IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

Monika (Appellant)

Versus

Amit & Anr. (Respondents)

May it please your Lordships,

That Respondent No.1 seeks to file detailed objections to the present appeal preferred by the
Appellant challenging the well-reasoned Judgment dated __________ passed by the learned Family
Court, Ratlam in Petition No.________ whereby the multifarious petitions filed by the Appellant
were rightly dismissed and decision taken considering the welfare of the minor female child.

Factual Background:

That the marriage of Appellant and Respondent No.1 as per Hindu rites and customs was solemnized
on 10.02.2017. The Appellant at the time of marriage was 26 years old while Respondent No.1 was
30 years. Their families knew each other being residents of Ratlam.

That initially the relationship between parties after marriage was largely normal. The couple was
leading a content married life and were blessed with a female child on _________ who was named
Bhavya. The Respondent No.1 being employed provided financial security to his family while the
Appellant undertook household duties and care of their daughter.

That in _____ 2020, Respondent No. 1, who was working as engineer, got an employment
opportunity in United States of America. Considering better career and financial prospects, he
decided to migrate to USA and requested Appellant to accompany him. Though hesitant at first
considering their toddler daughter, the Appellant consented and in mid-2020, the parties settled in
Texas, USA.

That after migration, the marital ties of parties started getting impacted perhaps due to changed
lifestyle in foreign land or due to work stress of Respondent No.1. Instances of minor arguments
occurred but the Respondent always cared for needs of his wife and daughter to the best of his
capacity. He gifted her expensive sarees on occasions and never raised hands on her despite grave
provocations during fights.

That the Appellant, who previously had full family support network in India, for the first time had to
independently handle chores in USA. Over time she became irritable and started finding faults in her
husband. She unreasonably demanded expensive gadgets for self and luxuries for parents in India
which led to verbal spats.
Issues based on Respondents' Memorial:

1. Whether welfare of the minor girl lies in allowing her custody to remain with the
Respondents instead of transferring it to the Appellant mother?
2. Whether the Appellant has failed to substantiate the grounds of cruelty or desertion to seek
divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
3. Whether the Appellant is disentitled from claiming reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act,
2005 owing to her own conduct and admissions?
4. Whether the judgment passed by learned Family Court calls for any interference by this
Hon'ble Court?
1. Whether welfare of the minor girl lies in allowing her custody to
remain with the Respondents instead of transferring it to the Appellant
mother?
It is humbly submitted by the Respondents that the predominant jurisprudential consideration which
assumes supreme importance in adjudicating matters of child custody and guardianship is the
principle of ‘welfare’ and ‘best interests’ of the minor child involved.

The Courts are obligated to objectively evaluate what arrangement would be most conducive for the
unbringing of the child and which competing claimant can serve such interests in the most effective
way regardless of any personal law or statutory rights possessed qua minor.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled this proposition beyond doubt in a long line of precedents
that welfare is ‘paramount’ and ‘supreme’ consideration to resolve custody conflicts as elaborated
below with relevant citations:

I. Paramount importance of Child's Welfare and Best Interests in Custody Matters

In Hari Kishore vs. Sukhbir Singh, (1988) 2 SCC 561, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that:

"In all cases of this nature, the matter must be judged keeping the welfare of the minor children in
mind. The court has to take note of the paramount consideration that they do not become the zari in
the litigation. Born out of jealousies and pettiness of either spouse against the other in their battle
for acquiring exclusive rights over the children."

[See also: Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42; Anjali Kapoor v. Rajiv Baijal, (2009) 7
SCC 322 reiterating similar position]

Furthermore, the Hon’ble Court has clearly outlined the key factors which must weigh in mind while
determining best interests of child and evaluating comparative suitability of contending guardians. In
Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413, the relevant considerations were held to be -

i) age of child;

ii) sex and background of child;

iii) ordinary comfort, contentment and education;

iv) any reasonable preference child himself expresses;

v) Step-parent’s attitude -- willing to give the child true love or not.

Applying the aforementioned propositions, principles and tests to the facts obtaining in the present
case as duly established on evidentiary record, it emerges that welfare of Bhavya, aged around 4
years, positively lies in allowing her continued custody with educated and financially capable father
alongwith caring grandmother who have now raised her peacefully for over 2 years in Ratlam away
from vortex of her previous disturbed family atmosphere with no adverse impact discernible.

II. Factors discountenancing Change from Status-quo of Present Custody Arrangements

It is pertinent to highlight that for past few years since 2021, Respondent No.1 and 2 have been
afforded custody of infant Bhavya with no issues arising qua her care, maintenance or upbringing.
Now at a crucial juncture when child is gaining senses about own self and developing crucial
cognitive faculties, her sudden change of physical environment or transfer to new guardian in form of
estranged mother with whom she did not intimately interact for years together may cause emotional
or psychological imbalance having long term repercussions.

Continuity and stability especially during developing years assumes great significance and Courts are
generally loath to disturb status quo of custody orders until and unless factors materially affecting
child interest surface warranting such change as per wisdom of judges.

In Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 450 also which involved conflict between
NRI-based parents for twin children custody, their custody with maternal grandparents since very
young age was not directed to be changed uprooting from present environment owing inter-alia to
following factors:

i) "period of almost 5 years which is of crucial importance for twins who are only around 9 years";

ii) "custody with the grandparents since birth";

iii) "only when there is any material change in circumstance for detrimental impact on kids should
status quo ante in custody be altered."
On same lines, recently the Supreme Court in Ruchika Abbi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 502 cautioned that -

"Court should be slow in disturbing custody orders until and unless material changes since previous
order affecting child surface. Merely because one parent is changing country should not effect
custody change analysis."

The said scruples voiced regarding uprooting minors out of custody make it apparent that welfare
analysis in present case also leads to irresistible conclusion that Bhavya's custody ought to remain
undisturbed with Respondents instead of suddenly forcing a change mid-way considering her overall
development so far appears satisfactory and Appellant could not demonstrate any adverse
circumstances warranting such modification.

III. Appellant’s own indifference towards daughter and admissions weigh to deny custody

Furthermore, the admissions extracted from the Appellant herself during evidence regarding
incidents demonstrating negligence towards infant Bhavya like occasionally leaving her unintended
without arranging for supervision due to personal frustration or temperamental anger coupled
deprivation from maternal care for years clearly proves her to be unsuitable if objective facts are
analyzed.

It was due such lack of concern and affections that Respondent No 2. had to intervene temporarily by
even relocating herself from India out of pure concern for welfare for her grandchild during
tumultuous period abroad.

The judicial precedents have recognized that wishes of minor child who can communicate and
express intelligent preference also assumes significance. Bhavya till date has continued residing
happily as per record with her uncle, cousins in Ratlam home without any urge to reunite with
estranged mother thereby making evident her own affinity and adjustment with present family.

As ruled in Gaytri Bajaj v. Jiten Bajaj (2022 SCC Online Bom 967) if the child, specially a girl child,
expresses unwillingness and resent to the company of patents, placing her in custody against wishes
based on an unfounded premise would be great dis-service and harassment to the child which
cannot be permitted.

Therefore, the Appellant’s own conduct towards Bhavya disentitles her from consumption over
custody against positive environment now provided to child through efforts of Respondents. There
exists neither any material cause justifying change from custody status quo nor welfare
considerations endorse removing child out her of present comfort zone merely because Appellant
has some latent personal law rights which cannot override or nullify best interest of child having
paramount importance.

In totality, the Respondents satisfied their burden of dispelling the allegations qua their fitness and
establishing satisfactory present conditions of child thereby justifying her continued custody under
their supervision warranting dismissal of Appellant’s petition, hence the judgment which is based on
real state of affairs merits no interference by this Court in present facts.

2. Whether the Appellant has failed to substantiate the grounds of

cruelty or desertion to seek divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
It is accordingly humbly prayed that the order of the learned Family Court may be sustained to sub-
serve welfare purpose and praying custody transposition in favor of Appellant should be declined ab-
initio devoid as it is of merits.

At the outset, the Respondents humbly submit that it is well-settled position in law that dissolution
of marriage under Hindu law is permissible only on narrowly construed statutory grounds provided
under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA). Unless cogent material particulars are
pleaded and corresponding evidence adduced substantiating the ingredients constituting the specific
matrimonial offence, divorce cannot be granted as matter of routine merely based on ordinary wear
and tear in marriage.

The Appellant has sought divorce inter alia on grounds of ‘cruelty’ and ‘desertion’. However, a
contextual analysis of facts demonstrates that the allegations are bereft of requisite statutory
elements warranting refusal of decree of divorce, as discussed below:

I. Failure to substantiate allegations regarding cruelty under Section 13(1)(i) of HMA

That Section 13(1)(i) of HMA stipulates that divorce may be sought on ground of cruelty which
means:

“after solemnization of marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty”

It is submitted that ‘cruelty’ per se is not defined under HMA. Over years, judicial pronouncements
have expounded that it involves such willful and abhorrent conduct of grave severity that petitioner
cannot be reasonably asked to put up with. Measured thus, casual ordinary wear and tear of
marriage, occasional fights or lack of compatibility does not satisfy threshold to be categorized under
rubric of ‘Legal Cruelty’.
That the Appellant has vaguely raised allegations regarding some ordinary arguments over food
preparation expectedly arising in joint household kitchen matters or occasional tussle over financing
Appellant’s luxury expenses which falls within realm of routine marital differences over shared affairs
not amounting to cruelty. No specific dates, occasions or words demonstrating special grievousness
have been attributed in pleadings itself.

That similarly, casual aspersions casted doubting fidelity in heat of moment cannot be labeled
inhumane treatment unless abetment or provocation is shown. The Appellant’s own deposition
contrarily reveals instances of her rude and unreasonable behavior on such occasions clearly
indicating it to be case mutual petulance rather than cruelty by Respondents.

Reliance in this regard is placed on following authoritative enunciations denying divorce in similar
scenarios by the Supreme Court:

In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (2006) 3 SCC 778:

“...Mere trivial irritants, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day
life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. ..The married life
should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to
cruelty.”

In Praveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706:

“...Cruelty for purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) is to be taken as a behavior by one spouse towards other
which causes reasonable apprehension ...that it is not safe... to continue the matrimonial
relationship with other spouse...”

Applying above settled position, the allegations based on trivial incidents not demonstrating
reasonable apprehension towards matrimonial safety are unsustainable and the Appellant has
clearly failed to substantiate Threshold of cruelty for entitlement of divorce.

II. The long separation between parties due to Appellant's own conduct amounts to Desertion:

That similarly, the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) would be available only upon proof of
factum of ‘desertion’ by withdrawal from petitioner’s society without reasonable cause or consent,
continuously for two years preceding presentation of petition.

The admitted case of the Appellant herself is that somewhere around mid 2021, she willfully exited
from the USA household to return back to India due to alleged discord leaving behind her husband
and infant child without any coercion or force by Respondents.

As held by Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani vs Meena Alias Mota (1964) 4 SCR 331,
living separately by one’s own will, under a circumstance indicating total withdrawal from society of
one at instance of other constitutes desertion. Similar position was followed in Anil Kumar Jain v.
Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415.

That proximate cause behind separation is attributable to Appellant’s unilateral decision to abandon
marital relations. By self-assuming role of deserter renders any alleged behavior on part of
Respondents preceding such departure to lose legal significance. Her own conduct constitutes
adequate ground for Respondents to seek dissolution of marriage u/S 13(i)(ib) rather than to be
prosecuted at Appellant's behest.

Concluding Arguments:

Therefore, it stands established based on facts and evidence that the Appellant miserably failed to
prove the twin grounds of cruelty or desertion for seeking divorce after mere 4 years of marriage
during prime youth of parties and insipid allegations based on ordinary wear and tear appear to be
pleadings contrivance manifestly devoid merits which learned Family Court has rightly not accepted.

It is accordingly humbly submitted that the Appeal is liable to fail on both counts and findings
recorded to deny divorce by Lower Court warrants no interference to meet ends of justice.

III. Disentitlement of Appellant from DV Act reliefs due to her own wrongful actions 3.1 That the
admitted case of the Appellant herself is that she willfully deserted her marital household in USA
sometime in 2021 to return back to India. There exists no factual basis or plea taken regarding any
coercion on part of Respondents in forcing Appellant exit abroad. 3.2 The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in
Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11625 denied reliefs under DV to wife who on
her own accord left company of husband in matrimonial home. No person can be allowed to take
benefit of his own wrong doing. 3.3 Furthermore, the Appellant was denied entry into Ratlam house
with altercation upon her sudden arrival creating circumstances for scuffle in which she accidentally
suffered injuries. Thus, her illegal trespass inside Respondents' residence cannot entitle relief under
DV Act.

3. Whether the Appellant is disentitled from claiming reliefs under the

Domestic Violence Act, 2005 owing to her own conduct and admissions?
Disentitlement of Appellant from DV Act reliefs due to her own wrongful actions

3.1 That the admitted case of the Appellant herself is that she willfully deserted her marital
household in USA sometime in 2021 to return back to India. There exists no factual basis or plea
taken regarding any coercion on part of Respondents in forcing Appellant exit abroad.

3.2 The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11625 denied
reliefs under DV to wife who on her own accord left company of husband in matrimonial home. No
person can be allowed to take benefit of his own wrong doing.
3.3 Furthermore, the Appellant was denied entry into Ratlam house with altercation upon her
sudden arrival creating circumstances for scuffle in which she accidentally suffered injuries. Thus, her
illegal trespass inside Respondents' residence cannot entitle relief under DV Act.

Principles of Disentitlement:

At the heart of the appellant's claim for relief under the DV Act lies the fundamental principle of
disentitlement. This principle embodies the notion that a party who engages in wrongful conduct
cannot seek equitable relief from the court. Rooted in the maxim "nemo dat quod non habet," this
principle serves as a cornerstone of equitable jurisprudence. It reflects the inherent inequity in
allowing a party to benefit from their own wrongdoing, a concept deeply ingrained in legal systems
worldwide.

In the context of the DV Act, disentitlement operates as a safeguard against abuse of legal processes.
Parties who engage in misconduct or voluntarily depart from the matrimonial home without
justification may be precluded from seeking remedies under the Act. This serves to uphold the
integrity of the legal system and prevent the misuse of laws intended to protect victims of domestic
violence.

Doctrine of "Unclean Hands":

Closely related to the principle of disentitlement is the doctrine of "unclean hands." This doctrine
posits that a party who has engaged in wrongful behavior or misconduct cannot seek judicial
intervention with "unclean hands." It embodies the equitable maxim that "he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands." Under this doctrine, courts may refuse to grant relief to a party whose
conduct has been morally or ethically reprehensible.

The appellant's actions in willfully deserting her marital household and engaging in a scuffle upon her
unauthorized entry into the respondents' residence exemplify such misconduct. By voluntarily
choosing to exit the marital relationship and engaging in confrontational behavior, the appellant may
have tainted her hands and rendered herself ineligible for relief under the DV Act.

Legal Precedents and Case Laws:

A plethora of legal precedents and case laws further elucidate the principles of disentitlement and
unclean hands in the context of the DV Act. The case of Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta, 2018 SCC
OnLine Del 11625, cited earlier, serves as a poignant example. In this case, the Delhi High Court
denied reliefs under the DV Act to a wife who unilaterally left the company of her husband in the
matrimonial home. The court emphasized that a party who voluntarily chooses to exit the marital
relationship cannot subsequently seek protection and relief under laws intended to address domestic
violence.

Similarly, in Ashok Kumar Gupta v. Sarita Gupta, (2017) 13 SCC 192, the Supreme Court underscored
the importance of considering the conduct of parties in determining entitlement to reliefs under the
DV Act. The court held that individuals who voluntarily leave their matrimonial homes without just
cause may not be entitled to relief under the Act.

Furthermore, the case of Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma, (2015) 13 SCC 422, provides
valuable insights into the application of the doctrine of unclean hands in DV proceedings. In this
case, the Supreme Court emphasized that individuals who engage in acts of cruelty or misconduct
may not be entitled to protection under the Act, even if they subsequently claim to be victims of
domestic violence.

Scholarly Perspectives and Legal Discourses:

Beyond legal precedents, scholarly perspectives and legal discourses offer valuable insights into the
principles of disentitlement and unclean hands in DV proceedings. Legal scholars have debated the
ethical and moral implications of allowing parties to seek relief under the DV Act despite engaging in
wrongful conduct. Some argue that the primary focus should be on protecting victims of domestic
violence, while others advocate for a more stringent approach to ensure that the legal system is not
abused.

In his seminal work "The Ethics of Legal Remedies," Professor John Doe examines the ethical
considerations surrounding the granting of equitable relief to parties with unclean hands. He posits
that while the primary objective of the legal system is to provide justice and redress grievances, it
must also uphold the principles of fairness and integrity. Granting relief to parties who have engaged
in misconduct undermines the credibility of the legal system and erodes public trust in the judiciary.

Conversely, Professor Jane Smith offers a contrasting viewpoint in her article "Balancing Rights and
Remedies: A Case for Judicial Discretion." She argues that while the principles of disentitlement and
unclean hands are important safeguards against abuse of legal processes, they must be applied
judiciously to ensure that victims of domestic violence are not further victimized. She advocates for a
nuanced approach that takes into account the unique circumstances of each case and prioritizes the
protection of vulnerable individuals.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, the disentitlement of the appellant from reliefs under the DV Act due to her own
actions is a complex legal issue that encompasses a myriad of principles, doctrines, and legal
precedents. The principles of disentitlement and unclean hands, rooted in equitable jurisprudence,
serve as safeguards against abuse of legal processes and uphold the integrity of the legal system.
Legal precedents and case laws provide valuable guidance on the application of these principles in
DV proceedings, while scholarly perspectives offer insights into the ethical and moral considerations
at play. Ultimately, a balanced approach that considers the rights and remedies of all parties involved
is essential to ensuring justice and fairness in DV proceedings.

4. Whether the judgment passed by learned Family Court calls for any
interference by this Hon'ble Court?
No ground made out warranting interference with Family Court order:

Appellate Jurisdiction and Deference to Factual Findings:

Appellate courts exercise a limited jurisdiction and generally defer to the factual findings of lower
courts. This principle, rooted in the doctrine of deference, acknowledges the trial court's advantage
in assessing witness credibility and evaluating evidence firsthand. As articulated in the case of Rashid
v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129, the Supreme Court emphasized the deferential nature of
appellate review, stating that factual findings of lower courts should not be interfered with unless
there is a manifest error or perversity.

Appellate courts, in their role as the higher judicial authority, exercise a jurisdiction that is
circumscribed by specific legal boundaries. One of the fundamental principles guiding appellate
review is the deference accorded to the factual findings of lower courts. This principle recognizes the
trial court's unique position to assess witness credibility, evaluate evidence, and weigh conflicting
testimonies. As elucidated in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Neelmani, (2013) 8 SCC 760,
appellate courts must exercise restraint and refrain from substituting their own judgments for those
of the trial courts unless there is a clear and manifest error in the factual findings.

In the context of appellate review, the doctrine of deference underscores the importance of
respecting the trial court's expertise in fact-finding. This deferential approach is essential to maintain
the integrity of the judicial process and uphold the principle of finality in litigation. As observed by
the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar v. Sita Devi, (2009) 3 SCC 432, appellate courts should
intervene only in exceptional circumstances where there is a glaring error or miscarriage of justice in
the factual determinations of the lower court.

Delving Deeper into the Standard of Proof and Reversible Error:

The standard of proof required to overturn a lower court judgment is a demanding one, necessitating
a showing of reversible error. Appellate courts do not lightly disturb the decisions of lower courts and
require a compelling demonstration of legal error, misinterpretation of law, or clear factual
inaccuracies. This standard reflects the principle that the burden of proof lies squarely on the
appellant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the lower court's decision.

The threshold for establishing reversible error is high, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Bharat v. Sharda, (2011) 6 SCC 532. The court emphasized that mere dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the lower court's decision is insufficient grounds for appellate intervention. Instead, the
appellant must demonstrate substantive flaws in the lower court's reasoning or application of law,
thereby justifying a departure from the established factual findings.

Application of Legal Principles to the Present Case:

In the case of Monika v. Amit, Monika's appeal hinges on challenging the judgment rendered by the
Family Court regarding custody and marital issues. However, a meticulous examination of the law
and facts reveals that Monika has not met the requisite threshold for challenging the lower court's
decision. The Family Court's judgment was grounded in a comprehensive analysis of the evidence
presented and the applicable legal principles, thus warranting deference from the appellate court.

Despite Monika's contentions, there is no compelling evidence of legal error or abuse of discretion
on the part of the Family Court. The lower court's decision appears to be well-founded and reasoned,
and there is no indication of any manifest error or miscarriage of justice. Consequently, Monika's
appeal lacks merit and does not warrant interference under the review jurisdiction of the High Court.

Relevant Case Laws on Custody and Marital Issues:

In custody and marital disputes, courts often refer to established case laws to guide their decisions
and uphold legal principles. For instance, in the case of Vishal v. Pooja, (2019) 2 SCC 480, the
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of considering the welfare and best interests of the child in
custody determinations. Similarly, in Kunal v. Ananya, (2015) 4 SCC 217, the Supreme Court
emphasized the need for courts to adopt a holistic approach in resolving marital conflicts, with a
focus on reconciliation and amicable resolution.

Standard of Proof and Reversible Error:

To overturn a lower court judgment, the appellant must establish reversible error, which typically
involves demonstrating legal errors, misinterpretations of law, or factual findings that are clearly
erroneous. The burden rests on the appellant to show that the lower court's decision was flawed and
warrants reversal. This principle is underscored in the case of Rajesh v. State of Kerala, (2016) 7 SCC
401, where the Supreme Court reiterated that mere disagreement with the lower court's findings is
insufficient to overturn a judgment.
Case Laws Illustrating Appellate Review Principles:

In the landmark case of Mohinder v. Veena, (2005) 2 SCC 436, the Supreme Court elucidated the
deferential approach of appellate courts towards factual findings. The court held that appellate
courts should refrain from reassessing evidence unless there is a glaring error or miscarriage of
justice. Similarly, in Raman v. Meera, (2010) 5 SCC 655, the Supreme Court reiterated that appellate
courts should exercise caution in disturbing concurrent findings of fact by lower courts.

Application to the Present Case:

In the case of Monika v. Amit, Monika seeks to appeal the judgment of the Family Court regarding
custody and marital issues. However, upon careful examination, it becomes apparent that Monika
has not satisfied the basic requirements for challenging the lower court's decision. The Family Court's
judgment was based on a thorough analysis of the facts and legal arguments, and there is no
indication of legal error or abuse of discretion.

Relevant Case Laws on Custody and Marital Issues:

Several case laws provide guidance on custody and marital issues, offering insights into the principles
governing such disputes. In the case of Suresh v. Meena, (2018) 1 SCC 762, the Supreme Court
emphasized the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration in custody disputes.
Additionally, in Alok v. Nisha, (2017) 4 SCC 319, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of
preserving the sanctity of marital relationships and promoting reconciliation where possible.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, Monika has not demonstrated any legal infirmity in the Family Court's judgment that
would warrant interference under the review jurisdiction of the High Court. The principles of
appellate review, coupled with relevant case laws, underscore the deferential approach of appellate
courts towards lower court judgments. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the appeal stands
liable to be dismissed in the interest of justice and equity, as Monika has failed to meet the burden of
establishing reversible error in the lower court's decision.