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A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918

Article in Journal of Strategic Studies · December 2012

DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2012.669737

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This is the final text of this article published in Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6
(December 2012): 799-827, which can be found here:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2012.669737

A Case Study in
Horizontal Military Innovation:
The German Army, 1916-1918

By Dr Robert T. Foley
Defence Studies Department
King’s College London

robert.foley@kcl.ac.uk
@RobertFoleyKCL

Using the German army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a
different form on military innovation than has hitherto been analyzed by literature on
the subject. During the First World War, the German army innovated by spreading
knowledge between units rather than up and down the chain of command. Thus, this
army used ‘horizontal innovation,’ rather than vertical innovation to change how it
fought in the midst of battle. Although combat in the First World War is significantly
different from operations today, horizontal innovation offers armed forces a means by
which to transform themselves much more rapidly than the traditionally recognized
forms of military innovation.

Keywords: Military Innovation; Military Learning; First World War; German army;
Organizational learning.

1
 A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation:
The German Army, 1916-1918

Using the German army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a
different form on military innovation than has hitherto been analyzed by literature on
the subject. During the First World War, the German army innovated by spreading
knowledge between units rather than up and down the chain of command. Thus, this
army used ‘horizontal innovation,’ rather than vertical innovation to change how it
fought in the midst of battle. Although combat in the First World War is significantly
different from operations today, horizontal innovation offers armed forces a means by
which to transform themselves much more rapidly than the traditionally recognized
forms of military innovation.

‘…bullets quickly write new tactics.’1

In many ways, armed forces are unique institutions. Often, they will go years
or even decades without carrying out their prime function – combat. This creates
unique problems. How is a military to prepare itself for a future conflict without
recent experience? Of course, all armed forces look to the past and to contemporary
conflicts involving other militaries, but only so much can be learned from such
indirect observation. Thus, armed forces are forced to take their best guess as to what
a future conflict will look like and prepare themselves accordingly. In peacetime, how
an armed force expects to fight, in other words its doctrine, how it should be
structured and the equipment to be employed can only be conjectures. The lack of
direct practice creates another problem for all armed forces. Without first hand
experience, no one can know how well a military will be able to learn when faced
with the new and unexpected challenges thrown up in any war. All conflicts have a
reciprocal element: each side works hard to copy and/or counter the tactics and
technologies of the other. Thus, going into a conflict, an armed force never really
knows just how effective its doctrine, training, equipment and structures will be, nor
does it know how quickly it will be able to learn and adjust to new conditions.

1
William Balck, Tactics Vol. I: Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry (4th ed.) (trans. Walter
Krueger) (Leavenworth: US Cavalry Association, 1915),14.

2
 Therefore, it is unsurprising that the past 25 years or so have seen numerous
studies on how armed forces deal with the uncertainty created by war, in other words
how armed forces are able to innovate. Four main schools of thought have emerged to
describe this process. The first of these is led by Barry R. Posen. In his The Sources of
Military Doctrine, Posen argued that the interaction between military and civilian
leaders caused and shaped innovation within the respective armed forces. For Posen,
it was important to have a strong civilian leadership, who provides the catalyst for
military change. Aware of emerging threats for which existing doctrine has no
answer, these external champions are necessary, in Posen’s view, to push a usually
conservative military to change the way in which it thinks and acts.2 This school’s
view that armed forces are inherently conservative and reluctant to change without
pressure from civilian leaders was challenged by Stephen P. Rosen. Rosen argued that
it was not civilian leaders that drove change within armed forces, but rather senior
military leaders. These senior military leaders recognized a threat that required a
changed way of thinking and acting. They then waged an ‘ideological struggle’ to
impose their view on their respective organization.3 A third school, championed by
Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, argues that innovation is a result of organizational
culture. These authors believe that the ‘identities, norms and values’ of an armed
force shape how and why the organization innovates. Again, they see military
institutions as being inherently conservative and requiring strong leadership to
change.4 Finally, there is an inchoate literature that examines military innovation as a
bottom-up process. Adam Grissom has recently highlighted this school and has noted
that, compared to the other schools of thought on military innovation, it is poorly
developed.5 This literature generally takes the form of historical case studies and sees

2
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 232-235. For other examples, see Deborah Avant, Political
Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1994).
3
Stephen P. Rosen, ‘New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,’ International Security
13/1 (Summer 1988),134-168; and Winning the Next War: Innovation in the Modern Military (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991).
4
Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change,’ in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff,
eds. The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
See also amongst others, Theo Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation,’
International Affairs 84/4 (2008),777-807; Terry Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die:” Organizational Culture
and the Origins of Manoeuvre [sic] Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,’ Journal of Strategic
Studies 29/3 (2006), 475-503; and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military
Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
5
Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5
(October 2006), 919-930.

3
innovation as a result of ideas formed, often in combat, by relatively junior officers.
These ideas then travel up the chain of command and are eventually incorporated into
new doctrine or practice. Although there are numerous examples of this school of
thought,6 the German army in the First World War has proved a rich case study for
this approach to innovation studies. G.C.Wynne’s path-breaking book, first published
on the eve of the Second World War, examined the development of German defensive
doctrine on the Western Front during the First World War.7 Wynne’s ideas are
reflected in the much-later work of Timothy Lupfer on the same subject.8 Bruce I.
Gudmundsson has examined the role of relatively junior officers in the development
of German infantry doctrine during the First World War,9 and David Zabecki has
done the same for German artillery doctrine.10
More recently, a literature on ‘adaptation’ has emerged. Theo Farrell has
explored how the British army in Afghanistan has attempted to improve its
operational performance. Farrell has examined what he terms ‘adaptation,’ a process
short of military innovation, as it does not involve ‘institutional’ change. Indeed,
Farrell focuses on changes to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which do not
require changes to formal doctrine. He has demonstrated how successive British
brigades deployed to Helmand province in Afghanistan have harnessed knowledge
gained by earlier brigades to fashion a new, more effective approach to counter-
insurgency operations.11
Despite their differences, there are common themes that emerge from the
diverse literature on military innovation and adaptation. In his recent survey of

6
For example, see Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars
Doctrine, 1915-1940 (Boulder: Westview, 2000); and Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen
McCartney, ‘“Transformation in Contact:” Learning the Lessons of Modern War,’ International Affairs
87/2 (March 2011), 253-270.
7
Three editions of this book exist: A first edition that was heavily censored, G.C.Wynne, If Germany
Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London: Faber & Faber, 1940); a facsimile edition of this
(New York, Greenwood Press, 1976); and a final, unexpurgated edition based on Wynne’s original
manuscript (ed. Robert T. Foley) (London: Tom Donovan, 2008). (Subsequent references will be to
this unexpurgated edition.)
8
Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the
First World War (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1981).
9
Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (New York:
Praeger, 1989).
10
David Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994).
11
Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province,
Afghanistan, 2006-2009,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (August 2010), 567-594. See also, James
Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewar Provinces, Iraq,
2005-2007,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (August 2010), 595-624; and Gian Gentile, ‘Learning,
Adapting and the Perils of the New Counter-Insurgency,’ Survival 51/6 (Dec 2009-Jan 2010), 189-193.

4
military innovation studies, Grissom noted that, although there is a lack of a single
definition of ‘innovation,’ four key components can be identified: Innovation
‘changes the manner in which military formations function in the field,’ is ‘significant
in scope and impact,’ and leads to ‘greater military effectiveness.’12 In addition to
these four characteristics identified by Grissom, we can add two others: First, all
existing studies of military innovation and adaptation see this, in some way or other,
as a vertical process: New ideas either travel from the top of the military hierarchy
down (Posen, Rosen, and Farrell and Terriff) or from the bottom to the top and back
down again (Wynne, Lufper, Gudmundsson, Zabecki and Farrell). Second, there is a
tendency in the existing literature on military innovation to give credit to certain
individuals, whether they be high-ranking civilian or military leaders or lower-ranking
frontline officers, for new ideas and, hence, innovation. Even in the organizational
cultural model, individuals play the central role in innovation.
A close analysis of the German army in the First World War, however, shows
that there exists another, hitherto unexplored, model by which an army can innovate.
Rather than being reliant on a few key individuals high in the military hierarchy or
several exceptionally bright junior officers who are able to shape their battlefield
experience into new doctrine, the German army on the Western Front between 1916
and 1918 demonstrates that an organization can innovate without these factors. In this
period, the German army faced new challenges from an enemy that continually
employed new tactics and new technologies and was able develop the way in which it
fought in the face of the constantly changing enemy threat.13 It did this without
waiting for ideas to be transmitted from above in the form of updated doctrine.
Instead, units used the experiences of other units to change the way in which they
fought and consequently instituted what amounted to radically different doctrine in
the course of battle.14 Indeed, the German army from 1916 to 1918 might be seen as

12
Grissom, ‘Military Innovation Studies,’ 906-907.
13
Contrary to previous interpretations, recent literature has demonstrated the extent to which the
French and British armies employed new tactics and technologies over the course of the First World
War. See Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18
(London: Yale University Press, 1994); Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War:
Myths and Realities (London: Headline, 2001); Michel Goya, La chair et l’acier: L’armee française et
l’invention de la guerre moderne (1914-1918) (Paris: Tallandier, 2004); and Mark Grotelueschen, The
A.E.F. Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
14
In this article, doctrine is understood by the definition given by the US Department of Defense:
‘fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support

5
being in a state of ‘continuous transformation.’15 As a result of changes on the
battlefield, German tactical units developed new informal doctrine and disseminated
this new doctrine widely throughout the army without waiting for this to come from
above. Consequently, throughout the war, official German doctrine tended to lag
behind the practice in the field.
Thus, the case study of the German army in the First World War shows us a
different model of military innovation – horizontal innovation. In this form of military
innovation, new ideas are spread between units, not from the high command down or
from the frontline up. As a result, new, informal doctrine is formed by units learning
from one another, rather than from centrally produced doctrine.16 In organizations
practicing horizontal innovation, the impetuous for the development of new ideas
comes directly from the staffs and commands of combatant units seeking out and
sharing new experiences and knowledge without waiting for direction from above.
Moreover, although individuals are clearly important for moving this knowledge, few
if any claim ‘ownership’ of new ideas or doctrine. This type of military innovation is
much more flexible than that described by the existing literature on innovation, and,
in the case examined here, allowed the German army to meet the challenges of a
rapidly changing battlefield.
Of course, horizontal innovation does not exist in a vacuum. As the following
case study shows, the informal doctrine produced as a result of horizontal innovation
invariably becomes part of formal doctrine and is thus integrated into the vertical
innovation described by other literature. The informal doctrine produced as a result of
horizontal innovation is formed faster and has a shorter life span than doctrine
produced by vertical innovation. Formal doctrine, formed by vertical innovation, is
formed more slowly and changes less frequently.17 Also, it is clear from this study
that horizontal innovation has its limits: Tactical units are obviously unable to
produce new weapons systems or affect permanent changes to force structure.

of national objectives.’ JP 1-02: DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html, accessed 31 December 2010.
15
While Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld envisioned the US armed forces being in a state of
‘continuous transformation.’ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003, 3.
16
This is perhaps closest to Theo Farrell’s idea of ‘adaptation,’ though in the German army’s case, it is
a case of more far-reaching ‘innovation’ than narrow ‘adaptation.’ Farrell, ‘Improving in War,’ 568-
573.
17
These two ‘knowledge cycles’ might be seen as representing the formation of ‘tactics, techniques
and procedures’ (TTPs) and ‘doctrine’ today. (E.J. Degen, ‘Knowledge Management by the Generating
Force,’ Military Review (Jul-Aug 2008),102-110) However, the case study below shows that it is
possible to create what we would today term ‘doctrine’ using a shorter ‘knowledge cycle.’

6
Although clearly informed by new ideas from below, these remain the purview of
higher command. Nonetheless, horizontal innovation can be a powerful means by
which an armed force can quickly and effectively change the way in which it operates
in the midst of conflict, and the case study of the German army in the First World
War, despite the clear differences from institutions and operations today, can still
offer important lessons for contemporary armed forces.

Horizontal Innovation at Work – The German Army in the Battle of the Somme,
1916
A good way to demonstrate horizontal innovation is to examine it in practice.
At first glance, the a study of a First World War army would not seem to provide a
productive case of innovation of any sort. One of the enduring myths of the Great
War is the stalemate of the Western Front, a stalemate that appears to derive from an
inability of First World War soldiers to devise new tactics and technologies to break
the defensive strength of the trenches. Recent research has convincingly demolished
this myth by showing how truly innovative all armies of the First World War really
were. Combat on the Western Front also seems a far cry from most other conflicts,
particularly recent Western conflicts such as Iraq or Afghanistan. For one, the war
was clearly a war of national survival for all countries involved, and with this came
massive mobilization of all national resources and high-intensity combat for years on
end. As a consequence, the size of the armies engaged dwarfed any seen today. Thus,
division, corps, and even armies could be seen to be ‘tactical-level’ units, compared to
battalions and brigades today.
However, there are some key elements that make the German army a valid
case study even today. First, the German army in the First World War faced a flexible
and reactive foe and was forced to develop rapidly and continually to remain
operationally effective, just as Western armed forces do today. The intensity and type
of operations were certainly different from the predominantly counter-insurgency
operations conducted today, but the resourcefulness of the enemy was the same.
Second, the German army of this period offers a different institutional culture from
which we can still learn. With decades of common NATO training and doctrine and
coming from broadly similar societies, Western armed forces are all cut from pretty
much the same clothe. Today, all Western armed forces have highly centralized
doctrine and training processes and emphasize the importance of individuals as

7
instigators of change, and these have fostered the type of vertical innovation explored
by the existing literature on military change. With a weak central doctrine and
training process and with a culture that emphasized anonymity, the German army of
the First World War period offers use another type of institution to study.
The battle of the Somme, which lasted from late June to mid-November 1916,
provides the first and clearest example of horizontal innovation at work in the German
army. Moreover, good collections of Erfahrungsberichte (‘experience reports’) from
German units throughout the battle allow us to see how knowledge, and hence new
doctrine, was formed and transferred at the tactical (largely division and corps)
level.18 We can also see how this new doctrine was applied during the battle, often in
direct contradiction to existing formal doctrine, and how it spread throughout the
German army as a whole, without intervention from the high command, over the
course of the battle.
On 26 June 1916, British and French artillery began a bombardment designed
to pave the way for a war-winning offensive. Although it would be eclipsed in later
battles, the scale and intensity of this preparatory bombardment signaled that the
battle of the Somme would be like no other battle thus far in the war. Between 26
June and the start of the infantry assault on 1 July, the Anglo-French artillery fired
some 2.5 million rounds into the German defenses.19 From its beginning, the battle of
the Somme would be a Materialschlacht (battle of material), and would consume
resources, both material and manpower, in ways hitherto unseen in the First World
War: If the Anglo-French artillery got a head start, the German artillery would
eventually catch up. Between 3 July and the end of December, the German defenders
fired almost 23 million artillery rounds.20 Before the battle was over, the equivalent of
147 German divisions, 96 British divisions and 70 French divisions would cycle
through the battle.21 At the battle’s height, German divisions would last an average of

18
This article make use of analysis of reports from the Army Group Kronprinz Rupprecht, 1 st and 2nd
Armies, 15 army corps, 32 divisions, and 23 brigades or below, as well as a number of technical
specialists found in four archives in Germany. This amounts to 71% of the army corps and almost 33%
of the divisions deployed in the battle.
19
William Philpot, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth
Century (London: Little Brown, 2009),167-169. Although the battle has been the subject of numerous
books, Philpot’s book brings the French contribution to the offensive back into the picture and provides
perhaps the most balanced account of the battle.
20
Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, ‘Munitionsverbrauch bei 1. und 2.Armeen,’ July-December
1916, Bayerisches Hauptsstaatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Munich (HStA-KA), HGKPR/574.
21
The actual numbers of divisions is smaller – 52 British, 44 French, and 96 German. However, many
of these were deployed more than once, so I have given the ‘equivalent’ number here reflecting this.

8
only two weeks in the front line before suffering too many casualties to continue to
hold their positions.22 Over the course of the battle, the German army would suffer
some 430,000 casualties.23
The German army on the Western Front was by no means ready for the
Materialschlacht that was the battle of the Somme. Used to more limited offensives
that lasted days or at most a couple of weeks, it struggled to cope with the new form
of battle. German defensive doctrine at the beginning of the battle stressed holding the
front line at all costs and retaking any lost territory as soon as possible.24 As a
consequence, though located where possible on reverse slopes, German trenches were
fairly simple and lacked depth. Fearful of losing their trenches, the German garrison
was generally concentrated in the foremost trench. Machineguns, crucial for stopping
an enemy attack, were also concentrated in the frontline. In short, the German defense
at the beginning of the battle of Somme was organized around preventing the enemy
from gaining even a foothold in the German line, and if they did break into the
German line, they were to be immediately thrown out regardless of the cost.25
The initial Anglo-French infantry attack took place on 1 July. Although this is
remembered in British popular memory for 60,000 British casualties suffered on this
day, it also hit the German army hard. The German 2nd Army, which commanded the
battle on 1 July, had only 11 divisions against 32 Anglo-French divisions.26 It was so
take aback by the force of the initial Anglo-French assault that it went against
doctrine and ordered the front line to be withdrawn in certain sectors. When the
German Chief of the General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, learned of this decision, he
immediately ordered it rescinded and reinforced existing defensive doctrine, telling

The British and French numbers are from Philpot, Bloody Victory, 438. The Germans from
Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd. XI: Die Kriegführung im Herbst 1916 und im Winter 1916/17 (Berlin:
Mittler, 1938),102-103.
22
Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Iab Nr. 2222, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht für die
Heeres-Gruppen-Führung,’ 10 February 1917, 2, Generallandesarchiv (GLA) – Karlsruhe, 456 F1/521.
23
The number here is taken from German 10-day casualty reports from 24 June to 10 November 1916
compiled by Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht to Oberste
Heeresleitung, Ie Nr. 5249, 26 January 1918, HStA-KA, HGKPR/189. The question of calculating
German casualties has been the subject of much debate. For the most recent examination, see James
McRandle and James Quirk, ‘The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in
World War I,’ The Journal of Military History 70 (July 2006), 667-702.
24
Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr.7563r, ‘Gesichtspunkte für den Stellungskrieg,’ October
1915, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BA/MA), PHD7/1.
25
For a good understanding of the nature of the German defensive position, see Jack Sheldon, The
German Army on the Somme 1914-1916 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005).
26
Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd.X: Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel in der
Obersten Heeresleitung (Berlin: Mittler, 1936), 348.

9
the 2nd Army that ‘the first principle of position warfare must be not to surrender a
foot of ground and when ground is lost to throw in even the last man in an immediate
counter-attack.’27
Despite doctrine and Falkenhayn’s exhortations, it soon became clear that new
Anglo-French tactics made it impossible to hold the front line at all costs. Unlike
previous battles, the British and French made extensive and effective use of combined
arms – infantry, artillery, and airpower – in the battle of the Somme. The
extraordinarily heavy Entente artillery fire was skillfully directed by airborne
observers. One German unit wrote of its experience:
The [Entente] successes were only made possible by brilliant cooperation
between the artillery and the aircraft. These dominated the battlefield. English
pilots circled a relatively small portion of the trenches at low level, observed
every movement in the trench and called in barrages on each…. Heavy
artillery systematically fired on [targets] one after the other.28
Two things made this possible. First, the British and French made wide-scale use of
aircraft equipped with radios to adjust artillery fire for the first time in the battle.
Second, the British and French aircraft were technically superior to their German foes
and were much more numerous.29 Thus, they were able to gain control of the air,
allowing unmolested artillery observation for most of the battle. Additionally, both
the British and French made increasing use of new artillery tactics, in particular the
creeping barrage, to support their infantry assaults.30 After the disastrous 1 July
assault, subsequent Entente attacks almost always broke into the German defensive
position. If these did not result in the operational breakthrough expected by British
and French commanders, they nonetheless inflicted massive damage on the German
defenders.
27
Ibid., 352-355.
28
I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 29, ‘Erfahrungen und Beobachtungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,’ 17
September 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe 456 F1/530. See also, I. Bayerisches Reservekorps, ‘Erfahrungen aus
der Somme-Schlacht im August/September 1916,’ 18 September 1916, GLA Karlsruhe 456 F1/527;
16.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 5750, ‘Bericht über die Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme,’ 11
September 1916, GLA-Kalrsruhe, 456 F1/530; 111.Infanterie-Division, I Nr.154, ‘Erfahrungen aus den
Somme-Schlacht,’ 29 September 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.
29
The combined arms tactics of the Entente armies on the Somme has not been well examined. The
British official history of the war in the air remains useful. H.A.Jones, The War in the Air: Being the
Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force Vol.II (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1928) 203ff.; and Peter Hart, Somme Success: The Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of the Somme,
1916 (London: Pen & Sword, 2001) provides a more recent interpretation of the air war from the
British perspective.
30
On the development of artillery tactics, see Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (London:
Yale University Press, 2005).

10
 Behind the curve technically, the German army had no ready counter to the
Anglo-French combined arms team.31 Instead, German units had to come up with new
a tactical doctrine to deal with the potent threat. What emerged was a radically new
defensive doctrine almost completely at odds with that existing at the battle’s start.
Running like scars across the French countryside, German trenches were
clearly visible to the Anglo-French aircraft circling the battlefield. What they could
see, the enemy artillery could hit. Thus, German troops soon learned that the
traditional, deep trenches, which had stood them in such good stead in 1914 and 1915,
were now death traps.32 Instead of easily recognizable trenches, they began using the
numerous craters formed by artillery blasts as the basis for a new defensive position.
Craters were sometimes linked together with simple, narrow trenches, but were often
just left as they were. This new type of defensive line was termed a ‘Trichterstellung,’
or ‘shell-hole position.’33 Obviously, such a position lacked a clear ‘front line’ that
could be manned strongly or, indeed, retaken if lost. Thus, German troops
increasingly came to honor in the breech the official doctrine of ‘holding the front line
at all costs.’
The lack of a clear ‘front line’ also meant that the German units could add
more depth to their defensive positions. Troops in the foremost ‘line’ were most
vulnerable to enemy artillery and infantry assault. Therefore, as the battle progressed,
the German defenders employed fewer and fewer troops in the forward-most
positions. These were organized as a screen that would prevent weak enemy patrols
from penetrating the German position, but would withdraw in the face of a serious
enemy infantry attack.34 Shell holes behind the forward-most screen were organized

31
German aircraft were both behind the Entente in numbers and performance and lacked the ability to
work closely with German artillery. Erich von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft: Ein
Rückblick auf die Entwicklung und die Leistung unserer Heeres-Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege
(Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1921), 71-76; Georg Neumann, Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im
Weltkriege (Berlin: Mittler, 1920), 472-473. The lessons-learned reports are replete with testimony on
the poor cooperation between the different German arms. For example, see I. Bayerisches Reserve-
Korps, Ia Nr. 2351, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht im August/September 1916, 18 September
1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/527.; 1st Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 28, ‘Bericht über das
Zusammenartbeiten der verschiedenen Truppengattungen in der Schlacht an der Somme, 6 October
1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530; 5.Batterie, Feld-Artillerie-Regiment 185, ‘Erfahrungen aus den
Schlachten and der Somme, 3.9. bis 26.9.1916,’ 9 October 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530.
32
Bayerisches Ersatz-Division, ‘Bericht über die Erfahrung in der Somme-Schlacht,’ 26 November
1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530.
33
53.(Sächs.) Reserve-Division, I Nr. 2310/X, ‘Erfahrungen der 53.Res.-Div. in der Somme-Schlacht,’
20 October 1916, HStA-KA, 14.bay.ID, Bd. 11.
34
214.Infantrie-Division, Ib Nr.2391, ‘Erfahrungen in der Somme-Schlacht,’ 30 October 1916, HStA-
KA, HGKPR/216; III.Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 27, ‘Bericht: Erfahrungen aus dem
Stellungskrieg,’ 30 November 1916, GLA-Kalrsruhe, 456 F1/530.

11
for all around defense and villages and woods were turned into strongpoints that could
hold out if surrounded. Machineguns, increasingly the backbone of the defense, were
also removed from the front line and sighted in enfilade in great depth where they
could dominate the confused terrain over which an attack would have to advance.35
Thus, the goal of the German defense changed from being about keeping out enemy
assaults at all cost to absorbing the enemy infantry attack and inflicting the highest
number of casualties on them while reducing German casualties to a minimum.
Of course, some key terrain features needed to be held and retaken if lost, but
the German troops fighting on the Somme quickly developed new techniques for
counter-attacks. Early in the battle, German units rushed to regain every piece of lost
terrain. These hasty attacks were more often than not extremely costly for the German
units taking part and often did not achieve their goals or retook unimportant
positions.36 Thus, as the battle progressed, the German defenders were forced to
develop new, less costly approaches to counter-attacking. What emerged were two
distinct types of counter-attack. Immediately after a position was lost to a British or
French infantry attack, German troops on hand would launch a ‘Gegenstoß,’ or
‘immediate counter-attack,’ with whatever reserves were available.37 If this wasn’t
successful and the position lost was important, then a ‘Gegenangriff,’ or a ‘deliberate
counter-attack,’ would be carried out. A Gegenangriff could call on the resources of a
division or an army corps and might take days to plan and prepare. If the position was
not important, no further action would be taken and no lives wasted in an attempt to
retake a piece of terrain not vital to the German defense.38
The new defense in depth and the new approach to counter-attacks also led to
a new means of deploying units in the battle. German divisions in 1916 were
comprised of three or four infantry regiments, each of three battalions.39 Before the
battle of the Somme, it had been common practice to have two or three regiments

35
183. Infanterie-Division, ‘Erfahrungen über die Sommeschlacht,’ July 1916, HStA-KA/216;
I.Bataillon, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 28, ‘Bericht über das Zusammenartbeiten der verschiedenen
Truppengattungen in der Schlacht an der Somme, 6 October 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530; II.
Bataillon, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 212, ‘Bericht über Erfahrungen aus der Sommeschlacht,’ 8
October 1916,’ GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530.
36
IV.Armeekorps, Ia Nr.1357, ‘Erfahrungen des IV.A.K. aus der Somme-Schlacht im Juli 1916,’ 22
August 1916, p.7, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216; 208. Infanterie-Division, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-
Schlacht,’ 10 December 1916,’ GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F7/849.
37
22.Reserve-Division, Ia Nr.2839, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme,’ 2 October 1916,
HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.
38
Heeresgruppe Gallwitz, Ia Nr.115, 27 July 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.
39
Hermann Cron, Geschichte des deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege 1914-1918 (Berlin: Siegismund,
1937), 99-100.

12
deployed in the front line and for the third or fourth regiment to be held back as a
divisional or corps reserve. This command arrangement proved unworkable in the
battle. The reserve regiment was invariably broken up to reinforce the frontline in an
ad hoc manner.40 Command became confused and effectiveness fell sharply. What
worked better in the high intensity fighting of the Somme was to deploy all regiments
in the frontline, but in depth. Each regiment would have one battalion in the front, a
second in immediate reserve, and the third resting out of the range of enemy
artillery.41 This new technique allowed for immediate reinforcement within a single
chain of command and allowed each regiment to rotate its battalions in and out of the
frontline as needed. Another feature of this new technique was how these reserve
units were commanded in the height of battle. When things were quiet, each battalion
commander was responsible for his own unit. However, if a battalion were sent
forward to reinforce the frontline battalion during a large-scale enemy attack, this
frontline commander, who knew the situation better than anyone else, would assume
command of both battalions. By making the lines of command clearer, this also
helped reduce confusion. Ultimately, the frontline battalion commander became
known as the Kampftruppenkommandeur, or ‘battle units commander.’42 The new
deployment and command technique allowed for much smoother reinforcement and
significantly simplified command arrangements.
To launch and keep going the massive offensive on the Somme, the British
and French armies had to concentrate their heavy limited artillery and aircraft there.
Thus, other sectors of the Western Front remained quiet. This allowed the German
army to rotate rested divisions from quiet sectors to the battlefront in exchange for
‘fought-out’ divisions.43 As the battle lasted longer and longer, it became clear that
most divisions would have to do their time in the battle. It was also clear that most

40
Division Frentz, ‘Bericht über die Kämpfe der zusammengesetzten Division Frentz an der Somme
vom 30.6. – 9.7.1916,’ 9 July 1916, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/530; Anonymous liaison officer from
Armee-Oberkommando 6, ‘Eindrücke an der Sommefront,’ no date, but probably mid-August 1916,
HStA-KA, AOK 6, Bd. 21.
41
XXVI.Armeekorps, Ia Nr.2/24.10, ‘Erfahrungen in der Sommeschlacht. Richtlinien für zukünftige
derartige Kämpfe,’ 24 October 1916, 7, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/521; 28.Infanterie-Division, I Nr.
10/16, ‘Erfahrungen an der Somme,’ 16 October 1916, HStA-KA, HGKPR/216.
42
Wynne, If Germany Attacks, p.84; and Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training
and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1916 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.176.
43
Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Iab Nr. 2222, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht für die
Heeres-Gruppen-Führung,’ 10 February 1917, p.2, GLA-Karlsruhe, 456 F1/521. For the rotation of
units throughout the battle, Weltkrieg X, Anlage 3: Verzeichnis der vom 1.Juli bis Ende August auf
dem Kampfelde eingesetzen Generalkommandos und Divisionen, ihrer Ablösungen, Verschiebungen
und Verluste.

13
German divisions needed to know about the new Entente tactics and what measures
were useful in countering these before their deployment to the Somme battlefield.
Thus, divisions not deployed to the battlefront clamored for the most recent the
‘experience reports,’ and these spread quickly throughout the German army on the
Western Front.44 These reports allowed inexperienced units to learn about the new
tactics from the battlefront and incorporate them in their training before deploying to
the battle. Armed with these, divisions and corps across the Western Front threw out
much of their previous defensive doctrine and reworked their defensive systems and
their training programs to reflect the new doctrine being created in the heat of the
battle of the Somme.
This process of constantly updating defensive doctrine across the army on the
Western Front did not stop when the battle of the Somme ended. We can see this
same process at work in 1917 and 1918. As the British and French introduced new
tactics, technologies and techniques – from more effective artillery barrages to tanks
to bite-and-hold tactics – the German army rapidly created new defensive doctrine to
cope. Invariably, this new doctrine was formed through trial and error by frontline
units and was disseminated quickly to other frontline units. The High Command, who
formed official doctrine, was left to write new doctrine that merely reflected changes
that had already happened in frontline practice.45

Enabling Factors of Horizontal Innovation

There can be no doubt that horizontal innovation was effective for the German
army in the First World War. Although Germany proved to be strategically inept and
ultimately lost this war, the German army has consistently been praised for its
operational effectiveness. If nothing else, horizontal innovation allowed the
numerically inferior German army to hold out against enemies vastly superior in
manpower and material from 1914 to 1918. There are a number of factors that
allowed horizontal innovation to occur in the German army of this period and these
may be useful for thinking about how this could or can occur in different
organizations.

44
III.bayerische Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 16000, ‘Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,’ 30 October 1916,
HStA-KA, MKr.2924.
45
For this process in action in 1917, see Robert T. Foley, ‘The Other Side of the Wire: The German
Army in 1917,’ in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, eds. 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology
(Canberra: Australian History Military Publications, 2007), 169-176.

14
Weak Central Doctrine
Unlike today’s armed forces, the German army of the First World War did not
have a tradition of strong centralized doctrine. Before the First World War, the term
‘doctrine’ itself was considered a bad word by German soldiers.46 ‘Doctrine’ such that
it was before the war was enshrined in the ‘field regulations’ for each arm. These
manuals were designed to shape the training of the infantry, artillery and cavalry up to
the equivalent of regiment-sized units. German observers were proud that these
changed infrequently. Regulations were not seen as prescriptive. William Balck, the
foremost German commentator on ‘doctrine’ before the First World War wrote:
‘Regulations must never be reduced to immutable laws and must not be used to hinder
freedom of action. Regulations should stimulate free thought….’47 For the German
army of the First World War, each tactical situation was seen as unique, requiring the
judgment of the individual commander. Regulations provided the form in which units
would deal with a situation – company column or line, etc. – but how a commander
dealt with the situation was up to him.48
This approach was carried on during the war as well. Before the battle of the
Somme, Falkenhayn’s doctrinal guidance consisted of 23 points on 20 pages of A4
paper. As it was so short, it could only offer general guidance for frontline
commanders; how they applied this was left to them. Moreover, this defensive
doctrine was issued in October 1915, 9 months before the start of the battle of the
Somme.49 The German High Command did not update this doctrine until December,
after the battle had finished.
Thus, without a tradition of strong centrally produced doctrine, the German
army of the Western Front was left to its own devices to respond to the radically new
threat posed by the new tactics, techniques and technologies employed by the Entente
armies on the Somme. Here, the practical nature of the German army came to the

46
See for example, Alfred von Boguslawski, ‘Strategisch-taktischer Meinungsstreit,’ Militär-
Wochenblatt Nr.36 (1902), 965.
47
William Balck, Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege (2nd ed.) (Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1922), 7.
48
This was emphasized from the earliest officer training. See General-Inspektion des Militär-
Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens, Leitfaden für den Unterricht in der Taktik auf den Königlichen
Kriegsschulen (15th ed.) (Berlin: Mittler, 1909), 80-83; Dilthey, Der Einjährig-Freiwillige, der
Reserve-Offizieraspirant und der Offizier des Beurlaubstandes der Infanterie (52nd ed.) (Berlin:
Mittler, 1917), 209-211.
49
Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr.7563r, ‘Gesichtspunkte für den Stellungskrieg,’ October
1915, BA/MA, PH3/295.

15
fore. Even if they were not involved in the battle at the time, units throughout the
army copied what was proven to be effective in the battle. If something did not work,
it was tossed aside and something else took its place.
Once Falkenhayn was replaced as Chief of the General Staff at the end of
August 1916, the new High Command under Paul von Hindenburg and Erich
Ludendorff attempted to regain control over doctrine development. In late 1916, they
published new official doctrine for the defensive battle.50 This ‘official’ doctrine
reflected the ‘unofficial’ doctrine that had been created by frontline units during the
battle of the Somme. However, given the tradition of weak official doctrine within the
German army, over the course of 1917, units again applied this as they saw fit and
again created new doctrine when faced with new Entente tactics in the battles of
Arras, Chemin-des-Dames and Passchendaele. The German High Command rewrote
its official doctrine a number of times throughout 1917, but was always behind the
frontline practice.51

Robust Lessons-Learned System and Learning Culture

The key way in which horizontal innovation occurred in the German army was
through an effective lessons-learned system. This system developed during the course
of the war, but came into its own during the battle of the Somme. Between 1914 and
mid-1916, units produced ‘experience reports’ on an ad hoc basis after the conclusion
of particular battles. Sometimes, the German High Command distributed these
throughout the army,52 but often they were used within tactical formations for training
purposes. Indeed, Falkenhayn tried to control this process by forbidding units from
exchanging lessons-learned reports amongst themselves before they had been
approved by the High Command.53 Despite this, the battle of the Somme actually
accelerated the sharing of these reports. This was for a number of reasons. First, the

50
Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Vorschriften für den Stellungskrieg für alle Waffen: Teil 8:
Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskriege (Berlin: Reichsdruckerie, 1
December 1916), BA/MA, PHD7/16. On the development of this doctrine, see Oberstleutnant
Engelmann, ‘Die Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskriege,’ unpublished
manuscript in BA/MA, RH61/291.
51
Abwehrschlacht was reissued in March and September 1917 and additions were added in May 1917.
52
For example, see Armee-Oberkommando 7, Ia Nr. 30 Dez., ‘Auszug aus den vom III.A.K.
zusammengestellten Erfahrungen bei den Angriffen auf Vailly-Chavonne-Soupir,’ 5 December 1914,
BA/MA, PH8/II/154; and Armee-Oberkommando 2, Ia Nr. 290 geh., ‘Erfahrungen aus den
Septemberkämpfen bei der 6. und 3.Armee,’ 5 November 1915, US National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA), RG120, Case 13-2, Box 5371, Folder 19.
53
Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr. 22657, 27 January 1916, BA/MA, RH61/1145.

16
high unit turnover in the battle meant that ‘fought-out’ units were rotated to quiet
sectors all over the Western Front for rest and refit. Of course, they shared their
experiences of the battle with their new neighboring units. Second, the high tempo of
the battle meant that most divisions on the Western Front would have to do their time
in the battle. This created a heavy demand for the most recent lessons-learned reports.
By the end of the battle, hundreds of such reports had been produced by units from
battalion to army group. Indeed, their usefulness of these reports is shown by the
numbers surviving in the existing files of the regiments and divisions of the German
army that provided the research base for this article. The battle of the Somme
ultimately proved the utility of the lessons-learned reports produced by tactical units,
and subsequent battles saw their continued use. In early 1917, Army Group Kronprinz
Rupprecht made it a requirement for all divisions under its command to complete
‘experience reports’ as soon as possible after leaving the frontline of a battle, and
these were distributed to divisions and schools throughout the army group.54
Although there was no formula for the lessons-learned reports, they all
focused on what worked and what did not work in the battle. Unlike contemporary
British army battle reports, the German reports were analytical rather than narrative.
They described the challenges posed by the French and British approach to the battle
and how these challenges could be overcome. The reports pulled no punches when it
came to critiquing German doctrinal and material shortcomings. As such, they
provided other inexperienced units with useful tools by which they could shape their
own training prior to deployment and were in high demand.
The lessons-learned system that developed in 1916 owed its success to a
learning culture that permeated the German army.55 As we have seen, the German
army traditionally had a weak official doctrine process and officers were expected to
apply their judgment and knowledge to battlefield problems. This was reflected in the
education system of the German army before and during the war. This system relied
on what they termed the ‘applicatory method.’56 This method used historical case
studies, wargames, staff rides and staff problems to force students make command

54
Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Ic Nr 2881, 25 April 1917, HStA-Stuttgart, M33/2/25.
55
The importance of a learning culture in war has recently been explore by John Nagl in his Learning
To Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2002).
56
Julius Verdy du Vernois is generally seen as the father of this method in the German army. For his
approach, see his Studien über Truppenführung (2nd ed.) (Berlin: Mittler, 1873), 1-3.

17
and staff decisions and explain their reasoning.57 In these exercises, there was no
correct or incorrect answer. The decisions reached by students and, more importantly,
the reasons for these decisions would be critiqued by their instructors and often by
their peers, and lessons would be drawn from the experience. This method of learning
reinforced independent thinking within the German army, as each officer had to come
up with his own answers and defend them to his superiors and peers. The applicatory
method was used to educate all levels from the most junior officer to the most
senior.58
The education of German officers was also continuous. In the summer, staff
rides and maneuvers would take place. In the winter, indoor staff problems and
wargames took their place. Performance in these exercises determined promotion, so
German officers took their education seriously. This was also reflected in the vibrant
military literature of Imperial Germany. Large numbers of professional journals, both
official and unofficial, allowed long-running debates on tactics and strategy.59
This learning culture did not end when the war broke out, and the lessons-
learned reports are an example of this at work. With learning at the heart of the
culture of the German army, officers were both expected to reflect on their
experiences and were receptive to new ideas. The lessons-learned reports represent an
attempt to make sense of their experiences and to share these with the wider army.
The ideas generated by reports produced by units about their experiences in battle
were welcomed by others as a useful means of continuing education.

General Staff System and Lack of ‘Ownership’ of Ideas

Another important component of horizontal innovation in the German army of
the First World War was its General Staff system. Prior to the war, it was commonly
said that Europe had produced five ‘perfect’ institutions: the Roman Curia, the British

57
For examples, see the staff rides and staff problems of Alfred von Schlieffen in Robert T. Foley,
Schlieffen’s Military Writings (London: Frank Cass, 2003). For other examples, see Erich Ludendorff,
Brigade- und Divisionsmanöver in Anlage und Leitung (Berlin: Mittler, 1908); Ludwig Freiherr von
Falkenhausen, Flankenbewegunf und Massenheer: Der Gedanke von Leuthen in Anwendung auf die
Gegenwart (Berlin: Mittler, 1911); and Otto von Moser, Die Führung des Armeekorps im Feldkriege
(2nd ed.) (Berlin: Mittler, 1913).
58
Indeed, even the Kaiser’s decisions during wargames were critiqued, though being too honest is said
to been detrimental to Alfred Graf von Walderee’s position as Chief of the General Staff. Lamar Cecil,
Wilhelm II: Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989),
184-187.
59
Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Oxford: Berg, 1991); and Robert T.
Foley, ‘Institutionalized Innovation: The German Army and the Changing Nature of War, 1871-1914,’
RUSI Journal Vol.147, Nr. 2 (2002), 84-89.

18
Parliament, the Russian ballet, the French opera, and the German General Staff.60
Although the staff system suffered a decline in quality due to the casualties and
massive expansion required by the war, it still played a central role in the German
conduct of the war. In the German army of this time, staff officers, in particular chiefs
of staffs, were not just there to help a unit commander make decisions and to put these
decisions into practice, they often had co-responsibility for decisionmaking.61 Indeed,
in an army where young and inexperienced royalty often held commands, chiefs of
staff were sometime de facto commanders.62
The General Staff system, however, operated behind the scenes. Before the
war, the unofficial motto of General Staff officers was ‘be more than you appear.’63
Staff officers, despite their responsibility for decisions, were expected to take a back
seat to their commanders, who were in the ‘public’ eye. While one who came up with
the plans of action, the chief of staff generally let the commander take credit for any
successes. Thus, Paul von Hindenburg or August von Mackensen became household
names in Germany during the war, while their chiefs of staff Erich Ludendorff and
Hans von Seeckt were little known at the time.64
While Ludendorff and Seeckt are remembered today, the vast majority of staff
officers from the war are not. Yet it was these very same staff officers who were
responsible for writing the lessons-learned reports and creating new doctrine within
the German army. Rarely identified on these reports, these officers did not take
‘ownership’ of the new tactical ideas developed during the battle of the Somme or
later in the war. They were more interested in spreading their experiences than in
taking credit for coming up with a new tactical doctrine. The lack of ownership of
ideas also meant that most German officers were not publically wedded to particular
ideas and thus had less resistance to changing their points of view when faced with

60
Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 34.
61
Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966), 107-109.
62
When the German Crown Prince took command of the 5 th Army at the outbreak of war in 1914,
Kaiser Wilhelm II told him that we would do exactly as he was told by his chief of staff. Kronprinz
Wilhelm, Meine Erinnerungen an Deutschlands Heldenkampf (Berlin: Mittler, 1923), 4. A similar
situation existed with the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht. Hermann von Kuhl, ‘Der Feldherr,’
Süddeutsche Monatshefte Vol.30, Nr.4 (January 1933), 225-230. By the end of 1916, both men
‘commanded’ large army groups that dominated the Western Front to the end of the war.
63
This motto was coined by the father of the modern German staff system, Helmuth von Moltke the
Elder. See Alfred von Schlieffen, ‘Helmuth von Moltke,’ in Schlieffen’s Military Writings, 227-233.
64
Theo Schwarzmüller, Zwischen Kaiser und “Führer”: Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1996); and Jesko von Hoegen, Der Held von Tannenberg: Genese
und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).

19
new evidence or new situations. Of course, differences of opinion occurred. For
example, Fritz von Loßberg, who was chief of staff of the 1st Army during the battle,
felt the new doctrine developed during the battle of the Somme surrendered terrain
too easily,65 but even Loßberg gave up this belief when faced with overwhelming
evidence to the contrary.66
The German General Staff system played another important role in horizontal
innovation. The General Staff was an elite within the German army and most staff
officers had trained or worked closely together at some point. They formed an
informal network within the German army, often communicating with each other
outside the formal chain of command. Staff officers wrote and spoke to each other
frequently and shared experiences.67 Under the General Staff system, Dienststellung
(position) was more important than Dienstgrad (rank). Thus, sometimes a lower
ranking officer could have great influence because of the position he held and his
experience. Divisional chiefs of staff, who wrote the lessons-learned reports, were
usually captains. Even army chiefs of staff were generally fairly low ranked. For
example, Fritz von Loßberg, who was chief of staff to five different armies in many of
the largest defensive battles of the war, was a colonel for most of the war. Once again,
this lack of rank reinforced the lack of ‘ownership’ of ideas and made the spread of
new concepts easier.

Devolved Training
If the German army lacked a strong central doctrine in the First World War, it
also lacked a centralized training apparatus. Unlike armies today, the German army of
the time did not have large recruit training depots. Initially, recruits were given basic
military training by the numerous regimental depots in Germany. However, this
quickly proved inadequate. Regimental training personnel were often old and did not
have wartime experience. If they did have experience, it was quickly rendered
obsolete by the rapidly changing nature of the First World War battlefield.68 In late

65
Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 109-111.
66
When chief of staff to the 4th Army during the battle of Passchendaele, Loßberg embraced the
defense in depth. Fritz von Loßberg, Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Mittler, 1939), 308-310.
67
Commanders often complained about this ‘Generalstabsdienstweg.’ See Otto von Moser, Ernsthafte
Plaudererien über den Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Chr.Belser, 1925), 429-431; and Walter Görliz,
Hindenburg: Ein Lebensbild (Bonn: Athenaum, 1953),127.
68
Chef des Stabes des Kriegsministers im Großen Hauptquartier, Nr.2841, 14 November 1914,
BA/MA, W10/50755.

20
1914 and early 1915, a number of corps and divisions established their own training
depots, staffed by officers and noncommissioned officers with recent experience of
the frontline. These depots organized more advanced training for recruits arriving
half-trained from the regimental depots in Germany. 69 Although not all divisions or
corps had their own advanced training depots by the time of the battle of the Somme,
many did and over the course of the battle more were established. These advanced
training depots were so successful that in early 1917 the High Command ordered that
each division establish one.70 Obviously, the creation of advanced training depots
gave tactical units greater control over what their troops were taught and lessened the
control of the High Command.
To spread the new defensive doctrine while the new advanced depots were
being formed, the High Command also took other steps, steps that ultimately resulted
in further devolution of training.71 First, it allowed each of the eight armies on the
Western Front to establish battalions of experienced training troops. Officers and
noncommissioned officers from throughout each army would attend a short training
session run by these battalions and take their new knowledge back to their own units
for dissemination. Each army was allowed to set the curriculum for its training
battalion without direction from the High Command.72 Once again, recent battle
experience featured prominently in these training regimes.73 The High Command also
established a large number of specialist schools across the Western Front. At the top
of the chain of command, several schools were established for divisional commanders
and their chiefs of staff,74 while at the bottom schools were set up for young company
commanders and for noncommissioned officers.75 Artillery and machinegun schools
were also set up.76 What these schools taught was also determined by their parent

69
XVIII.Armeekorps, Ia Nr.8, ‘Rekrutenausbildung hinter der Front,’ 20 November 1914; I.bayerische
Armeekorps, Nr.1659, ‘Ausbildung der Rekruten im Operationsgebiet,’ 23 November 1914; and
Armee-Oberkommando 1, Ia Nr.1520, 15 May 1915, in BA/MA, W10/50755.
70
Wilhelm Solger, ‘Ausbau des Heeres,’ p.19, unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, RH61/1858.
71
Wihelm Solger, ‘Die Maßnahmen der Obersten Heeresleitung zur Wiederherstellung der Kampfkraft
und zur Erstellung einheitlicher Vorschriften,’ unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, RH61/1089.
72
Oberste Heeresleitung, 23 October 1916, reprinted in Helmuth Gruss, Aufbau und Verwendung der
deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1939), 156-157.
73
See Armee-Oberkommando 6, Ia Nr.76899, ‘Besondere Anordnungen zur Errichtung der
Sturmlehrabteilung der 6.Armee,’ 14 November 1916, HStA-KA, AOK6/21.
74
Armee-Oberkommando 6, Ia Nr.87847, ‘Übungsdivision,’ 23 January 1917, HStA-KA, AOK6/21.
75
III.bayerische Armeekorps, IIb Nr.37320, ‘Unterführerschule III.b.A.K., 17 January 1917, HStA-
KA, III.bay.A.K., Bund 54; Armee-Oberkommando 6, Ia Nr.75457, ‘Unterführerschule,’ 5 November
1916, HStA-KA, AOK6/21.
76
Kriegsminsterium, Nr.545/17, ‘Übungsplatz für Feldartillerie hinter der Front der 6.Armee,’ HStA-
KA, I.b.A.K., Bd.97.

21
units, not by the High Command. Thus, they were focused on sharing best practice as
experienced by their instructors. More than this though, all of these training
establishments brought together experience students, who used the opportunity to
share and compare their new-found knowledge of battlefield conditions.77
Whether it was intentional or not, the various training establishments set up in
late 1916 and early 1917 reinforced horizontal innovation and further weakened
central control over doctrine. With a tradition of individual interpretation of doctrine
and of units being responsible for the training of their own men, the official doctrine
that emerged from the High Command was going to struggle to compete with the
viewpoints of highly experienced frontline officers and men. Moreover, with training
taking place close to the front line, the latest methods could be incorporated quickly
into the training of new troops; new knowledge could be spread much faster than in
top-down system. Throughout the rest of the war, these devolved schools harnessed
the understanding of the unofficial doctrine formed on the front to train their students
in the most up-to-date changes.

Limitations to Horizontal Innovation

As we have seen horizontal innovation enabled the German army to react
quickly and effectively to the rapidly changing environment of the First World War
battlefield. However, this type of innovation did have its limitations. First and
foremost, horizontal innovation was effective at determining how the German army
would fight. In other words, it enabled the German army to come up with new tactics
and techniques – what we would today call new doctrine – to deal with unexpected
developments in Entente tactics and technologies. Other areas were beyond its
purview.
Although reports from the frontline could highlight inadequacies in
equipment, frontline units could do nothing themselves to rectify these problems. This
can be seen in the battle of the Somme. It was clear from unit lesson-learned reports
that German aircraft were inferior, both in quality and quantity, to their British and
French opponents. While units could identify this capability problem, they themselves
could do nothing to solve it. To deal with this issue, steps would have to be taken by
the High Command and the Ministry of War to invest more in aircraft research and

77
Otto von Moser, Feldzugsaufzeichnungen als Brigade-, Divisionskommandeur und als
kommandierender General 1914-1918 (2nd ed.) (Stuttgart: Chr.Belser, 1923), 244-255.

22
development. Similarly, unit reports highlighted the need for more and lighter
machineguns, which would have to be procured by the High Command and Ministry
of War.
Another area where frontline experience could guide but not dictate was force
structure. The battle of the Somme highlighted the inadequacies of the organization of
the German army. It had too few divisions and many of these were too large.
Additionally, its command structure was not flexible enough to deal with the rapid
turnover of units required in the battle: The link between corps and divisions was too
strong and there needed to be a level of command above army to direct such a large
battle. The battle also showed that artillery was not distributed well for defense
against large-scale offensives in trench warfare: Divisions bore the brunt of the
fighting yet corps commanded the heavy artillery needed to strengthen the defense.
While some temporary changes to force structure could be made by the tactical units
fighting the battle, more permanent changes had to be made by the High Command.
The High Command largely implemented the changes suggested by the
frontline units in the battle of the Somme, and here we can see an example of
Grissom’s bottom-up innovation at work. Over the course of late 1916 and early
1917, the High Command radically restructured Germany’s industry to produce the
capability demanded by the frontline: The Hindenburg program launched in late 1916
sought to address the concerns of the front by doubling munitions production and
tripling artillery and machinegun production.78 In addition, new types of light
machineguns were designed and produced, as were new artillery pieces.79 In 1917, the
‘Amerika-Programme’ sought to increase the quality and quantity of aircraft
produced.80 The High Command also introduced many changes to the force structure
of the army in response to the lessons of the battle of the Somme. In late 1916, the
High Command ordered the establishment of 22 new divisions.81 They also shifted
responsibility for the defensive battle from the army corps to the division. Divisions
lost their permanent attachment to army corps, and corps became a static command

78
Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr.33825, 31 August 1916, reprinted in Erich Ludendorff,
ed. Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 1916/18 (Berlin: Mittler, 1922), 63-65.
On the effectiveness of this program, see Gerald Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor in Germany,
1914-1918 (Oxford: Berg, 1992).
79
Ernst von Wrisberg, Wehr und Waffen (Leipzig: Koehler, 1922), 6-12.
80
‘Kurzer Überblick über die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftstreitkräfte bis zum 7.August 1918 und
ihre Kriegsgliederung zu Beginn der Operationen,’ (6.Entwurf), 21, unpublished manuscript in
BA/MA, RL2/IV/317.
81
Ernst von Wrisberg, Heer und Heimat 1914-1918 (Leipzig: Koehler, 1921), 30-31.

23
responsible for a particular section of the front. Divisions also were standardized at
three infantry regiments and gained command over heavy artillery, as well as field
artillery.82 All of these changes were taken as a direct result of calls from the bottom
of the chain of command, those officers serving through the tough and quickly
changing battle. These bottom-up innovations complemented the on-going horizontal
innovations and helped to enhance the German army’s operational ability in 1917 and
1918.

Conclusion
Although the nature of the First World War battlefield is significantly different
from today, Western armed forces certainly face intelligent and adaptive enemies and
need to be able to react quickly to a rapidly changing operational environment, just as
the armies of the First World War did. Recent organizational changes have put
lessons-learned at the heart of transformation in both the US and British armed forces.
These changes have created a strong link between the experience at the front and
training at home. However, the current system relies a vertical model of innovation –
knowledge gained on the frontlines has to move up the chain of command before
being disseminated out again to the rest of the armed forces.83 New ideas about how
to counter enemy actions may spread quickly within a particular unit. Before these
can be incorporated into the training of units at home or spread to other deployed
units, they must first be submitted to and vetted by a centralized lesson-learned
organization. This new system may have harnessed bottom-up innovation, but this
innovation takes time to be institutionalized, even in today’s electronic world.
Horizontal innovation within the US and UK armed forces is hampered today
by the doctrine and training systems employed by each. Unlike the German army in
the First World War, the two armies still have highly centralized doctrine formation
and training. These processes serve to moderate the new knowledge coming from the
frontline and control the formation of new ways of operating. Although the doctrine
process has become faster today than it was in the past, it still takes 2 years for US
Army doctrine to be updated. On top of this, the doctrine produced by the US and
British armed forces tends to be expansive and, with this, prescriptive: The recent US

82
Cron, Geschichte des deutschen Heeres, 100-101.
83
Foley, Griffin and McCartney, ‘Transformation in Contact,’ passim.

24
Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine runs to 284 pages.84 The British
doctrine for stabilization operations runs to a staggering 423 pages.85 As a result,
doctrine is often not read and only vaguely understood by frontline officers.86
Despite this, there are certainly elements of horizontal innovation evident in
the US and British armed forces today. Both armed forces have begun to make more
extensive use of the internet to share and spread new ideas and to create new
knowledge: The US Army has a large community of practice in its
CompanyCommand.com, a forum on which junior officers can discuss their recent
experiences,87 and the British Army has recently launched a similar website,
VitalGround. Both armies make ‘lessons-learned’ reports available online to
registered users.88 The British Army has also begun carrying out ‘mission-exploitation
symposia’ that bring together recently returned officers from Afghanistan with those
soon to deploy. The US Army is also experimenting with ‘wikis’ as a means of
constantly updating doctrine.89 While these elements go some way towards sharing
and creating new knowledge, their effectiveness is limited by highly centralized
doctrine and training processes, which delay the spread of this new knowledge.
The German army in the First World War offers a clear example of another
type of innovation that enables organizations to transform much more quickly than
traditional models. As we have seen, moving new knowledge and ideas between units
rather than up and down a chain of command allowed the German army to innovate
extremely rapidly, at least in how it fought. Experience from the battlefront was
spread rapidly and effectively throughout the army through a simple lessons-learned

84
Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency (Washington: Department of
the Army, December 2006). See also Stuart Griffin, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British
Military Doctrine: From Counterinsurgency to Stabilization,’ International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011),
317-333.
85
Ministry of Defence, JDP 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (Shrivenham:
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2009).
86
A recent survey of British company-grade officers who had served in Afghanistan showed that only
31 percent had any knowledge of British or US counterinsurgency doctrine. Claudia Harvey and Mark
Wilkinson, ‘The Value of Doctrine,’ The RUSI Journal 154/6 (2009), 29.
87
Major Steve Schweitzer, ‘Communities of practice in the US Army,’ Center for the Advancement of
Leader Development and Organizational Learning, US Military Academy, West Point,
http://www.csci.psu.edu/seminars/fallnotes/cop1.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2010. See also Nancy
M. Dixon, et.al., CompanyCommand: unleashing the power of the Army profession (West Point: Center
for the Advancement of Leader Development & Organizational Learning, 2005).
88
See http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp; and ‘Welcome to the AKX – The Army
Knowledge Exchange,’ http://www2.armynet.mod.uk/akx/index.htm, accessed on 1 January 2011.
89
Bill Ackerly, ‘US Army Announces Test of Wikis To Revise Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,’
30 June 2009, http://www.army.mil/-newsreleases/2009/06/30/23722-us-army-announces-test-of-
wikis-to-revise-tactics-techniques-and-procedures/, accessed 21 February 2011.

25
system. The German army’s organizational culture was different from that of Western
armies today. Its lack of a strong centralized doctrine, its decentralized training, its
culture of learning, and its lack of ‘ownership’ of new ideas all helped ensure that
new knowledge of how to fight was created and disseminated rapidly and effectively.
All of these factors could be reinforced in Western armed forces today to allow faster
tactical innovation between units. If the US and UK armed forces are serious about
embracing change, they should perhaps think about how they can allow units at the
front more say over how they fight and they could do worse than look at the model of
horizontal innovation provided by the German army in the First World War.

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Biographical Note:

Robert T. Foley is senior lecturer in modern military history at the University of

Liverpool. A specialist in strategic thought and military innovation and learning, he
has taught at staff colleges in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
His books include Alfred von Schlieffen’s Military Writings (London, 2003) and
German Strategy and the Path to Verdun (Cambridge, 2005). He is currently
completing a history of the German army in the First World War for Cambridge
University Press and is involved in a project on the lessons-learned systems of
modern armed forces.

30

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