City of Cagayan De Oro vs.

Cagayan Electric Power (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 224825, October 17, 2018

CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, Petitioner, v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC.
(CEPALCO), Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner, through its local legislative council, enacted Ordinance, which imposed an annual Mayor's Permit
Fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) on every electric or telecommunications post belonging to public utility
companies operating in the city.

Respondent, Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) is a public utility engaged in the
distribution of electric power and the owner of utility poles erected within Cagayan de Oro City. The ordinance
entailed them to pay an annual Mayor's Permit Fee of P8,500,000.00.10.

CEPALCO thus filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages & Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order & Preliminary Injunction before the Cagayan RTC assailing the ordinance's validity.

CEPALCO contended that the imposition, in the guise of police power, was unlawful for violating the
fundamental principle that fees, charges, and other impositions shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory. Additionally, CEPALCO argued that, assuming the imposition was a valid regulatory fee, it
violated the legislative franchise that specifically exempted the electricity distributor from taxes or fees assessed
by Cagayan de Oro City.

RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief due to CEPALCO's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Aggrieved, CEPALCO elevated the case to the CA.

The CA declared the ordinance void for being exorbitant and unreasonable. The appellate court additionally
held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable considering the case involved a
regulatory fee and not a tax measure.

Hence, instant petition before this Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not CEPALCO should have exhausted administrative remedies by challenging Ordinance No.
9527-2005 before the Secretary of Justice prior to instituting the present action;

(2) Whether or not the amount of the Mayor's Permit Fee is excessive, unreasonable, and exorbitant.

RULING:

(1) No. The Court rules that ordinances that impose regulatory fees do not need to be challenged before the
Secretary of Justice.

In the case at bar, the ordinance imposes a fee since it was enacted pursuant to the city's police power and serves
to regulate, not to raise revenue.

Review by the Secretary of Justice is mandatory only when what is being questioned is a tax ordinance or
revenue measure. Section 187 does not require the same from parties who assail ordinances imposing regulatory
fees. Stated otherwise, the procedure found in Section 187 must be followed when an ordinance imposes a tax;
the institution of an action in court without complying with the requirements of the provision will lead to the
dismissal of the case on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, when an ordinance
imposes a fee, direct recourse to the courts may be had without prior protest before the Secretary of Justice.
Simply put, fees are not subject to the procedure outlined under Section 187.

(2) No. CEPALCO's failure to establish excessiveness, the Court rules in the negative. A judicious perusal of
the record fails to reveal anything definitively showing the ordinance’s unreasonable, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory nature; hence, because it enjoys the presumption of validity, the Court is constrained to reverse the
decision of the CA.

The presumption of validity is a corollary of the presumption of constitutionality, a legal theory of common-law
origin developed by courts to deal with cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes.
274 Phil. 323

PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:

"The new PAGCOR --- responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter - PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals,
public policy and order, and because -

"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;

"B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;

"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;

"C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization." (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national
policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree
is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of
Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21,
Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the
Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of
PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated
January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its
operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was
considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic
projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following
declared policy -

"Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate
all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the
following objectives:

"(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one
corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.

"(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools,
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of
chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1)
generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control
programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs,
Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which
will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all
the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling
clubs and casinos without direct government involvement." (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's
repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are
accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to
the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the
President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and
charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private
associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR
remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494
employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred
Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void"
for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy",
and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state
policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution.

This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate
consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and
most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C.
144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that
a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is
not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the
executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not
hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute
(Lozano v. Martinez, supra).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et. al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar
underscored the -

". . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as
obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who
attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may
work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports
the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted." (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539;
Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739
[1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of
petitioners to file the instant petition.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under
the 1987 Constituion, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the
Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng
mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

"With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before Us, We hold that the
same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking
they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement
and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

"In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they
were not proper parties and ruled that 'the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure.' We have since
then applied the exception in many other cases." (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does
not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
(Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along
with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to
govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a
power co-extensive with self-protection, and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity."
(Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of the winds of change.

What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate
institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD
1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity -
the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of
much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and
subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas
Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil
practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and
legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be
referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any
"tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local."

"(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under
this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the
Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the
National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority".
(Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City
of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7
SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to
tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has
the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers"
(Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the
City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975,
the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:

"Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other
local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse
and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.

"Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-
alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and
verification of the qualification of the applicant x x x."
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of
"licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also
exercises regulatory powers, thus:

"Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. - The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall
exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission
over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments
of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters
concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to
the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation."
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which
places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

"The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the
operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal
government." (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.

"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of
the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them." (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140,
underscoring supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National polices thru extermination of what local authorities
may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"
(U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).

The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc
Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which
has the inherent power to wield it.

(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869.
This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:

"Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government." (underscoring supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3,
Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of
local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III
Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

"Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under
the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government. (underscoring supplied)

As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units
remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and
hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

"As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally
necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. x x x In the absence of express grant of
power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void."
(Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You,
88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllian Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548,
underscorings supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it
legalized PAGCOR - conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force
on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego,
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same
(Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse
racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42)
are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D.
1869 for one, unconstitutional.

"If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)

"The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same
name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop
short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure
if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from
monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a
ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it
is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.

"The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power." (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170
SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:

"Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or
prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of
Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies.
As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define
and effectuate such principles.

"In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If
the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not
judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot" (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387;
Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287).
Therefore, for PD. 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must
fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of his petition is therefore, inevitable.
But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to
free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational
values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 -

"Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the
presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned.
Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been
violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed
legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that
petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the
OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass
upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and
the Congress."
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling
resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the
gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that
some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not
necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent,
but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose
of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in the result with Justice Padilla.
Padilla, J., see separate concurring opinion.

CONCURRING IN THE RESULT

PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I agree
with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as
gambling properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the
legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling,
and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy.

The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of policies adopted by
the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority, except only when such
policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not
involve such a factual situation.

However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the human
personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect, which in the long run will corrode
whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and
homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the
touchstones of real economic progress and national development.

Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the
government out of "legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by the irreparable
damage to the people's moral values.

Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed
and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate.

One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as gambling,
which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known
as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and
"regulated" by the government, in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out
its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I
submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy,
and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, GR No. 202242, 2012-07-17

Facts:
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of Congress with
one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution?
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an
eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC -
one from the House of Representatives... and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.[7]
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote... each.[8] At present, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
petitioner has questioned in this petition,[9] setting forth the following
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
I
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC shall have only
one representative from Congress.
II
The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC composed of only seven
(7) members.
III
Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one member from the Senate and
one member from the House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as they did in the other
provisions of the Constitution.
IV
The composition of the JBC providing for three ex- fficio members is purposely designed for a balanced
representation of each of the three branches of the government.
V
One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even ½ right) to sit in the said
constitutional body and perform the duties and functions of a member thereof.
VI
The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and unconstitutional
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as members of the JBC
in their Comment[13] filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the crux of the controversy is the phrase "a
representative of
Congress."... the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress.[16]
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.
when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative... from Congress," it should mean
one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Tracing the subject provision's history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was established, the Framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating "a representative of the National
Assembly" to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to... aptly jive with the change to bicameralism... the Court... views the
petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure... the
petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin
Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in
this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the... case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being... raised.
The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court...
need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC
is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of
the Court.
the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction.
It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may...
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative
from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
erba legis non est recedendum from... the words of a statute there should be no departure.
even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is
undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as the
sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left to
the determination of
Congress.
the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the
lawgiver's intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so
that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a... representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Principles:
The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued
by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court,
clothed with legal... standing and at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek... judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No. 83896, 1991-02-22

Facts:
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on
July 25, 1987.
"SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition
to his primary position, hold not more... than two positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies
or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
"SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of
the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate... official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
"SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant... secretary."
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein... imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution
"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,... par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No.
73, series of 1987,[5] declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries
may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of government... corporations: (a) when
directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or
(c) if allowed by... the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the
President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987, or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987,
promulgated Executive Order No. 284.
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),... Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil
Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions
do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13,... Article VII which applies specifically to the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
Issues:
does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
Section 7, par.
(2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality... thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
Ruling:
We rule in the negative.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission... should see it fit to formulate another provision,
Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in... the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or... employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the
Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment.
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
In striking contrast is... the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the... latter provision, the
disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on
the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or
employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or... special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidi-
aries."
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which...
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress,
members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family... as class by itself and to imposed upon said class
stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was
also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted
during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry... between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department.
Commissioner Foz commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of the
Cabinet because they exercise... more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants... may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the...
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article
VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution.
Surely, to say that the phrase "unless... otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII
has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet
Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one,...
i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as
constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed
vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so... interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their... tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read
with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple...
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is
to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.[21] The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must... be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided... under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office.
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act... done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office."[27] An ex-officio member of a
board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office,... and without further warrant or
appointment.[28] To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority,[29] and... the Light
Rail Transit Authority.
"An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R. A. 3137) reveals that for the... chairman and
members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by the respective department heads.
In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in... the offices mentioned in the law.
This is as it should be, because the representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition
to those already performed under their original appointments.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or
assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of
their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their... respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized
in many jurisdictions.
It is consistent with the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control
of all the executive... departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
The ex oficio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government,... except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's
manifest intent and the people's understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet... members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct... contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the Court hereby orders respondents Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government[45] Luis Santos,
Secretary of National Defense Fidel V.
Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R. A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to
immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are no
longer occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.[46] It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure
officer, a de... facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the... office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and
then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.[47] Any per... diem, allowances or other
emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may
therefore be retained by them.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No.
284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION

BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution,
all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections,
starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
 In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the
2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM
officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like
the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts
that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also
create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of
the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress
could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy
decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
 powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to
order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have
delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the
power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening
act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have
done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution
itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision
of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however,
should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus,
the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials
to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective
and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what
the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No.
10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides
only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.
JUAN DOMINO v. COMELEC, GR No. 134015, 1999-07-19
Facts:
DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of
the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for... one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.
private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo... filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO... is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he
has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.
the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate... for lack
of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the... cancellation of his certificate of candidacy...
his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This... negates all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to
and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency
requirement provided for candidates for Member of... the House of Representatives
On... the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that
the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the
Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become... final and executory.
The result of the election... shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents
DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution... which was denied by the COMELEC en banc
Issues:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the
Commission on Elections
Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of
petitioner.
Ruling:
The first issue.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false... representation as to material facts was made in the
certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings... does not
preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the
factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings... not conclusive
upon the COMELEC.
However,... a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire
the nature of res judicata.
it does not operate as a... bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in
the proceeding.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to... be registered as a voter in any other election.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction
when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a
resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion... cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not
qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
The trial court has no power... to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to
another for it is the function of the election Registration Board
The Second Issue.
the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means
the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that... place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one... residence or
domicile at a time.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur... and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his
certificate of candidacy
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established
a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona... fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to
adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile.
No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to... acquire a domicile without
actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence
without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile.
The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's... original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City.
it... give rise to a strong presumption of residence... especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his
former barangay.
The Third Issue.
the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny
due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason
no final judgment of... disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification
is voted for and receives the highest number of votes[38] and provided further that the winning candidate has
not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of... office.
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of... the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate.[41] A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House... of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District
of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the
COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over... the issue of his ineligibility as a
candidate.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR No. 160261, 2003-11-10

Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution... which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the... manner of disbursements and expenditures by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint[4] (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices[5] of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."[6] The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003[8] in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form,"[9] but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint [11] was filed
with the
Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the... alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.[13]
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year."
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,[36] this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there,
but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought... to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law... to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates... the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[37] (Emphasis and
underscoring... supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary[38] in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the... evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the... framers of
the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.[39]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue[40] where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:... x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional... construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation... offered by the framers.[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v.
De Leon,[42] this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:... x x x [T]he members of the
Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of
one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they...
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not
by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.[43] (Emphasis and...
underscoring supplied)
Issues:
whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre- requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled;
and (3) the substantive... issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Issue no. 1
Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution.
Issue no. 2
Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
Issue no. 3
Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Issue no. 4
Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Issue no. 5
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is... a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that... the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive
and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.[114]
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non- justiciable political question which is beyond the scope
of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been... initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

KILOSBAYAN v. MANUEL L. MORATO, GR No. 118910, 1995-07-17

Facts:
As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994))
invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the... ground that it had been made in violation of the
charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with
the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
On January 25, 1995, the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (hereafter called ELA) whereby the
PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived by the PCSO from... the operation of the lottery which in no
case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation. The
rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the
annual... minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its
current ticket sales.
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity. (R.A. No. L169, §6 (B))
A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior
case.
On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially
the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case.
Issues:
THE ELA IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2(2), ARTICLE IX-D OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN
RELATION TO COA CIRCULAR NO. 85-55-A.
Ruling:
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public... interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such
parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination... of difficult constitutional questions."
Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract
from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say... that their interest falls short of that required to
maintain an action under Rule 3, §2.
It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a
government corporation. There is, however, no allegation that public funds are being misspent so as to make
this action a public one and justify relaxation of the... requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest.
the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefitted or injured by the
judgment, or the `party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"
in regards to legal standing
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the
agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of
the contracting parties and can show the detriment... which would positively result to them from the contract
even though they did not intervene in it (Ibañez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 (1912)), or who
claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been, illegally excluded from it.
(See De la Lara Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. L-13460, Nov. 28, 1958)
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. . . . The phrase `present substantial interest' more concretely
is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter... of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive
law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be
protected in a payment to or recovery by him." (1 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULERS OF COURT
154-155 (1979))
Thus, in Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963) petitioner's right to question the validity of a
government contract for the importation of rice was sustained because he was a rice planter with substantial
production, who had a right under the law to sell to the... government.
But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.
Denying to them the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of
government contracts. Questions as to the... nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public
bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or
before the Ombudsman. The Constitution requires that the Ombudsman and his deputies, "as protectors... of the
people shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof including government-owned or controlled
corporations." (Art. XI, Sec. 12) In... addition, the Solicitor 6eneral is authorized to bring an action for quo
warranto if it should be thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its
corporate charter or misused its franchise.
In the new contract the rental is also expressed in terms of percentage of the gross proceeds from ticket sales
because the allocation of the receipts under the charter of the PCSO is also expressed in percentage, to wit: 55%
is set aside for prizes; 30% for contribution to... charity; and 15% for operating expenses and capital
expenditures. (R.A. No. 1169, §6) As the Solicitor General points out in his Comment filed in behalf of the
PCSO:
In the PCSO charter, operating costs are reflected as a percentage of the net receipts (which is defined as gross
receipts less ticket printing costs which shall not exceed 2% and the 1% granted to the Commission on Higher
Education under Republic Act No. 7722). The... mandate of the law is that operating costs, which include
payments for any leased equipment, cannot exceed 15% of net receipts, or 14.55% of gross receipts.
In G.R. No. 113375 it was held that the PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would
involve it in any form of "collaboration, association or joint venture" for the holding of sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities.
This interpretation must be reexamined especially in determining whether petitioners have a cause of action.
We hold that the charter of the PCSO does not absolutely prohibit it from holding or conducting lottery "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with another party. What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is to
invest in a business engaged in sweepstakes races,... lotteries and similar activities, and it is prohibited from
doing so whether in "collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." The reason for this is
that these are competing activities and the PCSO should not invest in the business of a... competitor.
When parsed, it will be seen that §1 grants the PCSO authority to do any of the following: (1) to hold or
conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries ands similar activities; and/or (2) to invest - whether "by itself or in
collaboration,... association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity" - in any "health
and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit oriented," except "the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," i.e.,... sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities.
The PCSO is prohibited from investing in "activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" because, as
already stated, these are competing activities.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold:
(1) that petitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to make them real parties in
interest within the meaning of Rule 3, §2;
(2) that a determination of the petitioners' right to bring this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision in the
prior case between the parties;
(3) that the Equipment Lease Agreement of January 25, 1995 is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code
and is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter
into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint
venture with another party, so long as it... itself holds or conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a
condition for its validity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare the Equipment Lease
Agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp.
invalid is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, GR No. 122156, 1997-
02-03
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding... shares of respondent MHC.
The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance
of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,... with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5]... which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On
18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and... culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national...
patrimony.
Issues:
that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing... that the non-self-
executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of
the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.
Ruling:
The argument is flawed. If the first... and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over... foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos... in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.[
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any... legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that

 qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no... statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources,... but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with
our struggle for sovereignty, independence and... nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51%... will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land
on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not... applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have... to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.
And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are
to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may...
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be
simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has... hosted many of the most important events in
the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer
to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their...
official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an
authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a... history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a
part in the shaping of a country.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and... to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue
the necessary... clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Principles:
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are... self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is... why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -... x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered
self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the... legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG v. COMELEC, GR No. 161872, 2004-04-13

Facts:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not... nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered
in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution,[1] by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the
COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral... process and limited the power of
the sovereign people to choose their leaders
Issues:
No.1... seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access
to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[1] by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties.
No. 2... whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not
Ruling:
No.1
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioner's invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for
public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in
his case, to seek the presidency. There is... none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision... which suggests
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,[2]
and there is no plausible reason for... according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive... action.[3] The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates
the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of... a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly... written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended.[8] Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public
service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent... impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions[9] of the
Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated December 10, 2002 outlining the
instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of... candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity
stands and has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner's reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,... objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time... and
resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State
from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to
alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever... necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not
merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.
No. 2
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence
is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner's aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.
As to petitioner's attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the
form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates
what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with... the required information tending to show that the
candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution
and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez
Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

A.M. No. P-08-2531 (Formerly A.M. No. 08-7-220-MTCC)

PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a letter[1] dated June 23, 2006 by Director David E. Cabanag, Jr. of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. VII calling the attention of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to the continued employment of Merle Ramoneda-Pita (Ramoneda-Pita) as Clerk III of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Danao City. It informed the OCA that in CSC Resolution No.
010263[2]dated January 26, 2001, Raoneda-Pita was found guilty of dishonesty and dismissed from the service.
As accessory penalties, she was perpetually barred from joining government service and her civil service
eligibility was revoked. However, Ramoneda-Pita did not declare her ineligibility when she stated in her
Personnel Data Sheet (PDS)[3] dated June 14, 2005 that she had never been involved in any administrative case
and that she was civil service eligible.

The antecedent facts follow.

On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter[4] informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity in the civil service
eligibility of Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity concerned Ramoneda-Pita's taking of the
Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987.

The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the pictures and signatures of
Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17,
1990. As the pictures and signatures did not match, the CSC required Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed
that another person took the civil service examination on her behalf.
Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her stead. She averred that she
took the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were
dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP and the PDS because these were not taken on the same year and might
have deteriorated in quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for the difference in her signatures
to her low educational attainment leading to her non-development and non-maintenance of a usual signature.[5]

In its Investigation Report[6] dated May 3, 1999, the CSC made the following observations and
recommendation:

The person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu City,
was the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of
Admission and in the Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature appear
in the Personal Data Sheet dated October 17, 19[9]0 of the real Merle C. Ramoneda.

In view of the foregoing, considering that the evidence presented [is] substantial, it is recommended that
respondent Merle C. Ramoneda be adjudged guilty of the charges and meted the penalty of dismissal with all its
accessories.[7]

Thus, the CSC issued Resolution No. 010263 dated January 26, 2001 finding Ramoneda-Pita guilty of
dishonesty, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Merle C. Ramoneda guilty of the offense of Dishonesty.
Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties is imposed.

Since the respondent is not in the government service, the penalty of dismissal is deemed implemented. She is
also perpetually barred from entering the government service and from taking any civil service examination in
the future. Her Civil Service Sub-Professional Eligibility is likewise revoked.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas for whatever legal action it
may take under the premises.[8]

Ramoneda-Pita moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied it in Resolution No. 010880[9] dated May 3,
2001.

Ramoneda-Pita appealed CSC Resolution Nos. 010263 and 010880 to the Court of Appeals and, subsequently,
to this Court. In both instances, her appeal was denied.[10]

On January 14, 2005, Ramoneda-Pita wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appealing for clemency
stating that she accepted her fate and turned a new leaf with a solemn commitment to do good for the rest of her
life. The Office of the President referred the matter to Director David Cabanag, Jr. of the CSC Regional Office
No. VII for validation, verification and investigation.[11]

While the appeal for clemency was pending and in the course of the CSC's investigation, the CSC discovered
that, again, Ramoneda-Pita had been declaring in her PDS, particularly the PDS dated June 14, 2005 submitted
to the Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in any administrative case and that she was civil
service eligible.[12]

Thus, on MAy 11, 2006, the CSC, in tis Investigation Report[13] pursuant to the Office of the President's referral,
found that Ramoneda-Pita had not sufficiently established moral reformation which is crucial in the grant of
executive clemency. It recommended that the plea for executive clemency be denied.

On June 23, 2006, Director Cabanag, Jr. wrote a letter to the OCA informing it of the continued employment of
Ramoneda-Pita as Clerk III of the MTCC, Danao City despite the finality of CSC Resolution No. 010263.

On August 18, 2006, the OCA required Ramoneda-Pita to submit her comment within fifteen (15) days.

In her Comment dated September 7, 2006, Ramoneda-Pita asserted that she never concealed that she had been
previously found guilty of dishonesty. She claimed that her immediate supervisor, Judge Manuel D.
Patalinghug, was furnished a copy of CSC Resolution No. 010263. She admitted having filed request for
executive clemency with the Office of the President. In connection to this, she said that the CSC directed her to
submit some documents needed for its processing. She explained that she made the entries in her June 14, 2005
PDS because she wanted to be consistent in her statements in her previous PDS and, considering her low
education, she just copied the data entries contained in her earlier PDS. She said that it was never her intention
to falsify the PDS and she did not understand the legal implications. She prayed for the Court's understanding
and cited her good record during her years of service.
In its Report[14] dated July 4, 2008, the OCA recommended, among others, that the case be docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that this Court conduct its own investigation on the matter.

This Court noted and adopted the recommendation of the OCA in a Resolution[15] dated August 6, 2008 where it
directed the OCA to conduct its own investigation on the matter and submit a report and recommendation
thereon.

Thus, this administrative case.

In its Memorandum[16] dated February 19, 2009, the OCA recommended Ramoneda-Pita's dismissal from the
service. It found that Ramoneda-Pita fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC never once
questioning its jurisdiction. It stated:

In the instant case, respondent Ramoneda-Pita, who never even questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC, fully
participated in the proceedings before the CSC. Although she was not yet a Supreme Court employee when the
CSC instituted the case against her, she had already become a member of the judiciary when Resolution No. 01-
0263 dated January 26, 2001 finding her guilty and meting her the penalty of dismissal was issued - having been
appointed by the Court to her present position on July 24, 2000. Her motion for reconsideration of the CSC
Resolution was denied. The respondent then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the same Resolution. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed with the Supreme
Court which in its Resolution dated August 24, 2004 found no reversible error in the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case.
Taking into consideration the pronouncement in the Ampong case, we believe that with all the more reason the
doctrine of estoppel should thus be considered applicable in the instant case as the respondent went all the way
to the Supreme Court to question the CSC Resolution. In addition, the Court itself has even ruled on the case,
effectively upholding CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 when it explicitly stated that in any event, the petition
would still be denied for failure thereof to sufficiently show that the public respondent committed any
reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case.

xxxx

There lies the question as to how should respondent then be proceeded against with respect to her employment
in the [J]udiciary. We deem that we cannot just implement CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 and dismiss the
respondent outright. The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction over the respondent and should
therefore have the final determination of her administrative liability.

Considering, however, that the CSC had already conducted both fact-finding and formal investigations, we find
no reason why the Court should replicate what the CSC had done more ably.[17]

In support of its conclusion, the OCA cited Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No.
11[18] among others. Said the OCA:

The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Supreme
Court through the OCA as shown in several cases. The Court, however, has made exceptions in certain cases. In
the very recent case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared that it had administrative jurisdiction over the
petitioner, nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. In the said case,
petitioner Ampong, a court interpreter at the time the CSC instituted administrative proceedings against her,
questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC after it found her guilty of dishonesty in surreptitiously taking the CSC-
supervised Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) in 1991 in place of another person and
dismissed her from the service. The Court denied the petition on the ground that the previous actions of
petitioner estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC which had accorded her due process.
[19]
(Citations omitted.)

The OCA then proceeded to discuss the merits of Ramoneda-Pita's contention. It noted Ramoneda-Pita's claim
that her physical appearance changed over the intervening years since she took the Civil Service Sub-
Professional Examinations. She also posed the possibility that the picture quality had deteriorated over time. In
addition, she also claims that the examiner must have interchanged her picture with someone else as he was the
one who pasted the pictures to the seat plan.

However, the OCA seriously doubted the validity of Ramoneda-Pita's claim saying:
We do not think that a mere three-year gap would bring about drastic changes in a person's appearance. Besides,
the respondent failed to substantiate her claims. She could have easily submitted additional evidence, such as
pictures to show the gradual change in her appearance through the three-year period.[20]

On the confusion with respect to the pictures, the OCA said that it was not "likely due to the strict procedure
followed during civil service examinations x x x."[21] Moreover, the OCA stated:

The presentation of various explanations and conjectures show the inconsistent stands taken by the respondent.
She insists that the picture in the seat plan was her and that her physical appearance has changed over the years,
yet in the same breath argues that the examiner must have interchanged her picture with the pictures of other
examinees.

The same inconsistency is manifest in all her records. Upon the Court's resolution of her petition for review on
certiorari, the respondent states in her letter dated January 14, 2005 addressed to President Arroyo that she
fought hard to prove her innocence but had accepted her fate and mistake, with the solemn commitment that
she would never commit the same or similar mistake for the rest of her life. x x x.

xxxx

The respondent has a string of dishonest acts which started when she had somebody impersonate her in taking
the Civil Service Subprofessional examination. Upon the discovery of her deception, she embarked on a series
of prevarications to cover it up, the most notable of which is the Personal Data Sheet dated April 5, 2000 she
submitted to the Court as one of the supporting documents for her appointment to the judiciary. In the Personal
Data Sheet, item no. 25 asks "Do you have any pending administrative case?" while item no. 27 queries "Have
you ever been convicted of any administrative offense?" The respondent answered "no" to both questions. It
must be remembered that at the time she filled out the Personal Data Sheet, she already had a pending
administrative case, the CSC having already fikled its formal charge on September 7, 1998. Her fraudulent
answers had been instrumental in the unquestioned approval of her appointment because had she answered
truthfully the Court would have been alerted to her pending administrative case with the CSC and would have
surely withheld, if not denied, her appointment.

Taking judicial notice of the fact-finding and formal investigations conducted by the CSC relative to the
impersonation case of the respondent and given the observations on her subsequent actuations which were
predisposed to deceive, we find that the respondent, is indeed, guilty of dishonesty and falsification of
document.[22]

The OCA thus recommended:

In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court the
recommendation that respondent Merle Ramoneda-Pita, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City,
be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and be DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leaves, if any, and with prejudice to
re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies including
government-owned or controlled corporations.[23]

We note and adopt the recommendation of the OCA.

As a preliminary matter, we address the matter of propriety of the proceedings against Ramoneda-Pita in the
CSC.

We have always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.[24] However, as aptly pointed out by
the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law, that is, afforded due process. She was able
to file several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It may also be noted that the case had been
elevated to the Court of Appeals and this Court, where the Resolution of the CSC was upheld in both instances.

The OCA's reliance in Ampong v. Civil Service Commission is well taken. As we have stated in Civil Service
Commission v. Andal[25]:

In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She voluntarily went to the CSC regional office, admitted
to the charges leveled against her and waived her right to the assistance of counsel. She was given ample
opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed her answer to the
charges against her and even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling of the CSC. In short, Ampong
did not question the authority of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated in the proceedings before it.

In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having
been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service examination and did not even appear at the
formal investigation conducted by the CSC-NCR. He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the
CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that as an
employee in the Judiciary, "the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him vests with the Sandiganbayan
or the Supreme Court." It cannot therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
CSC.

This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects
the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility.
The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. (Citations omitted; emphases ours.)

In any event, the OCA had asked Ramoneda-Pita to comment on the matter. She was therefore given due notice
and fair hearing. It is noteworthy that she only rehashed the arguments that she raised before the CSC
proceedings.

We now proceed to the substantive aspect of the case.

This Court has defined dishonesty in Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr.[26] as:

[I]ntentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any
deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like
bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the
intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his
act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. (Citations omitted.)

We have previously dealt with cases with a marked resemblance to the present case.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,[27] we found sufficient basis to dismiss a court stenographer for
misrepresenting herself to have passed the Career Service Professional Examination Computer Assisted Test
(CAT) when she had somebody else take the exam for her. The CSC undertook to compare the respondent's
PDS with the CAT application and the Picture Seat Plan of the examinations and found them to be different.

In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco,[28] we found Ms. Caridad S. Dasco guilty of dishonesty and consequently
dismissed her from the service for having someone else take the requisite Civil Service Examinations in her
stead. It was found that her picture in the CSC's PSP had a marked difference from her PDS.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo,[29] we dismissed Ms. Lourdes Bermejo for having another
person impersonate her at the Civil Service Examinations.

A careful review of the documents submitted before the CSC and a perusal of its investigation reports in the
present case, convince us that Ramoneda-Pita was not the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional
Examinations conducted on July 26, 1987. Specimen signatures in the various PDS she had submitted over the
years to the Court do not resemble the signature which appeared in the seat plan of the CSC. Moreover, no
substantive evidence was presented by Ramoneda-Pita to bolster her defense that she was not able to develop a
settled signature. Nor did she substantiate her claim that the difference between the pictures in the PSP and the
PDS is due to the aging process.

This Court cannot stress enough that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a
reflection of this esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty
perpetrated by its employees. As we have stated in the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel[30]:

WHEREAS, court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that
of a judge or justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon court personnel as part of the Judiciary.

WHEREAS, in performing their duties and responsibilities, court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and
any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people's confidence in it. (Emphases supplied.)

In this case, Ramoneda-Pita's length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSC's discovery of the
perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service
eligible in her PDS when she had been already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the finality of
the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell this Court that Ramoneda-Pita has not and does
not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. As the Court has previously stated it will not
hesitate to rid the ranks of undesirables.[31]

WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUlLTY of dishonesty. She is DISMISSED from
the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leave credits, if any, and
with prejudicto re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies
including government-owned and controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to her
records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part due to relation to party.
Perez, J., no part, acted on matter as Court Administrator.

G.R. No. 179267 GARCIA v. DRILON 699 SCRA 352

GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their
children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a
single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her
of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men
in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.

JOKER P. ARROYO v. JOSE DE VENECIA, GR No. 127255, 1997-08-14

Facts:
hallenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240... charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum,... although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by
the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
etitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House; that these rules embody... the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of
the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was... properly
passed is false and spurious.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence
of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone... objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock
in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
Issues:
Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was
still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
Ruling:
"When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to asce... n this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to this Court
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in... this case is a legislator's nightmare because it
suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce
or nominal voting.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the
proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's... question was not, in form or substance, a point of order
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further... consideration of the
question.[31]
To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the... business of the House.[
Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[3
34 Phil. 729, 735
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much... energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of
Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in
the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a...
conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a... proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been
obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts."[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good,... if
old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the... wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities... with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained
provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no
more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a
bill which it had prepared, we should decline... the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments
of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of
Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here
and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
 . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody
of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to... coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so...
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four
(Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases
and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres,
JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the... membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House
of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A.
No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is... required by the Constitution. Art. VI,
§16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be... entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have
also been accorded conclusive... effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives
of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They
should be public, because all are required to conform to them;... they should be permanent, that rights acquired
today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote
period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240... is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside
a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek... a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and... would
itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence... of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177780 January 25, 2012

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A.

SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 that dismissed the petition
for certiorari brought by the petitioner to nullify and set aside the resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice
on July 20, 20042 and November 18, 20053 directing the City Prosecutor of Malabon City to withdraw the
information in Criminal Case No. 27020 entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.

We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the Secretary of
Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the latter’s determination of the existence of
probable cause, absent any showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby commits grave abuse of his discretion.

Antecedents

In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was introduced to respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias)
by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK. Subsequently, Tobias opened a
savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months
later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit
verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property
Tobias offered as collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related documents.4 The
property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-16751.5 Based on the financial
statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a credit line for ₱40,000,000.00. On August 15,
1997, Joselito Bermeo Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to the Registry
of Deeds of Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The
annotation was Entry No. 26897.6

Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of ₱20,000,000, but took out the balance within six months.7 He paid
the interest on the loan for about a year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request.
Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to
METROBANK as the lone bidder.8 On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of
METROBANK.9

When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no
corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido,
Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned that Serial No.
4348590 appearing therein had been issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT
No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a
parcel of land located in Navotas.10
Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
to investigate.11 In its report dated May 29, 2000,12 PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax
declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in relation
to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.13

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of
public documents through the following information,14 viz:

xxx

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of Malabon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense, fraudulent
acts and misrepresentation executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud, represented to
METROBANK, as represented by MS. ROSELLA S. SANTIAGO, that he is the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented to be true and genuine when he knew the Certificate
of Title No. M-16751 is fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Metrobank and
offered the same as collateral for a loan and Rosella S. Santiago relying on said misrepresentation gave to
accused, the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by spurious title and misappropriate, misapply and
converted the said amount of ₱20,000,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands
accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the amount to complainant METROBANK,
and/or delivered the land covered in the spurious title in the aforementioned amount of ₱20,000,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation,16 which was granted.

In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation,17 Tobias averred that he had bought the property
from one Leonardo Fajardo through real estate brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that Natalio
Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin International, had convinced him to purchase the property due
to its being an ideal site for his meat processing plant and cold storage business; that the actual inspection of the
property as well as the verification made in the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the veracity
of TCT No. 106083 under the name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he had applied for the loan from METROBANK
to pay the purchase price by offering the property as collateral; that in order for the final application to be
processed and the loan proceeds to be released, METROBANK had advised him to have the title first
transferred to his name; that he had executed a deed of absolute sale with Fajardo covering the property, and
that said instrument had been properly registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the title, being
under the account of the seller, had been processed by seller Fajardo and his brokers Munsuyac and Pilapil; that
his title and the property had been inspected and verified by METROBANK’s personnel; and that he did not
have any intention to defraud METROBANK.

Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias,
and recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification of public document.18

Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the
withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias,19 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of
Malabon City is directed to cause the withdrawal of the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against
respondent Antonino O. Tobias III, and report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith in
purchasing the property; that he had even used part of the proceeds of the loan to pay the seller; that it was
METROBANK that had caused the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT, thereby creating an impression that
the title had been existing in the Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that the
possessor of a falsified document was the author of the falsification did not apply because it was always subject
to the qualification or reference as to the approximate time of the commission of the falsification.

METROBANK moved to reconsider,20 arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or false pretense in offering the
property as collateral by using a fake title; and that the presumption that the possessor of the document was the
author of the falsification applied because no other person could have falsified the TCT and would have
benefitted therefrom except Tobias himself.
On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK’s motion for
reconsideration.21

Ruling of the CA

METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari.

On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision,22 dismissing METROBANK’s petition
for certiorari by holding that the presumption of authorship might be disputed through a satisfactory
explanation, viz:

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is that such person is
the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192
SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing
People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render
ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.

It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the Department of Justice finding no probable cause against
private respondent Tobias for estafa thru falsification of public document. The record speaks well of Tobias’
good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability. Consider:

(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good faith is always presumed. Therefore, he who
claims bad faith must prove it (Prinsipio vs. The Honorable Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December
19, 2005). No such evidence of bad faith of Tobias appears on record;

(b) Tobias’ actuation in securing the loan belies any criminal intent on his part to deceive petitioner
Bank. He was not in a hurry to obtain the loan. He had to undergo the usual process of the investigative
arm or machine of the Bank not only on the location and the physical appearance of the property but
likewise the veracity of its title. Out of the approved ₱40,000,000.00 loan he only availed of
₱20,000,000.00, for his frozen meat business which upon investigation of the Bank failed to give
negative results;

(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one (1) year on the loan and two (2) installments on the
restructured loan; and

(d) More importantly, the loan was not released to him until after the mortgage was duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City and even paid the amount of ₱90,000.00 for the registration fees
therefor.

These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining
the loan. It may not be surprising to find that Tobias could even be a victim himself by another person in
purchasing the properties he offered as security for the loan.23

The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the
public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such
determination;24 that the private complainant in a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that
should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based
on Article 35 of the Civil Code, to wit:

In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose
only interest is the civil aspect of the case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In
Vda. De Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme Court has this for an answer:

"The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice would not allow the filing of a criminal
complaint against an accused because it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an
information for the complaint with which the respondents are charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated in
Article 35 of the Civil Code, which provides:

‘Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which
no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged
offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complainant should be
found to be malicious.
‘If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the
civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.’"25

METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose, emphasizing that the
presumption that METROBANK firmly relied upon was overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good
faith and lack of criminal intent. The CA relevantly held:

Petitioner should be minded that the subject presumption that the possessor and user of a forged or falsified
document is presumed to be the falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a conclusive one.
Under the law on evidence, presumptions are divided into two (2) classes: conclusive and rebuttable.
Conclusive or absolute presumptions are rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of
any particular averment which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof that the fact is otherwise, if the
basis facts are established (1 Greenleaf, Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on Evidence 6 ed, page
132). Upon the other hand, a disputable presumption has been defined as species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence (31A C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9,
1994; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41). In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that
the disputable presumptions therein enumerated are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence. Thus, as declared in Our decision in this case, private respondent had shown
evidence of good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that can overthrow the controversial
disputable presumption.26

Issue

In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of—

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN RENDERING THE
ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANK’S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18 NOVEMBER
2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUDTICE AND IN DENYING METROBANK’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient to establish probable cause to hold
Tobias for trial; that the presumption applies when a person is found in possession of the forged instrument,
makes use of it, and benefits from it; that contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is no requirement that the legal
presumption shall only apply in the absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed,
used and benefited from the forged document; that the CA erred in declaring that Tobias was in good faith,
because good faith was merely evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that Tobias was heavily
involved in a modus operandi of using fake titles because he was also being tried for a similar crime in the
RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.

METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused,
which should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.

On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the Department of Justice is to prosecute the guilty in
criminal cases, not to persecute; that although the prosecutors are given latitude to determine the existence of
probable cause, the review power of the Secretary of Justice prevents overzealous prosecutors from persecuting
the innocent; that in reversing the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor Ojer Pacis, the Secretary of
Justice only acted within his authority; that, indeed, the Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that there was
lack of evidence to prove that the purported fake title was the very cause that had induced the petitioner to grant
the loan; and that the Secretary likewise appropriately found that Tobias dealt with the petitioner in good faith
because of lack of proof that he had employed fraud and deceit in securing the loan.

Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be applied in his case because it was
METROBANK, through a representative, who had annotated the real estate mortgage with the Registry of
Deeds; and that he had no access to and contact with the Registry of Deeds, and whatever went wrong after the
annotation was beyond his control.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government,27 or to substitute their
own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,28 represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The
settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.29 That abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.30 For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth
Division, Cebu City,31 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required
"hard facts and solid evidence" in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such
requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable
cause is not part of a trial.32 At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.33 Probable
cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.34 There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is
determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the
finding of the public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts
presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.35

Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a) the
accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.36 It is required that the false statement or
fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with
the thing.37

METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having
offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no requirement that the
presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have
possessed, used and benefited from the forged document.

We cannot sustain METROBANK’s urging.

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State.38 The effect is to create
the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the
contrary.39 As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the
establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the
presumption and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the
investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a
criminal case in court.41

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence
upholds the contention for which it stands.42 It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating
prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to
disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary
of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the
investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the
existence of probable cause,43 a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and
inferences can properly warrant.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of
a satisfactory explanation.44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the
information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the
spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave.
We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:

It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the moment a person has in his possession a
falsified document and has made use of it, probable cause or prima facie is already established and that no
amount of satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the case in court by the investigating officer, for
any such good explanation or defense can only be threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not to be
persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the very purpose for which preliminary
investigation is required in this jurisdiction.1avvphi1
A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs.
Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of discovering the person or persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410
[2005]). Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent must be
informed of the accusation against him and shall have the right to examine the evidence against him and submit
his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a criminal preliminary investigation is
legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is
the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192
SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing
People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render
ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.45

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty
to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and
integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.46 Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its
competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner.47 Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a
thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it
had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than others in
their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.48 Their failure to do so constitutes
negligence on its part.49

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on December 29, 2006. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

OCAMPO v. ENRIQUEZ, GR No. 225973, 2017-08-08

Facts:
On November 8, 2016, the Court dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal remains
of Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos), former President of the Republic of the Philippines, at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB). As the Filipino public witnessed through the broadcast media and as the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) m
Petitioners argue that the main issue of the petitions does not deal on the wisdom of the actions of President
Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) and the public respondents but their violation of the 1987 Constitution
(Constitution), laws, and jurisprudence. They posit that, under its expanded jurisdiction, the Court has the duty
to exercise judicial power to review even those decisions or exercises of discretion that were formerly
considered political questions in order to determine whether there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of a public officer.
restored to them by law. Essentially, petitioners decry that Marcos' burial at the LNMB results in illegal use of
public funds, re-traumatization, historical revisionism, disregard of their state recognition as heroes and their
rights to effective reparation and to satisfaction.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.[18]
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he or she can demonstrate that (1) he or she has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
remedy being sought.[1
However, as the Court fully explained in the assailed Decision, the historical and legal bases governing the
LNMB unequivocally reveal its nature and purpose as an active military cemetery/grave site over which
President Duterte has certain discretionary authority, pursuant to his control and commander-in-chief powers,
which is beyond the Court's judicial power to review.
The fact that the Court was prompted to issue the SQAO does not make this case extremely urgent to resolve.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI), We issued
(and extended) the effectivity of the SQAO in order not to render moot and academic the issues raised in the
petitions. With respect to the alleged strong public interest on the case as shown by the nationwide protests, the
Court views that such mass actions indicate the controversial nature of the issue involved. Again, the requisites
of judicial review must be satisfied.
Issues:
Petitioners-movants reiterate that AFP Regulations G 161-375 does not have the force and effect of Law and
cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation or power for violating the Constitution, international and
municipal laws, and foreign and local jurisprudence, which, cannot be disregarded as they are deemed
incorporated in administrative regulations.
Ocampo et al. maintain that Marcos' burial at the LNMB brazenly violates the Constitution, the basic principles
of which are respect for human rights and dignity and public accountability.
Rosales et al. propound that mere existence of human rights laws, administrative rules, and judicial issuance in
the Philippines is not equivalent to full compliance with international law standards
Ruling:
Ocampo et al. add that this Court struck down in Manila Prince Hotel the argument that some provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing and requires implementing legislation, and that provisions claimed to be non
self-executing can still be violated if the questioned act is directly opposite the provisions that require the
government to undertake.
Finally, it is contended that our constitutional tradition has consistently followed the doctrine that the silence of
the Constitution does not mean the absence of constitutional principles and commands. Rosales et al. cite
Angara v. Electoral Commission,... As the OSG correctly counters, reliance on Manila Prince Hotel is
misplaced because the issue there was whether Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution, a provision which was not
invoked in this case, is self-executing. Petitioners-movants repeatedly failed to demonstrate precisely how
Sections 3, 7, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Art. II; Sec. 18, Art. VII; Sec. 1, Art. VIII; Sec. 1, Art. XI; Sec. 3[2],
Art. XIV; Sec. 5 [2], Art. XVI; and Sec. 17, Art. XIII of the Constitution prohibit Marcos' burial at the LNMB.
In fac
Verba legis should prevail since the presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained.[76] The authors of our Constitution were not only the
members of the Constitutional Commission but also all those who participated in its ratification. Since the ideas
and opinions exchanged by a few of its commissioners should not be presumed to be the opinions of ail of them,
it is the specific text – and only that text – which was the result of the deliberations of the Commission that must
be read and construed.[77] As this Court, through Justice Leonen, held in David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal:
[78]... its plain and unambiguous language with respect to his power of control as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief should be construed in a sense that will allow its foil exercise.
It cannot be conveniently claimed that various provisions of the Constitution, taken together, necessarily imply
the prohibition of Marcos' burial at the LNMB.
Petitioners Ocampo et al. and Lagman et al. insist that R.A. No. 289 is applicable in determining the standards
on who are entitled to be buried at the LNMB. As a special law, its provisions prevail over the power to allocate
lands of the public domain granted to the President by the Administrative Code of 1987. Its salutary objective
encompasses all subsequent shrines or memorials as interment grounds for former Presidents, heroes, and
patriots, regardless of the time it was constituted and its location.
Thus, this Court is of the view that the statutory omission – the non-inclusion of the prohibition of Marcos'
burial at the LNMB – was both deliberate and significant.
If a statute is plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning or applied according to its
express terms, without any attempted interpretation, and leaving the court no room for any extended
ratiocination or rationalization
Principles on Impunity are merely expressions of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence
state behavior; therefore, they cannot be validly considered as sources of international law that is binding upon
the Philippines under Art. 38 (1), Chapter II[118] of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Principles:
The Basic Principles and Guidelines and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and. Promotion of
Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity ("UN Principles on Impunity") are neither a treaty nor have
attained the status of generally accepted principles of international law and/or international customs.

Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre
Malabanan... claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty (30) years.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified
at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did... not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified... to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the... manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession
prior to the... classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and... disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
Issues:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to
"patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, and not the concept of... prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from
the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the... property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no...
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is... duly authorized by law.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his... predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12
June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence the Tax Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot... avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national... evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is... insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.