Case Comment – Vikas Yadav vs State of UP

FACTS:

In the early hours of February 17, 2002, Vikas Yadav and his cousin Vishal kidnapped and
brutally murdered 25-year-old Nitish Katara, an MBA graduate and the son of an IAS officer.
Nitish Katara's body was found charred and hammered beyond recognition on February 20,
2002, near Hapur crossing in Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh, 80 km away from the wedding
venue. The motive behind the murder was Nitish Katara's relationship with Vikas's sister
Bharti Yadav. The perpetrators enlisted the help of a contract killer, Sukhdev Pehalwan, to
carry out the crime.

CHARGES LEVIED:

- Section 302 – Murder

- Section 364 – Kidnapping or abducting to murder
- Section 201 – Causing disappearance of evidence or giving false information
- Section 34 – Common intention

TRIAL HISTORY:

The Trial Court categorized Nitish's murder as an honor killing due to family disapproval.
Vikas, Vishal, and Sukhdev were found guilty and received a life sentence on May 30, 2008,
under Section 302/364/201 read with Section 34 IPC. The High Court declined to award the
death penalty, citing it didn't fall under the "rarest of rare category," promising "adequate
punishment." On October 3, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled Vikas and Vishal to serve 25
years each, and Sukhdev 20 years.

SENTENCING:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's sentences but modified the stipulation that Vikas
and Vishal's sentences would run concurrently, not consecutively. The court rejected altering
the sentence order and directed the Section 201/34 IPC sentences to run concurrently with
others.

ISSUES:

1. Justification for concurrent sentencing of 25 years for murder (Section 302) and 5 years for
causing disappearance of evidence (Section 201) – impact of Section 433-A of CrPC and
clemency option.
2. The Supreme Court's assessment of the High Court's sentencing – whether it was right to
commute the death sentence imposed by the trial court.

ARGUMENTS:

The appellant argued that fixing a term is impermissible, violating Article 21. Referring to
Swamy Shraddhananda, the court cannot impose a sentence not sanctioned by law.

REASONING OF THE COURT:

1. Death Penalty Jurisprudence:
- The court referred to Swamy Shraddhanand, emphasizing the need for an expanded
sentencing option between life imprisonment and death penalty.

the court also justifies it position by telling that the sentencing can be given above the
remission period to take care of the public interest where it finds the crime case to be not in
the rarest of the rare category and too heinous enough to have the person let off via remission
post 14 years.

reproducing the para 92 of the vikas Yadav case – the court states :

92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different angle. The issue of sentencing has
two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly
disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes to this Court carrying a death
sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find, as
in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may
feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But at the same time, having regard
to the nature of the crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment
subject to remission normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly
disproportionate and inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the Court’s option is
limited only to two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and
purposes, of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court may feel tempted and find
itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A
far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over
what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14 years’
imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasised that the Court would take recourse to
the expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years’
imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.

- The court has the discretion to impose a sentence beyond the remission period for crimes
not falling under the rarest of the rare category.

2. Reformation of Prisoner:
- Referring to Bachan Singh, the court considered the probability of reform and
rehabilitation.
- The court highlighted the duty to award a proper sentence, balancing societal needs and
reintegration of convicts.
- The court cited the importance of recognizing the rights of prisoners, emphasizing the
right to life under Article 21.

3. Factors Influencing Sentencing:

- The court criticized the prosecution for not producing available DNA evidence.
- Mere pendency of criminal cases against a convict should not influence sentencing.
- The court underscored the obligation of the state to rehabilitate prisoners.

At the same time, the Court, acknowledging the reformative approach in criminology in the
context of grant of parole, in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan[13] observed:
“17. … The theory of criminology, which is largely accepted, underlines that the main
objectives which a State intends to achieve by punishing the culprit are: deterrence,
prevention, retribution and reformation. When we recognise reformation as one of the
objectives, it provides justification for letting of even the life convicts for short periods, on
parole, in order to afford opportunities to such convicts not only to solve their personal and
family problems but also to maintain their links with the society. Another objective which
this theory underlines is that even such convicts have right to breathe fresh air, albeit for (sic
short) periods. These gestures on the part of the State, along with other measures, go a long
way for redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners. They are ultimately aimed for the
good of the society and, therefore, are in public interest.”

It is, further, a settled law that it is a duty of every court to award proper sentence to a
convict, having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was committed.
In fact, while granting sanctions, law prescribes that the courts must be mindful of the fact
that such penalties are adequate, just and proportionate with the gravity and nature of the
crime. Refer to Wali Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 979, para
15.However, at the same time, the courts have consistently cautioned that while awarding
sanctions, “circumstances of the accused are also required to be kept in mind … as one of the
objects of the criminal justice system is to rehabilitate the transgressors and the criminals”.
Therefore, seen in this perspective, though, the motivating force behind grant of sanction
primarily seems to be a mode of setting an example for the potential offender(s), however,
while sanctioning a perpetrator of offence, the rights of rehabilitation and a possibility of
acceptance of a convict, back into the society (on conclusion of such penalty) cannot be done
away with. Accordingly, it is quite understandable as to why modern day penology
emphasises on devising a fine balance between societal need and reintegration of a released
convict. In the words of Elizabeth Fry, “Punishment is not for revenge, but to lessen crime
and reform the criminal.”

Indian courts have time and again, reiterated the importance of assuring basic human rights to
even convicts and prisoners. In fact, the Supreme Court has determinedly resolved:

“22. Right to life is one of the basic human rights. It is guaranteed to every person by Article
21 of the Constitution and not even the State has the authority to violate that right. A
prisoner, be he a convict or undertrial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even
when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his fundamental rights including the right to
life guaranteed to him under the Constitution.”

the courts responsibility does not end post conviction – rehabilitation is also a work of the
state.

It is, further, a settled law that it is a duty of every court to award proper sentence to a
convict, having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was committed.
In fact, while granting sanctions, law prescribes that the courts must be mindful of the fact
that such penalties are adequate, just and proportionate with the gravity and nature of the
crime. Refer to Wali Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 979, para
15.However, at the same time, the courts have consistently cautioned that while awarding
sanctions, “circumstances of the accused are also required to be kept in mind … as one of the
objects of the criminal justice system is to rehabilitate the transgressors and the criminals”.
Therefore, seen in this perspective, though, the motivating force behind grant of sanction
primarily seems to be a mode of setting an example for the potential offender(s), however,
while sanctioning a perpetrator of offence, the rights of rehabilitation and a possibility of
acceptance of a convict, back into the society (on conclusion of such penalty) cannot be done
away with. Accordingly, it is quite understandable as to why modern day penology
emphasises on devising a fine balance between societal need and reintegration of a released
convict. In the words of Elizabeth Fry, “Punishment is not for revenge, but to lessen crime
and reform the criminal.”

Indian courts have time and again, reiterated the importance of assuring basic human rights to
even convicts and prisoners. In fact, the Supreme Court[State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna
Reddy, (2000) 5 SCC 712, 723.] has determinedly resolved:

“22. Right to life is one of the basic human rights. It is guaranteed to every person by Article
21 of the Constitution and not even the State has the authority to violate that right. A
prisoner, be he a convict or undertrial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even
when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his fundamental rights including the right to
life guaranteed to him under the Constitution.”

This Court in Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, (1964) 7 SCR 676, has observed to the effect
that the Probation of Offenders Act, was enacted with a view to provide for the release of
offenders of certain categories on probation or alter due admonition and for matters
connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent the conversion of offenders into
obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals. The above object
is in consonance with the present trend in the field of penology, according to which, efforts
should be made to bring about correction and reformation of the individual offenders and not
to resort to retributive justice. Although, not much can be done for hardened criminals,
considerable stress has been laid on bringing about reform of offenders not guilty of serious
offences and of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory
recognition to the above objective. It is, therefore, provided that offenders should not be sent
to jail, except in certain circumstances.

As someone, Stuart Turton. once rightly remarked, “ … bars can’t build better men and
misery can only break what goodness remains.” Therefore, the endeavour of every welfare
State must be to make attempts to eschew any form of penalties, which brand
individuals/convicts permanently and beyond all possibilities of repair. The State must further
endeavour to eradicate prejudices of past conviction and to provide avenues for rehabilitation
to released convicts. At the same time, it is for the society to dissuade from labelling and
classifying convicts/released convicts by their preceding deeds.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court, in Vikas Yadav vs State of UP, established a nuanced approach to
sentencing, emphasizing the need for expanded options between life imprisonment and the
death penalty. The court's reasoning focused on human rights, reformation, and societal
rehabilitation, setting a precedent for balancing punishment and redemption in the criminal
justice system.