Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-46) Author(s): Ervand Abrahamian Source: Middle Eastern Studies,

Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jan., 1978), pp. 22-55 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282680 . Accessed: 27/10/2011 09:55
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Factionalismin Iran: Political Groupsin the 14th Parliament(1944-46)*

ErvandAbrahamian

THE POLITICS FACTIONALISM OF

Westernobservers- beginningwith Victoriantravellersand continuingup to the recentarrivalof quantitative methodologistsfrom the UnitedStates- have constantlydrawn attentionto the intensityof politicalfactionalismin Iran. In the words of Professor Ann Lambton: 'Factional strife, in one form or another, has remained a feature of Persian life down to modern times." in Similarly,a Britishconsul, frustrated his attemptto form an anti-communist front in his region, complainedto the Foreign Office: 'No two Persianscan ever work togetherfor any length of time, even if it is jointly to extractmoney from a third party.'2 to While westernershave frequentlyreferred the existenceof factionalismin Iran, few have sought to explain it. And of those few, the majority have avoided socio-political causes and have instead resorted to such elusive A concepts as 'nationalcharacter','politicalculture', and 'psychodynamics'.3 recent study, for example, argues that particularfeaturesof child-raisingin Iran create adults who are intensely 'distrustful', 'cynical', 'neurotic', 'anxious', 'paranoid', 'xenophobic', 'anarchistic', and 'conspicuously individualistic'.4 Factionalismin politics,consequently,becomes a by-product of pyschologicalinsecuritiesin personal relationships. The aim of the present study is not to minimise the importance of of pysychology in the understanding cultures, nor to deny the existence of a high degree of personal insecurity in certain cultures, but, rather,to offer a socio-politicalexplanationfor the prevalenceof factionalismin modern Iran: to seek the roots of conflictin the social structureof the country insteadof the psychologicalmake-upof prominentpoliticians;and to focus on the national issues which continually intensifiedthese social differencesin the political on arena.In concentrating this main theme, the articleinevitablytouches upon a closely relatedproblemthat has long intriguedobservers:why, in an age of has republicanism, the monarchy not only survived recentchallengesbut has also successfully establisheditself as the central institutionof contemporary Iran? Or, in other words, why was the anti-courtopposition,especially the form of government? aristocracy,unable to establisha genuine parliamentary The 14th Parliament (I1944-46)will be used as a case study in presentinga This session of the majlis has been chosen for socio-politicalinterpretation. it threereasons. First,in a nationalhistoryof factionalism, was the assemblyof intense factionalism.As many as seven rivalgroups labelledfraksiuns a term borrowed from the Germanparliament- in constantlycompetingwith each other, wasted one quarter of the session in obstructionism,and brought
*I would like to thank Mr. Joseph Upton and ProfessorEllwell-Suttonfor commenting on an earlierdraft of this article.1, of course, take full responsibilityfor any opinions expressedin the article.

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

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persistentinstabilityon the governmentallevel: duringthese 24 months, there were seven changesof premiers,nine changesof cabinets,and 110 changes of ministers.Second, the 14th Parliamentsat during one of the rare periods in which there was some degreeof freedomfor politicalexpression.The opinions that were expressedcan be studiedin numerousprimarysources.The Official StateGazette,at the time, printedverbatimreportsof majlisdebatesin its daily issue of ParliamentaryProceedings(Muzakirat-iMajlis-i Shawra-yi Melli). Many of the fraksiuns publishedat least two newspaperspropagatingtheir policies and often giving 'inside'informationon the chamber.Further,retired politicianshave in recent years reminiscedon the safer aspects of the past in journals, speeches, and autobiographies.In addition, American and British diplomatsoften includedfrankand detaileddescriptionsof Iranianpolitics in and to theirconfidentialwar-timedespatches the StateDepartment the Foreign Office.The Americangovernmenthas publishedsome of its collection in the State Department'sannual volumes on the Foreign Relationsof the United States. The British government has not published its collection, but - as a resultof its 1972 decisionto declassifymost war-timedocuments- has opened the Foreign Office archives at the Public Record Office in London. Third, a number of reliable secondary sources exists for examining the social backgroundof politicians active in this period: short but useful character sketches in contemporaryjournals and newspapers; Mahdi Bamdad'sfour volume Biographies IranianStatesmen(Tarikh-iRajal-iIran); and last, but of not least of the secondarysources,ZahraShaji'i'ssociologicaldatain her work on Members of Parliament during the Twenty-OneLegislative Sessions (Nimayandigan-iMajlis-i Shawra-yi Melli dar Bist-u-Yak Dawreh-i Qanun Guzari).
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.1905-41

Iran constantlyswung back and forth between Power in nineteenth-century the monarch at the centre and the magnates in the provinces. The ruling dynasty,the Qajars,while claimingto be all-powerfulShah-in-Shahs(Kingof nor Kings),neverthelesscontrolledneitheran effectivebureaucracy a standing army outside the capital.On the other hand, the provincialmagnates- large landholders and tribal chiefs - although often petty shahs in their own domains, were unable to over-ridetheir tribal, linguistic, geographical,and sectariandivisionsin orderto act in concertagainstthe government.The shahs were thus able to pursuea systematicpolicy of 'divideand rule' and appearto stand over their subjects with the unlimited powers of typical 'oriental despots'.5 The impact of the west in the late nineteenthcentury led to the gradual developmentof two classes which eventuallydestroyedthe traditionalpower structure. On one hand, British and Russian economic penetrationslowly the transformed petite bourgeoisieand clergy of the many local bazaarsinto a nationalmiddleclass, conscious, for the firsttime, of its common interests.On the other hand, initial steps towards modernisation introductionof secular schools, Europeanlanguages,and liberalpoliticalthought- beganthe growth of an intelligentsiaeager to rebuild its national environment, especially its politicalinstitutions,in the image of the west. These two very differentmiddle

24

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

classes coalesced briefly in 1905 to carry through a successful constitutional revolution. The fundamentallaws of the constitution were designed to introduce a The membersof parliament system of governmentinto Iran.6 parliamentary the describedas representing 'whole people'who in turn were describedas the isource of all authority'- obtainedextensive powers: they won the right to approve,disapprove,or modifyall laws, concessions,loans, and budgets;they could investigateany 'matterconducive to the well-beingof the Government and the People'; and they were guaranteedtwo-year terms free of arrest, dissolution, recess, or dismissal. The shah, meanwhile, retained mainly nominalprerogativesas the Head of State:sovereigntywas definedas a 'trust confided by the People to the person of the King'; his 'person'was invested with the supreme command of the armed forces; and ministerswere both appointedand dismissedthrough his 'Royal Decrees'.But, as the constitution stressedin a numberof qualifyingclauses, 'Ministerscannotdivestthemselves to by of responsibility Parliament pleadingverbalor written instructionsfrom the King'; 'If Parliament,by an absolute majority,declaresitself dissatisfied Minister,that Cabinetor Ministershall with the Cabinetor with one particular resign'; and 'Ministers, besides being individually responsible for their Ministry, are also collectively responsible to Parliamentfor one another's actions in affairs of more general character.'The shah retained only one importantsource of power: the right to appointhalf the senatorsto an Upper House which was intendedto moderatethe extensive rightsof the deputiesin the Lower House of Parliament.But even this turned out to be a hollow privilege,for the first senate was not convened until some 43 years later. it Althoughthe revolutionwas greetedas a dawn for nationalrejuvenation, in fact ushered in fifteen years of social disintegration.In the capital, the modern intelligentsia- supported by some of the religious minorities confrontedthe traditionalmiddle class over vital issues such as land reform, progressivetaxation, role of religion in politics, status of women, and the position of non-Muslims in Iran. In the provinces, local magnates, taking themselves vis-a-vis the advantageof dissensionsat the capital,strengthened central government and settled old scores among themselves. Qashqayiand over rival land Khamsehchiefs, for example, turned Fars into a battleground claims stretching back half a century. An even greater threat to national survival came from abroadin 1907 when Britainand Russia, who had been antagonistsfor a generation,now put asidetheir global the main international differences,because of their mutual fear of Germany,and signed an Entente. As a part of the international Agreement, Iran was divided into three geographical zones: the north was defined as within Russia's sphere of influence,the south within Britain's,and the centralprovinceswere left as a neutral zone. Two years later the Russians militarilyoccupied their sphere. And as the FirstWorldWar came to the MiddleEast,Ottomantroops invaded tribalregions in the centralprovinces, Azerbayjan,Germanagents infiltrated and Britishofficersin their zone formed the South PersiaRifles. By the end of the war Iran was in chaos. Azerbayjanhad its own Azerispeaking government. Gilan, with the help of the Red Army, had declared between Assyrians was a battlefield itselfa Soviet SocialistRepublic.Kurdistan and Kurds. Arabistan - later renamed Khuzistan - had transformed its

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

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traditionalautonomy into virtual independencewith its own Arab sheikh. were in realityautonomousregionsruledby local tribal Sistanand Baluchistan chieftains. Isfahancontinued to be the domain of the Bakhtiyaritribes. Fars was in disputebetween the Qashqayis,Khamseh,and the BritishSouth Persia Rifles. And Tehran, wedged in between these provincial and international forces, was a state of acute instability.It is not surprisingto findthat a British official in Iran advised the Foreign Office: 'The only thing to do now is to concentratein the south and the centrewhere some healthylimbs remain.The rest of the country is in complete anarchy.'7 A 'saviour',however, appearedin 1921 in the form of Colonel Reza Khan. Cossacks- whose pay was Ridinginto Tehranwith his brigadeof dissatisfied in arrears - he deposed the cabinet, named himself Supreme Army Commander,and helped in the formationof a new governmentheaded by Sayyid Zia Tabatabai- a former editor of the newspaperRa'ad (Thunder), which, in the words of a Britishminister,was 'notoriousfor its Anglophilia'.8 Reza Khanthen proceededto commend himself,on one hand, to the Britishby convincing them that he was Persia's 'last hope of salvation from Bolshevism' - and, on the other hand, to the Soviets by promising to implementa Treatyof Neutrality.Once Britishand Russiantroopswere out of the country he systematically entrenchedhis own militaryposition. He ousted and SayyidZia and gainedcontrolof the ruralgendarmerie the urbanpoliceby from the interiorministryto his own ministryof war. havingthem transferred He successfully subdued the various tribal and provincial rebels. And he graduallytransformedthe decentralisedcontingents of local levies, Cossack brigades,and the South PersiaRifles into a centralisedarmy officeredmainly by his own appointees.Thus, in 1925, now enjoyinga monopoly of all armed forces, he was able to depose the Qajars,and, in the Napoleonic fashion, crown himself founder of the new Pahlevi dynasty. Reza Shah focused much of his reign - which lasted sixteen years - on buildinga new order based upon the three pillarsof army, bureaucracy,and court patronage. He instituted national conscription, increasedthe defence budget five-fold, enlarged the army from 40,000 to 124,000 men, and a meticulouslymaintained specialrelationship with the officersby sellingthem state domains at nominal prices, attractingthem into the court, and placing them in high governmentalpositions.He utilisedrisingoil revenuesin orderto replace the traditional haphazard collection of household scribes with a modern bureaucracycapable of enforcing the writ of the state throughout much of the provinces. And the simple soldier who had risen through the officerranksaccumulated the end of his reign- mainlythroughblackmail by some 60 million tomans in the bank and over 3 million acres of the most prosperousland in the country.9 His throne secureon these threepillars,RezaShah was able safely to ignore
the constitution. During previous elections - for the Ist-5th Parliaments - most

constituencieshad experiencedreal trials of strengthbetween rival magnates herdingtheir followersto the polls. The electoralprocesshad not been entirely democratic,but, at least, it had producedindependentassemblies.During the next eight elections - for the 6th-I3th Parliaments- deputies were chosen from above: the shah, consulting the secret police, informed his interior ministerwho was not to sit in the majlis;the ministerpassedon the messageto

26

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

the provincial governors; and the governors, in turn, instructed their appointees on the local supervisory election councils. Parliament, consequently, ceased to be the central institution of the state, and, instead, became a screen - even though a useful screen - hiding the nakedness of In militarismwith the decorous formalityof constitutionalism. the words of one ex-premier: 'The shah, throughout his reign, was always insistent on to having the deputieslegitimizeall his actions,decrees,and appointments the cabinet."' In fact, they performedthis task so obedientlythat the shah felt it unnecessaryeitherto convene the senateor to modify the powers of the majlis as envisaged in the fundamentallaws. Reza Shah, having full control of the politicalsystem, began to modernise the socio-economic system. A 'nation-building' programme- involving the extension of central institutions and the simultaneous reduction of local organisations,customs, and languages- underminedthe power of the tribal chiefs.The creationof a stateeducationalstructure(collegesexpandedfive-fold and secondary schools twelve-fold) rapidly increased the ranks of the intelligentsia.A strictly enforced policy of secularism- expulsion of clergy of from politicallife, replacement religiouscourtswith civiliancourts,granting women some rights, and finally the expropriationof ecclesiasticallands drasticallyweakened the position of the traditionalmiddle class. And an industrialisation drive, focusing on communications,consumer plants, and textile factories - together with the separategrowth of the oil company in Khuzistan- gave birth to a small but geographicallyconcentratedmodern working class. These reforms, especiallythe way that they were implemented,tended to accentuate rather than to alleviate social tensions. While the intelligentsia favoured many of the reforms, they resented his monopoly of power, his accumulationof propertyin the traditional autocratic fashion,his reluctanceto change the system of land tenure, and his eventual wooing of some families fromthe old aristocracy for duringthe reignthe landedinterestin parliament increasedfrom 39 per cent to a new high of 58 per cent."IAlthough some of the aristocratsfound comfortableplaces in the new order, especially in the majlis, bureaucracy,and state enterprises,most looked back nostalgicallyto the ancien regimewhere they, as Il-Khans(TribalChiefs),al-Saltanehs(Pillars of the Monarchy),al-Dawlehs(Aid of the State),and al-Mulks(Victoryof the Kingdom),had often exercisedreal power - especiallyon the local level in the provinces. As one writer stated in later years: Reza Shah split the aristocracyinto two sections. One section, formedof men unwilling to accept him, were forced either into exile or silence. Anothersection,composedof those willing to serve him, were readilycoopted into the regime. But whatever the shortcomings of the former section, they were minorcomparedto the crimesof the latter.If they had previously exploited in thousands of tomans and had the reputationof being feudalistic,the new group was corrupt,exploiting in hundredsof thousandstomans, and was commercialas well as being feudalistic.The reign, therefore,did not solve the problemof class exploitation.It merely added a novel element to the existing problem."2 Similarly,while the reigncreatedsome jobs for the lower classes and brought

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

27

them security from tribalism,it also hurt them in a number of ways: wages were kept at a minimum; peasantslost the traditionalright of choosing their village headmen; strikes were promptly dealt with by armed force; unions, guilds, and craftassociationswere all banned.Moreover,industrial expansion was financedmainly throughinflationand highertaxes on basiccommodities. As an American financialadviser stated: Altogether,RezaShahthoroughlymilkedthe country,grindingdown the lower classes. While his activitiesenriched himself and a new class of capitalists,merchants,monopolists, and politician-favourites inflation, '3 taxation,and other means loweredthe standardof living for the masses. These social tensions were contained mainly through the traditionaluse of terror.Publiccorporalpunishmentwas revived.The secretpolice was rapidly expanded. The propagation of any political philosophy resembling republicanism and socialism was pronounced punishable by ten years imprisonment. Military tribunals were given a free hand with radical intellectuals,labour organisers,tribalchiefs, conservativepatricians,and even religiousdignitaries. politicalorganisations, All includinga royalistparty,were banned as a threat to the regime. Parliamentary immunity was taken away from the handpicked deputies in the majlis. And many, including some prominent politicians, lost their lives while serving prison sentences. For in example,two well-known cabinetministerswere murdered jail, and a third, expectinga similarfate, committedsuicide. For membersof Reza Shah's elite life was in no ways poor, but it could definitelybe nasty, brutish,and short.
THE DESTRUCrIONOF THE NEW ORDER, AUGUST 1941-JUNE 1943

The Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941 opened the floodgatesof resentmentagainst the new order. As soon as the army - the pride of the regime - collapsed in a three-day war, tribesmen rushed to arms, in some placeswith weapons boughtfrom desertingsoldiers,retiredpoliticianshurried to the capital, religious leaders who had been forced into libraries again climbedthe pulpits,and even membersof the establishment raisedtheir voices to denounce their benefactoras a 'self-seekingmiser', a 'despot' who had resourceson an ineffectivearmy, and a 'militarydictator'who had squandered trampledon the constitutionwith his police henchmen.Threatened some of by his own deputies who now spoke of investigating his bank account, withdrawingthe title of SupremeArmy Commander, and even abolishingthe dynasty,he abdicatedin favour of his eldest son and hurriedlyleft for exile. In lateryears, court historianswere to painttragicscenes of the country grieving over the loss of the 'greatguiding light'. But closer to the time, an American ambassador reported to the State Department: 'A brutal, avaricious, and inscrutabledespot in his lateryears, his fall from power and his later death in exile were regrettedby no one."4 The new monarch, MuhammadReza Shah, took immediateprecautionsto protectthe throne. He did all he could to assure the Allies that he would cooperate,even going to the extent of volunteeringtroops for their war effort.'5 They, in turn, signed a Treatyof Allianceimplicitlyguaranteeing dynasty, the and explicitly promisingto evacuate the country six months after the war.'6

28

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

For internalconsumption,the new shah carefullyprojecteda public image of himself as an apoliticalyouth, who, having been educatedin the democratic ways of Switzerland,had always been uncomfortable his father'sautocratic in court, and now wanted nothing more than to reign, but not rule, as a true constitutionalmonarch.'7To prove his good faith, he took the constitutional oath of office before the deputies in parliament;reintroducedparliamentary immunityfor the deputies;decreedamnestyfor politicalprisoners;transferred to much of his landedinheritance the state for it to be redistributed among the previous legitimate owners; remained silent when two of his father's henchmen- a policechief and a prisonsupervisor- were arrestedfor murder; cultivatedcontactswith the religiousauthoritiesby encouragingthe returnof ecclesiasticallands and letting it be known that the policy of secularismhad gone far enough; permittedthe revival of old aristocratictitles in the court; and quietlyacceptedthe realitythat politiciansindependent the palacecould of now exercise influence in the ministries,especially in the interior ministry. Most importantof all as faras parliament was concerned,he did not attemptto prevent the deputies from regainingtheir old right of forming governments. Reza Shah's practice had been to first issue a farman (decree)to his chosen premierordering him to select his cabinet, and then sending him off to the majlisto obtainthe necessaryvote of confidence.Now the deputiesrevivedthe older procedure by which they first voted for the premier. The successful candidatethen automaticallyreceivedthe royalfarman. And having selected his colleaguesand drawn up a programme,he returnedto parliamentfor the requiredvote of confidence. In his striving to remain on the throne, the shah had inherited one invaluablelegacy. The invasion had occurredjust as the rigging of the 13th Parliament was being completed.He thereforeinheritedan assemblywhere a small minority were now vocal anti-royalists,but where the vast majority, having gained the freedomto participatein politics, were willing to reach a modus vivendi.The shah did not dictateto them in politicalmatters.And they did not attemptto intervenein the shah's specialpreserve- in militarymatters. Consequently, the structure of military command remained intact: orders continued to go from the shah, via his military departmentin the palace, through the chiefs of staff directly to the field commanders, bypassing the minister of war.'8 To ensure the smooth running of this line of command, royalists were packed into the war ministry, reducing it to a mere office of army supplies. Having maintainedthe military as a royal sanctuary, the shah worked vigorouslyto keepthe loyalty of the officercorps. He had been raisedto be first and foremostan officer,educatedexclusivelyin militaryschools,exceptfor the brief stay in Switzerland. He, therefore, retained his personal interest in militaryaffairs- in manoeuvres,inspections,graduations,promotions,often wearing uniforms in state functions, and invariably at military occasions reminding his audience that they owed their existence to his father."' He protected field commandersfrom public investigationsaimed at discovering why so many of them had desertedtheir posts in August 1941. He invitedan Americanmilitarymissionto help reorganise,retrain,and, hopefully,re-equip the armedforces. And he pressured,often successfully,for defenceallocations that would increaseofficers'salaries,extend their fringebenefits,and preserve

FACrIONALISM IN IRAN

29

theirrankand file. The army, whose rankshad fallensharplyfrom 124,000on the eve of the invasion to less than 65,000 soon after, mostly because of desertions,was graduallyrebuiltto reach 80,000 by mid-1943.20 As the British ministersummarisedin his annual report,the shah 'doubtfulof the popular enthusiasmfor his dynasty'has concentrated the army,cultivatingpersonal on ties with the officersand 'jealouslyguardinghis own controlof the military.... He has assumed both the title and the real authorityof the Commander-inChiefof the ArmedForces.'21Some western scholarsarguethat the monarchy has survived because of Iranian 'mystique' for kingship.22If any such sentimentexisted in 1943, the shah was unaware of it. He was much more aware of the practicalneed to retaincontrol of the unmysticalmilitary. The invasion, therefore, had washed away two of the three pillars supportingReza Shah'sestablishment the bureaucracy court patronage. and Politiciansindependentof the palace had engulfed the many ministries.And the royal family, in order to prevent a complete loss of its wealth, had been forced to release most of its landed inheritance. But out of the wreckage MuhammadReza Shah had managedto salvage the remnantsof the central pillar - that of the military. True, the army was diminished in size, disillusionedin spirit,and disruptedin discipline,but it was still the army, the only largeorganisedforcein the state,and the shah was still its commander-inchief in fact as well as in name - at least until the end of the royalist 13th Parliament.
ELECTIONS FOR THE 14TH PARLIAMENT,JUNE 1943-FEBRUARY 1944

The 14th Parliamentthreatenedto be a second more dangerousflood which would wash away the remnantsof the centralpillar. As the 13th Parliament drew towards the end of its two-year term, the BritishMinisterin Tehran,Sir Reader Bullard, informed the Foreign Office that the shah was taking 'all possibleprecautions'to safeguardhimself.23 firstsuggestedthat the sitting He majlis should be permittedto extend its session until the end of the war. But Bullard,in spite of his view that 'Persiandeputiesare a volatile race with no guidingprinciples',felt thatthe nation desperately neededa 'safetyvalve'.24 He next proposedthat the senate should be convened in orderto finallycomplete the constitution.Bullard,however, vetoedthe idea,arguingthat anotherhouse The would merely add to parliamentary'obstructionism'.25 shah then, as a finalprecaution,broughtbackhalf a million dollarsfrom Americaas a form of investmentin the 'politicalintrigue'of the unavoidableelections.26 Gone were the days when the monarchcould, in an orderlyand directbut dull fashion, arrangethe returnof the faithful'yes-men'to the forthcomingmajlis.Insteada new type of election began where the monarchwas reducedto using indirect methodsof 'intrigue',where over 800 candidatesvigorouslycompetedfor the 136 seats, and where the campaigningbeganas early as June 1943, continued throughthe closing of the existing majlisin November 1943, and did not end in some districtsuntil after the opening of the 14th Parliamentin February 1944. The lengthand livelinessof the campaignwas a reflectionof the underlying changes in the power structure.Power was no longer concentratedbut was unevenly distributedamong six different and at times conflicting forces:

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

among the Allies; the shah with his military;the interiorministerheadingthe civil bureacracy; the local magnates with their followers; the traditional middle class of the bazaars;and the modern labour movement organisedby The resultswere not simple dictates communist membersof the intelligentsia. of any one, but were invariably complicated compromises based on the regionalstrengthsof each among the six. The Allies were naturallystrongestin their respectivezones of occupation: the British having taken responsibility for the southern means of communicationin the oil provinces of Khuzistanand Kermanshah;and the Russians having manned the roads and railways in the border regions of Azerbayjan,Gilan, Mazandaran,and northern Khurasan. But this did not mean thatthe Alliedconsuls exercisedunlimitedpoliticalinfluencethroughthe direct and blunt interferenceof their troops. Rather, they exercised only limited influence through the indirect and subtle channels of local civil administration.Since these administrators,especially the governors, were obliged to work closely with the Allies in getting war supplies to Russia, otherwise riskingdismissal,they tendedto be amiableto consularsuggestions in day-to-day matters. And since the same governors were responsiblefor supervising the ballot-boxes, they tended to be receptive to consular recommendationsin electoral matters. Also, the consuls did not dictate the results,but generallyrestricted themselvesto puttingin a good word for one of the candidateswho already had a strong following in the locality. As one Foreign Office expert summed up: 'It is interesting that, in spite of all forebodings and the Cassandra-likeprophesies of the Americans, AngloIranianOil Company,and others, the Russianshave exertedlittle influencein the elections within their zone.'27 The Iranianauthorities- both the shah and the interiorminister- shared greater influence in the unoccupied central zone. The shah retained most weight in regions under martial law - the tribally-disturbed districtsin the provincesof Isfahan,Fars,Kerman,and Kurdistan.And the interiorminister, who at the time of the election was a nominee of prime minister'Ali Soheily, exercised most power in constituencies where the electoral supervisory councils were relativelyfree of both military and foreign influence. But the ministerand the shah were no more able than were the consuls to influence the finalresultsin their regions- without takinginto consideration various the local forces. They had no control over the votes going into the ballot-boxes. They only had the power to sway the count in favourof one of the candidates who had alreadycollecteda significantnumberof votes into the ballot-boxes. The relativestrengthof local competitorsdependedinvariablyon the social structure of the constituency. In rural regions, tribal chiefs and large landowners retained the support of their nomads, peasants, and other retainers.The results proved what one Britishconsul had anticipated:'The landlordsare justifiablyconfidentthat, in spite of radicalismin the towns, the majorityof the peasantswill continue to follow their lead on election day.'28 Meanwhile, in traditionalcities, religious notables and wealthy merchants again resorted to mosques and guilds in order to rally the middle-class populationof the bazaars.In more modernisedtowns, on the other hand, a
new force - a labour movement headed by the Tudeh Party - made its first

important appearance. This party, headed by a combination of Marxist

FACrIONALISM IN IRAN

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intellectualsand veteran union organisers,focused its activitieson mobilising the wage earners, especially the industrial wage earners, into a militant movement for social reform. In the words of a Britishmemorandumon the campaign,the Tudehwith its unions was the only nationalpartyto emergeas a 'serious' modern force in a general election marked by a high degree of confusion', 'rivalries',and 'complications'.29 These confusions, complications,rivalries,and eventual compromisescan best be seen in the confidentialand detailedbi-weekly reportsof the British The consul in Isfahan.30 campaignbeganin this city, known as the Manchester of Iran, with seven serious candidatescontendingfor its three seats. The first was Taqi Fadakar,a young lawyer from the TudehParty,whose strengthlay predominantlyamong the textile workers. The consul summarisedthe local situationas mainly a war between these workers and the factory owners: Under Reza Shah, the land and mill owners - who are mostly ignorant, believing that money can do everything, reactionaryto a degree, and solely interestedin makingas much money as possible- reignedabsolute in Isfahanwith the help of the centralGovernment.But with the change the of regimein 1941and removalof the ban on Communistpropaganda, Russian-backedTudeh, led locally by Fadakar, began to develop by taking advantageof this strugglebetween labour and capital.At present Isfahanis the centre of this strugglebecauseof the existenceof an easily organizedbody of uneducatedopinion among the millhands.3' A religious-conservative,Sayyid Dawlatabadi,headedthe main challengeto the Tudeh. His large constituency encompassed bazaar guilds, small ndependentfarmers outside the city, and the many clergy attachedto the mosques and seminarieswithin Isfahan.He also had the supportof the local army commanderwho followed royal instructionsfor buildingbridgesto the religious establishment.The third competitorwas HaidarEmami, a wealthy merchant-millownerwith powerful backing from large landowners in the province. Next came Sheif-PurFatemi,the patriarchof a well-known landed and his paper family. Althoughthe publicconsideredhim a 'Britishcandidate', Bakhtar (The West) reinforcedthis image, the British consul confidentially describedhim as highly unreliable.32 Trailing close was StamsamBakhtiar, who, as a chief of the importantand traditionally AnglophileBakhtiari tribes, had escapedexecutionfor beinga 'Britishagent' a few yearsearlieronly by the timely gift of his family estates to Reza Shah. And the last two challengersanotherlandlordand a formerpalacetutor with familyestatesin the province - both drew their supporters exclusively from their own villages outside Isfahan. As the campaign progressed, Fatemi and Bakhtiar withdrew their candidacies to neighbouring constituencies where they faced far less competition:the former won the nearby town of Najafabad;the latter took Shahr-i Kurd, the central location of his own tribes. And the Britishconsul who wanted to avoid public disturbancesat all cost, encouragedthe three leadingcandidates- Fadakar, Dawlatabadi,and Emami- to form an electoral alliance in which they pleaded with their own followers to cast their three votes for each other. Consequently,they won handsomely - Fadakarwith 30,499, Dawlatabadiwith 29,470, Emami with 27,870 - and the remaining

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

two, left out of the alliance,lost with less than 20,000 votes betweenthem. The consul was evidently satisfiedthat the campaignwhich had begun with the real danger of violence had ended peacefullyexcept for an isolated incident outside Isfahan.
COMPOSITION THE 14TH PARLIAMENT OF

The initial confusion on the national level, caused by the multiplicity of candidatesand politicalforces,graduallyclearedas the electeddeputiesarrived in the capital, sought out fellow members, and eventually coalesced into organised groups. The observer from the galleries could see slowly that from its althoughthe social compositionof the assemblywas not very different immediatepredecessors per cent of the 136 deputiesbelongedto an upper (86 class of landowners, wealthy merchants, and senior civil servants33) the politicalcompositionhad radicallychanged. After sessions in which the same faces had appearedand reappearedto form unanimous or near-unanimous royalist majorities,the new majlis brought 60 freshmen and six separate factions challengingthe royalist minority. The court deputies,although now a minority, were still the single largest group, mustering 30 votes within their National Union Faction (Fraksium-i Ittihad-i Melli).The thirty were mostly membersof the aristocracythat had been co-opted into Reza Shah's new order: half had regularlyattendedhis parliaments,and the others had either served in his administrationor had made large fortunes through state contracts. Among them were twenty landowners,four civil servants,three religiousnotables,two businessmenand one lawyer. Most represented constituenciesin the centralprovinceswhere the army had been the dominantforce duringthe elections.Five men actedas their spokesman:Ezat Bayat,Nassir Quli Ardalan,FarajAssef - three landowners from titled but not Qajar families who had sat in previous parliaments; Dawlatabadifrom Isfahan;and Sayyid Ahmad Bahbehaniwho had accepted both an ecclesiasticalpost and a majlis seat from Reza Shah, although his famous father who had led the constitutionalrevolutionhad always insisted on remaininga true mujtahid- a religiousleader independentof the state. The NationalUnionists, theirposition helpedby the court,triedto strengthen within parliamentby forming outside an organisationwith a similarname National Union Party (Hizb-i Ittihad-i Melli) and publishinga daily entitled Nida-yiMillat(TheCall of theNation).In a laterbidto gain wider support,they name to the People'sParty(Hizb-iMardom), changedthe organisation's talked in general terms of 'socialism', and issued a more radical sounding paper entitled Seda-yi Mardom (The Voice of the People). But in spite of these publicitymeasures,their actions in parliamentreflectedtheir own social and political backgrounds:conservative in social issues, especially in questions dealingwith the power of the landedelite; and royalistin constitutional issues, particularlyin preservingthe compromiseachieved in 1941-3 between king and deputies. They can be described as the seventeenth-century Tories of modern Iran. The Whigs, on the other hand, found their counterpartin the Liberal Faction(Fraksiun-iAzadi).They drew their membership predominantly from familiesthat had been forcedout of politicsby RezaShah northernaristocratic

FACIIONALISM IN IRAN

33

and now re-enteredparliamentfrom their home constituencieswith the help of the Soviet authorities.Of the twenty in the group,most had eitherpassively or actively opposed Reza Shah. Only three had played any public role in his later years. Fifteenof them were elected from the occupiedzone in the north as and kept friendly ties with the Russian representatives, long as the latter continued their wartime policy of discouraginga social revolution in Iran. Almost all were fromthe upperranksof the traditional social structure: twelve were large landowners from Qajarfamilies,two were religiousnotableswho had been in prison in recentyears,and four were wealthy nort' ern merchants who argued that Iran's naturaltrading partnerwas Russia. As one of them stressedin parliament:'Sinceour farmersand businessmendesperately need a foreign market,and since this marketexists in the north, we must do all we can to improve our relationswith the Soviet Union.'34 The Liberals were led by a triumvirate of Qajars: Muhammad Vali the Farmanfarmayan, patriarchof a branchof the deposeddynasty that had lost one of its sons underRezaShah but which had succeededin remainingthe wealthiestfamily in Azerbayjan;Amir Nusrat Iskandari,a direct descendant of the second Qajarking and now reputedto be the second richest man in and Azerbayjan; Abul QasimAmini,a close relativeof the last Qajarshah who had found it expedient to abandon public life in favour of land speculation during the previous reign, but was now vocal in politics through his wellfinancedpaper Umid(Hope). The Liberalsalso lookedto anothertraditional Ahmad Qavamalaristocrat, Saltaneh,as theirmain candidatefor primeminister.Qavamjustifiablyhad the reputation of being the most skilful and shrewd, if not the most of straightforward, all the veteran statesmen. Born at the palace, where his mother was a member of the royal family and his grandfathershad been ministersfor four generations,he began his careerin the 1890s as an assistant court secretary,brieflystudiedpoliticsin Paris,and returnedhome just before the constitutionalrevolution. During the upheaval, he presentedthe liberal viewpoint within the court and actually wrote, in his own hand, the final proclamationgrantingthe nation a parliament.In the chaotic years between 1906 and 1925, he was the most activeof the many independent politicians:he sat in one majlis as an anti-clericalreformer;he served as governor in the provincial administrationof Azerbayjan;and he participatedin numerous governments- firstas a deputy minister,later as war minister,and finallyas premierheadingfour consecutivecabinets.With the change of regimein 1925 he retiredto his tea plantationsin Gilan and later to his refuge in Paris. But immediately after the invasion, he reappearedin Tehran with his former vitality- the Britishministerreportedthat he still had a greatdeal of 'courage, energy, and authority'3, with a driving ambition to become premieragain. Some suspectedhim of planningto head the state as a republicanpresident,36 and, in the words of a court writer, with 'his teeth baredat the royal family', threateningto cut their ties to the military." The shah, in his conversations with western diplomats, frequentlydescribedQavam as a 'dangerous'man who had surrounded himself with a 'gang of cut-throats' and who was waiting for the Russiansto execute a 'desperatedesign'.38 Similar to the Liberals in their anti-court views and in their class but backgrounds, highly suspiciousof the Russians,were 26 southerndeputies

34

MIDDLE EASTERN STIUDIES

- most of them from the British zone - organised into a PatrioticFaction (Fraksiun-iMehan).The group was formedof thirteenlarge landowners, five with Britain,three journalists,three civil businessmentradingpredominantly servants,one lawyer, and one religiousnotable. A collectiveleadershipof six acted as their spokesmenin the majlis: Emami, the mill owner from Isfahan; Fatemi who had won the seat of Najafabad outside Isfahan; Shukruilah Safavi, a deputy from the southern port of Bushire and the editor of a proBritish daily Kushish (Effort); Malik Madani, a landed businessman in HadiTaheri,a millionairesilk traderin Yazdwho dominatedthe Kirmanshah; politics of his home city; and most conspicuous, Sayyid Zia Tabatabai,the 'Anglophile'premierof 1921. Havinglived in exile for twenty years,Tabatabai had returnedto politicswith a seat from Yazd- arranged Taheri- with the by hope, encouraged by the British, of becoming premier again, and with the conviction that he could reform Iran through an anti-courtcrusade. Bullard reportedthat the shah was 'hystericallyafraidof Sayyid Zia'.39 OutsideparliamentSayyid Zia organiseda FatherlandParty (Hizb-i Vatan) and revived his old paper with the new title of Ra'ad-i Emruz (Thunderof Today).Its editorials,written mostly by MazaffarFiruz(whose father Prince Nustrat al-Dawleh had been killed by Reza Shah), directed their attacks primarilyat the court. They arguedthat since the militaryhad been the 'chief instrumentof dictatorship',parliamentshould drasticallyreduce its size and immediately placeit underciviliancontrol."0 They stressedthat since the palace continued to spend money in political intrigue,all of its wealth, not just the landed inheritance,must be put under government supervision." And they remindedthe publicthat RezaShah,whom they always referred persistently to merely as Reza Khan, had ruthlesslyplunderedthe country, underminedthe religious institutions,made a mockery of the constitution,and dangerously intensifiedthe many existing social tensions.'2 Also associated with Sayyid Zia was another group of eleven southern deputies, most of them tribal magnates, organised in their own Democrat Faction (Fraksiun-iDimukrat).They were led by four prominentaristocrats: Samsam Bakhtiyar,the pro-Britishchief who had been elected from the province of Isfahan; his relative As'ad Bakhtiyar representing Dizful in Khuzistanwhere the family still owned large estates; Abbas Qabadyan,the head of the Kalhortribes in the south-west, who had spent fifteen years in prison and had lost much of his lands; and MuhammadFarrukhMu'tasinalSaltaneh,a veteranpolitician,electedwith the help of tribalallies in the southeastern province of Sistan. These Democrats naturally worked for their common tribalinterests:for the returnof confiscatedlands, for compensation to cover hardshipscaused by forcedsedentarisation, the rightto bear arms for and migrate annually as in the good old days, for the appointmentof their followers to administrativeposts in the provinces, and for the creation of a departmentof tribal affairs, staffed by themselves, within the ministry of interior.'3 Very different from the southern tribal magnates were fifteen deputies, many of them civil servantsrepresenting constituenciesnearTehran,coalesced within the IndependentFaction (Fraksiun-i Mustaqel). Owing their seats predominantlyto Premier Soheily, they tended to agree with his general policies. Like him, many of them were non-aristociatic members of the

FACIIONALISM IN IRAN

35

bureaucracy who originallysupportedReza Shah but eventuallygrew fearful of of his personalrule. They were, therefore,'independent' the court. And like him, while willing to collaborate with both Britain and Russia, they anticipatedthe end of the war and plannedto draw in the United Statesas a counterbalancing third force against the two traditionalrivals in Iran. They therefore considered themselves 'independent'of both Britain and Russia. Soheily had encouraged the replacement of British soldiers with 28,000 Americantransport troops. He had endorsedthe shah's invitationto American militaryadvisers,but once they had arrivedhe had unsuccessfullytriedto use them in orderto weaken the ties between the court and the army." Convinced that political involvementinevitablyfollowed economic involvement,he had tempted American companies with an oil concession and had granted an American financialexpert, Dr. Arthur Millspaugh,extensive power over the country's economy: control over the budget, imports, prices, government salaries,and distributionof food commodities.45 were led in the majlisby 'Ali Dashti,one of the prominent The Independents essayists of modem Iran. An early enthusiastof Reza Shah ever since he had been expelled from the 5th Parliamentby the clergy, Dashti, together with Soheily, had organised the royalist and secularist New Iran Party. His enthusiasm,however, had waned when all politicalorganisations,including his own party,were bannedand he was brieflyplacedunderhouse arrest.But himself and hiding his own feelings until the he succeeded in rehabilitating invasion, when, overnight, he was metamorphosed from a royalist backbencher into. the foremost parliamentaryopponent of the court. He immediatelydemandedamnesty for politicalprisoners,persistentlydenounced the old shah for violating 'man's inalienableright to private property',and frequentlywarnedthe young shah that he should keep his hands out of public issues if he wanted to remain on the throne.46 The Independent Faction was supportedoutside the majlis by the Justice Party (Hizb-i 'Adalat).This organisation,originallyformedby Dashti in 1942 and soon joined by the other members of the caucus, had considerable influencein the statebureaucracy was associatedwith four paperspopular and among the well-to-do:Bahram(Mars),Nida-yi 'Adalat(Callof Justice),Mehr-i Iran (Sun of Iran)- all three, at one time or another,publishedby the partyas its official organ; and Ittila'at (Information), the Times of Iran, edited by 'Abbas Mas'udi,a member of the faction in parliament. These five groups - National Unionists,Liberals,Patriots,Democrats,and Independents though differingin policy towards the court and the foreign powers, all shared one common factor: being membersof the upper class whether of the royalistaristocracy,the anti-royalistaristocracy,or the senior bureaucracy they were, on the whole, conservativein social issues. Radically opposed to them were eight representativesof the Tudeh Party Faction (Fraksiun-iHizb-i Tudeh).Of the eight, all were membersof the intelligentsia. Two had their family origins in the titled aristocracy,two were high-school headmasters,another two were lawyers, one was a medical doctor, one a universityprofessor,one an engineer,and one had spent most of his adult life in the tradeunion underground.Five of the eight, includingthe two from the aristocracy,had been in prison recently for advocatingMarxism. All except Fadakarof Isfahanwere electedfrom northernconstituencies.But they owed

36

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

their seats not so much to the Russiansas to union voters and to the assistance of such local landlordsas Qavam,Amini, and Farmanfarmayan. Althoughthe fraksiun, consistent with party discipline,stressedthat it should not be sidetrackedfrom mass politics into the cul-de-sac of parliamentary politicking,it forum and as neverthelessmade full use of the assemblyboth as a propaganda a means of obtainingsocial legislation,limiting royal power, and orientating foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Consequently, the three main newspapersof the Tudeh - Mardom(The People),Rahbar(The Leader),and Razm (Battle), all edited by members of the fraksiun, closely followed parliamentary politics,explainingto the publicthe party'sday-to-daytacticsin the complicatedmaze of the 14th Majlis. The six fraksiuns together totalled I 10 members in a house seating 136 representatives. the other 26, ten were inactive- five had their credentials Of rejected,two died early in the session, anothertwo resigned,and the last was in a Britishprison for his German connections. But the remaining 16 were active in an informalclusterknown as the Individuals The (Munfaradin). most prominentamong the Individualswas Dr. MuhammadMossadeqal-Saltaneh, a veteranpoliticianwhose birthplacedhim at the top of the old establishment, but whose views on constitutionalism,nationalism,and social reform had gradually taken him into the ranks of the new radical but non-communist intelligentsia. As a convinced constitutionalist, he had been forced into provincialexile for persistently opposing Reza Shah'sriseto power; and upon returningto parliament,he insistedthat the constitutionwould not be secure until the militaryhad been broughtunderciviliansupervision.As a nationalist he argued,with crusadingzeal, that past statesmenhad triedto preserveIran's independencewith a mistakenpolicy of 'positive equilibrium':either allying with one empire againstanother, or giving concessions to both, or seeking a third counterbalancing force. Iran had thus become a free-for-allwhere the majorstatescompetedto graspas much as they could in orderto preservetheir interests vis-a-vis their own internationalrivals. To end this scramble, he formulateda simpletheory of 'negativeequilibrium'. Accordingto this theory, the major powers, especially Britainand Russia, would be content to leave Iran alone if it scrupulouslyrefusedto grant concessions to any international power.47 Mossadeq has a reputation in the west of being an emotional xenophobe who consideredforeignersas inherentlyimperialistic. fact, his In formula was based on the trust that neutralismcould satisfy the legitimate concerns of all the international powers. And as a reformer,he threatenedto undermine the political base of the upper class with a new electoral law introducing literacy qualifications, which would disenfranchisethe rural masses who continuallyvoted for their magnates,and replacingsupervisory electoralcouncils with independent committeesstaffedby intellectuals, thereby blocking interferencefrom the state authorities.48 Five young professionalsrepresentingthe radicalIran Party (Hizb-i Iran) were the closest to Mossadeqamong the Individuals.This party, begun as an Engineer'sAssociation in 1941, had tried to transformitself into a national organisation by attractingthe intelligentsia,but failing to become a major force, it had settleddown as a small but vocal circle of professionals.Its views were expressed mostly through its party organs, first Shafaq (Twilight)and later Jibheh (Front). Both papers concentrated on the activities of the

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

37

Individualsin parliamentand advocatedrapid social modernisationthrough industrialisation,the elimination of the 'parasitical aristocracy', and the establishmentof a 'genuine constitutionalmonarchy'.49 These parliamentary groups were dividedon three major issues. First,the question of social reform drew a simple but sharp line between the conservativemajorityand the radicalminorityformed of the Tudehand the Individuals. Second, the problem of preserving national independence, especiallyin the looming Cold War, cut equally sharp but more complicated lines. The Tudehand the Liberals,seeing Britainas the main enemy, intended to ally with the Soviet Union. The Patriotsand the Democrats,fearingRussia as the chief threat, hoped to work closely with Britain.The Independents, distrustingboth, plannedto rely on the United States.The Individuals,on the other hand, proposedto save the country's independence through a policy of 'negativeequilibrium'.In most Third World countries where there has been one obvious enemy, nationalismhas tendedto be a unifyingsentiment.But in Iran, where, owing to geographicalreasons, there has been no single enemy, nationalismhas tendedto be a disunifyingforce. And third,the constitutional issue isolatedthe royalistsin the NationalUnionFactionfrom the anti-royalist majorityin the other six groups.As the Britishmilitaryattachereportedon the eve of the opening of the 14th Parliament: The shah is obsessed by the fear of a strong Constitutionalbloc in the majlis,for the army is likelyto be a firstclass problem,both as regardsthe shah's pretensionsto make it the instrumentof his policy and as regards the share it consumes of the annual budget. For some days it had been evident that parliamentwould not be opened if the shah could prevent
it.50

As a last minute gambit,the monarchapproachedMossadeqwith the plan of enforcing martiallaw and appointinghim premierif Mossadeqdeclaredthe electionsnull and void on groundsof 'corruption undue interference'. and But Mossadeqaddedthe conditionsthat his proposalsfor electoralreformsshould be accepted and new elections should start immediately throughout the country.51The shah decided to face the existing danger rather than be confronted, in the near future, by a larger danger produced by electoral reform.
CONVENING OF PARLIAMENT,FEBRUARY-MARCH 1944

The shah reluctantly openedparliament late February, in once two-thirdof the deputies, enough to form a quorum, had arrived in the capital.The routine business of the new session began with the four main anti-royalistgroups Liberals,Patriots,Democrats,and Individuals- allying to initiatea collective offensiveagainstthe royalistsin the NationalUnionFaction.They introduced a novel oath of office stressing the duty of each deputy to defend the constitutional rights of the majlis. They selected As'ad Bakhtiyar of the Democratsas Speakerof the House, and Madaniof the Patriotsas the Deputy Speaker of the House. And in the bi-annual elections for the crucial parliamentarycommittees where most legislation was hammeredout, they

38

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

obtainedonly 5 successfullyisolatedthe courtdeputies.The NationalUnionists of the 18 seats on the financecommittee,4 of the 16 on the interiorcommittee, 2 of the 16 in the foreign affairscommittee, and 2 of the 13 on the armed servicescommittee.The latter,which was vital for the shah if he was to retain the army, was packed with five tribal chiefs who had borne the brunt of militaryexpansionin the previousdecade.Recentenemies of the army were to decide its fate. The bloc continued its offensive once the routinebusiness was completed, by forcing the resignationof PremierSoheily. Although Soheily was by no means a court favourite,he had antagonisedthe other anti-royalists with his interventionin with his policy of obtainingarms from United States,52 the majlis elections, and with his suspected 'corrupt' handling of food distribution."

1944 PREMIERSA'ID. MARCH-NOVEMBER

for Directlyafter Soheily's fall, representatives the main anti-courtfactionsFarmanfarmayan the Liberals, Farrukhof the Democrats,Taheri of the of Patriots, and Mossadeq of the Individuals, met in the caucus rooms of parliamentand chose MuhammadSa'id as their compromise candidate for prime minister.As a careerdiplomatwho had served abroadduringthe past twelve years, he was consideredindependentof Reza Shah's establishment. Moreover,as a close friendof Madaniand a native of Azerbayjan, educatedin Baku,and recentlyambassador Moscow, he was acceptable in both to the proBritishand the pro-Russian The ForeignOfficecommentedthat the aristocrats. new premier was 'honest', 'friendly' to the Allies, but probably lacked the strengthof character'to stand up againstthe deputies.54 Sa'id, guaranteedof a parliamentarymajority and given the subsequent royalfarman to form a government,proceededto choose his ministersin close consultationwith the factions in the majlis. Keepingthe foreign ministry for himself,since diplomacywas his specialty,he gave three posts to the northern Liberals and four to the southern Patriots and Democrats.Years later, he complainedthat the factions interferedso much while he was forming the administration he endedup with colleagueshe had neverset eyes on before that in his life.55 At the time some newspapers, especially royalist newspapers, protested that the deputies, by participatingso directly in the selection of ministers,were dangerouslyviolating the separationof powers between the This legislativeand executive branchesof the constitution.56 was to be the first of many constitutionalcriticismsdirectedat the 14th Parliament. In spite of criticism,Sa'id successfullyobtaineda largevote of confidencein parliamentfor his cabinetand his programme,which explicitlystatedthat one of its first aims would be to 'reform' the army and place it on a 'correct In footing'.57 the debate,a spokesmanfor the Liberalsarguedthat to safeguard civil libertiesthe militaryhad to be drasticallycut and reorganised.5" Another Liberal proposed a bill to investigate the 'treacherousactivities' and the 'financial dealings' of all citizens who had actively supported the former
regime.59 An Independent. while not supporting the new government, voiced

his backingfor the generalaim of bringingthe militaryunderciviliancontrol.60 Farrukh,speaking for the Democrats,took the rostrum to make a personal

FACIIONALISM IN IRAN

39

attackon on the Chief of Staff for secretlymeddlingin politics.61 And Sayyid Zia concludedwith the sharpestof a seriesof sharpdenunciations the court: of 'For twenty-threeyears we have wasted our scarce nationalresourceson an inefficient,corrupt,and despoticarmy. It is now time to reduce the defence budget,cut the ties between the Chiefs of Staffand the shah, and, at last, take the military under parliamentary The supervision.'62 Britishmilitary attache was one of immediatelylimiting observedthat the generalmood in Parliament the 'shah's activitieswithin strictlyconstitutionalbounds'.63 ForeignOffice A experton Iran who was askedto investigatewhat these constitutionalbounds were, summed up the ominous truth: 'The Shah is Commander-in-Chief but what this involves is in dispute.Sincethe interpretation the Laws, according of to the Supplementary Laws, is the businessof the Majlis,it is for the Majlisto say to what extent the Shah should command the armed forces.'64And Bullard, now raised to an ambassador,reportedhome that the shah, in a confidential interview, had bitterly complained of lack of authority in the constitutionand had expressedthe immediatefearthat he would very soon be at the 'mercy' of parliament.65 The anti-courtbloc receivedadditionalsupportfrom two importantsources outside parliament:from the FreedomFront(Jibheh-iAzadi),a coalitionof 31 newspapersincludingsuch diverseanti-royalistdailiesas the Tudeh,Mardom and Rahbar,the conservativepro-RussianUmid,the conservativepro-British and Bakhtar,and the conservativepro-American Nida-yi 'Adalat;66 from Dr. Millspaugh,the American adviser, who had been given extensive economic powers in the expectation of bringing aid, but instead had arrived with an ambitiousprogrammethreateningto cut the 'wasteful'army down to 30,000 men, to settle the 'just grievances'of the tribes peacefully,to transferall of RezaShah's wealth to the statetreasury,and to listento the recommendations of such deputies as Sayyid Zia who intendedto put the 'young man' in his right place as a decorationon the throne.67 In spring of 1944 it seemed only a matterof time beforethe constitutional issue would be settledfinallyeither by the aristocracy establishinga genuinely parliamentary system, or the military,in a pre-emptivecoup, re-establishing royal autocracy.But before events could run their expectedcourse, the other two issues- the socialcrisiscaused by class conflicts,and the nationalproblem created by international rivalries - erupted onto the scene, forcing the constitutional struggle in to the background, dividing the aristocratic opposition, and, consequently,giving a new lease on life to royal authority. The social dynamiteexplodedonly twenty days afterSa'idobtainedhis vote of confidence. The crisis was initiatedby mill-owners in Isfahan who, hurt financially by the Tudeh, and, in the words of the British ambassador, .outraged that such important persons as themselves should be treated disrespectfully mere workmen using such foreignslogans as "equality,"'68 by firstformedyellow unions, financedright-wingparties,temptedlabourleaders to break from the communist movement, offeredbribesto local authoritiesin order to have martiallaw, and finally, having ordereda generallock-out, left the city.69Since the workers were dependent on the mills for their bread rations distributedby the factory granaries, the lock-out immediately and literallyturned into a life and death struggle.In desperation,they broke into the plants, fightingthe army in the process and losing some fifty wounded.

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

They were promptly supported by fellow unions that organised a general sympathy strikethroughoutthe city. The upheaval in Isfahan, describedby opponents as a 'workers' revolt',70 convinced the southern magnates to call off their offensive against the monarch. Their primarypoliticalaim was no longer to destroy the military foundationsof royal dictatorship.But rather,their main social fear was: no shah, no army; no army, no property.As the anti-courtand pro-British daily Ra'ad-i Emruz argued: the Tudeh, with its 'satanical' doctrine of 'class struggles'had misled 'ignorantworkmen' into seizing the plants; the seizure had not only reducedthe industrialcentre of the nation into 'social anarchy', but had also violated the citizen's inalienable 'right of private property' as laws of Iran; guaranteed the religiouscode of Islamand by the fundamental by and the local revolt would continue to threaten to spread into a general revolutionagainstpropertyunless immediatemilitaryaction was taken by the governmentto stamp out the TudehParty.7' The reactionsto the upheavalwere apparentin local politicsof the south, in nationalpolemics of the capital,and in factionalalliancesof the majlis.In the south, Qashqayitribes, who had been fightingsuccessfullyboth the army and the pro-BritishKhamsehsince 1941, now sent their own contingentsto help the army in its occupationof Isfahan.72 They informedthe Britishconsul that they would assist in the task of 'maintainingorder'." They furtherinformed the shah that they, as 'traditional bulwarks of the monarchy', had no 'grievances'againstthe crown.74And they signed a secret 'pact of friendship' with their long-time enemies in the south - with the Khamseh, with the Bakhtiyaris,and with the governor of Fars province.75 The British military attachereportedthat this pact would win the supportof 'southernpropertyowners' since it had the common goal of resisting'Tudehsubversion'.76 And the Britishambassador explainedthat these formerrivalswere willing to work together because they, like 'all men of property', intended to prevent revolutionby creatingsome semblanceof stabilityin their 'feudal south'.77 Similarreactionsoccurred in the capital. Six pro-Britishdailies, including Fatemi'sBakhtar,resigned from the FreedomFront and joined a competing And in parliament, Unionof NationalNewspapers (Ittihad-iJarayid-iMelli).78 the events of Isfahan- rumouredto have made seven hundred casualtiesbecame the most 'prominent' issue, over-shadowing the constitutional As problem.79 a result,the two conservativegroups from the south, Democrats from the north, the and Patriots,broke with their fellow anti-courtaristocrats Liberals,and instead formed a new majority bloc with the royalists of the National UnionFaction. These three partiesintroduceda bill permittinglocal governorsto impose martiallaw over industrial plants.They voted togetherin the bi-annual elections for parliamentaryofficers, winning a significant majorityin the vital committees,retainingMadaniof the Patriotsas Deputy Speaker,and placing a National Unionist,Sayyid MuhammadTabatabai,as Speakerof the House.80 They changed Sa'id's cabinet, supplantingLiberals with new nominees of the court. And they sent a staunch anti-communist law and order royalistto Isfahanas governorwith instructionsto re-establish at any cost, even at the cost of distributingarms to potentially dangerous tribesmen. The three factions, moreover,worked closely togetherin financialmatters.

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

41

When the government introduced its annual budget, the deputies from Azerbayjan,left out of the finance committee, found that the allocation for Tehran was twenty times more than for the whole of Western Azerbayjan, although the population of the latter was estimatedto be triple that of the former. One deputy from Tabrizcomplained:'Every time the topic of public Iraniansmust education comes up, you people insist that Turkish-speaking learn Persian. But, in actual fact, you are unwilling to spend even the taxes collected in Azerbayjanfor buildingof schools in the same province.'8'And when Sa'id proposeda bill loaning an additionalsum of 15 million tomans to the war ministry,againstthe advice of Millspaugh,he receivedthe supportof but Fatemiof the not only NationalUnionists also of Patriotsand Democrats.82 Patriots, who a few months earlier had demandeda cut in the army, now declared:'Unless we immediatelyfinancean effectivemilitary,such uprisings as occurredin Isfahancan spreadand destroythe whole foundationsof private property.'A Democrat,whose spokesmanhad been vocal in denouncingthe chiefs of staff, exclaimed: 'Since our house is on fire all citizens should be in favour of a strong army. Without a strong army, Iran will burn into ashes.' Meanwhile,the opposition,unable to preventthe passageof the bill, tried to turn the debate into an investigationof the entire military establishment.A introduceda motion to set up a committeeof inquiryto Tudehrepresentative cashier the officers who had desertedthe front in 1941. One of Mossadeq's supportersunsuccessfullyproposedto reduceconscriptionfrom two years to one year. Another argued that, according to the constitution, all national matters,includingmilitarymatters,should be undercivilian supervision.The assistantwar ministerrepliedthat althoughthis argumentwas correct,on the whole, nevertheless,the fundamentallaws vested the supreme command of the armedforces in the personof the king. At this point, Mossadeqwas unable to resist deliveringa short history of the constitutionalmovement concluding with a veiled threat: The shah has no rightto interferein nationalpolitics,because,according to the fundamental laws, the ministers, not he, are responsible to parliament. If he interferes, he can be held responsible. If he is responsible,then some deputieswill concludethat shahs can be changed in the same way as ministerscan be dismissed. In spite of a lengthy debate,Said carriedthroughthe bill. NationalUnionists, Patriots, and Democrats voted for the loan, Liberals and Independents abstained.The Tudehand Individualscast their votes againstthe government. The 14th Parliamenthad begun with a general assault on the monarch. But beforethe offensivecould achieve lastingresults,two of the anti-courtfactions, shaken by Isfahan, were voting to strengthenthe royal army. The industrial workers- the newest class of modernIran- had burstinto the nationalarena and thus inadvertentlypreservedthe shah, the oldest symbol of traditional Iran. The alliance between royalists and southern conservatives was further strengthenedin Octoberby the sudden outbreakof the national issue in the form of an oil crisis. During the precedingthirteenmonths, Soheily and Sa'id had been secretly negotiatingwith western oil companies for concessions in the south-easternprovinces. The former had encouraged StandardOil and

42

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

The latter,on the other hand, had StandardVacuum of the United States.83 favoured Royal Dutch Shell of Britain.84But anti-western politicians, eventuallydiscoveringthese behind-the-scenes discussions,leakedthe news to the public in August of 1944.8S The Soviet reacted, slowly but not unexpectedly, two months later by asking for equivalent privileges in the northernprovinces.Sa'id, however, was convincedthat either a straight'yes' or a straight'no' would both lead to the same disastrousend, the permanent loss of the region.He arguedthateconomic penetration would inevitablyresult in the establishmentof 'Soviet Republics',and he felt that a rebuttalwould encouragethe Russiansto organisedissidentsin Kurdistanand Azerbayjan.86 He thereforereplied evasively that all oil negotiationswould be postponed until the end of the world war. He confidentiallyinformedthe Britishthat he had given an evasive replyin orderto makehis real 'no' more 'palatable'.87 But the Russians, refusing to accept his answer, persisted in demanding an agreement as soon as possible, denounced him as a 'crypto-fascist',and encouragedthe Tudehto hold mass ralliescalling for his resignation. This crisis, initiatingthe Cold War in Iran long before the Cold War in Europe, consolidatedthe position of the shah by sharpeningthe differences among his opponents. The pro-western groups, Democrats, Patriots, and Independents, togetherwith their National Unionof Newspapers now totalling 24.editors, allied with the National UnionFaction to support Sa'id's 'heroic' stand.The pro-Russian Liberalsjoinedthe Tudehwith its FreedomFrontof 26 papersto denounce Sa'idas a dangerous'Britishstooge'. And the Individuals stood on neutralground, opposing Russian demands,refusingto supportthe pro-British Sa'id,and insistingthat the whole crisis had provedtheir argument that concessionsto one power would inevitablyleadto demandsfor equivalent concessions from rival powers.88 The oil crisis subsidedin November as suddenlyas it had arisenin October. The Russians, failing to gain a concession of their own but succeeding in preventingthe west from obtaining theirs, informed the deputies that they were willing to drop the demands if a more 'trustworthy'premier replaced Sa'id.89Members of parliament,especially the National Unionists, always having the unthinkableat the back of their minds - the danger of separatist revolts in the north - grabbedat the opportunityand withdrew their support of the government.90 Britishmilitaryattache,who continuedto back Sa'id The to the very end, explainedthe behaviourof the deputiesnot in termsof rational fears but of irrational'individualism': The Persianstake a childish delight in any such 'grown up' disease as a political crisis. Being individualists without loyalty, discipline, or cohesion, they are loath to sink their differences,fix upon a common
policy and elect leaders to carry out that policy.9'

PREMIERBAYAT, NOVEMBER 1944- APRIL 1945

Sa'id's downfall was precededby two weeks of searching,mostly in closed parliamentary sessions, for a viable successor. It was apparentthat no prowestern candidatewould be acceptableto the Russians. It was also equally apparentthat no pro-Russiancandidatewould be acceptableto the west. The

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

43

advantage,therefore,lay with the two factionsnot closely associatedwith the and foreignpowers - the royalistNationalUnionists the anti-royalist neutralist Individuals. The Individuals promptly presented Mossadeq and gradually collected a majority for him by receiving the full support of the pro-Soviet Liberalsand Tudehand the half-hearted The supportof the NationalUnionists. latter,althoughthreatenedby his internalpolicies,felt that his externalpolicies could alleviate the fears of the foreign powers. But Mossadeq, seeing the to precariousbasesof his majorityand determining retakehis seat in the majlis once he ceased being premier, requested a special dispensation from the constitutionalclause that obliged all membersof the executive to resign their The refusedto vote for the posts in the legislativebranch.92 National Unionists request arguing that it would undermine the fundamental separation of powers. The National Unionists now judged the time appropriateto offer their candidate, Morteza Bayat Saham al-Sultan, to the pro-BritishPatriots and Democrats. Bayat, a staunch royalist - a participantin all of Reza Shah's parliaments,a founding member of the court People's Party, and an elder brother of Ezzat Bayat in the National Union Faction - was, nevertheless, acceptableto the southernconservativesbecause his large family estateswere concentratedin the British occupied province of Kermanshah.Musteringa small majority,he firstrewardedhis supportersby giving seven cabinetposts to royalists and four to pro-Britishpoliticians.He then tried to alleviate the fears of the opposition. He stated that previous premiers were wrong to negotiate behind closed doors. He promisedto keep the deputiesthoroughly informedof the internationalsituation. And he helped Mossadeqpass a law which made it a criminaloffence for any public officialsecretlyto discuss oil concessions with either a foreign company or a foreign government."9 Bayat took office in November with a slim majority formed of National Unionists pro-British and Democrats-Patriots. he left office six months later But having lost the votes of all Democrats-Patriots of some dissidentNational and Unionists,and insteadhaving gained a significantminoritycomposedof loyal neutralistIndividuals,and pro-SovietTudeh-Liberals. NationalUnionists, This fundamental change in the bases of his support was precipitatedby the problemof Millspaugh.Bayat discovered,as soon as he took charge,that his authority was disputed by this foreign 'adviser', who not only persisted in schemingto cut the militarybudget,but also used his positionto freezethe 15 million tomans recentlyloaned to the war ministry.94 new prime minister The was faced with the choice either of seeing the army frustrated of preparing or the early exodus of the economic mission. He chose the latter without hesitation,introducing,only two weeks after taking office, a bill to withdraw the financial powers granted to Millspaugh by parliament two years previously. This promptly alienated the pro-western factions who were convinced that Iran would need all its foreign links to remain free of the communist world. But it immediatelyattractedthe neutralistsand the proRussians, who, for some time had accused the mission for becoming a dangerous bond which could eventually drag Iran into the western world. Bullard, who, a few weeks earlier, had described Bayat's cabinet as 'a collectionof decent men', now complainedthat he had no 'confidence'in this same government.9" few months laterhe was to describeBayatas 'one of the A

44

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

And the Soviet embassy, which had been so most stupid men in Persia'.96 active in bringingabout Said's downfall, was now willing to pursue a policy of 'non-interference' the activitiesof the new prime minister. in Bayat,having antagonisedhis originalfriends,moved rapidlyfurtherto win committee over his new-found friends.He helpedthem set up a parliamentary to investigatepro-British deputiesimplicatedin a scandalinvolving the illegal sale of import licences to business associatesof Sayyid Zia. He replacedthe of and governorof Isfahanwith a moderatewho stoppedthe distribution arm's unions to organiseagain.The Democratsdeclared that this changeof permitted He policy threatenedto bring 'anarchy'back to the city.97 was more generous than the previouspremierin grantingthe Tudehpermitsto hold mass ralliesin Tehran. Indeed he used martiallaw against the anti-communists,restricting the activitiesof SayyidZia'sFatherlandPartyand banningten dailiesaffiliated with the Union of National Newspapers.The Patriots denounced this as an 'unlawful'use of the policeto stiflethe constitutionalrightof freeexpression.98 He introducedan electoral bill proposing to increase the representationof from 15 to to 20, Isfahanfrom 3 to Tehranfrom 12 to 15 deputies,Azerbayjan 6. And he drew up the country's first labour bill, limiting work hours, regulating factory conditions, initiating paid holidays, banning the use of children in industry, and guaranteeingunion rights, including the right to strike. The conservativeRa'ad-i Emruz and Kushish,which had welcomed Bayat'selection,now suddenlydiscoveredthat he had packedthe cabinetwith his 'feudal'relativesand that he had no systematicprogrammefor eliminating 'mass poverty'.99Meanwhile, the radical Rahbar, which had originally describedBayatas a typical 'feudalist',now arguedthat with enemies such as the reactionary Sayyid Zia he needed and deserved the friendship of all
progressives. ?00

The prime minister, in initiating an innovative strategy, was carefully calculating to exchange the pro-western votes with almost the same total mustered by neutrals and pro-Russian deputies. He accomplished this conversion as planned, but, unfortunately for his administration, he the miscalculated underestimating fears of his own fellow royalists.In the by eyes of more conservativemembersof the court faction, Bayat'spolicies were not daring but dangerous, not expedient but explosive, not a reflection of social-minded conservatism but of politically-motivatedadventurism, not experimentalbut, as Nasrollah Fatemi has written, threateningly'flirtatious' Their fears, which were arousedin early Januarywhen with communism.10' he replacedthe governor of Isfahan, and grew rapidlyin Februarywhen he introduced the new labour bill, broke into the open in March when a demonstrationof university students, protestingagainst 'corrupt'politicians, clashed violently with the police outside the parliamentbuilding. Ra'ad-i Emruzexpressedthe anxiety of many conservativeswhen it arguedthat these students- describedas 'rebels without a legitimategrievance'who hoped to of establisha 'dictatorship the intelligentsia' had been encouragedindirectly by the lenient attitudesof the government.'02 The clash instantly split Bayat's main supporters,the National Unionists, into two separate factions. Thirteen members, almost all from western and headedby EzzatBayat,remainedloyal to the scatterednorthernconstituencies, prime minister. But the other seventeen, all from central and southern

FACIIONALISM IN IRAN

45

of provinces,led by Dawlatabadi Isfahan,ignoringroyalpleas,left and formed They were not mere court their own NationalFaction (Fraksiun-iMelli).'03 placemenexecuting the will of the shah. On the contrary,they were royalist aristocratswhose independentpoliciesand fears usually but not always, as in March 1945, coincided with those of the shah. Their defectionautomatically jeopardisedthe administration.In the bi-annualelections for parliamentary obtaineda slightedge in the officers,held in mid-April, governmentsupporters important committees, and their candidate for Speaker, Muhammad Tabatabai,was re-electedwith the majorityof one single vote over Farrukh. to And three days later,when Bayatreluctantlycame to parliament prove his Liberals,Individuals, majority,he found that his backers- NationalUnionists, and Tudeh - could muster only 45 votes, while the opposition, formed of and Patriots,Democrats,Independents, the new NationalFaction, was able to gather 48 votes. Bullardsighed with reliefthat Bayat'sgovernment,which he five claimedhad begun to 'disintegrate' months earlier,had finallybeen forced to resign.'04

PREMIERHAKIMI,APRIL-JUNE1945

crisis. At first, the The resignationof Bayat began a six-week parliamentary factionslobbiedfor their own specialcandidates.The Liberalscampaignedfor Qavam.The Individuals,helped by the Tudeh,introducedSadeq Mushtashar al-Dawleh. Sadeq,who had been generallyrespectedbecauseof his role in the constitutionalrevolution, his imprisonmentby the British during the First World War, his consistentsupportfor secularreformsbeforebeing forcedinto retirementby Reza Shah, was now smearedby opponentsas 'senile' mainly becauseof his activitiesas chairmanof the Soviet-IranianCulturalSociety.'05 The Independents, meanwhile,triedto collect votes for Mansural-Mulk,who, becausehe was working fairlyharmoniouslywith the Russiansin his capacity as governorof Khurasan,was distrustedby the Britishas 'eithera Petainor a The National Unionistsbrought forward FathallahPakravan,a Quisling'.'06 soldier turned diplomat-courtier,who hoped to make a success of Bayat's 'soft' policy towards the Tudehand the Russians.And at the same time, the royalistdissidents,the NationalFaction,togetherwith the Democrats-Patriots, worked on behalf of Muhsin Sadr al-Ashraf as a suitable candidate to reintroduce Sa'id's 'hard' line against the Tudeh and the Soviets. Sadr, a religiousjudge in his eighties, had the notoriousreputationof being the most consistentlyconservativeof all conservativeadvisersto the monarch,whether the monarchwas a Qajaror a Pahlevi.Duringthe constitutional revolution,he had personallypresidedover the executionof a numberof liberalintellectuals. And during Reza Shah's reign, he had served the king both as a backbench deputy,and as a tough high-courtjudge. Bullardhad describedhim in 1943 as a 'stiff reactionaryex-mulla'.'07 The factions,failingto gatherenough votes for their own favourites,finally settled upon a compromisecandidate- IbrahimHakimal-Mulk.As a former court doctor who had taken part in the constitutionalrevolution, Hakimi receivedlukewarmsupportfrom royalistsas well as anti-royalists. a native As of Azerbayjanwith old friends among politiciansin Fars, he was acceptable

46

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

both to northernersand to southerners.And as a respectablestatesmanwho had taken care to keep his hands clean of all foreign associations, he was backed half-heartedlyby pro-westerners, pro-Russians, and neutralists.'08 Bullarddescribedhim as a 'harmless nonentity' who was 'old', 'deaf, and without any recent 'experience'in public affairs.'09 Hakimi, having received an ample but tepid majority,tried to retain his supportersby choosing ministerswho were not directlyassociatedwith any of the parliamentaryfactions. He hoped to half-satisfy most by not fullysatisfying any one group. Instead he found himself dissatisfyingmost. As Bullardreported,the premier,when he returnedto the majlis to obtain the necessaryvote of confidence,was confrontedby 'generaldisapproval'."I0 The in Liberals,pointing out that the north was not represented the government, opposed him."' The Individualswithdrew their originalsupport,arguingthat an 'impartial'statesman,such as Sadeq, should have been invited to prepare the interior ministry for the forthcoming 15th Majlis elections."2As a final blow, both Democratsand Patriots,disgruntled that none of their spokesmen had been given ministries, refused to continue their initial backing for the premier."3The Hakimi government, therefore, ended before it had even officiallystarted.
PREMIERSADR, JUNE-OCTOBER 1945

Hakimi'sfailuredrove most court deputiesto become more royalistthan even the royal family. The two court factions fused back into the National Union Faction, allied with the Democrats-Patriots, and, underestimating fears the expressedby the palace,cast their decisivevotes for the arch-monarchist Sadr. Only three royalist deputies shared the concern held by the shah that the election of such an extreme conservative could force the opposition - the liberalas well as the radical,the neutralas well as the pro-Russian, internal the as well as the externalopposition- to take extremecountermeasures."4 Sadr, obtaininga majorityand a subsequentfarman,packedhis supportersinto the cabinet. Of the three most importantministries,he retainedthe interior for himself, gave the war department its formerroyalisthead, and handedthe to foreignofficeto a pro-British diplomat.The latterwas consideredto be so proBritishthat the Americanembassy was soon pressingto have him removed.' Is And of the seven less importantministries,four went to the southernfactions and three were given to royalist politicians. Sadr returned to parliamentwith his cabinet in mid-June expecting an immediate vote of approval. But, instead, he entered a long three-month strugglewith a determinedminority formed of Liberals,Individuals,Tudeh, and a few dissenters from the Independentsand National Unionists.These factions - outraged by the victory of an arch-conservative,fearful of his controlof the bureaucracy beforethe expectedelections,and alarmedby a just pro-British dominancein the administration organiseda joint boycott of the assembly. And since they could jointly muster enough deputies to reduce parliamentbelow its quorum,their boycott turned into an effectivefilibuster. Whenever the governmentcame either to ask for a vote of confidenceor to present a bill, they would file out of the chamber, thus automatically the this terminating meeting.For the Britishambassador was anotherproof of

FACrIONALISM IN IRAN

47

he immaturityamongthe 'natives'- forgettinghis earlierdiscription, made fun of newspapersthat depictedthe same premieras a 'hardenedreactionary" 16 but for many Iraniansthe filibusterwas a drastic and necessarymeasure to undo the originaldrasticand unnecessaryelection of Sadr.In their eyes, Sadr was not just another undesirable premier, but was the symbol of royal despotism, the embodiment of religious conservatism, and the epitome of right-wingdogmatism. Their fears were furtherintensifiedas Sadrproceededto enforce his 'hard' line policies.Bayat'sreformbills were withdrawn.An agreement,describedby Bullardas 'of great importanceto Britishinterests',was negotiatedbetween Iran and the British-ownedImperialBank of Persia."7And martiallaw was used in Tehran to curtail mass meetings, to ban some 48 newspapers, to and occupy the Tudehheadquarters, to arrestover one hundredof the party's cadres. Sadr expressed regret in his later memoirs that parliamentary immunity had deterredhim from detainingthe eight Tudeh deputies."8The Americanambassadorformedthe impressionthat he was out to 'abolishthe Tudeh'."19 such circumstances,the opposition felt it had no choice but to In persist in its parliamentary boycott. The filibusterstirredup a constitutionalstorm. The minority,championing parliamentaryrights, insisted that cabinets had no legitimacy until they The receivedthe vote of approvalfrom the deputies.'20 majority,resortingto court prerogatives,claimed that cabinets obtained legal authority from the momentthe royalfarman was issued.'2' Forthe former,the vote was essential, the farman ceremonial; for the latter,thefarman was fundamental,the vote superficial. One memberof the government,who, as a colleagueof SayyidZia, had recently advocated the curtailment of court influence, now blatantly the laws to arguethatthe shah was endowed with misinterpreted fundamental the unlimited power of appointing and dismissing all cabinet ministers.'22 Findingthemselveson shaky legal grounds,the majoritybloc triedto shift the debateon to the moral rightsand wrongs of filibustering a minority.They by maintainedthat such behaviourhad killed parliamentary life, was trampling over the rights of the public, and could encourage desperateundesirablesto plot whole-scale social dissolution. The opposition retorted that 'obstructionism a vital weapon in the hands of any parliamentary is minority in order to defend democracyand constitutionalism'.'23 The heated discussion within the debating chamber persisted into late summer when it was gradually but dramaticallydwarfed by a much more heated storm in the society outside. The storm was brought to a head by a rapidsuccession of outbursts,each more serious than its predecessor.In midAugust, a contingentof radicaljunior officersin Khurasan,harassedby their royalistsuperiors,mutiniedand organisedan unsuccessfulrevolt among local Turkoman tribes. Meanwhile, in Kurdistan, communal leaders who had been asking for provincial autonomy since 1941 finally announced the formation of a KurdishDemocraticParty. A week later, a group of Tudeh speakers, pleading with peasants outside Tabriz to withhold the landlord's share of the harvest, were ambushed by retainersof the village owner. In Tehranit was rumouredthatthe landlordhad been lynched.Anothergroupof Tudehmilitants,without party authorisation,occupiedgovernmentoffices in the third largest town in Azerbayjan.At the same time, a group of inmates

48

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

attemptedan unsuccessful break-outat the city prison in Tabriz. Although they had no politicalconnections,the prison authoritiesannouncedthe Tudeh had supplied them with weapons. In late August, armed workers in the Caspianprovinces, without centralinstructionsbut seeing the suppressionof trade unions in the south, took over industrialplants. The Britishembassy controlof affairsseems to be passinginto reported:'In Gilan and Mazandaran And as a climax, in early the hands of Tudeh committees and Soviets."l24 with the Tudehfor not vigorously veterancommunists,dissatisfied September, representing minority grievances, formed their own Democratic Party of Azerbayjan.The party put forward three main demands: use of Turkish in local schools and administrative offices; retentionof taxes for the development of of the area; and establishment regionalautonomy, since language,history, and culture had endowed the people of Azerbayjanwith a distinct 'national identity'.'25Joined promptly by the provincial branch of the Tudeh, and from entering protectedby the Russianswho preventedcentralreinforcements the north, the Democratic Party initiated an armed uprising throughout Azerbayjan.The fears that had lurked in many minds during the past four years were now being realised. The upheavalhad immediaterepercussionsin parliament.It convinced the royaliststhat the shah, in forewarningagainstSadr,had not been exaggerating the possible reactions from the opposition. It persuaded many northern deputiesthat the royalistarmy was a vital necessity;as one prominentLiberal, who had consistentlycriticisedthe military,now asked himself the rhetorical question: 'Who but our soldiers can save the nation from these ?'126 The crisis in the north was for many Liberals what the secessionists sixteen months earlier. uprising in Isfahan had been for Democrats-Patriots Six Liberals resigned from the faction and joined the southern bloc in the denouncingthe DemocraticPartyfor 'undermining securityof the Iranian nation'.'27 One formerLiberaldeclaredin the majlis: This so-calledDemocraticPartyis strikingterrorand spreadingthe false notion that Persianis not the mothertongue of all Iranians.It is high time to end our parliamentary stalemate,and insteadto start buildinga stable governmentthat can prevent general disintegration.'28 These tendencies led to a new parliamentarycompromise. The majority promisedto let Hakimi,the shah's firstchoice, to have anotherchance. And the minority, with a few exceptions,agree to permitthe passageof two bills. One postponedthe voting for the forthcomingmajlisuntil the evacuationof all Allied troops. Mossadeq, however, unsuccessfully argued that delay could result in a long intersession,and that it would not guaranteefree balloting: 'For twenty-six years we had no foreign soldiers on our soil, yet we did not have fair results. What we need is not postponementbut electoralreform."29 The other bill sharplyincreasedmilitaryallocationsby raisingofficer'ssalaries and creating two new northern divisions, thus expanding the army from 90,000 to 102,000 men. Only the Tudehrefusedto acceptthe argumentgiven by the war ministerthat the military was the 'sole' organisationcapable of The saving Iran from 'total anarchy'.'30 military'logic' had finallytriumphed in parliament.The two bills having been accepted, Sadr stepped down in favour of Hakimi.

FACIIONALISM IN IRAN HAKIMI,OCTOBER1945-JANUARY 1946

49

Hakimi returned to office with a new programme. His earlier attempt at establishing an administration independent of most factions had ended abruptlyby being left in mid-airwithout secure footing among most factions. Bayat's 'soft' line towards the radicals had drastically undermined the confidenceof the conservatives.And Sadr's 'hard' line had found itself in a dangerouscul-de-saccollidingwith the Soviet Union. Hakimi,therefore,tried to chart a new course which combined elements of both Sadr'sand Bayat's approaches. From the former he borrowed the tough policy towards the radicalsin orderto retainthe supportof the conservatives.And from the latter he took the moderatepolicy towards the Russians in order to insure their scheduledtroop withdrawal and to obtain the immediatebackingof the antiwestern groups. As the first part of the new programme,Hakimi continued the military occupationof the Tudehheadquarters, spoke of entirelyoutlawing the party, and, claiming that Turkish was a 'foreign' tongue imposed on northern Iraniansby the 'barbarian Mongols',refusedto negotiatewith the 'anarchists' leading the DemocraticParty of Azerbayjan.'3' And as a second part of the same programme,he gave three ministriesto northernpro-Russians, to a one neutralist,six to royalists,and none to the southernpro-British. parliament In he received a large vote of approvalfrom all except from the Tudehand the The Tudeh opposed. The Democrats-Patriots Democrats-Patriots. abstained, announcingthat because of the 'criticalsituation'they could not vote against the government.'32 Furthermore,Hakimisent MortezaBayat as governor to Azerbayjan, appointedQavam,Sadeq,and Mansurto a new Councilof Senior Advisors to the Premier; and, following Mossadeq's suggestion, invited himself to Moscow in order to negotiatedirectlywith Stalin.'33 These measures,however, failedto win over the Russians.They repliedthat a future premier Qavam, rather than a present premier Hakimi, would be welcome in Moscow.'34They refused to commit themselves on a date for complete evacuation.They stopped the transportof agricultural goods from to Azerbayjan the south. They demandedthe repealof the restrictions imposed on the Tudeh.And they continuedto preventthe entry of governmenttroops into the north. Consequently, rebels in Gilan revived an old regional organisation, the Jungle Party (Hizb-i Jangali), which had established the Soviet SocialistRepublicin 1921. The Azerbayjani Democratspressedon with their uprising, captured Tabriz, and announced the formation of an autonomousgovernmentof Azerbayjan. Meanwhile,the KurdishDemocrats, receivingarmedassistancefrom the Barzanitribes,went furtherand declared the birth of an independentRepublicof Kurdistan. Hakimi not only failed with the Russians but also alienatedthe British. Bullard,who had initiallydistrustedthis policy of 'appeasement', now began safeguarding British interests by proposing that all provinces, including southernones, should have administrative autonomysince 'over-centralization was the real cause of presentdisintegration'.'35 as a finalblow, the B.B.C. And announcedin earlyJanuarythat Britain,Russia,and UnitedStateswould hold a Tripartite Commission to solve the internal problem of Iran. This immediately brought back nightmares of the 1907 Entente, and, as the Americanambassadorreported,arousedin its wake sharppanic in Tehran.'36

50

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Nationalistshad only one horrorworse than seeing Britainand Russia fight in Iran. They were afraidof the two powers sitting down together,as they had done in 1907, in order not to fight in Iran. Now before their own eyes they saw impendingdoom - the stateagain beingcarvedup into foreignspheresof influence. Only one possible route for escape remained: direct negotiations between Russiaand Iran,led by Qavam,beforethe conveningof the Tripartite Commissions.As Mossadeqdeclaredin parliament:'If we don't talk directly with our northernneighbourwe are finished.The end of Iran will come as soon as the Tripartite Commissionmeets. We must, therefore,replaceHakimi with a premier who will be welcomed in Moscow."" This was a solution proposed not only by neutralist Individuals, and, of course, pro-Soviet but Tudeh-Liberals, also by dissidentLiberalswho rejoinedtheir faction,and even by some defectorsfromthe othergroups- such as the pro-British Madani from the Patriots and Muhammad Tabatabai from the royal National Unionists.The Britishmilitaryattache explainedthis drift not by taking into account legitimate fears, but by resorting, as usual, to national :138 "characteristics' The Persian, though capable of spasmodic feats of bravery, is not renowned for that dogged brand of courage which sustains prolonged resistance in adverse circumstances. He was dismayed that recent approaches made to the Soviet Union did not immediately elicit favourablereplies. So Persiancourage is beginningto ooze away. Some 45 deputies have signed a document pledging support to Qavam. Like most Persians he is obsessed with the idea of his own cleverness and believes that he can handle the Russians. This is a belief which few outside the ranks of his own countrymenwould share.

PREMIER QAVAM AND THE ENDING OF THE 14TH PARLIAMENT, JANUARYMARCH 1946

The defectorsfrom the royalistand the pro-westernfactionsbroke from their camps graduallyand reluctantly.They took their painfulsteps not in the heat of blind emotionalism,but in the emotion-ladenawarenessthat the destinyof the country was at stake.Theirdecision,however, provedto be decisivein the end, for, on 25 January,Qavam was elected premierwith the marginof one single determiningvote. It was a thin majority,but it was the only majority achieved by an anti-court, pro-Soviet prime minister. The pro-Russian aristocrats,who had been numericallytoo weak to gain power during the previoustwo years, had achievedsuccess at last, ironicallyas a resultof a news broadcastmade by their main foreign opponent - the BritishForeignOffice. Qavam,unsure of his parliamentary position but sure of the parliamentary calendarwhich marked I I Marchas the end of the majlis,began a systematic policy of procrastination. spent three full weeks bargainingwith the shah He over the make up of the new administration. the conclusionof the haggling, At he retainedthe ministriesof interiorand foreign affairsfor himself, kept five otherposts for his supporters, gave threeto court favourites.He eventually and presentedthis cabinetto the deputiestwenty hours beforehis scheduledflight to Russia, and, with the help of the Speaker,persuadedthe house to postpone

FACTIONALISMIN IRAN

51

the debate for the vote of approval until after the completion of his urgent mission. In Moscow he extended his pressing visit into long-drawn-out negotiations,offeringto arrangean oil concession and settle the Azerbayjan questionpeacefully,if, in return,the Russianswithdrew their troops by early the May. At one point he even interrupted discussionsto go on a sight-seeing tour of Kiev. Meanwhile, back home, his staunch adherentsboycotted the majlis to prevent a quorum from convening. The Tudeh held mass to at demonstrations the entranceof parliament deterany wavererswho might have been temptedto breakthe boycott.And the oppositionfactions,unableto hold officialmeetings,spent the time exchangingcriticisms.Some blamedthe royalistsfor having postponedthe electionsfor the next assembly.Othersheld the pro-British responsiblefor havingbroughtSadrto power. A few cursedthe crowds for terrorising their colleagues.Many denouncedthe greatpowers for And some triedunsuccessfullyto instigatingmost of Iran'sinternaldifficulties. extend the life of the sittingparliamentuntil the electionsfor the forthcoming majlis. Qavam,at long last, returnedto Tehranon 10 March- a day beforethe last session. And he presentedhimselfto the deputiesthe following day, only one hour before the fateful deadline. With sardonic humour, he expressed deep regretthattherewas neitherenough time nor enough memberspresentto hold a meaningfuldebate.'39 Within the chamber,distantshouts of demonstrators could be hearddemandingan immediateend to this 'den of thieves'. The 14th which had begun with a determined Parliament, attackon the monarchy,had ended half-empty, not with a bang, but with a whimper, muttering faint criticismsof the still-powerfulshah, of the discontentedclasses, and of the great powers beginningtheir Cold War. Factionalismhad slowly killed the majlis- factionalismcausednot by unrealphobiasin the mindsof the deputies but by very real social and political forces outside the control of the 14th Parliament.
NOTES 1. A. Lambton,Islamic Societyin Persia (An InauguralLectureDeliveredat the Universityof London in 1954) (Oxford, 1954), p. 16. 2. IsfahanConsulto the F.O., 'Bi-weeklyReports',9 May 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/Persia 222-45476. Crown copyright records reproduced by kind permission of the Controller, Office. H.M.Stationery 3. For the 'nationalcharacter'explanationsee J.Fraser,Narrativeof a Journeyinto Khorasan (London, 1825).The authorarguesthat only 'warlikeand determined'despotscan establishpeace in such a society where the subjectsare divided from each other by intense'insecurity','personal jealousy', and lack the 'habitof obedience'. For the 'politicalculture' approachsee H.Vreeland, Human RelationsFile on Iran (New Haven, 1957). Here 'culture'has replaced'character' the as deus ex machina,explainingeverything,including factionalism.Iran is unstablebecause Iranians are 'insecure' and 'distrustful each other' (p. 4). At times, they are subservientfor 'they are of taught from birth to give respectand disciplinedobedience to their superiors'(p. 94). At other because they 'are a volatile people who react to authoritywith a times, they are insubordinate certainamount of rebelliousness' 4). (p. 4. M. Zonis, The PoliticalElite of Iran (Princeton,1971). 5. For an elaboration this theme see, E.Abrahamian, of 'Oriental Despotism:The Caseof Qajar Journalof MiddleEast Studies, Vol. IV, no, 1 (January1974), pp. 3-31. Iran,'International 6. Forthe constitutional documentssee, E. Browne,ThePersianRevolution (London, 1910),pp. 354-400. 7. Armitage-Smith the F.O., 14 Feb. 1921, Documentson BritishForeign Policy, 1919-39 to (London, FirstSeries),XIII, p. 721.

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8. Ministerto the F.O., 3 and 18 March 1921, ibid., p. 735, 745. 9. Anonymous, 'Reza Shah' (Unpublishedbiographyat PrincetonUniv. Library,1970). 10. Matin-Daftari, 'Memoriesfrom Past Elections',Khandani-ha,5 April 1956. 11. Z. Shaji'i, Nimayandigan-i Majlis-i Shawra-yi Melli dar Bist-u-Yak Dawreh-i Qanun Guzari(Members Parliamentin Twenty-One of LegislativeSessions)(Tehran, 1965), p. 173. 12. A. Khal'atbari, Iran (The IranianAristocracy), Aristukrasi-yi (Tehran, 1945), p. 20. 13. A. Millspaugh,Americansin Persia (WashingtonD.C., 1946), p. 34. 26 14. Ambassadorto the State Department, June 1945, ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates (Referredbelow as ForeignRelations)(WashingtonD.C., 1945)VIII, p. 385. of 15. War Officeto the F.O., 'Memorandumon the Reorganization the PersianArmy', F.O. 371/ Eastern 1941/ Persia6619-27251 . 16. J. Hurewitz,Diplomacyin the Near and MiddleEast: A Documentary Record (Princeton, 1956), II, pp. 232-4. 17. H. Kuhi-Kermani, Shahrivar 1320 to Faj'eh-i Azerbayjan(FromAugust 1941 until the Az Tragedyof Azerbyajan) (Tehran, 1944), I, pp. 158-60. 18. An Anonymous Officer,'Need for MilitaryReform', Rahbar, 7 June 1945. 19. As one young officertold an anti-courtintellectual:'It may be true that the old shah dealt harshlywith you civilians,but he did transform rabbleinto our modernarmy. Withouthim there a would be no armed forces in Iran.'R.Mustawfi,TehranDimukrat(DemocraticTehran)(Tehran, 1942), pp. 21-2. 20. War Office to the F.O., 'Memorandum on the Reorganizationof the Persian Army', F.O.371/Eastern 1941/Persia 6619-27251; War Officeto the F.O., 'Memorandum the Persian on Army', F.O. 371/Eastern 1942/Persia 1122-31440; Military Attache in Tehran to the F.O, 'General Ridley's Recommendationsfor the Reorganization the Army', F.O. 371/Eastern of 1943/Persia 549-35129. 21. Ministerto the F.O., 'Annual Report of the Year 1942', F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 239-35117. 22. R. Frye, 'Charismaof Kingshipin Ancient Iran', Iranica Antiqua,IV (1964), pp. 36-54. 23. Ministerto the F.O., 27 May 1943, F.O., 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35070. 24. Ministerto the F.O., 9 Feb. 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35068; and 27 May 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35070. 25. Ministerto the F.O., 27 May 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35070. 26. Ministerto the F.O., 11 April 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40187. 27. F.O. Official,'Commenton the PersianElections', 3 Dec. 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/ Persia239-35119. 28. TabrizConsulto the F.O., 'Bi-weeklyReports',9 July 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 80-35093. 29. Ministerto the F.O., 'Memorandum PoliticalActivitiesfor the MajlisGeneralElections', on F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35074. 30. IsfahanConsul to the F.O., 'Bi-weekly Reports',June-Dec. 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/ Persia247-35120. 31. IsfahanConsulto the F.O., 'Reporton Isfahan',F.O. 371 /Eastern 1945/Persia 222-45476. 32. IsfahanConsul to the F.O., 'Bi-weeklyReports',F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 35-40163. 33. Shaji'i,op. cit, p. 176. 34. Q. Rahimian,Muzakirat-iMajlis-iShawra-yiMelli(TheProceedings the LowerHouse of of Parliament) (Referred below as Parliamentary Proceedings) (Official StateGazette,Tehran),2 June 1945. 35. Ministerto the F.O., 'Monthly Summary for February 1943', F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/ Persia 38-35070. 36. N. Shabstari,'Qavamand the LiberalParty', Vazifeh,25 Feb. 1946. 37. A. Sipahr, 'Qavam al-SaltanehAfter August 1941', Salnameh-i Donya, XV (1959), pp. 55-6. 38. Ministerto the F.O., 31 Aug. 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35073. 39. Ministerto the F.O., 20 Jan. 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 34-40186. 40. Editorial,'The Court and National Dolitics', Ra ad-i Emruz, 1 June 1944; 'The Military Must be Reformed', Ra'ad-iEmruz, 11 Jan. 1944. 41. Editorial,'WhateverHappenedto the Other270 Million', Ra ad-i Emruz, 26 May 1944. 42. Editorial, 'The Army and RezaKhan',Ra ad-i Emruz, 22 May 1945; 'Reza Khan- the Enemy of Islam', Ra'ad-i Emruz, 5 April 1945, 'The Shah is Only a Figurehead in the Constitution',Ra'ad-i Emruz, 19 Dec. 1943; 'Iran is on the Verge of a Revolution,' Ra'ad-i Emruz, 9 Aug. 1945.

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43. MuhammadFarrukh- in his recent autobiography entitled Khatirat-iSiyasi-yi Farrukh (The PoliticalMemoirsof Farrukh)(Tehran, 1969) - has produceda masterpiecein the art of historicalmystification.Although he allots over 350 pages to the 14th Parliament stressinghis own role in it - he successfullyavoidsexplainingwhat policieshe pursued,who joined his faction, and why therewere so many separate parties.Instead,he reducesparliamentary politicsto the safe level of personalanimosities,thus covering up his past which is now embarrassing him, and, for incidently,reinforcingthe western impressionthat Iranianfactionalismis nothing more than the sound and fury of megalomaniacal The politicians. primarysources,however, show that Farrukh's group consistentlypursued a tribalpolicy. This often brought them in conflict with the shah which he never mentions.It frequentlyalliedthem with the British which he.againignores.And it occasionallydrew them into an anti-Russian bloc - which he plays to the hilt in orderto appear as a militantnationalist. 44. Chief of the Division of N.E. Affairs,'Memorandumon the MilitaryMission', F.R., IV, 1943, p. 513. 45. Ministerto the State Department,F.R., IV, 1943, p. 580, 625. 46. 'A. Dashti, Parliamentary Proceedings,6 Sept. 1941 and 5 Feb. 1942. 47. For the theoryof 'negativeequilibrium'see, H.Kay-Ostovan, Siayasat-iMuvazeneh-i Manfi dar Maflis-i Chahardahum in (ThePoliticsof NegativeEquilibrium the 14th Parliament) (Tehran, 1950), I and II. 48. M. Mossadeq,'Bill for ElectoralReform',Ayandeh,III, No. 2 (1944), pp. 61n3. 49. E. Gazidpour,'The State Must Industrialize Iran', Jibheh, 2 March 1946; Editorial,'The ClassStructure', Jibheh,3 March 1946; A. Khal'atbari, 'Politicsand the War Ministry',Jibheh,21 April 1946; Editorial,'Need for a National Revolution',Jibheh,26 May 1946. 50. MilitaryAttache in Tehranto the F.O., 'Bi-WeeklyReport', 17 January 1944, F.O. 371/ Eastern 1944/Persia 422-40205. 51. Ministerto the F.O., 20 Jan. 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 40-40186. 52. Ministerto the State Department, Foreign Relations,IV, 1943, p. 580. 53. Ministerto the F.O., 14 Feb. 1943, F.O. 371/Eastern 1943/Persia 38-35069. 54. F.O. Comment, 21 March 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40189. 55. M.Sa'id, 'My First Experiencesas Premier',Salnameh-i Donya, XV (1959), pp. 159-62. 56. Anonymous, 'Concerningthe Role of the Majlisin CabinetFormations',Ayandeh,III, No. I (Sept. 1944), pp. 48-50. 57. M. S'a'id, Parliamentary Proceedings,15 April 1944. 58. Z. Farmand,Parliamentary Proceedings,6 April 1944. 59. Rahimian,Parliamentary Proceedings,7 April 1944. 60. J. 'Abdeh, Parliamentary Proceedings,14 April 1944. 61. Farrukh,Parliamentary Proceedings,14 April 1944. 62. Sayyid Zia, Parliamentary Proceedings,15 April 1944. 63. MilitaryAttacheto the F.O., 'Bi-WeeklyReports',3 April 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/ Persia422-40205. 64. Assistant Secretary to the Embassy, 'Memorandum on Royal Prerogatives in the Constitution',6 May 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40187. 65. Ambassadorto the F.O., 2 May 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40187. 66. Anonymous, 'Programmeof the FreedomFront', Mardom, 17 July, 1942. 67. T. Vail Motter, U.S. Army in World War II: The Persian Corridor(WashingtonD.C., 1952), p. 467. Ambassadorto the F.O., 'Summaryfor the Months of January-June1944', F.O. 371 /Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40187. Millspaugh,op. cit., p. 114. 68. Ambassadorto the F.O., 9 March 1944, F.O. 371 /Eastern 1944/Persia 195-40222. 69. Descriptionof the events in Isfahan have been obtained from the BritishConsul's 'BiWeekly Reports',F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 35-40163. 70. N. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy:Powderkegof Iran (New York, 1954), p. 216. 71. Anonymous, 'The Revolt in Isfahan',Ra ad-i Emruz, 15-25 May, 1944. 72. Fatemi,op. cit, p. 217. 73. Ambassador the F.O., 'Bi-WeeklyReports',9 May 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia to 189-40187. 74. MilitaryAttacheto the F.O., 'Bi-WeeklyReports',23 May 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/ Persia 189-40187. 75. MilitaryAttacheto the F.O., 'Bi-WeeklyReports',7 Aug. 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/ Persia 189-40187. 76. Ibid.

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77. Ambassador the F.O., 'Three Monthly Report', 18 July 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/ to Persia 189-40187. 78. Ra'ad-i Emruz, 28 April 1944. 79. MilitaryAttacheto the F.O., 'Bi-Weekly Reports',8 May 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/ Persia422-40205. Khandani-ha, 15 June 1948. 80. M. Ghaffari,'Biographyof Sayyid MuhammadTabatabai', Proceedings,23 Jan. 1945. 81. Shaykh-al-Islami, Parliamentary Proceedings,3-22 Oct. 1944. 82. For the debateon the loan bill see Parliamentary 83. Minister to the State Department,Foreign Relations, IV, 1943, p. 627; and Charge d'Affairesto the State Department,Foreign Relations,V, 1944, p. 445. of 84. Ministerof Fuel and Power to the F.O., 'Memorandum Iran', F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/ Persia24-45443. Proceedings,10 Aug. 85. An account of these events were given by D.Tussi, Parliamentary 1944. 86. Ambassadorto the F.O., 'Memorandumon the Present Political Situation', F.O. 371/ Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40187. 87. Ambassadorto the F.O., 10 Oct. 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 6058-40241. Proceedings,I I Sept. 1944. 88. Mossadeq,Parliamentary 89. Ambassadorto the F.O., 9 Nov. 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40188. 90. Ibid. 91. MilitaryAttacheto the F.O., 'Reporton the Fall of Sa'id', 20 Nov. 1944, F.O. 371 /Eastern 1944/Persia 422-40206. 92. Editorial,'PoliticalAffairs',Kushish, 14 Nov. 1944. 93. N. Ardalan,Parliamentary Proceedings,28 Nov. 1944. 94. Anonymous, 'GovernmentActions against Dr. Millspaugh',Iran-i Ma, 5 Jan. 1945. 95. Ambassador to the F.O., 26 Nov. 1944, F.O. 371/Eastern 1944/Persia 189-40189; Foreign Relations,V, 1945, pp. 477, 483. Ambassadorto the State Department, 96. Ambassadorto the F.O., 22 Nov. 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/20-45436. 97. S. Bakhtiyar, Proceedings,14 Feb. 1945. Parliamentary 98. S. Fatemi,Parliamentary Proceedings,8 Feb. 1945. 99. Anonymous, 'The Bayat Household', Ra ad-i Emruz, 8 March 1945; and Editorial,'The Questionof Poverty', Kushish, 19 Jan. 1945. 100. Editorial,'Why We Voted for Bayat', Rahbar, 20 April 1945. 101. Fatemi,op. cit., p. 260. 102. Editorial,'The Dictatorship the Intelligentsia', 'ad-i Emruz, 10 March 1945. of Ra 103. Ambassador the F.O., 'ThreeMonthlyReports',26 July 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/ to Persia31-45450; and Anonymous, 'Bayat'sPosition in the Majlis',Rahbar, 25 April 1945. 104. Ambassador the F.O., 'ThreeMonthlyReports',26 July 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/ to Persia 31-45450. 105. Ambassadorto the F.O., 'The Composition of the Council of Senior Advisors to the Premier', 10 Dec. 1945, F.O.371/Eastern 1945/Persia 31-45452. 106. MilitaryAttache to the F.O., 'Weekly Reports',21 Dec. 1945, F.O.371/Eastern 1945/ Persia70-45458. 107. Ambassador the F.O., 'ThreeMonthly Reports',3 Dec. 1945, F.O.371/Eastern 1945/ to Persia238-35117. 108. Anonymous, 'Biography of Hakimi', Salnameh-i Donya, I (1946) pp. 910-S15 and Ittila'at-i Mahaneh,I (March 1948), pp. 10-7. 109. Ambassadorto the F.O., 'Three Monthly Reports', 13 Aug. 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/Persia 31-45450. I 10. Ibid. Proceedings,19 May 1945. I 11. S. Ipekjan,Parliamentary Proceedings,20 May 1945. 112. Mossadeq,Parliamentary 113. Mossadeq'sdescriptionof these events, Parliamentary Proceedings,2 June 1945. to 114. For the Shah'scontinuedoppositionto Sadrsee, Ambassador the F.O., 'ThreeMonthly Reports',26 July 1945, F.O. 371 /Eastern 1945/Persia 31-45450. I 15. Ambassadorto the F.O., 3 Nov. 1945, F.O. 371 /Eastern 1945/Persia 31-45449. 116. Ambassador the F.O., 'ThreeMonthlyReports',26 May 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/ to Persia 31-45450. 117. Ambassadorto the F.O., 22 Oct. 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/Persia 31-45445. Salnameh-i Donya, XIV (1959), pp. 40-4. I 18. M. Sadr, 'The Story of my Administration',

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Foreign Relations,VI, 1945, p. 417. 119. Ambassadorto the State Department, Minority,'An Open Letter',Rahbar, 18 June 1945. 120. Parliamentary 121. Parliamentary Majority, 'An Open Letter on the Present. Crisis', Parliamentary Proceedings,19 June 1945. Proceedings,27 Sept. 1945. 122. K. Hedayat,Parliamentary Rahbar, 14 June 1945. Minority, 'A Messageon Filibustering', 123. Parliamentary to 124. Ambassador the F.O., 'ThreeMonthly Reports',7 Nov. 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/ Persia31-45452. 'The Tudeh PartyofAzerbayjansee E. Abrahamian, 125. For the formationof the Democratic and the Firqah-i Dimukrat', InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, I (Oct. 1970), pp. 291-316. Proceedings,24 Oct. 1945. 126. A. Sadeqi,Parliamentary on 127. Twenty-nine Deputies,'A Proclamation Azerbayjan',Kushish,27 Sept. 1945. Proceedings,27 Sept. 1945. 128. S. Hikmat,Parliamentary Proceedings,11 Oct. 1945. 129. Mossadeq,Parliamentary Proceedings,2 Oct. 1945. 130. War Minister,Parliamentary 131. Anonymous, 'Hakimi'sSecretSpeech', Kushish, 19 Dec. 1945. Proceedings,5 Nov. 1945. Parliamentary 132. The Patriots,'A Proclamation', 133. Anonymous, 'Hakimi'sSecond SecretSpeech', Kushish, I I Dec. 1945. op. 134. Kay-Ostovan, cit., II, p. 214. 135. Ambassadorto the F.O., 27 Nov. 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/Persia 20-45436. 136. Ambassadorto the State Department,ForeignRelations,VIII, 1945, p. 475. 137. Mossadeq,Parliamentary Proceedings,9 Jan. 1946. 138. MilitaryAttacheto the F.O., 'Weekly Reports',21 Dec. 1945, F.O. 371/Eastern 1945/ Persia 70-45458. Proceedings,I1 March 1946. 139. A. Qavam, Parliamentary