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187, JULY 9, 1990 311

Umil vs. Ramos
*
G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
*
G.R. Nos. 84581-82. July 9, 1990.

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs.

GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
respondents.
*
G.R. Nos. 84583-84. July 9, 1990.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs. HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT.
CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 83162. July 9, 1990.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS

CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA.
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 85727. July 9, 1990.

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

_______________

* EN BANC.

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312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN.

ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332. July 9, 1990.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO,
petitioner, vs. THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE
MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila,
P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT.
LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Arrest of a person

without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law.—
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is
recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be
effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Arrest without a warrant is justified when the
person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto.—An arrest without a warrant
of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in
flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an
offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale behind lawful arrests without
warrant stated in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui.—The rationale
behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case
of People vs. Kagui Malasugui thus: “To hold that no criminal can, in any
case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified.—The record of the instant cases
would show that the persons in whose behalf these

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petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained
by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
Criminal Law; Habeas Corpus; Subversion; The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing
crimes.—However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Same; Same; If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
be allowed.—It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered,
criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
be allowed.
Same; Same; No compelling reason to abandon the doctrine laid down
in the case of Ilagan vs. Enrile; As the court stated in Morales Jr. vs. Enrile,
in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of petitioner’s detention.—We find, however, no compelling
reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of
the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed
by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan
case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be,
not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or
not the court which issued the process, judgment or order or of commitment
or

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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue
the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather,
as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for
habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner’s detention—from the moment petitioner was taken into custody
up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition:” and
“only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.” This is exactly what
the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be
done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving
deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts
for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.

CRUZ, J., Dissenting:

Fact that subversion is a continuing offense to justify the arrest

without warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities
say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the
offense is a dangerous doctrine.

FELICIANO, J., Concurring:

There is no obstacle to a careful examination of the doctrine of

continuing crimes as applied to such offenses as subversion and
inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses in some future case
where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:

Warrantless arrest may be exercised only in the most urgent cases

and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident.

CORTÉS, J., Concurring:

I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate concurring statement.

PETITIONS for Habeas Corpus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
 Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino
G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

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Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates
for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No.
86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:

These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the
Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of
issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at
liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in
their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have
not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending
these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
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316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be

arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.”

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a)

and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified
when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the
act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The
rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant,1 was stated by this
Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui thus:

“To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.”

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the
eight (8) petitions is in order.

_______________

1 63 Phil. 221.

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Umil vs. Ramos
 I

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1
February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital
in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found
that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and
CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest
and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with
the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons
in Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal,
Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was
filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and
Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had

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318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The
petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed,
since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in 2favor of an accused in
a criminal case who has been released on bail.
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:

“From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The

_______________

2 Zacarias vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-25899, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 728.

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arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest
or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of
waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them 3 while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be ess justified. x x x”

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for “Double Murder, etc.”
was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17
August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found
guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is
now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus,
the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
4
available to him. For, as held
in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson:

“In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to
him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the
judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if
there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he
could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil
action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire.
It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free
from error.”

_______________

3 Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472, 488-
489.
4 4 Phil. 317, 325.

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Umil vs. Ramos

II

In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia

Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified.
When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque,
upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan
City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation
grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988,
one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had
surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the
operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of
his former comrades as “Ka Mong”, a staff member of the
Communications and Transportation Bureau; “Ka Nelia”, a staff
member in charge of finance; “Ka Miller”, an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; “Ka Ted”, and “Ka Totoy”. He also
pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located
in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United
Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed
under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal
Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the
following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:

a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 &
2605778;

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 321

Umil vs. Ramos

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit

or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give
a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member
of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of
the International Department of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day (12 August
1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily
admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the
CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to “Ka
Mong”, referring to Renato Constantino, and other members of the
rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is
known as “Ka Miller” and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:

(1) Handwritten letter addressed to “Ka Bing & Co. from A &
Co.” dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to “ROD from VIC (Schell
datre)” dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to “Suzie” from “Vic”, dated
August 11, 1988.

Also found in Buenaobra’s possession was a piece of paper

containing a written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M.
Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias “Ka Nelia”, at 69 Geronimo St.,
Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of
Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next
day (13 August 1988). They arrived at

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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

the place at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning. After identifying

themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search
the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a search
in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay
captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of
the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank
deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11
rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live
ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a
result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were
brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that
the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other
occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the
said other occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan
City Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was
filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before
this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At
the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his
desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is
now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains
for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and
Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 323

Umil vs. Ramos

traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed

admitted.5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their
arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier
stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque
was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in
possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.

III

In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of

Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also
justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the
house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive
materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they
had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30
o’clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by
military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their
waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns.
Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to
possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not
produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one
(1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live
ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit
tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live
ammunition of same caliber.

At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as “Ka

_______________

5 Lorenzo vs. Mc Coy, 15 Phil. 559.

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324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

Ted”, and Ramon Casiple as “Ka Totoy” of the CPP, by their

comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other
documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at
Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as
Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully
arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against
them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing
and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued
the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a
Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners’ (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were
unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest,
is without merit. The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition
in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations
filed against them are null and void for want of a preliminary
investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the
Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:

“Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.—When a

person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 325

Umil vs. Ramos

the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a

responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the
time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule.”

The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however,

refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against
them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:

“This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec.
7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe
that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.”

Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the

informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot
now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right
to due process.

IV

In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant,
of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this
case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located
at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the
CPP-NPA. In the

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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny

Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for
a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result,
Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC
Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not
produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the
other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this
Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged
therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and
denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in
flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No
preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested
without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.

V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession
when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were “planted”
by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to
support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or
ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has
been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not
appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for
the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, “there is absolutely
nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners
are on the ‘AFP Order of

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 327

Umil vs. Ramos
6
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.’ ” On the
other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the
petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition,
but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed
to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly
observes:

“x x x. To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,

Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure
conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The
raid at Constantino’s residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing
expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military
surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the
underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results.
To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino
when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions,
as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino
that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably
conducted a ‘stake-out’ operation whereby some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid
and Constantino’s arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s
residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the
military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary
letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to
Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino
and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino’s
place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino’s residence considering that Constantino’s information was
true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under
the circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and search
anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Ca-

_______________

6 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 84583-84, p. 105.

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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

siple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple’s flimsy
and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for
Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to
effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who
provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the
latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque’s telephone number as written
on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra’s possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted
reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events in
question, especially considering that at the time of petitioners’ arrest,
incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and
circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up
to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.”

VI

In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus
of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an
Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
is similarly not warranted.
 The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the
General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at
Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and
operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for
their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister
Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire
his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of
arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner-type jeepney.

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 329

Umil vs. Ramos

He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to

accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and
hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police
District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and
detained. Then, at about 9:00 o’clock of the same morning, he was
brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said
respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter
brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division
of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal7 where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his
liberty.
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the
petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed against him
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully
arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when
arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon
of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National
Press Club.

“Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the
Alliance
8
Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
1988.”

Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press9 Club in

order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. He was
next seen at about 5:00 o’clock that afternoon at a

_______________

7 Petition, Nos. 4 to 8, inclusive.

8 Return of Writ.
9 Exhibit 2.

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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay

Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to
say:

“Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila,
at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto
nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang
10
pagpapalaya sa ating
pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. ” (emphasis supplied)

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November

1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to police
headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of
the Revised Penal Code11
was filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of
Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released
on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as
recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended
bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.

VII

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find

no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally
arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows
that at about 8:30 o’clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T.
Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who
was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning,
Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions in the
killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police
officers, without

_______________

10 Exhibit 1.
11 Exhibit 4.

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 331

Umil vs. Ramos

warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police

headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner’s
guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging
Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing
of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail,
but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10
January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-
accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989,
the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna,
Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989
and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued
a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence
against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law.
Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to
Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively
implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo
Bunye II; and after investigation
12
by the police authorities. As held in
People vs. Ancheta:

“The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a

crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the

_______________

12 68 Phil. 415.

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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to

be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making
the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.”

VIII

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal

charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102,
Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:

“Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears

that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)

At this point, we refer to petitioners’ plea for the Court to reexamine13

and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile,
that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an
information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of
arrest or an order of commitment
14
is issued by the court where said
information has been filed. The petitioners
_______________

13 G.R. No. 70748, Oct. 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.

14 Actually, the requirement in the Ilagan case doctrine that a

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 333

Umil vs. Ramos

claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past
dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no
place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with
the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people.
Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest
and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against
them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is
filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal
information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the
protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands
as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits
lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said
doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court
and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the
Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a
mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process,
judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained
person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the15 case, but rather, as
the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for
habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner’s detention—from the moment petitioner was taken into
custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition;” and “only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself
that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact

_______________

warrant of arrest or order of commitment should be issued even after the

information has been filed against the detained person, would seem superfluous. As
aptly stated in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381, “where a person who has
been legally arrested without a warrant was actually before a court, that court had a
right to proceed against him without in the first place issuing a warrant for his
detention.”
 15 G.R. Nos. 61016 and 61107, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, 563.

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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

been satisfied.” This is exactly what the Court has done in the
petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future
cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except
that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
petitioner’s provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,

Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., See separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., See separate concurring statement.
Sarmiento, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion.
Cortés, J., I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate
concurring statement.

CRUZ, J., Dissenting and Concurring:

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla

v. Enrile that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest
without warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities
say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the
offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested
when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing
his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the
ground that he is committing the “continuing” offense of subversion.
Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed during
the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it
altogether as one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship
and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are
really to reject the past oppression and commit ourselves to the true
freedom. Even if it be argued that the military

335
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Umil vs. Ramos

should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I

maintain that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance
with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy
we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely what we
are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation
should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

FELICIANO, J., Concurring

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated

Petitions for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some
reservations concerning certain statements made by the Court in
G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and
in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam
opinion states categorically that: “the crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.” The majority here relies upon Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there made
the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to
examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping statement.
Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it
regarded as “in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses” (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to
me that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the
Decision), the per curiam opinion has in effect included the offense
of “inciting to sedition” penalized under Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code as a “continuing offense” under the capacious blanket of
the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of
determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court
that “inciting to sedition” is defined in Article 142 of the

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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos
1
Revised Penal Code in terms of speech and that consequently it is
important constantly to distinguish between speech which is
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of
the press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded as
violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely
because speech which the police authorities might regard as
seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be
only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would
submit that we must apply the concept of “continuing offense”
narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Court. In my view, the very broad statement
made about “continuing crimes” in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v.
Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court below for
“double murder, etc.” and found guilty of the offense charged,
sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural,
service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had
already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that
the arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the

_______________

1 Article 142. Inciting to sedition.—The penalty of prision correccional in its

maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite
others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems cartoons, banners, or other representa
tions tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious
words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or
which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202).

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 337

Umil vs. Ramos

Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly necessary,

considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid
information filed with the competent court, which court had
presumably issued an order for his commitment, and considering
further that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of
the doctrine of “continuing crimes” as applied to such offenses as
subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in
some future case where that issue is raised squarely and is
unavoidable.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting Opinion

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in

all eight cases.

G.R. No. 81567

The majority says that Rolando Dural’s arrest without a warrant is

lawful under the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail,
1
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.

“Rolando Dural,” so states the majority, “was arrested for being a

member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed

_______________

1 RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, sec. 5.

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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos
2
subversive organization,” and that “[s]ubversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified
3
as
it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.”
As I said, I beg to differ.
 First, Rolando Dural was charged4 with “Double Murder with
Assault upon Agents of Authority.” If he had been guilty of
subversion—the offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a
warrantless arrest—subversion was the logical crime with which he
should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion
on account of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible
basis for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the
majority points out, “he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
[them]. . .[n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said
5
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.”
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen’s) arrest is
possible in case of subversion—in the absence of any overt act that
would justify the authorities to act. “Subversion,” as the term is
known in law, means “knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts
affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of
any subversive
6
association as defined in sections two and three
hereof. . .” Logically, the military could not have known that Dural,
at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People’s Army
because he was not performing any overt act6 that he was truly, a
rebel. Indeed, it had to take a “verification” before he could be
identified as allegedly a member of the underground army. Under
these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing
subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was guilty of
subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.

_______________

2 Decision, 7.
3 Supra; emphasis in the original.
4 Supra, 6.
5 Supra, 6; emphasis in the original.
6 Exec. Order No. 276, sec. 3; emphasis ours.

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 339

Umil vs. Ramos

“Overt act” is made

7
up of “[e]very act, movement, deed and word of
the [accused],” indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective.
Dural, at the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This
is not the overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided
that the peace officer has “personal knowledge” that he, the suspect,
is guilty. (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in
the act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of
the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a
mere “confidential information.” I do not think that this 8
is the
personal knowledge referred to by the second paragraph. Plainly
and simply, it is hearsay.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one.
By its language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases
and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think
we have here is purely and simply, the military taking the law in its
hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural’s warrantless arrest, I am
afraid that the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all
due respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket
authority to pick up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant
for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a continuing
offense.
That Rolando9 Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People’s Army” is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet
to be established that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist
Party’s military arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and
must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic
because Dural has been convicted and is serving sen-

_______________

7 Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 34 (1944), a treason case.

8 Prior to its amendment, paragraph (b) required merely “reasonable ground” to
justify a warrantless arrest. See RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 113, sec. 6, par. (b).
The amendment was made to stop warrantless arrests based on suspicion and hearsay.
See FERIA, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 20 (1987).
9 Decision, supra, 7.

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340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

tence. I likewise take exception. It has been10 held that: “The writ may
be granted upon a judgment already final.” 11
The writ of liberty is a high
12
prerogative writ. Vindication of due
process is its historic office.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82

In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers 13that he had

“manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade,” for which
habeas corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not
convinced that that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as
moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to
make sure that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and
voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he should prefer
to stay in jail than go scotfree.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra’s 14
petition is one
impressed with a public interest. In one case we denied a motion to
withdraw a petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching
importance to the nation, I do not see how we should act differently,
perhaps even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons
who think and believe differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that
they were ranking officers of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. According to 15the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are
bound by their admissions.

_______________

10 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 684;
see Castro, J., Concurring, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391 (1963).
11 Supra, 683.
12 Supra, 690.
13 Decision, supra. 14.
14 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-35546, 35538, 35539, 35540, 35547, 35556,
35567, 35571, and 35573, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, 247-248, citing among
other cases, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27
SCRA 835 and Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
15 Decision, supra.

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 341

Umil vs. Ramos

That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist

Party of the Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a
naked contention of the military. The fact that it has not been
controverted, in my view, does not justify the couple’s arrest without
a warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military, this
very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a
crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the bone of
contention, precisely, below.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84

I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon

Casiple to be contrary to law. That they are16“admittedly members of
the standing committee of the NUFC” and that “subversive
17
 17
materials” and unlicensed firearms were found in their possession,
are, like Buenaobra’s and Roque’s cases, barren claims of the
military. I also fear that by the majority’s strong language (that
Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the majority has
pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have yet to
sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision
of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of
innocence accused persons enjoy.

G.R. No. 83162

With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am

inclined towards the same conclusion. There was no basis—at the
outset—to say that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession
of firearms. As I have observed, a warrantless arrest must be
predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed
or having been committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less
than a successful fishing expedition conducted by the military upon
an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still
possible under a supposed democracy.

_______________

16 Supra.
17 Supra.

342

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

G.R. No. 85727

Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed
under arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be
picked upon in one’s own home and held moments later without a
warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of
a speech delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club
on November 21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after,
November 22, 1988. Under these circumstances, it eludes me how
an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under paragraph
(a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with
the court, Espiritu’s detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question
is whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in
custody. Under the Rules, an information means “an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal
18
 18
and filed with the court.” It is not, however, an order to keep one
under detention.

G.R. No. 86332

The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held—the fatal

shooting of Romulo Bunye II—was committed on December 14,
1988. It was, however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police
collared a suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to
Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how Nazareno,
under these circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest
without a warrant or the existence of the circumstance described
under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The
crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.

G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;

85727 & 86332; Postscripts

The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of

_______________

18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 4.

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 343

Umil vs. Ramos

what I view as doctrines that have lost their luster:

19
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, which held that
subversion is a continuing offense;
20
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile;

I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of

the fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in
the authorities’ handling of the petitioners’ cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the
present Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant
to due process of law. (“The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which require the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial
21
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable.” Under the 1987 Constitution, not even “[a]22
state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter]. . .”
Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man (“On
these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the President
takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave
peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience,
the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme
mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that,
giving him their own 23
loyalty and without patriotism, the President
will not fail them.” ) Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief
Executive shares, to a24 certain extent, the exercise of emergency
powers, with Congress.
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged
the soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand
up under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it
can withstand scrutiny under the 1987

_______________

19 No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.

20 No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
21 Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, supra, 489.
22 CONST., art. VII, sec. 18.
23 Garcia-Padilla, supra, 501.
24 CONST., supra.

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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umil vs. Ramos

Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-
Padilla 25was handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v.
Enrile, a case that in my view has significantly whittled down
Garcia-Padilla’s very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:

xxx xxx xxx

16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper

complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts
of justice within the time prescribed by law . . .
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason
would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as
amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released
on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he
26
is detained under subsisting
process issued by a competent court.

I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been:
(1) informed of their right to remain27
silent; and (2) to have
competent and independent counsel.
 As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving
claims of the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque,
Añonuevo, and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines—and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact
members of the outlawed organization. The question that has not
been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are
admissible, for purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt,
in the absence of any showing that they were apprised of their
constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the majority. I
am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the
Constitution divests
28
the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused
to habeas corpus.
According to the majority, a “re-examination
29
or re-appraisal . . .
of the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer.” In my consid-

_______________

25 Nos. 61016-7, April 16, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.

26 Supra, 560, 562.
27 CONST., art. III, sec. 12.
28 Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949).
29 Decision, supra, 28.

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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 345

Umil vs. Ramos
30
ered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile does not rightfully belong in the
volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners,
three Davao-based lawyers, were held by virtue of a simple
information (“the petition herein has been rendered moot and
academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for
Rebellion
31
. . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
them” ) without any preliminary investigation (examination) having
been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant). As I
have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that
an information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons
32
have the right of preliminary investigation33
(examination). It forms part and parcel of due34 process of law. I
find the majority’s reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, an ancient (1905)
decision, inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been
served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question
that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid
the accused’s charges that the judge who issued it did not examine
the complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic,
because the accused had already pleaded, and the case had entered
the trial stage.
 The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been
issued. I submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to
freedom by way of the writ of liberty.
xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the
increasing pattern of arrests and detention in the country without the
sanction of a judicial decree. Four years ago at “EDSA”, and many
years before it, although with much fewer of us, we valiantly
challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had

_______________

30 Supra.
31 Supra, 364-365.
32 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra, 384, Teehankee, J., Dissenting.
33 Supra.
34 4 Phil. 316 (March 24, 1905).

346

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human

rights. We set up a popular government, restored its honored
institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the
guideposts of peace and freedom. I feel that with this Court’s ruling,
we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so
painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty
years of struggle against tyranny.
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a
quixotic outlook of Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its
implications on liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me.
Quixotic as they may seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a
strong bias on my part—forged by years of experience and
sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom and justice—
toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this dissent
can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as
a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with
which we not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
Petitions dismissed except G.R. No. 85727.

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