab nationalist
legitimacy. In particular, Syria’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas is con-
sidered a unique and legitimate tool for manifesting such confrontation to
imperialism. After all, President Bashar al-Assad polls quite well throughout
the region compared to other Arab leaders, and enjoys significant popularity
among various segments of Syrian society.194
Later, in an interview, Assad himself expressed similar viewpoint.:

If you want to make a comparison between what is happening in Egypt
and Syria, you have to look from a different point: why is Syria stable, although
we have more difficult conditions? Egypt has been supported financially by the
United States, while we are under embargo by most countries of the world. We
have growth although we do not have many of the basic needs for the people.
Despite all that, the people do not go into an uprising. So it is not only about
the needs and not only about the reform. It is about the ideology, the beliefs
and the cause that you have. There is a difference between having a cause and
having a vacuum. So, as I said, we have many things in common but at the
same time we have some different things.195
Baker, Aryn, “Syria Is Not Egypt, but Might It One Day Be Tunisia?,” Time, February 4,
193
2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046426,00.html
194
Haddad, Bassam, “Why Syria Is Unlikely to be Next… for Now,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, March 9, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&ar-
ticle=42936&utm_source=Arab+Reform+Bulletin&utm_campaign=2ce519be42-ARB+Week-
ly+%28English%29&utm_medium=email
195
Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894
However in the first days of anti-regime demonstrations analysts work-

ing on the Syrian issue were in denial that the regime would not remain
immune from a mass movement within Syria. According to David Hirst,
the “patriotic” and anti-Western rhetoric of Assad may not save him from
the coming storm. He stated that, “this argument, advanced by a despot in
favour of his own survival, appears almost as delusional as those advanced
by others – such as the al-Qaida of Colonel Gaddafi's bizarre imagining.
The patriotic card clearly counts for little with the Syrian public. It is just
a diversion from the real issues at stake.”196
Syria also lacked, a well-organized opposition. In fact, many opposi-
tion groups were monitored by the extremely effective mukhabarat ser-
vices.197 Particularly, State Department officials were skeptical about the
capabilities of the opposition and some were even unwilling to engage
these groups, who reminded them of the role that Ahmed Chalabi had
played before the invasion of Iraq. According to these officials, meetings
between U.S. diplomats and members of the Syrian opposition left more
questions than answers.198 The U.S. lacked real-time information about
events occurring in the country. The administration had trouble devel-
oping situational awareness on the ground as most U.S. embassy staff
and contacts were concentrated in Damascus, far from the outbreak of
the uprisings. According to State Department officials, most of the infor-
mation about Syria at the time was received in Washington, rather than
Damascus.199 For years, U.S. agencies had demonstrated more interest in
the strategic international dimension of Syrian affairs rather than in the
country’s internal dynamics. As a result, American diplomats dedicated
most of the spring and summer attempting to piece together stories from
196
Hirst, David, “Even anti-western Syria is not immune to revolution,” The Guardian,
March 22, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/syria-not-immune-
to-arab-uprising
197
Emile Hokayem, Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (New York: The Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013), 13.
198
199
the news and personal reports in an attempt to garner an actionable un-

derstanding of events on the ground.
Furthermore, the administration had been making headway on the
Middle East peace and non-proliferation talks. As such, officials shared a
certain degree of hope that a settlement in Syria could be secured.200 At the
discrete request of its Syria envoys, the White House held off on issuing
a harsh condemnation of the regime for fear that it would jeopardize the
possibility of negotiations, efforts for which continued until the summer.
The State Department also overestimated the regime’s political acumen
and believed the government could withstand the uprisings if it harnessed
Assad’s image and implemented changes. This later embarrassed the State
Department after Secretary Hillary Clinton’s extemporaneous comment
about Assad as a “reformer” on Face the Nation. Questioned about Syria,
Secretary Clinton underlined the differences between Libya and Syria:
Many of the members of the Congress of both parties, who have gone to
Syria in recent months, have said they believe he is a reformer. What’s been
happening there for the last few weeks is deeply concerning. But there is a
difference between calling out an aircraft and indiscriminately bombing your
own cities than police actions, which frankly have exceeded the use of force
that anyone of us want to see.201
These statements from Secretary Clinton later garnered significant criti-

cism from the Syrian opposition.202 Some members of the Congress also de-
veloped critical positions on the administration’s Syria policy. They asked the
administration to take a strong stand against the killing of the demonstrators
in the country. Senator Joe Lieberman maintained that, in Syria, the inter-
national community should pursue the same course of action as it had in
Libya. He said, “we’re not going to stand by and allow this Assad to slaughter
his people like his father did years ago and in doing so we’re being consistent
200
201
Lucy Madison, “Clinton: No Military Action in Syria for Now,” CBS News, March 27,
2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-no-military-action-in-syria-for-now/;
202
Lake, Eli, “Syrian rebels don’t want U.S. aid, at least for now,” The Washington Times,
March 27, 2011 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/27/syrian-rebels-dont-want-
us-aid-at-least-for-now/print/
with our American values and we’re also on the side of the Arab people who
want a better chance for a decent life.”203 Senator Kyl and Kirk raised similar
criticisms about the administration’s Syria policy. They argued that:
The Syrian people must know that the United States stands with them
against the brutal Assad regime. We can ill afford another timid embrace of a
democratic uprising….We urge the President, Secretary Clinton and Ambas-
sador Ford to publicly condemn the murders committed by the Assad dictator-
ship and to demonstrate their support for the Syrian people.204
Despite these calls from Congress, the administration continued its

line of policy in Syria and rebuffed the criticism. However, the regime
proved to be more rigid than anticipated, and hope faded after Assad deliv-
ered his defiant speech to the Syrian parliament in late March.205 In fact, as
stated by senior policymakers, the U.S. administration began to think that
it could no longer negotiate with Assad.206 Knee-deep in a NATO-mission
in Libya that was turning out to be more complicated than expected, the
administration was hesitant to make statements that could pull it more
deeply into Syria. The belief that regional actors, in the name of national
interest, would choose to manage the crisis independently, precluding the
need for extensive U.S. intervention, permeated the administration.207 The
United States was also unable to ignore the issue-linkage between Syria
and Iran, with whom it was engaged in serious nuclear negotiations.208
All of these pieces and U.S. interests were defined very narrowly in Syria
in 2011. They resulted in the administration’s failure to immediately con-
demn as had done with U.S. ally Mubarak and enemy Gadhafi.209
203
Nagesh, Gautham, “Lieberman would back U.S. action in Syria,” The Hill, March 27,
2011 http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/152031-lieberman-would-back-us-ac-
tion-in-syria
204
Rubin, Jennifer, “Syria’s dictator shows his true colors,” The Washington Post, March 25,
2011 https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/syrias-dictator-shows-his-true-
colors/2011/03/04/AFnGttUB_blog.html
205
206
207
208
David Schenker, interview by Kilic Kanat, July 21, 2014.
209
Demonstrations in Syria continued to attract larger crowds despite the

use of force by the regime against the protesters. As early as March 19th,
New York Times reported that twenty thousand people had joined the fu-
neral processions of protesters killed by the regime forces.210 Though aware
of the political costs attached to direct involvement, the White House and
the State Department were sympathetic to the democratic ambitions of
the Syrian people. Barack Obama issued his first criticisms against Assad
for the violence at the start of April 2011. He made a statement con-
demning the Syrian government for the violence that it committed against
the peaceful protesters. The administration, however, left a door open for
the regime to pursue reform and outlined its expectation for the Syrian
government to the repression of its citizens. The President stated, “until
now, the Syrian government has not addressed the legitimate aspirations
of the Syrian people. Violence and detention are not the answer to the
grievances of the Syrian people. It is time for the Syrian government to
stop repressing its citizens and to listen to the voices of the Syrian people
calling for meaningful political and economic reforms.”211 Assad, however,
continued to target peaceful protesters throughout the country.
April 22nd of that year was to be remembered as the deadliest day
in Syria, witnessing the death of 99 Syrians. The White House released
a statement condemning the violence. This time, the White House not
only accused Assad of resorting to violence against his own people, but
also pointed the finger at Iran for aiding the Syrian regime. The state-
ment underlined, “President Assad is blaming outsiders while seeking
Iranian assistance in repressing Syria’s citizens through the same brutal
tactics that have been used by his Iranian allies.”212 The statement called
210
The New York Times, “Syrian Police Attack Marchers at Funerals,” March 19, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/middleeast/20syria.html?_r=1&ref=world
211
Barack Obama, “Statement from the President on the Violence in Syria,” April 8, 2011
(online by The White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/04/08/statement-president-violence-syria.
212
Kori Schulman, “A Statement by President Obama on Syria,” The White House Blog, April
22, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/22/statement-president-obama-syria.
on President Assad to change course and respond to the demands of his

people.213 The Iranian linkage had been discovered earlier in April by the
U.S. intelligence agencies. In a Wall Street Journal story it was reported
that Obama administration officials had said that “they believe that Iran
is materially assisting the Syrian government in its efforts to suppress
their own people.”214 With this statement Obama administration made
this information public.
By April 29th, President Obama had signed Executive Order 13572,
which declared the regime’s “continuing escalation of violence against the
people” a national emergency and instituted targeted sanctions. In the
EO, President Obama stated that the Syrian regime was responsible for
committing “human rights abuses, including those related to the repres-
sion of the people in Syria, manifested most recently by the use of vio-
lence and torture against, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of, peaceful
protestors.”215 The sanctions were not targeted at Assad, but rather at a
number of his relatives and confidants. These individuals included Assad’s
brother, Maher al-Assad, as well as Atif Najib, Bashar’s cousin, and Ali
Momlouk, the Syrian intelligence chief. Additionally, the Obama admin-
istration sanctioned the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force,
which was heretofore under UN sanctions for supporting different mili-
tant groups around the world. Through this order, the United States also
revoked licenses issued by the U.S. government allowing for the exporta-
tion of several goods and furnishings to Syria. Among them was a license
issued for an airplane reserved for private use by Assad.216 Following this
statement, Secretary Clinton applauded the resolution put forth by the
UN Human Rights Council in its Special Session on Syria, which con-
213
Ibid.
214
Entous, Adam & Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Says Iran Helps crackdown in Syria,” The
Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2011. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870454780
4576261222747330438
215
“Obama Signs New Sanctions Against Syria,” The Huffington Post, June 29, 2011, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/29/obama-sanctions-syria_n_855593.html.
216
Ibid.
demned human rights abuses by the regime, calling on the establishment

of an urgent investigation of the events.217
In May 2011, major figures from numerous government branches be-
gan to express their fading hopes for a compliant Assad regime. Senator
Kerry admitted that he no longer viewed the Syrian government as willing
to reform. He also mentioned that, while Assad held an opportunity to re-
form in the past, this was no longer the case.218 Disagreements throughout
the government branches as well as partisan disputes over the Syria policy
resurfaced following Assad’s continued attacks on civilians. For instance,
Senator John McCain claimed, “lawmakers’ contention that Assad could
be a reformer was one of the great delusionary views in recent foreign
policy history.”219 For Senator McCain, the miscalculation was not only
that of Senator Kerry, “it was a whole lot of people, first of all the admin-
istration.”220 On the other hand, an equally important figure, Senate Intel-
ligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, argued that Assad still
had a chance to do the right thing. She asserted, “I don’t think Syria has
shaken out yet, I don’t think we know what Assad will or won’t do.”221 Oth-
er members of the Congress also expressed similar viewpoints. A bipartisan
group of Senators introduced a resolution condemning abuses committed
by the Syrian regime and calling for the expansion of targeted sanctions
against Syrian officials. The resolution also expressed support for the Syri-
an people, who, it put forward, had joined peaceful protests in the streets
of cities and towns across the country. The resolution was introduced by
Senator Lieberman and Senator Marco Rubio and was cosponsored by
prominent lawmakers including Senators John McCain, Jon Kyl, Richard
Durbin, Lindsey Graham, John Cornyn, Johnny Isakson, Bob Menendez,
217
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “The Human Rights Council’s Special Session on Syria,” Press State-
ment, April 29, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/04/162260.htm.
218
Rogin, “Kerry: It’s Time to Give Up on Assad the Reformer.”
219
Ibid.
220
Ibid.
221
Ibid.
Ben Cardin, Bob Casey, John Barrasso, Kirsten Gillibrand, Chris Coons,
Mark Kirk, John Hoeven and Kelly Ayotte.222
However during this period, the administration retained some hope
for the Syrian regime. On May 8th, Secretary Clinton stated that, despite
the mounting crackdown, the regime in Syria was still expected to take
some steps towards political reform. In an interview, she stated, “there are
deep concerns about what is going on inside Syria and we are pushing hard
for the government of Syria to live up to its own stated commitment to
reforms.”223 The mounting criticisms against the Obama administration’s
position coupled with the increasing death toll began to change the US
perception of the events in Syria. A short time after the Secretary’s inter-
view, this time in another interview, Secretary Clinton expressed the first
signs of frustration about the Syrian regime. Answering a question about
the lack of reaction from the U.S. in the wake of Assad’s attacks, Secretary
Clinton said:
I think we wanted to coordinate with our allies in the European Union,
to talk to our friends and partners in the region, especially those that border
Syria, Israel, Iraq, and others. And we also wanted to make it clear that, as the
President just said in his speech, President Assad of Syria can either lead this
transition or get out of the way. And unfortunately, the evidence thus far is that
he’s not providing the kind of leadership that is needed.224
However, she again stated that the window of opportunity was still
open for the regime. She avoided making an “Assad must go” statement.
She instead argued:
Well, I think President Obama was very clear. And what we want is to
continue to support the voices of democracy, those who are standing against
the brutality. But we're also well aware every situation is different, and in this
one, Assad has said a lot of things that you didn't hear from other leaders in
222
Press Release. “A Bipartisan Group of Senators Introduce Resolution Condemning
Human Rights Abuses In Syria, Urging Further Sanctions,” Website of John McCain, U.S. Sen-
ator- Arizona, May 11, 2011. http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/5/post-
e07e2930-bee0-db70-2fa2-7dc556a1eab8
223
Quinn, Andrew, “Clinton says reform still possible in Syria,” Reuters, May 6, 2011. http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-usa-idUSTRE7455WO20110506
224
Transcript, Hillary Clinton-Katie Couric interview, CBS Evening News, May 19, 2011.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/complete-transcript-hillary-clinton-may-19/
the region about the kind of changes he would like to see. That may all be out
the window, or he may have one last chance.225
Meanwhile, in the proceeding Executive Order 13573, President

Obama targeted senior Syrian government officials, including Bashar
al-Assad, Faruk al-Shara and other high-level authorities, mainly in re-
sponse to the continuing escalation of violence by the Syrian government
against the Syrian people.226 The most significantly clear messages that the
Obama administration conveyed to Assad originated from the President’s
speech on the Arab Spring in May 2011. The President alluded to the gross
human rights violations and attacks against peaceful protesters in Syria
and emphasized that Assad still held a choice: “he can lead that transition,
or get out of the way,” he said.227 President Obama also stated that, if the
regime failed to cease its wrongdoings, “it will continue to be challenged
from within and isolated abroad.”228 A significant dimension of this speech
was in the link President Obama drew between the violence of the Syrian
regime and its Iranian ally, stressing the way in which Tehran was assisting
the Syrian regime with its tactics of suppression.
These statements and sanctions, in part, signaled the end of U.S. efforts
to restore ties with Syria. In this context, the United States began working
at the multilateral level in June 2011, co-drafting a proposal with Canada
that was later signed by 54 UN member states to address the escalating
situation in Syria. The proposal called for the condemnation of violence
and requests authorization for the creation of a UNHCR fact-finding mis-
sion.229 In the meantime in a story in the Wall Street Journal reported
225
Ibid.
226
Executive Order 13573 of May 20, 2011, Blocking Property of Senior Officials of the
Government of Syria, Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2011): 29143-29146, http://www.trea-
sury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13573.pdf.
227
Josh Rogin, “Full Text of Obama’s Middle East Speech,” The Cable (Foreign Policy blog),
May 19, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/19/full_text_of_obamas_middle_
east_speech.
228
Ibid.
229
“Fact Sheet on Syria,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August 18, 2011,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/fact-sheet-syria;
that the administration was collecting information about the human rights
abuses committed by the Syrian regime in preparation for a possible refer-
ral to the International Criminal Court.230
Further statements from the U.S. government followed the proposal,
conveying to the opposition and other actors in the region that the U.S.
would potentially act to stop the violence in Syria. Secretary Clinton made
a statement that the Assad regime was running out of time. She claimed,
“they are either going to allow a serious political process, that will include
peaceful protests take place throughout Syria and engage a productive di-
alogue with members of the opposition and civil society, or they are going
to continue to see increasingly organized resistance.”231 Although there was
an emphasis on an organized resistance, some members of the adminis-
tration were already expressing views strongly against providing military
aid to the opposition groups. According these administration officials, any
form of militarized civil conflict would only bring radicalization, resulting
in further instability in Syria. The only way to prevent such radicalization,
they thought, was to form a moderate and unified opposition, but they
were not very hopeful about the emergence of such an organization.232
Later, this reasoning was frequently recited to explain the administration’s
initial position of inaction in Syria.
A critical development during this period was U.S. Ambassador Robert
Ford’s visit to Hama. The trip occurred just as the regime crackdown on
protesters in the city escalated. According to State Department officials,
the trip was not on the agenda and came as an individual initiative by
Ford. He traveled to Hama by SUV and was surprisingly welcomed at
regime-imposed roadblocks by Syrian soldiers, who did not recognize the
potential repercussions of such a visit. When Ambassador Ford reached
230
Solomon, Jay, “U.S. Pushes to Try Syria Regime,” The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2011.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303635604576391901761410060
231
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Syria,” July 1, 2011 (online by U.S. Department
of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/167502.htm.
232
Hama, the news of his visit spread in the streets. As people began to greet
him, the gathering quickly transformed into a major demonstration.233
According to reports, olive branch waving Syrians chanted on the streets,
waving to the U.S. Ambassador’s jeep; they placed red roses on the wind-
shield and hood of his car.234 Later, Ambassador Ford posted a message
about the situation in Hama on his Facebook page, stating:
“The people in Hama have been demonstrating peacefully for weeks. Yes,
there is a general strike, but what caused it? The government security measures
that killed protesters in Hama. In addition, the government began arresting
people at night and without any kind of judicial warrant. Assad had promised
in his last speech that there would be no more arrests without judicial process.
Families in Hama told me of repeated cases where this was not the reality.
And I saw no signs of armed gangs anywhere – not at any of the civilian street
barricades we passed.
Hama and the Syrian crisis is not about the U.S. at all. This is a crisis the
Syrian people are in the process of solving.”235
While visiting the city, Ambassador Ford stopped at a hospital to

visit those injured by the Syrian security forces and engaged in conver-
sations with the protesters. This visit served as an important opportunity
for the Obama administration to establish contact with the members of
the opposition.236
The news of Ford’s visit to both Hama and to the hospital made its way
to Syrian government officials, who quickly condemned Ford’s meeting
with members of the Syrian opposition. Hama remained a symbolically
important town for Syrian dissent. It is there where Bashar al-Assad’s fa-
ther massacred Syrian civilians in 1982. In its statement, the Syrian regime
claimed that “the presence of the U.S. ambassador in Hama without pre-
vious permission is obvious proof of a clear evidence of the United States’
233
Rania Abouzeid, “U.S. Diplomat Causes Firestorm with Visit to Rebellious Syrian City,”
234
TIME, July 8, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2082128,00.html.

235
“A Note from Ambassador Robert Ford,” Facebook post, July 10, 2011 at 7:10 a.m.,
https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150237831306938.
236
Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).
involvement in current events in Syria and it is an attempt to incite an

escalation in the situation which disturbs Syria’s security and stability.”237
The U.S. State Department responded to the accusations by stating that
the Embassy in Damascus had, in fact, practiced its due diligence by in-
forming the Syrian Foreign Ministry of the visit. The State Department
stressed that “the fundamental intention was to make absolutely clear with
his [Robert Ford] physical presence that we stand with those Syrians who
are expressing their right to speak for change.”238 The show of solidari-
ty with the city by the top U.S. diplomat in the country energized and
motivated the opposition, generating a significant degree of hope among
the members of the opposition. Following this event, the escalation of
the crisis continued with Syria’s decision to restrict the movement of U.S.
diplomats. Shortly after the incident, the U.S. reciprocated the conditions
imposed on them by Damascus and announced that Syrian diplomats
would also be required to request permission prior to visiting Washington,
D.C.239 Approximately a month after this visit, Ambassador Ford gave an
interview to Foreign Policy about his perspective about the developments
in Syria. The interview had an alarmist tone, with Ambassador Ford quot-
ed as saying, “I have seen no evidence yet in terms of hard changes on the
ground that the Syrian government is willing to reform at anything like
the speed demanded by the street protestors. If it doesn’t start moving with
far greater alacrity, the street will wash them away.”240
Following Ford’s visit and interview, relations between the two coun-
tries took on an increasingly antagonistic tone. A few days after the
Hama visit, the U.S. and French embassies in Damascus were attacked by
pro-government mobs. Secretary Clinton responded to the events by as-
237
Martin Chulov, “Syria condemns US ambassador's 'provocative' visit to Hama,” The
Guardian, July 8, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/08/syria-condemns-us-am-
bassador-visit-hama.
238
Ibid.
239
“Fact Sheet on Syria.”
Lynch, Mark, “Our Man in Damascus,” Foreign Policy, July 14, 2011. http://foreignpolicy.
240
com/2011/07/14/our-man-in-damascus/
serting that Assad had lost his legitimacy and should not observe himself as
indispensable for Syria’s future. She also claimed that the U.S. government
had nothing invested in his hold on power.241 A day after this statement,
in a televised interview, President Obama also maintained that the regime
had lost its legitimacy. He said that “He [Assad] has missed opportunity af-
ter opportunity to present a genuine reform agenda. And that’s why we’ve
been working at an international level to make sure we keep the pressure
up.”242 In the following days, top State Department officials, including
Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Hof, met with what would become
the Syrian National Council (SNC) to discuss the steps the U.S. could
take to address the growing crisis. The members of the Syrian opposition
made three requests for the United States in efforts to assist it: 1) a call for
Assad to step down, 2) broader reaching sanctions, and 3) an effort to pass
a UNSC resolution condemning the violence. The Obama administration
accepted the three requests as the foundation of a new plan, which was put
into motion in August 2011.243
241
“Clinton Says Syria’s Assad 'Not Indispensable,'” Voice of America, July 10, 2011, http://
www.voanews.com/content/clinton-says-syrias-assad-not-indispensable--125382213/142106.html.
242
Landler, Mark & David E. Sanger, “White House, in Shift, Turns Against Syria Leader,”
The New York Times, Jul7 12, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/middlee-
ast/13policy.html?_r=2&ref=middleeast
243
Radwan Ziadeh, interview by Kilic Kanat,
FOUR OBAMA CALLS FOR
ASSAD’S REMOVAL
(AUGUST 2011-AUGUST 2012)
“
While trying to avoid involvement,
the inner circle of the Obama White
House did want to give a message
to the world and to the Assad regime
about its position on the conflict.
“We have consistently said that President Assad
must lead a democratic transition or get out
of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the
Syrian people, the time has come for President
Assad to step aside.”244
President Obama, August 18, 2011
The decision-making process for the U.S.’s denunciation of

Assad was consistent with the general approach that President Obama em-
ployed to address other issues during his time in office. Presidential the-
orist James Pfiffner characterizes Pres. Obama’s approach as both encour-
aging of deliberation but also highly centralized, featuring the President
as his own honest broker.245 Former members of Pres. Obama’s foreign
policy team, including Vali Nasr, offer similar arguments describing the
foreign policy decision-making process at the White House. The process
often included a the exclusion of key personalities from debates and de-
liberations.246 What made many observers of U.S. foreign policy team for
Syria frustrated with this process was the lack of a clear policy, the absence
of an interagency process, and a constant emphasis on the message instead
of on strategizing policy responses for the crisis in Syria. Obviously, the
Syrian conflict was something that the White House wanted to avoid to
engaging in. However, while trying to avoid involvement, the inner circle
244
Barack Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria,” April 18, 2011
office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria.
245
Pfiffn Pfiffner, “Decision Making in the Obama White House.”
246
Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Dou-
bleday, 2013).
100 / O bama C alls fo R A ssad ’ s R emova L ( A ugust 2011- A ugust 2012)
of the Obama White House did want to convey a message to the world
and to the Assad regime its position on the conflict. In most instances, the
lack of a clear message seemed less costly and less risky and a responsibili-
ty-free way of dealing with a complicated crises in a different parts of the
world. Many in the State Department considered this an unconventional
way of shaping foreign policy and approached it with skepticism.247
According to some observers, the White House foreign policy team be-
lieved that Assad was going to lose power in a very short period of time. The
President was right in his previous messages to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt,
which allowed him to be “on the right side of the history”. Rather than analyz-
ing the differences and similarities between Egypt and Syria, close advisors of
President Obama were instead concerned that Assad might be overthrown be-
fore the President issued any definite judgment about him publicly. Because of
that, they pressured him to make a statement about Assad without preparing a
corresponding strategy that would back up this message as strong, determined,
and well-thought-out.248 There were also other expectations for the message.
According to many, not only would the rhetoric serve to position the admin-
istration on the “right side” of history in Syria, but it would also encourage
military defections and empower the opposition to topple the regime without
significant investment from the U.S. AFter all, this had been the outcome fol-
lowing the President’s denunciation of Mubarak in Egypt. As David Remnick
put forward during an interview with President Obama, the President (as well
as his inner circle) believed that his words could encourage positive change
in different parts of the world. Such a message would create psychological
support for the opposition in Syria and would simultaneously demoralize and
isolate the regime. Moreover, it would improve the Obama administration’s
image worldwide by demonstrating its commitment to U.S. ideals.249
247
248
ibid.
249
Remnick, David, “Going the Distance: ON and off the road with Barack Obama,” The
New Yorker, January 27, 2014. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-dis-
tance-david-remnick
According to Ambassador Hof, most policymakers in the administration

agreed that the Assad regime was a “dead man walking,” however, disagree-
ment arose over “how long that walk would be.”250 Veterans in the inter-
agency, like Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta, believed that recommen-
dations about putting out a statement over emphasized using messaging
to shape public opinion above crafting effective policy to bring down the
regime. If Assad outlasted the White House’s expectations, they felt that
President Obama would have to back up his statement with action. Yet,
Obama claimed in an August 18, 2011 speech that the United States has
“heard [activists’] strong desire that there not be foreign intervention in
their movement,” relieving the U.S. of any responsibility if and when the
crisis worsened.251 The National Security Council (NSC), either confident
enough in the power of rhetoric or so certain of Pres. Obama’s unwillingness
to get involved militarily, did not advise the President to request contingen-
cy plans from the Pentagon. The White House did not even consult the mil-
itary in high-level discussions until the end of 2011.252 Therefore, members
of Pres. Obama’s NSC team emphasized rhetoric over policy in the decision
to call on Assad to cede his role in government. However, the repercussions
of such a statement for the opposition and U.S. allies in the region extended
beyond messaging; many of them expected a corresponding strategy.
President Obama’s statement on Syria constituted the first significant
split between the White House and the State Department. The Obama
administration issued the statement on August 18, 2011 asserting that
“Assad must step aside.” They supposed that these magic words that would
mark the end of the regime. President Obama said,
“The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President
Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform
250
251
Macon Phillips, “President Obama: ‘The future of Syria must be determined by its people,
but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way,’” The White House Blog, August 18,2011,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-deter-
mined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad.
252
have rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own
people. We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic
transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian
people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”253
The statement was interpreted by the Syrian opposition, observers of

U.S. politics and U.S. allies around the world as a U.S. commitment to
overthrow the regime in Syria. However, many in the U.S. bureaucracy
had not anticipated such a strong statement from the President. Accord-
ingly, despite the public statement, neither the State Department nor the
Pentagon had any plans or preparations for how to handle the situation.254
Moreover, according to State Department projections, Assad was not go-
ing anywhere in the short term.
There were two significant issues that most complicated the calcula-
tions of President Obama’s inner circle on the end of the Assad regime.
First, those who rushed the President to issue a statement assumed that the
Assad regime had a moral compass and that it would not make the mistake
of shelling its own cities or engaging in civilian massacres. They assumed
that, after the number of protestors increase and as the demonstrations
spread to other cities, the regime would be forced to take a step back,
which would trigger the demise of the regime. Second, they underestimat-
ed the level of military assistance the Syrian regime would receive from
its allies in the region. Although the potential role of Iran was taken into
consideration, the administration expected that, at a certain point, Assad
would run out of ammunition.255 The foreign policy bureaucracy and oth-
er veteran officials were more skeptical about this projection. For others,
the administration was feeling the pressure of critical Washington Post ed-
itorials more than the pressure from allies and the Syrian opposition; the
administration wanted to appease The Washington Post’s Editorial Board
253
Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria.”
254
Anonymous interview, by Kilic Kanat, July 2014
255
with a strong statement on Syria.256 In multiple editorials in 2011, The

Washington Post had harshly criticized the Obama administration’s inac-
tion in Syria. In one of these editorials in April, the inaction was described
as “shameless”257 and in June, there was another editorial that said::
It seems fair to ask what Mr. Obama has done in response, given his pledge
to employ all of the “tools” at the administration’s disposal. The answer can be
summed up in one word: nothing… The administration has excused its pas-
sivity by saying that it does not want to “get ahead” of allies in the region, and
that it worries about the consequences of a regime collapse. But Mr. Assad’s
violence is already causing serious problems for Turkey and for Israel, which
has twice faced incursions on its territory from Syria by Palestinian refugees
organized by the regime. Other U.S. Arab allies are observing Mr. Obama’s
passivity with dismay: “Why doesn’t the United States have a policy?” one
senior official from the Persian Gulf recently asked us.
In fact, Mr. Obama enunciated a clear policy four weeks ago. He said the
United States would use all its power to stop violent repression and promote
democratic transition in countries such as Syria. He said his words “must be
translated into concrete actions.” But he has yet to act.258
Just before President Obama’s “Assad must go” statement, The Wash-
ington Post published yet another editorial about U.S. inaction in Syria, in
which they stated:
Until recently, the Obama administration was still describing the solution
to Syria’s crisis as negotiations between the regime and opposition. On Sunday
President Obama, who has spoken in public about Syria only twice since the
rebellion began in March, issued a statement saying he was “appalled” by the
“horrifying” reports from Hama, “which demonstrate the true character of the
Syrian regime.” It was not clear, however, what action, if any, the administra-
tion was prepared to take.
Mr. Obama promised that “in the days ahead, the United States will
continue to increase our pressure on the Syrian regime.” But we have heard
that before. On June 17, administration officials gave reporters a briefing in
which they used those same words and talked about such measures as sanctions
against Syria’s oil and gas sector and the referral of Mr. Assad and his collabo-
256
“Shameful U.S. inaction on Syria’s massacres,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2011, http://
257
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shameful-us-inaction-on-syrias-massacres/2011/04/22/
AFROWsQE_story.html.
258
“Silence on Syria,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/silence-on-syria/2011/06/15/AG9v0WWH_story.html.
rators to the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges. Nothing has
happened since then. Is it any wonder that Mr. Assad thinks he can slaughter
the people of Hama with impunity?259
According to many analysts, these editorials sparked an intense de-

bate within the NSC as well as within the President’s inner circle about
what message should be conveyed. They were considered critical ahead of
a presidential race and added further pressure to provide a message. How-
ever, many of the same members of the administration believed that, once
stated by the President, the position would not constitute the main tenet
of U.S. foreign policy. It became clear to all later that the statement had
merely been rhetoric preceding a formal strategy.260
The President’s statement was accompanied by Executive Order
13582, issuing the harshest U.S. petroleum-related sanctions to-date on
Syria. The order was fulfilling the first two items on the opposition’s wish
list. Pres. Obama then sought to fulfill their third request by approaching
the UNSC to draft a resolution condemning regime violence and urging
a “Syrian-led political process.”261 The draft was presented for a vote in
October 2011, but was rejected by China and Russia in the first double
UNSC veto since 2008, causing U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice
to storm out of the Council.262 Thus, the Syrian opposition’s wish list was
exhausted to marginal avail.
Following President’s call for Assad to step down, , a new debate began
in the U.S. about the possible U.S. actions in Syria. There were some who
supported a strong position, which if necessary would include military
intervention halt the atrocities being committed by the Assad regime.
259
“Syria’s Ramadan massacre,” The Washington Post, August 1, 2011, http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/syrias-ramadan-massacre/2011/08/01/gIQAZHCKoI_story.html.
260
261
“Russia and China veto draft Security Council resolution on Syria,” UN News Centre, Oc-
tober 4, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39935#.U9XJ34BdVU4.
262
Daniel Miller, “'They'd rather sell arms than stand with the Syrian people': U.S. envoy
storms out after Russia and China veto U.N resolution,” Daily Mail, October 5, 2011, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2045442/US-envoy-Susan-Rice-storms-Russia-China-veto-
UN-resolution.html.
Joshua Landis summarized such arguments saying that this group of

scholars, who are mainly the neocons, were not advocating direct military
involvement in Syria because of the political realities in the US. Howev-
er, they were “preparing the grounds for a much higher level of military
commitment in the future. They understand full well that in order to take
down the Assad regime and counter the force of the Syrian military, the
Syrian opposition will need to develop a full military option. To do so, it
will need major U.S. and NATO backing.”263 On the other hand more
realists observers of the U.S. policy towards Syria argued that the U.S. did
not need to involve itself in the conflict in Syria. Instead, they argued that
Assad was too strong for U.S. intervention, saying, “The U.S. is trying to
prune its military commitments not grow them. The Assad regime still
has the support of important sections of the population. It is not a clear
good versus evil battle but something reflects deeper civil and sectarian
divisions in Syria. The Syrian opposition is hopelessly divided. Perhaps
it will develop a leadership, but that will take time and must be left to
emerge organically for the time being.”264 The debate was closely followed
by both the administration and by the public opinion in the country.
Early public opinion polls showed that the American public was not en-
thusiastic about directly militarily involvement in yet another foreign
conflict, a point which would be frequently brought up by the members
of the administration.
Even though many observers stopped expecting a diplomatic solution
for the crisis in Syria in light of Russian and Chinese attitudes at the
UNSC, the United States continued to push for a multilateral approach
to manage the conflict. There were several causes for this continuation of
a diplomatic push. First of all, there were still serious domestic economic
issues to be dealt with and under these circumstances a military solution
for Syria, which would necessitate high-level U.S. involvement, was con-
263
Landis, Joshua, “Washington’s battle over Syria,” CNN, August 27th, 2011. http://global-
publicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/24/washingtons-battle-over-syria/
264
Ibid.
sidered too costly. Secondly, as previously mentioned, American public

opinion was reluctant about another “military adventure” in the Middle
East, a view which many in the Obama administration shared. In partic-
ular, the specter of American unilateralism in Iraq still haunted President
Obama. After years of fruitless military occupation that only served to
aggravate sectarianism in Iraq, the President had a strong aversion to any
political or military action that might prompt a similar situation in Syria.
For this reason, throughout the end of 2011, the administration looked
only to take minimal symbolic steps though statements against Assad.
For instance, in October, the administration pulled out ambassador from
Damascus because of increasing security concerns. In this instance, the
developments on the ground pressured the administration to take a more
forceful stance. Senior administration officials issued statements that
would have far reaching repercussions. For instance, Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, in an October press conference, said that it would only
be matter of time before the Assad regime toppled down. He stated that
“While he (Assad) continues to resist, I think it’s very clear that it’s a
matter of time before that (exit) in fact happens. When it does, we don’t
know.”265 Vice President Joe Biden also sparked debate when he claimed
that the military intervention model used in Libya—coalition air power
with rebel groups on the ground— could be utilized elsewhere.266 It was
also reported that the Obama administration was preparing for a Syria
without Assad in order to prevent an Iraq like scenario in the country.267
Meanwhile, the American press continuously reported bureaucratic in-
fighting over U.S. policy on the Syrian crisis. In one instance, there were
265
AFP, “Fall of Syrian regime a matter of time, says U.S. defense chief,” Al Arabiya News, Oc-
tober 3, 2011. https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/03/170046.html
266
Ewen MacAskill, “US pulls ambassador Robert Ford out of Syria over security concerns,”
The Guardian, October 24, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/24/us-with-
draws-ambassador-syria-robert-ford.
267
Cooper, Helene, “U.S. Is Quietly Getting REady for Syria Without Assad,” The New York
Times, September 19, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/world/middleeast/us-is-quiet-
ly-getting-ready-for-a-syria-without-an-assad.html
apparent jurisdictional disagreements about sending emergency medical

equipment to Syria. Different agencies seemed unable to resolve their dif-
ferences and in the end no medical aid was sent. There were also reports
of disagreements within the administration on how to approach the Arab
League’s monitoring mission. Some in the administration were skeptical
about the mission and argued that the bar for intervention was set too
high in an effort to prevent military intervention.268
In December 2011, media reports surfaced that the Obama adminis-
tration was beginning to deliberate on several possible courses of action to
assist the Syrian opposition. According to the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights,269 the number of deaths by the regime had surpassed
5,000. This number led to increased pressure on the administration from
the Congress, some members of which believed that the President was too
hesitant to intervene to stop killings.270 This report followed a statement by
Fred Hof, predicting the possible fall of the Assad regime in the very near
future, referring to the Assad regime as “dead man walking.” Hof went so
far as to request that the opposition prepare for the day that it took control
of the Syrian state.271 However, despite growing criticism from members
of the administration, the U.S. government continued to act slowly rather
than engaging in a rapid response. The administration justified its position
by stating that it needed to respond cautiously in order to avoid further
destabilizing in the region and to learn more about the complex nature of
both Syria and the Syrian people. Reports suggest that the NSC had be-
gun an informal and interagency process of collecting options to provide
268
Josh Rogin, “Obama administration secretly preparing options for aiding the Syrian op-
position,” The Cable (Foreign Policy blog), December 28, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2011/12/28/obama_administration_secretly_preparing_options_for_aiding_the_
syrian_opposition.
269
“Syria: 5,000 dead in violence, says UN human rights chief,” The Guardian, December 12,
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/12/syria-5000-dead-violence-un.
270
Rogin, “Obama administration secretly preparing options for aiding the Syrian opposition.”
271
Matthew Lee, “US: Assad's Syria a 'dead man walking,'” The Christian Science Monitor,
December 14, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1214/US-As-
sad-s-Syria-a-dead-man-walking.
assistance to the Syrian opposition. The process was led by the NSC Senior
Director, Steve Simon. According to participating officials, the process in-
cluded “establishing a humanitarian corridor or safe zone for civilians in
Syria along the Turkish border, extending humanitarian aid to the Syrian
rebels, providing medical aid to Syrian clinics, engaging more with the
external and internal opposition, forming an international contact group,
or appointing a special coordinator for working with the Syrian opposition
(as was done in Libya).”272 According to the same reports, many members
of the administration had already realized that the current situation was
not sustainable and recognized the fact that financial sanctions alone were
not sufficient to bring about the end of the Syrian regime.273
The beginning of 2012 was again a period characterized by consis-
tent U.S. condemnation of the Syrian regime, but void of meaningful
action on the part of the Obama administration. In December 2011, a
spokesman for the State Department stated that, if the regime did not
put an end to its tactics, the international community would start look-
ing for alternative means to protect civilians in Syria. Following this, in
January 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the regime’s
violent and brutal attacks against civilians in Syria and stated that if As-
sad remained in power, the instability might escalate and spill over the
region.274 In a hearing at the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper delivered important remarks about
the conflict in Syria. He asserted that it was only a matter of time before
Assad would lose his power and being toppled in Syria. Although Clapper
also conditioned that this process could be drawn it, he also mentioned
that "protraction of these demonstrations, the opposition continues to be
fragmented, but I do not see how he can sustain his rule of Syria." In this
272
Rogin, “Obama administration secretly preparing options for aiding the Syrian opposition.”
273
Ibid.
274
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Sharp Escalation of Regime Violence in Syria,” Press Re-
lease, January 30, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/182720.htm.
hearing he also advised that the threat of increased Iranian and Hezbollah
influence in the conflict was growing.275
President Obama, in his 2012 state of union address, made a similar
remark about Syrian conflict. He stated that “In Syria, I have no doubt
that the Assad regime will soon discover that the forces of change can’t be
reversed, and that human dignity can’t be denied.” However he again did
not make a roadmap or actions that he will undertake in Syria.276 In Feb-
ruary, President Obama released a subsequent statement commemorating
the 30th anniversary of the Hama Massacre and promised to help the Syr-
ian people to achieve their goals. He also reiterated that the Assad regime
must come to an end.277
Critics of the administration’s inaction in Syria from Congress argued
that the Obama White House need to begin to consider alternative op-
tions to help the opposition within Syria. For the first time since the out-
break of the Syrian civil war the possibility of arming rebels was openly
discussed. According to a note released by Senators John McCain, Lindsey
Graham and Joe Lieberman, the means of support they envisioned in-
cluded political and military assistance “to organize their activities, to care
for the wounded and find safe haven, to communicate securely, to defend
themselves, and to fight back against Assad’s forces.”278 To achieve these
goals, these three senators requested that the administration work togeth-
er with U.S. allies in the region, including Turkey, under a joint effort.
During congressional hearings, members began hounding the administra-
tion about its Syria policy. Answers given by administration officials made
275
Zakaria, Tabassum, “U.S. spy chief says Syria’s Assad cannot hold power,” Reuters, January 21,
2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-intelligence-syria-idUSTRE80U1H520120131.
Friedman, Uri, “Highlights from Obama’s SOTU address,” Foreign Polixy, January 25,
276
2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/25/highlights-from-obamas-sotu-address/
277
President Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” Press Release, February 4, 2012
office/2012/02/04/statement-president-syria.
278
“Graham, McCain, Lieberman Statement on Syria,” Office of Sen. Lindsey Graham,
Press Release, February 8, 2012, http://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view_rss/411052/
member/44.html.
it painfully clear that the administration was still unwilling to deepen

U.S. commitment to the conflict. There was an increasing emphasis on
the differences between Libya and Syria. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Dempsey, in one of those hearings, laid out those differences to
congressional members, saying,
“My observations, Senator, are that it is a much different situation than we
collectively saw in Libya. And I think that's an important point to make be-
cause we don't have as clear an understanding of the nature of the opposition.
We're working in the intelligence community to develop it. But, as you know,
there's some significant differences vis-a-vis Syria. There is a chemical and bi-
ological warfare threat. There's a very significant integrated air defense system,
a very credible military. We're watching the trend lines on their military to see
if they are still under the control of the regime.”279
Such remarks from administration officials were contradictory with

the findings of senior intelligence officials. In March, The Washington
Post reported that “senior U.S. intelligence officials described the na-
tion’s (Syria) President, Bashar al-Assad, on Friday as firmly in control
and increasingly willing to unleash one of the region’s most potent mil-
itaries on badly overmatched opposition groups. The officials also said
Assad’s inner circle is “remaining steadfast,” with little indication that
senior figures in the regime are inclined to peel off, despite efforts by
the Obama administration and its allies to use sanctions and other mea-
sures to create a wave of defections that would undermine Assad.”280
According to these officials Assad’s inner circle was remaining stead-
fast.281 Another official also stated that there is no sign of fracturing
within the Assad regime.282
279
Testimony of Martin E. Dempsey to the United States Congress, “President’s 2013 Se-
fense Department Budget Request,” C-SPAN, February 14, 2012, http://www.c-span.org/
video/?304412-1/defense-department-2013-budget-request
280
Miller, Gret & Daren De Young, “Syria’s Bashar al-Assad firmly in control, U.S. intelligence
officials say,” The Washington Post, March 9, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na-
tional-security/syrias-bashar-al-assad-firmly-in-control-us-intelligence-officials-say/2012/03/09/
gIQAv7r71R_print.html
281
Ibid.
282
Starr Barbara & Jamie Crawford, “U.S. sees “no fracturing of Assad regime,” CNN, March
1, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/01/u-s-sees-no-fracturing-of-assad-regime/
When the Friends of Syria meeting was launched in Tunis at the begin-
ning of 2012, members of the Obama administration provided more ques-
tions than answers about the situation in Syria. Secretary Clinton stated the
necessity of a negotiated political solution to the crisis; however, later in an
interview, she described the situation in a more complicated manner. Secre-
tary Clinton stated that the people in Aleppo needed to do something about
the “illegitimate regime”283 that kills innocent civilians and protesters. Her
words gave the impression that the U.S. anticipated that, if the residents
of Aleppo joined the demonstrators, it would trigger the fall of the regime.
However, Secretary Clinton was less clear on the what threshold of violence
that would trigger a military intervention by the U.S. into Syria. Clinton
argued, “it is important to stop and ask what that is and who’s going to do
it and how capable anybody is of doing it. And I like to get to the second,
third and fourth order questions, and those are very difficult ones.”284 Her
statements created confusion among the observers of U.S. policy on Syr-
ia. Later, In her memoirs, Clinton mentioned a discussion with the Saudi
Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, about providing weapons to the
rebel groups. The Saudi Minister stated that it would be an excellent idea
to arm these groups and attempted to convince the Obama administration
to follow suit on the plan. However, Secretary Clinton was wary about the
further militarization of the conflict and feared the acceleration of the coun-
try’s descent into a full-scale civil war.285 From these messages, it was not
clear what the Obama administration was planning to do about Syria. On
the one hand, it sounded like the administration was expecting the fall of
the regime once Aleppo joined the opposition, and on the other, like it was
trying to establish a military intervention as a distant possibility.
The statements that came after Clinton’s assertions were no less con-
fusing. In a statement on Syria before the House Armed Services Com-
283
Hillary Rodham Clinton, interview by Wyatt Andres, CBS, Sofitel Hotel, Rabat, Morocco,
February 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184662.htm.
284
Ibid.
285
Clinton, Hard Choices.
mittee, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made similar suggestions. After

enumerating the Obama administration’s endeavors in regards to Syria, he
underlined the final objective of the administration by stating, “Make no
mistake—one way or another, this regime ultimately will meet its end.”286
Yet, just like other members of the administration he failed to provide
a clear path to resolve the crisis, and instead resorted to comparing and
contrasting the Syrian crisis with the Libyan conflict. According to Panet-
ta, the operation in Libya had provided the Obama administration with
lessons for the crisis in Syria. As in the Libyan case, the U.S. was follow-
ing a multilateral and international engagement approach; it maintained
regional support from the Arab world; offered substantial contributions;
searched for a clear legal basis for the approach; and kept all options on the
table, cautiously recognizing the limitations of the use of military force.
However, it was not clear what the limitations of the use of military force
were and if there were any conditions that would remove these limitations.
Moreover, Panetta emphasized the lack of support from the Arab world
and UNSC authorization for military intervention. He also suggested
that, unlike the Libyan case, the opposition in Syria was not well orga-
nized. Despite these limitations, he suggested that they were “continuing
to plan for a variety of possible scenarios should the President determine
that further steps are necessary.”287 Panetta’s presentation constituted yet
another set of conflicting and confusing statements by a member of the
Obama administration. This intensified the scrutiny of the White House
by outside observers over its Syria policy. In the meantime some reports in
US media also state discussions between Turkey and US about a possible
buffer zone. Especially after some instances of Syrian troops firing across
the border, these debates intensified.288
286
Leon E. Panetta, Statement on Syria before the House Armed Services Committee, “Sec-
retary of Defense Testimony,” Hearing, April 19, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.
aspx?SpeechID=1663.
287
Ibid.
288
Labott, Elise, “U.S. discusses possible buffer zones for Syria,” CNN, April 11, 2012,
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/11/whats-next-for-syria/
The 2012 national elections in the United States added another level
of complication to the Syrian crisis. Obviously, the Obama administra-
tion did not want to take any risks over its policy in Syria, resorting to fol-
lowing a policy of diplomatic engagement on the one hand, and political
and military avoidance on the other. In most instances, members of the
administration indicated that sanctions against the regime were proving
effective. In fact, sanctions aside, the administration became even less
clear in its direction on Syria.
Foreign policy was not among the primary concerns of U.S. voters
during this election and President Obama did not want the debate to shift
to foreign policy during the race. Thus, the administration worked through
the UN and the Friends of Syria Group to address the political angle of
the conflict. The UNSC was able to make progress in summer 2012, when
it approved the ceasefire-monitoring group under Kofi Annan’s six-point
plan and issued the Geneva Communiqué calling for a transitional gov-
ernment in Syria. The Obama administration seemed to place an unwar-
ranted amount of faith in this communiqué as a potential solution to the
conflict. While the election was nearing, the administration believed that
it had enough ammunition in terms of diplomatic endeavors and interna-
tional engagement to respond any questions on Syria. Moreover, different
members of the administration constantly emphasized the “war fatigue of
Americans” and “low-level of support for a military intervention to Syria,”
and tried to preempt any criticisms from the Republican candidate on Syr-
ia. The administration believed that all of the possible politically-correct,
risk-free and cost-free steps had already been taken to avoid any kind of
damage during the elections: the strong message was given, the military
intervention was avoided, the humanitarian assistance was provided, and
diplomatic and multilateral endeavors were launched.
Throughout 2012, despite scattered multilateral attempts, the admin-
istration seemed to decide the Syrian problem as too intricate and com-
plicated to deal with. Secretary Clinton referred to it as a “wicked one,”
one that defies standard solutions and approaches. According to her, every
option was worse than the next. In her memoir, she explains the conflict
and options in Syria by stating, “Do nothing, and a humanitarian disaster
envelops the region. Intervene militarily, and risk opening Pandora’s Box
and wading into another quagmire, like Iraq. Send aid to the rebels and
watch it end up in the hands of extremists. Continue with diplomacy, and
run head-first into a Russian veto.”289 In 2012, the differences of opinion
within the administration about how to deal with the Syrian crisis also
started to be seen more clearly. As Geneva efforts were halted, the Secretary
of State and others within the administration searched for a solution that
would include arming the moderate Syrian rebels. Clinton’s plan depend-
ed on several motivations. On the one hand, arming a small group of mod-
erate forces, regardless of its size, would give a big psychological boost to
the Syrian opposition and pressure the Assad regime to agree to a political
solution. Such a move was necessary in order to stabilize problems with re-
gional partners. In addition, a well-trained and equipped force could also
provide security and governance in the aftermath of the Assad regime, and
prevent revenge attacks and chaos in the country. To achieve these goals,
Clinton reportedly worked together with General Petraeus, who was direc-
tor of the CIA by then, to set a plan to vet, train and equip moderate oppo-
sition fighters. The plan later received the support of Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, who was equally frustrated with the deadlock in the region.
Secretary Clinton also traveled to Turkey in August 2012 to discuss her
plan, receiving feedback from Ankara. Two days after her visit, the Turkish
Foreign Minister announced their agreement with her plan of action. Soon
afterward, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Davutoglu informed
and discussed this issue with the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France
and Germany.290 Secretary Clinton presented her plan, supported now by
her regional and European counterparts, to President Obama. According
to Clinton, the plan also had a very high-level of support at the NSC.
289
290
Ibid.
However, the second group of decision-makers, including President

Obama, considered inaction to be the best course of action and were
unwilling to engage in any form of armed conflict in the region. Ac-
cording to Clinton, this second group included some of the top generals
in the country.291 It was later reported that those in President Obama’s
close advisory circle at the White House were also skeptical about such a
course of action by a president whose main election promise was to end
U.S. military involvement in the Middle East.292 Deputy National Se-
curity Advisor Ben Rhodes, who was considered to be a very significant
member of the second group and a part of Obama’s inner circle, later
explained the reason for the decision. He claimed that “1) we wanted to
make sure that we were providing assistance to people who we knew so
that it wouldn't fall into the wrong hands given how many extremists
were operating in the area” and “2) we didn’t see a plan that was going
to decisively tip the balance against Assad.”293 Despite some debate be-
tween these two groups, the decision of the President prevailed and the
Obama administration continued to follow the same policy, failing to
shift away from the policy of inaction.
In late 2014, after Clinton published her memoirs and gave a set of
interviews on the rise of ISIS and the situation in Syria and Iraq, the ad-
ministration’s plan to arm the Syrian opposition had become a contested
and controversial topic and source of major debate between the Clinton
and Obama teams. It was revealed that, throughout 2011 and in most of
2012, the White House had barred the State Department from engaging
in any talks with moderate Syrian rebels. Reportedly, during this period,
and especially in mid-2012, the State Department cautioned the admin-
istration about radical groups and requested that the administration aid
291
Ibid.
292
293
Josh Rogin, “Obama Stifled Hillary’s Syria Plans and Ignored Her Iraq Warnings for
Years,” The Daily Beast, August 14, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/14/
obama-stifled-hillary-s-syria-plans-and-ignored-her-iraq-warnings-for-years.html.
moderate forces so that they could emerge as the center of gravity on the
ground. The State Department also warned the Obama administration
that the conflict in Syria could potentially spill over to Iraq. Ambassador
Ford, for instance, stated that the State Department warned the admin-
istration of the interaction between extremists in Iraq and Syria, and that
Iraq and Syria could emerge as one all-encompassing conflict. However,
the close inner circle at the White House, once again, preferred to stand
by its position.294 Later, reportedly, the State Department prepared classi-
fied reports for the White House stating that “the Assad regime was much
more durable than thought and was not on the verge of collapse.”295 The
divide between the two groups prevailed after these reports. For Clinton,
it was important to engage with the armed groups, as they were the only
potential game-changer under the current circumstances in Syria. How-
ever, the White House continued to engage only with the non-armed
civilian opposition groups. Despite some reports about the necessity to
assist the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Obama administration did not al-
low any agency to help the group in 2012.296 The State Department even
attempted to respond to the White House’s concerns regarding the risks
of arming rebels for U.S. security by trying to figure out who the rebels
were and how to help them in a way that would not create any risk for
U.S. security, but to no avail.297
In the meantime, the Pentagon was also evaluating its options in Syria.
For the Defense Department, the primary concern was Assad’s chemi-
cal weapons. According to the plans prepared by Pentagon staff, at least
75,000 troops would be necessary to enter the country and secure all
of the weapons repositories. Considering the unacceptability of such a
scenario, Secretary of Defense Panetta presented different and less costly
options to the NSC, including the use of limited air attacks, protecting
294
Ibid.
295
Ibid.
296
Ibid
297
Ibid
refugee camps and supporting regional allies.298 In his memoirs, Panetta

stated that there was not much support for any kind of military action
among President Obama’s top advisers. As a result, less aggressive mea-
sures such as coordinating a regional response and surveying Assad’s air
defense systems were evaluated. 299
During 2012, the Friends of Syria Group spent a great deal of its early
efforts looking to shape and strengthen the political opposition, out of a
belief that a more legitimate political force could attract greater domestic
and international support. The countries that participated in the group
had also been members of the Friends of Libya, and as stated by Secretary
of Defense Panetta, were willing to follow the Libya intervention model.
Enthusiasm to participate in the Friends of Syria among members of the
opposition was initially high because of the anticipation that they would
receive military support, just as the Libyan opposition had. Yet, Hillary
Clinton signaled the differences between Libya and Syria in January 2012,
when she called Libya a “false analogy” for operations and instead pushed
for a diplomatic solution.300 Through the Friends of Syria, the United
States pushed the SNC to more broadly represent Syria’s various politi-
cal beliefs, sectarian identities, genders and ethnicities, as a way to garner
greater support inside and out of Syria. While the Syrian National Coun-
cil, which became the Syrian National Coalition or Etilaf, became a more
attractive interlocutor with the international community, it failed to have
a strong resonance on the ground, as most of its members were trying to
influence Syria from the outside. Therefore, the first initiative achieved
modest gains but was not enough to shape the direction of the conflict.
The State Department also worked with allies and the opposition to de-
velop a plan for a political transition after Assad’s collapse. This was called
298
Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: Pen-
guin Press, 2014), 370.
299
Ibid.
300
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the United Nations Security Council Session on
the Situation in Syria,” January 31, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2012/01/182845.htm.
“The Day After Project,” which responded to many questions that were
directed to the opposition about the nature of the regime and governance
in Syria in the aftermath of the overthrow of the regime.301 Yet, these efforts
addressed problems that the opposition did not yet have; instead, the oppo-
sition needed a plan of action to unseat Assad in order to get to that stage.
Without the participation of the Pentagon or the CIA, such a plan would
not be forthcoming and there was little the State Department could do to
help. One State Department official familiar with the conflict criticized the
administration’s policy, claiming it focused too much on understanding the
problem and not enough on solving it by unifying the armed opposition
against Assad.302 This initiative, while valuable, distracted U.S. resources
and funding away from where it should have been focused.
Thus, the administration approached the first stage of the con-
flict in a very ad-hoc manner and throughout this period, there was some
confusion and mixed messaging by and between the members of the ad-
ministration. In May of 2012, in a story on CNN a US official described
the US position “ in "a holding pattern," waiting for Russia to abandon its
support for President Bashar al-Assad, waiting for sanctions to topple the
economy and waiting for an organized Syrian opposition to present a co-
herent vision for a post-Assad Syria.”303 As August 2012 approached, it was
quite clear that Syria would not experience an operation similar to the one
in Libya. Though President Obama waited to call on Assad to step down
at the request and advice of the interagency community, he heeded the
advice of his core team of political advisors to make the decision to issue
the August 2011 statement. There was very little consulting with various
other agencies or departments during this period.
301
“The Day After Project: Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria,” The Day After, Au-
gust 2012, http://www.usip.org/the-day-after-project.
302
Labott, Elise, “U.S. in waiting game in Syria,” CNN, May 16, 2012, http://security.blogs.
303
cnn.com/2012/05/16/u-s-in-waiting-game-on-syria/
FIVE OBAMA’S RED LINE
“
The red line speech was another
demonstration of the White House’s
approach to foreign policy making: the
message came before a strategy
or a plan of action about what to do
in case of a chemical weapons attack.
“We have been very clear to the Assad regime,
but also to other players on the ground, that a
red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch
of chemical weapons moving around or being
utilized. That would change my calculus.”304
In August 2012, President Obama issued a statement that

would serve as yet another major turning point on the U.S.’s position
on Syria. The statement arrived in the midst of mounting reports and
concerns over the Assad regime’s alleged use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion against civilians. A number of questions raised by policymakers were
concerned with the potential U.S. reaction if the reports were validated.
Soon after, in response to these speculations, President Obama stated, “We
have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the
ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical
weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calcu-
lus…That would change my equation…We’re monitoring that situation
very carefully. We have put together a range of contingency plans.”305 The
language was not unprecedented, the armed forces had been using the
phrase “red line” about chemical weapons in Syria since at least July; and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also used the phrase for the first time in
304
Claudette Roulo, “Little: Syrian Chemical Weapons Appear Secure,” Department of De-
fense News, July 13, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117118; See also
“Hillary Clinton on Syria: use of chemical weapons is a red line – video,” The Guardian, August
11, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2012/aug/11/hillary-clinton-syria-chemi-
cal-weapons-video.
305
Ball, “Obama issues Syria a ‘red line’ warning on chemical weapons.”
122 / O bama’ s R ed L ine ( A ugust 2012 - A ugust 2013 )
a speech just days before the President’s statement.306 During a press con-
ference in Turkey, Secretary Clinton said that the U.S. was working on the
necessary contingency plans, including a response for the potential use of
chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, which should be considered a “red
line” for the world. Secretary Clinton also mentioned that they needed
to plan for the possibility that these weapons would be used, specifically
how to provide the necessary humanitarian and medical aid and how to
contain those stocks.307 As mentioned previously, the Pentagon was already
working on potential plans and scenarios to deal with chemical weapons.
President Obama’s statement, however, came as a surprise to many in
the administration who had not been alerted to the solidifying of this po-
sition. According to members of the State Department, the administration
had only begun communicating within the interagency and with U.S. allies
about the likelihood and repercussions of a large-scale chemical weapons
attack. President Obama’s public declaration of the U.S.’ position seemed
premature and absent of further consultation with cabinet agencies.308 Its
introduction in the administration led U.S. policymakers to take the Presi-
dent’s comment as a directive meant to reorient the focus of its policy in Syr-
ia to chemical weapons.309 The move made sense given the lack of progress
in other negotiations. The use of chemical weapons was considered a legal
issue that would not require U.S. entanglement in Syrian affairs but also had
enough relation to Iranian non-proliferation negotiations to warrant the
country’s interest. Probably, the only exception to this situation took place a
month before President Obama’s statement, when a bomb exploded during
306
fense News, July 13, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117118; See also
“Hillary Clinton on Syria: use of chemical weapons is a red line – video,” The Guardian, August
11, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2012/aug/11/hillary-clinton-syria-chemi-
cal-weapons-video.
307
“Hillary Clinton Warns Assad ‘Chemical Weapons Use will be Red Line,’" YouTube, Au-
gust 11, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdXckFEZkt4.
308
309
a meeting of top-level security and military officials in the Syrian National

Security Headquarters. Among those killed were senior security and mili-
tary officials, including Defense Minister Dawoud Rajiha, Assef Shawkat—
Deputy Defense Minister and the brother-in-law of Assad—and Hisham
Ikhtiyar, the Director of National Security Bureau. The attack wounded
dozens, reportedly including the brother of Assad, Maher Assad, who also
serves as the commander of the Republican Guards. Many in Washington
were alarmed by this development, since nobody was expecting such a ma-
jor blow from the opposition, which was considered too inept to conduct a
military operation in Damascus. Those in the administration who favored
a policy change considered the attack a possible game-changing blow to the
regime in Damascus. However, there were no subsequent attacks that could
decapitate the regime and generate more defections from Damascus.
Following the red line speech, a statement was issued by the State De-
partment about allegations of chemical weapons usage in Syria. It con-
firmed that Syria had stockpiles of chemical weapons composed of nerve
agents and mustards gas.310 Later in September 2012, Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta responded to questions on the use of chemical weapons by
saying that the intelligence community had discovered limited movement
of chemical weapons in Syria. According to him, most of the Syrian re-
gime’s chemical weapons were secured, although there were a few stockpiles
unaccounted for. There seemed to be no information on the whereabouts
of these chemical weapons stockpiles.311 Following his statements, allega-
tions emerged from the international community that chemical weapons
had indeed been used in Syria. The assertion had already been made several
times by the Syrian opposition, which could not be confirmed by inde-
pendent sources throughout the summer of 2012. In part, what made the
310
“Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2014,” Arms Control Association,
July 2014, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity.
311
Lolita C. Baldor, “Syria Chemical Weapons Moved, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
Says,” The Huffington Post, September 28, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/28/
syria-chemical-weapons-moved-panetta_n_1923159.html.
administration react were the claims that chemical weapons were being
moved by regime forces.312 Following these unconfirmed reports, the first
strong allegation of chemical weapons usage by the Syrian regime was pro-
vided in October 2012 by the government of France as having occurred in
the Syrian town of Salquin, positioned near the Turkish border.313
According to observers of the Obama administration’s Syria policy, the
red line speech was another demonstration of the White House’s mishan-
dled approach to foreign policy making. Once again, the message came
before a strategy or a plan of action about what to do in case of a chemical
weapons attack. It is because of this that the administration had a hard
time figuring out an action plan after each and every allegation of chemical
weapon use. In several different speeches and statements, President Obama
repeated his “red line” position. For the members of the administration, the
message sounded enough like a deterrent and provided another cost and
risk-free opportunity to stay out of the conflict in Syria, while also prevent-
ing the breach a significant international and humanitarian norm. More-
over, the statement was regarded as an assurance by U.S. allies in the region.
Following this, however, some U.S. allies that had been imploring the U.S.
for years to set a similar “red line” for the Iranian nuclear program expressed
their disappointment for the lack of similar statements against Iran.
President Obama, starting with the August statement, made the chem-
ical weapons issue an important talking point of his stance on Syria. In
December 2012, President Obama reiterated his position in a speech at
the National War College. He underlined all the positions that he en-
dorsed since the beginning of the crisis in Syria:
…Let me just say this. We will continue to support the legitimate aspi-
rations of the Syrian people—engaging with the opposition, providing with--
providing them with the humanitarian aid, and working for a transition to a
312
“Syrian Rebels Claim Regime is Sending Chemical Arms to Borders,” NTI, July 24, 2012,
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/syrian-rebels-claim-regime-sending-chemical-arms-borders/.
313
“United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons
in the Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations, September 13, 2013, https://unoda-web.s3.ama-
zonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/report.pdf.
Syria that’s free of the Assad regime. And today, I want to make it absolutely
clear to Assad and those under his command: The world is watching. The use
of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable. And if you make
the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there where be consequences, and
you will be held accountable.314
In Prague, Secretary Clinton hedged the position saying, “I am not go-

ing to telegraph in any specifics what we would do in the event of credible
evidence that the Assad regime has resorted to using chemical weapons
against their own people, but suffice it to say we are certainly planning to
take action if that eventuality were to occur.”315 The growing number of
questions for U.S. officials on chemical weapons in Syria was a result of
the increasing number of reports in the media suggesting that the Syrian
regime was, in fact, moving around its chemical weapon stockpiles.
The fact that the President issued another “red line” statement after
his electoral win in November held significant repercussions for both the
Syrian opposition and U.S. allies in the region. Throughout 2012, because
of the U.S. Presidential Elections, the international community had low
expectations for the administration in terms of real action on Syria, espe-
cially regarding possible military engagement. What they did anticipate
was a major move on this issue following the elections. In the summer of
2012, it was reported that the Syrian opposition was especially pessimistic
about the possible military support of the Obama administration during
the election season. The opposition’s sentiments were well outlined in a
Telegraph story which also indicated that the White House had refused
to provide military and intelligence support to the Syrian opposition.316
314
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion Symposium,” Press Release, December 3, 2012, (online by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/remarks-president-nunn-lu-
gar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium.
315
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Video Remarks on Syria,” Remarks, December 3, 2012
(online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2012/12/199997.htm.
316
Peter Foster, “US refuses to help Syrian rebels until after election,” The Telegraph, July
16, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9404452/US-refus-
es-to-help-Syrian-rebels-until-after-election.html.
Lobbyists working for various groups went on the record saying that, “Ba-
sically the message is very clear; nothing is going to happen until after the
election, in fact nothing will happen until after inauguration [January 20,
2013]. And that is the same message coming from everyone, including the
Turks and the Qataris.”317 However, yet again there was contradictory re-
porting about U.S. support for opposition groups. On the one hand there
were the reports emphasizing that the White House had made it clear that
it would not provide military assistance for Syrian groups until after the
elections.318 On the other hand, The New York Times reported that a small
number of CIA officers were working in southern Turkey to vet Syrian
opposition groups that were slated to receive arms and military support
from the Americans.319 This situation led to general confusion among the
members of the opposition as well as U.S. allies in the region.
Although President Obama never signaled that there would a policy
change after the elections—and though he made some statements hinting
to his Syria policy during presidential debates—interested parties on Syria
never took him seriously. For example, during President Obama’s foreign
policy debate with Romney he argued that, although he was committed to
the idea that Assad must go, it would be hard for the U.S. to intervene in
the conflict militarily. Speaking on the prospect of directly arming the reb-
els, he said that the U.S. needed to be extremely cautious on both who and
how to arm. More importantly, little criticism or pressure was directed at
President Obama by the Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney,
which suggested that, even if the Republicans had won the White House
a more aggressive course of action in Syria was unlikely. Romney also did
not want to seem like yet another Republican presidential candidate in
favor of using of unilateral military force to force regime change in anoth-
317
Ibid.
318
Ibid.
319
Schmitt, Eric, “C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition,” The New York
Times,June 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-
steering-arms-to-syrian-rebels.html?_r=3&ref=middleeast&pagewanted=print.
er country in the Middle East. Because of that, both candidates avoided

talking in length about the situation in Syria, despite the deterioration of
the situation on the ground. The wishful thinking among regional allies
and the Syrian opposition was based on the expectation that President
Obama would become more assertive after the elections.320
At the same time, there were indications in some areas that the admin-
istration was increasing its involvement on the issue. In the wake of elec-
tions, the U.S. made an important attempt to restructure the opposition
and reorganize the coalition in a meeting in Doha, which was considered
the boldest move of the administration since the beginning of the civil war
in Syria.321 When President Obama stated in late December that the U.S.
formally recognized Syria’s main opposition coalition as the legitimate rep-
resentative of the Syrian people,322 the hopes for a change in U.S. policy
skyrocketed dramatically. The announcement came ahead of a Friends of
Syria conference in Morocco, which the Syrian National Coalition attend-
ed for the first time. Against this backdrop, according to many opposition
groups, there was little reason not to expect a more forceful push by the
U.S. to end the conflict.323
In the period after his election for a second term, another major factor
that influenced the President’s Syria policy was the September 2012 attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi. The attack in Libya, the death of the
U.S. ambassador to Benghazi, and the ensuing political fallout from the
incident was a major, contentious issue within U.S. domestic politics. Al-
though not directly related to the conflict in Syria, the fact that the attack
320
Sam Stein, “Mitt Romney, Obama Spar Over Syria,” The Huffington Post, October 22, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/romney-obama-syria-debate_n_2003918.html.
321
Mike Giglio, “Post Election, Obama Gambles on Syrian Rebels,” The Daily Beast, No-
vember 10, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/10/post-election-obama-gam-
bles-on-syrian-rebels.html.
322
“US recognizes Syria opposition coalition says Obama,” BBC News, December 12, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20690148.
323
Mike Giglio, “How the U.S. Election Helps Syria,” The Daily Beast, November 7, 2012,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/07/how-the-u-s-election-helps-syria.html.
took place in a country where the U.S. was militarily involved in order
to help the opposition resulted in a comparison between both cases. It
was widely reported that President Obama had been against involvement
in Libya until certain members of his cabinet convinced the President to
take action.324 However, the outcome was far worse than expected. After
what happened in Benghazi, President Obama’s preference to avoid mili-
tary involvement in the crises of the Middle East increased. In fact, after
the specter of the Iraq War, the ghost of the Benghazi episode became a
strong second factor for President Obama’s reluctance in Syria. The em-
bassy attack, the murder of Ambassador Stevens, the controversy following
the attack, the media scrutiny, and the Congressional investigation gen-
erated a pool of complications for the Obama administration. After the
Benghazi attack, those who were against military intervention attempted
to accentuate commonalities between Libya and Syria, arguing that mili-
tary intervention in Syria could not be an option. President Obama, later
in the last year of his presidency in different interviews expressed this issue
as the most significant challenge of his presidency.325
In addition to the Libya attack, another factor that influenced U.S.
policy towards Syria was a reshuffling of the President’s foreign policy team
for his second term in office. Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who
prepared the plan to arm rebels in early 2012, and Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, who supported Clinton’s plan of action, left their offices.
The new Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, was considered more cau-
tious about the use of force. The administration’s policy on Syria was most-
ly run by the new Secretary of State, John Kerry. Secretary Kerry, starting
from his years in the Senate, held an interest in Syria and had visited the
country and met with Assad on multiple occasions. Especially after the
Obama administration’s engagement with Syria in 2009, Senator Kerry
324
Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist,” The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist.
325
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, http://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.
had visited Damascus on multiple occasions in a very short span of time.

After the violent crackdown against demonstrators in Syria in early 2011,
Senator Kerry continued expressing hope about the possibility of Assad
being a reformer until mid-2011. Now, two years after the beginning of
the uprising, Kerry occupied the seat of Secretary of State and wanted to
pursue an assertive foreign policy that would change the situation on the
ground. He was particularly proactive in trying to find a framework for
negotiations to bring together the opposition and the regime in his first
month in office. However, these attempts did not generate a meaningful
outcome that could change the conflict’s equation. It was also revealed
that, other than these diplomatic endeavors, U.S. foreign policy did not
have a plan B to tackle the crisis and did not have any intention of becom-
ing more involved in the conflict with riskier options.326
While the U.S. foreign policy team was being reorganized, different
reports about the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime contin-
ued. The first of these was a Foreign Policy report from a secret State De-
partment cable that pointed to an indication of chemical weapons usage
by the Syrian government in Homs. Both the State Department and the
White House disputed the report.327 Later, Le Monde released a more com-
prehensive report, where its reporters in Syria claimed to have individually
witnessed the regime’s chemical attacks near the outskirts of Damascus.
Reporters saw the effects of several attacks when the fighters of the FSA
began displaying symptoms, such as shrinking pupils, blurred vision,
breathing difficulties, vomiting and loss of consciousness. A Le Monde re-
porter was one of those exposed to the chemical weapons in April 2013.
He experienced blurred vision and respiratory problems for the next four
days. The Le Monde report also indicated the increasing frequency of these
types of chemical attacks by regime forces against the FSA. In particular,
326
Gayle Lemmon, “Kerry’s Syrian Quagmire,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2013, http://foreign-
policy.com/2013/05/31/kerrys-syrian-quagmire/.
BBC, “US recognizes Syria opposition coalition says Obama,” December 12, 2012, http://
327
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20690148.
attacks took place in three areas of the Damascus region: Adra, Otaiba and
Jobar.328 There were differences in both the density and the frequency of
the use of gas in the respective areas, but there was no dispute that all three
localities had witnessed gas attacks. Furthermore, the Le Monde report put
forward an important warning about the goals of these chemical attacks:
“The aim of the attacks seemed to be essentially tactical at this stage—an
attempt to destabilize rebel units in areas where government soldiers have
been unable to dislodge them, and at the same time a test. If Syrian army
forces could dare to use chemical weapons in their own capital without
setting off a serious international reaction, would that not be an invitation
to pursue the experiment a bit further?”329 The warning did not seem to
generate any serious reaction in Western capitals. Later throughout the
spring of 2013, more reports and allegations emerged, this time occurring
in other localities, including Idlib, Aleppo, Hama and Rif Dimashq. The
UN mission was unable to verify these allegations, yet similar reports con-
tinued to mount throughout these months.
The first official U.S. announcement following allegations of chemi-
cal weapons usage came in April 2013, almost four months after the first
reports of attacks. In a letter to Congress, the White House claimed, “the
U.S. believes with some degree of varying confidence” that the Syrian re-
gime used chemical weapons against its own people.330 The White House’s
statement was based on physiological samples. The administration asked
the UN to probe the allegations. The statement also asserted, “We are con-
tinuing to do further work to establish a definitive judgment as to whether
or not the red line has been crossed and to inform our decision-making
328
Jean-Philippe Rémy, “Chemical warfare in Syria,” Le Monde, June 5, 2013, http://www.le-
monde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/05/27/chemical-war-in-syria_3417708_3218.html.
329
Ibid.
330
Kristen Welker, Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube and Tracy Connor, “White House:
US believes Syrian regime used chemical weapons,” NBC News, April 25, 2013, http://usnews.
nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/25/17913974-white-house-us-believes-syrian-regime-used-
chemical-weapons?lite.
about what we’ll do next.”331 Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense confirmed the findings in a letter in the aftermath of the state-
ment’s release.332 The letter was considered a significant development in
U.S. policy towards Syria. In several instances, the countries in the region
and the Syrian opposition alleged that chemical agents had been used by
the Syrian regime. President Obama’s “red line” speech was regarded as
a serious commitment by the U.S. government to deter and—if used—
punish the Syrian regime. The call by the U.S. for the UN to investigate
the use of chemical weapons and its statements to further probe the alle-
gations signaled a high-level of sensitivity, which might lead to a potential
change in U.S. policy. However, at the same time, the administration’s
insistence on obtaining further evidence of the presence of chemical agents
also reflected the inclination to avoid any intelligence failure like what was
witnessed during the Iraq War. Because of that, the administration was
extremely cautious.333 The political and diplomatic moves by the U.S. and
the international community were perceived as sufficient on their own to
deter Assad.334
Reactions to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria
failed to bear any hint of consensus in statements by the various members
of the administration. Then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has since
spoken of the moment he received the order from President Obama to stand
down in the face of overwhelming confirmation of the regime’s use of chem-
ical weapons. Prior to this order, the Department of Defense was already in
the final stages of planning Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against regime
331
Ibid.
332
Chuck Hagel, “Statement on Syria,” Press Release, April 25, 2013 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1773.
333
Michael Eisenstadt, “Investigating Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Syria: Technical and
Political Challenges,” The Washington Institute, Policywatch 2072, April 26, 2013, http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/investigating-alleged-chemical-weapons-use-in-syr-
ia-technical-and-political.
John Kerry, “Press Availability on Syria,” Remarks, February 28, 2013 (online by U.S. De-
334
partment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/02/205435.htm.

forces in Damascus to uphold the President’s “red line” policy. The decision
not to react to breaches of the “red line” was, according to administrative
officials, made because of the President’s desire for Congressional support
before embarking on military operations.335 During the spring of 2013, var-
ious administration officials made multiple and sometimes confusing state-
ments in speeches and in writings. In February, Leon Panetta, in his final
appearance before Congress as Secretary of Defense, answered a question
about arming the Syrian rebels and a possible U.S. military intervention by
mentioning the 2012 Clinton-Petraeus plan to arm the rebels. He claimed
that he and General Dempsey had both supported the plan. This statement
was the first time that a member of the administration admitted to endors-
ing a plan to arm the rebels in Syria.336 Part of it was an endorsement to
vet, arm and train moderate rebels in Syria affiliated with the FSA as a way
to balance the growing al-Qaeda presence by instilling greater confidence
among locals as well as the international community and attracting support.
Overcome with a bad case of what Ambassador Hof called “Iraq Syndrome,”
which had only been exacerbated at this point by the NATO intervention in
Libya, the President had no desire to engage militarily in Syria.337
President Obama’s decision not to operationalize this plan revealed the
growing interagency divide over Syria policy within the Obama adminis-
tration. In a February 2013 congressional hearing, Senator John McCain
said that he was disappointed that Obama “overruled the senior leaders
of his own national security team, who were in unanimous agreement
that America needs to take greater action to change the military balance
of power in Syria,” and that if there was “another time in history when
335
Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Reslies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support
Syrian Rebels,” The New York Times, January 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/
world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0.
336
Jon Swaine,“Leon Panetta supports Hillary Clinton plan to arm Syrian rebels,” The
Telegraph, February 7, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
syria/9856382/Leon-Panetta-supports-Hillary-Clinton-plan-to-arm-Syrian-rebels.html.
337
Frederic Hof, “Frederic Hof Criticizes Obama Administration's 'Iraq Syndrome,'” The
Atlantic Council, August 22, 2013, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/in-the-news/freder-
ic-hof-quoted-in-the-economist.
a President’s entire national-security team recommended a course of ac-

tion and he overruled them...I’m not aware of it.”338 However, President
Obama’s new foreign policy team was quick to point to the new direction.
Secretary of State John Kerry explained that the best solution for Syria
was a political one and that the U.S. was working towards this goal by try-
ing to bring together another international conference that would include
the warring parties.339 Yet, shortly after this statement, the new Secretary
of Defense, Chuck Hagel, claimed that all options were still on the table
and that the U.S. could take different measures in order to deal with the
conflict.340 According to SNC representatives, it was mostly the Obama
administration’s inner circle that was not convinced by any option that
other members of the administration brought forward. There were clear
indications that both Secretary Clinton and Secretary Kerry were sym-
pathetic to arming the opposition and had seriously tried to convince
the White House. However, the President did not want to initiate these
plans at that time.341 In a 2015 interview, Secretary Hagel said that White
House meetings were routinely unproductive. Meetings continually were
hung up on small matters and pushed back making tough decisions. At
one point, Secretary Hagel says he wrote a two-page memo to adminis-
tration officials outlining pressure he was getting from allies about the
administration’s strategy. He argued that the administration desperately
needed to formulate a coherent strategy on Syria342.
338
Michael Gordon and Mark Landler, “Senate Hearing Draws Out a Rift in U.S. Policy
on Syria,” The New York Times, February 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/pol-
itics/panetta-speaks-to-senate-panel-on-benghazi-attack.html?pagewanted=all; See also Dexter
Filkins, “The Thin Red Line,” The New Yorker, May 13, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2013/05/13/the-thin-red-line-2.
339
John Kerry, “Press Availability on Syria,” February 28, 2013.
340
Lolita C. Baldor, “Hagel: US rethinking possibly arming rebels,” U.S. News, May 2,
2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/05/02/hagel-us-rethinking-possi-
bly-arming-rebels.
341
Radwan Ziadeh, interview by Kilic Kanat,
342
Dan de Luce, “Hagel: The White House Tried to “Destroy” me,” Foreign Policy, December
18, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/hagel-the-white-house-tried-to-destroy-me/.
Reportedly, President Obama’s opinion on lethal aid changed in June

2013 when the investigators found intractable evidence of chemical at-
tacks perpetrated by the regime. They were small in scale, but their very
existence was apparently reason enough to cause the administration se-
rious concern. Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes declared
in June, “The President has said that the use of chemical weapons would
change his calculus, and it has.”343 The claim was true but incomplete.
The use of chemical weapons justified U.S. efforts to give lethal aid to
the rebels, but it was not because of the egregiousness of the attacks; se-
nior State Department officials stated that the attacks at that point had
failed to stir any grand response from the White House, save for inspiring
further discussions to get allies to apply greater diplomatic pressure on
Assad.344 Instead, it appears more likely that the U.S. increased its support
to demonstrate to its allies that it had “skin in the game,” a vested interest
in the opposition’s success. The United States’ move to arm rebels came
just as Saudi Arabia and Jordan excluded the U.S. from a rebel-training
program out of a belief that it was holding reservations about the strength
of its commitment.345 Thus, military aid was wielded as a tool to propel
political cooperation with U.S. allies going forward. In addition, this pe-
riod also coincided with the increasing influence of Hezbollah and Iran in
the Syrian conflict. For instance, Ben Rhodes, pointing to this increasing
Iranian influence stated, “There’s urgency to the situation. There has been
urgency to the situation for two years. It’s particularly urgent right now
in terms of the situation on the ground, in some respect, because we have
seen Hezbollah and Iran increase their own involvement in the conflict,
343
Mark Mazzetti, Michael Gordon and Mark Landler, “U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons
to Syrian Rebels,” The New York Times, June 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/
world/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons.html?pagewanted=all.
344
345
Mazzetti, Gordon and Landler, “U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels”;
See also Adam Entous and Nour Malas, “U.S. Still Hasn’t Armed Syrian Rebels,” The Wall Street
Journal, September 2, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324202304
579051280341316034.
and that has caused an influx of additional fighters to the conflict. And so
that has added an element of urgency.”346
In a statement, Rhodes claimed that the intelligence community, ac-
cording to the multiple and independent streams of information, assessed
that the regime used chemical weapons multiple times in 2012. He also
stated that “the United States and the international community have a
number of other legal, financial, diplomatic and military responses avail-
able” and that the U.S. is prepared for all contingencies and will make
decisions on its own timeline.347 However, this announcement failed to end
the dispute over the conflict in Syria among different members of the ad-
ministration. Reportedly, immediately after the announcement, deep-seat-
ed divisions emerged within the administration over U.S. involvement.
Secretary Kerry was among the proponents of more aggressive action, but
President Obama opposed putting American troops on the ground in Syria
and the administration had not made any decisions on operating a no-fly
zone.348 In leaked minutes from a strategy meeting, Secretary Kerry and
General Dempsey had a heated debate over possible operations in Syria.
Secretary Kerry endorsed a plan that involved immediate U.S. airstrikes
against Syrian airfields, specifically those that might be used for launching
chemical weapons attacks against opposition forces. Dempsey had argued
that such an operation would be too complex and that there was still no
clear entrance or exit strategy or enough understanding of the consequenc-
es of such an action for the United States.349 This division and lack of co-
346
Josh Rogin, “Obama’s Syria Aid: Too Late?” The Daily Beast, June 13, 2013, http://www.
dailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/13/obama-s-syria-aid-too-late.html.
347
Ben Rhodes, “Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Commu-
nications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use,” Press Release, June 13, 2013 (on-
line by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-.
348
Matthew Lee and Julie Pace, “Obama Authorizes Sending Weapons To Syrian Rebels,” The
Huffington Post, June 13, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/13/obama-syrian-reb-
els_n_3438625.html.
349
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Pentagon Shoots Down Kerry’s Syria Airstrike Plan,” Bloomberg View,
June 18, 2013, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-06-18/pentagon-shoots-down-ker-
ry-s-syria-airstrike-plan.
ordination was also reflected in bureaucratic circles. The administration

failed to put together a structure, let alone a body, responsible for setting an
agenda on Syria. An administration official told Gordon Lubold of Foreign
Policy that he was quite saddened that after two and a half years, there was
no sign of an effective, efficient, and organized interagency task force.350
Adding to the disagreements over airstrikes within the administration,
there was no coordination to operationalize military support or the arming
of opposition groups. A CIA and special operations training program was
put together to train Syrian rebels on the use of anti-aircraft weaponry
and an encrypted communications program. A 2016 report by The New
York Times outlines that the major source of money and weaponry for this
program, titled Timber Sycamore, was supplied largely by Saudi Arabia,
but also received covert funding from other U.S. partners; Qatar, Jordan,
and Turkey.351 The program was expected to expand in order to cover the
training and arming of rebels as well.352 However, throughout the summer
of 2013, little information was ever put forth on how to coordinate and
plan the effort to arm the Syrian rebels. This interagency divide on arming
the rebels was further reflected in news reports. For instance, some anon-
ymous sources from the administration stated that the new aid package
would not include lethal arms, and was limited only to military items that
could increase the effectiveness of rebels on the ground. In the same report,
a second administration official claimed that President Obama might de-
cide to provide lethal weapons to the Syrian opposition without informing
large parts of the national security bureaucracy due to its secret nature.353
A third administration official—senior this time—explained the nature of
the assistance to the Syrian opposition as symbolic. According to him, the
350
Gordon Lubold, “Is Anyone In Charge Of U.S. Syria Policy?,” June 20, 2013, http://for-
eignpolicy.com/2013/06/20/is-anyone-in-charge-of-u-s-syria-policy/.
351
Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Reslies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support
Syrian Rebels,” The New York Times, January 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/
world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0.
352
Lee and Julie Pace, “Obama Authorizes Sending Weapons To Syrian Rebels.”
353
Rogin, “Obama’s Syria Aid: Too Late?”
announcement had the potential to shift “the emotional balance by giving

the rebels hope and making Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fear that his
opposition will become a more formidable force.”354
Later, NSA advisor Philip Gordon would say of this wavering,
I came to the conclusion as early as late 2013 that we were pursuing a pol-
icy that had very little chance of working, and at very high cost. And that the
costs of seeking a de-escalation and diplomatic engagement that would stop
short of our ultimate political objective—removing the regime—were much
less than the cost of perpetuating a policy that couldn’t work… The problem
is that our policy was in fact to “change the equation on the ground.” And our
policy was to support the opposition to the point that it was strong enough to
lead the regime and its backers to come to the table and negotiate away the re-
gime. And that was an unrealistic objective. And so ultimately where we ended
up was with a political objective that couldn’t be achieved by using the means
that we were prepared to use. 355
Gordon lamented about the administration often being skeptical of

their own policy, questioning whether they were doing things “just to show
we were doing something,” rather than creating achievable objectives.
Yet, the United States was not timely in delivering that aid, delaying
much of it until the spring of 2014. The setback cast doubts over the sin-
cerity of the proposal and contributed to the declining of U.S. credibility
among the Syrian opposition. It also added to the deterioration of relations
with regional partners. Even when the aid was delivered, it did little to
change the balance of power on the ground. Critics and administration
officials alike asserted that this push was ineffective by design, as Al-Qae-
da-related groups were getting stronger and the political opposition was
incapable of leading. For a group of people in Washington, Assad was argu-
ably the only source of stability capable of preventing the state institutions
from crumbling. They believed that Assad was the only chance to avoid the
collapse of the country into a safe haven for terrorist groups. According to
354
James Traub, “Terms Of Engagement: Is Doing Something in Syria Better than Nothing?,”
Foreign Policy, June 14, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/14/is-doing-something-in-syria-
better-than-nothing/.
355
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “Obama’s Former Middle East Advisor: We Should Have Bombed
Assad,” The Atlantic,April 20, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/
philip-gordon-barack-obama-doctrine/479031/.
senior military officers, the Pentagon was expressly told not to draft mili-
tary strike options that would facilitate Assad’s ousting, as it would leave
a power vacuum in the country.356 Even General Dempsey repeatedly ap-
proached Congress to iterate his concern that Assad’s removal from power
would inevitably strengthen al-Qaeda and its affiliates.357 Therefore, the
United States deliberately failed to pick the opposition as the winner, allow-
ing for the development of a war of attrition in Syria, while simultaneously
fostering an atmosphere of impunity for the Assad regime. In making his
decision on whether to arm the opposition, President Obama made a uni-
lateral decision, isolating himself inside his own administration.
356
Entous and Malas, “U.S. Still Hasn't Armed Syrian Rebels.”
357
Ibid.
SIX A NEW CALCULUS
“
Some U.S. allies in the region
as well as many members of the
Syrian opposition saw the shift as
an effort to backpedal on the plan,
either to deflect blame in the event of
failure or to use the polarized Congress
to prevent its approval all together.
“Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided
that the United States should take military ac-
tion against Syrian regime targets...I will seek au-
thorization for the use of force from the Ameri-
can people's representatives in Congress.”358
On August 21, 2013, President Obama’s “red line” statement

was challenged in the largest incident of chemical weapons use in the conflict to-
date, killing up to an estimated 1,400 people in the Damascus suburb of Ghou-
ta. Other chemical attacks had been reported in November 2012 and March and
April 2013, but this latest attack was both the largest and the most well reported.
In addition to the high number of casualties, the aftermath of the attacks and the
affected patients’ conditions were recorded and distributed through social media.
The news of the attack was quickly circulated around the world. The attack in
Ghouta was impossible to ignore and warranted the involvement of the White
House. It was a shocking incident for the Obama administration because many
in the White House believed that the red line speech had been a major deterrent
against the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, ever since the
red line statement, the Obama administration had sent messages to both Iran
and Russia outlining the possible consequences of the use of these weapons.359
358
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” Press Release, August 31, 2013
(online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
359
Peter Baker, Mark Landler, David Sanger and Anne Barnard, “Off-the-Cuff Obama
Line Put U.S. in Bind on Syria,” The New York Times, May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/obamas-vow-on-chemical-weapons-puts-him-in-tough-spot.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 .
142 / A N ew C alculus ( A ugust 2013- A ugust 2014)
Although there were previous intelligence reports about the use of these
weapons, the time between the attacks and the confirmation of the use of
chemical agents was such that the issue was no longer on the agenda. In
addition, in previous attacks, finding conclusive evidence about the use of
chemical weapons was difficult. According to rebel forces, in one particular
instance, after a chemical weapons attack by Syrian regime forces,
American intelligence officers in Jordan were provided two sets of hair, soil
and urine samples from each of three contested areas near Damascus where
rebels have accused the government of using chemical weapons. After positive
tests… the officers asked for a third sample, but it could not be delivered along
an impassable road.360
The attack in Ghouta, however, was much different. YouTube videos

were circulated on social media in the immediate aftermath of the at-
tack, clearly demonstrating that victims were suffering from exposure to a
chemical agents, including difficulty breathing, convulsions, and foaming
of the mouth. According to experts, this kind of initial visual evidence
undeniably pointed to the use of chemical weapons.361
All the eyes again turned to the United States and President Obama,
who had made his redline statement exactly one year earlier. According to
many, if the Ghouta attack was also substantiated by intelligence reports,
this was a clear violation of the red line set forth by the President himself
and necessitated a swift U.S. response. First, the attack was a grave viola-
tion of international chemical weapons bans and international norms. As
the global superpower, the United States, with backing from the inter-
national community, needed to act in order to sanction those who used
these weapons. Second, the attack cast a shadow over the Iranian nuclear
negotiations, which President Obama had been pushing as a foreign policy
priority. If the United States failed to follow through on its 2012 threat
against Syria, the country’s credibility would be damaged, thereby embold-
360
Ibid.
361
Dashiell Bennett, “The Visual Evidence of a Chemical Attack in Syria Is Overwhelming
and Disturbing,” The Wire, August 21, 2013, http://www.thewire.com/global/2013/08/visual-ev-
idence-syrias-poison-gas-attack-overwhelming-and-disturbing/68586/.
ening U.S. enemies and shaking the faith of U.S. allies. Everyone in the
administration, including the President, believed that the United States
had to act. However, action never came. However some of the members
of the administration later came out and criticized the last minute change
of heart of President Obama. Commenting on the decision making pro-
cess of the administration during this period, Philip Gordon, who held
the NSC Middle East portfolio at the time, has said that he believes, in
retrospect, that the President’s red line should have been upheld. In an
interview with The Atlantic, Gordon said, “The president said in 2012
that the use of chemical weapons was a red line for us. I think this threat
actually worked for a time. This was in Assad’s mind, and it led him not to
use chemical weapons, at least on a large scale, for almost a year. So some-
times there’s utility in putting down a marker like that.” He continued,
“My view was that while achieving a comprehensive political transition in
Syria was a noble goal, we were not succeeding and we were unlikely to
succeed and therefore the costs of pursuing that goal—dead people, ref-
ugees, destabilizing neighbors, radicalization, instability in Europe—were
becoming far greater than the costs of de-escalation. But I was always told
that our credibility was at stake, and that we couldn’t stop halfway.”362
The use of chemical weapons in Ghouta took place after almost a year
long gradual increase in the intensity of use of the chemicals. According to
a senior U.S. official, the Assad regime had been purposely increasing the
number of deaths incurred by chemical weapons attacks as a way to test the
U.S.’ commitment to its “red line” threat. Yet the administration avoided
responding to the reported attacks in late 2012 and early 2013, providing
no deterrent to keep Assad from escalating his use of chemical weapons.
As Senator John McCain has put forward, “Assad was able to use chemical
weapons before and there was no response, and so why not do it again?
This should surprise no one...[Syria] viewed that not as a red line but as a
362
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “Obama’s Former Middle East Adviser: We Should Have Bombed
Assad,” The Atlantic, April 20, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/
philip-gordon-barack-obama-doctrine/479031/.
green light...”363 Members of the administration had already revealed that

the “red line” statement was made without an interagency process and that
it was another message without a pre-existing or prepared strategy. Because
of that, President Obama never “deliberately explained what his red line
actually is and how it would change his calculus.” A former defense policy
advisor for President Obama was not convinced that the administration
thought through the possible implications of such a statement. He said,
“I am worried about the broader damage to U.S. credibility if we make a
statement and then come back with lawyerly language to get around it.”364
Those who knew how the Assad regime operated believed that the ad-
ministration should have foreseen and prepared for the likelihood of an
even deadlier chemical attack with the potential to draw the U.S. deeper
into the Syrian conflict. Instead, in what one State Department official
called an “inexplicable lack of policy preparation,” the administration
failed to draw up military contingency plans in the event that the U.S.
was obligated to carry out its 2012 threat. Not only did the White House
lack trust in the Pentagon after a series of leaks, but it was also certain
enough of its own aversion to military action that it did not bother to seek
defense counsel.365 In addition to all this, there was a significant degree of
desensitization to the violence and chaos of the Syrian conflict among the
members of the administration.366 According to a New York Times report,
the overall atmosphere at the White House during meetings about Syria
was described as very distracted and disinterested. The report stated, “Mr.
Obama rarely voiced strong opinions during senior staff meetings. But
current and former officials said his body language was telling: he often
appeared impatient or disengaged while listening to the debate, sometimes
363
Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: McCain Says Obama Gave ‘Green Light’ to Syria to Use Chemical
Weapons,” The Daily Beast, August 27, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/27/
exclusive-mccain-says-obama-gave-green-light-to-syria-to-use-chemical-weapons.html.
364
Baker et al.
365
Glenn Thrush, “Locked in the Cabinet,” Politico Magazine, November 2013, http://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2013/11/locked-in-the-cabinet-99374.html#ixzz38LJVdmds;
366
scrolling through messages on his BlackBerry or slouching and chewing

gum.”367 The same report also suggested that there were even some admin-
istration officials within President Obama’s inner circle that favored the
status quo in Syria. Accordingly, “accompanying a group of senior law-
makers on a day trip to the Guantánamo Bay naval base in early June, Mr.
McDonough argued that the status quo in Syria could keep Iran pinned
down for years. In later discussions, he also suggested that a fight in Syria
between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda would work to America’s advantage,
according to Congressional officials.”368 Although many of these officials
changed their position as a result of deteriorating conditions in Syria, they
nevertheless stayed skeptical about any form of U.S. engagement in Syria.
After the distribution of the videos of the chemical weapon attack, the
first reaction from the White House came in a statement requesting im-
mediate access to witnesses and affected individuals to examine and collect
physical evidence without any intervention from the Syrian government.369
Meanwhile, the UNSC convened to discuss the attacks and potential re-
sponses to it. The international community focused on the U.S. reaction
to the attacks, specifically due to President Obama’s “red line.” The tone of
the first White House statement signaled an urgency and the potential for
action by the United States. On the first day after the attack, the Obama
administration stated that it could not verify the use of chemical weapons
in Ghouta, requesting that intelligence agencies help confirm the allega-
tions.370 In an interview after the attacks, President Obama described the
367
Mark Mazzetti, Robert F. Worth and Michael R. Gordon, “Obama’s Uncertain Path
Amid Syria Bloodshed,” The New York Times, October 22, 2013, http://mobile.nytimes.
com/2013/10/23/world/middleeast/obamas-uncertain-path-amid-syria-bloodshed.html.
368
Ibid; See also Peter Baker, “Amid Hunger Strike, Senators Lead Delegation to Prison at
Guantánamo,” The Caucus (New York Times blog), June 7, 2013, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2013/06/07/amid-hunger-strike-senators-lead-delegation-to-prison-at-guantnamo/.
369
Martin Chulov, Mona Mahmood and Ian Sample, “Syria conflict: chemical weapons
blamed as hundreds reported killed,” The Guardian, August 22, 2013, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/aug/21/syria-conflcit-chemical-weapons-hundreds-killed.
370
“U.S. says unable to conclusively determine chemical weapons used in Syria,” Reu-
ters¸ August 23, 2013, http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/08/22/syria-crisis-usa-state-idINDE-
E97L0IA20130822.
event as a “big event of grave concern.” However, President Obama also

emphasized his cautiousness in deciding on a response to this episode. He
explained, “Sometimes what we've seen is that folks will call for immediate
action, jumping into stuff, that does not turn out well, gets us mired in
very difficult situations, can result in us being drawn into very expensive,
difficult, costly interventions that actually breed more resentment in the
region.”371 The statement clearly followed an already established pattern
for the administration’s previous positions on military interventions. He
expressed his caution and skepticism on the outcomes of the use of mil-
itary force. For most Syrian observers, this statement itself was a major
indicator of Washington’s reluctance to take action.372
Over the next few days, President Obama and his administration re-
viewed the situation in Syria. Following these deliberations, Secretary of
State John Kerry made a statement confirming that the White House in-
deed held evidence on the use of chemical weapons in the suburbs of Da-
mascus, including proof of the perpetrators. He stated,
What has already happened in Syria is grounded in facts, informed by
conscience and guided by common sense. The reported number of victims,
the reported symptoms of those who were killed or injured, the firsthand ac-
counts from humanitarian organizations on the ground, like Doctors Without
Borders and the Syria Human Rights Commission—these all strongly indicate
that everything these images are already screaming at us is real, that chemical
weapons were used in Syria.373
The administration believed that the attack had been conducted by

the Assad regime, which it asserted possessed stockpiles of these weapons
and had the ability to deliver such agents. Secretary Kerry also said that
President Obama was working on making an informed decision on how to
respond to these chemical attacks and that he believed that there must be
371
“Obama: Syria chemical weapon claim a 'grave concern,'” BBC News, August 23, 2013,
372
Anonymous interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014
373
“Transcript: Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks on alleged Syria chemical attack,” The
Washington Post, August 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nation-security/tran-
script-secretary-of-state-john-kerrys-remarks-on-alleged-syria-chemical-attack/2013/08/26/40b-
0b4ea-0e8b-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html.
accountability for those who perpetrated the attack.374 At the same time,
a debate was occurring within the administration on how to respond to
the attacks—whether to strike the regime immediately or whether to wait
for UN inspectors to release their report.375 While the administration was
buying time with these discussions, several reports emerged suggesting
that a conversation between an official at the Syrian Ministry of Defense
and a leader of a chemical weapons unit had been intercepted. The con-
tent of the leak confirmed that the Assad regime was responsible for the
chemical attack in Ghouta.376 This was a major development since both
the administration and international community were waiting for proof
to verify that the Syrian regime was behind the attacks before pursuing
strong action. In the meantime, the U.S. military began devising potential
scenarios to “punish the Syrian regime,” but the options were limited.
The goal was to take punitive action against the perpetrators of this crime,
without tipping the balance in favor of the Syrian opposition or over-
throwing the Assad regime. In fact, the White House wanted to continue
to avoid involvement in the Syrian conflict and limit its goals to retaliation
for the breach of international norms. According to the plan, the U.S.
and its allies would use Tomahawk missiles to destroy Syrian command
and control facilities, weapons delivery systems, and intelligence bases to
prevent the repetition of chemical attacks. The operation was planned to
last for a narrow 48 hours, and be limited in nature with no boots on the
ground or the imposition of a “no-fly zone.”377 However, even before its
announcement, debate began among security analysts about the effective-
ness of such a plan. For instance, Chris Hammer, a former naval analyst
who had earlier drafted a proposal for surgical strikes, expressed skepticism
374
Ibid.
375
Noah Shachtman, “Exclusive: Intercepted Calls Prove Syrian Army Used Nerve Gas, U.S.
Spies Say,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/27/exclusive-inter-
cepted-calls-prove-syrian-army-used-nerve-gas-u-s-spies-say/.
376
Ibid.
377
Ibid.
about the success of such an operation under the current circumstances.

According to him, this form of tactical action was successful only in the
presence of a clear strategic objective. In the absence of a clear objective,
such actions could prove pointless and counterproductive.378 According
to other security experts, the constant comments from the White House
about the nature and length of the attacks were damaging to their pur-
pose. For David Deptula, the comments were merely making it easier for
Assad to prepare for the potential attacks, and thus minimizing their pos-
sible impact.379 Moreover, foreign policy experts were critical of the way
that President Obama was handling the decision making process. David
Rothkopf, in an article in Foreign Policy, interpreted the Obama adminis-
tration’s constant reaffirmation of the limited nature of the operations as
a message that said, "We don’t care so much if you kill your people. We
primarily care how you kill your people."380
With the release of the intelligence report, it was clear that the Obama
administration held sufficient evidence that the Syrian regime was respon-
sible for the chemical attacks.381 Following the report’s release, Secretary
Kerry delivered a speech to the American public, explaining the major
findings and how the U.S. would respond accordingly. Once again, Secre-
tary Kerry claimed that there would be no boots on the ground and that
the operation would be limited to airstrikes. He was careful to distinguish
the intervention in Syria from previous U.S. military involvement in the
378
John Hudson, “Architect of Syria War Plan Doubts Surgical Strikes Will Work,” The Cable
(Foreign Policy blog), August 26, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/architect-of-syria-
war-plan-doubts-surgical-strikes-will-work/.
379
Yochi Dreazen, “Did Obama Administration Leaks Already Spoil the Syria Attack?,” For-
eign Policy, August 28, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/28/did-obama-administration-
leaks-already-spoil-the-syria-attack/.
380
David Rothkopf, “Too Little, Too Late,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2013, http://foreign-
policy.com/2013/08/27/too-little-too-late/.
381
“Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on
August 21, 2013,” Press Release, August 30, 2012 (online by the White House Office of the
Press Secretary),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syri-
an-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21.
region. In addition, Secretary Kerry argued that the cost of inaction out-
weighed cost of action. He stated,
As previous storms in history have gathered, when unspeakable crimes
were within our power to stop them, we have been warned against the temp-
tations of looking the other way. History is full of leaders who have warned
against inaction, indifference, and especially against silence when it mattered
most. Our choices then in history had great consequences and our choice to-
day has great consequences.382
The wording of Secretary Kerry’s statement was unusually strong. He

called Assad a “thug and a murderer” and expressed that the international
community had the responsibility to act when there was such an obvious
breach of international norms and humanitarian principles. According
to him, the decision of the international community would have deep
significance. He said,
It matters because if we choose to live in a world where a thug and a mur-
derer like Bashar al-Assad can gas thousands of his own people with impunity,
even after the United States and our allies said no, and then the world does
nothing about it, there will be no end to the test of our resolve and the dangers
that will flow from those others who believe that they can do as they will.383
A day after Secretary Kerry’s statement, President Obama made an an-

nouncement at the White House. Following several TV interviews with
President Obama and the statements of Secretary Kerry, many around the
world expected the President to explain the timing and nature of forth-
coming limited airstrikes. Both the international community and U.S.
public opinion awaited with curiosity the decision of the U.S. administra-
tion about its military intervention. Even before the speech began, it was
heralded as a historic speech for the presidency. In his statement, President
Obama claimed that he made the decision to take military action against
regime targets. He also made it clear that it would not be an open-ended
intervention and would not involve U.S. combat troops. He explained
why it was important to degrade and destroy the regime’s capacity to de-
382
John Kerry, “Statement on Syria,” Remarks, August 30, 2013 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of State),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213668.htm.
383
Ibid.
liver chemical weapons for the U.S. and the international community. The
President’s statement was regarded as a declaration of the administration’s
intent to engage in a military operation until President Obama surprised
many with his footnote regarding the necessity to seek Congressional au-
thorization to launch military strikes. He said, “Yet, while I believe I have
the authority to carry out this military action without specific congres-
sional authorization, I know that the country will be stronger if we take
this course, and our actions will be even more effective.”384 In his Atlantic
interview, Philip Gordon outlined, “The President made clear that the re-
gime’s use of chemical weapons in August 2013 was an example of what
he meant when he warned against chemical weapon use.”385 He quoted the
president as saying in his Rose Garden speech,
What’s the purpose of the international system that we’ve built if a prohi-
bition on the use of chemical weapons that has been agreed to by the govern-
ments of 98 percent of the world's people and approved overwhelmingly by
the Congress of the United States is not enforced? Make no mistake—this has
implications beyond chemical warfare. If we won’t enforce accountability in
the face of this heinous act, what does it say about our resolve to stand up to
others who flout fundamental international rules?386
Later, David Rothkopf detailed how President Obama reached this

decision. According to Rothkopf, it was again President Obama and his
inner circle that made this critical decision without an interagency process
or the involvement of key national security and foreign policy figures. Rot-
hkopf stated that following the decision to launch a limited military strike,
…the president went on a walk around the South Lawn of the White
House with his chief of staff, Denis McDonough, a longtime loyalist whose
relationship with the president dates back to just prior to the 2008 campaign.
McDonough was not just a chief of staff—he was a member of the president’s
tightly knit innermost circle and a former deputy national security advisor.
McDonough had also long been one of the voices urging that America not get
involved in Syria, often stiffening the commander in chief ’s resolve to keep out
of the crisis when pressure came from others, such as first-term Secretary of
384
Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” August 31, 2013.
385
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/philip-gordon-barack-obama-
doctrine/479031/
386
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “Obama’s Former Middle East Adviser: We Should Have Bombed Assad.”
State Hillary Clinton, who thought Washington ought to do more to support

moderate opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It was during their
45-minute stroll that Obama shared with McDonough his concerns about
following through on his Syria plan.
Afterward, when the two joined a small group of top advisors in the Oval
Office, Obama reportedly announced, “I have a big idea I want to run by
you guys,” and then segued into his new plan to put action on hold until he
could get a formal vote of congressional support. Many in the group were
stunned by the news, including Rice, who reportedly argued that it would
send a message of vacillation and would set a bad precedent of deferring to
Congress on such issues.
Notably, the group did not include several key national security principals.
Obama called Hagel to let him know about the decision to punt. Absent as
well was Kerry, whom Obama later privately informed about his change of
mind. The secretary of state’s team felt he had been treated badly, having been
asked to play the role of front man on this issue just hours before.387
The announcement arrived at a moment of significant political polar-

ization in the United States. It also sparked a debate within the U.S. about
executive authority and presidential power. Previous presidents, including
George H. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ronald Reagan had used limited force
without seeking Congressional approval. President Obama, himself, had
conducted a military operation in Libya without seeking approval from
Congress and had previously not permitted considerable Congressional
involvement in his drone strike campaign against terrorist targets in differ-
ent countries around the world.388 To seek an authorization before such a
limited military strike set a precedent that could limit presidential powers
in the future.389 A few days after his statement, President Obama went
on to say during an interview, “As commander-in-chief I always preserve
the right and the responsibility to act on behalf of America's national se-
387
David Rothkopf, “National Insecurity: Can Obama’s Foreign Policy be Saved?” Foreign
Policy, September 9, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/09/national-insecurity/.
388
William G. Howell, “All Syria Policy is Local,” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2013, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/03/all-syria-policy-is-local/.
389
Karen DeYoung, “Obama’s decision to turn to Congress on Syria decision triggers debate,”
The Washington Post, September 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-secu-
rity/obamas-decision-to-turn-to-congress-on-syria-decision-is-fodder-for-debate/2013/09/04/
e59aace6-14ca-11e3-a100-66fa8fd9a50c_story.html.
curity…I do not believe that I was required to take this to Congress but
I did not take this to Congress just because it's an empty exercise. I think
it is important to have Congress's support.”390 As far as the international
arena was concerned, the decision to seek approval from Congress was not
interpreted as a constitutional step, but rather as an attempt to delay and
potentially avoid conducting military strikes.
In the meantime, a series of meetings were held between the admin-
istration and Congress about the potential for the use of force in Syria.
On September 3, President Obama met with Congressional leadership
while Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, and General Dempsey testified at
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.391 According to Hillary Clinton,
during this process, she advised the president to secure symbolic support
from Congress, while Russia and other countries—which were against a
military intervention—watched warily to see what domestic political con-
straints would be placed on the administration.392
During the testimonies of Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel, mem-
bers of the administration tried to make the case for a military operation.
Secretary Hagel claimed, “A refusal to act would undermine the credibil-
ity of America’s other security commitments—including the President’s
commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The word
of the United States must mean something. It is vital currency in for-
eign relations and international and allied commitments.”393 More sig-
nificantly, confusion began to appear in later days about the nature of the
390
Dan Roberts, “Obama seeks global backing on Syria: 'I didn't set a red line. The world did,'”
The Guardian, September 4, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/04/obama-syria-
red-line-chemical-weapons.
391
“Full Transcript: Kerry, Hagel and Dempsey testify at Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing on Syria,” The Washington Post, September 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/pol-
itics/running-transcript-senate-foreign-services-committee-hearing-on-syria/2013/09/03/35ae1048-
14ca-11e3-b182-1b3bb2eb474c_story.html.
392
393
Chuck Hagel, Statement on Syria before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Hearing, September 3, 2013, Available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.as-
px?SpeechID=1802.
possible military operation and its targets. Although the administration

was, until this declaration, very certain that it would be limited military
strikes, both the President and some leaders of Congress began to signal
the presence of a broader strategy that would include overthrowing the
Assad regime. First of all, President Obama, addressing the Congressio-
nal leadership, accentuated that his strategy for confronting the chemical
weapons issue should strengthen the opposition, leading to a peaceful
transition and generating stability for Syria and the region. This was the
first time that President Obama linked the planned military strikes to
policy objectives.394 Senator McCain, who had been a major proponent
for more assertive action against the Assad regime, was clear about his
reservations on the current plan. Senator McCain stated that President
Obama, during his meeting with him, promised to include regime change
as part of his strategy to on Syria’s chemical weapons.395
It was a complicated scene for those who want to trace the process of
decision making on Syria during this time. Part of the convolution owes
to the President’s indecisiveness, which created a great deal of confusion
among both the bureaucracy and observers of U.S. policy on Syria. De-
spite the week of painstaking deliberation, policy preparation, and com-
munication with allies leading to the decision to authorize the limited
use of force, President Obama chose to invite Congress to vote on the
strike. There were several reasons provided for this sudden change of heart.
Firstly, the failure to reach an agreement at the UNSC and the vote in the
British parliament contributed to this re-evaluation.396 However, almost all
accounts of this period indicate that President Obama wanted Congress to
394
Dan Roberts and Spencer Ackerman, “Obama hints at larger strategy to topple Assad in
effort to win over Republicans,” The Guardian, September 3, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/sep/03/obama-strategy-assad-republicans-syria.
395
Roberts, “Obama seeks global backing on Syria: 'I didn't set a red line. The world did.'”
396
Dave Urbanski, “Obama Changed Mind at 11th Hour on Syria, Overriding Top
National Security Advisers,” The Blaze, August 31, 2013, http://www.theblaze.com/sto-
ries/2013/08/31/obama-changed-mind-at-11th-hour-on-syria-overriding-top-national-securi-
ty-advisers-officials-say/.
take some responsibility in this critical decision so that if something went

wrong, Congress could not criticize the President. Accordingly, following
the disapproval of the administration’s decision to use force in Libya from
some members of Congress, the President decided to involve Congress in
the decision making.397 However, regardless of his motivation, the decision
making process that President Obama conducted in this case demonstrates
that he was making the decision himself and then consulting his aides on
the operationalization of his unilateral plan.
In his public statements, the President claimed he altered the plan be-
cause a positive vote from Congress would strengthen the United States
by offering Congress an olive branch and moving “forward together as
one nation” on Syria.398 Yet, some U.S. allies in the region as well as many
members of the Syrian opposition saw the shift as an effort to backpedal
on the plan, either to deflect blame in the event of failure or to use the po-
larized Congress to prevent its approval all together.399 President Obama’s
backpedalling was also visible in his September 4th assertion that the U.S.
“did not set a red line; the world set a red line.”400 With this statement, he
was trying to argue that it was a global responsibility and thus it was not a
burden for the United States to bear alone.
President Obama, caught in a policy nightmare on the plausibility of
airstrikes, was relieved when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov offered him a peaceful egress from his dilemma. The
conversion seemed sudden. In a September 9th press conference, Secretary
Kerry declared that if Assad wanted to prevent the bombing, “he could turn
over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international commu-
nity in the next week...[but] it can’t be done.” Discussions in Washington
about the reasoning behind such a “proposal” spread among policy makers.
For some within the State Department, it was a gaffe that Kerry made while
397
Howell, “All Syria Policy is Local.”
398
Urbanski, “Obama Changed Mind at the 11th Hour.”
399
Interview. Kilic Kanat August 2014
400
Roberts, “Obama seeks global backing on Syria: 'I didn't set a red line. The world did.'”
trying to make the case that Assad could do nothing to prevent these puni-
tive airstrikes. In fact, even the State Department was caught unprepared to
handle such an announcement. Immediately after the statement, the State
Department spokeswoman, in an email statement, stated,
Secretary Kerry was making a rhetorical argument about the impossibil-
ity and unlikelihood of Assad turning over chemical weapons he has denied
he used…His (Kerry's) point was that this brutal dictator with a history of
playing fast and loose with the facts cannot be trusted to turn over chemical
weapons, otherwise he would have done so long ago. That's why the world
faces this moment.401
State Department officials were not informed about a change in plan.

Following Secretary Kerry’s statement, the predominant view was that the
proposal would have no real impact on the Obama administration’s plan.402
Yet, on September 10th, the Obama administration announced a deal
with the Russians to do just that, a plan that had allegedly been in discus-
sion for some time. Later in an interview President Obama mentioned
some details about the process of reaching a deal on the chemical weapons.
He had had conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin about
eliminating the Syrian regime’s chemical weapon stockpiles in a summit.
In his controversial interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, it was stated that
Amid the confusion, a deus ex machina appeared in the form of the Rus-
sian president, Vladimir Putin. At the G20 summit in St. Petersburg, which
was held the week after the Syria reversal, Obama pulled Putin aside, he re-
called to me, and told the Russian president “that if he forced Assad to get
rid of the chemical weapons, that that would eliminate the need for us taking
a military strike.” Within weeks, Secretary Kerry, working with his Russian
counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, would engineer the removal of most of Syria’s
chemical-weapons arsenal—a program whose existence Assad until then had
refused to even acknowledge.403
While pursuing these conversations with different actors, President

Obama requested that Congress delay the vote on striking Syria and wait
401
“State Department: Kerry Statement On Syria Turning Over Chemical Weapons
Simply Rhetorical,” The Huffington Post, September 9, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/09/09/state-department-kerry-syria_n_3893213.html.
402
Interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.
403
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
to see if another round of diplomacy on Syria with Russia would work.

Following this process, Russia proposed an agreement in which Syria would
join the Chemical Weapons Convention and surrender its chemical arsenal
to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) by
mid-2014. The White House released a statement shortly after applauding
the progress in negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons.404
Following this agreement, Vice President Joe Biden labeled the agree-
ment a credit to “President Barack Obama’s “absolutely clear” vision for
foreign policy.”405 Thus, the prospect of military intervention in Syria was
essentially put to rest, as the United States joined forces with Russia in a
UN draft resolution calling on Assad to relinquish his chemical weapons.
Syria agreed to the deal, which the Obama administration identified as a
direct result of the “credible threat of U.S. force.”406 The deal received crit-
icism from many who believed it lent Assad legitimacy and emboldened
his actions. The debate on Syria had become diverted and monopolized
by the issue of chemical weapons. As October came to an end, Secretary
Kerry released a statement emphasizing the success of the first phase of the
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.407
While the chemical weapons were being destroyed, the Assad regime
continued its attacks on civilians with conventional weapons. The agree-
ment had likely been perceived by the Assad regime as a green light to con-
tinue its operations using conventional weapons. In the meantime, after
the President’s last minute change of heart, Secretary Kerry turned back to
404
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on U.S.-Russian Agreement on Frame-
work for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” Press Release, September 14, 2013, (on-
office/2013/09/14/statement-president-us-russian-agreement-framework-elimination-syrian-ch.
405
Alexander Burns, “Joe Biden credits Obama on Syria,” Politico, September 15, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/joe-biden-syria-96825.html.
406
Dan Roberts and Julian Borger, “Vladimir Putin warns US not to launch attack in Syria,”
The Guardian, September 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/12/putin-
warns-us-not-to-attack-syria.
407
John Kerry, “Progress Eliminating Syria's Chemical Weapons Program,” Press Release,
October 31, 2013 (online by the U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2013/10/216143.htm.
diplomacy. In October, he resumed preparations for an international con-

ference that would bring together the regime and Assad forces for the first
time. However, in the fall of 2013, Secretary Kerry’s initiative had to be
postponed because of the difficulty in bringing together separate groups,
and more significantly, as many in the State Department believed that it
could lead to a humiliating situation for the United States.408 Furthermore,
many actors in the region believed that it would be a futile endeavor that
would not bring a solution to the conflict in Syria.
In the meantime, because of the fluid situation on the ground in Syria,
there were several signs of change in U.S. policy in regards to the op-
position forces. First, in November, seven different Islamic groups came
together and formed the Islamic Front, which became a significant center
of power on the ground. Although the U.S. did not consider the Islamic
Front a terrorist organization like al-Nusra, the administration was con-
cerned about the anti-American and anti-Western opinions and the Salafi
backgrounds of some of the members. In just a short period of time, the
Islamic Front gained control of several FSA bases. Following this develop-
ment, State Department Spokeswoman Marie Harf responded by saying
the U.S. was open to engagement with the Islamic Front. She mentioned
that the U.S. “wouldn’t rule out the possibility of meeting with the Islamic
Front,” and “can engage with the Islamic Front, of course, because they’re
not designated terrorists.” Harf also said that the U.S. was open to meeting
with different opposition groups.409 In the meantime, Reuters reported that
U.S. officials and Islamic Front leaders were scheduled to meet in Turkey
at the same time as Ambassador Ford was expected to visit Turkey.410 Ac-
408
Yochi Dreazen, “Exclusive: Kerry and Top State Dept Officials Split Over Syria Talks,” The
Cable (Foreign Policy blog), October 23, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/23/exclusive-
kerry-and-top-state-dept-officials-split-over-syria-talks/.
409
John Hudson, “U.S. Weighing Closer Ties With Hard-Line Islamists in Syria,” The Cable
(Foreign Policy blog), December 17, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/17/u-s-weighing-
closer-ties-with-hardline-islamists-in-syria/.
410
Mariam Karouny and Dasha Afanasieva, “Syrian Islamist rebels to meet U.S. officials:
opposition sources,” Reuters, December 14, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/14/
us-syria-crisis-rebels-idUSBRE9BD08D20131214.
cording to some within the Syrian opposition, the main goal of the meet-
ing was to bring together the Islamic Front and the FSA under a single
command in order to create a unified command structure.411 Although
early contacts with the group proved inconclusive, it was nevertheless con-
sidered a major step in U.S. policy on Syria.412
In the beginning of 2014, U.S. diplomats sped up the preparation
for the Geneva II Conference, which was expected to be the first step in
launching a process of negotiation between the opposition and the Assad
regime. During this time the growing crisis in Ukraine had become the
biggest distraction for the State Department officials’ efforts to organize
the conference. The international conference took place in Switzerland in
the last week of January. Securing the attendance of the Syrian opposition
was a serious accomplishment on the part of Secretary Kerry.413 Kerry, in
his introductory remarks, underlined the significance of the negotiations
to reach an agreement on a transition government. He stated,
Mutual consent, which is what has brought us here, for a transition gov-
ernment means that that government cannot be formed with someone that is
objected to by one side or the other. That means that Bashar Assad will not be
part of that transition government. There is no way – no way possible in the
imagination – that the man who has led the brutal response to his own people
could regain the legitimacy to govern. One man and those who have supported
him can no longer hold an entire nation and a region hostage. The right to lead
a country does not come from torture, nor barrel bombs, nor Scud missiles.
It comes from the consent of the people. And it’s hard to imagine how that
consent could be forthcoming at this point in time.
So just as there could be no place for the perpetrator of this violence, there
could also be no place for the thousands of violent extremists who spread their
hateful ideology and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. And as we hear
talk about terrorism today, make no mistake: It is the presence of the current
intransigence within the existing government that makes this problem worse.
411
Hudson, “U.S. Weighing Closer Ties With Hard-Line Islamists in Syria.”
412
Scott Lucas, “Syria: US Shifts Position — Again — on Co-operation with Islamic Front,”
EA WorldView, December 13, 2013, http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/syria-us-shifts-posi-
tion-co-operation-islamic-front/.
413
Joyce Karam, “Syria’s Geneva II is a win for Kerry with ‘zero chance’ for transition,”
Al-Arabiya, January 23, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/01/23/
Syria-s-Geneva-II-is-a-win-for-Kerry-with-zero-chance-for-transition.html.
That is creating a magnet for terrorists. And until a transition takes place, there
is no prayer of reducing the increase of terrorism.414
Despite recognizing Secretary Kerry’s efforts to bring together this

conference, most people did not expect the conference to result in any
agreement or the formation of a transition government. As expected, after
a week, the conference ended with no significant outcome.
With the failure of the Geneva II process, the administration shelved
the discourse about finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Syria for
a period of time. Administration officials still underlined that there could
be no military solution for the conflict in Syria; however, those who re-
cently left the administration, such as Fred Hof who had served as special
advisor for the transition in Syria, demonstrated that there were some se-
rious disagreements within the Obama administration on this issue. After
leaving his post, Hof criticized the administration for constantly empha-
sizing that there could be no military solution. Immediately after the end
of Geneva II meetings, he stated,
Those who say there is no military solution for Syria are really saying there
are no military options they wish to exercise. Even the modest, life-saving
option of destroying regime air, artillery, rocket, and missile assets used to
produce genocidal effects is dismissed on the grounds that it cannot solve the
overall problem of Syria. As President Obama recently claimed in The New
Yorker, the choice is all or nothing: invade and occupy Iraq-style or refrain
entirely from military strikes. Why is this so? What was he considering last
August before he changed his mind? Did the anti-genocide bombing campaign
in Serbia a decade-and-a-half ago aim to occupy the country?415
According to media reports, during this period, Secretary Kerry had

begun to express his frustration more vocally during meetings. Leaks
from a closed-door meeting at the security conference in Munich be-
tween Secretary Kerry and senior Senators strengthened this perception.
414
“Transcript: John Kerry’s remarks at Geneva II conference on Syria on Jan. 22,’ The Wash-
ington Post, January 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-john-kerrys-
remarks-at-geneva-ii-conference-on-syria-on-jan-22/2014/01/22/f2ec3a56-83b8-11e3-bbe5-
6a2a3141e3a9_story.html.
415
Frederic C. Hof, “Syria: What Next for Geneva II?” MENASource (Atlantic Council blog),
February 3, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-what-next-for-geneva-ii.
According to reports, Secretary Kerry was frustrated with the lack of

success of the current policy on Syria and expressed concerns regarding
the increasing number of extremists streaming into the region. Those
present at the meeting, including Senator Graham and Senator McCain,
stated that Secretary Kerry emphasized the need for a new strategy and
the necessity of boosting the capacity of the opposition.416 Although
it was immediately denied by the State Department, most pundits in
Washington, D.C. believed that there was indeed a need for a new strat-
egy. They agreed that President Obama’s approach of reaching out to
Russia and finding a diplomatic solution had proven to be ineffective in
degrading or stopping Assad’s forces.
From February onwards, the use of military strikes to weaken the
Syrian regime and training opposition forces was back on the table. The
main sponsor of this renewed effort was Secretary Kerry. Partly out of
the failure of the Geneva II process and partly as a result of the delays
in the elimination of chemical weapons, Secretary Kerry consulted with
Generals David Petraeus and Jack Keane. The generals stated that limited
military strikes together with the training and equipping of the opposi-
tion forces would be a good way to go for changing the situation on the
ground in Syria. According to a Wall Street Journal report, Kerry proposed
this idea to the White House. His main ally in this endeavor was U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power, who was well known for her
role in Libya and her advocacy of humanitarian interventionism. Refer-
ring to a senior administration official, The Wall Street Journal reported,
“Kerry has felt that diplomacy backed by the threat of force is an effective
approach and that it would strengthen the administration's hand, but
he has never felt that we have run out of diplomatic options—this will
416
Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Spy Chief Says Assad Has Strengthened His
Hold on Power,” The New York Times, February 4, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/world/middleeast/us-representative-to-syrian-opposi-
tion-is-retiring.html?_r=0.
only be resolved through diplomacy."417 However, during the meeting

on Secretary Kerry’s proposition, Secretary Hagel and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey opposed the plan and convinced
Secretary Kerry to postpone it. For General Dempsey, even a very limited
military intervention in the Syrian conflict could possibly suck the U.S.
into a prolonged struggle whereas, for Secretary Hagel, the real problem
was how to vet the opposition forces to train. Furthermore, Pentagon
officials were also concerned about the train and equip program for the
Syrian opposition, since such an endeavor could jeopardize the process
of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons.418 This situation demonstrated,
unlike the case of Clinton’s plan to arm opposition groups, that there
was a serious difference of opinion between the Pentagon and the State
Department over the best policy for Syria.
Although President Obama’s position during this debate has not been
made public, there have been important indications of his stance. In inter-
views with David Remnick, President Obama expressed his opposition to
both military intervention and arming and equipping the moderate rebels.
He considered U.S. action in Syria as a gateway for a disaster similar to that
of Iraq. In the interview, he said, “I am not haunted by my decision not to
engage in another Middle Eastern war. It is very difficult to imagine a sce-
nario in which our involvement in Syria would have led to a better outcome,
short of us being willing to undertake an effort in size and scope similar to
what we did in Iraq.”419 President Obama also responded to criticism over
not helping the Syrian opposition by stating, “When I hear people suggest-
ing that somehow if we had just financed and armed the opposition earlier,
that somehow Assad would be gone by now and we’d have a peaceful tran-
417
Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “John Kerry, U.S. Military Clash on Approach to Syr-
ia's Rebels,” The Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052
702304441304579479500649988892.
418
Ibid.
David Remnick, “Going the Distance,” The New Yorker, January 27, 2014, http://www.
419
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-2?currentPage=all.
sition, it’s magical thinking.”420 With these statements, the President closed
the door to different forms of interventions offered by different adminis-
tration officials. Former Ambassador Fred Hof, in an essay discussing the
interview, wrote that President Obama was not willing to even evaluate any
other options and equated every form of military intervention with the Iraqi
experience. Because of this, the only alternative for him seemed inaction.421
In the same essay, Hof described President Obama’s arguments against arm-
ing the opposition, “This is a straw man fallacy that misrepresents the views
of those who have opposed the arm's-length, rhetoric-rich hope that Syria
could somehow fix itself if only the warring parties would meet and sort
things out. The real question is what the balance on the ground would look
like now in Syria if the president had heeded the advice of his national se-
curity team in the summer of 2012,” he wrote.422 However, the arguments
that President Obama made during the interview made it clear that he had
not changed his position on Syria.
During the first months of 2014, Syria had a strong place on the ad-
ministration’s agenda because of increasing reports of radicalism in the
region. As stated above, Secretary Kerry emphasized during the Geneva
Conference that the region was becoming “a magnet for terrorists” because
of the policies of the Syrian government. This statement was later repeat-
ed by the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, in a Senate
Intelligence Committee hearing. Director Clapper stated that Syria had
become a huge magnet for terrorists for both recruitment and training.423
A few weeks after President Obama’s interview, the Director of CIA, John
Brennan, issued a statement that conflicted with what the President had
previously put forward. During a hearing, Director Brennan went on to
420
Ibid.
421
Frederic C. Hof, “Syria: The Shadow of Iraq,” MENASource (Atlantic Council blog), Jan-
uary 27, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-the-shadow-of-iraq.
422
Ibid.
423
John Hudson, “Intel Chiefs: Syria a ‘Huge Magnet’ for International Terrorists,” The Cable
(Foreign Policy blog), January 29, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/29/intel-chiefs-syr-
ia-a-huge-magnet-for-international-terrorists/.
state that the situation in Syria had created a fertile ground for organiza-
tions such as al-Qaeda to emerge and organize attacks in and alongside the
Syrian border.424 Following this, Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson
stressed that the civil war in Syria had become a threat for the U.S. home-
land security.425 However, especially in terms of rising threats like ISIS,
President Obama was less inclined to consider them a major potential
threat. Responding to a question in regards to ISIS, the President said,
The analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is
if a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bry-
ant….I think there is a distinction between the capacity and reach of a bin
Laden and a network that is actively planning major terrorist plots against the
homeland versus jihadists who are engaged in various local power struggles
and disputes, often sectarian.426
Following this he also emphasized,

Let’s just keep in mind, Falluja is a profoundly conservative Sunni city in a
country that, independent of anything we do, is deeply divided along sectarian
lines. And how we think about terrorism has to be defined and specific enough
that it doesn’t lead us to think that any horrible actions that take place around
the world that are motivated in part by an extremist Islamic ideology are a
direct threat to us or something that we have to wade into.427
Both of these statements later generated a great deal of criticism of

President Obama and the administration’s approach to the early signals
of ISIS’ presence in Iraq and Syria. The statements also demonstrated that
there was mismatch between the intelligence community and the White
House about the threat the organization posed.
Just before the summer, media reports provided details about the de-
livery of U.S. anti tank missiles to opposition groups. According to these
reports, two dozens U.S.A.-made TOW missiles were provided to moderate
424
Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Spy Chief Says Assad Has Strengthened His
Hold on Power,” The New York Times, February 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/
world/middleeast/us-representative-to-syrian-opposition-is-retiring.html?_r=0.
425
“Homeland security secretary: Syria conflict a threat to U.S.,” CBS News, February 7, 2014,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/homeland-security-secretary-syria-conflict-a-threat-to-unit-
ed-states/.
426
Remnick, “Going the Distance.”
427
Ibid.
opposition groups by the Friends of Syria. This was part of the pilot pro-
gram, observed as the introduction of a potentially larger flow of sophis-
ticated weaponry in the very near future. The TOWs that were given to
opposition groups in early March had extra security mechanisms, includ-
ing fingerprint-keyed security devices. The only statement from the White
House on the issue maintained, “The U.S. is committed to building the
capacity of the moderate opposition, including through the provision of
assistance to the vetted members of the moderate armed opposition.”428
The observers of U.S. policy on Syria, including Andrew Tabler and Fred
Hof, interpreted this recent development as a signal of a major change in
U.S. policy in the region, particularly its relations with armed opposition
groups.429 However, in the coming weeks and months, there were no addi-
tional reports about the continuation of this effort. It was instead a one-time
deal. Later, some members of the Syrian opposition stated that those who
delivered the missiles asked the opposition members to record and post their
use of these missiles on social media. It was not very clear why this was de-
manded from the armed opposition but it was interpreted as more of a PR
move than a change in strategic thinking.430 A few weeks later, a statement
by General Martin Dempsey demonstrated that there was no major change
in the approach to the Syrian opposition. In a panel at the Atlantic Council,
General Dempsey responded to a question about the Syrian opposition’s
demands for anti-aircraft weaponry. He stated that such assistance would
be a short-term solution for the problem on the ground and described the
future of Syria as a series of crises and conflicts.431Later, Presidential Advisor
428
Ellen Knickmeyer, Maria Abi-Habib And Adam Entous, “Advanced U.S. Weapons Flow
to Syrian Rebels,” The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702304626304579509401865454762.
429
Matthew Bell, “Why are US-made anti-tank missiles showing up in Syria?,” PRI, April 17,
2014, http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-17/why-are-us-made-anti-tank-missiles-showing-syria.
430
431
John Hudson, “Top U.S. General: Syrian Opposition Not Ready for the Big Leagues,” The
Cable (Foreign Policy blog), May 14, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/14/top-u-s-gener-
al-syrian-opposition-not-ready-for-the-big-leagues/.
Ben Rhodes would defend the administration’s failure to take this opportu-
nity to build a serious opposition force, saying that the the notion that there
would a simple way to build an army out of an opposition quickly has been
overstated. “The notion that we are going to be able to make contact with
people that we are just beginning to get to know and be able to build them
into an army in a period of months is not realistic.” he would say.432
In the summer of 2014, the Obama administration tried to pass a res-
olution at the UNSC to authorize an International Criminal Court in-
vestigation into the Syrian regime on the grounds of its crimes and the
evidence about mass atrocities committed by Assad’s forces. However, the
resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. After the vote failed, Ambas-
sador Samantha Power made a statement expressing her disappointment
with the outcome and the commitment of the U.S. to help those being
persecuted by the regime.433 There was also increasing signs of frustration
within the administration. During a May visit by the Syrian opposition
to Washington—of which the content was leaked to the press a few days
later—Secretary Kerry reiterated his frustration about the Syrian impasse,
revealing yet another major disagreement within the administration. Re-
portedly, in a private meeting with the leaders of the Syrian opposition,
Secretary Kerry disclosed that he believed the international community
wasted a year by failing to coordinate in a concerted effort to topple As-
sad.434 What is particularly important was that while the administration
was signaling a potential reevaluation of its Syria policy, senior members
of the administration seemed to be extremely frustrated with the lack of
developments. Some members of the opposition, who were present in the
432
Ben Rhodes, interview by Mehdi Hasan, al Jazeera Up Front, September 25, 2015, http://
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2015/09/obama-failed-syria-150925142816322.html.
433
Samantha Powers, “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Perma-
nent Representative to the United Nations, On the Security Council Vote on Syria,” Press Release,
May 22, 2014 (online by the United States Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.gov/
briefing/statements/226438.htm.
434
Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: Kerry Told Syrian Rebels ‘We Wasted a Year’ in Fight Against
Assad,” The Daily Beast, May 12, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/12/ex-
clusive-kerry-told-syrian-rebels-we-wasted-a-year-in-fight-against-assad.html.
meeting, stated that Secretary Kerry was vocal in his frustration; however,
they also said that Secretary Kerry was ultimately not the decision-maker
and that the power to act did not lay in his hands.435
In May, President Obama delivered a speech at West Point, in which he
focused on foreign policy and security challenges that the U.S. was facing
in the world. President Obama, after restating his belief that there was no
military solution to the conflict, signaled again a potential policy change
by saying that he was planning to help those who could be an alternative
to both terrorists and a brutal dictator at the same time. He said,
As frustrating as it is, there are no easy answers – no military solution
that can eliminate the terrible suffering anytime soon. As President, I made
a decision that we should not put American troops into the middle of this
increasingly sectarian civil war, and I believe that is the right decision. But that
does not mean we shouldn’t help the Syrian people stand up against a dictator
who bombs and starves his people. And in helping those who fight for the right
of all Syrians to choose their own future, we also push back against the growing
number of extremists who find safe-haven in the chaos.
With the additional resources I’m announcing today, we will step up our
efforts to support Syria’s neighbors – Jordan and Lebanon; Turkey and Iraq –
as they host refugees, and confront terrorists working across Syrian borders. I
will work with Congress to ramp up support for those in the Syrian opposition
who offer the best alternative to terrorists and a brutal dictator.436
Again, although it was not completely clear how this policy change
would be operationalized in the coming months, this statement was con-
sidered as a signal that a serious shift in U.S. policy was on the horizon.437
While these considerations were underway, Mosul, the second largest city
in Iraq, was taken over by ISIS, shocking the administration and the in-
ternational community. Although some considered this development a
source of distraction for the Obama administration, observers like Hof—
435
Interview by Kilic Kanat, January 2015
436
Abby Ohlheiser, “President Obama Says His Foreign Policy Critics Are 'Misreading His-
tory,'” The Wire, May 28, 2014, http://www.thewire.com/politics/2014/05/watch-live-president-
obama-addresses-his-foreign-policy-critics/371700/.
437
Michael Gerson, “Michael Gerson: The end of illusions,” The Washington Post, June 12,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-the-end-of-illusions/2014/06/-
12/0ff2bf24-f25b-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.
writing about developments in Syria—argued that it could be a great op-

portunity for revising the Syria policy and working with the FSA to change
the course of the conflict in the country and resist the rise of ISIS and the
Assad regime at the same time.438 While President Obama signaled his
change of course, at the same time, he continued to express his skepticism
about the capability of the moderate opposition groups in Syria. Answer-
ing a question on this issue, President Obama stated,
Oftentimes, the challenge is if you have former farmers or teachers or
pharmacists who now are taking up opposition against a battle-hardened re-
gime, with support from external actors that have a lot at stake, how quickly
can you get them trained; how effective are you able to mobilize them. And
that continues to be a challenge.439
This was the second time that the President portrayed the moderate
Syrian opposition in these terms. He mostly used this argument to explain
his reluctance to engage in train and equip operations. For him, it was
unrealistic to expect these forces to make a difference on the ground even
if they were being supported and equipped by the United States. This con-
stant emphasis on the opposition’s incapability was harshly criticized by
former members of the administration. For instance, in an essay criticized
this position, Hof stated,
The question that arises, however, is why President Obama fails to men-
tion the tens of thousands of Syrian Army officers and soldiers who abandoned
the Assad regime rather than participate in that regime's campaign of mass
homicide. Why is the totality of what the president calls "the moderate oppo-
sition" characterized by him as entirely civilian, and therefore inadequate, in
nature? And why does he not assume that a healthy percentage of the farmers,
teachers, pharmacists, dentists, and radio reporters to whom he refers have had
significant prior military training as conscripts in Syria? Does he think that
Syria has had an all-volunteer military force for the past fifty years?
The president and his strategic communications people should drop this
alibi. It is inaccurate, unworthy, and patronizing, if not insulting. Yes, Syrians
438
Frederic C. Hof, “Syria: The Impact of ISIS in Iraq,” MENASource (Foreign Policy blog),
June 13, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-the-impact-of-isis-in-iraq.
439
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Iraq,” Press Release, June
19, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq.
from all walks of life have rebelled against a regime that exploits their labor, as-
saults their dignity, and assigns to their lives and well-being a sub-human status.
Among those who have taken up arms there are, no doubt, some who have had
to learn for the first time about the business end of an AK-47. And even those
in uniform who walked away from the Assad killing machine were not the recip-
ients of world-class military training. Yet to imply that Syrians who have taken
up arms to defend themselves are coming directly from the stable or the library
to the battlefield is inaccurate. It is also gratuitously damaging to President
Obama in the eyes of Syrians. One wonders, however, if he cares.440
There were other voices that raised similar concerns about President
Obama’s handling of the Syria crisis and the potential impact on the situ-
ation on the ground if President Obama would arm and equip the mod-
erate rebels. While trying to respond to these claims, President Obama
constantly re-emphasized that the moderate opposition was nothing but
a “bunch of ordinary civilians” who had no experience or training in
fighting against Syria’s battle-hardened military. In an interview in late
June, President Obama stated, “When you get farmers, dentists, and
folks who have never fought before going up against a ruthless opposi-
tion in Assad, the notion that they were in a position to suddenly over-
turn not only Assad but also ruthless, highly trained jihadists if we just
sent a few arms is a fantasy.”441
On June 26, 2014, the President asked Congress for an unexpected
$500 million to train and arm the moderate opposition in Syria. This
was yet another significant development in his Syria strategy. The plan
was an important turning point in terms of signaling yet another change
in the policy of the administration. According to media reports, the pro-
gram would be affiliated with the Defense Department instead of CIA.442
440
Frederic C. Hof, “Syria: Farmers, Teachers, Pharmacists, and Dentists,” MENASource
(Foreign Policy blog), June 20, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syr-
ia-farmers-teachers-pharmacists-and-dentists.
441
“Obama: Notion that Syrian opposition could have overthrown Assad with U.S. arms
a ‘fantasy,’” CBS News, June 20, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-notion-that-syri-
an-opposition-could-overthrow-assad-a-fantasy/.
442
Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous and Carol Lee, “U.S. Set To Train, Arm Syria Rebels,” The
Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702304
557404579648751596692202.
However, observers of the Syria policy were extremely cautious in evalu-

ating such a move without seeing its full implementation by the Penta-
gon. According to one Democratic senator, the White House had only
sent emails, not envoys, to Congress in order to court their favor for the
proposal.443 Moreover, there had been little movement from the adminis-
tration to fund any programs to address the problem. Until August 2014,
U.S. policy had not been enough to change the tide of the conflict, but
whatever moderate effort the United States made could be considered a
small step in the right direction.
443
Interview by Kilic Kanat, July 2014.
SEVEN FIGHTING AGAINST ISIS
(AUGUST 2014 - AUGUST 2015)
“
When people harm Americans,
anywhere, we do what’s necessary
to see that justice is done.
“ISIL is as sophisticated and well-funded as any
group that we have seen. They’re beyond just a
terrorist group. They marry ideology, a sophisti-
cation of strategic and tactical military prowess.
They are tremendously well-funded. Oh, this is
beyond anything that we’ve seen. So we must pre-
pare for everything. And the only way you do
that is that you take a cold, steely, hard look at it
and -- and -- and get ready.”
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, August 21, 2014
The fall of Mosul to ISIS in June 2014 led to an extremely

serious turning point in the Obama administration’s policy on Syria. The
fact that U.S. had not foreseen the fall of Mosul created major doubt in
the U.S. about the capabilities of its intelligence agencies. It seems that
ISIS’s capabilities and the resulting rapid gains that they made were un-
derestimated by the administration.444 President Obama’s earlier state-
ment that ISIS was merely a “jayvee team” was frequently used as fodder
for criticisms of the Obama administration’s failure to take precautions to
prevent the rise of such a group. The fall of Mosul was the critical devel-
opment that kicked off this reexamination of U.S. intelligence and of the
administration’s policy toward the group. Mosul, the second largest city
in Iraq, was taken during the relatively smooth invasion by ISIS. The ease
of the annexation raised concerns about the power and effectiveness of
the organization. With Mosul, ISIS received new access to resources that
444
Gorman, Siobhan & Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Underestimated Urgency of Islamic State
Threat in Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-
missed-urgency-of-islamic-state-threat-in-iraq-1407717475.
174 / F ighting A gainst I S I S ( A ugust 2014 - A ugust 2015)
significantly increased the capacity of the organization to serve as a major

player in the conflict in Iraq, as well as expand into Syria.
The meteoric rise of attention on ISIS was directly responsible for the
change in President Obama’s calculus on Iraq and Syria. Immediately after
the fall of Mosul, President Obama went to Congress to request $500
million for a program to train and equip moderate Syrian rebels to combat
ISIS territorial advances and stem the contagion of the Syrian conflict into
Iraq. The request was the cause of much deliberation in Washington, since
it was largely undetermined exactly how these funds would be utilized.
Some even considered this as a public relations campaign by the Obama
administration to avert criticisms about the administration's failure to
properly address the rise of ISIS.445 The request coincided with two days of
high level meetings between Secretary of State John Kerry and president of
the Syrian Opposition Coalition President Ahmad al-Jarba in Saudi Ara-
bia. Coupled together, the meetings and request signaled that the Obama
administration had decided to focus on arming opposition groups as the
key component of what amounted to a substantial expansion of U.S. in-
volvement in Syria.446
The new campaign of U.S. military action in the region kicked off in
August 2014. At the request of the Iraqi government, President Obama
authorized airstrikes against ISIS targets advancing toward the northern
Iraqi city of Erbil. In his statement announcing the new strategy, President
Obama stated:
First, I said in June -- as the terrorist group ISIL began an advance across
Iraq -- that the United States would be prepared to take targeted military ac-
tion in Iraq if and when we determined that the situation required it. In recent
days, these terrorists have continued to move across Iraq, and have neared the
city of Erbil, where American diplomats and civilians serve at our consulate
and American military personnel advise Iraqi forces.
445
Anonymous interview. Kilic Kanat September 2014.
446
John Kerry, “Remarks With Syrian Opposition Coalition President Ahmad al-Jarba
During Their Meeting,” Remarks, June 27, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/228534.htm.
To stop the advance on Erbil, I’ve directed our military to take targeted
strikes against ISIL terrorist convoys should they move toward the city. We
intend to stay vigilant, and take action if these terrorist forces threaten our per-
sonnel or facilities anywhere in Iraq, including our consulate in Erbil and our
embassy in Baghdad. We’re also providing urgent assistance to Iraqi govern-
ment and Kurdish forces so they can more effectively wage the fight against ISIL.
Second, at the request of the Iraqi government -- we’ve begun opera-
tions to help save Iraqi civilians stranded on the mountain. As ISIL has
marched across Iraq, it has waged a ruthless campaign against innocent
Iraqis. And these terrorists have been especially barbaric towards religious
minorities, including Christian and Yezidis, a small and ancient religious
sect. Countless Iraqis have been displaced. And chilling reports describe
ISIL militants rounding up families, conducting mass executions, and en-
slaving Yazidi women.447
This marked the first time that the U.S. returned to battle in Iraq since
the withdrawal of troops in 2011.
By mid-August, the seriousness of the ISIS threat was beginning to
be taken more seriously by the Obama administration officials. In a Press
conference with Gen. Dempsey, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stat-
ed that ISIS was not an ordinary terrorist organization and that ordinary
counter-terrorism strategies may be insufficient to eliminate this threat.
He said:
ISIL is as sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen.
They're beyond just a terrorist group. They marry ideology, a sophistication
of strategic and tactical military prowess. They are tremendously well-funded.
Oh, this is beyond anything that we've seen. So we must prepare for every-
thing. And the only way you do that is that you take a cold, steely, hard look
at it and-- and -- and get ready.448
Although the rise and rapid spread of ISIS was a major shock for the
Obama administration, and undoubtedly shaped its new strategy, it was
not the only shock the region had in store for the White House. A second
major shock came when two American hostages were beheaded by the
ISIS. On August 20th, news broke that the American freelance war cor-
respondent James Foley, who had been captured in northern Syria in late
447
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president
448
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/606917
2012, had been beheaded by the terrorist group. The White House’s first
reaction came through the National Security Council Spokesperson Cait-
lin Hayden. “The intelligence community is working as quickly as possible
to determine its authenticity. If genuine, we are appalled by the brutal
murder of an innocent American journalist and we express our deepest
condolences to his family and friends. We will provide more information
when it is available," Hayden said.449 Soon after this initial statement, Pres-
ident Obama delivered an address about the incident:
“When people harm Americans, anywhere, we do what’s necessary to see
that justice is done... And we will continue to confront this hateful terrorism,
and replace it with a sense of hope and civility. And that’s what Jim Foley
stood for, a man who lived his work; who courageously told the stories of his
fellow human beings; who was liked and loved by friends and family,” the
President told the American public.450
The video of Foley’s beheading was distributed by ISIS through so-

cial media, and shocked the American public. In a very short period of
time it became the most impactful terrorist attack for American public
opinion since September 11. Before the shock of the Foley attack had
abated, just two weeks after Foley’s execution, ISIS militants violently
beheaded a second freelance journalist, Steven Sotloff. This execution
was also captured on videotape by ISIS militants and subsequently dis-
tributed to global broadcast media outlets. President Obama issued an-
other statement following this second execution. He made it clear that
he was repulsed by the attack, before making a grand commitment to
destroy ISIS altogether. “Our objective is clear, and that is: degrade and
destroy ISIL so that it’s no longer a threat, not just to Iraq but also to
the region and to the United States,” he put forward before continu-
ing, “it’s not only that we’re going to be bringing to justice those who
perpetrated this terrible crime against these two fine young men….The
449
Carter, Chelsea J., “Video shows ISIS beheading U.S journalist James Foley,” CNN, Au-
gust 20, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/.
450
Barack Obama, “Statement on the Murder of James Foley,” August 20, 2014, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/08/20/president-obama-delivers-state-
ment-murder-james-foley#transcript.
United States will continue to lead a regional and international effort

against the kind of barbaric and ultimately empty vision.”451
The two executions, occurring in such a short period of time, led to
an increase in pressure for the Obama administration to act more force-
fully against ISIS. According to a statement given by a masked militant
in the Sotloff video, the execution was conducted as a retaliation for the
administration’s recent decision to conduct strikes in northern Iraq. On
the same day as the footage emerged, the White House announced that the
Department of Defense would honor a State Department request for an
additional 350 military personnel to be transferred to Baghdad to “protect
[U.S.] diplomatic facilities and personnel.”
On September 4th, President Obama and UK Prime Minister David
Cameron published a joint op-ed in the Times of London. The piece called
upon NATO leaders to become a “more effective security network that fos-
ters stability around the world.” In this piece, Syria was only mentioned as a
possible source of insecurity to the Western world. There was nothing par-
ticular how to approach or resolve the problem in Syria. Instead, it stated:
Developments in other parts of the world, particularly in Iraq and Syria
threaten our security at home. And NATO is not just an alliance of friends who
come to the aid of each other in times of need, it is also an alliance based on
national self-interest. Whether it is regional aggression going unchecked or the
prospect that foreign fighters could return from Iraq and Syria to pose a threat
in our countries, the problems we face today threaten the security of British and
American people, and the wider world.452
A day later, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense

Chuck Hagel held a joint meeting in Wales with European allies to dis-
cuss the ISIS threat. Specifically, the meeting focused on how NATO
members could contribute to an anti-ISIS mission in Iraq, with mention
451
Davis, Julie Hirschfeld, “After Beheading of Steven Sotloff, Obama Pledges to Punish
ISIS,” The New York Times, September 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/
middleeast/steven-sotloff-isis-execution.html?_r=1.
452
Obama, Barack & David Cameron, “Strengthening the NATO Alliance,” Times, (ac-
cessed www.gov.uk), September 4, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/strengthen-
ing-the-nato-alliance-article-by-david-cameron-and-barack-obama.
of creating a program to train and equip Iraqi security forces at federal,

regional, and provincial levels.
Shortly after these joint discussions with the U.S. transatlantic part-
ner, President Obama delivered a nationally televised speech outlining the
country’s first public strategy for defeating ISIS.453 In an address only a
few days after a statement by President Obama enumerated the four main
objectives of the new strategy against ISIS. They included:
1) A systematic campaign of airstrikes against “these terrorists”
2) Increasing support for forces fighting ISIL on the ground
3) Continuing to draw on the “substantial counterterrorism capa-
bilities” to prevent ISIL attacks
4) Providing humanitarian assistance to civilians displaced by
ISIL attacks.454
The strategy demonstrated that the Obama administration had totally
shifted its regional focus toward fighting against ISIS, rather than the un-
derlying issues leading to the group’s rise in the country. The fact that the
operation would center on counterterrorism was only further emphasized
in Obama’s future statements rolling out the strategy. The aforementioned
train and equip program, it was determined, would mostly aim at the
anti-ISIS strategy. An integral piece of this would center on working with
Syria’s neighbors, particularly Turkey, to stem the flow of foreign fighters
into and out of Syria.
The strategy was first teased out to the press in a background press con-
ference call between senior administration officials and members of the
press. In this call, administration officials vaguely mentioned the Assad
regime and the situation in Syria. They note that:
453
Obama, Barak, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” Office of the White House Press
Secretary, September 10, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/state-
ment-president-isil-1.
454
Obama, Barack, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” Office of the White House Press
Secretary, September 10, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/state-
ment-president-isil-1.
President Obama has made very clear that he will not tolerate safe havens
for terrorist organizations that threaten the United States. He will not tolerate
a safe haven for ISIL in Syria...We are also calling on Congress to authorize
and resource a train-and-equip mission for the Syrian opposition. We had been
providing military assistance to the Syrian opposition, but clearly we need to
expand our efforts because the Syrian opposition is the counterweight to both
ISIL and to the Assad regime. We are not going to work with the Assad regime
in going after ISIL because they have no legitimacy in the Sunni communi-
ties...on the question about aiding the Syrian moderate opposition in Syria to
go after ISIL, the issue here is -- unlike in Iraq, where we have a government
with whom we can work and a ground force that we can support and assist, we
do not have a government, quite obviously, in Syria with whom we can work.
We need to bolster the Syrian moderate opposition to enable it to be able to
take and hold ground, pushing out both ISIL and the Assad regime.455
This statement ultimately raised further questions as to the main goal

of the Obama administration’s strategy about Syria in post-ISIS period.
In the days following the speech, there was a new appointment at
the State Department. General John Allen joined the agency as the Spe-
cial Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. In
the meantime Secretary of State John Kerry was deployed to try and
rally Middle Eastern and European partners to commit the strategy an-
nounced by President Obama. Secretary Kerry first traveled to Turkey to
meet with President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu to discuss
both the rising humanitarian crisis as refugees from Syria poured in
unprecedented numbers across Turkey’s southern borders and the fight
against the ISIS. He conducted similar visits to Egypt, Jordan, and
Iraq in a push to align Arab nations with the coalition. Following these
visits, Saudi Arabia pledged to host training facilities for Syrian rebels,
but it, along with the other targeted nations, failed to publicly outline
what military support it might actually provide to a coalition. The lack
of clarity about the role of potential allies was downplayed by the Pres-
ident, who instead focused on Saudi Arabia’s commitment to hosting
and helping to train rebel fighters. It was a frequently observed problem
455
“Background Conference Call on the President's Address to the Nation,” Press Release,
September 10, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/background-conference-call-presidents-address-nation.
during the tenure of the Obama administration that the nature of rela-
tions with allies were poorly clarified.
Shortly after the President’s strategy speech, Congress moved to back
a resolution to provide $500 million to train and equip “appropriately
vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted
Syrian groups.” Following the vote, President Obama made another pub-
lic statement in an effort to clarify the details of the program, designed to
train and equip moderate opposition forces. In this statement, President
Obama said:
Today’s vote is another step closer to having the authorization to train &
equip vetted elements of the moderate Syrian opposition so they can defend
themselves against, and ultimately push back on, ISIL forces in Syria, while
creating the conditions for the political solution necessary to solve Syria’s crisis
once and for all. This training program will be conducted outside of Syria, in
partnership with regional countries. There will be no U.S. military personnel
in Syria as part of this program.456
The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State also made statements

about the Congressional approval and underlined their appreciation for
the swift action by the lawmakers. 457 Despite bipartisan support for the
program, key players on both sides of the aisle had lingering hesitancies
about the plan. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, who later lent
his support to the bill, told the press, “even though I support what the
president’s doing, I’d like to take another look at it a couple of months
from now and see how it’s working out.” In a similar train of thought,
Democrat Senator Ben Cardin said of the train and equip program, “the
concern is, where does it lead?”
456
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on the House of Representatives Vote to Au-
thorize the Title X Train and Equip Program for the Moderate Syrian Opposition,” Statement,
September 17, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/17/statement-president-house-representatives-vote-au-
thorize-title-x-train-a.
457
Chuck Hagel, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on Congressional Passage
of the Continuing Resolution,” News Release, September 18, 2014 (online by U.S. Department
of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases /News-Release-View/Article/605193/
statement-by-secretary-of-defense-chuck-hagel-on-congressional-passage-of-the-c.
On September 22, 2014, the U.S. in partnership with Bahrain and

the UAE began to launch its first airstrikes against ISIS forces in Syria.
A day later, President Obama announced from the South Lawn of the
White House that American forces had, indeed, begun a campaign to de-
grade and ultimately destroy ISIS.458 To supplement the now very obvious
U.S. investment to fight against the ISIS, President Obama, just two days
following the commencement of airstrikes, chaired a UN Security Coun-
cil Forum on Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The summit resulted in UNSC
Resolution 2178, a resolution creating a new political and legal frame-
work requiring countries to address the threat of foreign fighters transiting
through borders.459 Following this resolution, President Obama addressed
the UN General Assembly on ISIS and Syria, to say:
Together with our partners, America is training and equipping the Syrian
opposition to be a counterweight to the terrorists of ISIL and the brutality of the
Assad regime. But the only lasting solution to Syria’s civil war is political -- an
inclusive political transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syri-
an citizens, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of creed. I can promise you America
will remain engaged in the region, and we are prepared to engage in that effort.460
Secretary Kerry later reiterated this sentiment at UN headquarters:

Let me make it clear to all those who are part of that effort that for all of the
men and women who make up the moderate Syrian opposition, we stand be-
hind you today. We have stood behind you in these last years. I know sometimes
there’s been a greater desire for more, but we will continue to stand beside you as
long as ISIL remains a threat and Assad remains in power, as well.461
458
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Airstrikes in Syria,” Statement, September
23, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/09/23/statement-president-airstrikes-syria.
459
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at U.N. Security Council Summit on Foreign
Terrorist Fighters,” Remarks, September 24, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/remarks-president-un-se-
curity-council-summit-foreign-terrorist-fighters.
460
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General
Assembly,” Remarks, September 24, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Sec-
retary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-ad-
dress-united-nations-general-assembly.
John Kerry, “Remarks at Syria Ministerial,” Remarks, September 24, 2014 (online by U.S.
461
Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/232086.htm.

In both of these statements the White House was looking to respond to

the criticisms in regards to the U.S. position about Syria. A few days later
Secretary Hagel again reiterated that the U.S. would not coordinate the
fight against ISIS with the Assad regime. 462
The first challenge to the new policy/strategy took place within a
month of its declaration. Between September 18th and 22nd ISIS forces
advanced across the northern Syrian countryside, surrounded, and began
a siege on the predominantly Kurdish city of Kobani. The siege sparked
a wave of 180,000 to flee across Syria’s southern border into Turkey. This
was the largest refugee outflux since the beginning of the conflict in 2011.
The Pentagon responded to the ISIS offensive with modest strikes
around Kobani in an effort to convey its commitment to the defense
of the area to its Arab coalition partners. However, these airstrikes were
insufficient to appropriately deal with the advance. Various officials
from the White House, State Department, and Pentagon warned the
administrations that the current level of airstrikes deployed would be
insufficient to protect Kobani. Wary still of over-committing the U.S.
to playing an integral role in Syria, the administration chose to pressure
Turkey to take stronger action in assisting Kobani, rather than increasing
its own support. Statements by senior U.S. officials appeared in both
the Washington Post and New York Times expressing the administration's
frustration over Turkey’s “inaction” in Kobani. In the Washington Post,
one of the administrative official stated, “There’s no question the U.S.
government thinks Turkey can do more, should do more, and that they
are using excuses not to do more…We have been sending that message
very clearly behind the scenes."463
462
Chuck Hagel, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and Gen.
Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” News Transcript, September 26, 2014 (online by U.S.
Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts /Transcript-View/Ar-
ticle/606934/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-hagel-and-gen-dempsey-in-the.
463
Mohammed, Arshad, “U.S. frustrated by Turkish inaction, but seeks support over
time,” Reuters, October 8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-turkey-
idUSKCN0HX2I020141008.
During this period the administration was unwavering in its pressure

for Turkey to become a key piece of the anti-ISIS coalition. White House
Spokesperson Jen Psaki called Turkey “well positioned to contribute to
the broad-based coalition,”464 specifically citing that its military and polit-
ical cooperation were uniquely placed to stop ISIS financing, counter the
flow of foreign fighters into the region, provide humanitarian assistance
to those worse affected, and ultimately delegitimize the extremist ideology
ISIS conveys. President Obama’s recently appointed Special Envoy Gen-
eral John Allen and his deputy Brett McGurk were dispatched to Ankara
for meetings with Turkish officials, including PM Davutoglu, to try and
convince Turkey to join the coalition and allow the U.S. access to Incirlik
air base. The U.S. needed Incirlik for a new starting point for increasing
strikes against ISIS in Syria. A joint military planning team followed up
this visit for military-to-military consultations about a pending agreement.
In the meantime, President Obama’s Deputy National Security Adviser
Ben Rhodes, in an interview, stated that U.S. forces air-dropped arms and
medical equipment to the people in Kobani, which demonstrated a new
opening in U.S. policy towards the conflict in Syria465. The ISIS crisis had
already transformed the U.S. policy towards Syria and shifted the atten-
tion from the crisis in Syria to the counter-terrorism against the ISIS.
As the conflict drew into November of 2014, the fate of the Assad
regime was discussed less and less. The administration’s attention and
primary target completely shifted to ISIS and its activities. Although the
administration kept emphasizing that the regime in Syria was not a legit-
imate government or representative of the Syrian people, the intensity of
this criticism declined dramatically. In the meantime, the military focus of
the anti-ISIS fight also shifted from Syria to Iraq. At the end of the first
week of November, President Obama authorized the deployment of 1,500
464
Psaki, Jen, “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, October 9, 2014, http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/10/232808.htm.
465
Wolf Blitzer interview with Ben Rhodes, “The Situation Room”, aired October 20, 2014,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1410/20/sitroom.01.html.
additional troops to Iraq, doubling the number of Americans deployed to

train and advise Kurdish and Iraqi forces.466 However while the U.S. ad-
ministration increased the number of troops in Iraq, some members of the
administration kept trying to recall attention to the situation in Syria. For
instance, in a testimony before the U.S. Congress, Secretary Hagel stated
that, though ISIS has been degraded in some parts of Iraq, it would not be
defeated only through the use of force. He also emphasized that the lack of
a partner government in Syria for the U.S. to work with meant that more
time, patience, and perseverance would be required before the military
strategy in place begins to deliver tangible results.467
The Obama administration kicked off the new year in 2015 with the
announcement that it would begin providing direct military assistance to
Syrian opposition forces. According to reports, the U.S. would train and
equip “moderate” Syrian opposition forces and the program would train and
support an estimated 5,000 recruits in the first year.468 The training would
be conducted by 400 soldiers and hundreds of U.S. support personnel in
Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.469 The announcement followed meetings
between senior U.S. officials and Syrian opposition leaders in Istanbul. It
was considered a major game changer by many analysts and observers of
the Syrian war. Days later, during his State of the Union Address, President
Obama underscored the train and equip program. He asked the congress to
pass a resolution authorizing the use of force against ISIS, saying:
In Iraq and Syria, American leadership -- including our military power -- is
stopping ISIL’s advance. Instead of getting dragged into another ground war
in the Middle East, we are leading a broad coalition, including Arab nations,
466
Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, “Obama to send 1,500 More Troops to Assist
Iraq,” The New York Times, November 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/world/
middleeast/us-to-send-1500-more-troops-to-iraq.html.
467
Jake Richmond, “Hagel: ISIL Degraded But Remains Dangerous,” DoD News, No-
vember 13, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603644/hagel-isil-degrad-
ed-but-remains-dangerous.
468
Payne, Ed, “Pentagon: U.S. to begin to train and equip moderate Syria rebels,” CNN, Jan-
uary 16, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/16/us/syria-rebel-training/.
469
Steward, Phil & Tom Perry, “Pentagon to deploy 400 troops to train Syrian rebels,” Reuters, Jan-
uary19,2015,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSKBN0KP0FO20150116.
to degrade and ultimately destroy this terrorist group. We’re also supporting
a moderate opposition in Syria that can help us in this effort, and assisting
people everywhere who stand up to the bankrupt ideology of violent extrem-
ism. Now, this effort will take time. It will require focus. But we will succeed.
And tonight, I call on this Congress to show the world that we are united in
this mission by passing a resolution to authorize the use of force against ISIL.
We need that authority.470
The development of train and equip was perceived as the emergence of

a dual-track policies for Syria. On the one hand, during a series of summits
the international coalition was trying to come up with policies that aims
to defeat ISIS and on the other hand the development of the train-equip
program related more directly to the broader dimensions of the civil war.
Coalition airstrikes were also providing vital support for Kurdish forces
working to liberate the fallen city of Kobani. The success of these forces
in liberating the city was one of a string of defeats suffered by ISIS at the
hands of Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. However, the burgeoning
U.S.-PYD relationship would, in its later phases, seriously impact Wash-
ington’s relationship with its regional allies and particularly with Turkey.
Both the domestic and international audience was expecting a new strat-
egy on Syria; the Obama administration released its 2015 National Security
Strategy plan in February. In the document the double track strategy of the
US administration was one again reiterated. The plan focused on the double
approach of destroying ISIS utilizing the strategy that was released in Sep-
tember and developing the train and equip program in an effort to further
militarily support the moderate Syrian opposition. The document stated:
We [the U.S.] have undertaken a comprehensive effort to degrade and
ultimately defeat ISIL. We will continue to support Iraq as it seeks to free itself
from sectarian conflict and the scourge of extremists. Our support is tied to
the government’s willingness to govern effectively and inclusively and to ensure
ISIL cannot sustain a safe haven on Iraqi territory. This requires professional
and accountable Iraqi Security Forces that can overcome sectarian divides and
protect all Iraqi citizens. It also requires international support, which is why
we are leading an unprecedented international coalition to work with the Iraqi
470
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Sate of the Union Address,” Office of the White
House Press Secretary, January 20, 2015 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/
remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015.
government and strengthen its military to regain sovereignty. Joined by our

allies and partners, including multiple countries in the region, we employed
our unique military capabilities to arrest ISIL’s advance and to degrade their
capabilities in both Iraq and Syria. At the same time, we are working with our
partners to train and equip a moderate Syrian opposition to provide a counter-
weight to the terrorists and the brutality of the Assad regime.”471
However the text also stated that the only solution for the conflict
would be a political one. 472
Of course, despite the National Security Strategy Plan’s attempt to bal-
ance between the fight against ISIS and to deal with the brutality of the Assad
regime, ISIS continued to be the priority. A centerpiece of this goal was secur-
ing Congressional authorization to use force against ISIL. A draft resolution
submitted to Congress sought to provide flexibility for “limited circumstanc-
es, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or the use
of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership.”473
The resolution, however, did not receive any love from Congress.474
The month of February brought new leadership in the Obama admin-
istration. Secretary Hagel, who had become openly his disagreeable about
the President’s Syria policy had been forced out by the administration in
November. Secretary Hagel made several comments both before he was
moved out of the office and immediately after his departure criticizing
the Obama administration’s handling of the Syrian conflict and the fight
against ISIS. In one of his remarks, he said “Strategically, there are limits to
471
White House, “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
472
Ibid.
473
Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on Request to Congress for authorization of
Force Against ISIL,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, February 11, 2015, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/remarks-president-request-congress-authoriza-
tion-force-against-isil.
474
Berman, Russel, “The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared,” The Atlantic, April 15,
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-war-against-isis-will-go-unde-
clared/390618/.
how much you can accomplish with airstrikes.”475 In the meantime, as later
revealed, there were serious disagreements between the Secretary of Defense
and the Obama administration’s White House staff. In his first interview
following his resignation, Secretary Hagel argued that the administration
tried to micromanage defense policies through the advisors of President
Obama and accused the administration of having no strategy to fix the
conflict in Syria.476 The quarrels between him and other administration
officials at the White House were a constant theme of the Obama White
House. The first three Secretaries of Defense of the Obama administration
wrote or said very similar things about the way that President Obama han-
dled security policies in their memoirs and interviews. This Hagel interview
demonstrates that, as late as December 2014, the administration was still in
disarray about how to deal with the conflict in Syria. The author outlined
his interpretation on Hagel’s comments in the interview, saying:
Hagel, however, said there was too much time spent on “nit-picky, small
things in the weeds,” while larger questions were ignored. “We seemed to veer
away from the big issues. What was our political strategy on Syria?” While
Hagel agreed with Obama’s reluctance to deploy a large ground force to Syria
or Iraq, he wanted the administration to hammer out a plan for a diplomatic
settlement in Syria and to clarify whether Assad needed to go and under what
circumstances, he said.477
Secretary Hagel was replaced by Ashton B. Carter, who had been

the principal architect of the administration's drone policy. Carter’s ap-
pointment elicited analysts’ skepticism as to whether he would be more
capable of impacting White House decision making than his predeces-
sors, especially in a waning presidential tenure.478 Secretary Carter’s first
475
Baron, Kevin, “Airstrikes Not Enough to Defeat ISIL, Hagel Says,” Defense One, August
21, 2014, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/08/airstrikes-not-enough-defeat-isil-hagel-
says/92153/.
476
De Luce, Dan, “Hagel: The White House Tried to “Destroy” Me,” Foreign Policy, December
477
ibid.
478
Harper, Jon, “Ashton Carter sworn in as new secretary of defense,” Stars and Stripes, Feb-
ruary 17, 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/us/ashton-carter-sworn-in-as-new-secretary-of-de-
fense-1.330008.
move in office was to gather his high ranking military commanders and
diplomats in Kuwait for a comprehensive review of the administration’s
strategy in the Middle East. Following a six-hour strategy session, the new
Secretary said that he was “satisfied” with the current campaign, whilst
acknowledging the complexity of the situation in Iraq and Syria against
ISIS. “I think that we have clearly in focus the idea that this can't be a
purely American thing, that it truly is a coalition effort and needs to be a
coalition effort to succeed. I think it was clear to us that we can't neatly
partition it geographically, that it has global evocations,” he said.479 This
statement was a direct contradiction with the statements of the former
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and his overt dissatisfaction with the
current strategy to defeat ISIS.
The Obama administration continued to underscore what it perceived
to be advancements by the coalition against ISIS throughout the end of
February. Special Envoy Allen testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
committee that the coalition had succeeded in the initial phase of its cam-
paign on ISIS. The strategic, operational, and tactical movements of the
organization in Iraq had been stunted.
Through over 2,500 coordinated Coalition airstrikes in support of our
partners on the ground, we have degraded ISIL’s leadership, logistical, and op-
erational capabilities, and are denying sanctuary in Iraq from which it can plan
and execute attacks… Since our first airstrikes in August, ISIL's advance has
been blunted and they have been driven back from the approaches to Baghdad
and Erbil… the aura of the so called Caliphate is destroyed, and the future of
the so-called Caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, is very much in doubt,”480 Allen
said during his testimony.
Meanwhile, at the UN, Ambassador Power was fighting for the hu-
manitarian side of events in Syria, particularly internally displaced persons,
479
Whitlock, Craig, “Pentagon chief says he is satisfied by U.S. campaign against Islamic State,”
The Washington Post, February 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/
pentagon-chief-says-he-is-satisfied-by-us-campaign-against-islamic-state/2015/02/23/50f8ebd4-
b9f1-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html.
480
Allen, John, “Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” U.S.
Senate Records, February 25, 2015, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gen_Allen_
Testimony.pdf.
and for the Obama administration’s insistence on finding a political solu-

tion to the conflict.
There is only one way out of this horrific crisis, and that is through a com-
prehensive political solution. To that end, the U.S. again joins others in com-
mending the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura to
halt - even for a limited time - the use of all aerial bombs and heavy artillery in
Aleppo, whose civilians have suffered immensely amidst fierce fighting,” she said
to a UNSC session on the humanitarian situation in Syria held in late February.481
In early spring, despite the grumblings from the Congress, the U.S.
continued its plan to degrade and destroy ISIS. In early March, there were
debates about an extensive offensive plan to retake Mosul from ISIS forc-
es.482 In a briefing to reporters, CENTCOM officials even detailed the size
and composition of the force necessary for such an action.483 Accordingly,
the plan was set include the training of 20,000 to 25,000 Iraqi and Kurd-
ish troops in order to launch a ground offensive against the ISIS. However
that plan never materialized.
On the Syrian front, Special Envoy Allen was routinely critical about
the lack of a partner on the ground in Syria. However, he remained opti-
mistic about the future of the train and equip program. In an address at
the Atlantic Council he stated that U.S. forces were “working closely with
regional partners to establish sites for training and equipping vetted, to
moderate Syrian opposition elements, to train approximately 5,000 troops
per year for the next 3 years.”484 However, some government and inde-
pendent reports began to unearth that the program was not functioning
as smoothly or as effectively as Special Envoy Allen was claiming.. For
instance, in a letter to the Sen. John McCain, the Senate Armed Services
481
Power, Samantha, “Remarks at a Security Council Session on the Humanitarian Situ-
ation in Syria,” United States Mission to the United Nations, February 26, 2015, http://usun.
state.gov/remarks/6382.
482
Baron, Kevin, “U.S. Military Reveals Massive Plan to Attack, Retake Mosul from Islamic
State,” DefenseOne, February 19, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/02/us-military-
reveals-massive-plan-attack-retake-mosul-islamic-state/105669/?oref=d-river.
483
ibid.
John Allen, “Remarks at the Atlantic Council,” Remarks, March 2, 2015 (online by U.S.
484
Department of State), http://www.state.gov/s/seci/238108.htm.

Committee chairman, the State Department wrote: “Even when consid-

ered as a whole, U.S. government assistance to the moderate armed op-
position will not be decisive in defeating regime forces…. Nor will the
fighters who receive this assistance, on their own, force Assad to change
his calculus about trying to hold on to power."485 A Reuters report in April
also showed that, despite the 11 month duration of the mission, the pro-
gram had not yet gotten “off the launch pad.”486 These skepticisms about
to train and equip program increased gradually through the summer 2015.
In May, Secretary Carter and General Dempsey held a press conference to
address the train and equip program. They announced that program had
been inaugurated with a class of 90 rebels, and that the trainees would be
operational in a matter of months. Secretary Carter stated:
There are about 90 of the trainees in this company-sized tranche, first
tranche that I referred to…. First of all, these are highly vetted individuals.
That's an important part of the program. Second, the training takes place
in a secure location. And third, of course, our people who are participating
in the training are very experienced in this kind of training, including in
security procedures.
However, there were significant problems emerging within the pro-

gram. First, it was reported that the initial group of Syrian rebels re-
ceiving CIA assistance in 2014 collapsed as Jabhat al-Nusra, a terrorist
group affiliated with al-Qaeda, captured their headquarters. Via social
media, Jabhat al-Nusra boasted that American-supplied TOW missiles
were amongst the stockpile of weapons captured from Hasm,487 a night-
mare scenario for an administration wary of intervening in the conflict.
The blow would foreshadow the Pentagon’s next effort to train and equip
moderate rebel fighters in Syria. Training for the Syria program was
485
Afanasieva, Dahsha, Warren Strobel, & Phil Stewart, “Set to begin, U.S. plan for Syrian
rebels already mired in doubt,” Reuters, April 27, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syr-
ia-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427.
486
ibid.
487
Sherlock, Ruth, “Syrian rebels armed and trained by U.S. surrender to al-Qaeda,”
The Telegraph, November 2, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
syria/11203825/Syrian-rebels-armed-and-trained-by-US-surrender-to-al-Qaeda.html.
scheduled to begin within four to six weeks; 100 Syrians were alleged to
have been vetted for the program.488
One of the most important allies for the U.S. train and equip pro-
gram was Turkey. In late March, President Obama and Turkish President
Erdogan discussed the program by phone, reviewing the program for vet-
ted members of the moderate Syrian opposition.489 Turkish officials an-
nounced that the fighters would be trained at a military base in Turkey
by a joint Turkish-U.S. team. Additional training centers had also been
envisioned by the U.S. in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar.490 The agree-
ment moved forward despite the continuation of different policies by the
Turkish and American governments. Unlike the Obama administration,
Turkey, was focusing on the train and equip forces as an effort to bolster
the Syrian opposition against the Syrian regime. Inversely, the U.S.’s main
strategic goal continued to be degrading ISIS capabilities. Disagreements
also occurred as to whether or not a no-fly zone should be established in
northern Syria to support future training of opposition forces and to pro-
vide relief to refugees and internally displaced persons. In April, Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu traveled to Washington to meet with
Secretary Kerry for further discussions on the mission and the coalition’s
continued efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq.
However, the two NATO allies failed to reach an agreement on this issue.
A lingering question for the administration centered on whether or
not, and to what extent, the U.S. would be willing to militarily back up
train and equip forces once they were in the field. By this point, the gov-
ernment was conducting almost daily air strikes against ISIS targets in
488
Sly, Liz, “Syrian rebel group that got U.S. aid dissolves,” The Washington Post, March
1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-fighter-group-that-got-us-missiles-dis-
solves-after-major-defeat/2015/03/01/286fa934-c048-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html.
489
Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Readout of the President’s Call with Presi-
dent Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey,” March 26, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/26/readout-president-s-call-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey.
490
Bekdil, Burak Ege, “Turkey, U.S. Set Plan to Train Syrian Rebels,” DefenseNews, March
31, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/03/31/tur-
key-syria-rebels-isis-joint-train-border-no-fly/70740010/.
both Iraq and Syria, but the issue of backing opposition forces trained
under the train and equip program was by no means guaranteed. Though
initially scheduled to start on May 9th, the initial matriculation of the pro-
gram was postponed for “technical reasons” according to Turkish Foreign
Minister Cavusoglu. However, many believed that the main reason for the
delay of the program were reported disagreements between Turkey and the
U.S. about the overall mission of the program.
While the U.S. and Turkey were negotiating the details of the train
and equip program, the White House was also participating in negoti-
ations with Russia on how to address the Syrian conflict. As part of this
process, on May 12th, Secretary Kerry traveled to Sochi to meet with
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov; the visit marked the first time since
2013 that Kerry had made the long trip to Russia. The visit came during
the final weeks of negotiations on the Iran nuclear agreement but Syria
was also a topic of discussion.
As the one year anniversary of U.S. airstrikes in Syria approached,
President Obama made a statement expressing caution about the tra-
jectory of the airstrikes. He admitted at the G-7 Summit that the U.S.
strategy toward Iraq, Syria, and ISIS was not comprehensive, and stated
during a press conference:
We don’t have, yet, a complete strategy, because it requires commitments on
the part of Iraqis as well,” he continued, “The details are not worked out. We
are still seeing thousands of foreign fighters flowing into, first, Syria, and then,
oftentimes, ultimately into Iraq. And not all of that is preventable, but a lot of
it is preventable -- if we’ve got better cooperation, better coordination, better
intelligence, if we are monitoring what’s happening at the Turkish-Syria border
more effectively. 491
In an interview a few weeks later, Special Envoy Allen tried to clarify

the U.S. strategy to defeat ISIS as well as lingering questions about the
administration’s broader Syria goals. When he was asked whether the fight
against ISIS subsumed U.S. focus on Assad regime, he answered:
491
Obama, Barak, “Remarks by President Obama in Press Conference after G7 Summit,”
Office of the White House Press Secretary, June 8, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/06/08/remarks-president-obama-press-conference-after-g7-summit.
Oh no, not at all. Things are not trending in his favor currently. Six months
ago, he was in a different position than he is today, which I believe is a position
of some instability, but weaker in his position as a leader. The United States
and the Coalition partners are still strongly focused on a political process that
removes Bashar al-Assad from the leadership of Syria and places it in the hands
of the Syrian people.492
In the summer of 2015, the highly touted “train and equip” pro-
gram again came under the spotlight following the Pentagon’s ac-
knowledgement in a CNN report that the program has “run into a
number of difficulties,” including struggles to identify qualified fight-
ers from Syria to join the program, as well as maneuvering the com-
plexities of vetting possible candidates for the program. Of the 6000
program volunteers, less than 200 had begun training with the pro-
gram. Considering the initial goal of training 3000 fighters during
2015, the numbers demonstrated that the program was way behind
the schedule.493 Secretary Carter acknowledged that there had been
significant challenges for the program during subsequent testimony
before Congress. He said that only 60 fighters were actively involved in
the program. He admitted that the number was lower than expected.
The low number was attributed to the high vetting standards required
for participation in the program. Secretary Carter also mentioned that
program continued to serve as a necessary program to achieve the
U.S. goal of eradicating ISIS.494 Train and equip forces, branded as
the “New Syrian force” by the military, finally entered Syria through
the Jordanian border on July 12, 2015. The mission was immediately
thrown off course when fighters came under attack by al-Nusra; several
other fighters were captured just days before. Later attacks on a second
492
John Allen, “Interview With Judy Woodruff, PBS NewsHour,” Interview, June 16, 2015
(online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/s/seci/246718.htm.
493
Starr, Barbara, “Snag in Pentagon training of Syrian rebels to fight ISIS,” CNN, June 18,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/18/politics/syrian-rebels-pentagon-training-isis/.
494
Pellerin, Cheryl, “Carter: DoD, Global Coalition Seeks ISIL’s Lasting Defeat,” DOD
News, Defense Media Activity, July 7, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Ar-
ticle/612612/carter-dod-global-coalition-seek-isils-lasting-defeat.
entry wave ended up handing over 25 percent of their weapons to

al-Nusra, rendering the initial launch an abject failure. 495
While the immediate failure of train and equip was a blow to the U.S.,
it was not the only iron the administration had in the fire. The U.S. had
also begun to step up its military support for YPG forces in Syria. The
U.S. military had built up, over time, surveillance and drone operations
with the tactical mission of helping Kurdish militias; special force officers
also began to step up intelligence sharing. To the Obama administration,
Kurdish forces represented a glimmer of hope in the ongoing battle against
ISIS, having already retaken the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani from ISIS
forces and more recently pushed ISIS from the border town of Tal Abyad.
However, the fact that YPG was a faction of the PKK, which is recognized
as a terrorist organization by U.S., EU and Turkey, put the U.S. adminis-
tration in a challenging situation with Turkey.
In the summer of 2015, the fight against ISIS was still the most signif-
icant topic on the U.S. agenda. However, the nuclear deal with Iran had
shifted the focus and the nature of the debates in the country. There were
rumors of a secret deal between U.S. and Iran about policies on Syria and
other countries of the region. Skepticism was also increasing about U.S.
commitment to the security in the Middle East. These perceptions spurred
the administration to redouble efforts emphasizing the complexity of the
situation in Syria as well as ongoing U.S. commitment to fight against the
ISIS. During a Press conference discussing the Iran deal, President Obama
spoke about the U.S.’s policy on ISIS. He said:
My key goal when I turn over the keys to the President -- the next President
-- is that we are on track to defeat ISIL; that they are much more contained
and we’re moving in the right direction there. That we have jump started a
process to resolve the civil war in Syria, which is like an open sore in the region
and is giving refuge to terrorist organizations who are taking advantage of that
chaos.” The President continued to discuss the importance of the Coalition
and U.S. allies in finding a solution in regards to the conflict in Syria,” be-
495
Torbati, Yeganeh, “U.S.-trained Syrian rebels gave equipment to Nusra: U.S. military,”
Reuters, September 24, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-equipment-
idUSKCN0RP2HO20150925.
fore continuing, “We’re not going to solve the problems in Syria unless there’s
buy-in from the Russians, the Iranians, the Turks, our Gulf partners. It’s too
chaotic. There are too many factions. There’s too much money and too many
arms flooding into the zone. It’s gotten caught up in both sectarian conflict
and geopolitical jockeying. And in order for us to resolve it, there’s going to
have to be agreement among the major powers that are interested in Syria that
this is not going to be won on the battlefield.496
Through the summer of 2015, a key piece of U.S. attention in the

region was negotiations with Turkey on the potential anti-ISIL coalition
use of Incirlik air base. In July a deal was sealed between the international
coalition and Turkey to allow the U.S. access to Incirlik air base in an
expanded role, including the launch of airstrikes against ISIS. Previously
U.S. action from Incirlik had been limited to unarmed surveillance flights.
The change in action was a game-changer for U.S. efforts in Syria and Iraq
in part because of its strategic location in the region. It significantly de-
creased travel time between the base and Syria, and also allowed increased
capabilities for surveillance missions and response times.
As the U.S. moved into its new phase of operations, now including
the launching of airstrikes from Incirlik, another game changer for Syria
loomed on the horizon. In August 2015 reports began to surface about in-
creasing Russian military presence and weaponry in Syria. Previously, Rus-
sian involvement in Syria had occurred mostly in political and diplomatic
sphere. However, with a new August came a new military dimension of
this involvement that would dramatically change the nature of the conflict.
496
Obama, Barack, “Press Conference by the President,” Office of the White House Press Sec-
retary, July 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/15/press-confer-
ence-president.
EIGHT RUSSIAN MILITARY
INTERVENTION
(AUGUST 2015)
“
This is not some superpower
chessboard contest... Mr. Putin had to
go into Syria not out of strength but
out of weakness, because his client,
Mr. Assad, was crumbling.
President Obama, October 2, 2015
“Russia is ‘pouring gasoline on the Islamic State
phenomenon.’”
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, September 24, 2015
August 2015 brought a new dimension to the conflict in

Syria and significantly changed the equation of the conflict and thus also
U.S. policy on the issue. The major game changer was a secret deal that
was revealed later in January 2016. According to a document that was
posted on a Russian government website, in August the two countries had
reached an agreement on aerial support of the Russian forces to the Syrian
regime. In this document that was dated to August 26, 2015, the Russian
government “made an open-ended commitment to its military deploy-
ment in Syria.”497 An English translation of the agreement that was posted
was provided The Washington Post. The document outlined the following
points as the major takeaways of the agreement:
1. Upon the request of the Syrian side, the Russian Federation
is deploying a Russian aviation group on the territory of the
Syrian Arab Republic;
2. For the deployment of the Russian aviation group, the Syrian
side provides Hmeimim airbase in Latakia province, with its
infrastructure, as well as the required territory agreed upon be-
tween the parties;
3. The engagement of the Russian aviation group shall be carried
out upon the decision of the commander of the group and in
497
Birnbaum, Michael, “The secret pact between Russia and Syria that gives Moscow carte
blanche,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world-
views/wp/2016/01/15/the-secret-pact-between-russia-and-syria-that-gives-moscow-carte-blanche/
200 / R ussian M ilitary I ntervention ( A ugust 2015)
accordance with the plans agreed upon between the parties.498

This agreement allowed for active involvement of the Russian military
into the conflict in Syria and provided opportunity for Russia to protect
and secure its allied regime in the country. However, while the parties were
reaching this agreement, there was not much awareness in the U.S. ad-
ministration about the extent of the discussions. The historic ties between
Russia and Syria are well known by the international community, and since
the beginning of the conflict in Syria the Russian government had tried to
protect the survival of the Syrian regime by providing military assistance
for the country. It had also vetoed several resolutions at the UN Security
Council aimed at the Assad regime. Following the use of chemical weap-
ons by the regime, Russia also played a role in deterring airstrikes against
the regime by Western powers. However, the international community was
expecting that this would be the limit of possible Russian involvement to
the conflict, especially after its “Ukraine adventure” and strong internation-
al pressure over the Russian government, including economic sanctions,
following the annexation of Crimea. These expectations proved to be un-
founded. In the very early days of September, U.S. news outlets began to
report that President Putin was in the process of launching an expansion of
Russian military support for the Syrian government.499
Following Twitter rumours about the presence of the Russian soldiers in
different parts of Syria, a New York Times story reported that a rapid mili-
tary buildup in Syria by the Russian forces was underway. According to this
report, the Russian moves included “the recent transport of prefabricated
housing units for hundreds of people to a Syrian airfield and the deliv-
ery of a portable air traffic control station.”500 It was also mentioned that
the Russian government had requested military overflight permission from
498
ibid.
499
Gordon, Michael & Eric Schmitt, “Russian Moves in Syria Pose Concerns for U.S.,” The
New York Times, September 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/world/middleeast/
russian-moves-in-syria-pose-concerns-for-us.html?_r=0
500
ibid.
neighboring countries. In the piece, the U.S. officials expressed uncertain-

ty about Russia’s intentions for the buildup. There were different theories
for this sudden buildup, which included a Russian attempt to protect its
interest in its naval base and to fight against ISIS. Administration officials
made statements to various different outlets expressing more confusion
than a clear explanation of Russian actions. While these debates were going
on in Washington, D.C., President Putin denounced the commentary as
premature.501 On September 5th, the day after the Times report, Secretary
of State John Kerry called Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to discuss the
administration's concerns about the suggested imminent enhancement of
Russian presence in Syria. During this call the Secretary expressed that the
U.S. did not support this possibility, which could lead to further escalation
of the conflict (and in turn greater loss of life), increased refugee flows, and
the risk of unwanted confrontation between the U.S. Coalition operations
in Syria and whatever mandate Moscow was about to uptake.502
Russia denied in the following days that its forces were in Syria, main-
taining that Moscow, in the words of FM Lavrov, “has never concealed
that it delivers military equipment to official Syrian authorities with the
aim of combating terrorism.”503 The Russian Information Minister put
forward, “There are no Russian forces and there is no Russian military ac-
tion on Syrian territory.”504 This was a direct contradiction with what was
circulating in Western press about the Russian military buildup. Speaking
to CNN, Special Envoy John Allen iterated his displeasure at the idea of
Russian combat forces in Syria. “Much of the instability in the region is
501
Al-Arabia, “Putin: Premature to talk about Russian military action against ISIS,” Sep-
tember 4, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/09/04/Premature-to-
talk-about-Russian-military-action-against-ISIS-Putin-.html.
502
Office of the U.S. Department of State Spokesperson, “Readout of Secretary Ker-
ry’s Call with Foreign Minister Lavrov,” September 5, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2015/09/246664.htm.
503
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.675162
504
Haaretz, “Syria Denies Russian Military Buildup in the Country,” September 8, 2015,
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.675162.
a direct result of the actions of Bashar al-Assad, and to prop him up with
military force creates an additional crisis in the region,” he put forward.505
U.S. military intelligence sources, however, maintained that there was clear
evidence that Russia was sending troops and military hardware at both the
Russian naval facility in Tartus and at al-Assad International Airport.
The U.S. continued its diplomatic dialogue with Russia as Secretary Kerry
spoke with Russian FM Lavrov again in the middle of the month. The Sec-
retary again reiterated the U.S.’s position that Moscow’s military support for
Assad risked exacerbating and extending the conflict in Syria, as well as under-
mining the goal of fighting extremists in the region. He also emphasized that
the U.S. would welcome constructive Russian action such that they would
complement counter-ISIS efforts.506 Secretary of Defense Ash Carter also
pursued a similar conversation with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu,
discussing areas where the U.S. and Russia’s interests and goals both over-
lapped and diverged. The pair, according to the official call readout, agreed
for further discussions on how to de-conflict actions in Syria and the count-
er-ISIS campaign.507 However, these conversations failed to bring clarity to
the Russian motivation for its military buildup in the region.
Concerns of the administration on the buildup continued to emerge
from among the administration officials. A Fox News report quoted multi-
ple U.S. officials’ concerns about Russia’s military buildup in Syria, calling
the intervention “unprecedented,” with one telling the news agency that
it compares in scope to Putin’s incursion into Crimea. The Pentagon, ac-
cording to the report, had not seen evidence that the newly arrived Russian
troops were, as of yet, engaging in combat. This did little to mollify the
Tapper Jake, Interview with General John Allen, “Counter-ISIL Coalition Anniversary,”
505
CNN, September 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/246798.htm.

506
Office of the State Department Spokesperson, “Readout of Secretary Kerry’s Call With For-
eign Minister Lavrov,” September 15, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/246963.htm.
507
Cook, Peter, “Readout of Secretary Carter’s Call with Russian Minister of Defense Sergei
Shoygu,” U.S. Department of Defense Press Operations, September 18, 2015, http://www.defense.
gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/617775/readout-of-secretary-carters-call-
with-russian-minister-of-defense-sergei-shoygu.
administration, which continued to view the developments as a cause for

concern.508 As the buildup became more obvious, administration officials
became more open in their criticisms. The ignorance of these criticisms
and of the warnings issued by U.S. officials to Russia generated further
frustration in Washington. This reflected itself in the statements by differ-
ent administration officials. For instance, Secretary Carter called the idea
that by expanding its military buildup in Syria, Russia is actually “pouring
gasoline on the Islamic State phenomenon.”509 However, the administra-
tion was careful not to destroy all the bridges between the U.S. and the
Russian government. After making this strong comment, Secretary Carter
suggested that “the Obama administration is willing to work with Russia
and may be easing off its long-held position that Mr. Assad’s ouster be a
precondition for peace talks with U.S. backed opposition in Syria- as long
as the ultimate goal remains political transition in Damascus.”510
The increasing complexity of the situation on the ground paired with
increasing confusion of Russia's intentions in Syria generated more ques-
tion marks about the administration’s Syria policy. On the one hand,
there was the increasing military buildup of Russia, and on the other
hand, there were constant messages from the Russian side in regards to the
absence of any military goals at this point. For instance, days before the
Russian air forces launched airstrikes in Syria President Putin reiterated
that he had no plans “right now” to deploy combat troops to Syria, but af-
firmed that the Kremlin would continue to back the Syrian government.
During an interview with CBS’s 60-Minutes the Russian President said,
“Russia will not participate in any troop operations in the territory of Syr-
ia or in any other states.” He pointed to the administration’s underwhelm-
508
Tomlinson, Lucas and Jennifer Griffin, “Russian military build-up in Syria “unprec-
edented,” officials say,” FoxNews.com, September 10, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/poli-
tics/2015/09/09/russian-military-build-up-in-syria-unprecedented-officials-say.html.
509
Taylor, Guy, “Ashton Carter: Russian buildup in Syria could “pour gasoline” on ISIS,” The
Washington Times, September 24, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/24/
carter-russian-buildup-syria-could-pour-gas-isis/.
510
Ibid.
ing “train and equip program,” before defending the Syrian government
as the only legitimate actor in Syria.511
At the UN General Assembly meetings at the end of September 2015,
President Obama made a speech stating that military power at this point
was not sufficient to resolve the crisis in Syria. In his speech he said that
“Nowhere is our commitment to international order more tested than in
Syria.” He said that the U.S. was prepared to work with any nation, includ-
ing Russia and Iran, to resolve the conflict. “This work will take time. There
are no easy answers to Syria,” he said.512 During the UN meetings, there was
also a bilateral meeting between President Obama and President Putin. The
administration was trying to make sense of the Russian goals in Syria and
figure out how to properly interpret Russia’s this military buildup.
While it was obvious that the Russian military would imminent-
ly begin airstrikes, Secretary Carter instructed his staff to “open lines
of communication with Russia on deconflicting,” the situation as the
possibility of unwanted military encounters between air operations of
Russian and Coalition forces began to haunt the administration.513
The directive by Secretary Carter was an attempt to ensure that Amer-
ican operations would not be disrupted by Russian military activity as
Moscow began airstrikes in Syria at the close of the month.514 Speaking
at a meeting in International Peace and Security and Countering Ter-
rorism at the UN, Secretary Kerry reiterated that the U.S. would be
supportive of genuine effort against ISIS and al-Qaeda undertaken by
511
Rose, Charlie interview with Vladimir Putin, “All Eyes on Putin,” Charlie Rose, aired:
September 27, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/vladimir-putin-russian-president-60-min-
utes-charlie-rose/.
512
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General As-
sembly,” Remarks, September 28, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secre-
tary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-unit-
ed-nations-general-assembly.
513
RT, “Pentagon to open “lines of communication” with Russia over strikes in Syria,” Sep-
tember 29, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/316987-pentagon-russia-communications-syria/.
514
Cooper, Helene & Michael Gordon, “Russia Buildup Seen as Fanning Flames in Syria,”
The New York Times, September 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/world/russia-
buildup-seen-as-fanning-flames-in-syria.html?_r=0.
Moscow, while saying that the U.S. “will not be confused” in the fight
against ISIS with support for Assad.515
After the commencement of Russia’s airstrike program in Syria, the Syria
question became more challenging for the United States. The Obama ad-
ministration had to deal with criticisms about its inability to stop the expan-
sion of the Russian influence in the region as well as with the new reality on
the ground brought about by Russian action. Options available to the U.S.
to deal with the Syrian crisis also became narrowed. In a first assessment of
these bombings, the Institute for the Study of War concluded:
Russian airstrikes continue to bolster the Assad regime’s efforts to defeat
the Syrian opposition. Russian airstrikes from October 19-20 primarily sup-
ported ongoing regime ground offensives in rebel-held areas in the southern
countryside of Aleppo, the al-Ghab plain of northwestern Hama Province,
and the Jebel al-Akrad mountain range in northeastern Latakia Province. The
regime is launching probing attacks in Jebel al-Akrad and the al-Ghab plan,
likely in order to fix rebel forces in Hama and Latakia Provinces. This effort
will prevent rebel forces from reinforcing positions in Aleppo Province, where
the regime and its allies have launched their main effort. Russia’s air campaign
continues to marginalize moderate elements of the Syrian opposition by tar-
geting moderate, U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipients.516
In fact, as was a common assessment amongst observers of the Russian

involvement in Syria, the U.S. administration also got the impression that
the main target of airstrikes was not ISIS, but rather Syrian opposition
forces fighting the Assad regime.
Following these developments, President Obama held a press confer-
ence in an effort to clarify its Syria policy. During this conference, the
president said that the reason Assad was still in power was because of Rus-
sian and Iranian support for the regime. Furthermore, the president put
forward that the international community needed to make it clear to Pres-
ident Putin that the only way to solve the problem in Syria was “to have a
515
Kerry, John, “Remarks at the Meeting on International Peace and Security and Countering
Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, September 30, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2015/09/247639.htm.
516
Casagrande, Genevieve, “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 20 - October 20, 2015,”
Institute for the Study of War, October 21, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/back-
grounder/russian-airstrikes-syria-september-30-october-20-2015.
political transition that is inclusive- that keeps the state intact, that keeps
the military intact, that maintains cohesion, but that is inclusive- and the
only way to accomplish that is for Mr. Assad to transition, because you
cannot rehabilitate him in the eyes of Syrians.”517 He clarified that the U.S.
would not impose a military solution, instead saying, “Eventually Syria
will fall, the Assad regime will fall, and we have to have somebody who
we’re working with that we can help pick up the pieces and stitch back
together a cohesive, coherent country.”518 This admission of course took
place following a high number of question marks about the outcome of
this program. In this conference, President Obama also responded to the
several articles evaluating the situation in Syria for a possible conflict be-
tween U.S. and Russia and stated that Syria will not turn into a proxy war
between the U.S. and Russia.519 During the press conference the President
also spoke about the train equip program. He acknowledged that the pro-
gram had “not worked in the way it was supposed to.”
Later it was revealed that during a meeting with senior aids before the
press conference the President and his administration decided it would not
directly confront the Kremlin over its recently launched air campaign in
Syria.520 Members of the administration thought that the Russian interven-
tion would likely result in a significant burden for Russian government that
would impact the longevity of the operation. In fact, some administration
officials said that the Syria intervention of Russia would turn into a major
517
Barack Obama, “Press Conference by the President,” Remarks, October 2, 2015 (on-
line by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/10/02/press-conference-president.
518
519
520
DeYoung, Karin, Juliet Eilperin, & Greg Miller, “U.S. will not directly confront Russia
in Syria, Obama says,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/2015/10/02/44c1f7fc-6932-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html.
quagmire for the Russian government.521 At the time, the main expectation
among members of the administration was that the Russian government
would ultimately fail in its endeavor to support the Assad regime. Part of
this would be the result of the alienation of Sunni populated countries to-
wards Russia because of its support for the minority Assad regime. This was
also seen as having the potential to bring geopolitical challenges for Russia
in the long run.522 Because of this, members of the administration very
self-confidently stated that the Russian intervention to Syria was “doomed
to fail.”523 Another frequently stated opinion during this period was the fact
that the Russian intervention was not a show of strength but a weakness
on the part of the Russian ally in the Syrian conflict. President Obama
stated in multiple instances that “this is not some superpower chessboard
contest….Mr. Putin had to go into Syria not out of strength but out of
weakness, because his client, Mr. Assad, was crumbling.”524
Through these arguments of “quagmire” and “weakness of Russian ally”,
the U.S. administration was trying to respond to the criticisms of its failure
to respond Russian aggression. However, many experts and observers were
still concerned about the possible negative outcomes of increasing Russian
involvement to the conflict. Accordingly, former administration officials,
such as former Ambassador Robert Ford, expressed serious concerns about
the impact of the Russian military strikes on the U.S. covert programs in
the country, which were already encountering significant problems.525 There
was also some concern about the potential influence of this development
to the relations between U.S. and the Syrian opposition. The expectation
was that the situation would increase the frustration of the members of the
521
Ibid.
522
Ibid.
523
Ferdinando, Lisa, “Carter: Russia “Doomed to Fail” in Syria; ISIL Must be Defeated,”
DoD News, Defense MEdia Activity, October 30, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Arti-
cle-View/Article/626828/carter-russia-doomed-to-fail-in-syria-isil-must-be-defeated.
524
DeYoung, Karin, Juliet Eilperin, & Greg Miller, “U.S. will not directly confront Russia
in Syria, Obama says,”
525
ibid.
opposition toward the U.S. administration. Ambassador Ford stated that

the members of the Syrian opposition started to believe that “the Americans
don’t do as much as the Russians do for their side of the conflict.”526
These concerns were later proved to be right. Shortly after the begin-
ning of Russian airstrikes, it was documented by U.S. officials that Russian
Air Force units were intentionally targeting U.S.-backed opposition forces.
This proved that the main intention of Russia was not fighting against the
ISIS but rather to counter against Syrian opposition advances.527 Speaking
in Madrid, Secretary Carter said that Russia’s behavior would “escalate the
[Syrian] civil war, putting further at risk the very political resolution and
preservation of Syria’s structure of future governance it says that it wants
The U.S. position is clear that a long lasting defeat of ISIL and extremism
in Syria can only be achieved if pursued in parallel with a political transi-
tion in Syria.”528 However, once again the administration was careful not
to totally antagonize the Russian government. Secretary Carter, in anoth-
er remark, stated that the administration would continue to support the
moderate Syrian opposition. It would also continue to keep the door open
for the Russians to contribute to a diplomatic resolution. He said, “We
will seek an agreement with the Russians on professional safety procedures
for the U.S.’s strategy in Syria, and will leave the door open for Russia to
rejoin the track toward a political transition in Damascus.”529
Later, the impact of the Russian intervention to the relations between
U.S. and Syrian opposition was revealed. In a report Russian attempt to re-
526
ibid.
527
Entous, Adam, “U.S. Sees Russian Drive Against CIA-Backed Rebels in Syria,” The Wall
Street Journal, October 5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-concludes-russia-targeting-cia-
backed-rebels-in-syria-1444088319.
528
Carter, Ashton, “Remarks at Spanish Center for Advanced Studies of National Defense:
Strong and Principled Security Cooperation,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 5, 2015,
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/621829/remarks-at-spanish-cen-
ter-for-advanced-studies-of-national-defense-strong-and-p.
529
Pellerin, Cheryl, “Carter Addresses Syria, Afghanistan, Modern NATO Mission,” DoD
News, Defense Media Activity, October 8, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Ar-
ticle/622446/carter-addresses-syria-afghanistan-modern-nato-mission.
cruit the members of the opposition that were supported by the covert pro-
gram of the U.S. administration was uncovered. Accordingly members of the
Russian administration were approaching the military leaders of the Syrian
opposition and promising to support them. A military commander of the
opposition forces detailed to a reporter, “They told me, ‘We will support you
forever. We won’t leave you on your own like your old friends did.’530 The
report also stated that “The secret outreach shows that as it works to muscle
the U.S. out of Syria, Russia isn’t just bombing the U.S.’s current and former
rebel allies — it’s also working to co-opt them, launching a shadowy cam-
paign that seeks to highlight U.S. weakness in Syria.”531
A second issue on the administration’s plate was the fate of the train and
equip program. Although there were reports that the U.S. intended to stop
the train and equip program, administration officials continued to say that
U.S. intended to continue this program in Syria.532 However, despite the
claims that the train and equip program would continue, the White House
announced in early October that the program would take an “operational
pause.” Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said in an interview
with Al-Jazeera that the program had, “not gone as [the administration]
would have like to have gone.” “This is a complicated situation, we have to
learn from our different policies in Syria,” he concluded.533 The administra-
tion planned to use this time to revamp the program, taking some of the lead-
ers of groups who were already fighting on the ground, putting them through
the same rigorous vetting process used in the original program, and then
giving them basic equipment packages to distribute to their fighting forces.
530
Giglio, Mike, “Russia Is Recruiting the U.S.’s Rebel Allies In Syria,” BuzzFeed, June 9, 2016,
https://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/russia-is-recruiting-the-uss-rebel-allies-in-syria?utm_term=.
ixKxebMBZk#.nxMx3JMLQW.
531
ibid.
532
Cook, Peter, “Department of Defense Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of Defense, September
8, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/616516/depart-
ment-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in.
533
Hasan Mehdi interview with Ben Rhodes, Al Jazeera English Up Front, September 25,
2015, http://pr.aljazeera.com/post/129845054685/al-jazeera-englishs-upfront-interview-with.
Under Secretary of Defense Christine Wormuth explained this strategy in a

press call on the counter-ISIL campaign held with Deputy National Security
Advisor Rhodes and Deputy Special Envoy McGurk.534 Days later, the U.S.
military dropped 50 tons of ammunition, M-16s, AK-47s, grenades, and
mortar and rocket-propelled grenade rounds to opposition forces battling
ISIS in northern Syria.535 It was reported that Kurdish fighters were some of
the main recipients of the airdrops. However, during a press briefing, Penta-
gon Spokesman Peter Cook rebuffed these claims saying, “My understanding
is that this specifically went to Syrian Arab forces.” The emerging situation
complicated the U.S. relationship with Turkey, since the main beneficiary of
this military aid was the YPG forces in the Northern Syria.
As the situation on the ground became increasingly complicated,
the administration was still trying to clarify the position of the U.S.
in Syria. In a testimony presented to the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Anne
Patterson outlined the four major components of the evolving U.S.
strategy for Syria as the following,
1. Defeat ISIL militarily in both Syria and Iraq;
2. Develop a political transition that gives Syria a future without
Bashar al-Assad;
3. Ease the suffering of the Syrian people;
4. Stabilize our regional allies and help European partners as they
cope with a massive refugee crisis.536
She continued, “Our strategy regarding the Syrian conflict remains fun-
damentally the same, to leverage military action and diplomacy to achieve
534
Press Call by Ben Rhodes and Brett McGurk, “Press Call on the Counter-ISIL Cam-
paign,” Office of the White House Press Secretary,” October 9, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/10/09/press-call-counter-isil-campaign.
535
Gibbons-Neff Thomas, “Pentagon airdrops ammunition to groups fighting the Islamic
State,” The Washington Post, October 12, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/check-
point/wp/2015/10/12/pentagon-airdrops-ammunition-to-groups-fighting-the-islamic-state/.
536
Anne Patterson, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 4,
2015, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20151104/104160/HHRG-114-FA00-Wstate-
PattersonA-20151104.pdf.
a political transition in which Syrians ultimately have a government that

respects the rights of its people and Syria retains its unity, independence,
territorial integrity and secular character.”537 Later another attempt to clar-
ify the U.S. policy in Syria came from Secretary Kerry. Kerry put forward:
Having made peaceful change impossible, Assad made war inevitable. And
this war gave rise to Daesh – ISIL – the gravest extremist threat faced by our
generation and the embodiment of evil in our time. From the beginning of this
crisis, there has not been a single idea for addressing the Syrian conflict that has
been discussed in public that hasn’t been the subject of intense scrutiny within
the Administration. Whatever questions one might have about the content of
our policy, there should no doubt about the effort made to consider every sin-
gle option for ending this crisis. To that end, President Obama has set for our
nation three interrelated goals. President made it clear that the United States
was committed to the defeat and dismantlement of this terrorist organization.
Second, we are intensifying our diplomatic effort to finally bring an end to the
civil war in Syria. And third, we are determined to support our friends in the
region, and to ensure that the instability created by the Syrian crisis does not
spread further beyond its borders.538
In the meantime, there was a personnel change in the administration’s

counter-ISIS team. The State Department announced that Special Envoy
John Allen would be replaced by his deputy, Brett McGurk.539 This cor-
responded with a change in the approach to fight against ISIS. Secretary
Carter testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that, in Syria,
new emphasis would be placed on the Syrian Arab Coalition to working
towards destroying ISIS’s capital in Raqqa. He expressed disappointment
with the train and equip program, and said that the new program would
be developed to focus on working with vetted leaders of groups already
fighting ISIL, building on successes of Syrian Arabs and Kurds.540 Later
537
Ibid.
538
John Kerry, “Remarks on the U.S. Strategy in Syria,” Remarks, November 12, 2015 (online
by the U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249454.htm.
539
Kerry, John, “Departure of Special Presidential Envoy John Allen and Appointment of
Brett McGurk,” U.S. Department of State, October 23, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2015/10/248665.htm
540
Crong, Terri Moon, “Carter Outlines Strategy to Counter ISIL at Senate Armed Ser-
vices Hearing,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity, October 27, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/
News-Article-View/Article/626113/carter-outlines-strategy-to-counter-isil-at-senate-armed-
services-hearing.
in the hearing, under questioning from Senator Graham, Secretary Car-

ter stated that the U.S.’s principal efforts to ensure Assad transitions out
of power in Syria are diplomatic, rather than militaristic. General Joseph
Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that the
“balance of forces” in Syria had shifted in favor of Assad.541
Following the failure of the train and equip program and the Russian
intervention in Syria, the administration one more time launched an effort
to find a diplomatic solution for the crisis. During the November 14th
Vienna Negotiations, world powers agreed to pursue political negotiations
between the regime and opposition forces before the end of the year, and
that the negotiations would be followed by a UN-backed ceasefire agree-
ment. The administration was hopeful that this agreement and ceasefire
it proposed would pave the way for a refocus of efforts on ISIS. The talks
came just a day after multiple terrorist attacks were conducted across Paris
by ISIS. Secretary Kerry said, “The Paris attacks have shown, alongside
with ISIS claiming responsibility, that it doesn’t matter if you are for Assad
or against him, ISIS is your enemy.” Speaking directly to the day’s negoti-
ations, Secretary Kerry told a press conference:
Today, Sergey Lavrov and I and Staffan joined representatives from the
Arab League, China, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq,
Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE,
the UK, and the United Nations. We still differ, obviously, on the issue of what
happens with Bashar al-Assad. But we are relying on the political process itself
– led by Syrians, which it will be, going forward, and with Syrians negotiating
with Syrians – that that can help to bring a close to this terrible chapter. We do
agree on this: It is time for the bleeding in Syria to stop. It is time to deprive
the terrorists of any single kilometer in which to hide. It is time that we come
together to help the Syrian people embark on the difficult but extraordinarily
high imperative of rebuilding their country.542
Just a day later, prior to the opening of G20 meetings in Antalya, Tur-
key, President Obama briefly spoke with President Putin about Syria. The
541
ibid.
542
Kerry, John, “Press Availability with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and UN Spe-
cial Envoy Staffan de Mistura,” U.S. Department of State, November 14, 2015, http://www.state.
gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249515.htm.
leaders allegedly agreed on the need for political transition in the country.
"Russia has not officially committed to a transition of Assad moving out,
but they did agree to the political transition process. And I think we’ll
find out over the next several weeks whether or not we can bring about
that change of perspective with the Russians,” the president said.543 At the
conclusion of the G20 summit, President Obama held a press conference
in which he discussed diplomatic progress in ending the Syrian civil war:
We’ve begun to see some modest progress on the diplomatic front, which
is critical because a political solution is the only way to end the war in Syria
and unite the Syrian people and the world against ISIL. The Vienna talks mark
the first time that all the key countries have come together -- as a result, I
would add, of American leadership -- and reached a common understanding.544
Later in a press conference with the French President François Hol-

lande, following the Paris attacks, President Obama was more straightfor-
ward about the Vienna process and the Assad regime. In his remarks he
stated:
With respect to Mr. Assad, I think we've got to let the Vienna process play
itself out. It is our best opportunity. And so the notion that there would be
an immediate date in advance of us getting a broad agreement on that political
process and the details I think doesn’t make sense. As soon as we have a frame-
work for a political transition -- potentially, a new constitution, elections -- I
think it's in that context that we can start looking at Mr. Assad choosing not
to run and potentially seeing a new Syria emerge.545
Amid further questions and concerns, President Obama one more time
expressed its administration’s policy in regards to the Assad regime and
Syria in a press conference. He said:
543
Kreiter, Marcy, “US President Barack Obama Calls on Russia To Change Its Approach To
Syria To Defeat ISIS,” International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/us-president-barack-
obama-calls-russia-change-its-approach-syria-defeat-isis-2195299.
544
Obama, Barack, “Press Conference by President Obama -- Antalya, Turkey,” Office of
the White House Press Secretary, November 16, 3026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/11/16/press-conference-president-obama-antalya-turkey.
545
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Hollande of France in Joint
Press Conference,” Remarks, November 24, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/24/remarks-president-obama-
and-president-hollande-france-joint-press.
Now, where [the U.S. and Russia] continue to have an ongoing difference
is not on the need for a political settlement; it's the issue of whether Mr. Assad
can continue to serve as President while still bringing the civil war to an end.
It's been my estimation for five years now that that's not possible. It is possible,
however, to preserve the Syrian state, to have an inclusive government in which
the interests of the various groups inside of Syria are represented.546
At the close of 2015, Secretary Kerry issued a statement that confused

the observers and analysts of Obama administration’s Syria policy. During
Secretary Kerry’s Moscow trip he stated, “The United States and our part-
ners are not seeking regime change in Syria,” he said, marking an unprec-
edented departure from the administration's half decade-long policy that
any solution to the crisis in Syria would not include the Assad regime.547
He went further and asked the Syrian opposition not to make Assad’s de-
parture a precondition for negotiations with the Syrian regime.
2016 opened with a fresh attempt by the UN Special Envoy de Mistura
to convene another conference on Syria in Geneva. The move was wel-
comed by the U.S. administration. During a press conference, Secretary
Kerry urged the opposition groups to attend the talks. He also hinted that
the administration might be willing to renew its nonlethal assistance to
certain groups, an offer that had been previously taken off the table amid
concerns that supplies had been captured by militant groups rather than
reaching the intended recipients.548
The new conference was not convened without challenges. Whether or
not the Kurdish PYD would take part in the conference became a major is-
sue. The Turkish government was totally opposed to the idea of the PYD’s
participation in the talks. Representatives of the Turkish government even
546
Barack Obama, “Press Conference by President Obama,” Briefing, December 1, 2015
(online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/12/01/press-conference-president-obama.
547
Kramer, Andrew E., “John Kerry Visits Moscow to Prepare for Talks on Syria,” The New
York Times, December 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/world/europe/john-ker-
ry-visits-moscow-to-prepare-for-talks-on-syria.html?_r=0.
548
Gordon, Michael R., “Kerry Urges Syrian Rebels to Go to Peace Meeting,” The New York
Times, January 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/us-presses-syr-
ian-opposition-to-join-talks.html?_r=1.
threatened to boycott the talks if the PYD was allowed to attend. Ultimate-
ly, the PYD was kept out of the invitation list. Despite the resolution of
this problem, the Geneva talks continued to face delays. Due to the heavy
Russian airstrikes and a blockade of the Assad forces around Aleppo the
opposition considered the situation unfeasible for the start of peace talks.
The opposition demanded that the regime and Russian forces stop their
attacks and sieges before starting the negotiations.549 After long delibera-
tions and discussions, the peace talks finally started in February 1st, 2016.
Again, however, the talks did not proceed as smoothly as hoped. Following
the beginning of the major offensive on the city of Aleppo by the Syrian
regime with the air support of Russia, UN Envoy de Mistura suspended
the talks between the parties. During a White House press briefing, Press
Secretary Josh Earnest addressed the U.S. perspective on the actions of the
Syrian regime and Russian attacks on Aleppo saying, “Certainly it is not
going to prevent the United States from continuing to push forward the
political transition process to try to get Assad out of power so that we can
begin to address the political chaos that’s the root of so many problems in
that country.” He also welcomed an offer from Saudi Arabia to deploy
ground troops in Syria, but first advised that the U.S. needed to make sure
that their commitment would be integrated into the overall effort.550
From February 11th to 12th the International Syrian Support Group
(ISGG) met in Munich to discuss the now critical humanitarian situation
in besieged areas of Syria as well as the path forward to trying to secure
peace.551 The ISSG reaffirmed its readiness to ensure a Syrian-led and Syr-
ian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué in its
entirety; press for the end of any indiscriminate use of weapons; support
549
BBC. “Syria conflict: Opposition sets terms for Geneva peace talks,” January 31, 2016,
550
Earnest, Josh, “Daily Press Briefing,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, February
5, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/press-briefing-press-secretary-
josh-earnest-252016.
551
Office of the State Department Spokesperson, “Statement of the International Syria Sup-
port Group,” February 11, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252428.htm.
and accelerate the agreement and implementation of a nationwide cease-

fire; facilitate immediate humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach
areas and the release of any arbitrarily detained persons; and fight terrorism.
An announcement was made by Secretary Kerry and Russian FM Lavrov,
saying that they had agreed to follow a “cessation of hostilities” within a
week.552 By the end of the February, they finally the agreed upon cessation
of hostilities went into effect. This move was considered an opportunity by
the members of the U.S. administration usher in resolve to the conflict in
Syria. Of course part of this success was dependent on the actions of Russia
and Syrian regime. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Mark Toner
answered questions about the consequence of Russia’s actions by stating, “it
is time for them to show, through action rather than words, that they are
serious about what they profess to be serious about, which is a ceasefire or
a cessation of hostilities and a political process that leads to a transition.”
He refuses to comment on the “Plan B” that media outlets reported and
Secretary Kerry alluded to in his testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. A day after the ceasefire took effect, President Obama, during
his weekly address, said that the only way to defeat ISIL is to end the civil
war in Syria. He said the ceasefire agreement would be, if successful, a crit-
ical part of this process. “We’re not under any illusions,” he said, however,
“There are plenty of reasons for skepticism [about the cessation].”553
Since then there have been various reports indicating the violation of
cessation of hostilities in Syria. However, both the U.S. and Russian gov-
ernments are supporting this process, and with a recent agreement the
ceasefire was also extended to include Aleppo.
552
Ibid.
553
Obama, Barack, “Weekly Address: Degrading and Destroying ISIL,” Office of the
White House Press Secretary, February 27, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2016/02/27/weekly-address-degrading-and-destroying-isil.
TIMELINE OF U.S.-SYRIA RELATIONS

(OCTOBER 2008 TO APRIL 2016)
October 26, 2008 U.S. troops allegedly descended from helicopters to attack
Al-Sukkariya, a Syrian enclave five miles west of the Iraqi
city Qaim to kill Badran Turki Hishan al -Mazidih - Iraqi
sanctioned by U.S. Treasury for allowing supplies to funnel
to AQI through Syria. Demonstrated that U.S. taking mat-
ters into own hands to address AQI in Syria.554
November 2008 Pres. Obama is elected amidst the suspension of indirect
Syrian-Israeli negotiations in reaction to Israel’s 2008-2009
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Bashar al-Assad declares that
Israel’s attack on Gaza in December 2008 “closed the door
on the Syrian-Israeli indirect talks.” Later, the Syria pushes
other arab countries to stop endorsing the Arab Peace Ini-
tiative with Israel, sponsored by Saudi Arabia. Assad joins
Hezbollah and Iran in backing Hamas’ call for Israel to un-
conditionally open its border crossings with Gaza.555
November 2008 Sami Moubayed authors an article about the steps Pres. Obama
would have to take to court Syrian favor. This included:
1) Re-institution of a U.S. ambassador in Damascus
2 An end to the anti-Syrian rhetoric from the White
House and State Department, which had been harsh
since 2003
3) Recognition of Syria’s attempt to help border security
4) Assistance in some form to help with 1.2 million Iraqi
refugees
5) Lifting of sanctions on Damascus
6) Abolition of Syrian Accountability Act
7) Willingness to hold indirect peace talks with Israel
8) Recognition that no problems in Mid-East can be
solved without Syria
9) Combat against Islamic fundamentalism
10) Apology for air raid on Syria that left 8 dead in Octo-
ber 2008 and
11) Normalization of relations between Syria and America
on a people-to-people level.
554
555
Sharp, “Syria: Background and U.S. Relations,” 2-3.
218 / T imeline of U . S .- Syria R elations ( O ctober 2008 to aprıl 2016)
November 19, 2008 IAEA puts Syria on its agenda for the al-Kibar reactor.556
February 9, 2009 U.S. Department of Commerce eases restrictions on an ex-
port license for Boeing 747 spare parts to Syrian Air, Syria’s
national airline.557
February 26, 200: Jeff Feltman, Assistant Sec. of State, and Daniel Shapiro,
Middle East expert of the NSC meet with the Syrian Ambas-
sador to the U.S. (Imad Mustapha) to address U.S. concerns
about Syrian behavior. Pres. Obama asks Clinton to arrange
this meeting 1) to engage with America’s adversaries as the
underpinning idea of U.S. foreign policy in the new admin-
istration and 2) to stave off any chance of Hezbollah’s success
in the elections scheduled for June 7, so as not to alienate
U.S. allies in Lebanon. In the meeting, Feltman raises the
issues of Syria’s support for terrorism, non-proliferation, in-
tervention in Lebanese politics, and disintegrating human
rights standards. After the meeting, Feltman is referred to as
too “neo-con” by both Syrian officials and domestic media
to be considered an effective negotiator.558
Mid-February 2009 Senator Kerry visits Bashar al-Assad in Damascus.559 In
preparation for his arrival, FM Spokesperson Bushra Kana-
fani said, "Senator Kerry, like the rest of U.S. delegates ar-
riving in Damascus, is so welcome...We have always called
for deep dialogue with Washington to put our relations on
the right track, which would serve bilateral interests, securi-
ty and stability."560
March 7, 2009 Feltman and Shapiro go to Syria in the highest level visit
since 2005 to explore Washington’s relationship with Da-
mascus.561 The two provided few specifics about the visit, but
they said that the talks “constructive” and that they found “a
lot of common ground” (in Feltman’s words, especially on
556
Tabler, In the Lion’s Den, 219
557
558
559
Heather Saul, “Pictures resurface showing US Secretary John Kerry and President Assad
dining in Syria together,” The Independent, September 3, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/pictures-resurface-showing-us-secretary-john-kerry-and-president-as-
sad-dining-in-syria-together-8796846.html.
560
George Baghdadi, “John Kerry to Visit Syrian Capital,” CBS News, February 12, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-kerry-to-visit-syrian-capital/.
561
Elise Labott, “U.S., Syria find 'common ground' in diplomatic talks,” CNN, March 7,
2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/03/07/US.Syria/index.html?eref=edition.
wanting a “unified Iraq”).562 Instead of setting “benchmarks”

for Syria, Feltman and Shapiro say they are looking forward
to each country watching the “choices” of the other.563
March 9, 2009 Assad begins to speaks publicly; in the following days he
offers Israel a “cold peace” and announces he had been asked
to mediate between the U.S. and Iran. He demanded U.S.
mediation for the Arab-Israeli conflict and requested direct
contact with President Obama.564
May 7, 2009 According to Feltman, Feltman and Shapiro revisit Syria
“as part of President Obama’s commitments to use diplo-
macy and to use dialogue in order to try to see where we
can move forward, where our interests overlap, and to see
where we can try and work together to bridge the difference
that remain in some of our policies.” Feltman recognizes
improvements in the bilateral relationship compared to two
months ago.565 Also this day, the Obama administration, in
accordance with the National Emergencies Act, renews the
annual iteration of a National Emergency with respect to
Syria. The declaration allows the administration to continue
targeted sanctions on government and security officials.566
June 8, 2009 Pres. Obama gives the famous “Cairo Speech” in which he
charts a new course for U.S.-Middle East relations, promising
characterizes his Middle East policy as centered around the
Middle East Peace Process and U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.567
June 13, 2009 U.S. Envoy George Mitchell and Jeff Feltman visit Damas-
cus in the highest level visit since 2005.568 He announces
that Syria is critical for a comprehensive Middle East Peace:
“Syria has an integral role to play in reaching comprehensive
peace,” Mr. Mitchell said. Both Syria and the United States
have the responsibility “to create conditions for negotiations
562
See Sharp, “Syria: Background and U.S. Relations, 2.)
563
564
565
566
567
Barack Obama, “Remarks By The President On A New Beginning,” Press Release, June
4, 2009 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09.
568
“Mitchell Cites Syria’s Role in Mideast Peace Effort,” The New York Times, June 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14mitchell.html?_r=0.
to begin promptly and end successfully.” He also offered,

"It's my hope that we can also see full diplomatic relations
and friendship restored between Damascus and Washington
at an early day in the New Year.”569 Days after the visit, the
U.S. declares it will reinstate its ambassador.570
Late June 2009 The administration sends Ambassador Hof and a delegation
from CENTCOM in June and August 2009 to discuss cut-
ting off the flow of foreign fighters and to assess Syria’s bor-
der-monitoring will and capacity.571
Late June 2009 The Obama administration messages that it plans to return an
ambassador to the Syrian capital within the next few months.572
Senator Kerry is reportedly very supportive of this move.573
July 26, 2009 U.S. Envoy Mitchell visits Syria in a further demonstration
of thawing U.S.-Syrian relations.574 Mitchell apparently
spent hours with Assad personally reviewing U.S. sanctions
after the head of state reiterated its demand that the U.S.
pullback its economic pressure.575 Mitchell called on the
Arab world to begin normalization efforts with Israel. Syria
said it was “looking forward” to the visit as “the first step of
dialogue. He also mentioned that the U.S. was “trying to de-
velop...bilateral issues that we have with the Syrians as well”
and that they would discuss those issues at the meeting. Fi-
nally, Sen. Mitchell said, "In terms of the Syrian-American
relationship, the United States is committed to a dialogue
based on mutual interest and mutual respect and a solid
foundation for discussion of our shared goals and of real dif-
ferences, where they occur.”576
569
George Baghdadi, “Syria Hopes for “Natural Relations” with U.S.,” CBS News, June 13,
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-hopes-for-natural-relations-with-us/.
570
571
572
Ibid.
573
Heather Saul, “Pictures resurface showing US Secretary John Kerry and President Assad
dining in Syria together,” The Independent, September 3, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/pictures-resurface-showing-us-secretary-john-kerry-and-president-as-
sad-dining-in-syria-together-8796846.html.
574
Josef Ferman, “George Mitchell In Syria: Obama Determined To See "Truly Compre-
hensive" Mideast Peace,” The Huffington Post, August 26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/07/26/george-mitchell-in-syria-_n_245019.html.
575
576
“Obama’s Middle East Envoy Steps Up Diplomatic Push in Syria.”
July 28, 2009 The United States takes steps to ease sanctions on Syria, es-
pecially on sectors involving information technology (IT),
civil aviation, and communications.577 8July 30, 2009:
Pres. Obama extends his presidential authority to enforce
EO 13441 that freezing assets of anyone who tries to un-
dermine Lebanon’s sovereignty by reissuing a “continuation
of National Emergency with Respect to Actions of Certain
Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty of Lebanon or its
Democratic Processes and Institutions.”578
Early/Mid-August 2009 Another CENTCOM delegation visits Damascus and an-
nounces that the U.S. will form a tripartite committee with
Iraq and Syria to ensure greater border security.579
August 19, 2009 After a visit to Damascus, Iraqi PM al-Maliki is almost
blown up in Baghdad. Iraq accused Syria of hosting terrorist
camps, which it said were responsible for the attacks.580 Iraq
withdrew its ambassador and engagement. The tripartite se-
curity agreement is now dead in the water.581
Late September 2009 Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad is invited to
Washington for high-level talks, almost exclusively on
sanctions.582 This is the first visit by a Syrian official to the
U.S. in more than 8 years.583 FM Walid Moallem declares,
“I am optimistic about this visit...the agenda is clear; it is
continuing the Syrian-U.S. dialogue to normalize bilat-
eral relations. There are, of course, many obstacles and
suspicions after an eight-year suspension of contacts. The
gap must be bridged...This is a continuing process and
this is part of the dialogue.”584 However, Syria shows lit-
tle to no flexibility in its foreign policy—it continues its
support of U.S.-designated terrorists, refuses to engage in
577
“Syria’s Response to US Engagement,” Lebanese Information Center, Fact Sheet, March
15, 2010, http://www.licus.org/liclib/2010-04-19%20LIC%20FACT%20SHEET-SYRIA's%20
RESPONSE%20TO%20US%20ENGAGEMEN.pdf.
578
579
Tabler, “Syria Clenches Its Fist.”
580
581
582
Ibid; See also “Syria’s Response to US Engagement,” Lebanese Information Center, March
15, 2010, http://www.licus.org/liclib/2010-04-19%20LIC%20FACT%20SHEET-SYRIA's%20
RESPONSE%20TO%20US%20ENGAGEMEN.pdf.
583
584
Ibid.
rapprochement with Israel, and continues its repressive

human rights record.
November 2009 Israel seizes a freighter from Iran to Syrian port of Latakia
that is loaded with arms (medium range 107-mm and 122-
mm rockets, armor piercing rounds, grenades, Kalashnikov
ammunition); it is believed to be destined for use by Hezbol-
lah in Lebanon.585
December 2009 U.S. denies Airbus the ability to sell Syria planes, as Airbus
planes are approximately 40% U.S. origin, making them il-
legal to sell without an export license.
February 16, 2010 This week, amid growing U.S. pressure for a peace settle-
ment, a “war of words” is exchanged between Syria and Isra-
el after Ehud Barak told the Israeli Defense Forces, that "in
the absence of an arrangement with Syria, we are liable to
enter a belligerent clash with it that could reach the point of
an all-out, regional war...just like the familiar reality in the
Middle East, we will immediately sit down [with Syria] after
such a war and negotiate on the exact same issues which we
have been discussing with them for the last 15 years." While
Barak likely meant it as a way to push Israeli citizens to favor
negotiations, Syrian officials responded to the threat of war.
Moallem responded, “Israel knows that if it declares war on
Syria, such a war will reach its cities."586
February 17, 2010 Deputy Secretary of State William Burns meets with Bashar
al-Assad.587 The same day, the President announces that
Robert Ford will be his choice for Ambassador to Syria.588
Allegedly, the U.S. and Syria held additional talks soon after
to discuss weapons smuggling to Hezbollah through Syria.589
February 18, 2010 U.S. Counterterrorism official Daniel Benjamin meets with
Syrian Deputy FM al-Miqdad and is accompanied by a sur-
prise guest, Gen. Ali Mamlouk, head of Syria’s General In-
585
Charles S. Levinson and Josh Mitnick, “Israeli Navy Seizes Weapons Believed to Be for
Hezbollah,” The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB125732536158927651.
586
“Believe in Israel, Believe in Peace,” Americans for Peace Now, Middle East Peace Re-
port 11, No. 18 (February 16, 2010): http://archive.peacenow.org/entries/peace_report_feb-
ruary_16_2010.
587
“Top US William Burns Envoy in Syria for Talks,” BBC News, February 17, 2010, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8520917.stm.
588
589
telligence Directorate.590 The group discusses possible areas

of cooperation for counterterrorism.
February 20, 2010 Syria buys two French airplanes after discussions between
France and Syria. It does not violate U.S. sanctions law, but
the deal was financed by the Commercial Bank of Syria, which
goes around Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act that forbids
U.S. financial institutions’ ability to work with the CBS.591
February 2010 The IAEA reports that Syria may have been involved in a nu-
clear program at the al-Kibar facility given the level of urani-
um particles found in the soil. Previous reports had declared
that the uranium was not from Syria’s declared inventory.592
February 24, 2010 Clinton tells a Senate committee that the United States was
“asking Syria to move away from Iran.”593
February 25, 2010 Yet the next day, at what is referred to as the “Axis of Evil
Banquet” among Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, Ahmadinejad
and Assad defiantly mock Clinton’s request, saying “there is
no distance between Iran and Syria...”594
Early March 2010 Syria criticizes the Arab League for approving of proximity
talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Syrian of-
ficials argued that the move was a way for the Arab League
to cover for the decision that the PA had already made.595
March 2010 A 2010 Human Rights Watch report condemned U.S. for-
eign policy relations with Syria saying it encouraged bad
behavior on the part of the government: “Talking to Syria
without putting its rights record on the table emboldens the
government to believe that it can do whatever it wants to its
people, without consequence,” and that A message to Syria
that says ‘We only care about your external affairs’ is a green
light for repression.”
March 16, 2010 At Robert Ford’s nomination hearing, the Ambassador-Des-
ignate outlines 5 key issue areas in the U.S.-Syrian bilateral
relationship: 1) Syria’s help in stabilizing Iraq, 2) stability in
Lebanon, 3) Syria’s support for talks with Israel, 4) Syria’s
590
“US embassy cables: Syrian spy chief's surprise appearance at US talks,” The Guardian,
December 6, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250462.
591
592
Ibid.
593
594
Ibid.
595
cooperation with the IAEA, and 5) an improvement in the

human rights situation. Sanctions would not be lifted, Ford
says, if these are not addressed.596 Ford said of Syria: “With-
out significant changes in its policy, Syria will remain on our
list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for the foreseeable future.
And while we and our friends in the region are working to
mitigate Iran’s influence, Syria has helped promote Iran’s
destabilizing policies...I do not think that the Syrians will
change their policies quickly. Finding avenues of coopera-
tion with Syria will be a step-by-step process that will require
patience and steady commitment to our principles.”597
March 31, 2010 Sen. Kerry visits Syria.
Early April 2010 Syria allegedly transfers Scud missiles to Hezbollah, though
Syria denies the accusations.598 The missiles they sent are
thought to have the capability to carry chemical warheads,
though there is no evidence that Hezbollah has chemical
weapons. The State Department says that it condemns the
weapons transfer.599
April 21, 2010 Feltman testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, announc-
ing that the administration plans to send Ambassador Ford
to Damascus upon confirmation from the Senate. Feltman
states, “As we try to minimize the prospects of war and max-
imize the chances for peace in a region where our national
security is defended by American men and women in uni-
form, we have no choice but to use all the tools of statecraft at
our disposal. We simply must make sure that leaders in Syria
and elsewhere understand fully and accurately the position of
the U.S. before they act - this is not something to be left to
rumor, to second- or third-hand knowledge, or to others. This
is our job. To do less amounts to negligence; to unilateral dip-
lomatic disarmament. This is not the option we will pursue.”600
April 22, 2010 Clinton states, “The larger question as to what the United
States will do with respect to Syria is one we've spent a lot of
596
Tabler, “How to React to a Reactor.”
597
598
Mark Landler, “U.S. Speaks to Syrian Envoy of Arms Worries,” The New York Times, April
19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/20syria.html?_r=0.
599
600
Ibid.
time considering and debating inside the administration…

Where we are as of today is that we believe it is important
to continue the process to return an ambassador; this is not
some kind of reward for the Syrians and the actions they
take that are deeply disturbing.”601
September 16, 2010 U.S. Envoy George Mitchell visits Syria again in order to
persuade it to back Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, but the
Golan Heights issue and the seize on the Gaza strip seem to
hamper progress.602
January 16, 2011 The United States appoints an ambassador to Syria after
withdrawing its chief diplomat in 2005 over suspicions of
Syrian involvement in the assassination of Lebanese presi-
dent Rafik Hariri.603
January 31, 2011 In an interview with WSJ, Assad says Syria is immune to the
type of violence shaking North Africa because the regime is
“very closely linked to the beliefs of the people.”604
March 16, 2011 Senator John Kerry makes a statement at the Carnegie En-
dowment, claiming that he believed Assad would reform
and engage more meaningfully with the U.S. and its allies:
“[M]y judgment is that Syria will move; Syria will change,
as it embraces a legitimate relationship with the United
States and the West and economic opportunity that comes
with it and the participation that comes with it."605 By this
point in time, he had met with Assad six times in two years.
Soon after, he makes this statement: "President Assad has
been very generous with me in terms of the discussions we
have had," he said after his March speech. "And when I last
went to – the last several trips to Syria – I asked President
Assad to do certain things to build the relationship with the
601
Ibid.
602
Sarah Birke and Borzou Daragahi, “U.S. envoy Mitchell meets with Syrian president,” Los
Angeles Times, September 17, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/17/world/la-fg-mitch-
ell-syria-20100917.
“First US ambassador for six years takes up post in Syria,” The Guardian, January 16,
603
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/16/new-us-ambassador-syria.
604
“Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” The Wall Street Journal, January 31,
2011, http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894.
605
John Kerry, “Senator John Kerry on U.S Policy Toward the Middle East” (speech at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, March 16, 2011), http://car-
negieendowment.org/files/0317carnegie-johnkerry.pdf. ; Rogin, “Kerry: It’s time to give up on
Assad the reformer.”
United States and sort of show the good faith that would
help us to move the process forward...So my judgment is
that Syria will move; Syria will change, as it embraces a le-
gitimate relationship with the United States and the West
and economic opportunity that comes with it and the par-
ticipation that comes with it."606
March 27, 2011 Sec. Clinton makes comments on “Face the Nation” that
Assad is a reformer, confirming Sen. Kerry’s earlier portrayal
of the U.S. position. Sec. Clinton received a lot of criticism
for her characterization of the Middle East leader.607
March 30, 2011 Assad delivers a speech to the Syrian parliament that puts a nail
in the coffin of “Assad the Reformer.”608 His defiant, conspir-
atorial speech signals to the Obama administration that Assad
may no longer be a man with whom it could negotiate.609
April 8, 2011 Pres. Obama issues a statement condemning the violence
and calling the regime to address the “legitimate aspirations”
of the people.610
April 22, 2011 Pres. Obama issues a statement condemning the violence
at the hand of the regime in Hama. The White House says,
“We call on President Assad to change course now, and heed
the calls of his own people.”611
April 29, 2011 Pres. Obama signs Executive Order 13572 that declares
the regime’s “continuing escalation of violence against the
people” a national emergency.612 It imposes targeted sanc-
tions on individuals and entities such as President Assad’s
brother Maher as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
606
Harriet Alexander, “John Kerry and Bashar al-Assad dined in Damascus,” The Telegraph,
September 3, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10283045/
John-Kerry-and-Bashar-al-Assad-dined-in-Damascus.html.
607
Glenn Kessler, “Hillary Clinton’s uncredible statement on Syria,” The Washington Post,
April 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/hillary-clintons-uncred-
ible-statement-on-syria/2011/04/01/AFWPEYaC_blog.html.
Bashar al-Assad, “Syria: speech by Bashar al-Assad” (speech to the Syrian parliament, Syria,
608
March 30, 2011), http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/syria/bashar_assad_speech_110330.htm.

609
Fred Hof, Interview
610
Barack Obama, “Statement from the President on the Violence in Syria,” Press Release,
April 8, 2011 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2011/04/08/statement-president-violence-syria.
611
Schulman, “A Statement by President Obama on Syria.”
612
“Fact Sheet on Syria,” Press Release, August 18, 2011 (online by the White House Office
of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/fact-sheet-syria.
Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF). The Dept. of Commerce

revokes commercial export licenses pertaining to Syrian
official VIP aircrafts. In her first official comments on the
crisis, Sec. of State Clinton issues a press statement regard-
ing the Human Rights Council’s Special Session on Syria.
She applauds the resolution put forth by the UNHRC
that condemns human rights abuses by the regime and en-
courages the establishment of an urgent investigation into
those abuses.613
May 6, 2011 Sec. Clinton condemns “in the strongest terms” the repres-
sive tactics of the Assad regime and endorses the right of the
Syrian people to exercise the freedom of speech.614
May 10, 2011 Sen. Kerry states that there is no more hope for “Assad the
Reformer”: "He obviously is not a reformer now...I've always
said the top goal of Assad is to perpetuate his own regime."615
May 11, 2011 Syria withdraws its candidacy for the UN Human Rights
Council after aggressive U.S. lobbying to prevent its acces-
sion to the UN body.616
May 18, 2011 Pres. Obama issues Executive Order 13573 that im-
poses targeted sanctions on Assad and other key Syrian
officials for human rights abuses.617 The Dept. of Com-
merce also suspends specific licenses related to Syria’s
Boeing 747 aircrafts.
May 19, 2011 Pres. Obama gives his famous “Middle East Speech” in re-
sponse to developments in the Arab Spring. Pres. Obama
condemns Assad’s violent response, realistically assessing
that “President Assad now has a choice: he can lead that
transition, or get out of the way.”618
May 25, 2011 George Mitchell visits Syria again to demonstrate Pres.
613
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “The Human Rights Council's Special Session on Syria,”
Press Release, April 29, 2011 (online by Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2011/04/162260.htm.
614
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Violence in Syria,” Press Release, May 6, 2011 (online by De-
partment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/05/162843.htm.
615
Rogin, “Kerry: It’s Time to Give up on Assad the Reformer.”
616
617
“Fact Sheet on Syria.”; Arshad Mohammed and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “U.S. imposes
sanctions on Syria's Assad,” Reuters, May 18, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/18/
us-syria-idUSLDE73N02P20110518.
618
Rogin, “Full Text of Obama’s Middle East Speech.”
Obama’s commitment to a comprehensive Middle East

Peace, saying he welcomed “the full cooperation of the Syri-
an Arab Republic in this historic endeavor.” 619
June 15, 2011 The United States and Canada draft a statement signed by
54 UN member states that addresses the deteriorating hu-
man rights situation in Syria and urges the Syrian govern-
ment to allow access to the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights’ fact-finding mission.620
June 20, 2011 Assad gives a speech at Damascus University, Assad blames
the protests on “conspirators” and “takfiri elements” more so
than on the legitimate concerns of the Syrian people.621
July 1, 2011 Sec. Clinton says that there must be a “genuine transition
to democracy” in Syria and that the “Syrian Government
is running out of time” to allow for a more inclusive polit-
ical process.622
July 8, 2011 Ambassador Robert Ford makes his famous trip to Hama,
where protestors view his presence as a force of protection,
sure that the government would not act with him there.623
The Treasury Department issues a warning to U.S. finan-
cial institutions alerting them to the potential for increased
illicit financial activities involving accounts held by or on
behalf of senior political figures in Syria, as a result of the
unrest in Syria.624
July 11, 2011 Sec. Clinton says that Assad has lost legitimacy and that he
should not consider himself “indispensable” to Syria’s future.625
July 15, 2011 Sec. Clinton reiterates that “Assad has lost legitimacy”
and that the U.S. supports a democratic transition in
619
Josef Federman, “George Mitchell In Syria: Obama Determined To See "Truly Com-
prehensive" Mideast Peace,” Huffington Post, August 26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/07/26/george-mitchell-in-syria-_n_245019.html.
620
621
“Highlights: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's speech on unrest,” Reuters, June 20, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-syria-assad-speech-idUSTRE75J1U720110620.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Syria,” Press Release, July 1, 2011 (online by De-
622
partment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/167502.htm.

623
“Robert Ford, U.S. Ambassador To Syria, Causes Controversy With Visit To Hama,” The
Huffington Post, July 8, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/08/robert-ford-us-am-
bassador_n_893522.html.
624
625
“Clinton Says Syria’s Assad 'Not Indispensable.'”
Syria; however the future of Syria lies in the hands of

Syrians themselves.626
July 22, 2011 The State Dept. imposes travel restrictions on the Syrian
Embassy in Washington, D.C., in response to Syrian efforts
to restrict the movement of U.S. diplomats in Damascus.
Syrian diplomats now must request permission prior to leav-
ing Washington, D.C.627
August 10, 2011 U.S. Treasury freezes assets of the Commercial Bank of Syria
as the bank was linked to suspicious weapons deals.628
August 12, 2011 Sec. Clinton says, “There are Syrian opposition figures outside
of Syria and inside. But there’s no address for the opposition.
There is no place for any of us who wish to assist can go.”629
August 18, 2011 Pres. Obama asserts, “The future of Syria must be deter-
mined by its people...Assad must step aside.”630 Addition-
ally, Pres. Obama issues an executive order that imposes the
harshest petroleum sanctions the government had taken
thus far. Targeted sanctions have been imposed on 32 Syrian
and Iranian individuals.631
August 23, 2011 Sec. Clinton congratulates the Human Rights Council
for the establishment of an independent Commission of
Inquiry to investigate human rights abuses in Syria. She
echoes Pres. Obama’s call for Assad to step aside “for the
sake of the Syrian people.”632
October 5, 2011 Amb. Susan Rice storms out of a UN Security Council
meeting after China and Russia exercise a double veto, the
first since 2008, to turn down a resolution that would con-
626
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Libya and Syria,” Press Release, July 15, 2011(online
by Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168656.htm.
627
628
Jeff Bliss, “U.S. Treasury to Freeze Assets of Syrian Bank,” Bloomberg, August 10, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-10/u-s-treasury-to-freeze-assets-of-syrian-bank.html.
629
“Hillary Clinton urges countries to cut energy, arms ties with Syria,”Al Arabiya News, Au-
gust 12, 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/12/161919.html.
630
Barack Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria,” Press Release,
August 18, 2011 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria.
631
632
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “The Human Rights Council's Special Session on Syria,” Press
Release, April 23, 2011 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2011/08/170949.htm.
demn Assad’s violence in Syria.633

October 24, 2011 U.S. withdraws Ambassador Robert Ford from Syria due to
security concerns.634
November 12, 2011 Sec. Clinton says that the Arab League’s decision to suspend
Syria demonstrates that “the international pressure will con-
tinue to build until the brutal Assad regime heeds the calls
of its own people.”635
December 2, 2011 In a press statement, Sec. Clinton lauds the work by the
Human Rights Council to further the isolation of the Syrian
government and draw attention to its abuses by endorsing a
report issued by the independent International Commission
of Inquiry on Syria.636 VP Biden visits neighboring Turkey
to discuss options on Syria and Iran.637
December 6, 2011 At a meeting with the Syrian National Council in Geneva,
Sec. Clinton emphasizes the importance of creating an in-
clusive, post-Assad Syrian government.638
January 30, 2012 Sec. Clinton condemns the sharp escalation in regime bru-
tality against its people and encourages the UNSC to make
clear the threat that the Syrian regime poses to international
peace and security.639
January 31, 2012 Sec. Clinton speaks at the UN confirming U.S. commitment
633
Daniel Miller, “'They'd rather sell arms than stand with the Syrian people': U.S. envoy
storms out after Russia and China veto U.N resolution,” Daily Mail, October 5, 2011, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2045442/US-envoy-Susan-Rice-storms-Russia-China-veto-
UN-resolution.html.
634
MacAskill, “US pulls ambassador Robert Ford out of Syria over security concerns.”
635
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Arab League Suspends Syria,” Remarks, November 12,
2011 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2011/11/177044.htm.
636
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “The Human Rights Council's Special Session on Syria,” Re-
marks, December 2, 2011 (online by U.S. Department of State) http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2011/12/178137.htm.
637
Mark Landler, “In Turkey, Biden Talks About Iran and Syria,” The New York Times, De-
cember 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/world/middleeast/biden-confers-with-
turkish-leaders-about-syria-and-iran.html?_r=0.
638
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at Meeting with Syrian National Council,” Re-
marks, December 6, 2011(online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2011/12/178332.htm.
639
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Sharp Escalation of Regime Violence in Syria,” Press Re-
lease, January 30, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/182720.htm.
to reaching a resolution on ending the conflict in Syria and

lauding the Arab League for its involvement and support.640
She also calls Libya a “false analogy” for UNSC involvement.641
February 4, 2012 Pres. Obama issues a statement commemorating the thir-
ty-year anniversary of the Hama Massacre and condemning
the ongoing violence under the Assad regime.642
February 5, 2012 Russia and China veto a UN Security Council Resolution
that would have formally condemned Assad for the violence
in Syria. Amb. Susan Rice deems the double veto “outra-
geous” and disgusting.643
February 8, 2012 Sens. John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and Joe Lieberman
issue a statement declaring that the Obama administration
should consider providing arms to the Syrian opposition.644
February 6, 2012 U.S. Embassy in Damascus suspends operations.645
February 24, 2012 In Tunis, at the first-ever Friend of Syrian People meet-
ing, Sec. Clinton echoes the Arab League’s demand for a
halt to violence against civilians, calls for the negotiated
political solution to the crisis, and confirms U.S. commit-
ment to the sovereignty of Syria.646 She also calls Russia
and China’s repeated use of the veto power in the UNSC
640
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks Following UNSC Meeting on Syria,” Remarks,
January 31, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/182848.htm.
641
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at a United Nations Security Council Session on the
Situation in Syria,” Remarks, January 31, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/182845.htm.
642
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” Press Release, February 4, 2012
643
“Syria Veto 'Outrageous' Says U.N. Envoy Susan Rice,” NPR, February 5, 2012, http://
www.npr.org/2012/02/05/146424981/un-ambassador-susan-rice-fumes-at-syria-veto.
644
“Graham, McCain, Lieberman Statement on Syria.”
645
Att Spetalnick and Andrew Quinn, “U.S. closes embassy in Syria, vows further pres-
sure,” Reuters, February 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/us-syria-usa-embas-
sy-idUSTRE81512C20120206.
646
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Intervention at the Friends of Syrian People Meeting,” Press
Release, February 24, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184606.htm.
“despicable” when people are being murdered.647

February 26, 2012 In an interview with CBS in Rabat, Sec. Clinton made com-
ments backpedalling slightly on U.S. involvement in Syria,
asking “I’m wondering is what about the people in Damascus,
what about the people in Aleppo? Don’t they know that their
fellow Syrian men, women, and children are being slaughtered
by their government?…When are they going to start pulling the
props out from under this illegitimate regime?” In an answer to
a question as to when the threshold for violence will warrant
international intervention, Sec. Clinton responded, “If you take
just a moment to imagine all the terrible conflicts that go on in
the world, we have seen in the last 15 years millions of people
killed in the Eastern Congo in the most brutal, terrible, despi-
cable ways. It wasn’t on TV. There were no Skype-ing from the
jungles that were the killing fields. And I could point to many
other places where governments oppress people, where govern-
ments are turning against their own people. And you have to be
very clear-eyed about what is possible and what the consequenc-
es of anything you might wish to do could be. I am incredibly
sympathetic to the calls that somebody do something. But it is
also important to stop and ask what that is and who’s going to
do it and how capable anybody is of doing it. And I like to get
to the second, third, and fourth order questions, and those are
very difficult ones.”648
March 29, 2012 Congress passes the National Defense Authorization Act
for 2013. Among other things, the act requires the Secre-
tary of Defense to report to the defense and appropriations
committees identifying the limited military activities that
could deny or significantly degrade the ability of President
Bashar al-Assad of Syria and forces loyal to him to use air
power against civilians and opposition groups in Syria. It
also requires the Secretary to report to the defense and for-
eign relations committees on military assistance provided
to Syria by the Russian Federation. The President signs it
into effect on January 2, 2013.649
647
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “the Meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People Press Availability
on the Meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People,” Press Release, February 24, 2012 (online by U.S.
Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184635.htm.
648
Hillary Rodham Clinton, interview by Wyatt Andrews, CBS, February 26, 2012, http://
649
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, HR 4310, 112th Congress, 2013,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4310.
March 23, 2012 Syrians currently residing in the U.S. are granted Temporary
Protected Status by Sec. of Homeland Security Janet Napol-
itano.
April 1, 2012 Friends of Syria Group meets for the second time.650 Sec.
Clinton makes a statement in Istanbul that the U.S. has
“ratcheted up” its involvement in the crisis by introducing
new sanctions on the regime, working with international
partners to establish accountability measures, and increas-
ing its humanitarian support, announcing an additional $12
million, bringing the U.S. contribution to $25 million.651
April 19, 2012 Sec. Clinton makes remarks in Paris at the Ad Hoc Minis-
terial Meeting on Syria supporting the monitoring mission
and demanding a tougher stance on Assad, suggesting a
move toward Chapter 7 UN sanctions resolution.652 Sec. of
Defense Panetta makes a statement before the House Armed
Services Committee on Syria.653 He outlines first the U.S.
approach to Syria then draws analogies to the intervention
in Libya to demonstrate the utility of this approach.
June 1, 2012 Sec. Clinton lauds the UN Human Rights Council’s adop-
tion of a resolution that calls for an investigation of the mas-
sacre in Houla the week prior. She repeats the call for Assad
to step aside.654
June 6, 2012 Sec. of Treasury Tim Geithner speaks to the Friends of the
Syrian People Sanctions Working Group endorsing sanctions
650
“The Second Conference of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People will take place in İs-
tanbul,” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-con-
ference-of-the-group-of-friends-of-the-syrian-people-will-take-place-in-istanbul.en.mfa.
651
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Intervention to the Friends of the Syrian People,” Re-
marks, April 1, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/187295.htm.
652
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Ad Hoc Ministerial Meeting on Syria,” Re-
marks, April 19, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188147.htm.
653
Leon E. Panetta, Testimony on Syria before the House Armed Services Committee,
Hearing, April 19, 2012, Available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?-
SpeechID=1663.
654
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “The Human Rights Council's Special Session on Syria,” Press
Release, June 1, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/191673.htm.
and commending nations on their progress so far.655 Clinton

issues a press statement on behalf of Working Group that
sanctions are working in putting pressure on Syrian officials
for their human rights abuses.656
June 24, 2012 Sec. Clinton reaffirms strong U.S. support for its Turkish
ally after the Syrian shoot down of a Turkish plane.657
June 30, 2012 Following a meeting of the Action Group on Syria in Gene-
va, Sec. Clinton announces U.S. support of Special Envoy
Kofi Annan’s six-point plan for a Syrian-led transition to de-
mocracy. She also makes comments regarding Russian and
Chinese changes to the original document.658
July 6, 2012 Sec. Clinton makes remarks during Friends of the Syria
Ministerial Meeting in Paris lauding the Geneva meeting of
the five permanent UNSC members and the Arab League
in support of the transition.659 Sec. Clinton also makes
comments after the meeting announcing the creation of a
plan for an inclusive, Syrian-led, democratic transition and
recognizing the challenges of implementing it. In addition
to reiterating U.S. commitment to sanctions and commu-
nication with the opposition, Sec. Clinton announces that
the United States is pursuing a UNSC resolution that would
impose sanctions under Chapter 7.660
655
Tim Geithner, “Remarks by Secretary Tim Geithner before the Friends of the Syrian People,
International Working Group on Sanctions,” Press Release, June 6, 2012 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1602.aspx.
656
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Friends of the Syrian People Sanctions Working Group,” Press
Release, June 6, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/191874.htm.
657
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Syrian Shoot-Down of Turkish Aircraft,” Remarks, June 24,
2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2012/06/193962.htm.
658
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Press Availability Following the Meeting of the Action Group
on Syria,” Remarks, June 30, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/194328.htm.
659
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Friends of the Syrian People Ministerial
Meeting,” Remarks, July 6, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/194628.htm; “'Friends of Syria' push for tougher sanc-
tions,” France 24, July 7, 2012, http://www.france24.com/en/20120706-diplomacy-friends-syria-
sanctions-transition-plan-assad-paris-usa-un-arab/.
660
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Press Availability Following the Friends of the Syrian People
Ministerial Meeting,” Press Release, July 6, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://
August 2, 2012 Sec. Clinton thanks Special Envoy Kofi Annan for his ser-
vice upon news of his resignation and confirms U.S. com-
mitment to the transition framework he envisioned.661
August 11, 2012 Sec. of State Clinton says from Istanbul that has been made
clear to the Assad regime the use of chemical weapons is a “red
line for the world.”662 The the first use of the “red line” language
by an administration official was first used in July 2012.663
August 17, 2012 Sec. Clinton welcomes Lakhdar Brahimi’s appointment as
Joint Special Representative for Syria.664
August 20, 2012 In a press conference, Pres. Obama states, “We have been
very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on
the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole
bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being uti-
lized. That would change my calculus. That would change
my equation."665
September 13, 2012 U.S. Treasury designates Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah
and other Hezbollah figures as targets for financial sanctions.666
September 28, 2012 Sec. of Defense Leon Panetta says most caches of Syrian
chemical weapons are secure, but there are a few that can-
not be accounted for by U.S. intelligence.667 Sec. Clin-
661
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Resignation of Kofi Annan as Joint Special Envoy for Syria,”
Press Release, August 2, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/196017.htm.
662
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Syria: Questions and Answers Session,” Re-
marks, August 11, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/196394.htm; “Hillary Clinton on Syria: use of chemical weapons
is a red line – video,” The Guardian, August 11, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
video/2012/aug/11/hillary-clinton-syria-chemical-weapons-video.
663
fense News, July 13, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117118.
664
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Appointment of Lakhdar Brahimi as Joint Special Representa-
tive for Syria,” Press Release, August 17, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.
state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/196676.htm.
665
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” Press Re-
lease, August 20, 2012 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.
666
Terry Atlas, “Hezbollah Chief Designated for U.S. Sanctions for Syria,” Bloomberg, Sep-
tember 13, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-13/hezbollah-chief-designated-for-
u-s-sanctions-for-syria.html.
667
Lolita Baldor, “Syria Chemical Weapons Moved, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta Says,”
The Huffington Post, September 28, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/28/syr-
ia-chemical-weapons-moved-panetta_n_1923159.html.
ton makes remarks at the Ad Hoc Friends of the Syrian

People Ministerial in New York in which she announces
an additional $30 million in humanitarian aid from the
U.S., bringing the total U.S. contribution to $130 mil-
lion. She also announces an additional $15 million for
nonlethal aid, bringing support for the unarmed opposi-
tion to $45 million.668
November 11, 2012 The United States issues a press statement congratulating
representatives for forming the coalition but stopped short
of recognizing the Coalition as a “government in exile” de-
spite having spearheaded efforts to unite the opposition.669
December 3, 2012 The President again warns Assad over chemical weapons
at the National Defense University: "If you make the trag-
ic mistake of using these weapons, there where be conse-
quences, and you will be held accountable," Pres. Obama
says.670 On the same day, Sec. Clinton assures reporters
that the U.S. is "planning to take action" if Assad's regime
launches a chemical attack.671
December 11, 2012 The U.S. joins fellow members of the Friends of Syria Group
at its fourth conference in Morocco in recognizing the Syri-
an National Coalition as the sole legitimate representative of
the Syrian people.672
January 29, 2013 Pres. Obama announces the delivery of $155 million
668
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Ad Hoc Friends of the Syrian People Ministe-
rial,” Press Release, September 28, 2012 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.
gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/198455.htm.
669
“US declares support for united Syrian opposition,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 5, 2015,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-declares-support-for-united-syrian-opposition.aspx?Page-
ID=238&NID=34455&NewsCatID=359; “National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=50628.
670
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Re-
duction Symposium,” Press Release, December 3, 2012 (online by the White House Office of
the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/remarks-presi-
dent-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium.
671
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Video Remarks on Syria,” Remarks, December 3, 2012
(online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2012/12/199997.htm.
672
“'Friends of Syria' recognise opposition,” Al Jazeera, December 12, 2012, http://www.al-
jazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212124541767116.html; “US recognises Syria oppo-
sition coalition says Obama,” BBC News, December 12, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-20690148.
in humanitarian aid to Syria, bringing total U.S. aid to

$365 million.673
February 2, 2013 VP Biden calls Assad a “tyrant hell bent on clinging to pow-
er...and he must go.”674
February 7, 2013 Sec. of Defense Leon Panetta and JCS Chairman Dempsey
tell a congressional panel that they agree with preliminary
plans drafted by Sec. Clinton and CIA Director Petraeus to
provide arms to rebel groups.675 In doing so, Sec. Panetta is
the first Western senior official to publicly support arming
rebels against Assad.
February 28, 2013 Sec. Kerry makes a speech from Rome at the Friends of Syria
Meeting communicating that the U.S. believes the “best solu-
tion for Syria is a political solution.”676 He also announces the
donation of $60 million in nonlethal assistance.677
April 25, 2013 U.S. and Britain demand an investigation into reports of
governmental chemical weapons use.678
April 11, 2013 In a presidential memorandum, Pres. Obama authorizes
the drawdown of up to $10 million in the resources of
“any agency” at the discretion of the Sec. of State and
Congress so that the money may be provided as foreign
assistance to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Su-
673
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President Announcing $155 Million in Additional Hu-
manitarian Assistance for the Syrian People,” Press Release, January 29, 2013 (online by the White
House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/
president-obama-announces-155-million-additional-humanitarian-aid-syrian.
674
Patrick Donahue and Jonathan Tirone, “Biden Says Syria’s Assad ‘Hellbent’ on Power,
Must Go,” Bloomberg, February 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-01/syrian-
opposition-may-seek-no-fly-zone-as-envoy-tells-un-to-lead.html.
675
Jon Swaine, “Leon Panetta supports Hillary Clinton plan to arm Syrian rebels,”
The Telegraph, February 7, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
syria/9856382/Leon-Panetta-supports-Hillary-Clinton-plan-to-arm-Syrian-rebels.html.
676
John Kerry, “Press Availability on Syria,” Remarks, February 28, 2013 (online by U.S. De-
partment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/02/205435.htm; Michael Ma-
inville and Nicolas Revise, “US set to boost support for Syria opposition,” Middle East Online,
February 28, 2013, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=57241.
677
John Kerry, “Remarks With Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Terzi and Syrian Opposition
Council Chairman Moaz al-Khatib,” Remarks, February 28, 2013 (online by U.S. Department of
State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/02/205457.htm.
678
Michael Eisenstadt, “Investigating Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Syria: Technical and
Political Challenges,” The Washington Institute, Policywatch 2072, April 26, 2013, http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/investigating-alleged-chemical-weapons-use-in-syr-
ia-technical-and-political.
preme Military Command.679

April 17, 2013 Sec. Kerry issues a press statement commemorating Syria
National Day and extending his sympathies for the Syrians
who struggle against Assad.680 Sec. Hagel speaks at the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee hearing advocating strongly
for a political solution though he notes the military has pre-
pared contingency plans. He states, “Military intervention is
always an option...but one of last resort.”681
April 21, 2013 Sec. Kerry makes remarks with FM Ahmet Davutoğlu and
Etilaf (SNC) Pres. Moaz al-Khatib after a meeting of the
Friends of Syria in Istanbul laying out the opposition’s vi-
sion for Syria’s future.682 Sec. Kerry outlines key concerns in
Syria: “chemical weapons; the slaughter of people by ballistic
missiles and other weapons of huge destruction; the poten-
tial for the whole country...breaking up into enclaves; [and
the] potential of sectarian violence.”
April 25, 2013 The White House issues a letter to Congress stating that
U.S. intelligence had reports that Assad had used chemi-
cal weapons twice so far against his own people, but reports
were not solid enough to warrant U.S. involvement in the
conflict.683 Sec. Hagel reiterates these suspicions and says
that the U.S. has an “obligation to investigate.”684
May 1, 2012 Pres. Obama issues the executive order, “Prohibiting Certain
Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United
States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with respect to Iran and
679
Barack Obama, “Presidential Memorandum -- Presidential Determination on Syria Draw-
down,” Memorandum for the Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, April 11, 2013 (on-
line by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2013/04/11/presidential-memorandum-presidential-determination-syria-drawdown.
680
John Kerry, “Syria National Day Message,” Press Release, April 17, 2013 (online by U.S.
681
Chuck Hagel, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, April 17,
2013, Available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1771.
682
John Kerry, “Remarks With Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Syrian Op-
position Coalition President Moaz al-Khatib,” Remarks, April 21, 2013 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207811.htm; Tulin Daloglu,
“Friends of Syria Deliver Nothing New,” Al Monitor’s Turkey Pulse, April 21, 2013, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/syrian-opposition-radical-elements-wester-arms.html.
683
Welker, Miklaszewski, Kube and Connor, “White House: US believes Syrian regime used
chemical weapons.”
684
Chuck Hagel, “Statement on Syria,” Press Release, April 25, 2013 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1773.
Syria.” This order tightens sanctions on Iran and Syria.685

May 2, 2013 Sec. Defense Chuck Hagel confirms that the Obama admin-
istration is reconsidering arming the rebels as a legitimate
policy option.686
May 9, 2013 Sec. Kerry announces an additional $100 million in human-
itarian aid, bringing U.S. donations to $510 million.687 Sec.
Hagel makes comments on Syria at the Washington Insti-
tute for Near Eastern Policy.688
May 22, 2013 Friends of Syria Group met again today in Amman amid the
escalating conflict to encourage opposition leaders to agree
to meet with the regime in the Geneva II Accords.689
June 12, 2013 U.S. Departments of State, Commerce and Treasury ease
sanctions in Syrian opposition-held areas.690
June 13, 2013 Pres. Obama authorizes providing weapons to the Syrian op-
position because the administration claims it has conclusive
evidence that Assad used weapons on a small scale against
his own people.691
June 17, 2013 At a G8 Summit in Northern Ireland, Pres. Obama an-
nounces an additional $300 million in humanitarian aid,
685
“Fact Sheet: New Executive Order Targeting Foreign Sanctions Evaders,” Press Release,
May 1, 2012 (Online by U.S. Department of the Treasury), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1558.aspx.
686
Lolita Baldor, “Hagel: US rethinking possibly arming rebels,” U.S. News, May 2, 2013,
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/05/02/hagel-us-rethinking-possibly-arm-
ing-rebels.
Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, “U.S. To Provide $100 Million In New Syria Aid For
687
Humanitarian Purposes Only,” The Huffington Post, May 8, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.

com/2013/05/08/us-syria-aid-humanitarian_n_3237964.html.
688
Chuck Hagel, “Washington Institute for Near East Policy Soref Symposium,” Speech,
May 9, 2013 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.
aspx?SpeechID=1777.
689
“Friends of Syria meet as conflict escalates,” The Daily Star, May 22, 2013, http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/May-22/217973-friends-of-syria-meet-as-conflict-es-
calates.ashx.
690
“Sanctions Eased for Syrian Opposition,” Media Note, June 12, 2013 (online by the
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2013/06/210577.htm.
691
Lee and Julie Pace, “Obama Authorizes Sending Weapons To Syrian Rebels”; “State-
ment by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian
Chemical Weapons Use,” Press Release, June 13, 2013 (online by the White House Office of the
Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-na-
tional-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-.
bringing the U.S. total to $815 million.692

June 22, 2013 Friends of Syria Group meets in Doha to discuss arming
rebels.693
June 26, 2013 Amb. Rice, in her last comments as U.S. ambassador to the
UN, calls inaction on Syria “a stain” on the Security Coun-
cil’s reputation: “The council's inaction on Syria is a moral
and strategic disgrace that history will judge harshly.”694
August 26, 2013 Sec. Kerry makes remarks to the press condemning the at-
tacks in Ghouta and confirming U.S. consultation with al-
lies and consideration of policy options.695
August 29, 2013 VP Biden demonstrated his resolve against the military op-
tion by saying that if Pres. Obama led an intervention in
Syria without Congressional authorization, he would move
to impeach him.696
August 30, 2013 The Obama administration declares “with high confidence”
that the Assad regime carried out the chemical attacks in
Ghouta.697 Sec. Kerry says that the U.S. is weighing options
while it is in communication with the UN, U.S. allies, and
“the American people.”698
August 31, 2013 In a press conference, Pres. Obama publicly opts for a tar-
geted military strike against the Assad regime in response to
the chemical attack and announces that he will seek Con-
692
“FACT SHEET: President Obama Increases Humanitarian Assistance to Syrians,” Press
Release, June 17, 2013 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-president-obama-increases-humanitari-
an-assistance-syrians.
“'Friends of Syria' debate arming rebels,” Al Jazeera, June 22, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.
693
com/news/middleeast/2013/06/201362263944556379.html.
694
“Susan Rice: Syria inaction a 'stain' on security council,” BBC News, June 26, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23057745.
695
John Kerry, “Remarks on Syria,” Remarks, August 26, 2013 (online by U.S. Department
of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213503.htm.
696
Conor Friedersdorf, “Joe Biden's Case That Waging War Without Congress Is an Im-
peachable Offense,” The Atlantic, August 29, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2013/08/joe-bidens-case-that-waging-war-without-congress-is-an-impeachable-of-
fense/279160/.
697
“Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on Au-
gust 21, 2013.”
698
John Kerry, “Statement on Syria,” Press Release, August 30, 2013 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213668.htm.
gressional authorization for the use of force.699

September 3, 2013 following his announcement, Pres. Obama meets with Con-
gressional leaders at the White House to discuss the use of
force.700 Sec. Kerry, Sec. Hagel, and Gen. Dempsey testify
at the Senate Foreign Relations committee about the pos-
sible authorization of U.S. military action against the Syr-
ian government.701 Sec. Hagel comments, “A refusal to act
would undermine the credibility of America’s other security
commitments – including the President’s commitment to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The word of
the United States must mean something.”702
September 4, 2013 Pres. Obama insists that the U.S. “did not set a red line; the
world set a red line.”703 Sec. Kerry reiterates this sentiment
almost verbatim in his testimony before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.704
September 6, 2013 U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Sa-
mantha Power discussed the Assad regime’s use of chemical
weapons against Syrian civilians and the need for a limit-
ed military response.705 Also, the president issues a joint
statement on Syria with ten other nations condemning the
Ghouta attack and repeating its support of non-prolifera-
699
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” Press Release, August 31, 2013
700
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President Before Meeting with Members of Congress
on the Situation in Syria,” Press Release, September 3, 2013 (online by the White House Office
of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/03/remarks-pres-
ident-meeting-members-congress-situation-syria; Megan Slacks, “President Obama Meets with
Congressional Leaders on Syria,” The White House Blog, September 3, 2013, http://www.white-
house.gov/blog/2013/09/03/president-obama-meets-congressional-leaders-syria.
701
“FULL TRANSCRIPT: Kerry, Hagel and Dempsey testify at Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on Syria.”
702
Chuck Hagel, Statement on Syria before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
703
Robert, “Obama seeks global backing on Syria: 'I didn't set a red line. The world did.'”
704
John Kerry, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Syria: Weighing the
Obama Administration's Response, Hearing, September 4, 2013, Available online at: http://www.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213787.htm.
705
Samantha Powers, “Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Represen-
tative to the United Nations, on Syria at the Center for American Progress, Washington D.C.,”
Statement, September 6, 2013 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.
gov/briefing/statements/213901.htm.
tion.706 By September 9th, thirty-seven more countries join

in supporting the statement.707 Sec. Kerry publishes an op-
ed in The Huffington Post in which he advocates for limited
military action in Syria as someone who is “informed, not
imprisoned” by the military analogies of Vietnam and Iraq.708
September 7, 2013 In his weekly address, President Obama makes the case for
limited and targeted military action to hold the Assad re-
gime accountable for its violation of international norms
prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.709
September 9, 2013 Pres. Obama continues his support for the limited military
strike.710 Ambassador Rice lays out the case for the damage
that would be done to our national security and that of our
partners and allies should we fail to respond to enforce the
longstanding international norm against the use of chemical
weapons.711 Former Sec. of State Clinton also agrees with
the President’s remarks, stating that she would “continue to
support his efforts, and I hope the Congress will as well.”712
September 10, 2013 In response to the Ghouta chemical attacks, Pres. Obama
gives a speech in which he favors a Russian-brokered diplo-
matic solution over a military option in response for Syria
706
“Joint Statement on Syria,” Press Release, September 6, 2013 (online by the White House
Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/06/joint-
statement-syria.
707
“Statement on Additional Countries in Support of September 6 Joint Statement on Syria,”
Press Release, September9, 2013 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/09/statement-additional-countries-sup-
port-september-6-joint-statement-syria.
708
John Kerry, “A Yes Vote of Conscience for the World's Red Line,” The Huffington
Post, September 6, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnkerry/syria-red-line-vote-con-
science_b_3879304.html.
709
Barack Obama, “Weekly Address: Calling for Limited Military Action in Syria,” Press Re-
lease, September 7, 2013 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/07/weekly-address-calling-limited-military-action-syria.
710
Alicia Oken, “Weekly Wrap Up: Syria and the G-20,” The White House Blog, September 6,
2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/09/06/weekly-wrap-9613-situation-syria.
711
Caitlin Hayden, “National Security Advisor Susan Rice Speaks on Syria,” The White House
Blog, September 9, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/09/09/national-security-advi-
sor-susan-rice-speaks-syria.
712
Hillary Clinton, “Former Secretary of State Clinton's Statement on Syria,” Speech, Sep-
tember 9, 2013 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.white-
house.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/09/09/former-secretary-state-clintons-statement-syria.
crossing the “red line.”713 The President asks Congress to hold

off on the vote while the first round of diplomatic engagement
played out.714 Sec. Kerry, Sec. Hagel, and Gen. Dempsey visit
the House Armed Services Committee advocating the Gene-
va II process and asserting that the timeline for handing over
chemical weapons “cannot be a delaying tactic.”715 Sec. Hagel
concurs with Sec. Kerry in his testimony before the House
committee and outlines reason for U.S. action.716 Sec. Kerry
also gives an interview regarding U.S. options on Syria, reit-
erating his views from the House committee hearing.717
September 14, 2013 In his weekly address, Pres. Obama says there is the possibil-
ity for a diplomatic solution in Syria, partially because of the
“credible threat of U.S. military force.”718 The White House
issues a statement applauding the progress made with Russia
on the agreement on the Framework for the Elimination of
Syrian Chemical Weapons.719
September 15, 2013 VP Biden receives criticism for using Pres. Obama’s negoti-
ated political solution with Russia and Syrian officials as a
“victory lap” for the administration in one of the U.S.’s most
important caucus states.720
713
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria,” Press Re-
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria.
714
Jeff Zeleny and Arlette Saenz, “Obama Asks Congress to Delay Vote on Syria,” ABC News,
September 10, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/obama-asks-congress-to-de-
lay-vote-on-syria/.
715
John Kerry, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Proposed Authoriza-
tion to Use Military Force in Syria, Hearing, September 10, 2013, Available online at: http://www.
716
Chuck Hagel, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Proposed Autho-
rization to Use Military Force in Syria, Hearing, September 10, 2013, Available online at: http://
www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1803.
717
John Kerry, interview by Lara Setrakian, Syria Deeply, September 10, 2013, http://www.
718
Barack Obama, “Weekly Address: Pursuing a Diplomatic Solution in Syria,” Press Re-
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/14/weekly-address-pursuing-diplomatic-solution-syria.
719
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on U.S.-Russian Agreement on Frame-
work for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” Press Release, September 14, 2013 (on-
office/2013/09/14/statement-president-us-russian-agreement-framework-elimination-syrian-ch.
720
Burns, “Joe Biden credits Obama on Syria.”
September 19, 2013 Sec. Kerry states that the UN Sellstrom Report on Syria’s
chemical weapon use confirms and strengthens the U.S. re-
port issued weeks before, emphasizing the need for interna-
tional action against the Assad regime.721
September 24, 2013 Pres. Obama announces that the U.S. will provide $339
million in additional humanitarian aid, bringing the total
aid given by this point to $1.4 billion. Sec. Kerry holds a
meeting with SNC Chairman Jarba.
September 26, 2013 At the Friends of the Syrian People Ministerial, Sec. Kerry
reiterates U.S. commitment to the diplomatic process and
thanks the Syrian opposition for agreeing to participate in
Geneva II.722
September 27, 2013 UN Security Council Resolution 2118 is passed demanding
that Syria remove its chemical weapons in accordance with
the OPCW’s framework.723
October 22, 2013 UK FM Hague speaks on behalf of the Friends of Syria after
meeting of core group in London endorsing the Geneva process
and reiterating that there is no place for Assad in Syria’s future.724
October 31, 2013 In a press statement, Sec. Kerry applauds the completion of
the first milestone in eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons
and states that the U.S. will show its continued financial and
political support for the mission.725
November 25, 2013 Sec. Kerry issues a press statement thanking Special Rep-
resentative Brahimi for his agreement to participate in the
Geneva talks and underscoring the importance of a diplo-
matic solution.726
721
John Kerry, “Remarks to the Press on Syria,” Press Release, September 19, 2013 (online by
U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214441.htm.
722
John Kerry, “Remarks at the Friends of the Syrian People Ministerial,” Press Release,
September 26, 2013 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2013/09/214830.htm.
723
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118, September 27, 2013, Available online
at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2118.
724
William Hague, “‘London 11’ meeting on Syria,” Press Release, October 22, 2013 (online
by the U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-
11-meeting-on-syria.
725
John Kerry, “Progress Eliminating Syria's Chemical Weapons Program,” Press Release,
October 31, 2013 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2013/10/216143.htm.
John Kerry, “Geneva Conference on Syria,” Press Release, November 25, 2013 (online by
726

December 11, 2013 U.S. and Britain suspend non-lethal aid after a raid on a Free
Syrian Army warehouse by the Islamic Front.727
January 23, 2014 Kerry promises protection to Syrian minorities if they
abandon Assad, not by American troops but by the many
other countries “who would be willing” to go there as
peacekeepers.728
January 27, 2014 Congress discretely approves light weapons to flow to “mod-
erate” rebels.729
January 28, 2014 News of Congress’ approval of lethal aid disrupts Geneva
II talks.730
January 30, 2014 State Dept. Spokesperson Jen Psaki accuses Syria of “drag-
ging its feet” on the removal of chemical weapons. Sec. Ha-
gel echoes this disenchantment with the regime, stating, “I
do not know what the Syrian government’s motives are — if
this is incompetence — or why they are behind in deliver-
ing these materials.”731
January 31, 2014 Sec. Kerry warns Assad that it could face UNSC punish-
ment for failure to comply with the chemical weapons re-
moval framework.732 “Friends of Syria,” which includes the
U.S., blames the failure of Geneva II on Assad’s unwilling-
ness to negotiate.733
February 1, 2014 Jen Psaki denies Syrian FM al Moualem’s claim that the U.S.
sought direct negotiations with the Syrian regime, circum-
727
“US and UK suspend non-lethal aid for Syria rebels,” BBC News, December 11, 2013,
728
Julian Pecquet, “Kerry promises protection for Syrian minorities,” The Hill, January 23, 2014,
http://thehill.com/policy/international/196269-kerry-promises-protection-for-syrian-minorities.
729
Mark Hosenball, “Congress secretly approves U.S. weapons flow to 'moderate' Syrian
rebels,” Reuters, January 27, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-usa-syria-reb-
els-idUSBREA0Q1S320140127.
730
Anne Barnard and Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Syrian Talks Disrupted by Congress’s Approval
of Aid to Rebels,” The New York Times, January 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/
world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=0.
731
“U.S. accuses Syria of ‘dragging its feet’ on chemical weapons,” Raw Story, January 30, 2014,
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/01/u-s-accuses-syria-of-dragging-its-feet-on-chemical-weapons/.
732
Paul Richter, “Kerry warns Syria of possible U.N. action over chemical arms delay,” Los
Angeles Times, January 31, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-kerry-syria-
chemical-arms-20140131-story.html.
733
Khaled Oweis, “'Friends of Syria' blame Assad for holding up peace talks,” Reuters, Jan-
uary 31, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/us-syria-crisis-talks-friends-idUS-
BREA0U18E20140131.
venting UN intermediaries.734
February 4, 2014 During a hearing before the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, Mr. Clapper said that Mr. Assad had grown stronger
over the past year “by virtue of his agreement to remove the
chemical weapons.” This NYTimes article also notes that
though Pres. Obama claimed “Assad must go” in mid-2011,
this language has dropped from his recent statements.735
February 6, 2014 U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power questions the
sincerity of Assad regime’s intentions in releasing civilians
trapped in Homs after UN-encouraged deal.736
February 7, 2014 Sec. of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson says Syria becoming
a greater threat to U.S. security due to threat that jihadis will
return to the U.S. to launch attacks.737
February 11, 2014 Pres. Obama reiterates that there is “no military solution in
Syria” but that peace talks are stalling.738
February 14, 2014 Given the failure of Geneva II, Pres. Obama again opens up
to suggestions of policy options, but few seem forthcoming.739
February 15, 2014 Pres. Obama threatens to “apply more pressure” to the Assad
regime after Geneva talks end fruitless.740
February 16, 2014 Sec. Kerry issues a statement blaming the stalled Geneva
negotiations on the Syrian regime but ensures that the U.S.
734
“U.S. denies it sought direct negotiations with Syria in Geneva,” Reuters, February 1, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/02/us-syria-crisis-talks-idUSBREA0T0W420140202.
735
Gordon and Mazzetti, “U.S. Spy Chief Says Assad Has Strengthened His Hold on Power.”
736
Erika Solomon and Michelle Nichols, “U.N. welcomes reported Homs humanitarian
deal, U.S. skeptical,” Reuters, February 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/
us-syria-crisis-idUSBREA151E020140206.
737
“Homeland Security Secretary: Syria Conflict a Threat to U.S.,” CBS News, February 7,
2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/homeland-security-secretary-syria-conflict-a-threat-to-unit-
ed-states/.
738
“Obama: Right Now No Military Solution in Syria,” News Conference, February 11,
2014 (online by Bloomberg TV), http://www.bloomberg.com/video/obama-right-now-no-mili-
tary-solution-in-syria-oJtwI5SOSdWLyb4CUgM_ag.html.
739
“Kerry says Obama seeks Syria options, none presented yet,” Reuters, February 14, 2014, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/14/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSBREA1D0NC20140214?utm_
source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=Mid-
east%20Brief%202-14-2014.
740
Richard Spencer, “Syria: Barack Obama threatens to 'apply more pressure' on Assad re-
gime,” The Telegraph, February 15, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
syria/10640895/Syria-Barack-Obama-threatens-to-apply-more-pressure-on-Assad-regime.html.
remains committed to a diplomatic solution.741 He also in-

sisted that there is talks will not move forward if Assad be-
lieves he has a place in Syria’s future.742
February 17, 2014 Sec. Kerry accuses Russia and Iran of effectively undermin-
ing Syrian peace talks by stepping up military support and
aid to the regime while Assad tries to “double down” on a
military victory.743
February 18, 2014 U.S. decides to reconsider options for Syria after failure of
Geneva II.744
February 20, 2014 The United States and its European and Arab allies have
set up regulations that establish a unified way to pro-
vide aid to rebel groups. Categories include groups that
should receive arms and other assistance, groups that are
excluded due to extremist ties, and those that require fur-
ther discussion.745
February 22, 2014 UN Security Council Resolution 2139 is passed calling
upon the different parties in Syria to allow greater access for
humanitarian aid.746
March 4, 2014 Pres. Obama’s FY2015 budget asks Congress for $1.5 bil-
lion dedicated to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Syria.747
Undersecretary of the Treasury David Cohen releases a state-
ment calling Kuwait, a U.S. ally, the “epicenter of fundrais-
741
John Kerry, “Geneva Conference and Situation in Syria,” Press Release, February 16, 2014
(online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221702.htm.
742
“Kerry insists no place for Assad in Syria's future,” Reuters, January 17, 2014, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-syria-crisis-kerry-idUSBREA0G14A20140117.
743
Simon Denyer, “Kerry says Russia and Iran undermining Syria peace talks,” The Wash-
ington Post, February 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kerry-says-russia-under-
mines-syria-talks/2014/02/17/c6e88386-979c-11e3-ae45-458927ccedb6_story.html.
744
Entous and Barnes, “U.S. Revisits Options on Syria as Talks Stall.”
745
Karen DeYoung, “U.S., allies agree on standards for which opposition groups in Syria will
receive aid,” The Washington Post, February 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-allies-agree-on-standards-for-which-opposition-groups-in-syria-will-receive-
aid/2014/02/20/7b5b8b02-9a53-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html.
746
“Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2013) to Ease Aid Delivery to
Syrians, Provide Relief from ‘Chilling Darkness,’” United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press
Releases, February 22, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11292.doc.htm.
747
Julian Pecquet, “Obama budget carves out $1.5 billion for Syria,” The Hill, March 4, 2014,
http://thehill.com/policy/international/199847-obama-budget-carves-out-15-billion-for-syria.
ing for terrorist groups in Syria.”748

March 5, 2014 The U.S. restricts Syria’s ambassador to the UN to keep
his movements to a 25-mile radius around New York.749
The U.S. Ambassador to the UN Power accuses the Syr-
ian government on “stonewalling” on the chemical re-
moval timeline.750
March 17, 2014 Daniel Rubenstein replaces Robert Ford as U.S. Special En-
voy to Syria.751
March 18, 2014 U.S. State Department notifies the Syrian Embassy in D.C.
that it must close by the end of the month.752
March 24, 2014 The U.S. resumes aid to the Syrian opposition after grave
mismanagement of materials caused the U.S. to suspend
aid.753 Sec. Kerry makes remarks with OPCW Direc-
tor-General Uzumcu before their meeting supporting the
removal framework.754
March 26, 2014 Whatever facade remained of a unified congressional
and executive foreign policy stance was shattered in a
heated debate on the floor of the Senate Foreign Rela-
748
“Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before
the Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,’”
March 4, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of the Treasury), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx.
749
“U.S. restricts movements of Syria's U.N. envoy Ja'afari,” Reuters, March 5, 2014, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/05/us-syria-crisis-usa-un-idUSBREA2429I20140305?utm_
source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=Mid-
east%20Brief%203-6-14.
750
Louis Charbonneau, “U.S. accuses Syria of stonewalling on chemical arms plants,” Reuters,
March 5, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/us-syria-crisis-chemical-usa-idUS-
BREA2501R20140306?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Morning%20
Brief&utm_campaign=MB.03.06.2014.
751
Michael Gordon, “Kerry Announces U.S. Representative to Syrian Opposition,” The
New York Times, March 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/world/middleeast/
kerry-announces-us-representative-to-syrian-opposition.html?ref=middleeast&utm_source=-
Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=Mideast%20
Brief%203-18-14.
752
“U.S. Relations with Syria,” Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, March 20, 2014,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm.
753
Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Readies New Syria Aid, Foreign Policy, March 25, 2014, http://for-
eignpolicy.com/2014/03/25/u-s-readies-new-syria-aid/.
754
John Kerry, “Remarks With OPCW Director-General Ahmet Uzumcu Before Their
Meeting,” Press Release, March 24, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.
tions Committee.755
April 1, 2014 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a non-
binding measure that requires the Obama administration to
provide Congress with an updated humanitarian strategy for
Syria within 90 days.756 The House followed suit.757
April 13, 2014 The U.S. Ambassador to UN Samantha Power states that
reports regarding a new, but limited, poison gas attack have
been unsubstantiated.758 The claims from either side have
not yet been substantiated. Nevertheless, the U.S. will do
what is necessary to “establish what has happened and then
consider possible steps in response.”
April 18, 2014 Reports surface that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have sup-
plied Syrian rebel groups with a number of American an-
ti-tank missiles for the first time in a pilot program.759
April 21, 2014 U.S. cites “indications” that confirm allegations that the
Syrian government used a toxic agent to attack a reb-
el-controlled area in Kafr Zeita, yet the reports were not
yet substantiated.760
April 28, 2014 Sec. of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announces, “Syria
has become a matter of homeland security” due to the grow-
ing threat of jihadism returning to the United States.761
755
Karen DeYoung, “Senators unleash criticism of Obama administration over handling of
war in Syria,” The Washington Post, March 26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/senators-unleash-criticism-of-obama-administration-over-handling-of-war-in-
syria/2014/03/26/dd4da610-b524-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html.
756
Julian Pecquet, “Senate panel calls for new US strategy for Syria,” Al Monitor’s Congress
Pulse, April 1, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/senate-strategy-syr-
ia-us-calls.html.
757
Calling for an end to attacks on Syrian civilians and expanded humanitarian access,
H.Res.520, 113th Congress, 2014, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hres520/text.
758
Loveday Morris, “U.S. looks into new Syria chemical weapons attack claims,” The Wash-
ington Post, April 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-looks-into-new-syria-chem-
ical-weapons-attack-claims/2014/04/13/548d898d-ef9d-48c6-b55c-6b2eec65c0a0_story.html.
759
Knickmeyer, Abi-Habib and Entous, “Advanced U.S. Weapons Flow to Syrian Rebels.”
760
Anne Gearan, “U.S. cites ‘indications’ toxic chemical was used in Syria attack,” The Wash-
ington Post, April 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cites-
indications-toxic-chemical-was-used-in-syria-attack/2014/04/21/78a8592c-c987-11e3-93eb-
6c0037dde2ad_story.html.
761
Susan Jones, “Jeh Johnson: 'Syria Has Become a Matter of Homeland Security,'” CNS
News, April 28, 2014, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/jeh-johnson-syr-
ia-has-become-matter-homeland-security.
May 5, 2014 The State Department announces the delivery of an ad-

ditional $27 million in nonlethal aid. It also announces
that the U.S. will allow the Syrian National Coalition to
establish a foreign mission in Washington D.C. However,
members do not receive diplomatic immunity and do not
replace the Syrian embassy.762
May 7, 2014 Pres. Obama notifies Congress of the extension of the state
of national emergency with respect to Syria beyond May
11, 2014.763
May 8, 2014 Sec. Kerry welcomes SNC President Jarba to the U.S. for
meetings with White House and Congress.764 Department
of Treasury increases sanctions on Russian bank Tempbank
as well as Syrian government officials and refineries like Ba-
nias Refinery Co. and Homs Refinery Co.765
May 12, 2014 Sec. Kerry told members of the Syrian opposition in a pri-
vate meeting that the U.S. “wasted a year” by not working
together as the international community to defeat Assad.766
May 14, 2014 Pres. Obama and NSA Rice meet with SNC Pres. Jarba
as a show of support for the opposition, especially amid
concerns that lethal weapons may make it into the wrong
hands.767 The Treasury Department announces sanctions
against two “specially designated global terrorists” in Syr-
“Syrian opposition will have foreign mission in US,” BBC News, May 5, 2014, http://
762
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-27287650?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=e-
mail&utm_term=*Morning%20Brief&utm_campaign=MB%20050614.
763
“Message to the Congress -- Continuation of the National Emergency with respect to
Syria,” Press Release, May 7, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/07/message-congress-continuation-nation-
al-emergency-respect-syria.
764
John Kerry, “Remarks With Syrian Opposition Coalition President Ahmad al-Jarba Before
Their Meeting,” Remarks, May 8, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.
765
“Treasury Sanctions Syrian Regime Officials and Supporters,” Press Release, May 8, 2014
(online by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2391.aspx.
766
Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: Kerry Told Syrian Rebels ‘We Wasted a Year’ in Fight Against
Assad,” The Daily Beast, May 12, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/12/ex-
clusive-kerry-told-syrian-rebels-we-wasted-a-year-in-fight-against-assad.html.
767
“Obama meets Syria opposition leader Jarba,” Al Jazeera, May 14, 2014, http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/obama-meets-syria-opposition-lead-
er-jarba-201451491026774741.html.
ia for their support of al-Qaeda.768

May 15, 2014 Rebels stated that the Southern Front strategy suggested
by the U.S. government has failed. The Friends of Syria
group meets for the first time since January and condemns
Assad’s “parody” of elections. Kerry states, “We have to
redouble our efforts, all of us, in support of the moderate
opposition in order to bring about a peaceful resolution
that the people of Syria want.”769
May 22, 2014 China and Russia veto a UN Security Council Resolution
that would make Assad stand trial before the International
Criminal Court.770 Amb. Samantha Power responds, “The
Syrian people will not see justice today. They will see crime,
but not punishment. The vetoes today have prevented the
victims of atrocities from testifying at the Hague.”
May 28, 2014 Pres. Obama announces in his West Point Speech he will
give the Syrian opposition greater aid as well as give Syrian
people more humanitarian assistance.771
June 3, 2014 Robert Ford announced he quit his position as U.S. am-
bassador to Syria because he could no longer support the
Obama administration’s policy on Syria.772
June 4, 2014 While in Lebanon, Secretary Kerry called the elections that
extended Bashar al-Assad’s rule by seven years a ‘great big
zero.’ He said that the ‘elections were non-elections’ and that
768
“Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders In Syria,” Press Release, May 14, 2014 (online
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/jl2396.aspx.
769
“'Friends of Syria' vow to boost aid to opposition rebels,” France 24, May 15, 2014,
http://www.france24.com/en/20140515-friends-syria-vow-boost-aid-opposition-rebels-london-
usa-uk-assad/.
770
Ian Black, “Russia and China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal
court,” The Guardian, May 22, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/rus-
sia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court.
771
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Com-
mencement Ceremony,” Press Release, May 28, 2014 (online by the White House Office of
the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-presi-
dent-west-point-academy-commencement-ceremony.
772
Mick Krever, “Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford: I could no longer ‘defend
the American policy,’” Amanpour (blog), June 3, 2014 (10:48 a.m.), http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.
com/2014/06/03/former-u-s-ambassador-to-syria-i-could-no-longer-defend-the-american-poli-
cy-robert-ford/.
they would have no bearing on U.S. foreign policy.773 He

announced on his trip to Lebanon that the United States
would commit an additional $290 million in humanitarian
aid, which brings total U.S. contributions to $2 billion.774
June 19, 2014 President Obama gives a speech in which he pins the ineffi-
cacy of U.S. policy on the underwhelming military capability
of the opposition: “And so we have consistently provided that
opposition with support. Oftentimes, the challenge is if you
have former farmers or teachers or pharmacists who now are
taking up opposition against a battle-hardened regime, with
support from external actors that have a lot at stake, how
quickly can you get them trained; how effective are you able
to mobilize them. And that continues to be a challenge.”775
Yet many in the policy field call this an excuse for U.S. inac-
tion, stating that the majority of the opposition has actually
received military training through conscription demands.776
June 22, 2014 Pres. Obama said that the notion that a US.-backed mod-
erate Syrian rebel force could have stopped Bashar al-Assad
and ISIS is a “fantasy.”777
June 23, 2014 Sec. Kerry issues a statement lauding the international commu-
nity for its efforts to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons, which
it completed as of this day. Sec. Kerry notes, however, that “our
work is not finished” and that more must be done to deal with
the use of chlorine in opposition areas, to destroy production
facilities, and to address the humanitarian crisis.778
June 25, 2014 Sec. Kerry issues a warning after Syrian warplanes strike at
ISIS combatants in Iraq. He says, "We've made it clear to
everyone in the region that we don't need anything to take
773
Liz Sly, “Kerry calls Syria election a ‘great big zero,’” The Washington Post, June 4, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kerry-calls-syria-election-a-great-big-ze-
ro/2014/06/04/652a9b93-bc29-4f1a-b701-4e614e98c36a_story.html?wprss=rss_world.
774
John Kerry, “Press Availability in Beirut, Lebanon,” Press Release, June 4, 2014 (online by
775
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Iraq,” Press Release, June
19, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq.
776
Glenn Kessler, “Are Syrian opposition fighters ‘former farmers or teachers or pharmacists’?”
777
Talev and Keane, “Obama Says Quickly Arming Syrian Opposition a ‘Fantasy.’”
778
John Kerry, “Removal of Declared Chemical Materials from Syria,” Press Release,
June 23, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2014/06/228302.htm.
place that might exacerbate sectarian divisions that are al-

ready at a heightened level of tension," 779
June 26, 2014 Pres. Obama asks Congress for $500 million to directly train
& equip the moderate Syrian opposition; operations would
be led by the Department of Defense and will expand a CIA
program already in place.780
June 27, 2014 Sec. Kerry meets with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Ah-
mad Jarba to discuss what can be done in Syria to stymy ISIS’s
advance by cooperating with the moderate opposition.781
June 5, 2014 The White House releases the Brussels G7 Summit Declara-
tion, strongly condemning the brutality exhibited by the As-
sad regime. The declaration, formed by the leaders of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., E.U., and Pres. Obama
also denounces the recently held presidential elections in Syr-
ia, saying, “There is no future for Assad in Syria.”
June 10, 2014 ISIS militants take control of Iraq’s second largest city,
Mosul, after forcing out Iraqi security forces. Iraqi PM
Nouri al-Maliki declares a state of national state of emer-
gency. It has been two and a half years since the U.S.
pulled troops out of Iraq.782 The State Department issues
a statement condemning ISIS’s takeover of Mosul. De-
partment spokesperson Psaki says, “The situation remains
extremely serious.”783
June 11, 2014 The White House releases a statement strongly condemn-
ing the recent attacks in Iraq by ISIS, saying “The United
States will stand with Iraqi leaders across the political spec-
trum as they forge the national unity necessary to succeed
“Kerry Warns Mideast Nations After Syria Bombs Iraq,” CBS News, June 25, 2014, http://
779
www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-syria-may-have-launched-airstrikes-in-iraq/.
780
Karen DeYoung, “Obama asks for authorization to provide direct military training to
Syrian rebels,” The Washington Post, June 26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na-
tional-security/obama-backs-us-military-training-for-syrian-rebels/2014/06/26/ead59104-fd62-
11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_story.html.
781
Ahmed Al Omran and Ellen Knickmeyer, “John Kerry Meets With Saudi King Abdullah,
Syrian Opposition Leader Jarba,” The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2014.
782
Ziad al-Sinjary, “Mosul falls to militants, Iraqi forces flee northern city,” Reuters, June 11,
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-idUSKBN0EL1H520140611.
“U.S. Condemns ISIL Assault on Mosul,” Press Release, June 10, 2014 (online by U.S. De-
783
partment of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/227378.htm.

in the fight against ISIL.”784

June 13, 2014 UN Amb. Power travels to Turkey to visits refugee camps in
the southeast. Addressing the press from Gaziantep, she says
that halting the atrocities in Syria perpetrated by the Assad
regime is a “top priority” for Washington.”785
June 23, 2014 The final eight percent of chemical weapons in Syria are de-
clared to have been removed from the country. Amb. Pow-
er states, “This represents a significant step. We must also
resolve discrepancies and omissions related to the Syrian
government’s declaration of its chemical weapons program,
and we must ensure the destruction of all of Syria’s chemical
weapons production facilities.”786
June 26, 2014 President Obama requests $500 million from Congress to
train & equip what the White House calls “appropriately
vetted” members of the Syrian opposition, reflecting in-
creased worry about the spillover of the Syrian conflict into
Iraq. However, the request comes without any specific devel-
opment of what such a program would look like.787
June 27, 2014 Sec. Kerry meets with Syrian Opposition Coalition Pres-
ident Ahmad al-Jarba. After the meeting the Secretary re-
marks, “Obviously in light of what has happened in Iraq,
we have even more to talk about in terms of the moderate
opposition in Syria, which has the ability to be a very im-
portant player in pushing back against ISIL’s presence.”788
July 30, 2014 During a press statement, Sec. State Kerry remarks, “The world
must act quickly and decisively to get life-saving assistance to
784
“Statement by the Press Secretary on Iraq,” Press Release, June 11, 2014 (online by
the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2014/06/11/statement-press-secretary-iraq.
785
Samantha Power, “Remarks to the Press by Ambassador Samantha Power, U. S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, in Gaziantep, Turkey,” Remarks, June 13, 2014 (online by
the United States Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.gov/remarks/6085.
786
Samantha Power, “Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, on the Removal of Chem-
ical Weapons Materials from Syria,” Statement, June 23, 2014 (online by the United States Mis-
sion to the United Nations), http://usun.state.gov/remarks/6093.
Helene Cooper, “Obama Requests Money to Train ‘Appropriately Vetted’ Syrian Rebels,”
787
The New York Times, June 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/middleeast/

obama-seeks-500-million-to-train-and-equip-syrian-opposition.html?_r=0.
788
John Kerry, “Remarks With Syrian Opposition Coalition President Ahmad al-Jarba
During Their Meeting,” Remarks, June 27, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://
the innocent civilians who are bearing the brunt of this barbar-
ic war. That’s why the United States is providing nearly $378
million in additional aid to help those battered by conflict.” 789
August 7, 2014 At the behest of the Iraqi government, Pres. Obama autho-
rizes targeted airstrikes to protect American personnel and
humanitarian airdrops of food and water to Iraqi civilians
trapped in the mountains by ISIS offensive movements.790
August 15, 2014 The UNSC adopts Resolution 2170 on ISIL and the al-Nus-
rah Front in Iraq and Syria.”791
August 18, 2014 Pres. Obama releases a statement regarding the destruction of
chemical weapons from Syria, saying, “The most lethal declared
chemical weapons possessed by the Syrian regime were de-
stroyed by dedicated U.S. civilian and military professionals.”792
August 20, 2014 News breaks that ISIS beheads American journalist James
Foley, who disappeared in northern Syria in November 2012.
National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden
says, “We have seen a video that purports to be the mur-
der of U.S. citizen James Foley by (ISIS)...The intelligence
community is working as quickly as possible to determine its
authenticity.”793 Later in the evening, Pres. Obama delivers
an address to the nation on Foley’s murder, saying, “When
people harm Americans, anywhere, we do what’s necessary to
see that justice is done... And we will continue to confront
this hateful terrorism, and replace it with a sense of hope
and civility. And that’s what Jim Foley stood for, a man who
lived his work; who courageously told the stories of his fellow
human beings; who was liked and loved by friends and fami-
789
John Kerry, “The United States Contributes $378 Million in Additional Funding to
Syria,” Press Statement, July 30, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.
790
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President,” Statement, August 7, 2014 (online by
fice/2014/08/07/statement-president/
791
“Security Council Adopts Resolution 2170 (2014) Condemning Gross, Widespread
Abuse of Human Rights by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria,” Meetings Coverage, August 15,
2014 (online by the United Nations), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm.
792
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on the Completion by the M/V Cape Ray
of the Destruction of Syria’s Declared Chemical Weapons,” Statement, August 18, 2014 (on-
line by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/08/18/statement-president-completion-mv-cape-ray-destruction-syria-s-declared-.
793
Chelsea Carter, “Video shows ISIS beheading U.S. journalist James Foley,” CNN, August
20, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/.
ly.”794 Sec. Kerry also releases a statement honoring Foley and

reiterating U.S. commitment to defeating ISIS.795
August 21, 2014 While speaking to the press, Sec. Hagel claims ISIS advance-
ments in Syria are, “beyond anything that we have seen,”
continuing, “We must prepare for everything. And the only
way you do that is that you take a cold, steely, hard look at
it... and get ready.” Hagel later claims he received push back
from the administration for overstating ISIS advancement.796
August 28, 2014 Pres. Obama discusses Syria during a press briefing gives a
press. He says, “Assad has lost legitimacy in terms of drop-
ping barrel bombs on innocent families and killing tens of
thousands of people. And right now, what we’re seeing is the
areas that ISIL is occupying are not controlled by Assad any-
way. And, frankly, Assad doesn’t seem to have the capability
or reach to get into those areas.”797
September 3, 2014 Pres. Obama condemns ISIS’s execution of Steven Sotloff, an
American citizen, saying the act “only strengthened the U.S.’
resolve “to take the fight against these terrorists.” He vows to
punish the Sunni militants whose videotaped beheadings of
two American journalists he said had “repulsed” the world.798
September 4, 2014 Pres. Obama and UK PM David Cameron pen a joint op-
ed, published in the Times of London. In the text, the two
leaders call for NATO to become a “more effective security
network that fosters stability around the world,” and con-
front ISIS.799
794
Barack Obama, “President Obama Delivers a Statement on the Murder of James Foley,”
Video, August 20, 2014 (online by the White House), https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2014/08/20/president-obama-delivers-statement-murder-james-foley#transcript.
795
John Kerry, “Murder of James Foley,” Statement, August 20, 2014 (online by U.S. Depart-
ment of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230772.htm.
796
Dan de Luce, “Hagel: The White House Tried to Destroy Me,” Foreign Policy, December
797
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President,” Statement, August 28, 2014 (online by
fice/2014/08/28/statement-president.
798
Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “After Beheading of Steven Sotloff, Obama Pledges to Punish
ISIS,” The New York Times, September 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/
middleeast/steven-sotloff-isis-execution.html?_r=0.
799
David Cameron and Barack Obama, “Stregthening the NATO alliance: article by David
Cameron and Barack Obama,” Article, September 4, 2014 (Online by Prime Minister’s Office),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/strengthening-the-nato-alliance-article-by-david-cam-
eron-and-barack-obama.
September 5, 2014 During remarks delivered during the Wales NATO Summit,
Pres. Obama says that the U.S., “will not be placing U.S.
ground troops to try to control the areas that are part of the
conflict inside of Syria.”800
September 5, 2014 Sec. Hagel holds a joint meeting with Sec. Kerry with key
allies in the fight against ISIS. The meeting focused on the
fight against ISIL in Iraq, and creation of a multinational
task force to share more information about the flow of for-
eign fighters into Syria and from Syria into Iraq.801
September 8, 2014 Sec. Hagel meets with Turkish leaders, including President
Erdogan, in Ankara to discuss Turkey’s role in the fight
against ISIL. Hagel says, "Today’s meetings were a reaffir-
mation, clearly, of Turkey's commitment to be part of this
effort, to destroy ISIL and everything that ISIL represents.” 802
September 10, 2014 In national speech, Pres. Obama outlines his strategy for de-
feating ISIS in four major points: a comprehensive campaign
of airstrikes, increased support of forces on the ground fight-
ing ISIL, specifically Iraqi forces; counterterrorism strategies,
including cutting funding and stemming the flow of foreign
fighters; and humanitarian assistance to civilians displaced by
the conflict. Pres. Obama announces a drastic expansion of
U.S. action in Syria, including airstrikes in Syria and the de-
ployment of an additional 475 military advisors to Iraq.803
September 11, 2014 In a press briefing, White House Press Secretary John Ear-
nest says that the, “President has indicated that he is ready
to order military action in Syria, predicated on what he de-
scribed as a core principle of his presidency, which is to deny
a safe haven to those individuals who would seek to do harm
800
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference,”
Remarks, September 5, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president-obama-nato-sum-
mit-press-conference.
801
Chuck Hagel, “Joint Statement by Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on the ISIL
Meeting,” News Release, September 5, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://
www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View /Article/605170/joint-statement-by-
secretary-kerry-and-secretary-hagel-on-the-isil-meeting.
802
Phil Stewart, “Turkey to play role in fight against Islamic State,” Reuters, September 8,
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-crisis-usa-turkey-idUSKBN0H312B20140908.
803
Barack Obama, “In Speech on ISIS Promises Sustained Effort to Rout Militants,” The
obama-speech-isis.html.
to the United States of America.”804

September 13, 2014 During his weekly address to the nation, Pres. Obama an-
nounces that additional nations are joining the anti-ISIS co-
alition. “This week, Arab nations agreed to strengthen their
support for the new Iraqi government and to do their part
in the fight against ISIL, including aspects of the military
campaign. Saudi Arabia will join the effort to help train &
equip moderate Syrian opposition forces, he says.”805
September 16, 2014 Congress passes and Pres. Obama signs the Continuing
Appropriations Resolution to arm and train “appropriately
vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appro-
priately vetted Syrian groups.” The program is estimated to
cost the U.S. government $500 million.806
September 17, 2014 Pres. Obama reiterates, during a speech at MacDill Air Force
Base in Tampa, that he will not send troops to Syria or Iraq.
Later, Sec. State Kerry reiterates the position that the U.S.
will not send ground troops into combat.807
September 17, 2014 Pres. Obama releases a statement regarding the House of
Representatives’ vote to approve the program to train the
Syrian Opposition. He says, “Today’s vote is another step
closer to having the authorization to train & equip vetted
elements of the moderate Syrian opposition so they can de-
fend themselves against, and ultimately push back on, ISIL
forces in Syria, while creating the conditions for the politi-
cal solution necessary to solve Syria’s crisis once and for all.
This training program will be conducted outside of Syria, in
partnership with regional countries. There will be no U.S.
804
John Earnest, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary”, September 11, 2014 (online by White
House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/11/
press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014
805
Barack Obama, “Weekly Address: We Will Degrade and Destroy ISIL,” Video, Sep-
tember 13, 2014 (online by the White House), https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/
video/2014/09/13/weekly-address-we-will-degrade-and-destroy-isil#transcript.
806
“TRANSCRIPT: Dempsey testifies to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Is-
lamic State,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/transcript-dempsey-testifies-to-the-senate-armed-services-committee-on-the-is-
lamic-state/2014/09/16/a65b6aea-3da3-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_story.html.
807
Michael D. Shear and Michael R. Gordon, “Obama Promises Again Not to Send Ground
Troops to Fight Militants,” The New York Times, September 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/18/us/politics/obama-promises-again-not-to-send-ground-troops-to-fight-mi-
litants.html.
military personnel in Syria as part of this program.”808

September 17, 2014 Sec. Kerry testifies before Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the U.S. strategy to defeat ISIL. He outlines the adminis-
tration’s strategy as having two pillars, saying, “At its core, our
strategy is centered on a global coalition that will collaborate
closely across a number of specific areas, including direct and
indirect military support. The U.S. troops that have been de-
ployed to Iraq do not and will not have a combat mission.
Instead, they will support Iraqi forces on the ground as they
fight for their country against these terrorists. And in Syria, the
on-the-ground combat will be done by the moderate opposi-
tion, which serves as the current best counterweight in Syria to
extremists like ISIL. We know that ISIL – as it gets weaker, the
moderate opposition will get stronger.809
September 22, 2014 The U.S., in partnership with Bahrain, and the United
Arab Emirates, launches its first airstrikes against the ISIS
forces in Syria.810
September 23, 2014 Pres. Obama speaks from the South Lawn, announcing that
he has ordered American armed forces to begin targeted air-
strikes against ISIS targets in Syria.811
September 24, 2014 Pres. Obama addresses the U.N. Security Council Summit
on Foreign Terrorist Fighters after the council unanimous-
ly adopts Resolution 2178 (2014) condemning violent ex-
tremism and underscoring the need to prevent travel and
808
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on the House of Representatives Vote to Au-
thorize the Title X Train and Equip Program for the Moderate Syrian Opposition,” Statement,
September 17, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/17/statement-president-house-representatives-vote-au-
thorize-title-x-train-a.
809
John Kerry, “Opening Remarks on the United States Strategy To Defeat the Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant,” Testimony, September 17, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/231773.htm
810
“Sept. 23: U.S. Military, Partner Nations Conduct Airstrikes Against ISIL in Syria,” News
Release, September 23, 2014 (online by United States Central Command), http://www.centcom.
mil/en/news/articles/sept.-23-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-s.
811
Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Airstrikes in Syria,” Statement, September
23, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/09/23/statement-president-airstrikes-syria.
support for foreign terrorist fighters. 812

September 24, 2014 Pres. Obama addresses the U.N. General Assembly, dis-
cussing ISIS, Syria, and Islamic extremism. “Together with
our partners, America is training and equipping the Syrian
opposition to be a counterweight to the terrorists of ISIL
and the brutality of the Assad regime. But the only lasting
solution to Syria’s civil war is political -- an inclusive political
transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all
Syrian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of creed. I
can promise you America will remain engaged in the region,
and we are prepared to engage in that effort.” 813
September 24, 2014 Speaking at UN headquarters, Sec. Kerry states, “Let me
make it clear to all those who are part of that effort that for
all of the men and women who make up the moderate Syr-
ian opposition, we stand behind you today. We have stood
behind you in these last years. I know sometimes there’s
been a greater desire for more, but we will continue to stand
beside you as long as ISIL remains a threat and Assad re-
mains in power., as well.”814
September 26, 2014 Hagel speaks at a joint press conference with General
Dempsey. He discusses the U.S. strategy with ISIL with re-
gards to Assad: “In Syria there has been no coordination, nor
will there be with the Assad regime. Nothing has changed
about our position that has shifted our approach to Assad
and his regime because this regime, President Assad, has lost
all legitimacy to govern.”815
September 27, 2014 The Pentagon announces the first U.S. airstrikes against
ISIS near the Syrian city of Kobani, a Kurdish city near
812
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at U.N. Security Council Summit on Foreign
Terrorist Fighters,” Remarks, September 24, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/remarks-president-un-se-
curity-council-summit-foreign-terrorist-fighters.
813
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General
Assembly,” Remarks, September 24, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Sec-
retary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-ad-
dress-united-nations-general-assembly.
John Kerry, “Remarks at Syria Ministerial,” Remarks, September 24, 2014 (online by U.S.
814

815
Chuck Hagel, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and Gen.
Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” News Transcript, September 26, 2014 (online by U.S.
Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts /Transcript-View/Ar-
ticle/606934/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-hagel-and-gen-dempsey-in-the.
the Turkish border.816

September 28, 2014 In an interview with 60 minutes, Pres. Obama acknowledg-
es that he underestimated the rapid rise of ISIS.817
October 7, 2014 The New York Times reports on Turkish inaction in Kobani
has disappointed the Obama administration. Pres. Obama
would like to see Turkey take stronger action against the Is-
lamic State in Kobani, but President Erdogan says Turkey
will not get more deeply involved in the conflict.
October 9, 2014 Special Pres. Envoy Allen and Dept. Special Pres. Envoy Mc-
Gurk travel to Turkey to meet with Turkish officials, includ-
ing PM Davutoglu. They discuss areas where the two allies
are able to of cooperate in against ISIS.818
October 14, 2014 Sec. State Kerry announces that the U.S. and Russia have
reached an intelligence sharing agreement on ISIS.819
October 20, 2014 Pres. Obama’s Dep. National Security Advisor Rhodes
speaks with CNN about the fight in Kobani. He says that
U.S. forces have air dropped arms, medical supplies, and
food provided by Iraqi Kurds to Kobani.820
November 7, 2014 Pres. Obama authorizes the deployment of an additional
1,500 American troops to Iraq, doubling the number of
Americans deployed to train and advise Kurdish and Iraqi
forces. The new personnel are authorized to operate at Iraqi
bases outside those traditionally used by U.S. forces.821
November 13, 2014 Sec. Hagel testifies before the House Armed Services Com-
816
David Sanger and Anne Barnard, “U.S., Defending Kurds in Syria, Expands Airstrikes
Against Islamic State Militants,” The New York Times, September 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/28/world/middleeast/us-strikes-isis-in-syria-to-defend-kurds.html.
817
Peter Baker and Brian Knowlton, “Obama Acknowledges U.S. Erred in Assessing ISIS,”
The New York Times, September 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/world/mid-
dleeast/president-obama.html.
818
“Special Presidential Envoy John Allen Meetings With Turkish Officials on Efforts to
Counter ISIL,” Press Statement, October 9, 2014 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/10/232819.htm.
819
Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. and Russia Agree to Share More Intelligence on ISIS,” The New
York Times, October 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/world/europe/us-and-rus-
sia-agree-to-share-more-intelligence-on-isis.html.
820
Ben Rhodes, “The Situation Room,” CNN, October 20, 2014, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/1410/20/sitroom.01.html.
821
Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, “Obama to send 1,500 More Troops to Assist
Iraq,” The New York Times, November 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/world/
middleeast/us-to-send-1500-more-troops-to-iraq.html.
mittee that though ISIS has been degraded in some parts of

Iraq, it “will not be defeated through military force alone.”
He cites the lack of a partner government in Syria to work
with and emphasizes that military strategy will demand
time, patience and perseverance to deliver results.822
November 16, 2014 In a press conference at the Brisbane G-20 Summit, Pres.
Obama maintains that the U.S. policy and attitude that “As-
sad must go” remains unchanged.823
November 22, 2014 VP Biden announces that the U.S. will provide $135 mil-
lion in additional humanitarian assistance to Syria.824
December 14, 2014 Sec. Kerry and Russian FM Lavrov meet in Rome for talks
on the Middle East. The meeting focused on Israel and Pal-
estine, but discussion also includes tensions over Syria and
Ukraine. The event ends without a news conference.825
January 16, 2015 The Pentagon officially announces that the U.S. will begin
to train & equip “moderate” Syrian rebels to fight against
ISIS. The military plans to deploy 400 trainers and hun-
dreds more troops to assist in this mission. Training will be
conducted at sites in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar.826
January 20, 2015 During his State of the Union Address, Pres. Obama calls
upon Congress to pass a resolution authorizing the use of
force against ISIS.827
822
Jake Richmond, “Hagel: ISIL Degraded But Remains Dangerous,” DoD News, No-
vember 13, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603644/hagel-isil-degrad-
ed-but-remains-dangerous.
823
Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama at G20 Press Conference | November 16, 2014,”
Remarks, November 16, 2014 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/16/remarks-president-obama-g20-press-confer-
ence-november-16-2014.
824
“FACT SHEET: Vice President Joe Biden Announces $135 Million in Additional Hu-
manitarian Assistance for Syria Crisis,” Release, November 22, 2014 (online by the White House
Office of the Vice President), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/22/fact-
sheet-vice-president-joe-biden-announces-135-million-additional-hum.
825
Steven Erlanger, “Kerry Piles On Miles, Pressing for a Middle East Compromise,” The
New York Times, December 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/world/middleeast/
kerry-in-rome-on-foreign-policy-mission.html.
826
Ed Payne, “Pentagon: US to Begin to Train and Equip Moderate Syria Rebels,” CNN,
January 16, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/16/us/syria-rebel-training/.
827
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address,” January 20,
2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015.
January 22, 2015 Sec. Hagel says, “We will begin deploying soon troops to the
region to help train & equip the moderate Syrian opposition.”828
January 27, 2015 The Kurdish YPG captures Kobani, the strategic city that
had been long under siege, from ISIS.829
February 6, 2015 The White House releases the 2015 National Security Strat-
egy. Outlining the U.S.’s security strategy for 2015, it reiter-
ates the Obama Administration’s stance that the only lasting
solution to Syria’s civil war is a political transition that rep-
resents the aspirations of all Syrian citizens.830
February 11, 2015 Pres. Obama holds a press conference about the draft resolu-
tion he submitted to Congress to authorize the use of force
against ISIL.831 He states that he does not want the United
States to be “dragged back into another prolonged ground
war in the Middle East.” He says this resolution provides
authorization for the continued use of force to degrade and
defeat the ISIS and provides flexibility for “limited circum-
stances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition
personnel or the use of special operations forces to take mil-
itary action against ISIL leadership”. 832
March 1, 2015 The initial group of Syrian rebels armed by the U.S. col-
lapses after Jabhat al-Nusra, a terrorist group affiliated with
Al-Qaeda, captures its headquarters. The group was armed
in 2014 with anti-tank missiles.833
828
Chuck Hagel, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel in the Pentagon
Briefing Room,” News Transcript, January 22, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of Defense),
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript- View/Article/606998/department-
of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-hagel-in-the-pentagon-briefin.
829
Eliott McLaughlin, “Kobani liberated: Kurds take strategic city from ISIS,” CNN, January
27, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/26/middleeast/syria-kobani-fighting/.
830
“National Security Strategy,” Release, February 6, 2015 (online by the White House),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
831
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Request to Congress for Authorization
of Force Against ISIL,” Remarks, February 11, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the
Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/remarks-president-re-
quest-congress-authorization-force-against-isil.
832
Barack Obama, “Letter from the President- Authoarization for the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”, February 11, 2015
(online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection.
833
Liz Sly, “Syrian Rebel Group that got U.S. Aid Disolves,” The Washington Post, March
1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-fighter-group-that-got-us-missiles-dis-
solves-after-major-defeat/2015/03/01/286fa934-c048-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html.
March 2, 2015 Special Envoy Allen speaks at the Atlantic Council regarding
ISIL, reiterating the lack of a partner on the ground in Syria,
which makes the situation more challenging. He also reiter-
ates that the U.S. is “working closely with regional partners
to establish sites for training and equipping vetted, to mod-
erate Syrian opposition elements, to train approximately
5,000 troops per year for the next 3 years” 834
May 7, 2015 Sec. Carter holds a joint press conference with Joint Chiefs
of Staff Chairman Gen. Dempsey to announce the first class
of train & equip, which formally launches with an initial
class of 90. He states that trainees of the program should go
operational in a matter of months, and that their mission
is to fight ISIL. In that mission, the U.S. will provide them
support. If they are confronted by regime forces, the U.S.
would have “some responsibility to help them, but their
principal mission is to engage with ISIS. Carter states that
the trainees do receive compensation along with their train-
ing and equipment. In response to a question about U.S.
responsibility if the trainees commit war crimes, Carter says,
“an explicit part of their training is how to conduct them-
selves in a way that is consistent with international law.”835 836
May 7, 2015 Carter announces that combat training has begun for nearly
90 fighters from the new Syrian forces and that a second
group will begin training in the next few weeks.837
May 12, 2015 Sec. Kerry meets with Russian FM Lavrov in Sochi. The two
diplomats discussed today discussed ISIS, with Sec. Kerry not-
ing, “while Russia is not a formal member of the Global Co-
alition to Counter ISIL, Russia is a very important partner in
the global effort against violent extremism,” continuing, “The
John Allen, “Remarks at the Atlantic Council,” Remarks, March 2, 2015 (online by U.S.
834
Department of State), http://www.state.gov/s/seci/238108.htm.

835
Ashton Carter, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Ash Carter and
General Martin E. Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” News Transcript, May 7, 2015
(online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/
Transcript-View/Article/607048/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-ash-carter-
and-general-martin.
836
Missy Ryan, “U.S. begins training Syrian rebel force,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-begins-training-of-syrian-rebel-
force/2015/05/07/5c5ac026-f4f0-11e4-bcc4-e8141e5eb0c9_story.html.
837
Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter: Combat Training Begins for New Syrian Forces,” DoD News,
May 7, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604596/carter-combat-train-
ing-begins-for-new-syrian-forces
US and Russia might work together on this in the days ahead,

and Foreign Minister Lavrov and I agreed to examine specific
concepts, but more importantly, to continue that conversation
in the coming weeks with increased focus and purpose.”838
May 13, 2015 Sec. Kerry offers a statement to the press at the NATO
Ministerial meeting in Antalya, Turkey. He says that his col-
leagues discussed Syria, Libya, terrorism in general, and the
responsibility of NATO to be able to come together to work
on each of those challenges.839
May 16, 2015 Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced in a statement that
U.S. special operations forces conducted an operation in
Syria to capture a senior leader of the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant terrorist organization. “Abu Sayyaf was killed
during the course of the operation when he engaged U.S.
forces,” he said. “U.S. forces captured Umm Sayyaf, who
we suspect is a member of ISIL, played an important role
in ISIL's terrorist activities, and may have been complicit in
what appears to have been the enslavement of a young Yazidi
woman rescued last night,” Carter said.840
May 21, 2015 In a press briefing, Press Sec. Earnest speaks about recent
U.S. actions against ISIS. He says, “in the Iraq-Syria re-
gion, that if you look at populated areas that had previ-
ously been under control of ISIL, 25 percent of those areas
-- or up to 25 percent of those areas are areas where ISIL
fighters no longer have freedom of movement. There are
areas where they have made gains in areas like Palmyra.
But there are also areas where they’ve been in retreat, and
those are regions on northeast Syria outside of Kobani.
And that's an indication that we will have days of progress
and periods of setback.”841
838
John Kerry, “Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Re-
marks, May 12, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2015/05/242214.htm.
839
John Kerry, “Statement to Press at NATO Ministerial,” Remarks, May 13, 2015 (online by
840
“Carter: Special Operations Troops Conduct Raid in Syria,” DoD News, May 16, 2015,
http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604655/carter-special-operations-troops-
conduct-raid-in-syria.
841
Josh Earnest, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 5/21/15,” Remarks, May 21,
press-office/2015/05/21/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-52115.
June 3, 2015 Special Envoy Allen speaks at the Brookings-Doha U.S. Is-
lamic World Forum., stating, “Daesh is not an Iraq or Syria
problem; Daesh is a regional problem with global implica-
tions.” He also discusses Turkey’s border with Syria, empha-
sizing that the burden of closing off this 900km border to
foreign fighters cannot rest with Turkey alone.842
June 8, 2015 In a press conference following a Summit Meeting of the
G-7, Pres. Obama states, “We don’t have, yet, a complete
strategy, because it requires commitments on the part of
Iraqis as well,” he continued, “The details are not worked
out...We are still seeing thousands of foreign fighters flowing
into, first, Syria, and then, oftentimes, ultimately into Iraq.
And not all of that is preventable, but a lot of it is prevent-
able -- if we’ve got better cooperation, better coordination,
better intelligence, if we are monitoring what’s happening
at the Turkish-Syria border more effectively. This is an area
where we’ve been seeking deeper cooperation with Turkish
authorities who recognize it’s a problem but haven’t fully
ramped up the capacity they need. And this is something
that I think we got to spend a lot of time on.”843
June 16, 2015 Sec. Kerry states, “I am absolutely certain – we are certain –
that the preponderance of those [chemical] attacks have been
carried out by the regime, and we’re putting together a port-
folio of that data that supports that even as we speak now.844
June 16, 2015 Special Envoy Allen speaks with Judy Woodruff of PBS
NewsHour. Woodruff asks, “Has the – essentially the fight
against ISIS just completely subsumed or all but subsumed
the U.S. focus on President Assad?” to which Special En-
voy Allen responds: “ Oh no, not at all. Things are not
trending in his favor currently. Six months ago, he was in
a different position than he is today, which I believe is a
position of some instability, but weaker in his position as
a leader. The United States and the Coalition partners are
still strongly focused on a political process that removes
842
John Allen, “Remarks at Brookings-Doha U.S. Islamic World Forum,” Remarks, June 3,
2015 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/s/seci/243115.htm.
843
Julie Davis and Michael Shear, “Ukraine Crisis and Advance of ISIS Dominate Agenda
for Group of 7”, The New York Times, June 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/
europe/united-states-increase-training-iraqis-fighting-isis-obama.html
John Kerry, “Secretary Kerry's Press Availability,” Statements, June 16, 2015 (online by
844

Bashar al-Assad from the leadership of Syria and places it

in the hands of the Syrian people.”845
June 18, 2015 The Pentagon acknowledges, in a CNN report, that train
& equip “has run into a number of difficulties” including
struggles to exfiltrate qualified fighters from Syria, as well
as vetting possible candidates. According to the Pentagon,
fewer than 200 of 6,000 volunteers have begun the pro-
gram. Despite these difficulties, the U.S. continues to plan
on training an additional 3,000 fighters in 2015, and an es-
timated 5,400 the following year. 846
June 26, 2015 The White House announces a $500 million proposal to
train & equip moderate opposition forces in Iraq. The plan
was a major u-turn for the Obama administration, which
had previously sought to limit its military involvement in
Syria. Major hurdles looming ahead for the proposal include
obtaining congressional approval and planning how to effec-
tively vet and train large numbers of rebel fighters. 847
July 6, 2015 Pres. Obama discusses ISIL at the Pentagon. Regarding
Syria, he says, “In Syria, the only way that the civil war
will end -- and in a way so that the Syrian people can unite
against ISIL -- is an inclusive political transition to a new
government, without Bashar Assad -- a government that
serves all Syrians.” He says that progress has been made in
the fight against ISIL.”848
July 7, 2015 Carter speaks before the Senate Armed Services Committee
detailing the U.S.’s strategy in Syria and against ISIL. He
says the U.S. is actively pursuing a political transition from
Assad to a more “inclusive government with which we can
also work to defeat ISIL.” The Department of Defense is also
leading an air campaign and training and equipping vetted
local forces in Iraq and Syria to fight ISIL. He discusses the
845
John Allen, “Interview With Judy Woodruff, PBS NewsHour,” Interview, June 16, 2015
Barbara Starr, “Snag in Pentagon training of Syrian rebels to fight ISIS,” CNN, June 18,
846
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/18/politics/syrian-rebels-pentagon-training-isis/.
847
Julian Barnes, Adam Entous, and Carol Lee, “Obama Proposes $500 Million to Aid
Syrian Rebels,” The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-pro-
poses-500-million-to-aid-syrian-rebels-1403813486.
848
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL,” Re-
marks, July 6, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/06/remarks-president-progress-fight-against-isil.
train & equip program in Syria in more detail, stating that

the D.O.D. is currently reviewing screening and vetting
over 7,000 volunteers and is actively training 60 fighters. He
acknowledges this is a much smaller number than they were
hoping for at this point.849
July 7, 2015 Sec. Carter testifies before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee. He says that in Syria, the Department of Defense is
three months into its train & equip mission. Training is un-
derway and work is ongoing to screen and vet nearly 7,000
volunteers “to ensure they are committed to fighting ISIL,
pass a counterintelligence screening and meet standards
prescribed by U.S. law regarding the law of armed conflict
and necessitated by operations.” Carter says that as of July
3, the department is training about 60 fighters, adding that
vetting standards have whittled the expected numbers. “But
we know this program is essential. We need a partner on the
ground in Syria to assure ISIL’s lasting defeat.”850
July 12, 2015 The first U.S. trained Syrian rebels (54 in total) enter Syria
through the Jordanian border. Several fighters are immedi-
ately captured, and another unit is attacked by an affiliate of
al Qaeda. The second group entering Syria hands over 25
percent of the weapons supplied by the U.S. to al-Nusra.851
July 15, 2015 In a press conference, Pres. Obama says, “my key goal when I
turn over the keys to the President -- the next President -- is
that we are on track to defeat ISIL; that they are much more
contained and we’re moving in the right direction there. That
we have jump started a process to resolve the civil war in Syr-
ia, which is like an open sore in the region and is giving refuge
to terrorist organizations who are taking advantage of that
chaos...I do agree that we’re not going to solve the problems
in Syria unless there’s buy-in from the Russians, the Iranians,
the Turks, our Gulf partners. It’s too chaotic. There are too
849
Ashton Carter, “Statement on Counter-ISIL before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee,” Speech, July 7, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.
gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/611705/statement-on-counter-isil-before-the-senate-
armed-services-committee.
850
Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter: DoD, Global Coalition Seek ISIL’s Lasting Defeat,” DoD News,
July 7, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/612612/carter-dod-global-coa-
lition-seek-isils-lasting-defeat.
851
Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Revamping Rebel Force Fighting ISIS in Syria,” The
New York Times, September 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/middleeast/us-
to-revamp-training-program-to-fight-isis.html?_r=0.
many factions. There’s too much money and too many arms
flooding into the zone. It’s gotten caught up in both sectarian
conflict and geopolitical jockeying. And in order for us to
resolve it, there’s going to have to be agreement among the
major powers that are interested in Syria that this is not going
to be won on the battlefield.” 852
July 23, 2015 Turkey announces that it will allow the U.S. access to Incirlik
air base in order to launch strikes against ISIS. Three weeks later,
the U.S. is flying its first manned airstrikes from the airbase.853
July 31, 2015 Train & equip forces come under attack in Syria from al-Nus-
ra, a day after the al-Qaeda affiliate captured two leaders and
six fighters from one of train & equip’s divisions.854 August 2,
2015: Pres. Obama authorizes air defenses for train & equip
forces in Syria following multiple attacks on the group.855
August 4, 2015 Defense Dept. officials indicate that al-Nusra has captured
additional members of U.S. train and equip program.856
August 7, 2015 The UN Security Council passes Resolution 2235 on a Syr-
ian Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism.
August 13, 2015 At the UN, Amb. Power strongly condemns the Assad regime’s
intensified bombing of civilians and civilian infrastructure
across Syria, along with its continued use of barrel bombs. 857
August 14, 2015 Answering a question about the use of mustard gas in
Syria, Sec. Kerry says, that the U.S. is working with on a
852
Barack Obama, “Press Conference by the President,” Statement, July 15, 2015 (online
by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
853
Ceylan Yeginsu and Helene Cooper, “U.S. Jets to Use Turkish Bases in War On ISIS,” The
New York Times, July 23, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/world/europe/turkey-isis-
us-airstrikes-syria.html?_r=0.
854
Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, “Rivals of ISIS Attack U.S.-Backed Syrian Rebel Group,”
The New York Times, July 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/middleeast/nus-
ra-front-attacks-us-backed-syrian-rebel-group.html.
855
Adam Entous, “U.S. to Defend New Syria Force From Assad Regime,” The Wall Street
Journal, August 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-to-defend-new-syria-force-from-
assad-regime-others-1438549937.
856
“Train-and-equip Syrian fighters held by Nusra: Pentagon,” Hurriyet Daily News, August
5, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/train-and-equip-syrian-fighters-held-by-nusra-pen-
tagon---.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86458&NewsCatID=359.
857
Samantha Power, “Statement on the Syrian Regime's Ongoing Use of Barrel Bombs in Ci-
vilian Areas,” Remarks, August 13, 2015 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations), http://
usun.state.gov/remarks/6792.
UN resolution with Russia and other nations to get to the

bottom of this claim. 858
August 17, 2015 The White House issues a statement strongly condemning
deadly airstrikes perpetrated by the Assad regime on a mar-
ket in the Damascus suburb of Douma.859
August 20, 2015 In the press briefing room, Sec. Carter discusses the Syrian
train & equip program. Following a question from a reporter
inquiring about the 54 people being trained in this program,
Sec. Carter says, “we need Syrian train & equip...forces that
coalesce into a coherent fighting force or can associate them-
selves with other coherent fighting forces that we can then
support and that can retake and hold territory in Syria...”860
September 4, 2015 The New York Times reports that Russia has sent a military
advance team to Syria and is taking other steps the United
States fears may signal that President Vladimir V. Putin is
planning to vastly expand his military support for President
Bashar al-Assad of Syria, administration officials said Friday.861
September 5, 2015 Sec. Kerry calls Russian FM Lavrov to discuss Syria, includ-
ing U.S. concerns about reports suggesting an imminent
enhanced Russian build-up within the country.862
September 8, 2015 Pentagon Press Sec. Cook says that Sec. Carter “still believes
that it's important to provide support to those moderate
Syrian force. We've seen and the secretary's been candid
about what happened initially with the train & equip pro-
gram. We've learned lessons from that, continue to learn les-
858
John Kerry, “Interview With Elise Labott of CNN,” Interview, August 14, 2015 (online by
859
“Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on the Market Bombing in Douma, Syria,”
Press Release, August 17, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/17/statement-nsc-spokesperson-ned-price-mar-
ket-bombing-douma-syria.
860
Ashton Carter, “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Secretary Carter in the Pen-
tagon Press Briefing Room,” News Transcript, August 20, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of
Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/614330/de-
partment-of-defense-press-briefing-with-secretary-carter-in-the-pentagon-pres.
861
Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Moves in Syria Pose Concerns for U.S.,” The
russian-moves-in-syria-pose-concerns-for-us.html.
862
“Readout of Secretary Kerry's Call With Foreign Minister Lavrov,” Press Release,
September 5, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2015/09/246664.htm.
sons from that, and we're going to continue moving forward

with that program.”863
September 9, 2015 Senior national security officials meet to discuss how to re-
vamp the fledgling Pentagon train & equip program.864
September 10, 2015 Special Envoy Allen speaks with CNN. Allen says he thinks
it’s a bad idea for Russia to use combat forces to prop up the
regime of Bashar al-Assad.865
September 10, 2015 U.S. military intelligence sources say there is evidence Russia
is sending troops and military hardware to bolster Assad’s
forces.866
September 10, 2015 Sec. Kerry expresses concerns about reports of increased
Russian military activities in Syria, warning that may bring
yet more violence to the country.867
September 11, 2015 Russia denies reports that it is increasing its military pres-
ence in Syria, insisting that it is only humanitarian aid and
military equipment being deployed in accordance with its
existing contracts. Russian FM Lavrov tells reporters, "We
have never made our military presence (in Syria) a secret."868
September 12, 2015 Sec. Carter says that the “U.S. military is still waiting on
Congress to release $116 million it requested for the train &
equip program of Syrian opposition forces.869
September 15, 2015 In a phone conversation with Russian FM Lavrov, Sec. Ker-
863
Peter Cook, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter
Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” News Transcript, September 8, 2015 (online by U.S.
Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Ar-
ticle/616516/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in.
864
Barbara Starr, “Pentagon reviews troubled program to train Syrian rebels,” CNN, September
9, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/politics/syrian-rebels-pentagon-train-and-equip/.
865
John Allen, “Interview of General John Allen With Jake Tapper, CNN on Counter-ISIL
Coalition Anniversary,” Interview, September 10, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of State),
http://www.state.gov/s/seci/246798.htm.
866
“Russian presence in Syria growing, sources say, as US warns Moscow conflict will escalate
if it provides military support to Assad,” ABC News, September 10, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2015-09-10/russian-military-buildup-continues-in-syria/6764670.
867
“Kerry and NATO warn Russia over military acts in Syria,” Al Jazeera, September 10, 2015, http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/kerry-nato-warn-russia-military-acts-syria-150910052623584.html.
868
“Russia denies military buildup in Syria,” The Global Times, September 11, 2015, http://
www.globaltimes.cn/content/941862.shtml.
869
Yuri Gripas, “Pentagon Urges Congress to Release $116 Million for Syrian Train-Equip Pro-
gram,” Sputnik News, December 9, 2015, http://sputniknews.com/us/20151209/1031494793/
pentagon-syria.html.
ry makes clear that Russia’s continued support for President

Assad risks exacerbating and extending the conflict, and un-
dermining the shared goal of fighting extremism if the two
countries do not also remain focused on finding a solution
to the conflict in Syria via a genuine political transition.870
September 18, 2015 Sec. Carter has a conversation with Russian Defense Minis-
ter Shoygu on the situation in Syria. The two discuss about
areas where the United States and Russia's perspectives over-
lap and areas of divergence. They agree to further discuss
mechanisms for deconfliction in Syria and the counter-Is-
lamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) campaign.871
September 19, 2015 Sec. State Kerry says that Russian deployment of military
equipment in Syria raises “serious questions” about Russia’s
goals for the region. Moscow alleges that the buildup is part
of its mission to combat ISIS.872
September 20, 2015 Fox News reports that U.S. officials are expressing grow-
ing concern about Russia's military build-up in Assad-con-
trolled Syria, calling it "unprecedented" -- with one telling
Fox News it compares in scope to Vladimir Putin's incur-
sion into Crimea.873
September 24, 2015 Sec. Carter says Russia’s expanding military buildup in Syria
could “pour gasoline on the [Islamic State] phenomenon,”
because Moscow is bent on backing one of the extremist
group’s top enemies, Syrian President Assad. Any successful
effort to crush ISIS without simultaneously pursuing a polit-
ical transition away from Mr. Assad will only “fuel the very
kind of extremism that underlies ISIL.”874
870
“Readout of Secretary Kerry's Call With Foreign Minister Lavrov,” Press Release, Sep-
tember 15, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2015/09/246963.htm.
871
“Readout of Secretary Carter’s Call with Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoygu,”
Press Release, September 18, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.
gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/617775/readout-of-secretary-carters-call-
with-russian-minister-of-defense-sergei-shoygu.
872
Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "Russian Buildup in Syria Raises Questions on Role,”
The New York Times, September 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/mid-
dleeast/russian-buildup-in-syria-raises-questions-on-role.html.
873
“Kerry: Russian fighter jets in Syria raise serious questions,” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2015,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/19/kerry-russian-fighter-jets-in-syria-disturbing.html.
874
Guy Taylor, “Ashton Carter: Russian buildup in Syria could ‘pour gasoline’ on ISIS,” The
Washington Times, September 24, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/24/
carter-russian-buildup-syria-could-pour-gas-isis/.
September 27, 2015 Russian Pres. Putin says that Russia had no plans "right
now" to deploy combat troops to Syria, but affirmed that it
would continue backing the Syrian government.875
September 28, 2015 Pres. Obama addresses the U.N. General Assembly. “No-
where is our commitment to international order more tested
than in Syria.” He states that military power is not sufficient
to resolve the situation in Syria, and that the United States
is prepared to work with any nation, including Russia and
Iran, to resolve the conflict. He adds, “This work will take
time. There are no easy answers to Syria.”876
September 28, 2015 Pres. Obama meets with Russian President Putin on the
sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. A senior adminis-
tration official says the White House got "clarity" on Rus-
sian objectives in Syria: defeating the Islamic State group
and supporting Assad.877
September 29, 2015 Pres. Obama speaks at the Summit to Counter ISIL and
Violent Extremism in New York. He says, “I believe what
we have here today is the emergence of a global movement
that is united by the mission of degrading and ultimately de-
stroying ISIL. In Syria, as I said yesterday, defeating ISIL re-
quires a new leader and an inclusive government that unites
the Syrian people in the fight against terrorist groups. This
is going to be a complex process. And as I’ve said before,
we are prepared to work with all countries, including Russia
and Iran, to find a political mechanism in which it is possi-
ble to begin a transition process.”878
September 29, 2015 The White House denies reports that the train & equip pro-
875
Jack Stubbs and Denis Dyomkin, “Putin says Russia has no plans to deploy combat troops
in Syria,” Reuters, September 28, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-putin-usa-
idUKKCN0RR14R20150927.
876
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General As-
sembly,” Remarks, September 28, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secre-
tary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-unit-
ed-nations-general-assembly.
Teresa Welsh, “Obama, Putin Meet in New York,” US News, September 28, 2015, http://
877
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/28/obama-putin-meet-in-new-york.
878
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the Leaders' Summit on Countering
ISIL and Violent Extremism,” Remarks, September 29, 2015 (online by the White House Office
of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/remarks-presi-
dent-obama-leaders-summit-countering-isil-and-violent.
gram has been suspended.879

September 29, 2015 Sec. Carter directs his staff to “open lines of communication
with Russia on deconflicting” the military missions of the
two countries in Syria, to ensure that American operations
are not disrupted by Russian military activity.880
September. 30, 2015 Russia begins airstrikes in Syria against opponents of Assad’s
regime. The U.S. says it was informed of the strikes only
hours before they began.881
October 2, 2015 Pres. Obama holds a press conference. He says the reason
Assad is still in power is because Russia and Iran have sup-
ported him throughout this process. He says he had made
clear to President Putin that the only way to solve the prob-
lem in Syria is “to have a political transition that is inclusive-
that keeps the state intact, that keeps the military intact, that
maintains cohesion, but that is inclusive- and the only way
to accomplish that is for Mr. Assad to transition, because
you cannot rehabilitate him in the eyes of Syrians” He clar-
ifies that the U.S. will not impose a military solution. He
states, “Eventually Syria will fall, the Assad regime will fall,
and we have to have somebody who we’re working with that
we can help pick up the pieces and stitch back together a
cohesive, coherent country” Pres.Obama acknowledges that
the train & equip program has “not worked in the way it
was supposed to.” He reiterates that Syria will not turn into
a proxy war between the United States and Russia.882
October 2, 2016 In a meeting with senior aides, Pres. Obama decides that the
U.S. will not directly confront Russia over Moscow’s recent-
879
Kristina Wong, “Administration: Syrian train and equip program not suspended,” The
Hill, September 29, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/255304-administration-syri-
an-train-and-equip-program-not-suspended.
880
Helene Cooper and Michael Gordon, “Russia Buildup Seen as Fanning Flames in Syria,”
The New York Times, September 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/world/russia-
buildup-seen-as-fanning-flames-in-syria.html.
881
“Syria Crisis: Russian Air Strikes Against ISIS Enemies,” CNN, September 30, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34399164
882
ly launched air campaign in Syria.883

October 5, 2015 The Wall Street Journal reports that Russia is intentionally
targeting backed Syrian rebel groups in airstrikes in Syria.884
October 5, 2015 Speaking from Madrid, Sec. Carter discusses Russia’s behav-
ior in Syria, stating that Russia is “escalated the civil war,
putting further at risk the very political resolution and pres-
ervation of Syria’s structure of future governance it says that
it wants.” He adds, “The U.S. position is clear that a lasting
defeat of ISIL and extremism in Syria can only be achieved
if pursued in parallel with a political transition in Syria.”885
October 8, 2015 Sec. Carter meets with NATO defense ministers in Brussels
to discuss Russia’s involvement in Syria He says that Russian
targeting of opposition forces “is a fundamental strategic
mistake and that it will inflame and prolong the Syrian civil
war.” Regarding the U.S.’s strategy in Syria, he says the U.S.
“will continue to support the moderate Syrian opposition.
We will seek an agreement with the Russians on professional
safety procedures for coalition pilots. And we will leave the
door open for Russia to rejoin the track toward a political
transition in Damascus.”886
October 9, 2015 The White House announces an “operational pause” in the
original train & equip program. The new U.S. plan will be
“taking some of the leaders of these groups who are already
fighting on the ground, putting them through the same
rigorous vetting process that we have used in the original
program, and then giving them basic equipment packages
883
Karen DeYoung, Juliet Eilperin, and Greg Miller, “U.S. will not directly confront Russia
in Syria, Obama says,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/2015/10/02/44c1f7fc-6932-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html.
884
Adam Entous, “U.S. Sees Russian Drive Against CIA-Backed Rebels in Syria,” The Wall
Street Journal, October 5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-concludes-russia-targeting-cia-
backed-rebels-in-syria-1444088319.
885
Ashton Carter, “Remarks at Spanish Center for Advanced Studies of National Defense:
"Strong and Principled Security Cooperation,” Speech, October 5, 2015 (online by U.S. De-
partment of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/621829/re-
marks-at-spanish-center-for-advanced-studies-of-national-defense-strong-and-p.
886
Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Addresses Syria, Afghanistan, Modern NATO Mission,” DOD
News, October 8, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/622446/carter-ad-
dresses-syria-afghanistan-modern-nato-mission.
to distribute to their fighting force.”887

October 11, 2015 American C-17 cargo planes drop 50 tons of ammunition,
M-16s and AK-47s, grenades, and mortar and rocket-pro-
pelled grenade rounds to Arab forces confronting ISIS in
northern Syria. The Department of Defense does not identify
the groups, but says that their “leaders were appropriately vet-
ted by the U.S. and have been fighting to remove ISIL from
northern Syria” and claims that the supplies “reached friendly
forces.” It is reported that Kurdish groups are the main receiv-
ers of these U.S. airdrops. However, during a press briefing,
Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook states, “My understanding
is that this specifically went to Syrian Arab forces.”888
October 13, 2015 Special Envoy Allen speaks to the Economic Club of New
York, saying, “We reject Russia’s assertion that everybody
opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Assad is a terrorist. We
think that is self-defeating and will only draw Russia into
a quagmire. And can only be used as a further recruitment
tool for foreign fighters to join groups like Daesh. Let me
be clear: Mr. Putin had to go into Syria not out of strength
but out of weakness, because his client, Mr. Asad, was crum-
bling. And only Iran is lining up behind him to support this
plan. There may be some short-term appearance of tactical
benefit, as Russia stabilizes and props up the Assad regime,
but unless Russia remains to assist Asad in crushing every
component of the Syrian Opposition, the Assad regime will
continue to require foreign support to survive. Let me be
clear, this is NOT a contest between the United States and
Russia. It is in our interest for Russia to be a responsible, ef-
fective actor on the international stage. Our battle remains,
and will continue to remain, with Daesh.”889
October 14, 2015 Sec. Carter discusses Syria at the Association of the U.S.
Army’s Annual Convention. He says that Russia’s behavior
in Syria is concerning, as its air force’s behavior has been
887
Ben Rhodes, Christine Wormuth and Brett McGurk, “Press Call on Coutner ISIL Cam-
paign,” October 9, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/09/press-call-counter-isil-campaign.
888
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Airdrops Ammunition to Groups Fighting the Islamic
State,” The Washington Post, October 12 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/check-
point/wp/2015/10/12/pentagon-airdrops-ammunition-to-groups-fighting-the-islamic-state/.
889
John Allen, “Remarks to the Economic Club of New York,” Remarks, October 13, 2015
“unprofessional,” referring to its recent flight into Turkish

airspace, and its joint ground offensive with the Syrian re-
gime has made clear that it is not in Syria to fight ISIL.890
October 14, 2015 Former Presidential Advisor on Syria Amb. Frederic Hof writes
for Politico, “I spent early 2011 trying to ease tensions be-
tween Syria and its neighbors. I never predicted the brutality
that would come from the inside.” He continued to predict,
“Obama will bequeath to his successor a problem of gargantu-
an dimensions if he does not change policy course now.”891
October 16, 2015 Pres. Obama says “It is essential to get the Iranians, the Rus-
sians, the Turks, the Gulf countries and all the interested
parties to sit down and recognize we have to have a political
transition if we want to end the humanitarian crisis and save
the structure of a unified Syrian state." He also emphasizes
that the U.S. is only cooperating with Russia to the extent
that it will prevent accidental clashes between air missions.892
October 16, 2015 Pres. Obama speaks with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh
Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan by phone. “ They agreed
that Russia’s military operations in Syria should focus on
ISIL – not moderate Syrian opposition groups – and reaf-
firmed the importance of establishing the conditions neces-
sary for a political transition in Syria.”893
October 20, 2015 Russia and the U.S. sign an agreement to minimize the risk
of in-flight incidents between all aircraft and drone flights
operating in Syrian airspace. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter
Cook outlines that, “These protocols include maintaining
professional airmanship at all times, the use of specific com-
munication frequencies and the establishment of a commu-
nication line on the ground. The U.S. and Russia will form
890
Ashton Carter, “Remarks to the Association of the U.S. Army Annual Convention,”
Speech, October 14, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/
News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/623099/remarks-to-the-association-of-the-us-army-annu-
al-convention.
Frederic Hof, “I Got Syria So Wrong,” Politico, October 14, 2014, http://www.politico.
891
com/magazine/story/2015/10/syria-civil-war-213242?o=1.
892
Kevin Lamarque, “Obama says ‘no meeting of minds with Russia on Syria,” Reuters, October 16,
2015,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-obama-idUSKCN0SA2I420151016.
893
“Readout of the President's Call with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed Bin
Zayed Al Nahyan,” Press Release, October 16, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the
Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/readout-presidents-
call-abu-dhabi-crown-prince-sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed.
a working group to discuss any implementation issues that

follow.”894
October 22, 2015 Speaking at the UN about Russian engagement in Syria,
Amb. Power says, “Since Russia began its strikes, the Syrian
map has shifted in ISIL’s favor: civilians are on the move in
terror and ISIL is on the move gaining ground. Let me be
clear: aiding and abetting Assad’s military as it targets the
very groups that we need to bring to the negotiating table
will only prolong the conflict and push a political solution
further from reach. This conflict will not end until Syria is
free of Assad. Supporting him now only ensures that by the
time a political transition is negotiated, ISIL will only be
stronger; its recruitment having been bolstered by the actions
of Russia, Iran, and the regime; and the Syrian state will only
be weaker, the country more fragmented, and the heartbreak
for families across the country, more widespread.”895
October 23, 2015 The State Dept. announces the departure of Special Presiden-
tial Envoy John Allen and appointment of Brett McGurk.896
October 27, 2015 Sec. Carter testifies before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee regarding the U.S. counter-ISIL military campaign.
Carter describes the changes he’d like to implement to the
U.S. military campaign, which he calls the “Three R’s”:
Raqqa, Ramadi, and raids. In Syria, he aims for the Syri-
an Arab Coalition to work towards destroying ISIL’s capital
in Raqqa. He expresses disappointment with the train &
equip program, and says that the new program will focus
on working with vetted leaders of groups already fighting
ISIL, building on successes of Syrian Arabs and Kurds. Sec.
Carter also comments on Russia’s involvement in Syria and
894
Peter Cook, “Department of Defense Press Briefing,” News Transcript, October 20, 2015
(online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Tran-
script-View/Article/624976/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-
peter-cook-in.
895
Samantha Power, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Middle East,”
Remarks, October 22, 2015 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.
gov/remarks/6910.
896
John Kerry, “Departure of Special Presidential Envoy John Allen and Appointment of
Brett McGurk,” Statement, October 23, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.
its targeting of opposition forces.897

October 31, 2015 Sec. Carter says Russia is "doomed to fail" in Syria, while the
goal of the U.S. remains defeating the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant in both Syria and Iraq. He says Russia has not
"thought through very thoroughly" its actions in Syria. While
Russia said it was going to fight ISIL, it is not doing that.898
November 4, 2015 In testimony presented to the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs, Assistant Sec. of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Patterson outlines the four major components of the U.S.
strategy for Syria as the following, “1) defeat ISIL militari-
ly in both Syria and Iraq; (2) develop a political transition
that gives Syria a future without Bashar al-Assad; (3) ease
the suffering of the Syrian people; and, (4) stabilize our re-
gional allies and help European partners as they cope with a
massive refugee crisis.” She continued, “Our strategy regard-
ing the Syrian conflict remains fundamentally the same, to
leverage military action and diplomacy to achieve a political
transition in which Syrians ultimately have a government
that respects the rights of its people and Syria retains its uni-
ty, independence, territorial integrity and secular character.899
November 15, 2015 Pres. Obama talks with Russian Pres.Vladimir Putin prior
to the opening of G-20 sessions Antalya. He later remarks
“When we were in Turkey I discussed with Pres. Putin, in
a brief pull-aside, his need to recognize that he needs to go
after the people who killed Russian citizens. And those aren’t
the groups that they were currently hitting with strikes. So
they're going to have to make an adjustment in terms of
what they're prioritizing."900
897
Ashton Carter, “Statement on the U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East and the Count-
er-ISIL Campaign before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Speech, October 27, 2015 (on-
line by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Ar-
ticle/626037/statement-on-the-us-military-strategy-in-the-middle-east-and-the-counter-isil-c.
898
Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter: Russia 'Doomed to Fail' in Syria; ISIL Must be Defeated,” DoD
News, October 31, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/626828/carter-rus-
sia-doomed-to-fail-in-syria-isil-must-be-defeated.
899
Anne Patterson, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 4,
PattersonA-20151104.pdf.
900
Marcy Krieter, “US President Barack Obama Calls on Russia to Change Its Approach to
Syria to Defeat ISIS,” International Business Times, November 22, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/
us-president-barack-obama-calls-russia-change-its-approach-syria-defeat-isis-2195299.
November 13, 2015 ISIS kills 130 people in a series of attacks across Paris.901
November 16, 2015 Pres. Obama holds a press conference from Antalya, Turkey at
the G20 Summit. He discusses diplomatic progress in ending
the Syrian civil war: “we’ve begun to see some modest progress
on the diplomatic front, which is critical because a political
solution is the only way to end the war in Syria and unite the
Syrian people and the world against ISIL. The Vienna talks
mark the first time that all the key countries have come to-
gether -- as a result, I would add, of American leadership --
and reached a common understanding. In terms of decreasing
ISIL’s ability to carry out attacks worldwide, he says “our abil-
ity to shrink the space in which they can operate, combined
with a resolution to the Syria situation -- which will reduce the
freedom with which they feel that they can operate, and get-
ting local forces who are able to hold and keep them out over
the long term, that ultimately is going to be what’s going to
make a difference.” He also says we must “not close our hearts
to these victims of such violence and somehow start equating
the issue of refugees with the issue of terrorism.”902
November 19, 2015 Pres. Obama speaks at the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion summit, maintaining “"Bottom line is, I do not foresee
a situation in which we can end the civil war in Syria while
Assad remains in power." 903
November 24, 2015 Pres. Obama holds a joint press conference with French
Pres. Hollande. He says, “With respect to Mr. Assad, I think
we've got to let the Vienna process play itself out. It is our
best opportunity. And so the notion that there would be an
immediate date in advance of us getting a broad agreement
on that political process and the details I think doesn’t make
sense. As soon as we have a framework for a political transi-
tion -- potentially, a new constitution, elections -- I think it's
in that context that we can start looking at Mr. Assad choos-
901
Steve Almasy, Pierre Meilhan and Jim Bittermann, “Paris massacre: At least 128 killed
in gunfire and blasts, French officials say,” CNN, November 14, 2015, http://www.cnn.
com/2015/11/13/world/paris-shooting/.
Barack Obama, “Press Conference by President Obama -- Antalya, Turkey,” Press Briefing,
902
November 16, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/press-conference-president-obama-antalya-turkey.
903
“Obama says Syria settlement needed to eliminate Islamic State,” Reuters, November 19,
2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/19/obama-says-syria-settlement-needed-to-eliminate-islam-
ic-state.html.
ing not to run and potentially seeing a new Syria emerge.”904

November 24, 2015 Turkey downs a Russian jet violating its airspace along Turk-
ish-Syrian border. NATO and US stand in solidarity with
Turkey. U.S. and Turkish officials confirm that the jet briefly
entered Turkish airspace prior to its downing. Russia denies
that its plan entered Turkey.905
December 1, 2015 Sec. Carter testifies before the House Armed Services Com-
He says the U.S. is gaining momentum on the battlefield
in Syria and Iraq, citing that local forces in northern Syria
are fighting ISIL along the Ma’ra line, and Syrian Arabs and
Kurds have recaptured important territory and are focusing
on recapturing Raqqa. The Secretary also says that the coali-
tion hopes to open a southern front on ISIL. 906
December 7, 2015 Syria claims the U.S. led anti-ISIS coalition bombed a Syr-
ian military base. The U.S. denied the accusation, instead
saying that a Russian airplane had been responsible. 907
December 9, 2015 Sec. Carter testifies before the Senate Armed Services Com-
The campaign adopts three approaches: taking the fight to
the enemy where they are, developing local ground forces,
and setting the conditions for a political solution in Syria.
Carter reiterates statements made in his previous speech in
front of the House Armed Services Committee.908
904
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Hollande of France in Joint
Press Conference,” Remarks, November 24, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press
and-president-hollande-france-joint-press.
905
Dion Nissenbaum, Emre Peker, and James Marson, “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Mil-
itary Jet,” The Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-
shoots-down-jet-near-syria-border-1448356509.
906
Ashton Carter, “Statement on the U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East and the Count-
er-ISIL Campaign before the House Armed Services Committee,” Speech, December 1, 2015 (on-
line by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Ar-
ticle/631649/statement-on-the-us-military-strategy-in-the-middle-east-and-the-counter-isil-c.
907
Hwaida Saad and Eric Schmitt, “Syria Blames U.S. in Base Bombing, but Americans
Blame Russia,” The New York Times, December 7, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/
world/middleeast/syria-airstrikes.html?_r=0.
908
Ashton Carter, “Statement on the Counter-ISIL Campaign before the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee,” Speech, December 9, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://
www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/633510/statement-on-the-counter-isil-
campaign-before-the-senate-armed-services-committ.
December 14, 2015 Pres. Obama holds a press conference at the Pentagon. He
gives an update on the anti-ISIL campaign, saying “So far,
ISIL has lost about 40 percent of the populated areas it once
controlled in Iraq. ISIL also continues to lose territory in Syr-
ia. We continue to step up our air support and supplies to
local forces -- Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Christians, Turkmen -- and
they’re having success...I’ve asked Secretary Carter to go to the
Middle East -- he’ll depart right after this press briefing -- to
work with our coalition partners on securing more military
contributions to this fight. On the diplomatic front, Secretary
Kerry will be in Russia tomorrow as we continue to work, as
part of the Vienna process, to end the Syrian civil war. Mean-
while, here at home, the Department of Homeland Security
is updating its alert system to help the American people stay
vigilant and safe…The Special Forces that I ordered to Syria
have begun supporting local forces as they push south, cut off
supply lines and tighten the squeeze on Raqqa.”909
December 15, 2015 Sec. Kerry visits Moscow to discuss Syria, ISIS, and Iraq
with his Russian counterpart, FM Lavrov and Pres. Putin.
During press availability he tells reporters, “We started with
negotiations at Russian foreign ministry and we continued
here in the Kremlin during the meeting with President Pu-
tin. Negotiations in the morning and in the evening were
concrete, specific. We were focusing on issues of Syrian set-
tlement with the link on intensifying our efforts to counter
terrorism. ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other terrorist groups
are a common threat to every one of us, and today, we reiter-
ated our determination to uproot this evil. We reiterated the
arrangements reached between the military of the Russian
Federation and the U.S., arrangements that are applied to
the U.S.-led coalition is working against ISIL. 910
December 18, 2015 During a press conference, Pres. Obama discusses Syria. Re-
garding Assad, he says, “The reason that Assad has been a
problem in Syria is because that is a majority-Sunni country
and he had lost the space that he had early on to execute an
909
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Military Campaign to Destroy ISIL,”
Remarks, December 14, 2015 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/14/remarks-president-military-campaign-de-
stroy-isil.
910
John Kerry, “Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Press Re-
lease, December 15, 2015 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2015/12/250680.htm.
inclusive transition -- peaceful transition. He chose instead

to slaughter people, and as a consequence, our view has been
that you cannot bring peace to Syria, you cannot get an end
to the civil war unless you have a government that is recog-
nized as legitimate by a majority of that country. John Kerry
is meeting as we speak with Syria and Turkey and Iran and
the Gulf countries and other parties who are interested.911
December 15, 2015 Sec. State Kerry changes the long held U.S. policy that Assad
will have no role in a Syrian transition. He says, “The focus
now is not on our differences about what can or cannot be
done immediately about Assad. Rather, it is on facilitating a
peace process in which Syrians will be making decisions for
the future of Syria.” 912
December 16, 2016 The U.S. and Russia join forces in drafting a U.N. Securi-
ty Council resolution sanctioning entities that do business
with terrorist groups, namely ISIS.913
December 18, 2015 UN unanimously approves Resolution 2254 (2015), which
constitutes a roadmap for peace in Syria.914
Resolution 2254 (2015) the Council reconfirmed its endorsement of the 30 June
2012 Geneva Communiqué, and endorsed the “Vienna
Statements” in pursuit of the Communiqué’s implemen-
tation as the basis for a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned political
transition to end the conflict.915
December 21, 2015 UN Amb. Power announces that Pres. Obama plans to host
a high-level summit at next year’s General Assembly during
911
Barack Obama, “Press Conference by the President, 12/18/15,” Briefing, December 18,
press-office/2015/12/18/press-conference-president-121815.
912
Kellan Howell, “Kerry Changes Stance on Syria: U.S. Not Seeking Regime Change,” The
Washington Times, December 15, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/16/
kerry-changes-stance-syria-us-not-seeking-regime-c/.
913
Somini Sengupta, “UN Council to Adopt Sanctions Against ISIS,” The New York Times,
December 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/world/middleeast/un-council-to-
adopt-sanctions-against-isis.html?ref=topics.
914
John Kerry, “Remarks at the United Nations Security Council Meeting on Syria,” Re-
marks, December 18, 2015 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.
gov/remarks/7063.
915
Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for
Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks,United Nations Security Council, December 1,
2015, www.un.org/press/en/2015/sec1271.doc.htm
high-level week focused on the global refugee crisis.916

December 28, 2015 Iraqi troops retake most of Ramadi, seven months after the
city fell to ISIS forces.917
January 5, 2016 2015 U.S.-led Coalition spokesman U.S. Army Col. Steve
Warren announces that, “ISIS territory shrank by 40 percent
from its maximum expansion in Iraq, and by 20 percent in
Syria in 2015, as international forces pushed it out of several
cities.” 918
January 11, 2016 Sec. Kerry speaks by phone with Russian FM Lavrov, dis-
cussing Syria political process, the fight against DAESH,
and Middle East region, amongst other things.919
January 13, 2016 Sec. Carter discusses goals for 2016 for the United States’
fight against ISIL. He says that the campaign will focus on
collapsing ISIL’s control of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in
Iraq. He mentions that he ordered the most elite U.S. special
operations forces to go into Syria to support the fight against
ISIL.920
January 13, 2016 Former Sec. Hagel says that the “we [the US] have allowed
ourselves to get caught and paralyzed on our Syria policy by
the statement that ‘Assad must go’.”921
January 13, 2016 U.N. Special Envoy de Mistura says that Syria peace talks
are scheduled for January 25, 2016 in Geneva. His office
releases a statement saying, “The Special Envoy and his team
916
Samantha Power, “Remarks at the Security Council Stakeout Following Consultations on
the Middle East,” Remarks, December 21, 2015 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations),
http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7069.
917
Falih Hassan and Sewell Chan, “Iraqi Victory Over ISIS in Ramadi Could Prove Piv-
otal,” The New York Times, December 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/
middleeast/iraq-ramadi-isis.html.
918
Stephen Kalin and Maher Chmaytelli, “Islamic State Territory Shrinks in Iraq and Syria:
U.S.- Led Coalition,” Reuters, January 5, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-cri-
sis-islamicstate-idUSKBN0UJ17F20160105.
919
“Secretary Kerry's Phone Call With Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov,” Press Re-
lease, January 11, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2016/01/251087.htm.
920
Ashton Carter, “Remarks to the 101st Airborne Division on the Counter-ISIL Campaign
Plan,” Speech, January 13, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of Defense), http://www.defense.
gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/642995/counter-isil-campaign-plan-remarks.
921
Aaron Mehta, “Hagel: US 'Paralyzed' in Syria by Assad Focus,” Defense News, January 13,
2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/war-in-syria/2016/01/13/hagel-us-paralyzed-syria-as-
sad-focus/78769202/.
will continue working hard to issue the invitations in order

to ensure maximum inclusivity, with a view to starting the
intra-Syrian Geneva Talks on 25 January.”922
January 14, 2016 Sec. Kerry tells Syrian Opposition that U.S. support for the
group could be reduced if it doesn’t attend upcoming peace
conference in Geneva.923
January 20, 2016 Sec. Kerry and Russian FM Lavrov meet in Zurich in an
effort to reconcile difference over what countries and or-
ganizations will be represented at upcoming international
Syrian peace talks to be held in Geneva later during the
week. The meetings adjourn with no tangible progress hav-
ing been made. The Russian delegations were seeking to
include more opposition factions, including the Kurdish
PYD, in the talks.924
January 25, 2016 The Syria peace talks ,scheduled to begin on Monday, Janu-
ary 25 are pushed back to Friday, January 29. 925
January 26, 2016 UN Special Envoy de Mistura sends invitations to the de-
layed talks on Tuesday, without saying who had been invited
or how many groups might participate. A decision by the
opposition's recently formed High Negotiations Committee
(HNC) on whether to accept the invitation is due to be tak-
en at a meeting in Riyadh.926
January 26, 2016 Turkish FM Mevlut Cavusoglu says that Turkey will boycott
Geneva meetings if the PYD is invited.927
922
Tom Miles and Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. envoy says Syria peace talks still on for Jan-
uary 25,” Reuters, January 13, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-
idUSKCN0UR2MJ20160113.
923
Michael R. Gordon, “Kerry Urges Syrian Rebels to Go to Peace Meeting,” The New York
Times, January 14, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/us-presses-syr-
ian-opposition-to-join-talks.html?_r=0.
924
Anne Barnard, “Squabbles Persist Over Who Should Be at Syria Peace Talks,” The New
York Times, January 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/middleeast/syria-
peace-talks-john-kerry-sergey-lavrov.html?ref=topics.
“Syria talks to seek ceasefire, excluding ISIL and Nusra,” Al Jazeera, January 25, 2016, http://
925
www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/syria-peace-talks-postponed-january-160125131356951.html.
926
Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Tom Perry, and Tom Miles, “U.N. invites warring parties to Syria
talks this week,” Reuters, January 26, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syr-
ia-opposition-idUSKCN0V40MJ.
927
Ali Unal, “If PYD Is Invited to Syria Peace Talks, Turkey Will Boycott the Meeting,” Daily
Sabah, January 26, 2016, http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2016/01/26/fm-cavusoglu-if-
pyd-is-invited-to-syria-peace-talks-turkey-will-boycott-the-meetings.
January 26, 2016 Amb. Power comments on the state of besieged areas in
Syria, specifically Madaya. She says, "The conditions are
particularly abysmal in besieged areas, where, according to
the UN, nearly 400,000 people are waging a daily struggle
to merely survive.928
January 27, 2016 Speaking to the decision of the U.N. not to invite Kurdish
PYD forces to peace talks in Geneva, State Dept. Spokes-
person Mark Toner says in a briefing, “The exclusion of the
PYD, at least in this initial round of talks, was a decision
taken by de Mistura and his people and it was partly a re-
flection of, again, these meetings to define the Syrian oppo-
sition and to basically choose who among the Syrian oppo-
sition would represent them going forward in these talks,
and we respect that process.929
January 27, 2016 UN Amb. Power remarks at the Security Council stakeout
following consultations on Syria, “Syria is in what he called
“a race against time.” 930
January 29, 2016 The Syrian opposition announces that it will send a team
to Geneva, though it does not commit to attending the
peace talks with the Syrian government.931 The opposition
says they will stand by their demand for an end to air-
strikes and blockades before they will negotiate with the
Syrian government. 932
January 31, 2016 Special Envoy McGurk crosses into the Kurdish-held north
of Syria to meet with Kurdish officials and fighters battling
the ISIS. This was the first known visit to Syria by a senior
U.S. official since the ambassador, Robert Ford, departed
928
Samantha Power, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Middle East,”
Remarks, January 26, 2016 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.
gov/remarks/7106.
929
Mark Toner, Daily Press Briefing, January 27, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of State),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/01/251728.htm.
930
Samantha Power, “Remarks at the Security Council Stakeout Following Consultations on
Syria,” Remarks, January 27, 2016 (online by U.S. Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.
state.gov/remarks/7110.
931
Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Opposition will send team to Syria talks but has not
agreed to participate,” The Washington Post, January 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/middle_east/syria-peace-talks-open-in-disarray-with-opposition-groups-staying-
away/2016/01/29/c1cc02b0-c607-11e5-b933-31c93021392a_story.html.
932
“Syria conflict: Opposition sets terms for Geneva peace talks,” BBC News, January 31,
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35452640.
the capital, Damascus, in 2012.933

February 1, 2016 The U.N. announces the official start to the Syria peace talks
in Geneva.934
February 2-3, 2016 Sec. Kerry travels to Rome to lead the U.S. delegation to the
Global Coalition to Counter ISIL Small Group Ministerial.
Secretary Kerry then travels to London to lead the U.S. del-
egation to the Fourth Syria Donors Conference.935
February 3, 2016 Sec. Kerry issues a statement supporting a peaceful resolu-
tion to the Syrian Crisis.936
February 3, 2016 The Syrian regime with Russian air support begins a major
offensive in Aleppo, complicating the peace talks in Geneva.937
February 3, 2016 UN Special Envoy de Mistura announces that he has tempo-
rarily suspended the Syria peace talks.938
February 4, 2016 World leaders meet at a donor conference in London and
pledge over $10 billion in aid for Syria. Sec. Kerry represents
the U.S. at the conference. He says, “So today the United
States is announcing our latest contribution, which is over
$925 million. That includes more than 600 million in direct
humanitarian aid to provide food, shelter, water, medical
care, and other vital relief to millions of people inside of Syr-
ia and across the region. It also includes 325 million in de-
velopment assistance, 290 million of which is new funding
933
Liz Sly, “US Envoy Goes to Syria to Press the Fight Against the Islamic State,” The Wash-
ington Post, January 31, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-envoy-goes-to-syr-
ia-to-press-the-fight-against-the-islamic-state/2016/01/31/7cd39aaf-b44e-467c-97e9-a365c-
627fa31_story.html?tid=a_inl.
934
Tom Miles, John Irish, Tom Perry and Arshad Mohammed, “U.N. announces start of
Syria peace talks as government troops advance,” Reuters, February 1, 2016, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0VA2OT.
935
John Kerry, “Remarks at the Ministerial Meeting of the Small Group of the Global Coali-
tion to Counter ISIL,” Remarks, February 2, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://
936
John Kerry, “Supporting a Peaceful Resolution to the Syrian Crisis,” Statement, Feb-
ruary 3, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2016/02/252110.htm.
937
Nick Cumming-Bruce, “New Offensive by Assad’s Forces Overshadows Syria Peace Talks,”
The New York Times, February 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/world/middleeast/
new-offensive-by-assads-forces-overshadows-syria-peace-talks.html.
938
Nick Cumming-Bruce and Somini Sengupta, “Syria Talks Are Suspended,” The New York
Times, February 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/world/middleeast/syria-peace-
talks-geneva-de-mistura.html?ref=world.
specifically to support schooling for 300,000 refugee youth

in Jordan and Lebanon – meeting directly, hopefully, the
challenge that we face here today.”939
February 4, 2016 Syrian government forces continue to advance on Aleppo
with Russian air support, displacing thousands of civilians.940
February 6, 2016 Tens of thousands of Syrian refugees flee a Russia-backed
government offensive in the Syrian city of Aleppo.941
February 10, 2016 Special Envoy McGurk testifies before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on the threat posed by ISIL in Iraq, Syr-
ia, and Libya. Recently returning from the region where he
met with Syrian Kurdish groups in rebel-controlled territo-
ry, he cited progress in reducing the oil output of ISIS due to
U.S. and allied airstrikes, as well as Turkey’s efforts to secure
its border with Syria in order to reduce the flow of foreign
fighters and supplies. He also discussed the humanitarian
and Syrian refugee situation, efforts to counter ISIS mes-
saging on social media and the role of other countries in the
region to aid in the conflict. 942
February 11-12, 2016 The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) meets in
Munich. The member countries decide that humanitarian
access will commence this week to besieged areas, and that
an ISSG task force will within one week elaborate modalities
for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. The ISSG members
unanimously commit to immediately facilitate the full im-
plementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254,
adopted unanimously December 18, 2015.943
February 11, 2016 Sec. Kerry and Russian FM Lavrov announce that they
agreed on the delivery over the next few days of desperately
939
John Kerry, “Remarks at the Syria Donors Conference,” Remarks, February 4, 2016 (on-
line by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/252121.htm.
940
Ben Hubbard, “Government Forces, Backed by Russian Jets, Advance in Syria,” The New
York Times, February 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/middleeast/saudis-
suggest-a-syria-ground-operation-led-by-us-and-its-allies.html.
941
Mehmet Emin Caliskan, Lisa Barrington, and Humeyra Pamuk, “Syrians flee to Turkish
border as Aleppo assault intensifies,” Reuters, February 6, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0VF087.
942
Brett McGurk, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 10,
McGurkB-20160210.pdf.
943
“Statement of the International Syria Support Group,” Statement, February 11, 2016
(online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252428.htm.
needed aid to besieged Syrian cities, to be followed by a “ces-

sation of hostilities” within a week.944
February 12, 2016 Sec. Kerry holds a joint press conference with Russian FM
Lavrov at the International Syria Support Group meeting
in Munich. Kerry applauds the progress made in Munich
on the humanitarian front and the cessation of hostilities,
which will apply to all parties in Syria with the exception of
the terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Nusra. He states
that the ISSG agreed upon the need to work with Russia in
an effort to guarantee that the access is provided and that the
cessation of hostilities actually takes hold.945
February 15, 2016 Amb. Susan Rice says that Russia’s intensified campaign in
Syria “does call into question Russia’s willingness or ability
to implement the agreements achieved in Munich.” 946
February 15, 2016 The U.S. condemns airstrikes conducted in and around Alep-
po against civilian targets, including two hospitals in Azaz
city. Russia claims the U.S. is responsible for the bombings. 947
February 15, 2016 German Chanc. Merkel calls for the formation of no fly
zone in Syria:948
February 15, 2016 Senator John McCain says of Russian Pres. Putin at the Mu-
nich Security Conference, “He [Putin] wants to exacerbate
the refugee crisis and use it as a weapon to divide the trans-
atlantic alliance and undermine the European project. The
only thing that has changed about Mr. Putin’s ambitions is
that his appetite is growing with the eating.”949
February 17, 2016 UN Special Envoy de Mistura says the Syrian government has
944
David Sanger, “U.S. and Russia Announce Plan for Humanitarian Aid and a Cease-Fire in
Syria,” The New York Times, February 11, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/mid-
dleeast/us-and-russia-announce-plan-for-humanitarian-aid-and-a-cease-fire-in-syria.html?ref=world.
945
John Kerry, “Press Availability at the International Syria Support Group,” Remarks,
February 12, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2016/02/252431.htm.
946
Susan Rice, “Press Briefing by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz,” Briefing, Feb-
ruary 15, 2016 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2016/02/15/press-briefing-principal-deputy-press-secretary-eric-schultz.
947
John Kirby, “Airstrikes in Northern Syria,” Press Release, February 15, 2016 (online by
U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252503.htm.
948
Michelle Martin, “Merkel says supports some kind of no-fly zone in Syria,” Reuters, February
15,2016,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-merkel-nofly-idUSKCN0VO1ZH.
Tim Hume, “McCain slams Russia: 'Mr. Putin is not interested in being our partner',”
949
CNN, February 15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/14/middleeast/syria-russia-u-s-turkey/.

approved access to seven besieged areas and UN convoys are

expected to travel to them within days after meeting with with
Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem in Damascus.950
February 22, 2016 Pres. Obama speaks with Russian Pres. Putin by phone to
discuss efforts to establish a nation-wide cessation of hos-
tilities between the Syrian regime and its allies on the one
hand and the armed opposition on the other. Pres. Obama
welcomes that an understanding was reached between the
United States, Russia, as well as other partners in the In-
ternational Syria Support Group on the terms and modal-
ities for such a cessation of hostilities. He also emphasizes
that the priority now was to ensure positive responses by
the Syrian regime and armed opposition as well as faith-
ful implementation by all parties in order to alleviate the
suffering of the Syrian people, galvanize UN-led political
process, and focus on defeating ISIL. 951
February 22, 2016 Sec. Kerry says he and Russian FM Lavrov had reached a
provisional agreement on terms of a cessation of hostilities in
Syria and the sides are closer to a ceasefire than ever before.952
February 22, 2016 Sec. Kerry announces the cessation of hostilities agreement
at a press conference in Washington.953
February 22, 2016 President Obama speaks by phone with President Vladimir
Putin of Russia at the Kremlin’s request to discuss efforts to
establish a nation-wide cessation of hostilities between the Syr-
ian regime and its allies on the one hand and the armed op-
position on the other. suffering of the Syrian people, galvanize
UN-led political process, and focus on defeating ISIL. 954
950
“Syria 'approves' aid access to seven besieged areas,” Al Jazeera, February 17, 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/russia-rejects-war-crimes-accusation-syria-at-
tacks-160216175121002.html.
951
“Readout of the President’s Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” Press Release,
February 22, 2016 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/22/readout-presidents-call-president-vladimir-putin-russia.
952
Arshad Mohammed and Tom Perry, “Syrian rebels see flaws in U.S.-Russian truce
plan,” Reuters, February 22, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-draft-
idUSKCN0VV1NJ.
953
John Kerry, “Cessation of Hostilities in Syria,” Statement, February 22, 2016 (online by
954
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/22/readout-presidents-call-president-vladimir-putin-russia.
February 23, 2016 The Syrian government says that it has accepted a pro-
posed truce in the country, adding that operations would
nevertheless continue against the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda's branch in Syria. A Foreign
Ministry statement on Tuesday says government forces
would have the right to respond to any violation carried
out by insurgents.955
February 23, 2016 Pres. Obama speaks via video conference with heads of
state from Germany, France, and Britain about the agree-
ment to end hostilities in Syria. The leaders "called on all
parties to implement it faithfully," and "underscored the
importance of an immediate halt to the indiscriminate
bombing of civilian populations," the White House said
in a statement.956
February 23, 2016 Sec. Kerry testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid in
Syria. He says “We have the opportunity to put to the test
their commitment to a political solution. If this doesn’t end
and the opposition continues to fight, this could get a lot
uglier. The Russians have to consider that, too.”957
February 24, 2016 Sec. Kerry says it would take 15,000 to 30,000 ground
troops to maintain a safe zone inside northern Syria, citing
previously unheard estimates provided by the Pentagon.958
February 25, 2016 Press Sec. Earnest reiterates the White House’s position that
“the core of solving this problem involves bringing about a
long-overdue political transition inside of Syria.”959
955
“Syrian regime agrees to truce deal,” CBS News, February 23, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.
com/news/syria-bashar-assad-cease-fire-but-isis-nusra-war-russia/.
956
“Readout of the President’s Video Conference with British Prime Minister David Cam-
eron, French President Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel,” Press Re-
lease, February 23, 2016 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/23/readout-presidents-video-conference-brit-
ish-prime-minister-david-cameron.
957
Oren Dorell, “Kerry warns of 'Plan B' in Syria if cease-fire fails,” USA Today, February
23, 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/02/23/kerry-warns-plan-b-syria-if-
cease-fire-fails/80810158/.
958
Justin Fishel, “Up to 30,000 Troops Needed for Syria Safe Zone, Kerry Says,” ABC
News, February 24, 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/International/30000-troops-needed-syr-
ia-safe-zone-kerry/story?id=37173697.
959
Josh Earnest, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 2/25/2016,” Press Release,
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-2252016.
February 26, 2016 UN Amb. Power says Resolution 2268 adopted by the
U.N. Security Council to endorse the cessation of hostili-
ties in Syria “offers a genuine opportunity to pause, at least
in part, the fighting in one of the most brutal conflicts the
world has seen in a generation.” She cites continued con-
cern for Syria and Russia’s continued airstrikes throughout
Syria, but is hopeful that the cessation of hostilities will
allow UN Special Envoy de Mistura to reconvene talks in
Geneva for a political solution.”960
February 27, 2016: The ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and
Russia goes into effect.
February 27, 2016 Pres. Obama states in his weekly address that the only way
to defeat ISIL is to end the civil war in Syria. He says the
ceasefire meant to take effect this weekend will be critical
and adds, “We’re not under any illusions. There are plen-
ty of reasons for skepticism.” He emphasizes that there
will be no ceasefire against ISIL.961
February 29, 2016 State Dept. Deputy Spokesperson Toner reiterates that he has
no details about the “Plan B” for Syria if the ceasefire fails.962
March 11, 2016 Sec. State Kerry travels to Saudi Arabia to meet with se-
nior Saudi officials to discuss efforts to resolve the Syrian
and Yemeni crisis963.
March 13, 2016 Sec. Kerry, during a joint press conference with his coun-
terparts from France, Germany, the U.K., EU, and Italy
discusses the International Syria Support group and the
cessation of hostilities agreement. “Now, the diplomatic
process that has been launched by the International Syria
Support Group has enabled us to move forward in two
critical areas. I mentioned one, the reduction of violence.
But it has made possible the delivery of emergency sup-
960
Samantha Power, “Explanation of Vote at the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 2268 on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria,” Remarks, February 26, 2016 (online by U.S.
Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7156.
961
Barack Obama, “WEEKLY ADDRESS: Degrading and Destroying ISIL,” Remarks, Feb-
ruary 27, 2016 (online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/27/weekly-address-degrading-and-destroying-isil.
962
Mark Toner, Daily Press Briefing, February 29, 2016 (online by U.S. Department of
State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/02/253784.htm.
963
John Kirby, “Secretary Kerry’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and France,” Press Release, March 10,
2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/254590.htm
plies to communities inside Syria.964

March 14, 2016 Russia announces that it will begin to withdraw its forces
from Syria.965 Pres. Obama speaks with Russian President
Putin by phone. The two discuss developments in Syria, in-
cluding the ongoing cessation of hostilities and Putin’s an-
nouncement that day to withdraw Russian forces. Obama
emphasized the U.S.’s stance that a political transition is
required to end violence in Syria.966
March 16, 2016 Sec. Kerry speaks on the phone with Russian FM Lavrov to
stress the urgent need for a political transition in Syria. He
also underscored the U.S. desire for maintaining the cessa-
tion of hostilities and providing of humanitarian access to
Syrian populations in distress967.
March 22, 2016 ISIS perpetrates a series of explosions at the Brussels airport
and Maelbeek subway station968.
March 23, 2016 Sec. Carter testifies before the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, stating that he is confident that the Islamic State will
be defeated in both Iraq and Syria, adding “we have the mo-
mentum of the campaign.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Joe Dunford, expressed agreement with Car-
ter’s sentiment, adding, “Since [October], [ISIL] not only
have less territory, they have less resources, they have less
freedom of movement.”969
964
John Kerry, “Remarks at the Joint Press Availability with French Foreign Minister Jean-
Marc Ayrault, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary
Philip Hammond, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, and Italian Foreign Minister
Paolo Gentiloni,” Remarks, March 13, 2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/254644.htm
965
Holly Yan and Tim Hume, “Russia Begins Withdrawing Forces from Syria,” CNN, March
15, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/15/world/russia-syria-withdrawal/
966
March 14, 2016 (Online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/14/readout-presidents-call-president-vladimir-putin-russia
967
John Kirby, “Readout of Secretary Kerry’s Call with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov,”
Press Release, March 16, 2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2016/03/254770.htm
968
Victoria Shannon, “Brussels Attacks: What We Know and Don’t Know,” March 22, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-attacks-what-we-know-and-dont-
know.html
969
Jim Garamone, “Coalition Has Momentum in Fight Against ISIL, Carter, Dunford Say,”
DoD News, March 23, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/702339/coali-
tion-has-momentum-in-fight-against-isil- carter-dunford-say
March 23, 2016 Discussing Sec. Kerry’s upcoming trip to Moscow, a Senior
State Department Official says, “On Syria, as you know,
with the cessation of hostilities going better than a lot of
people expected – albeit with significant violations every day
– it’ll be a chance to evaluate where we are there.”970
March 22-24, 2016 Sec. Kerry travels to Moscow for meetings with Russian
Pres. Putin and FM Lavrov. Sec. Kerry discussed Syria with
both leaders. “It’s fair to say, Mr. President, that the serious
approach that we have been able to cooperate on has made
a difference to the life of people in Syria and to the possibil-
ities of making progress on peace,” he told Pres. Putin971.
March 24, 2016 The U.S. and Russia renew their commitment to strengthen
the Syrian cease-fire during “marathon” talks in Moscow. The
two sides agreed that negotiators from both the Syrian oppo-
sition and government must meet in Geneva and produce a
“target schedule” for drafting a constitution and guidelines
for a political transition to occur no later than August.972
March 27, 2016 Syrian state forces report that they have retaken Palmyra
from ISIS after a three week operation supported by Rus-
sian airstrikes973
March 30, 2016 The U.S. announces, at a high-level UNHCR meeting in
Geneva, that it will provide an additional $10 million to
the UNHCR towards aiding in identifying and resettling
Syrian refugees.974
March 30, 2016 White House Press Sec. Josh Earnest says, “it is impossi-
ble to imagine a scenario where the political turmoil and
violence inside of Syria comes to an end while President
Assad is still there,” reiterating the administration’s po-
970
U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Secretary Kerry’s Travel to Moscow, Russia,” Press
Release, March 23, 2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2016/03/254981.htm
971
John Kerry, “Remarks with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Remarks, March 24, 2016
(Online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/255114.htm
972
Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia and the U.S. Agree to Try to Bolster Cease-Fire in Syria,”
The New York Times, March 24, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/europe/ker-
ry-russia-talks.html
973
Erika Solomon, “Syrian Forces Retake Palmyra from ISIS,” Financial Times, March 27,
2016, https://next.ft.com/content/75ce4d64-f406-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132
974
U.S. Department of State, “The United States Announces Additional Pledges in Support
of Syrian Refugees,” Press Release, March 30, 2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/255304.htm
sition that Assad must step aside in order to achieve a

resolution to the Syrian conflict.975
March 31, 2016 The U.S. condemns an attack on Deir Al Asafir, Syria say-
ing it is “ appalled by aerial strikes March 31, reportedly by
the Assad regime, on a school and hospital in the Damascus
suburb of Deir Al Asafir, where more than 20 people are
believed to have been killed and dozens were injured, in-
cluding women, children, and first responders.”976
April 1, 2016 Pres. Obama speaks at the closing session of the Nuclear Se-
curity Summit in Washington. He states that ISIL is losing
ground in Syria and Iraq in terms of morale, oil infrastruc-
ture and revenues, and flow of foreign fighters. He adds, “as
ISIL is squeezed in Syria and Iraq, we can anticipate it lash-
ing out elsewhere.”977
April 5th, 2016 Sec. Kerry appears on PBS’s Charlie Rose. Rose quotes Gen-
eral Petraeus’ sentiment that, “if we’re not winning we’re los-
ing,” asking Sec. Kerry if the U.S. is losing the fight against
ISIS. The Sec. responds, “No, we’re distinctly not. That I be-
lieve very deeply. We are aggressively making progress with
respect to ISIL, Daesh.978
April 6, 2016 White House Press Sec. Earnest says efforts to destroy the
Islamic State have been effective in decreasing the number
of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria, enhancing
the capabilities of local forces to fight the Islamic State, and
pushing the Islamic State off of previously-held territory.979
April 12, 2016 US Rep. to the UN Samantha Power expresses strong dis-
trust toward statements from the Syrian regime and Rus-
975
Josh Earnest, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,” Press Release, March 30,
2016 (Online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2016/03/31/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-3302016
976
John Kirby, “Attacks in Deir Al Asafir, Syria,” Press Release, March 31, 2016 (Online by
U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/255386.htm
977
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the Closing Session of the Nuclear Se-
curity Summit,” Remarks, April 1, 2016 (Online by the White House Office of the Press Secre-
tary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-clos-
ing-session-nuclear-security-summit
978
Samantha Power, “Remarks Following a UN Security Council Meeting on Humanitarian
Access to Besieged Areas in Syria,” Remarks, April 5, 2016 (Online by the United States Mission
to the United Nations), http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7214
979
Josh Earnest, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,” Press Release, April 6, 2016
(Online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/04/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-462016
sia that they have only been targeting terrorists, calling the
claims “ludicrous.”980
April 13, 2016 Pres. Obama calls the negotiated ceasefire in Syria “tenuous” and
emphasizes that talks on a political solution in Syria “must in-
clude a transition away” from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.981
April 14, 2016 State Dept. Press Sec. Kirby announces that the U.S. has
pledged $421 million in aid the the UNHCR.982
April 15, 2016 Sec. Kerry speaks by phone with Russian FM Lavrov to re-
iterate U.S. concerns about the stability of the cessation of
hostilities in Syria.983
April 18, 2016 Rebel groups in Syria, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Is-
lam, and several other groups under the Free Syrian Army
umbrella declare that their intent to wage an offensive
against government forces after multiple alleged truce viola-
tions on the part of the government.984
April 19, 2016 The main Syrian opposition group, the High Negotiations
Committee (HNC), has left Geneva in protest of the con-
tinued violence in Syria, a day after suspending their partic-
ipation in the talks.985
April 22, 2016 Pres. Obama holds a joint press conference with British Prime
Minister David Cameron, in which Obama says he has al-
ways been skeptical of Russian President Putin’s “actions and
motives inside of Syria.” He continues, “we cannot end the
crisis in Syria without political negotiations and without get-
ting all the parties around the table to craft a transition plan.”
980
Samantha Power, “Remarks Following UN Security Council Consultations on Syria, Re-
marks, April 12, 2016 (Online by United States Mission to the United Nations), http://usun.
state.gov/remarks/7220
981
Carol Lee, “Obama Describes Syrian Cease-Fire as ‘Tenuous’,” The Wall Street Journal, April
13, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-describes-syrian-cease-fire-as-tenuous-1460591700
982
John Kirby, “The United States Contributed $421 Million to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees,” Press Release, April 14, 2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/255835.htm
983
John Kirby, “Readout of Secretary Kerry’s Phone Call with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov,” Press Release, April 15, 2016 (Online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/255870.htm
984
“Syria Conflict: Rebels Vow Retaliatory Attacks Against Government,” BBC, April 18,
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36071608
985
Rua’a Alameri & Ammar Aziz, “Lack of ‘Pressure’ on Syria Regime as Truce Fails,” al Ara-
biya English, April 19, 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/04/19/Syri-
an-truce-crumbles-as-Russia-urges-more-peace-talks.html
He also states that the cessation of hostilities has endured lon-

ger than he expected and that he has spoken with President
Putin to pressure Assad to maintain this ceasefire.986
April 24, 2016 Pres. Obama says that his objection to a safe zone in Syria
is a practical, not ideological, objection, with concerns of
whose troops would ensure it, how people would be let in,
and how it would be monitored.987
April 26, 2016 The White House states that President Obama would con-
sider sending more Special Operations forces to Syria if the
deployment of 250 additional personnel is successful.988
April 28, 2016 Sec. Carter testifies before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee that the U.S. has made effective moves in the last
year’s fight against the Islamic State, including the decision
to base additional aircraft in Turkey.989
Sec. Kerry insinuates that Bashar al-Assad is a war criminal,
saying “ I believe there is strong evidence to that effect, and
at some point, obviously, there could well be a reckoning
with respect to that.” Kerry also insists that the Kremlin had
played a constructive role in some regards in Syria,
April 28, 2016 The State Department condemns airstrikes in Aleppo on the
al-Quds hospital, was was operating under the support of
both Doctors Without Borders and the Red cross. Spokes-
person Kirby also said that, “Russia has an urgent responsi-
bility to press the regime to fulfill its commitments under
UNSCR 2254, including in particular to stop attacking ci-
vilians, medical facilities, and first responders, and to abide
fully by the cessation of hostilities.”990
986
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron in Joint
Press Conference,” Remarks, April 22, 2016 (Online by the White House Office of the Press
and-prime-minister-cameron-joint-press
987
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel in Joint Press Con-
ference,” Remarks, April 24, 2016 (Online by the White House Office of the Press Secretary),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/24/remarks-president-obama-and-chan-
cellor-merkel-joint-press-conference
988
Jordan Fabian, “Obama Open to Sending More Troops to Syria,” The Hill, April 26, 2016,
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/277682-obama-open-to-sending-more-troops-to-syria
989
Halimah Abdullah, “Sec. Carter: Military Personnel in ‘Combat’,” NBC News, April
29, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sec-carter-defends-u-s-strategy-defeating-
isis-n564266
990
John Kerry, “Attack on al-Quds Hospital in Aleppo, Syria,” Press Release, April 28, 2016
(Online by U.S. Department of State), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/04/256697.htm
KILIC BUGRA KANAT
T he Syrian conflict that began as a
revolution quickly descended into a major humanitarian disaster with the
KILIC BUGRA KANAT
Assad regime’s increasing use of force and the militarization of the dis-
pute between the regime and the opposition. The country is witnessing
a gloomy reality on the ground and there is little evidence to suggest any
OBAMA’S SYRIA POLICY

breakthrough in the near future. The ever-growing death toll, thousands of
documented cases of war crimes and systematic torture, the use of weapons
of mass destruction and the rise of radical groups have all failed to stir a
robust American response. This book provides a synopsis of the past four
years of U.S. policy in Syria. It brings together the major turning points of
this policy since the beginning of the Arab Spring.
REVISED AND ENLARGED SECOND EDITION
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KILIC BUGRA KANAT

T he Syrian conflict that began as a

A TALE OF FOUR AUGUSTS

REVISED AND ENLARGED SECOND EDITION

© 2016 SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi

All rights reserved.

ONE THE BUSH YEARS

TWO THAWING RELATIONS BEFORE THE ARAB SPRING

THREE THE ARAB SPRING THUNDERS THROUGH SYRIA

FOUR OBAMA CALLS FOR ASSAD’S REMOVAL

FIVE OBAMA’S RED LINE

SIX A NEW CALCULUS

SEVEN FIGHTING AGAINST ISIS

EIGHT RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

TIMELINE OF U.S.-SYRIA RELATIONS

The Syrian conflict began as a revolution but quickly descended into a

started in the Geneva II talks in January 2014, it immediately became clear

bombs, chemical weapons, and committed crimes against humanity and

Gradually the intensity of the regime’s chemical attacks became unignor-

by the President’s unfulfilled policies and the lack of a communication or

military assistance for humanitarian aid purposes.10 Later in September,

the Syrian regime to earn international legitimacy and to be considered a

number of foreign fighter recruiters to North African countries.28 Howev-

ditional factors began to generate new complications. The two countries

tensions. One final camp, which included Secretary of Defense Robert

Prior to stepping foot in the Oval Office, it was reported

interlocutors voiced the hope that Syrian-US relations would soon be

on knee-jerk support from Syria.” 64 Specifically, the new administration

to meet in order to normalize relations. These requirements were: 1) the

had much to gain from building stronger lines of communication with

Syria and asked her to launch an initiative of engagement.86 According

the participation of different agencies from the U.S. government. During

the highest-ranking administration officials to visit Syria since Deputy

rights abuses in Syria, the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations, the elections

was key. According to Landis, “[Obama] may want Israel to understand

mote instability through terrorism, proliferation and insurgency in Iraq.106

Despite pressures, FM Moallem reportedly responded dubiously to

May 29, 2009, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09DAMASCUS377.html.

820, November 24, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09DAMASCUS820.html.

to cooperate by engaging with it in areas of technical interest to boost

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

unstable. Israel felt threatened in facing an unconventional challenge from

Obama is President, it will be difficult in the future.”137 Seymour Hersh, in

May 13, 2009, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/page/101/

East. During the rapprochement with Syria, the Obama administration

leaked that discussed the status of Turkish-Syrian relations. The document

February 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/middleeast/05mideast.html.

the issue of controlling weapons of mass destruction. This was a significant

ing to a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, General Mamlouk

The diplomatic thaw continued following these developments. In

Hezbollah.174 Following this threat, the State Department released a state-

On the eve of the revolutions in the Middle East, President Obama

Landis, Joshua, “Is the Syrian-US Engagement at an End?” joshualandis.com, Thursday,

September 17th, 2009 http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/page/93/

The report also recommended some caution in regards to the future

The Arab Spring struck at an inopportune time for the Obama

intervention was conducted via NATO and endorsed by the UN.

Another analysis by Bassam Haddad raised similar points about the

Later, in an interview, Assad himself expressed similar viewpoint.:

However in the first days of anti-regime demonstrations analysts work-

the news and personal reports in an attempt to garner an actionable un-

These statements from Secretary Clinton later garnered significant criti-

Despite these calls from Congress, the administration continued its