Social Progress in Islamic Societies:

Achievements and Challenges

Richard J. Estes
University of Pennsylvania
School of Social Policy & Practice
311 Woodside Avenue
Narberth, Pennsylvania 19072 USA
E-Mail: restes@sp2.upenn.edu

and

Habib Tiliouine
Department of Psychology & Educational Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Oran2
Oran, Algeria
E-Mail: htiliouine@yahoo.fr

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 Abstract

Today, approximately one fourth of the world’s population is part of the expanding Islamic

Ummah (1,634 million people). Muslims are found in large numbers in all regions of the world but are

concentrated most heavily in Africa and Asia. Muslims also constitute sizeable minority populations in

Europe as well as in North and South America and, to a lesser extent, Oceania. Despite the obvious

wealth of some Islamic financial centers and oil-exporting countries of West Asia, most Muslims live

under conditions of poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, ill health, social and political unrest and, in some re-

gions, religious extremism. This paper reports a 45-year time series analysis of the nature, extent, and

pace of social progress that is taking place within 53 of the 57 member states of the Organization of Is-

lamic Cooperation (OIC). Data are reported at four levels of analysis (country specific, subregion, region,

and for the OIC-as-a-group). Comparisons also are made between the development changes that are tak-

ing place within the OIC countries and those occurring in the world-as-a-whole. The paper also considers

the contribution of the “Arab Spring” that began in December, 2010 in promoting the emergence of more

participatory political systems in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa--the so-called MENA

region. The findings reported present a sometimes bleak portrait of the current state of social develop-

ment in many OIC countries but, as often, offers a generally optimistic picture of the positive social and

economic changes that are taking place in many of the group’s socially least developed countries of Sub-

Saharan Africa.

Keywords
Islam, Muslim, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, social development, economic development, politi-

cal development, sustainable development

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 Social Progress in Islamic Societies: Achievements and Challenges

1. Introduction

The first Islamic state was founded in 622 CE following the Prophet’s (570-632 CE) flight

from persecution in Mecca (referred to as the Hijra) to safety in present-day Medina. In Medina

the Prophet was able to consolidate his revelations and to attractsubstantial numbers of fellow

believers. Initially limited to the nomadic and comparatively small urban dwelling populations

of the Arabian Peninsula, Islam rapidly took root and, in time, spread from West Asia to North

Africaand Europe and, over time, to all regions and countries of the world. Today, the Islam-

icUmmahi numbers more than 1,634 million people or approximately one in four people world-

wide. Muslimsii are concentrated in Africa and Asia but are also found in smaller numbers in

Europe, North and South America, and in Oceania (Wikipedia 2014b). Today, Islam is the

world’s fastest growing religion and continues to attract new believers from other monotheistic

religions.Wherever they live and in whatever numbers, however, Muslimseverywhere follow the

same basic set of teachings as revealed to the Prophet by God in the holy Qur’an and in the large

body of his teachings and practices recordedby early Islamic scholars in the Hadith (Haleem

2008; Nawawi& Clarke 2009). A reading of both works is necessary to fully understand the

shared set of beliefs and practices of Muslims worldwide.

Over the course of more than fourteen centuries Islam evolved through periods of consider-

able turmoil, expansion, and contraction (Lewis 1993; Wikipedia 2014c; Wolfe 2013). In many

cases the growth of Islam is associated with conflicts and confrontations with Western nations,

conflicts that have been characterized by some as a “clash of civilizations” (Huntingdon 1996).

These conflicts were frequent and, indeed, did span many centuries. And to a very great extent

the largely unresolved underlying causes of these confrontations continue to be at the center of

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contemporary tensions between Islamic and non-Islamic peoples (Lewis 1993, 2002; Estes &

Sirgy 2014). However, the nature of these tensions are much more nuanced and multilayered

than can be carried adequately in this introduction and are discussed fully in Part I of the vol-

ume.For now it is sufficient to note that with the notable exceptions of the oil exporting and fi-

nancial centers of West Asia and Turkey (ESCWA 2013), the social situation in the majority of

Islamic countries is characterized by considerable under-development including widespread

poverty, high levels of joblessness, restricted roles for women, limited political freedom, weak

welfare infrastructures, and comparatively limited opportunities for international trade (Estes &

Tiliouine 2014; Tiliouine & Meziane 2012).

This contemporary unfavorable social situation of many Islamic societies exists despite Is-

lam’s supremacy in science, medicine, education, finance and banking achieved during the pe-

riod of its Golden Age from the 9th to 12th centuriesof the Common Era (Arkoun 1994;Bennabi

2005; Esposito 1998; Shalabi 1996; Wikipedia2014d). Islamic societies also were the wealthiest

in the world if we consider the recent estimates of per capital gross domestic product (PCGDP)

for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the 10th Century in

comparison with those estimated for other world regions and countries for the same time period

(Maddison 2003; Drine 2012a). Today, many countries of the region are either at or near the

bottom of PCGDP despite the region’s rich natural resources and ample stores of human capital

(UNDP 2014; WB 2014).The array of internal and external dynamics that contribute to Islam’s

contemporary social position is discussed both in this chapter and throughout the volume.

Islamic societies, however, are attempting to reverse the pattern of social deterioration that

took place within their borders during decades of European colonization (Nasr 2013; Wolfe

2013). Thesecountries also are struggling with profound social, political, and economic chal-

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lenges associated with the return of national of sovereignty, e.g., the modernization of indige-

nous political systems, creating a cadre of skilled public administrators, generating the revenues

needed to support government activities, containing internal diversity-related social conflict, and

developing harmonious relationships with neighboring states, among others (Wolfe 2013).

These countries are being aided in their renewal efforts by the United Nations (UN 2014a-b; ES-

CAP 2010), the World Bank (WB 2014), the International Monetary Fund (IMF2012b, 2013a-b),

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2012), the European

Union (EU 2013),and by many international non-governmental organizations (Foundation Center

2012).

One of the earliest fruits of decolonization of predominately Islamic lands was the creation in

1969 of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (hereafter the OIC). The OIC is a pan-Islamic

organization with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia that includes a membership of 57 predomi-

nately Islamic countries as well as many non-Islamic observer states that support the activities of

the OIC in accelerating the pace of development among its members(OIC 2014). The Organiza-

tion serves as “…the collective voice of the Muslim world and seeks to both safeguard and pro-

tect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony

among various people of the world”.Together with the near laser-like focus of the United Na-

tions’ Millennium Development Campaign (UN2014a-b),the OIC developed its own Ten Point

Programme of Action: To Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century-

that focuses on advancing the development objectives of all of its members but with a special

concern for the development needs of its poorest countries (OIC 2005). The efforts of both

worldwide bodies have been far-reaching and optimism exists that historicpatterns of social dete-

rioration within “the Islamic world” are beginning to be reversed, albeit slowly (Estes 2015a; UN

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2014; WB 2014). Evidence in support of these advances has been difficult to obtain, however,

and many commentators challenge the notion of significant social changes taking place within

many predominately Muslim societies--especially in the areas human rights, advances in the sta-

tus of women, inequalities in wealth distribution, recurring diversity-related social conflict in-

cluding civil wars, the absence of public accountability structures, and the recurring difficulties

that characterize Islamic and non-Islamic political relationships worldwide (Huntingdon 2006;

Leonard & Straus 2003; Lewis 2002; Moyo 2009).

1.1 The Focus of this Paper

This paper explores the extent to which member states of the OIC are succeeding in achiev-

ing their goal of accelerating the pace of social development within their borders. More specifi-

cally, the paper: 1) examines the current state of social, political, and economic development

of53 of the 57 member states of the OIC; 2) reports results obtained from application of the sta-

tistically weighted Index of Social Progress (ISP, WISP) to these countries over a 41 year time

period (1970-2011); 3) identifies OIC countries with the highest, lowest and middle performing

scores on the WISP in 2011; and, 4) compares the changes in social development that took place

in the OIC member countries with those of other countries and regions of the world during the

same time period (N=162). The paper concludes with a summary of the major challenges in so-

cial development that confront both the member states of the OIC and the world-as-a-whole at

the outset of this still young century.

2. Methodology

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The present study is the 16th in a series of analyses of worldwide and regional social development

trends conducted by the chapter’s lead author (Estes 2010, 2012a-b, 2015a-b; Estes & Tiliouine

2014; Estes & Sirgy 2014). The purpose of all 16 studies has been: 1) to identify significant

changes in the "adequacy of social provision"iii occurring throughout the world and within spe-

cific continental and geo-political regions; and (2) to assess national and international progress in

providing more adequately for the basic social and material needs of the world's growing popula-

tion. These reports also are intended to provide policy analysts, development scholars, and spe-

cialists in quality of life and well-being research with otherwise difficult to obtain data concern-

ing a wide range of development phenomena needed to shape policy outcomes at the local, na-

tional, regional, and global levels.

2.1 The Index of Social Progress (ISP)

The primary instrument used in this study is the extensively pre-tested "Index of Social Progress"

(ISP). In its present construction the ISP consists of 41 social indicators that have been subdi-

vided into 10 subindexes (Table 1): Education (N=4); Health Status (N=7); Women Status

(N=5); Defense Effort (N=1); Economic (N=5); Demographic (N=3); Environmental (N=3);

Social Chaos (N=5); Cultural Diversity (N=3); and Welfare Effort (N=5). All 41 of the ISP's

indicators have been established to be valid indicators of social development and are used regu-

larly by other policy-focused scholars and researchers in their analysis of social development

trends and patternsiv (Hagerty et al.02; UNDP14; World Bank14).

[Insert table 1 about here]

2.2 The Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP)

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Owing to the volume of data gathered for this analysis only statistically weighted index (WISP)

and subindex (SI) scores are reported in this paper. The study's statistical weights were derived

through a two-stage principal components and varimax factor analysis in which indicator and

subindex scores were analyzed separately for their relative contribution in explaining the vari-

ance associated with changes in social progress over time. Standardized indicator scores (N=41)

were multiplied by their respective factor loadings, averaged within their subindex, and the aver-

age subindex scores (N=10), in turn, were subjected to a second statistical weighting. The result-

ing values from this two-stage statistical weighting process formed the basis for computing the

composite Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP) scores as summarized in Table 2.v Statis-

tically unweighted Index of Social Progress (ISP) scores may be obtained from the chapter’s lead

author for those investigators who may wish to reanalyze the data using their own system of sta-

tistical weights.

[Insert table 2 about here]

2.3 Data Sources

The majority of the data used in the analysis were obtained from the annual reports supplied by

individual countries to specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN), the United Nations De-

velopment Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooper-

ation and Development (OECD), the International Social Security Association (ISSA), the Inter-

national Labour Organization (ILO), and other major international data collection and reporting

organizations. Data for the Environmental subindex were obtained from the World Resources

Institute (WRI), the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and the

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World Bank. Data for the Social Chaos subindex were obtained from Amnesty International

(AI), Freedom House (FH), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-

eties (IFRCRCS), the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) and Trans-

parency International (TI). Data for the Cultural Diversity subindex were gathered from the CIA

World Factbook, the Encyclopedia Britannica and from the work of independent scholars in the

fields of comparative language, religion and ethnology (Ellingsen 2000). Data sources for the

individual demographic, economic, and political indicators reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6are

identified in those tables.

2.4 Country Selection

Fifty-three of the 57 member states of the OIC included in this analysis are identified in Table

3vi. The table groups countries by continents and major subregions within continents and, in

parenthesis, identifies the major socio-economic grouping to which each country has been as-

signed by the World Bankvii.

[Insert Table 3About Here]

2.5 Levels of Analysis

Data are reported for four levels of analysis: (1) the country-specific level (N=53); (2) the re-

gional (N=4) and (3) sub-regional levels (N=9); and (4) for all member states of the OIC consid-

ered as-a-group (N=1). Selected data also are provided in Tables 4, 5, and 6 as well as in sev-

eral of the paper’s figures that compare OIC member state development performances over time

with those of the world-as-a-whole (N=1).

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2.6 Time Frame

Index and subindex findings are reported separately for each of the study’s five time periods, i.e.,

1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010/2011.More current social indicator data for all 53 countries

(2011-2014) are reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Thus, the study provides a cross-sectional analy-

sis of the “state” of social development for the same set of countries over a 45-year time period.

3. World Social Development: 1970 to 2011

Figures 1 and 2 summarize the study's major findings on the WISP for all 162 countries included

in the more inclusive analysis of worldwide social development trends (Estes 2010, 2012a-b, and

2015a-b). These time-series data cover the period 1970-2010/2011 and reflect comparative

WISP performances for six continental groupings, i.e., North America (N=2), Australia-New

Zealand (N=2), Europe (N=36), Latin America N=26), Asia (N=45), and Africa (N=50). The

WISP scores for all countries worldwide averaged 43.6, 43.4, 48.1, 48.5, and 48.7 for 1970,

1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010/2011, respectively (Estes 2015a-b)viii.

1. The world's most socially developed regions are the developed market economies

(DMEs) of Australia-New Zealand, Europe, and North America (Figure 1). These geo-

graphic regions had already attained the most favorable ratings on the WISP by 1970 and

added to them for the periods 1970-80 and 1980-90. Some social improvements contin-

ued to accrue to selected members of this grouping between 1990 and 2000 but, as a

group, the study’s 39 DMEs experienced net social losses averaging -3.7 percent and -

28.2 percent between 1990-2000 and 2000-10, respectively (Figure 2). These lossesare

associated with: (a) the near-collapse of global financial markets that originated in North

America in 2007; (b) the actual collapse in 2008 of twoglobal investment houses in the

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 United States (Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers); (c) the bursting of the real estate bub-

bles in North America and Europe; (d) the onset of a major economic recession in all

three DME subgroups; (e) substantial downward pressures on the viability of the “Euro”

as the common unit of currency in the European Union; and, (f) the election of conserva-

tive governments in all three subregions followed by regressive social policies that weak-

ened the previously secure “social safety nets” that existed in many of these countries

prior to 2007.

2. The remarkable average WISP gains reported in Figures 1 & 2 for Africa’s 50 nations

between 2000 and 2010 (+114.9 percent) are accounted for by the continent’s recent abil-

ity to exploit to its own advantage the abundant natural resources located in its Northern

(primarily oil) and Southern regions (mostly gold, diamonds, and other precious miner-

als). These recent social gains for Africa are associated with: (a) increasing levels of

peace in previously war-torn African states; (b) expanding patterns of international trade;

and (c) the social, health, and economic accomplishments associated with the United Na-

tions’ Millennium Development Campaign (MDC)ix. Though still fragile, certainly re-

versible, the region’s recent social gains are impressive and are continuing to accumulate

(Estes 2015a; UNDP 2014; World Bank 2014).

3. The social development situation in South America and the Caribbean continues to be

perplexing given the region’s rich natural resources, well developed economic infrastruc-

ture, and substantial levels of human capital. A legacy of civil unrest, political instability,

and public corruption continues to slow the pace of development in many of the region’s

countries (Weyland 1998;Tulchin&Espach 2000; Transparency International 2014).

Latin America’s slow rate of social progress is compounded by continuing high fertility

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 rates, especially among the region’s poor and near poor populations, and itsrapidly in-

creasingly levels of economic inequality (Blofield 2011). These long-standing impedi-

ments to development persist despite the very significant progress that is taking place in

the region’s most populous countries--Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.

4. Considerable 40-year variations also characterize social development patterns in the

Asian region. These variations are closely associated with the rapid rates of economic

growth that are occurring for Asia’s largest low- to moderate income nations (but espe-

cially for China). These social gains are of considerable importance to the world commu-

nity in that 60 percent of the planet’s population, including 70 percent of the world’s

poor, live in the region—many in the region’s three population “super-giants”, i.e., China

(1,394 million), India (1,267 million) and, Indonesia (253 million), the last of which is a

member state of the OIC. As is occurring in other major world regions, income inequal-

ity is becoming a major defining characteristic of the Asia and Pacific regions as well

(ADB 2012; Kanbur, Rhee, & Zhuang 2014).

[insert figure 1 about here--Cont]

[Insert figure 2 about here--% Cont]

In general, then, world social development since 1970 has been uneven and asymmetric.

This pattern is especially pronounced in the African and Asian regions in which the majority of

the OIC member states are located (N=50).

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4. Islamic Social Development: 1970 to 2011

The state of social development within and between the 53 countries included in this analysis

is highly variable. The reasons for these variations are complex but, in most cases, are associ-

ated with a legacy of colonialism for many OIC members (Nasr 2013), recurrent inter-group con-

flicts and intransigent intra-regional wars (Wikipedia 2014e-f), limited natural resources (WRI

2013), significant gender inequalities (UN-Women 2014) and, for many countries, comparatively

low levels of human capital (UNDP 2014). These barriers to development exist in combination

with inadequate investments on the part of central governments in critical social and economic

infrastructure (World Bank 2014). Widespread patterns of public corruption (Transparency Inter-

national 2013) and increasing levels of income inequality (Kanbur, Rhee, & Zhuang 2014) add to

the mix of development challenges that confront OIC member states. These development chal-

lenges are especially prominent among the African states (African Development Bank 2014) but

also characterize the political situation in many of the OIC’s Asian members, especially those

located in the South Central Asia subregion (Heidenheimer& Johnston 2011). As a result, over-

all patterns of social development for the majority of the members of the OIC tend to be lower on

average that those observed for other associations of developing countries, i.e., the South Asia

Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of Southeast Asia Nations

(ASEAN), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), among others.

The current development situation of the OICs middle and lowest performing states on

the WISP is compounded by the reality that 21of its members (37 percent) are classified by the

United Nations as “Least Developing Countries” (UN-OHRLLS 2013). The OIC’s LDCs con-

tain approximately 444.5 million people who, in turn, represent 27.2 percent of the OIC popula-

tion and 6.1 percent of the world’s total. Poverty is widespread in these countries, average life

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expectation is comparatively low but increasing, and most of these countries rank in the bottom

25 percent on the set of demographic, economic and political indicators reported in Tables 4, 5,

and 6. As a result, the need for international development assistance for these nations is great and

is increasing as their populations continue to grow.

Figure 3 reports average WISP scores over a 40-year time period for all 53 OIC members

included in the analysis. Figure 4 reports the percent changes that occurred in the average WISP

scores of the same group of countries for the periods 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and

2000-2011. The data summarized in both figures are organized by major continental groupings

and for the OIC-as-a-whole (N=4).

[Insert figure 3 about here--OIC]

[Insert figure 4 about here--% OIC]

The data summarized in Figure 3 identifies the European (WISP2011 Average=52.8),

Latin American (WISP2011 Average=48.8), and Asian (WISP2011 Average=45.5) members of

the OIC as having achieved the highest average WISP scores across the full 40-year period cov-

ered by the analysis. These WISP performances are impressive and compare favorably with the

average regional WISP scores reported for the world-as-a-whole in Figures 1 & 2 (WISP2010

Average=48.7). At the same time, the comparatively recent social improvements that have taken

place in these geographic regions since 2000 are fragile and likely cannot be sustained over the

long term without continued financial and technical assistance support from the international

community.

4.1 Subregional Development Trends

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The membership of the OIC consists of countries located in nine of the world’s 19 major geo-

graphic subregions. The subregions represented by the OIC are identified in Figure 5 which

both: 1) rank orders each subregion in terms of its average performance on the WISP in 2011;

and, 2) identifies the average number of changes in WISP rank positions for each subregion be-

tween 2000 and 2011. These data offer important insights into identifying those OIC subregions

that have experienced the most and least favorable WISP scores and changes in WISP rank posi-

tions during the most recent developmental decade. They also focus the reader’s attention on the

subregions that are in need of increasing levels of development assistance by the OIC and wider

community of nations.

[Insert Figure 5 about here—Subregion Rank]

The six OIC subregions that achieved the most favorable average WISP scores for 2011

were: Southern Europe (WISP2011 Average=52.8), South America (WISP2011 Average=48.8),

South East Asia (WISP2011 Average=46.8), North Africa (WISP2011 Average=46.6), West Asia

(WISP2011 Average=46.2) and, somewhat surprisingly, South Central Asia (WISP2011 Aver-

age=44.3). The average WISP scores achieved by these six subregions compare favorably with

the average WISP levels reported for: 1)other OIC subregions; 2) the world’s 10 subregions in

which there is no OIC member state; and, 3) those composite scores reported for the world-as-a-

whole (WISP2011 Average=48.7). Further, the recent WISP achievements of these subregions

are impressive given their appreciably lower average WISP scores reported for earlier develop-

ment decades (Estes 2015a-b).

Data reported in the figure for subregional changes in WISP rank positions between 2000

and2011, however, present a different picture than that which emerges when examining only the

average subregional WISP scores for 2011. For example, the 10-year changes in WISP rank

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positions indicate that the three top performing OIC subregions also experienced the highest

number of net social losses in WISP rank positions between 2000 and 2011, i.e., Southern Eu-

rope (-4.7 rank positions), South America (-4.8 rank positions), and South East Asia (-7.8 rank

positions). However, these losses in rank positions are not significant when compared to average

2000-2011 net losses in rank positions experienced by other world subregions (Estes 2012a-b)

but they do, nonetheless, reduce the significance of recent increases in WISP levels reported for

these subregions.

Of the OIC’s six subregions with the most favorable average WISP scores only the North

African (+7.5 ) and West Asian (+8.0) subregions experienced net gains in both their WISP

scores and 10-year WISP rank positions during over the most recent development decade. The

negative change in WISP rank position reported for the South Central Asian region (-0.4) is too

small to be statistically meaningful, especially given the 10-year WISP gain of +11.0 percent

reported for South Central Asia, i.e., from a WISP subregional average of 39.9 in 2000 to a sub-

region average of 44.3 in 2011(Figures 6 & 7). Also, the nine nations of the South Central Asia

subregions includes five countries that only recently achieved independence only since the col-

lapse of the former Soviet Union in December, 1991--Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajik-

istan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These countries are predominately rural, highly traditional,

have only limited histories of interacting with the larger world community and, as of now, con-

tinue to retain many of the authoritarian political patterns developed during their seven decades

of dominance by the Soviet Union (Table 7; CIA 2014). Though comparatively low-moderate in

overall levels of human capital, several of these countries are rich in natural resources (World

Resource Institute 2013), the presence of which has attracted considerable external investment

into the subregion (OECD 2011).

Page 14 of 50
 However, the South Central Asian subregion also includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and

Iran—two of which are countries that either are at war (Afghanistan) or are experiencing high

levels of political instability (Iran). Developments in Bangladesh have been impeded by the

country’s high poverty level that engulfs nearly a third of the country’s total population (CIA

2014). Also, at least 13 percent, likely more, of the working age populations of the Caucasus and

Central Asia subregions are unemployed, including many who are in possession of university

degrees that are not competitive in a global economic system (IMF 2012a). Most of the unem-

ployment in these subregions is long-term in nature and, as result, growing numbers of young

people are leaving these countries in search of better economic opportunities elsewhere (Ban-

der& Rather 2013).

[Insert Figure 6 about here—OIC subregions]

[Insert Figure 7 about here--% OIC subregions]

The OIC subregions with the lowest average WISP scores were East Africa (WISP2011

Average=32.0), Middle Africa (WISP2011 Average=34.5), and West Africa (WISP2011 Aver-

age=34.9). The average WISP scores and percentage change in these scores between 2000 and

2011, of these subregions reported in Figures 8 & 9 are well below those reported for most other

world subregions. Further, over the study’s most recent 10-year period, net positive changes in WISP

rank positions were recorded only for the West African subregion (+1.7) while the Middle African and

East African subregions experienced 10-year losses in WISP rank positions averaging -2.5 and -1.6, re-

spectively. Thus, Africa’s Eastern (N=5 countries), Middle (N=3 countries) and Western (N=13 coun-

tries) subregions, as in the past (African Development Bank 2014), continue to be the least developed

within the OIC, albeit very important improvements occurred in the average WISP scores occurred of all

Page 15 of 50
three subregions between 2000 and 2011, i.e., +252 percent, +167 percent, and +327 percent, respectively

(Figure 9).

Many African members of the OIC, especially those located in the continent’s Middle and Cen-

tral subregions, are moving steadily forward in advancing their development profiles. In doing so, they

are benefitting directly from the preferential aid and technical assistance that is being provided to them by

the United Nations system since the launching of the MDC in 2005. The containment of long-standing

internal civil wars and intra-regional conflicts in these same subregions also added measurably to the

region’s recent development successes, especially to increasing levels of political stability (CIA 2014),

greater transparency in international trade (Transparency International 2013), and the beginning emer-

gence of at least basic social safety nets (ISSA 2014).

However, the average WISP scores of Africa’s three lowest developed subregions continue to

remain the lowest in the world despite their preferential aid status within the MDC. Many of these coun-

tries continue to struggle with the legacy of aid-related dependency (Glennie 2008; Leonard & Straus

2003; Moyo 2009) as well as with a broad range of social, political, and economic problems that have

their origins in deeply rooted both national and international forces (African Development Bank 2014).

Africa’s recent development trends, however, provide solid evidence that the continent’s nations,

on average, are moving forward and are doing so at a comparatively rapid rate. Whether or not these pat-

terns of development can be sustained once the MDC ends in 2015, however, remains uncertain.

[Insert Figure 8 about here--Africa]

[Insert Figure 9 about here--% Africa]

5. The Pace of Islamic Development: 1970 to 2011

In this section, the member states of the OIC are regrouped into three development classifications: 1)

countries with the highest WISP scores and highest WISP rank positions in 2011 (N=15); 2) countries

with the lowest WISP scores and lowest WISP rank positions in 2011 (N=15); and 3) 23 countries that are

Page 16 of 50
characterized as middle performing countries with respect to both their 2011 WISP scores and WISP rank

positions (Table 4). In other reports of worldwide social development trends, Estes (2012a-b, 2015a-b)

has referred to the first group of nations as world Social Leaders (SLs), the second group as Socially

Least Developing Countries (SLDCs), and the third group as Middle Performing Countries (MPCs). This

taxonomy, however, cannot be applied to the member states of the OIC inasmuch as the highest WISP

score attained by any member of the OIC was only 53 (Qatar), a score that is just four points higher than

the average score of 49 reported for all 162 countries included in the world study in which WISP2010

scores range from a high of 98 (Sweden and Denmark) to a low of -14 (Afghanistan). Hence, in this

section of the analysis we will refer to the three clusters of OIC member states as the countries with the

“highest”, “lowest” and “middle level” performances on the WISP2011. However, the WISP rank posi-

tions reported in the Table 4 for 1990, 2000, and 2011 (columns 6, 7 and 8) rank OIC member states rela-

tive to all 160 countries included in the worldwide study of social development, i.e., Qatar’s WISP2011

rank of 51 (column 8) means that Qatar ranks first in overall level of social development among member

states of the OIC but 51st worldwide.

[Insert Table 4 about here—WISP Ranks]

Table 4also reports WISP scores and WISP rank positions for 1990, 2000, and 2011 for each

nation individually as well as group medians, averages, and standard deviations for each of the three clus-

ters of nations as well as those of the OIC-as-a-group. Average WISP scores and ranks for the world-as-

a-whole also are reported in the table for comparison purposes. The table, then, provides a comprehen-

sive summary of the state of social development for all member states of the OIC since 1990 as well as

that of OIC-as-a-whole in comparison with worldwide trends.

5.1 OIC Members with the Highest WISP Scores

The 15 OIC countries with the highest WISP scores in 2011 are identified in the top category of Table

4.The table reports country WISP scores and WISP rank positions for 1990, 2000, and 2011 and also

Page 17 of 50
summarize the percentage change that occurred in WISP scores and WISP rank positions between 2000

and 2011 (columns 4 & 9).

The OIC’s top performing countries on the WISP in 2011 include: Qatar, Kuwait, Tunisia, Albania,

the Kyrgyz Republic, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Guyana, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Morocco,

Egypt, Algeria, and Bahrain. The majority of these countries already had attained the OIC’s highest

WISP scores during the developmental decades that preceded 2000-2011 and, as a result, were able to

continue to build on their earlier social accomplishments. The presence of large reserves of high quality

petroleum (Kuwait and Qatar), comparative ease of access to international financial markets (Bahrain,

Kuwait, and Qatar), a favorable geographic location along the Mediterranean Sea (Morocco, Egypt, Alge-

ria), and geographic proximity to the more socially developed countries of Western Europe (Albania) all

combined to accelerate the pace of social development that is occurring within this group of OIC member

states. Comparatively small populations and the existence of established land and water transportation

networks also figure prominently in the rapid development changes observed for these countries.

Of some importance, too, is that five of the 15 top performing OIC countries were, until 1991,

satellites of the former Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan. An additional country, Albania, also was influenced directly by the former Soviet Union as a

member of the Warsaw Pact.x Though the majority of these societies existed along only the social margins

of the former Soviet Union they did, nonetheless, benefit directly from the USSR’s effort to establish a

broad range of social programs designed to meet at least the basic needs of all the people that lived within

her sphere of influence, e.g., for food, housing, health care, education (including higher education), en-

ergy, transportation, and communications infrastructure, and so on. These six countries also participated

in the establishment of social safety nets designed to protect their most vulnerable population groups

(e.g., children and the aged, the poor, persons with disabilities) from the ravages of extreme poverty with

the result that, today, many of these societies, including Albania, developed some of the earliest systems

of universal social security found in either Europe or Asia (ISSA 2014).

Page 18 of 50
 The majority of the highest performing countries in 2011, as evidenced by their WISP scores, bene-

fitted directly from their already comparatively more advanced levels of development prior to 2011. The

development patterns were broad-based in nature and were reflected on the majority of the 10 subindexes

that comprise the WISP. The development challenges that confronted the nations of South Central Asia

following their forced shift to more open political and economic systems in 1991proved daunting but, on

average, these countries have been able to continue their forward progress…but not always at the same

level as that experienced by other groups of socially developed nations worldwide (Estes 2012b).

The remaining nine highest performing OICs on the WISP between 2000 and 2011 are located pri-

marily in North Africa (e.g., Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco) and West Asia (e.g., Bahrain, Lebanon). The

only country among the top performing 15 that is located outside these regions is Guyana (South Amer-

ica) whose WISP scores were higher than those reported for the world-as-a-whole for both 2000 and

2011, i.e., 55 and 51, respectively.

5.2 OIC Members with the Lowest WISP Scores

Table 4 also identifies the 15 OIC states that performed the most poorly on the WISP: Afghanistan*, So-

malia*, Sierra Leone#, Chad*, Guinea-Bissau#, Iraq*, Guinea, Mozambique, Djibouti, Togo, the Gam-

bia, and Cote d’Ivoire*, Niger#, Sudan*, and Yemen*. The average WISP scores for these countries in

2011 was only 29.8 (SD=6.2)—a level of WISP attainment well below that reported for the OIC-as-a-

whole (WISP2011 Average=41.4, SD=9.2) and for the world-as-a-whole (WISP2011 Average=48.7).

Twelve of the lowest performing countries on the WISP in 2011 are located in Africa and three in Asia.

Ten of the lowest performing OIC states on the WISP were identified as either “failed” (*) or “failing” (#)

states by the Fund for Peace in 2013 (Fund for Peace 2014) and 13 of these 15 nations—all but Cote

d’Ivoire and Iraq—have been classified as “least developing” countries (LDCs) by the United Nations

(UN-OHRLLS 2014)xi.

Page 19 of 50
 The majority of LDCs worldwide, including the OIC nations with the lowest WISP scores in-

cluded in this study, lack the essential social, political, and economic capital required to advance their

state of social development. They also are heavily in debt to the World Bank, the IMF, regional develop-

ment banks, as well as to individual countries that provided them financial assistance on a concessionary

basis (IMF 2012b, 2013).

In the most extreme situations, the OIC’s lowest performing countries on the WISP, like many

other low performing countries worldwide, are in danger of imploding upon themselves; thus, their classi-

fication by the Fund for Peace as “failed” or “failing” nations. In an effort to counterbalance this possibil-

ity, the Millennium Development Campaign has targeted the OIC’s lowest performing countries for pref-

erential aid and development technical assistance in helping them achieve the MDCs eight Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs). The realization of these goals is understood to be prerequisites for these

countries to turn their downward development trajectory toward a more positive outcome. As a result,

many of the most significant social gains reported in Table 4 for this subset of the OIC’s are the direct

result of their successful implementation of the MDC (UN 2014a-b).

Further, the favorable development trends that are beginning to occur within this group of 15 OIC

member states are occurring at a rapid pace, especially for those countries located in the African subre-

gions whose WISP scores increased by a group average of 466 percent between 2000 and 2011(column

4)! Changes in WISP scores of this magnitude and unparalleled and are not a statistical artifact stemming

from their very low scores at the outset of study. Rather, these group average changes in development

status very real advances that are being to be made in the basic social, political, and economic infrastruc-

ture of many of these countries especially in reducing the exceptionally high rates of infant, child (MDG

#4) and maternal mortality (MDG #5) that pre-existed implementation of the MDGs. School enrolments

levels of girls and young women (MDG #2 & #3) also have increased appreciably within these countries

as have immunizations (MDG #6) against the most common infectious and communicable diseases that

exist in their communities (UN 2014). Of significance, too, is the emergence of new regional and inter-

Page 20 of 50
national partnerships (MDG #8) between the OIC’s lowest performing countries and other private actors

in the international development assistance community, including those with individual benefactors (e.g.,

George Soros in Central Asia and William and Melinda Gates in Africa).

Thus, a substantial share of the recent 10-year gains in development achieved by the OIC’s low-

est performing countries are directly associated with the successful implementation of the UN’s MDC.

Other gains reflect the comparatively new, long overdue, non-exploitative partnerships that are emerging

between these countries beyond the OIC that have joined with the United Nations in helping to advance

the MDC with OIC countries (UN 2014).

Though still fragile, the WISP trends reported for the OIC’s 15 lowest performing members are

important from both a national and international perspective. In time, hope exists for believing that the

gains in WISP rank positions will reflect the substantial changes in the WISP scores of individual coun-

tries. Development gains at this level may prove more difficult to achieve given the nature of the devel-

opment changes occurring in other world regions (Estes & Tiliouine 2014).

5.3 OIC Members with Middle Level Scores on the WISP

Table 4 identifies twenty-three OIC member states as “middle performing” countries (MPCs). The

MPCs divided more or less equally between Asian and African members though, on average, Asian coun-

tries occupy the top half of the list (with the notable exceptions of Afghanistan and Iraq).

Scores on the WISP for the MPCs in 2011 averaged 42.7 (SD=4.2) representing a net average

increase of 126 percent in their WISP scores between 2000 and 2011. Their average WISP rank position

in 2011 relative to that of all 160 countries included in the worldwide study 112.5 (SD=18.3), however,

continues to place the OIC’s middle performing countries well below the world average WISP rank posi-

tion of 81.5 (out of 160). Virtually no appreciable changes occurred in the average ten-year WISP rank-

ings of the OIC’s MPCs though a number of these countries experienced considerable rank losses be-

tween 2000 and 2011, i.e., Tajikistan (-25), Suriname (-14), Libya (-13), Malaysia (-9), Indonesia (-7),

and Comoros(-6). At the same time, substantial gains in WISP rank positions were recorded for other

Page 21 of 50
MPCs, i.e., Bangladesh (+27), Burkina Faso (+25), Uganda (+12), Mauritania (+8), and Saudi Arabia

(+8).

These data reflect the dynamic nature of the social changes that are occurring in the OIC’s middle

performing countries, albeit their change trajectory is anything but that of a straight line. Further, the

development picture of these countries is clouded by the reality that some of the OIC’s most prosperous

and poorest members are included in the list of MPCs…including eight countries classified by the United

Nations as “least developing”, i.e., Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Benin, Comoros, Mali, Senegal, Maurita-

nia, and Uganda. This pattern lends credence to that reported in other regional studies of social develop-

ment, i.e., that higher levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Per Capita Gross National Income

(GNI) do not necessarily predict either individual or collective well-being of people or countries over

time. Although economic resources play an important role in helping to facilitate the realization of non-

economic outcomes, an over-dependency on the part of development scholars in using economic indica-

tors as proxy variables for assessing the state of collective well-being for countries simply is not adequate.

Though essential to attaining a basic sense of well-being, higher levels of income alone do not necessarily

predict higher levels of individual or collective “life satisfaction”, “well-being”, or “happiness” (Easterlin

2010; Gallup 2013).

6. Islamic Development Trends: 2011-2014

In this section, a variety of indicators are used to summarize the major development

trends occurring in the 53 OIC member states between 2011 and 2014. The indicators focused on

are component measures used in the construction of three of the WISP’s ten subindexes: (1) pop-

ulation characteristics (Table 5); (2) economic characteristics (Table 6); and, (3) political charac-

teristics (Table 7). The data presented reflect some of the most important development accom-

plishments and challenges experienced by Islamic societies worldwide.

Page 22 of 50
6.1 Population Characteristics

Table 5 reports major population characteristics for the 53 OIC countries included in the

study. The combined population of these countries totals somewhat more than 1,634million peo-

ple or approximately one in four people worldwide (UNPOP 2013). As evidenced by the data

summarized in the table, OIC countries are extraordinarily heterogeneous with respect to virtu-

ally every indicator presented in the table. Population size, for examples, ranges from a high of

250 million for Indonesia to as few as one million or fewer people in countries such as Suriname,

Guyana, Comoros, and Djibouti.

Population growth rates in OIC countries also varies considerably from country to coun-

try. Of importance in these data are the continuing high fertility rates that are occurring in the

majority of OIC countries in combination with declining mortality, increased population aging,

and longer average life expectation for virtually all OIC countries. Population growth rates are

especially high in Niger (2.9 percent) and Uganda (+3.3 percent) while the slowest rates of in-

crease are occurring for Albania (-1.0 percent) and Guyana (0.5 percent). The negative growth

rate for Albania reflects the steady outflow of young people and other highly skilled workers to

other parts of Europe in search of improved economic opportunities (IOM 2013). These popula-

tion growth rates are at considerable variance with those reported for all countries of the OIC

(2.2 percent) as well as for the world-as-a-whole (1.2 percent). Further, the population growth

trends occurring in OIC countries are expected to continue into the foreseeable future and may,

indeed, become even more prominent (UNPOP 2013).

The population challenges confronting the member states of the OIC are compounded by

the group’s high age-dependency ratios resulting from a combination of continuing high fertility

Page 23 of 50
rates and, today, rapid population aging. For at least the near term, the combination of high fer-

tility and population aging is preventing the poorest OIC countries from creating the social infra-

structure needed to satisfy the most basic needs of large segments of their population, e.g., for

schools, improved health care, improved housing, and appropriate employment for persons wish

to remain or become economically active (ISSA 2014). The jobs and, thus, the taxes needed to

create the social infrastructure simply are not available to the poorest OIC countries. One conse-

quence of this forced joblessness among young people, including among many highly educated

university graduates, is the presence of a pervasive sense of social anomie that exists in many

less developed OIC countries. This phenomenon is particularly widespread among long-term

jobless youth who are unable to find appropriate economic opportunities for themselves within

their own societies (ILO 2013; Schwartz 2011). This sense of anomie frequently often spills

over into excessive internal competition and inter-group conflicts that frequently manifest them-

selves in recurring tensions and confrontations between unemployed young people and public

officials (Drine 2012b; Estes & Sirgy 2014). In the most extreme situations the recent youth led

Arab Spring was populated by large numbers of socially and economically displaced educated,

but long-term unemployed, workers (Schwartz 2011).

Similarly, differences in years of average life expectancy, one of the most favorable

achievements resulting from advances in social development, also characterize member states of

the OIC. Years of average life expectancy, for example, is just 60 years (SD 5.4) for the OIC’s

least developing countries (LDCs) versus an average years of 78 years for the group’s more eco-

nomically developed countries (DCs and DMEs) such as Qatar and Turkey among others. As-a-

group, though, average years of life expectation for OIC member states remains substantially

Page 24 of 50
below those for the world-as-a-whole (65.3 years) but shows evidence of eventually reaching at

least this level.

Infant mortality rates, which are calculated on the basis of the incidence of infant deaths

per 1,000 live births, are another important indicator of social progress. Islamic countries are

highly variable on this aspect of development as well with a group average of 41 infant deaths

per 1,000 live births (Range = 5 to 107) versus a rate of 38 infant deaths per 1,000 live births for

the world-as-a-whole (Table 5). These rates are improving however and for most OIC countries

at a pace that is more rapid than the world-as-a-whole. The acceleration of advances in reducing

the rate of infant deaths can be credited to the successful implementation of the United Nations

Millennium Development Campaign (MDC) which targets deeply impoverished countries, such

as the LDCs who are member states of the OIC, for preferential aid and technical assistance in

solving this and other deeply rooted social and health problems (UNMP 2005; UN 2014a-b). All

evidence is that the OIC’s Middle Performing Countries (MPCs) beginning to achieve their goals

of substantially reducing their rates of infant and child deaths (UN 2014). Every indication exists

for believing that even more dramatic successes in these areas will be realized over the near-term

as more primary care providers, birthing clinics, neonatal specialists, childhood immunization

programs, and hospitals are more present in these countries.

Adult literacy rates reflect the efforts made by individual countries in extending to the

most basic literacy skills in reading and writing to their populations. Because of their importance

these rates are considered robust measures of overall societal progress. Here again, OIC coun-

tries are some 12 points lower than the world’s average of 84 percent. The OIC’s Least Devel-

oping Countries (N=21) identified in Table 5 registered an average of 50 percent adult literacy

Page 25 of 50
levels while the OIC’s most socially advanced countries, such as the oil-exporting countries of

West Asia and Turkey, have already attained full literacy.

Also, the percent of the population of OIC countries that self-identify as Muslims varies

considerably from one OIC country to the next. The lowest concentrations of Muslims are found

in Guyana (7 percent) and Gabon (10 percent) while Muslims make up nearly the entire popula-

tions of Morocco and Tunisia. On average, 75 percent of the population of the OIC member

countries included in this study are Muslims (CIA 2014).

Overall, the OIC performances on population indicators confirm that, with some easily

identifiable exceptions, Islamic countries are underperforming on virtually all indicators relative

to the demographic achievements reported for the world-as-a-whole.

[Insert Table 5 about here--POP]

6.2 Economic Characteristics

A close examination of the OIC’s performances on the selected economic indicators reported in

Table 6 also confirms the high degree of economic heterogeneity that exists within the Ummah.

While a few OIC countries are succeeding on a limited number of these indicators, the majority

of the OIC’s member states still have a long reach if they are to achieve near economic parity

with levels already attained by the world-as-a-whole.

Regarding the widely used indicator of per capita gross domestic product (PCGDP) as a

proxy variable for quality of life, the OIC’s developing countries (N=24) earned an average of

$23,412(SD=29,177) in 2013 while the PCGDP of its Least Developing Countries (N=21) aver-

aged only $1,956 (SD=$877) during the same year, i.e., approximately one-tenth of that realized

by the group of 27 OIC DCs. PCGDP levels are especially low for the poorest OIC members--

Somalia ($600) and Niger ($884). Per capita incomes at this level exist in sharp contrast with

Page 26 of 50
those reported for the OIC’s richest member states which have per capital GDP levels that are

160 or more times higher than those of its the poorest members, i.e., Qatar ($127,562) or Kuwait

($84,188)! The wealth gap that exists within the OIC is continuing to widen, especially as their

population growth rates stabilize. Stunning intra-OIC wealth differences are especially promi-

nent among countries experiencing very significant different rates of population and economic

growth, i.e., -6 percent for resource poor but population rich Yemen versus 5.6 percent and +10.2

percent for oil rich Qatar and Turkmenistan, respectively (Table 6). The effects of civil war have

been drastic on economic growth in Libya. It registered -9.4percent of growth in 2013 (UNDP

2014; World Bank 2014).

The picture of highly asynchronous economic development within the OICs is further

complicated when taking into consideration the very high levels of foreign indebtedness that

severely hamper the group’s poorest countries from developing jobs and social welfare infra-

structure needed to combat chronic unemployment and poverty that permeates the majority of

the OIC’s poorest countries, i.e., Guinea-Bissau (259%) and Comoros (115%). However, other

countries, including Algeria, have made early repayments of their external debt a priority with

the result that Algeria now has the lowest external debt level among OIC countries (Table 6).

Even so, the high levels of external indebtedness that exists for the majority of the OIC member-

ship severely limits their ability to initiate new development initiatives even those directed at

providing for the most basic social and material needs of their group, and youthful, populations.

Similarly, average unemployment (and under-employment) levels within OIC countries is

very high (17.4 percent, SD=16.3)…nearly twice that of the world-as-a-whole (8.4 percent).

And, as with other economic measures, huge discrepancies in joblessness exist between different

groupings of OIC countries, i.e., an average of 24percent of joblessness for the LDCs and 13.2

Page 27 of 50
percent for the DCs and 13.1 for the Islamic successor states to the former Soviet Union.xii Job-

lessness among youth exceeds 25 percent and is well above the average for women for whom

joblessness is more the norm than the exception (ILO 2012b).

Further, poverty rates are very high both within and between the member states of the

OIC (Table 6). The country and subgrouping unemployment rates in Table 6 confirm that large

numbers of people within OIC countries live well under nationally established poverty thresh-

olds. Poverty rates for the OIC members also are higher than those reported for the world-as-a-

whole and certainly higher than those which exist within other associations of countries, i.e., an

average of 24.9 percent (SD= 24.3 percent) for OIC states versus an average of 18.1percent for

the world-as-a-whole. Poverty levels are especially unfavorable within the OIC’s least develop-

ing countries, i.e., 44.1percent (SD=18.7 percent). Paradoxically, poverty levels have increased

for many nations since the “Arab Spring” of 2011 and 2012.

GINI Coefficientsxiiifor OIC member states attest to the increasing levels of income in-

equality that are becoming a recurring fixture of Islamic development, i.e., an average GINI

score of 38.6 (SD=6.1) for the OIC-as-a-whole. The OIC’s five member states of the former

Soviet Union are characterized by generally lower level of income inequality (Average = 34.2,

SD=3.8)...another aspect of the social legacy associated with the comparatively successful efforts

at poverty alleviation of the former USSR. Troublesome, though, is the increased income in-

equality reported for Comoros (64.3), Malaysia (46.2) and Cameroon (44.6). Within the OIC the

lowest levels of income inequality are reported for Tajikistan (29.4), Iraq (30.9), and Kazakhstan

(30.9).

Unless some genuine development measures are undertaken on behalf of these countries,

perhaps in the form of an expanded MDC, disparities in income inequality are likely to continue

Page 28 of 50
to increase over at least the near-term. In addition to contributing to the creation of poverty in

other OIC states, these patterns are likely to promote even higher levels of social unrest and po-

litical instability than those that currently exist in many Islamic countries (Estes 2012a,b; Sachs

2005; Sen 2009). Today, too many OIC’s countries are trapped in a quagmire of economic in-

equality, political conflict, and frozen opportunities for economic mobility---all elements that

contribute to revolutions and the fall of governments.

[Insert Table 6 about here--ECON]

6.3 Political Characteristics

The member states of the OIC also are characterized by considerable variability with respect to a

wide range of political indicators (Table 7). Forty-five of the 53 OIC countries studied, for ex-

ample, are government by republican forms of governance that encourage the active participa-

tion of citizens in all aspects of public life. Multiple political parties, the presence of citizen-cre-

ated civil society organizations, and a free press are among the political ideals being sought by

many of these countries.In 10 of the countries identified with republican forms of governance,

however, the political position of their head of state (usually referred to as “president”) is only

ceremonial versus in the majority of countries where the head of state also presides over the

country’s executive branch. Eight OIC countries are ruled by, or at least heavily influenced by,

monarchies--five of which are constitutional monarchies that must govern in cooperation with a

publically elected parliament. The OIC also has among its membership three countries that are

absolute monarchies (Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia). The leader, usually a King, has complete

control over all aspects of the social, political, economic, and even religious lives of the coun-

try’s subjects. Thus, levels of political participation within OIC countries vary enormously by

Page 29 of 50
the type of political system and the power assigned to the head of state of each country. For these

and other reasons not discussed here the NewYork-based think tank, Freedom House, identified

only four OIC countries as being truly “free” (Benin, Guyana, Senegal, Suriname) whereas 22

are classified as “partly free” and the remaining 27 countries are classified as being “not free”

(FH 2014). Thus democracy and democratic institutions are absent in the majority of OIC coun-

tries and, in those countries where democracy does exist, and with certain exceptions, often they

tend to be weak and under the control of the ruling elites with the backing of security services.

For the most part, as evidenced by the data reported in Table 7 and as others have suggested,

many, perhaps most, Islamic societies appear to be unready to assume the political vagaries and

clumsiness associated with democracies (Lewis, 2011; Maghraoui 2006;Mernissi, & Lakeland

1992).

The WISP’s subindex of Social Chaos measures four levels of social and political stabil-

ity: 1) strength of political and civil liberties; 2) the number of internally and externally dis-

placed persons resulting from wars and intra-national conflicts; 3) the number of deaths result-

ing from armed conflicts; and 4) the level of perceived public corruption (Estes 2014a). Each of

these dimensions is measured by international NGO research think tanks that have been monitor-

ing development at the country and world level for at least 10 years (FH 2014; IFR 2014; TI

2014). Only 11 OIC countries attained scores on this subindex that competed favorably with

average scores reported for the world-as-a-whole (Table 7). Three countries--Afghanistan, Iraq

and Somalia—attained WISP scores well below those of the world-as-a-whole and are countries

characterized by high levels of social and political instability. All are at war as well and, there-

fore, the causalities reported for these countries, as well as the number of internally and exter-

nally displaced persons associated with these countries and their neighboring states, are steadily

Page 30 of 50
increasing. Since 2011, political instability has characterized public life in other countries of the

OIC, including Syria, Yemen and Mali.

In terms of scores on the Political Freedom Index which range from 1 (most free) to 7

(least free), 39 OIC countries attained scores lower that of the world as a whole (Average = 3.6).

Rich oil countries such as Saudi Arabia attained the favorable score on the index along with

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Chad, Somalia, Sudan and Syria. The situation in Libya has changed

to an open civil war following the fall of the Guaddafi regime, while the situation in Syria has

been further complicated with the rise terrorist groups, such as ISIS. The general situation of the

majority of OIC countries is more or less the same on the Civil Liberties Index scores reported by

countries and subgroups of related countries. Forty-four OIC member states, for example, scored

lower on the index and all 160 countries reflected in the worldwide average of 3.3.

While a score of 100 indicates the lowest possible level of public corruption using the

Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2012), eight OIC countries (Turkey,

Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Suriname) scored just slightly

higher than the world average of 43.3. The most corrupt OIC countries identified on the index

are Afghanistan and Somalia.

With regard to Failed State Index, OIC countries averaged 14.4 points higher (SD=15) on

the index than the international average (70.9). Significant social collapses are continuing to oc-

cur in many of these countries including in Somalia (114), Chad (109), Yemen (107), Guinea

(101), Guinea-Bissau(101), Pakistan (103), Nigeria (101), Iraq (104) and Cote d’Ivoire (104).

Only a few OIC countries are moving forward steadily on this index of political stability, i.e.,

Qatar (47.0), Albania (65), and Bahrain (63), albeit Bahrain’s overall performance has not been

Page 31 of 50
as favorable during recent years than in the past. Though, the performance of this latter country

is not as solid as it was because of the recent civil unrest.

Lastly, advancing gender equality and encouraging women’s active participation in pub-

lic life is an important factor in the development of nations, especially in the ability of women to

participate in political decision making. Using percentage of seats allocated to women in par-

liament as a proxy variable to representing overall progress of women within OIC member

states, the status of women in Islamic societies continues to lag far behind that of men, i.e., with

women holding an average of only 16.3 (SD=9.9) percent of parliamentary seats compared with

those held by women in other world regions (Average = 21.8 percent) and, certainly, in compari-

son with the percentage of seats held by men UNDP 2005). The situation is especially problem-

atic countries such as Qatar which deny women any form of participation in the making and

shaping of laws and public policies in these countries. Saudi Arabia also known as a conserva-

tive country opted for a system of quota leading to a parliament with a women representation

reaching 20 percent. Algeria is leading the Arab countries with a 32 percentage of parliament

seats held by women (Table 7). The OIC’s most favorable public policy participatory rates for

women exist in Senegal (43 percent), Mozambique (39 percent) and Uganda (35percent).

[Insert Table 7 about here--POLIT]

7. Discussion

The data summarized in this chapter represent a comprehensive overview of social develop-

ment trends and patterns occurring in 53 member states of the Organization of Islamic Coopera-

tion (OIC). The study spans a 45-year time period (1970-2014) and embraces more than 1,634

Page 32 of 50
million people living in predominately Muslim societies in 2014. In addition to performance

scores on the Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP) for the time period 1970 to 2010/11, the

chapter also reports more current demographic, economic, and political social indicator data for

this group of countries for the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and, where possible, 2014. The study does

not, however, include approximately 10 million Muslims residing in four member states of the

OIC for which comparable social indicator data could not be obtained. Nor does the study report

on the changing social status of Muslims residing in non-member states of the OIC in which

Muslims are a minority population. Other chapters in the volume, however, focus on many of

populations. Readers are referred to Parts 2 and 3 of the volume for discussions of the contem-

porary social status of these two population groups.

Forty-year social development trend data were presented for the OIC-as-a-whole (Figures

3 & 4) and for OIC member states organized by major geographic regions and subregions (Fig-

ures 5 to 9). Data also were reported for individual OIC countries for the 25-year time 1990-

2014 (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7). Particular emphasis in the analysis was given to the dramatic im-

provements on the WISP that occurred for selected subgroups and individual member states of

the OIC during the 15-year time period 2000 to 2014 (Table 4). The very significant post-2000

social advances reported for many of the OIC’s poorest African members, and for some of its

Asian members as well, reverses the downward trajectory that characterized development in

many OIC countries prior to 2000 (Estes 2015a; Estes & Tiliouine 2014). These important,

hopefully sustainable, social advances resulted directly from the combined efforts of govern-

ments, governmental agencies, and citizen’s groups to implement the eight goal strategy of the

United Nations Millennium Development Campaign (UNMP, 2005; UN 2014a-b). The assign-

ment of preferential development aid and technical assistance to the world’s poorest and socially

Page 33 of 50
least developed countries is obviously succeeding given the now accelerated pace of develop-

ment that is occurring in many of the OIC most impoverished members (UN 2014a-b).

The data reported in this paper confirm that the member states of the OIC are highly di-

verse with respect to their social, demographic, economic, and political profiles. They also differ

dramatically with respect to the stores of natural and human capital available to them as well as

in the extent and quality of their relationships with other countries both within and outside the

OIC. Some have achieved political independence only recently—since the ending of WWII or

following the collapse of the former Soviet Union---while others have been fully autonomous

nations since as early as 1502 (Iran) and 1650 (Oman). The vast majority of the members of the

OIC, however, achieved independence from European colonizers only during the last half of the

20th century (Table 7). Therefore, as nations, the vast majority of member states of the OIC are

comparatively young and many are still searching for the most appropriate system(s) by which to

govern themselves. The “Arab Spring” that began in Tunisia with the self-immolation of Mo-

hamed Bouazizi in December, 2010 illustrates the dramatic actions, high levels of social unrest,

and the regional complexities that often are associated with political development in the MENA

region and, to a lesser extent, the Islamic countries of Central Asia (Danahar 2013; Schwartz

2011).

Because of their geographic diversity and large population size, the member states of the

OIC, on average, are characterized by extreme income inequality both within their own borders

and between other member states of the OIC. The Gini coefficient for all 53 countries, for exam-

ple, averages 38.6 (SD=6.1) with approximately 24.9 percent (SD=24.3) of the population of the

OIC living in severe poverty versus 18.1 percent for the world-as-a-whole (Table 6). The high-

est concentrations of poverty exist within the 27 African members of the OIC, but poverty also is

Page 34 of 50
a prominent feature of the organization’s 23 Asian members. Gender inequality, as in the past,

remains a defining characteristic of OIC member states with the result that, today, women and

children are disproportionately represented among the OIC’s poor. The situation remains bleak

over the near-term for not only the OIC’s women and children but also for other historically dis-

advantaged populations, e.g., persons with disabilities, the aged, religious and sexual minorities,

among others. Added to this reality is the fact that women in OIC countries occupy on average

only 16.3 percent (SD=9.9) of the seats in their national parliaments compared with a worldwide

average of 21.8 (Table 7).

Though the situation with respect to income inequality is beginning to improve in a few

OIC countries, social and economic progress for the OIC-countries-as-a-whole continues to lag

behind that observed for other organizations of nations, e.g., Association of Southeast Asian Na-

tions (ASEAN), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the South Asian Association

for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Fifty-two of the 53 countries included in this analysis are classified by the United Nations

as either “developing” (DCs, N=31) or “least developing” (LDCs, N=21) countries. Only Tur-

key, with its large population of 74.9 million people of which 98.6 percent are Muslim, is as a

“developed market economy” (DME). As a result, many of the OICs member countries, but

especially its 21LDCs, are receiving preferential development aid and technical assistance from

the United Nations through its 10-year Millennium Development Campaign (2005-2015). The

need for the MDC to succeed is even greater for the 10 deeply impoverished OIC members that

have been identified by the Fund for Peace (2012) as either “failed” (e.g., Yemen, Sudan, Cote

d’Ivoire, Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan) or “failing” (e.g., Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, and

Sierra Leone) states.xiv In response to the severe social crises that confront these and other mem-

Page 35 of 50
ber countries, the OIC launched its own 10-Year Programme of Action in 2005. Significant so-

cial advances already are associated with the implementation of the UN’s MDC but, as of now,

the authors have no clear sense of the outcomes resulting from the OIC’s 10-Year Action Plan.

Of some significance, too, is the very rapid rate of social change that occurred within the

OIC’s 15 lowest performing countries on the WISP between 2000 and 2011, i.e., a net average

group increase of +466.2 percent (SD=393.4) over the 10-year period. Changes of this magni-

tude on the WISP are unparalleled, especially for historically low performing countries. Even

discounting for some possible distortions that may have crept into the data during earlier obser-

vation time periods, the WISP gains summarized in Table 4 for these 15 nations are real and they

are substantial ( Estes 2015a-b). They also are very much the result of effective working partner-

ships between the OIC countries and the specialized agencies of the United Nations (UNDP,

WHO, ILO, etc.) and other major international development assistance organizations including

the World Bank (WB 2014), International Monetary Fund (IMF 2013a-b), Organization for Eco-

nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2013), and the European Union (EU 2013), among

others (UN 2014; World Bank 2014). The extent to which these gains can be sustained after the

MDC ends in 2015, however, remains an open question, especially given the threats of widening

epidemics, recurrent political turmoil, social unrest, and religious extremism in many OIC coun-

tries. Plans, however, already are underway to extend the MDC and other large scale develop-

ment initiatives over at least the near-term (Browne & Weiss 2014; UN 2014a-b). And within

these plans, the least developed countries of the OIC continue to be among those identified for

preferential development assistance.

Page 36 of 50
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Page 45 of 50
i
Ummah is an Arabicword meaning "nation" or "community". It is distinguished from Sha'b (Arabic: ‫ )شعب‬which
means a nation with common ancestry or geography. Thus, it can be said to be a supra-national community with a
common history” (Wikipedia 2014a).At the time of the Prophet the concept of the Ummah included not only fol-
lowers of Islam but all members of the larger community-- Christians, Jews, non-believers, and others—all of
whom had direct access to the Prophet. Over the centuries, however, the meaning of Ummah became narrower
and, today, refers only to the worldwide community of Muslims.

ii
The term “Muslim” should not be confused with the Arabic term “Moslem” that was used in earlier centuries to
designate the followers of Islam. The latter term has taken on a pejorative meaning and is no longer used to refer
to the followers of Islam. The terms should not be used interchangeably.

iii
"Adequacy of social provision" refers to the changing capacity of governments to provide for the basic social,

material, and other needs of the people living within their borders, e.g., for food, clothing, shelter, and access to at

least basic health, education, and social services (Estes 1988: 199-209).
iv
For methodological reasons, the ISP's 41 indicators are divided between positive and negative indicators of social

progress. On the Education Subindex, for example, higher adult illiteracy rates are negatively associated with

social progress whereas gains in primary school enrollment levels are positively associated with overall improve-

ments in development. Thus, not only is the ISP representative of all major sectors of development, the instrument

also achieves balance with respect the range of positive and negative factors that are used to assess changes in

social progress over time.

v
A fuller description of these procedures is summarized in Estes (1988), pp. 199-209.
vi
Four member states of the OIC were excluded from the analysis due to missing or incomplete data.
vii
This taxonomy groups countries into four clusters by overall level of socio-economic development: (1) Developed

Market Economies (DMEs) consisting primarily of economically advanced countries (plus selected middle income

countries added to the Organizations of Economic Cooperation and Development) on the basis of their current

level of economic development; (2) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) consisting entirely of succes-

sor states to the former Soviet Union; (3) Developing Countries (DCs) consisting primarily of low, middle and

high income countries located in developing Africa, Asia, and Latin America; and (3) Least Developed Countries

(LDCs) which, for a variety of historical and socio-political reasons, often experience net negative patterns of de-

velopment from one time period to another.

viii
The average scores for each of the WISP’s ten subindexes was set at 10.0; thus, the theoretical range of WISP

scores is 0.0 to 100.0, albeit owing to some unusual conditions operating in selected countries, some nations
 achieved scores that fell outside the theoretical range (Estes 2011).
ix
The MDC is organized around the attainment of eight goals (MDGs) by 2015 that are central to meeting at least

the basic needs of the world’s poorest nations: 1) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal

primary education; 3) promote gender equality; 4) reduce infant mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat-

ting HIV/AIDS and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; and, 8) promoting global partnerships

(UN 2012a,b).
x
Referred to as the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, the eight

member states of this organization were: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,

Romania, and the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist following the collapse of the Soviet Union in

December, 1991.
xi
LDCs and SLDCs consist of the world’s poorest and slowest developing countries. The majority of these coun-

tries have been identified by the United Nations as “least developing” (LDCs) but they also include other low-in-

come and politically unstable societies that are at risk of social, economic or political collapse.
xii
The unemployment figures reported here reflect different time periods and, therefore, may not fully reflect the full

employment-unemployment picture for all countries at the same point in time (ILO 2012).
xiii
Gini coefficients range from 0 to 100 with the highest levels of income inequality at the higher ends of the scale.
xiv
The 10 OIC member states identified as either “failed” or “failing’ states are identified in column 5 of Table 5.