Professional Documents
Culture Documents
a. An order in writing;
b. Issued in the name of the People pf the Philippines Islands;
c. Signed by a judge or a justice of peace;
d. Directed to a peace officer;
e. Commanding him or her to search for personal property; and
f. And to bring it before the court.
Atty. Alo: Nganu dalon sa court? It is not just “search”, but also “seizure”.
So, kwaon.
NB:
Exception:
1. The application may be made before any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed, if the place of the commission
of a crime is known. (Sec. 2(b), Rule 126, Rules of the Court).
2. The application may also be filed before any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced (Sec. 2(c), Rule 126,
Rules of the Court).
Qualification: The application shall be made only in court where the criminal
action is pending, if the criminal action has already been filed (Sec. 2, last
paragraph, Rule 126, Rules of the Court).
Atty.: Remember in our lesson for the Midterms, Territorial Jurisdiction applies
except for crimes like “estafa”, “crimes committed” on a bus, in an aircraft or a ship,
or “cyberlibel”? But the general rule is, where the crime was committed. Are there
any exceptions? Yes. For COMPELLING (valid) reasons. For example, for safety
of undue influence. Those are compelling reasons. (Take note, the court did not
enumerate what these compelling reasons so it will not be used to frustrate justice.
You just have to convince the court that, that is allowed.) If a criminal action has
been filed, then the application of a search warrant should be filed, where it is
pending. There is, however, another exception. It is the “search warrant for heinous
crimes”.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance
of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
These special criminal cases pertain to those “involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.” Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by “the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies.” As in
ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly describe therein the places to
be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court.”
“The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges” are
authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.”
Facts: The petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress
evidence illegally seized. It was contended, among others, that the application fpr search
warrant was filed and the warrant was issued by the RTC of Manila which is a court outside
the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the courts of Angeles City and Porac,
Pampanga where the alleged crime was committed. It was also urged that the application
for search warrant was not personally endorsed by the head of the NBI as required by the
new guidelines as required by A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC.
Held: The cases against petitioners involved a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law of
1972 (R.A. 6425) now R.A. 9165. As such, the application for search warrant may be filed
by the NBI in the City of Manila and the warrant issued may be served outside Manila
pursuant to the guidelines. The Court likewise held that as to the claim that the application
for a warrant was defective for not having been personally endorsed by the head of the
NBI, nothing in the rule prohibits the head of the NBI and of other law enforcement
agencies mentioned from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application to
their assistant heads. Besides, under Sec. 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such
duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with
law. (Connect this with the new rule Now A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC2.)
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
laid down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the
following factors:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not
by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it
are legally just and proper." Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place
to be searched.
1. crime;
2. the object connected to the crime; and that
3. It is in the place to be searched
For example, the crime is “rape”, but you are looking for marijuana. Is that valid?
Of course not, because there is no connection between marijuana and rape. If
you say na the cause if the rape was that the accused was high in marijuana.
Can that be? Of course not. That is too far-fetched. So why? This is in keeping
with the rule that we don’t want the officer to abuse his authority and it basically
becomes a fishing expedition.
The probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or witnesses he may produce and not based on hearsay.
Webb v. De Leo
247 SCRA 65
It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is
concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each requires
a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus one
can exist without the other.
(1) that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity;
(2) and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.
Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in
the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants.
Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused."
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by
the authorities.23 In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 4224 specifically authorized the
taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the
principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class
or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually
be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless
there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such
inference.25
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted.
Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer,
jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the
word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing
the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for
themselves which items in appellant’s residence they believed were "proceeds of the
crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our view, absolutely
impermissible.26
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly
described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those
particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.27 Accordingly, the objects taken
which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.1avvphi1
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or
pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.
People v. Mamaril
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together
with the affidavits submitted.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding
of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.30 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2)
the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in
the form of searching questions and answers.31
Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the
proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge
upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with
application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application covered by that
record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?
Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston
about said transcript?
A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she
told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.
Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of
this case together with the application for search warrant as well as the supporting
affidavit of the said application, but there is no records available to have it with you
and there is no proof with you?
A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room
which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are having
a hard time in scanning the records, sir.
Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said
transcript, Mr. Witness?
A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said
transcript.
Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?
A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using
the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)?
A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the
transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-
54.34 (Underscoring ours)
Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to
prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance
of the search warrant. The records only show the existence of an application35 for a search
warrant and the affidavits36 of the complainant’s witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,37 we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition
is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if
it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge
examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search
Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is
no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the
depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the
record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor
General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of
Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the
records in the latter’s branch when he assumed office.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted
during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who
searched their residence.
We disagree. The cases38 cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In
this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence
was searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in
accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his
counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant
to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally
offered by the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,39 we ruled:
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it
must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
"x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp.1180, 1181)."
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the
search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover,
appellant seasonably objected40 on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence
seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the case,41 after the prosecution formally
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure
cannot validate an invalid warrant.43 In Mata v. Bayona,44 we ruled:
….[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the
legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.’
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of
the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights
secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the
complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant
invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be
used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2),45 Article III of the
Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the
evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the
conviction of appellant.
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for
and seize "an undetermined amount of marijuana," was too general and hence, void for
vagueness. He insists that Abratique could already estimate the amount of marijuana
supposed to be found at appellant’s residence since Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is
issued if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited
drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The OSG points
out that, as the trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact
amount of prohibited drugs that a person has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of marijuana" as used in the
search warrant fails to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 229 of the Constitution that
the things to be seized must be particularly described. Appellant’s contention, in our view,
has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving
the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
seizing the wrong items;30 and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.31 What the
Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or
sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition
to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an
offense.32 However, it is not required that technical precision of description be
required,33 particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no
warrant could issue.34
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as
to create a general warrant.35 Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all
implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use, possession,
or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional.36 A search
warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held
sufficiently particular.37
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of
marijuana" must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant.
Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e.,
marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it
would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and
ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances.38 Thus,
this Court has held that the description "illegally in possession of undetermined
quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized.39
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could
be guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping
statement as said statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he
contends, said warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his
possession and control marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),41 and we find that it is
captioned "For Violation of R.A. 6425, as amended."42 It is clearly stated in the body of the
warrant that "there is probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by
R.A. 7659 has been and is being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of
Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having in his possession
and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of
the aforementioned law."43 In an earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Law is not pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause."44 Appellant’s
averment is, therefore, baseless. Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for
one offense, namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to
exhaustively examine the applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate
should not have swallowed all of Abratique’s statements – – hook, line, and sinker. He points
out that since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the examining
judge should have elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for
squealing on appellant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI operative
who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all by
Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellant’s contention is apparent. The OSG points out
that Abratique personally assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the
latter’s house and to appellant’s rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., Baguio City. Definitely,
this indicates personal knowledge on Abratique’s part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be
eyewitnesses to every crime; they are allowed to present witnesses before an examining
judge. In this case, witness Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the
NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a search warrant but on personal
knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution45 and the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure46 require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
his witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely
routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.47 In the instant case, it is not
disputed that Judge Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin
A. Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique.
Notes of the proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio
City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In the letter of transmittal
of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention
is made of "notes" at "pages 7-11."48 We have thoroughly perused the records of Search
Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find said "notes." The depositions of Lising and
Abratique were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of
Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be
taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.49 The Bill
of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the
records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal,
for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented.50 In
the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required Abratique to confirm the contents
of his affidavit;51 there were instances when Judge Reyes questioned him extensively.52 It is
presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,53 absent a showing to the
contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,54 as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination.55 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No.
415 (7-98) in his motion to quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague
generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of the applicant and his
witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said
witness.56 But it is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and
objections then available, existent or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.57
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lising’s knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in
appellant’s house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had
personal knowledge about said drugs and their particular location. Abratique’s statements to
the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As the NBI’s witness,
Abratique was a person on whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed
description of appellant’s activities with respect to the seized drugs was substantial. In
relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending on casual rumor circulating in
the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the
place to be searched. The OSG points out that the address stated in the warrant is as
specific as can be. The NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by
Abratique, thus ensuring that there would be no mistake.
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended59 and distinguish it from
other places in the community.60 A designation or description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to
it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search
warrant. Appellant fails, however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support
his contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellant’s mother, testified on the search
conducted but she said nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of the NBI
operatives who conducted the search and seizure.61 What the record discloses is that the
warrant was served on appellant,62 who was given time to read it,63 and the search was
witnessed by the barangay officials, police operatives, members of the media, and
appellant’s kith and kin.64 No breakage or other damage to the place searched is shown. No
injuries sustained by appellant, or any witness, appears on record. The execution of the
warrant, in our view, has been orderly and peaceably performed.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and
the application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the
application is so far remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and
the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches,
Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the
following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and
definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the
affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of
observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is
made or the search warrant issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of time
of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant
while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in
the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the
affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of
the offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the
conclusion of establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
Requisite of Description of Place
People v. Chiong
G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998
It does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause,
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to
be searched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place
so described.
Atty.: So you really have to be particular. So for example, we are here in the RM 701,
you cannot search 702, 703… So that again, there’s no fishing expedition.
This is recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, and
by prevailing jurisprudence. In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest
must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.
Atty.: This presupposes, class, that the person being searched was arrested
lawfully. He may be arrested in flagrante delicto. He can be searched, but only
within the premises within his immediate control.
Atty.: So if Ms. Ratunil was arrested. You can only search the desks around her.
Within arm’s length. There is no specific criteria, but as long as it is within the reach
of the accused to get a weapon or to start destroying evidence.
Atty.: So kung nadakpan sa sala and the kitchen is on the other side of the house,
you don’t search the kitchen. Of course, you will need a search warrant for that.
You cannot say that was a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Atty.: I you have studied Terry Search, medyo kuyaw jud ang Terry Search.
Why? If a police officer has just a reasonable belief, not even probable cause,
a reasonable belief based on genuine reason, that in light of his experience
and the surrounding circumstances a crime has either taken place is about to
take place and that the person is armed and dangerous.
For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances,
as personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to
suspect that a person is committing an illicit act.
A “stop and frisk” situation, also known as the Terry search, refers to a case in
which a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously for the
purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior, in line with the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection.128 The objective of a stop and frisk
search is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information. A basic criterion is that the police officers, with their personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. The
concept of “suspiciousness” must be present in the situation in which the police
officers find themselves in.
The court held that, while investigating suspicious behavior, an officer may lawfully
pat down the outer clothing of someone they reasonably believe to be armed and
dangerous. A pat down aims to discover weapons that the person can use to
assault the officer or someone nearby. In other words, the objective is to ensure
officer safety.
Atty.: Outer clothing lang ang pag pat-down. It must not be intrusive.
While the officer doesn't need probable cause to stop you, they must
have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot. In addition,
they can only frisk you if they reasonably believe you are armed and
dangerous.
Any contraband officers find during the weapons pat-down, such as illegal
drugs, can usually be used against you in court, but it will depend on the
circumstances. For example, if an officer feels a hard container in which a
weapon could reasonably be stored, the officer would be permitted to
open it to ensure a gun was not inside. If drugs were found when the
container was opened, they would likely be admissible because a weapon
could reasonably have been found in the container.
The point of a Terry stop is to ensure officer and public safety and to hold
evidence discovered while frisking for weapons inadmissible would not
deter police misconduct.
The officer must be able to articulate the training and experience they
have which caused them to immediately, upon a plain feel, know that they
likely had discovered packaged drugs.
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
• Search Incidental to Arrest v. Stop and Frisk
People v. Bagista
G.R. No. 86218 September 18, 1992
REQUISITE. — This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable
or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
Atty.: It is limited to visual search. Not unless the contraband was caught in
plainview.
People v. Manago
[ G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019 ]
We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless
searches and seizures admit of some exceptions. One such exception relates to
arrests, searches and seizures made at a police checkpoint. Indeed, routine
inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if
the inspections are limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on the public fair grounds; (b)
simply looks inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its
doors; (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or
body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or
visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.12
Miclat v. People
Atty.:.You have to be familiar with the terms. Not necessarily the whole case.
But if dili jud madomdoman, kani na lang tulo: valid intrusion, inadvertent
discovery, and immediately apparent.
3. Immediately apparent
Atty.: It should be obvious. That’s why drugs could be tricky kay what
if gusulod ang drugs sa di proper na container? It can look like sugar
salt and sugar at the same time.
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely
that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus
exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.62
(Sa Riano naa pay Canine/Dog sniff test and Use of thermal imaging
device)
Admittedly, the absence of a search warrant was not squarely put into issue.
Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to delve into the legality of the raid due to
the gravity of the offense involved. The Court then analyzed the context, taking
into consideration the following facts: (1) the raid was precipitated by
intelligence reports and surveillance on the ongoing rebel activities in the
building; (2) the presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives in a automobile sales office could not be justified; (3) there was an
ongoing chaos at that time because of the simultaneous and intense firing
within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was
under attack by rebel forces; and (4) the courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
The Court ruled that the “case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently
more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court
was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.”
PACR Notes on Criminal Procedure Atty. Kyle Joesph Alo 2023-2024
LANDMARK CASE
People v. Sapla G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020 (an update overturning
Maspil and Baagista)
*read this text in full*
In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants
cannot produce probable cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive reliance on information
tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly
amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."70
As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise would be to sanction
frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be
initiated by sly informants."71
And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, through former Chief Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin, promulgated its Decision in People v. Gardon-Mentoy72 (Gardon-Mentoy). In the
said case, police officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay
Malatgao, Narra, Palawan based on a tip from an unidentified informant that the accused-
appellant would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually, the
authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van matching the description obtained from
the informant and conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, yielding the discovery of a
block-shaped bundle containing marijuana.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable cause, the Court
held that a tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion
coming from the personal knowledge of the searching officers, was not yet actionable for
purposes of conducting a search:
Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers'
suspicion about the block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give
unquestioned acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of
the officers concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose
duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of
probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's
determination of probable cause when none exists."
Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to
the doctrine that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender
probable cause that permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a
visual search - which include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should
be the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.
Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein,
on the sheer basis of an unverified information passed along by an alleged informant, the
authorities are given the unbridled license to undertake extensive and highly intrusive
This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in People v. Montilla.102 In holding that law and
jurisprudence require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches, former Chief Justice
Panganiban explained that allowing warrantless searches and seizures based on tipped
information alone places the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures in great jeopardy:
It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless
searches and seizures on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips.
Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated
information to the police. Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and
easily harass and intimidate another by simply giving false information to the police, allowing
the latter to invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis of a
bogus tip.
On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the
infiltration of a citizen's vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely
claiming that raw intelligence was received, even if there really was no such information
received or if the information received was fabricated.
Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against unreasonable search and
seizure will be at the mercy a phony tips. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures will
be rendered hollow and meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of the Bill of Rights.
Bail is discretionary/
2. Bail Hearing
3. When Bail is not necessary
4. Where can you file Bail?
a. What is the general rule?
b. What are the exceptions?
5. Is it possible to post bail even if it is not a matter of, right?
6. Is it about a crime being heinous or is it about the penalty?