SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 191611-14. July 29, 2019.]

LIBRADO M. CABRERA and FE M. CABRERA, petitioners, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

J.C. REYES , JR., J : p

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 dated

November 19, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan (4th Division) which found
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
its Resolution 2 dated March 10, 2010, which denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 27555, 27556,
27557 and 27558.
Petitioners Librado M. Cabrera (Librado) and Fe M. Cabrera (Fe)
together with accused Luther H. Leonor (Leonor), as public officers, were
charged in four separate Informations 3 with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 27555, Librado and Leonor, in their capacity as
then Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of Taal,
Batangas, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence, made several direct purchases of medicines from
Diamond Laboratories, Inc. (DLI), a corporation owned by the relatives by
consanguinity of Librado. The purchases were made without the benefit of
public bidding or canvass giving DLI unwanted benefit and depriving the
Municipality of Taal the opportunity to avail of a better price of the same
quality of supplies. The total costs of the purchases amounted to
P503,920.35. Leonor, despite being the Municipal Councilor, acted as the
authorized representative of DLI as he was the one who received all
payments due and signed all pertinent documents of the transactions.
In Criminal Case No. 27556, Librado, then Mayor of the Municipality
of Taal, Batangas, taking advantage of his official position, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, caused undue
injury to the Municipality of Taal, to the government as a whole and to public
interest at the same time, gave unwarranted benefit to himself by
reimbursing, collecting and appropriating the total amount of P27,651.83
representing the expenses he incurred during his unauthorized and illegal
travels to Manila.
In Criminal Case No. 27557, Fe and Leonor, in their capacity as then
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of Taal, Batangas
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
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 negligence, made several direct purchases of medicines from DLI, a
corporation owned by the relatives by consanguinity of Fe's husband,
Librado. The purchases were made without the benefit of public bidding or
canvass giving DLI unwanted benefit and depriving the Municipality of Taal
the opportunity to avail of a better price of the same quality of supplies. The
total costs of the purchases amounted to P1,042,902.46. Leonor, despite
being the Municipal Councilor, acted as the authorized representative of DLI
as he was the one who received all payments due and signed all pertinent
documents of the transactions.
I n Criminal Case No. 27558, Fe, then Mayor of the Municipality of
Taal, Batangas, taking advantage of her official position, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, caused undue
injury to the Municipality of Taal, to the government as a whole and to public
interest, at the same time, gave unwarranted benefit to herself by
reimbursing, collecting and appropriating the total amount of P170,987.66
representing the expenses she incurred during her unauthorized and illegal
travels to Manila.
Librado and Fe claimed that the purchases of medicines in question
were covered by the exceptions allowing certain purchases without public
bidding. These purchases conform with the exceptions pertaining to
emergency purchases that were made directly from manufacturers or
exclusive distributor of Philippine-manufactured drugs. Leonor, on the other
hand, explained that his participation in these transactions was only by
virtue of the request of DLI, his former employer, with respect to the
collection of payments. Leonor clarified that he had no financial or material
interest in these transactions and neither was his office charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or concessions.
As to the charge of illegal reimbursements of travel expenses, Librado
and Fe claimed that these were not questionable considering that they were
supported with bills and receipts and certifications attesting that their travels
were absolutely necessary. Moreover, they claimed that they secured the
verbal permission of the governor before every travel and although late, they
were able to secure a written permission from the governor after the travels.
On November 19, 2009, the Sandiganbayan (4th Division) rendered its
Decision finding Librado and Fe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Leonor was acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Librado Cabrera and Fe Cabrera are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Republic Act
3019, Section 3(e) and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty
of 6 years 1 month to 10 years for each charge as follows:
1) Accused Librado Cabrera for the charges in Criminal Case
Nos. 27555 and 27556
2) Accused Fe Cabrera for the charges in Criminal Case Nos.
27557 and 27558
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 with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
any public office. Accused Librado Cabrera and accused Fe Cabrera
are directed to reimburse the Municipality of Taal, Batangas the
amounts of [Php]27,651.83 and [Php]170,987.66 respectively[,]
representing the disbursed amounts for their unauthorized travels.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused
Luther H. Leonor beyond reasonable doubt, he is ACQUITTED.
Costs against accused Librado Cabrera and Fe Cabrera.
SO ORDERED. 4

In Criminal Case Nos. 27555 and 27557 involving the purchase of

medicines without competitive public bidding, the Sandiganbayan ruled that
since both Librado and Fe were public officers discharging administrative
and official functions, they ought to abide by the fundamental rules in the
procurement of supplies. The Sandiganbayan did not give merit to
petitioners' defense that the purchases they made fell within the exceptions
allowed by law, such as, they were emergency purchases and were directly
bought from the manufacturer or exclusive distributor of Philippine-
manufactured drugs. The Sandiganbayan ruled that in order to avail of the
exceptions, there were requirements to be complied with which petitioners
failed to comply.
In Criminal Case Nos. 27556 and 27558, involving reimbursements of
travel expenses, the Sandiganbayan ruled that petitioners did not comply
with the proper procedure. The Sandiganbayan did not subscribe to
petitioners' defense that their travels, albeit belatedly obtained, were with
the official permission of the governor. As it ruled, the permission referred to
by petitioners was not the permission required for purposes of accounting
and reimbursement. The Local Government Code (LGC) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) provide for mandatory documents
bearing the required permission/travel order that must be submitted.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion was, however,
denied in a Resolution 5 dated March 10, 2010.
Petitioners appealed to this Court seeking reversal of the
Sandiganbayan's Decision on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) COMMITTED A MANIFEST
ERROR OF LAW IN EQUATING LACK OF PUBLIC BIDDING TO
GIVING UNWARRANTED BENEFIT TO DIAMOND LABORATORIES,
INC. (DLI). 6
II. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) COMMITTED A MANIFEST
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE PERMISSION REQUIRED
UNDER SECTION 96(B) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE MUST
BE IN WRITING NOTWITHSTANDING THE EN BANC DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN "CABRERA ET[.] AL[.] VS[.]
MARCELO" 7
III. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) COMMITTED A MANIFEST
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE REIMBURSEMENT OF
PETITIONERS' TRAVEL EXPENSES RESULTED IN UNDUE INJURY ON
THE GOVERNMENT DESPITE THE PERMISSION GRANTED
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 THEREFOR BY FORMER GOVERNOR MANDANAS. 8

Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
I n Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, 9 the Court laid down the essential
elements of the crime, viz.:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or [gross] inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 10
The first element need not be explained. In this case, there is no doubt
that petitioners are public officers of Taal, Batangas, during the material
time and date of the commission of the alleged violation. Librado was the
mayor from January 30, 1998 to June 30, 1998 and his wife, Fe, was the
incumbent Mayor from July 28, 1998 to July 6, 1999.
The second element provides the modalities by which a violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed. It must be stressed that
these three modes, namely "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or
"gross inexcusable negligence" are not separate offenses, and proof of the
existence of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
committed, is sufficient to convict. 11 As explained by this Court:
x x x. There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad
judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected. 12 (Citations omitted)
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 T h e third element refers to two (2) separate acts that qualify as a
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. An accused may be charged with
the commission of either or both. The use of the disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019. 13
T h e first punishable act is that the accused is said to have caused
undue injury to the government or any party when the latter sustains actual
loss or damage, which must exist as a fact and cannot be based on
speculations or conjectures. The loss or damage need not be proven with
actual certainty. However, there must be "some reasonable basis by which
the court can measure it." Aside from this, the loss or damage must be
substantial. It must be "more than necessary, excessive, improper or illegal."
14

The second punishable act is that the accused is said to have given
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party. Proof of
the extent or quantum of damage is not thus essential. 15 It is sufficient that
the accused has given "unjustified favor or benefit to another." 16
In the instant case, Librado's and Fe's violation of the aforesaid Section
3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 basically hinges on two delictual acts, namely: (1) the
awarding of procurement contract (for the purchase of medicines) to a
private person (DLI) without the benefit of competitive public bidding as
provided under the LGC, as referred to in Criminal Case Nos. 27555 and
27557, and (2) by making illegal reimbursements of amounts representing
the expenses for their unauthorized travels to Manila, as referred to in
Criminal Case Nos. 27556 and 27558.

Criminal Case Nos. 27555 and 27557

Petitioners' first act constituting violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.

3019 is the alleged procurement of supplies without the benefit of public
bidding.
As a matter of policy, procurement or "acquisition of supplies or
property by local government units shall be made through competitive
public bidding." Thus, Section 356 of the LGC of 1991 on procurement of
supplies, provides:
SEC. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal . —
Except as otherwise provided herein, acquisition of supplies by local
government units shall be through competitive public bidding. x x x.
Whereas, Section 366 of the LGC, by way of exception, provides:
SEC. 366. Procurement without Public Bidding. —
Procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of public
bidding under any of the following modes:
(a) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(b) Emergency purchase;
(c) Negotiated purchase;
(d) Direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
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 and
(e) Purchase from other government entities.
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of
awarding government contracts, is to ensure that the people get maximum
benefits and quality services from the contracts. 17 It promotes transparency
in government transactions and accountability of public officers as it
minimizes occasions for corruption and temptations to abuse of discretion on
the part of government authorities in awarding contracts. 18 For these
reasons, important public policy considerations demand the strict
observance of procedural rules relating to the bidding process. 19
Petitioners admit that they have dispensed with the requirement of
public bidding. They justify non-compliance with the bidding process by
claiming that the purchases were emergency purchases as certified to by the
Head of the Municipal Health Office, and that the purchases were all directly
from the manufacturer or exclusive distributor of Philippine-manufactured
drugs. They averred that DLI was considered as such in the case of
Casanova v. Cabrera 20 decided by Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that these justifications are not
sufficient to forego the conduct of public bidding. Indeed, it is incumbent
upon a party who invokes coverage under the exception, to a general rule to
prove fulfillment of the requisites thereof. 21 In this case, petitioners fail to
adduce evidence that their purchases of the medicines fall under the
exceptions.
As ruled by the Sandiganbayan, certain legal requirements as provided
in the IRR of the LGC of 1991, 22 must be observed in order for a
purchase/procurement of supplies to be categorized as (a) emergency
purchase; and (b) direct purchase from duly licensed manufacturer. Article
437 of the IRR of the LGC of 1991, reads:
ART. 437. Procurement without Public Bidding. — The
procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of public
bidding under any of the following modes:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Emergency Purchase —
(1) In cases of emergency where the need for the supplies is
exceptionally urgent or absolutely indispensable and only to prevent
imminent danger to, or loss of, life or property, LGUs may, through
the local chief executive concerned, make emergency purchases or
place repair orders, regardless of amount, without public bidding.
Delivery of purchase orders or utilization of repair orders pursuant to
this Article shall be made within ten (10) days after placement
thereof. Immediately after the emergency purchase or repair order is
made, the head of office or department making the emergency
purchase or repair order shall draw a regular requisition to cover the
same which shall contain the following:
(i) Complete description of the supplies acquired or work
done or to be performed;
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 (ii) By whom furnished or executed;
(iii) Date of placing the order and date and time of delivery or
execution;
(iv) Unit price and total contract price;
(v) Brief and concise explanation of the circumstances why
procurement was of such urgency that the same could not
be done through regular course without involving danger
to, or loss of, life or property;
(vi) Certification of the provincial general services officer, city
general services officer, municipal treasurer, or barangay
treasurer, as the case may be, to the effect that the price
paid or contracted for was the lowest at the time of
procurement; and
(vii) Certification of the local budget officer as to the
existence of appropriations for the purpose, of the local
accountant as to the obligation of the amount involved, and
of the local treasurer as to availability of funds.
(2) The goods or services procured in case of emergency
must be utilized or availed of within fifteen (15) days from the date of
delivery or availability.
(3) Without prejudice to criminal prosecution under
applicable laws, the local chief executive or the head of office making
the procurement shall be administratively liable for any violation of
the provisions on emergency purchase and shall be a ground for
suspension or dismissal from service.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Procurement from Duly Licensed Manufacturers —
Procurement of supplies or property may be made directly from duly
licensed manufacturers in cases of supplies of Philippine manufacture
or origin. The manufacturer must be able to present proof showing
that it is a duly licensed manufacturer of the desired product.
In case there are two (2) or more known manufacturers of the
required supplies or property, canvass of prices of the known
manufacturers shall be conducted to obtain the lowest price for the
same quality of said supplies or property.
The award for the procurement of supplies or property from
duly licensed manufacturers shall be made by the committee on
awards.
None of the above-mentioned prescribed procedures are complied with
by petitioners. Going into the details, the Court observes the following:
A. As to petitioners' claim that the purchases were emergency
purchases. — While Fe was able to show the Purchase Request 23
dated August 25, 1998, issued by the Head of the Municipal
Health Office, Dr. Adolfo Magistrado, the request was incomplete
in details. There was likewise no Certification that at the time of
the procurement, the price contracted for, was the lowest and
that there was availability of funds as required by the IRR. No
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 such purchase request was presented by Librado.
B. As to petitioners' claim that they made direct purchase from DLI
as it is a duly licensed manufacturer of medicines in the
Philippines, such barren allegation is not sufficient. We cannot
accept hook, line and sinker, the ruling of the Ombudsman that
DLI is a duly licensed manufacturer of medicines. Courts,
generally, do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings. 24 There must be proof establishing that DLI is
indeed a duly licensed manufacturer of medicines in the
Philippines.
Neither did petitioners show that they conducted a canvass of
prices in order to obtain the lowest of prices of the known
manufacturers for the same quality of medicines needed.
Petitioners conveniently skipped the requirement of canvass
before making the purchases. Section 370 of the LGC imposes a
duty that a canvass of the known manufacturers first be
conducted before the purchase is made, so as to ensure that the
local government would spend the lowest possible price for such
purchase. 25 Since petitioners are claiming exemption to the
requirement of public bidding, the burden of proof lies upon them
to show that there is no qualified manufacturer but DLI which
could offer the best possible price for the government.
For failure to comply with the procedure, petitioners' case does not
qualify under the exceptions provided by law. Thus, petitioners should have
conducted a competitive public bidding on the procurement of the medicines
for the municipality in order to avoid suspicions of irregularity. Petitioners, as
mayors, should have acted in a circumspect manner to observe the law in
order to promote transparency in the handling of government funds. As
things stand, there was no public bidding that was conducted.
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of
procuring supplies, is to ensure that the people get maximum benefits and
quality services from the contracts. 26 "A competitive public bidding aims to
protect public interest by giving it the best possible advantages thru open
competition." 27 It promotes transparency in government transactions and
accountability of public officers as it minimizes occasions for corruption and
temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of government authorities in
awarding contracts. 28 For these reasons, important public policy
considerations demand the strict observance of procedural rules relating to
the bidding process. 29
As can be read from the Information, petitioners are charged of
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the second punishable act
which is giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to a private
party, through manifest partiality, bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence. Indeed, the choice of DLI as the grantee of the medicines, in the
absence of public bidding, shows that petitioners gave unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in favor of DLI. The words "unwarranted,"
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 "advantage" and "preference" were defined by the court in this wise:
"[U]nwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.
"Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course
of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or
desirability; choice or estimation above another. 30 (Citations
omitted)
In the instant case, there is no sufficient justification or adequate
reasons why DLI was favorably chosen. DLI was awarded the procurement
contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible
price for the government. And the only way to ascertain the best possible
price advantageous to the government is through competitive public
bidding. Indeed, public bidding is the accepted method for arriving at a fair
and reasonable price and it ensures that overpricing and favoritism, and
other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized. 31 To circumvent
this requirement outside the valid exceptions, is evidence of bad faith. As
held by this Court:
The further discovery that the procurements were made by the
petitioners from DLI without them first ensuring that the local
government would be acquiring the medicines at the lowest possible
price is sufficient to negate any presumption of good faith, especially
since such failure prima facie constitutes a contravention of the Local
Government Code. 32
It was established in this case and admitted by petitioners, that DLI is a
corporation whose stockholders, directors and officers are the relatives of
Librado. Petitioners' refusal to conduct public bidding and to award the
contract to the winning bidder, smack of favoritism and bias in favor of DLI.
Indeed, nothing demonstrates manifest partiality more than the awarding of
procurement contract to second degree relatives, either by consanguinity or
affinity, without the benefit of competitive public bidding.
By choosing DLI without public bidding, petitioners evidently give
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in favor of private persons,
through manifest partiality.

Criminal Case Nos. 27556 and 27558

Petitioners' second act constituting violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.

3019 is the alleged illegal reimbursements made by petitioners of the
amount representing their expenses for their alleged unauthorized travels.
Two acts are involved here: the unauthorized travels and the illegal
reimbursements.
Petitioners claim that their travels to Manila in 1998-1999 were
authorized by the Governor. To prove this fact, petitioners adduce as
evidence the testimony of then incumbent Governor Mandanas who testified
that he signed petitioners' permit to travel on December 14, 2000. He also
admitted that it is his policy to allow all travels and sign any documents
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 when presented to him — whether before or after the travel dates.
Pertinent provision of the LGC of 1991 33 provides:
SEC. 96. Permission to Leave Station . — (a) Provincial, city,
municipal, and barangay appointive officials going on official travel
shall apply and secure written permission from their respective local
chief executives before departure. The application shall specify the
reasons for such travel, and the permission shall be given or withheld
based on considerations of public interest, financial capability of the
local government unit concerned and urgency of the travel. Should
the local chief executive concerned fail to act upon such application
within four (4) working days from receipt thereof, it shall be deemed
approved.
(b) Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall
secure the permission of the governor concerned for any travel
outside the province.
(c) Local government officials traveling abroad shall notify
their respective sanggunian: Provided, That when the period of travel
extends to more than three (3) months, during periods of emergency
or crisis or when the travel involves the use of public funds,
permission from the Office of the President shall be secured.
(d) Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in
provinces, cities, and municipalities shall not leave their official
stations without giving prior written notice to the local chief executive
concerned. Such notice shall state the duration of travel and the
name of the officer whom he shall designate to act for and in his
behalf during his absence. (Underscoring supplied).
Paragraph (a) speaks of the term "permission" as one that is "written"
and secured "before departure." While the words "written" and "before
departure" are not repeated in paragraph (b) of the aforesaid provision, we
take into consideration the general rule of statutory construction that a word
used in a statute in a given sense is presumed to be used in the same sense
throughout the law. 34 While this rule is not, by some authorities, regarded
as so rigid and peremptory as some other of the rules of construction,
nevertheless it is particularly applicable in the case at bar, where in the
statute the words appear so near to each other physically, and particularly
where the word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined
in the statute. 35
As the Sandiganbayan observed, the term permission was defined in
terms of form, time and content in paragraph (a). Following the above-
mentioned rule of statutory construction, the Sandiganbayan was therefore
correct when it concluded that the word "permission" in paragraph (b)
should carry the same meaning attached to the word permission in
paragraph (a) as one that was written and issued before the
departure/travel. Strictly speaking, when the permission is not written and is
not obtained before departure, the travel is unauthorized.
Petitioners raised the defense that the unauthorized travels were
subsequently ratified. They claimed that they were able to subsequently
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 obtain the permission/approval of the Governor such that, the unauthorized
travels become authorized. True enough, the Governor issued a Certification
to the effect that he gave his subsequent approval to petitioners' previous
travel. The Governor even confirmed, in no uncertain terms, that he indeed
gave his permission to petitioners for the travels which they made. However,
the subsequent approval given by the governor did not save the day for the
petitioners. As the anti-graft court observed:
The permissions were not secured before the travels were
made, not even right after the travels. They were not also secured at
the time the reimbursements of expenses were sought; permissions
were not secured even at the time accused approved the
disbursement vouchers for the claimed reimbursements. x x x.
Subsequently, when a special audit was conducted in December
1999, these reimbursements were put in question. It was only on 14
December 2000 that a purported confirmation/consent was secured.
At that point, the permission sought was already for the purpose of
avoiding the liability from the violation that was already
consummated. 36
We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for brushing aside the Governor's
permissions which were not timely obtained. True, things got complicated
when petitioners sought reimbursements of the travel expenses which they
advanced from their personal funds. It is worthy to note that petitioners, as
claimants seeking reimbursements, are also the ones approving the
disbursement vouchers, in their capacity as the Chief Executives of the
Municipality of Taal during their respective terms. This is the mandate of
Article 454 (k) of the IRR 37 of the LGC of 1991, that approval of the
disbursement vouchers shall be made by the local chief executive himself,
thus:
(k) Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers — No money
shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the
existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the
purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and
the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose.
Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head
of the office or department who has administrative control of the fund
concerned, as to validity, propriety, and legality of the claim involved.
Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring
administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent
employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph
services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the
GSIS, SSS, LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of
the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the
local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds
are disbursed. (Underscoring supplied)
The foregoing provision also laid down the requirements needed to
disburse local funds, 38 to wit: (a) certification from local budget officer as to
the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose;
(b) that the local accountant has obligated said appropriation; (c)
certification from the local treasurer as to the availability of funds for the
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 purpose; (d) that the vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and
approved by the head of the office or department who has administrative
control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety, and legality of the
claim involved; and lastly, (e) the approval of the local chief executive of the
disbursement voucher.
As established, at the time the disbursement voucher was approved by
petitioners, there was yet no sufficient basis that would justify the
reimbursement of travel expenses. The validity, propriety and legality of the
claimed travel expense can be justified if the travel itself is with the written
permission/approval of the Governor as mandated by the LGC of 1991. At
that moment when petitioners were claiming reimbursements, the required
permissions of the Governor for petitioners' travels to Manila were yet to be
obtained and despite that, petitioners still proceeded to approve the
disbursement vouchers. This was the reason why a special audit was
conducted in December 1999, as the reimbursements made were
questionable. 39 Even the local accountant noted beside her signature as to
the absence of the required travel order. 40 Evidently, there was
circumvention of the rules and the procedure in claiming reimbursements.
Given that the travels made by petitioners were unauthorized at the time of
reimbursements, then there was no legal obligation on the part of the
municipality to disburse the said claimed travel expenses to the benefit of
petitioners.
It bears to stress that mere unauthorized travel does not automatically
equate to violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. There must be proof that
the said unauthorized travel caused undue injury to the government or that
it amounts to giving unwarranted benefit or advantage to a private person or
to oneself for that matter. The act of petitioners in approving the
disbursement vouchers without compliance with the disbursement
procedures (i.e., necessary supporting documents, written permission of the
government authorizing their travel) constitute bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence in observing the law, causing undue injury to the
Municipality of Taal. The Municipality of Taal was effectively deprived of the
amounts of P27,651.83 and P170,987.66 which petitioners Librado and Fe
respectively reimbursed for themselves. Indeed, there is no greater proof of
undue injury to the government when public funds are used for an
unjustified expense.
All told, we are convinced that the guilt of the petitioners were beyond
reasonable doubt and that the Sandiganbayan did not err in its findings and
conclusion. The totality of the facts and circumstances demonstrate that
they committed the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 by
causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to
DLI through manifest partiality; and to themselves through evident bad faith
and gross inexcusable negligence.
As to the penalty imposed, we find them in order. Any person guilty of
violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 is punishable with imprisonment for
not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years and
perpetual disqualification from public office. 41 Thus, the penalty imposed by
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 the Sandiganbayan which is an imprisonment term ranging from six years
and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum for each count of the
offense and the perpetual disqualification from holding public office, is in
accordance with law. The order to return in favor of the government the
amounts of P27,651.83 and P170,987.66 representing the disbursed
amounts for their unauthorized travels is just and proper.
The rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement are
imbued with public interest. 42 Laws regarding these matters were
formulated to ensure minimization of expenditures of the public fund.
Petitioners, as public officials have the bounden duty to work for, and protect
the interest of the government. Thus, greater degree of responsibility is
imposed upon them to ensure that the laws are faithfully complied with. 43
Any act which tends to violate the law or provides excuse to circumvent the
law shall not be countenanced. Indeed, it is the policy of the Philippine
Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 44
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 19, 2009
Decision and March 10, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (4th Division),
in Criminal Case No. 27555, Criminal Case No. 27556, Criminal Case No.
27557 and Criminal Case No. 27558, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, with Associate Justices Gregory
S. Ong and Roland B. Jurado, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-60.
2. Id. at 61-68.

3. Id. at 70-72, 73-75, 76-78 and 79-81.

4. Id. at 58-59.

5. Id. at 67.
6. Id. at 12.

7. Id. at 21.
8. Id.

9. 484 Phil. 350 (2004), citing [Ingco] v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112584, May 23,
1977, 272 SCRA 563, 574.

10. Id. at 360.

11. Abubakar v. People , G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409 & 202412, June 27, 2018.

12. Plameras v. People , 717 Phil. 303, 321 (2013).

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 13. Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9, at 360.

14. Abubakar v. People , supra note 11.

15. Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan , 308 Phil. 660, 694 (1994).

16. Supra note 11.

17. Manila International Airport Authority v. Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc.,
567 Phil. 255, 259 (2008).
18. Id.

19. Abubakar v. People , supra note 11.

20. Rollo, pp. 115-118.

21. Cabrera v. Hon. Marcelo, 487 Phil. 427, 444 (2004).

22. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 270 — PRESCRIBING THE IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. Approved
February 21, 1992.
23. Rollo, p. 119.

24. Bongato v. Spouses Malvar , 436 Phil. 109, 117 (2002).

25. Cabrera v. Hon. Marcelo, supra note 21, at 443.

26. Manila International Airport Authority v. Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc.,

supra note 17, at 259.
27. Rivera v. People, 749 Phil. 124, 145 (2014).
28. Manila International Airport Authority v. Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc.,
supra note 17.
29. Abubakar v. People , supra note 11.

30. Sison v. People , 628 Phil. 573, 585 (2010).

31. Manila International Airport Authority v. Mabunay, 379 Phil. 833, 844 (2000).

32. Cabrera v. Hon. Marcelo, supra note 21, at 445.

33. Republic Act No. 7160, October 10, 1991.

34. Froelich & Kuttner v. Collector of Customs, 18 Phil. 461, 480 (1911), citing
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Chap. 255.
35. Id.

36. Rollo, pp. 51-52.

37. Supra note 22.

38. See also: Field Investigation Unit-Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v.
De Castro, G.R. No. 232666, June 20, 2018.
39. Rollo, p. 51.
40. Id. at 56.
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 41. Sison v. People , supra note 30, at 586.
42. Abubakar v. People , supra note 11.

43. Id.
44. Republic Act No. 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 1, August
17, 1960.

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