Evasco, Jr. vs.

Montañez

While police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, Congress may delegate this
power to local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Republic Act No. 4354
otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Davao City Charter),enacted on
June 19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative power to regulate,
prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of billboards and
similar structures.

The power to regulate billboards within its territorial jurisdiction has been delegated by Congress
to the city government via the Davao City Charter. Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No.
092-2000 with the National Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the former. The city
government may impose stricter limitations because its police power to do so originates from its
charter and not from the National Building Code.

An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if:

a) it has a lawful subject such that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and
b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

Tijam vs. Sandiganbayan

To sustain a conviction for theft, the prosecution must prove justify a different conclusion the
following elements beyond reasonable doubt, namely:
(i) the taking of personal property;
(ii) the property belongs to another;
(iii) the taking was done with intent to gain;
(iv) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; and
(v) the taking is accomplished without violence or intimidation

The burden to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused against person or force
upon things lies with the prosecution. At best, the circumstantial evidence presented merely
arouses suspicion or gives room for conjecture, which is not sufficient to convict. The facts from
which the inferences are derived have not been substantially proven and fail to engender a moral
certainty of guilt. Thus, the petitioners' constitutional presumption of innocence must prevail.

It bears stressing that the fact of possession alone, wholly unconnected with any other
circumstances, cannot be used as a ground to convict. Clearly, the disputable presumption cannot
prevail over the petitioners' explanation. Tijam's possession having been explained, the legal
presumption is disputed and thus, cannot be the sole basis for the conviction.

The Court must judge the petitioners' guilt or innocence based on facts and not on mere
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions. highest quantum of proof is required as the petitioners'
life and liberty are at stake. In this case, the facts from which the inferences were derived were
not proven; and the evidence presented was susceptible of two interpretations.
Pichay vs. Sandiganbayan

While there is no law particularly vesting the Sandiganbayan the authority to issue HDOs, the
same is not necessary for it to exercise this power. The Sandiganbayan is "given the full
disposition of all the powers inherent in all courts of justice to effectuate the exercise of its
jurisdiction, including the issuance of HDOs, if in its good judgment, it finds necessary in the
administration of justice."

A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the court from leaving the country, or if
abroad, compelled to return. [Also,] [a]n accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the
necessity of a warrant if they attempt to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the court where the case is pending.

Pichay posted bail under the obligation that he will hold himself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court. The condition imposed upon Pichay to make himself available
at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel.

Criminal prosecutions should be allowed to run their course without undue delay. Pichay, as one
facing criminal charges with the People of the Philippines as the offended party, should hold
himself amenable to court orders and processes at all times.

Clavecilla vs. Clavecilla

The Court does not see any reason why the principle of clean hands should prevent a
psychologically incapacitated spouse from initiating a proceeding to annul a marriage. This is
because there is no party at fault in case of annulment of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Culpability cannot be imputed on the part of the spouse said to be psychologically
incapacitated since it is not deliberate or intentional on his or her part to possess such personality
trait. Art. 36 of the Family Code does not prohibit the psychologically incapacitated spouse from
initiating the action.

The Court ruled that since psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a
personality disorder, the proof required should be that which will establish the durable or
enduring aspects of the spouse's personality structure. Such personality structure manifests as
clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family by disabling the affected spouse to
understand and comply with the essential marital obligations.

The standards in determining whether Marivic is psychologically incapacitated are laid down in
Arts. 68 to 71of the Family Code.

(i) living together, observing mutual love, respect and fidelity, rendering mutual help and
support, fixing the family domicile, support, and management of the household.

Marivic was able to sufficiently refute petitioner's allegations of her supposed inability and
unwillingness to contribute to the family's income. The documents she presented reasonably
prove that she was able to find work during their marriage, thus, enabling her to also provide for
the financial needs of the family.
 The ruling in Tan-Andal is clear that there must be proof of the consistent behavior of the
psychologically incapacitated spouse. This shall consist of an undeniable pattern of failing to be
present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive. There was none in this case.

Fernando heavily relied on the report of Dr. Tayag, but there was nothing in her report which
indicated a pattern indicating his inability to perform the essential spousal obligations. Fernando
failed to impress upon the Court that his NPD impaired his ability to discharge the essential
marital obligations under Arts. 68 to 71 of the Family Code. To reiterate, psychological incapacity
should be viewed in the legal sense, and not in the medical sense.

Republic vs. Boquiren

The RTC has no jurisdiction in a Rule 108 petition to determine the validity of the marriage of Oscar
and Rosalinda. The RTC has no jurisdiction in a Rule 108 petition to determine the legitimacy and
filiation of children. Rule 108 proceeding can be used to correct the annotation on a birth
certificate pertaining to the parents' marriage only when it is certain that there really was no
marriage in the first place. Allowing a Rule 108 proceeding in such a case would not amount to a
collateral attack on the validity of a marriage because there is no marriage to speak of. In contrast,
where a marriage was in fact celebrated, as in the present case, the ruling in Braza should prevail.
The Court held in Braza that in a special proceeding for correction of entries under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), "the trial court has no jurisdiction
to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

The doctrinal rule that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack." the legitimacy of a child cannot be collaterally attacked, and may be impugned only in a
direct proceeding for that purpose: this doctrine applies with equal force to the impugnation of
the status of "legitimated" children.

Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent valid marriage between the illegitimate child's
biological parents who were under no legal impediment to marry at the time of the child's
conception.70 After legitimation, "legitimated" children shall enjoy the same rights as "legitimate"
children71 with its effects retroacting to the time of the child's birth. It stands to reason that,
similar to legitimate children, the status of legitimated children cannot be collaterally attacked.

Article 182 of the Family Code provides that, "Legitimation may be impugned only by those who
are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues."

The corrections herein sought by respondents are really meant to impugn their legitimated status
—the prayer for correction being merely a necessary consequence of the impugnation if resolved
in their favor. This is not to mention the absurdity that will result in relegating respondents to the
status of illegitimacy, when they are already enjoying the rights accorded to legitimated children.