International Journal of Ethics ISSN 1535-4776 Volume 3 Number 4, pp. 429-442 © 2004 Nova Science Publishers, Inc. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPORT: NTRINSIC VALUES AND INHERENT WORTH Yotam Lurie” Department of Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Beer-Sheva, 84105. ISRAEL ABSTRACT The paper sheds light on what it means to claim that sport is a valuable and worthwhile human endeavor. Is human life richer and fuller (due to the fact that sport is a part of it) than it would have been otherwise? We often use the notion of inherent worth to convey this idea. The notion of inherent worth is used in contrast with the axiological notions of extrinsic value and intrinsic value. Some people value sport for its extrinsic benefits. Other people might participate in sport and value it for certain intrinsic values. This familiar distinction between the extrinsic and the intrinsic value of sport is not sufficient in order to deal with the question whether or not it is an important and worthwhile human endeavor. As an alternative, I flesh ‘out the notion of inherent worth by distinguishing between “ways of life” and “forms of life.” There are different ways people can manage and organize their lives: one can choose between being a carpenter, a lawyer or an athlete; just as one can choose between being a parent or a spinster. These are different yet equal ways of life. The socio-cultural institution of sport, on the other hand, is of a different category. It is a form of life, and like many other forms of life, it should be understood as having inherent worth, i.e., it has value in and of itself in the sense that life would be poorer and impoverished without it. Key words: Axiology, Forms of Life, Inherent Worth, Intrinsic Value, Sport Philosophy, and Wittgenstein INTRODUCTION: JUSTIFYING THE VALUE OF SPORT WITHIN A LIBERAL TRADITION Many discussions in the Philosophy of Sport are based in the field of axiology and are devoted to topics drawn from applied ethics. Those who partake in them strive to disclose and solve ethical problems and to resolve practical and moral dilemmas. They focus on such issues as the use of drugs, the effect of violence, the relevance of equal opportunity and other ethical issues, as they are manifested in sport. This paper is also based in the field of axiology Address for correspondence: Yotam Lurie, Address: Department of Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O, Box 653, Beer-Sheva, 84105. ISRAEL. E-mail: yotam@bgumail.bgu.ac il, Tel: 972-8-647-2679, Fax: 972-8-647-7697430 Yotam Lurie and deals with the ethics of sport, but its slant and purpose are different. Rather than focus on various values that underlie sport activities, it looks at the value or the importance of sport per-se, examining the value of the very practice of sport as a human activity. In seeking to disclose the value of sport as a practice, I am aware, of course, that sport is not one thing. We regard all sorts of activities as sport, some of which, like baseball and football are games that are conducted according to strict rules, and some of which, like jumping, hurling objects, and running, can be solitary activities that are not themselves games and involve hardly any rules at all. A very wide conception of sport can bring under the heading of “sport” games of bridge, chess tournaments and possibly even Russian Roulette. A narrower conception of sport would allow for activities based on physical skills, which are neither part of the crafts or the arts (Suits, 1995, p. 8-15). Recalling Wittgenstein’s remarks about the concept of a game having no common essence, sport is a family resemblance concept, allowing for all sorts of different activities to be considered a “sport,” without their sharing a common essence. Thus, given that we know how to tell sport activities from other kinds of activities, and given that we know how to differentiate sport activities involving physical skills from other physical activities that are not sport, we can go on from there to ask whether, other things being equal, sport is a valuable and worthy activity for human beings to engage in? To help answer this question I want to focus on what I take to be the kernel from which the concept of sport grows into its mature and expanded form in our culture. The kernel is a skilled physical activity involving a kind of play. It is this kernel in the concept of sport, which in time sprouts into more claborate rule following practices, such as games of football and gymnastic competitions. It is also this kernel in the concept of sport that renders a physical activity such as running into a sport in one context, as when competing or when jogging for either health or pleasure, and not a sport at all, as when trying to escape from a blazing forest fire. I want to focus on this kernel in the concept of sport by asking whether by constituting such an activity sport is also a valuable and worthy activity? Certainly sport lovers think so. Believing in its importance and value, many sport lovers are virtual missionaries in the service of their favorite sport. They ‘preach’ their truth to members of their family, neighbors and friends, seeking to convince people around them to join in. Indeed, from their perspective they are right: Their favorite sport is indeed an important, valuable and worthwhile activity for them. Their commitment and love for their sport sheds light on certain important features in our human psychology and our cultures, attesting to some of the things that we human beings value. It does not, however, provide a very telling philosophical claim with respect to the value of sport per-se. It is too restricted to the psychological context of describing what sport-lovers personally cherish and value. The leap from this personal context to the claim that sport has value in its own right extends far beyond the point made and is, therefore, not supported by all the enthusiasm for sport that its missionaries espouse. Although there scems to be something important about what the sport missionary is trying to say with respect to the significance of sport and why people should value it, nonetheless the fact that a person’s preferred sport is important and valuable to hinvher as an individual does not entail that it is a valuable and worthwhile human endeavor in its own right. In asking whether sport is a worthy and valuable activity, I am not asking only about the value of sport for a particular individual or about its value within a given culture; I am asking about the value of the practice of sport in general: Should it be valued by human beings?The Significance of Sport: Intrinsic Values and Inherent Worth 431 Granted that some people value sport and some do not, is this activity very different from an ethical point of view from, say, stamp collecting? Are those who refrain from participating in sport or those who disdain the very idea of sport missing out on something of value? Is sport a valuable and worthwhile human endeavor, such that it contributes to the value of a human life experienced? In posing this last question | am asking whether human life is somehow richer and fuller (due to the fact that sport is a part of it) than it would have been otherwise? ‘One way of considering our answer to such a question is to dwell on what human life would be like without the practice of sport, or on what it would be like if sport was considered demeaning or unworthy of cultured human beings. Would human life be less worthwhile and less rich than it could be with the exclusion of sport as a valuable part of it? One reason for the current difficulty in dealing with the question of the value of sport is our shared liberal tradition regarding values. The modern liberal ideology is based on cultural pluralism, dismissing the idea that one “way of life” is better or worthier than any other. Liberals claim that people should have the freedom to choose among different “ways of life” through which they can pursue their happiness, as long as they do not infringe on the rights of others and do not violate our shared moral code. The different ways of life people value are linked with different points of view that people have regarding their personal happiness. Some choose to be lawyers, some decide to be doctors, while others prefer to be teachers; some like soccer while some prefer basketball; some prefer city life, while others want to live in the country. According to liberal ideology, these supposedly different ways of life cannot be compared and ranked in ethical terms. That is to say that their value resides only in how they are valued by different people, approaching the issue from different points of view. As they are valued differently by different people, the question, which of them is better or worthier, is moot. Within the public arena, they should have equal status, so as to ensure that people are provided equal opportunity to pursue their preferred way of life. There is no single preferred path for human life. Hence, to follow through on this argument, if our cultures in general or any individual in particular were to choose to give up sport altogether, then this would merely be their choice of a certain cultural way of life. Such decisions cannot be assessed ethically as the practice of sport itself is devoid of moral consequences. From an ethical standpoint not partaking in it is no different from giving up many other practices, such as witchcraft and astrology, which are no longer deemed relevant by most people in the modern age, or not engaging in such practices as stamp collecting, which some people value but which we do not regard as an essential part of what leads to a valuable and worthwhile human life. To ask whether sport is a valuable practice is already to go against the grain of this shared liberal ideology. For it is to try to reflect on sport from within certain ethical concepts that transcend personal points of view. Two such concepts have been brought to bear on this question in recent discussions with the aim of soliciting a positive response. One is that of intrinsic value, and the other is that of inherent worth. | first argue in this paper that the idea of intrinsic value is insufficient to show that sport, as a practice, is valuable. I then flesh out the idea of inherent worth, showing how it can be used to justify the claim that sport is a valuable human practice.432 Yotam Lurie EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC VALUES The value of sport is often discussed within the philosophy of sport literature through the distinction drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic value (Amold, 1997, 12-21; Kretchmar, 1994, pp. 137-176). Scott Kretchmar, for example, devotes a large portion of his book, titled Practical Philosophy of Sport, to developing and articulating the intricacies of this fine distinction, discussing what it means for a person to take sport one way or the other. He discusses both the extemal benefits as well as the intrinsic values of sport, showing that they are related to some combination of either fitness, knowledge, development of motor skills or pleasure (Kretchmar, 1994, pp. 137-176). However, since Kretchmar’s book aims at providing what he calls “a practical conception of the values of sport,” he refuses to take this issue beyond the scope of why a particular individual values sport. Peter Arnold also appeals to the notion of extrinsic and intrinsic value when discussing the value of sport. He takes a more communitarian point of view and argues that sport is a justified and worthwhile human practice because it has intrinsic values: “If sport is to be taught and justified as a form of education,” he writes, “it should be pursued for its own intrinsic worth rather than for those extrinsic values or purposes often associated with i (Amold, 1997, p.1). Arnold goes on to explain sport's “own intrinsic worth” by appealing to the MacInterian notion of a practice. Thus he argues, “sport, like science or medicine, is a particular type of practice that has its own integrity and is governed by its rules and ethos. Such practices are, of course, open to abuse but essentially they are distinctive forms of worthwhile life” (Amold, 1997, p.12). Why? On what grounds does Arnold claim that these are “forms of worthwhile life”? The notion of intrinsic value, to which Amold appeals, cannot establish such a claim. The fact that a practice has certain intrinsic values does not entail that it is a worthwhile and valuable activity. Witch buming and astrology were clearly well established practices in their time. They were rule-governed activities with a certain ethics, and as such were underlain by certain intrinsic values. Nonetheless, they were not “forms of worthwhile life” or valuable practices. Eventually the first was abandoned by our culture, and the second was relegated to a more minor position. I want to take a closer look at this distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic values before I go on to explain why it is insufficient for my purpose, which is to see if a rational argument can be given as to why sport is a valuable practice. The first thing that should be noted about this distinction regarding different kinds of values is that it is somewhat different from the distinction between values as ends and means. The latter distinction is older. In Book II of the Republic (357-358), Plato uses it by drawing a distinction between things that are valued for their “own sake”, as the goals of our actions, in contrast with things that are valued merely for the benefit we derive from them as means for attaining other things. Joy, pleasure and happiness are mentioned as things that are valued for their own sake. Money is mentioned as an example of something that has value only as a means for attaining other things that are desired. A third category of things that have value, which is mentioned by the participants in Plato’s discussion, is that of things that are of value both as ends and as means, such as justice. The problem set up for Socrates there, which is the point of embarkation on his attempt to conceive of a utopia in the guise of the most perfect state, is to show that justice deed of such a dual nature: that it is valuable both as an end and as a means. isThe Significance of Sport: Intrinsic Values and Inherent Worth 433 Plato was a metaphysician. He believed that various things in the world, by their very nature, belong to one of these categories. However the distinction between things valued as ends and thing valued as means docs not depend on Platonic metaphysies. It is grounded in our very concept of the ends-of-desire, as well as in our ancient teleological conception of nature, according to which things change and develop toward a goal that is part of their specific natures. Human beings who reflect on values from within the framework of a liberal ideology have a difficulty approaching values from this teleological conception of nature and its metaphysical perspective of values. They have a more subjective outlook on values. For them the value attributed to things has to do with how and why they are desired by particular individuals and is not inherent in the nature of the thing. This conception of values often embodies a certain form of psychological reductionism of our moral vocabulary to the ends of desire (Hume, 1978; Stevenson, 1963). Metaphysical teleology as a basis for ethics is thus rendered into psychologism of values as a basis for a liberal ethos, and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is used within this ideological framework. The liberal would thus argue that something like having a beautiful body, for example, could be an intrinsic value for some, who simply gains satisfaction from knowing that they look good; it is an extrinsic value for others, who need their beautiful body in order to make money; and it can have both extrinsic and intrinsic value for others. These are different, yet equally valuable points of view, both of which are grounded in personal choice. Arguing in this vein, it may be claimed that some people might participate in sport and value its intrinsic values. For them, excelling in their preferred sport is a goal in-itself: the end of their desire. Although the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is useful, it has been used, understood and elucidated by philosophers in four related ways (Taylor, 1975, p. 115): (1) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it is sought for its own sake, or desired as an end in-itself. (2) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that its value must depend solely upon the intrinsic—that is, roughly, non-rclational - properties of the object. Its value is due to its nature, rather than to its consequences or relation to other things. (3) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that its value is a non-natural objective property belonging to it (4) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that its value is non-derivative The connection between these different conceptions of intrinsic value is not an easy issue to resolve. The first of these four conceptions of intrinsic value is more related to a liberal ideology than the other three. The latter three are more ambiguous. It is a substantive issue whether value as an end in-itself depends solely upon intrinsic properties (Kegan, 1998, p. 277-297). So far, however, the discussion has focused on the formal features of the concept. What might fill this concept with content? That is, what sorts of things have intrinsic value? Traditionally, philosophers have gone in at least three directions in answering this question. Some philosophers of a more consequential bend have sought to identify a particular goal or state, such as pleasure or happiness, as the end product towards which we strive and towards which we should strive, lending pleasure and happiness an intrinsic value. Thus, in this context, sport might have intrinsic value if it is necessarily linked to our pleasure. Kantians have been known to argue that only moral values have intrinsic value in the sense of being434 Yotam Lurie good in themselves in unqualified terms. Consequentially, for a Kantian sport can have intrinsic value if it demonstrates moral values. Both of these answers have less relevance when assessing the value of sport than the third answer, which I believe is the most applicable to sport. Aristotelians, like MacIntyre, have tried to be somewhat more pluralistic with respect to what can have intrinsic value. MacIntyre argues that different practices have different intrinsic values, and that these values are internal to the practice. He claims that “Practices such as architecture, farming and physics, are coherent and complex forms of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to the practice are realized” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 190). Thus, to use a Platonic example, diligence, attentiveness and care are values that are internal to the practice of carpentry. Working diligently, attentively and with care is of value to carpenters not merely because these qualities help them achieve some external goal, but because of the nature of the practice of carpentry. Carpenters who do not work in this manner do not fulfill the values of their trade, and may be judged as bad carpenters. What's more, one just cannot be a really good carpenter without these qualities, just as a knife is not a good knife, unless it is sharp enough to cut. Why should parents care for their children? One would hope that they do so not merely for extrinsic benefits, such as to receive more social security allowances from the Government or to be adored by family and friends, but because they are parents: That is, because of the nature of their natural role as parents and the social activities that are an intrinsic part of it. Taking care of their children is part of what makes people into good parents. THE AXIOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE What should be noted is that the MacIntyrian idea of a practice having intrinsic values is not sufficient to support the claim that the practice itself is of intrinsic value. Indeed, this is the point where our liberal tradition blocks the move. It suggests that many practices have intrinsic values, and many are such that those who practice them value them for their own sake. Nonetheless, a person has a right to refuse to partake in them and a right to dismiss them as of no value to him or her. Intrinsic values are internal to a particular practice and are assessed in the context of a particular practice. Thus the claim that sport has intrinsic values only indicates that sport is a value-laden practice, not that it is a valuable practice in its own right. At most it might establish that those who partake in it for its intrinsic values, value it as an end in itself - for them. The intrinsic values of sport, like the values intrinsic to carpentry and prostitution, whatever these might be, are important only to those individuals who have already joined into this practice and seck to pursue it according to its internal values; such values are the conceptual foundation for athletics, carpentry and prostitution. They do not justify these practices themselves and they do not provide us with the conceptual tools to argue that the practice per-se has intrinsic value. To see the point of my argument and why the concept of intrinsic value cannot do the job for which it is sought, compare two types of athletes. Both business-Jeff and sporty-John are successful high jumpers, training hard and trying to improve. However, when pushed on the issue of why they jump and what’s good about high jumping they provide very differentThe Significance of Sport: Intrinsic Values and Inherent Worth 435 stories. Business-Jeff jumps and competes because he believes that this is the way to fame and fortune through commercial promotions. For him high jumping has only extrinsic value. He views jumping in particular and sport in general as a business venture. Sporty-John, on the other hand, couldn’t care less about these external benefits and merely wants to be the best high jumper he can possibly be. Both are serious high jumpers, well aware of the intrinsic values of the sport. Both adhere to them. The first does so for the sake of money, the second because he cherishes the sport itself and the values that underlie. But in both cases the practice is rendered valuable only because it is desired by its practitioners - albeit for different reasons. To sharpen the argument and bring it up one level, in axiological discussion one could argue that within the broad context of a liberal community, there are indeed certain practices that are somehow fundamental to the community and thus might have intrinsic value. Practices such as education as well as learning how to engage in a dialogue are essential for the cultivation of the kind of individuals who are citizens capable of participating in the political and social life of a liberal community. It could, therefore, be argued that practices such as education and dialogue are practices that have intrinsic value within the social and political context of a liberal community. Sport, however, is most likely not one of the practices necessary for the cultivation of such individuals and hence the context of a liberal community cannot serve as a context for assessing the practice of sport. The point I have been arguing for can be summed up as comprised of two claims. First, the fact that a certain practice has intrinsic values does not entail that the practice itself is of intrinsic value. There is a fine distinction between elements of the practice and the practice per-se, and one should beware of committing the fallacy of composition by which we infer from what we know of the parts to the whole. This conceptual point can be fleshed out at the normative level by suggesting that although a practice such as, for example, witchcraft may have certain intrinsic values associated with it, the practice itself is indefensible and lacks intrinsic value as it is morally repulsive and only fosters hate, fear and superstition. Second, no doubt a practice might have intrinsic value for a particular individual, but it does not follow that it is a valuable and worthwhile activity. For example, spending one’s time by gazing at mindless sitcoms is pleasant and painless and might have at least modest intrinsic credentials for certain individuals in particular situations. It is not morally repulsive, but yet it is not in itself a worthwhile activity. To further flesh out the insights of these two claims, consider the following hypothetical scenarios: (1) Imagine a culture, not so different from our own, in which people achieve all the extrinsic benefits of sport through chemical and other artificial means. If a person from this culture were to claim that s/he tried various sports and decided that “it is totally worthless and not for me,” is there room to dispute the claim? Might the person be missing out on something important and valuable to a human life? (2) Imagine that you are meeting with provost of your college or the principal of your child’s school: The provostprincipal has recently decided that it is not worth investing in sport education. Is there a philosophical argument why the decision is wrong? Attesting to the intrinsic values of the practice or to the fact that it has intrinsic value to you is not sufficient.436 Yotam Lurie The literature offers potentially compelling responses to these kinds of scenarios. For instance, Fraleigh is known for arguing that sport permits the acquisition of sport-specific “knowledge of relative ability to move mass in space and time” (Fraleigh, 1984, pp 93-106). Simon, to cite another example, says that sport is a mutual quest for excellence” Simon, 1991, pp 23-27). Supposedly, these types of arguments respond to the question of why sport is valuable, even if not experienced as worthwhile by certain individuals. They argue that sport is valuable because it fosters either knowledge of a certain kind, excellence, or possibly some other virtues. What these arguments do is point out a unique characteristic of sport in order to demonstrate that a culture lacking this unique characteristic would be lacking something. Such arguments are, however, automatically contested by two considerations: first, cannot this supposedly “unique characteristic” be satisfied by other means? ; Second what is so important and significant about this unique characteristic, which lends it the stature of moral practices that are obligatory? To conclude, based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values there is little one can offer to show that someone is misguided in their attitude to the value of sport, as the concept of intrinsic value is incapable of supporting the idea that sport in itself is a valuable practice. To establish such a claim one would have to find a way of arguing that certain practices have intrinsic value, as opposed to the intrinsic values embedded in certain practices. But no suggestion has been made thus far how to do so. Thus, those of us who believe that sport is such a practice and wish to support their belief by rational argument must seek support elsewhere. HERENT WORTH AND THE VALUE OF SPORT One place from which such support might be derived is the concept of inherent worth Building on this concept, I want to argue that sport as an activity has inherent worth. The axiological idea of inherent worth is less familiar than the two concepts previously discussed, that of intrinsic and extrinsic value. What is inherent worth? The idea of something having inherent worth is based on a basic attitude to life, sometimes referred to as “the Principle of the Value of Life.” Although this principle is ambiguous, having somewhat different implications in different contexts, generally speaking the principle requires that one respect life, that one not unthinkingly destroy life forms or alter forms of life. As it is stated, “Living beings are to be regarded as having a special kind of value. (...) Let us call this special kind of value inherent value, an expression that should remind us that this value is supposed to inhere in (belong direcily to) living beings themselves” (Blackstone, 1980, p. 301). In recent years, the idea of living beings having inherent worth has played an important role in environmental ethics. Environmental philosophers argue that some things have value independently of our goals and aims. Even though they might serve no human purpose, they are nonetheless worthwhile and important. The fundamental problem, argue environmental philosophers, with both extrinsic and intrinsic values is that they are connected with our (human) goals and ends. In this respect these are homocentric notions. Environmental philosophers seek a more biocentric outlook on values according to which even if a certain phenomenon or event serves no purpose to us (i.e., has no extrinsic value), and even if it is not valued by us for its own sake, because nobody really cares about it, it nevertheless can have value in and of itself. Environmental philosophers argue that a stream, the trees in theThe Significance of Sport: Intrinsic Values and Inherent Worth 437 woods, or a certain bug are natural species that are worthwhile in and of themselves. Assuming the use of this basic terminology and the value laden conception of life that goes with it, we can go on to ask several related questions about the notion of inherent worth. First, we can ask about the scope of this principle: to what degree different life forms have inherent worth. Second, we can ask what follows from this intuition about the inherent worth of life forms? Third, we can ask whether this intuition is justified when reflected upon in a more careful way? But rather than deal with these issues one by one, I want to focus on the very idea of life having inherent worth, Does this idea really make sense? Philosophers dealing with environmental ethics often think so. In support of their claim, consider the following example. If a certain whale species has been causing economic damage to the fishermen in a certain region and in addition at rare times also endangers the boats coming into the harbor, is this sufficient reason to argue for its annihilation? If we add another clement to this story and suggest that it has been scientifically proven that this particular species of whale serves no purpose in the grand ecological scheme, are we then justified in simply eliminating it? There is a strong moral intuition that it is somehow wrong to just get rid of this species of whale the way we clear dust off a bookshelf. A species of whales is different from mere dust. Even if we would eventually decide that these whales cause too much damage and need to be killed, it would be with some sense of regret. We do not have to go so far as to argue that it has a right to life in order to suggest that it makes sense to claim that its life is valuable. It would be a shame if this species became extinct. It would be disgraceful on our part if we brought about its extinction for no good reason, One might argue that there is something regretful about the extinction of a certain organic species, ¢.g., blue whales or African elephants. Nature will be lacking a certain life form that once was an integral part of it. In this respect, people reflecting on environmental ethics argue that these life forms have a certain inherent worth as part of the natural scheme of things (DesJardines, 1993, p. 144). It would be a mistake to try and reduce The Principle of Life to some other set of supposedly more basic values, such as complexity or diversity. For it is not because of the complexity or diversity of nature that whales have inherent worth. It is because they are life forms that are a part of the natural scheme of things. Other things being equal, the fact that they are living creatures requires that their lives be respected. Complexity and diversity are not the underlying value as is evident by the fact that manufacturing many different strange and exotic creatures through some kind of genetic engineering will not enrich the natural scheme of things, for such creatures are merely artificial and not natural. It will alter, corrupt and mutilate it. I believe that behind this argument is a very basic intuition that has not yet been sufficiently revealed. It is that there is something worthy of our respect about the natural scheme of things, so that a natural form of life is something that is valuable and which ought to be respected. A life with elephants no longer a part of, is a nature without elephants. This is tampering with the natural order of things, which diminishes its inherent value. Those who share this point of view may not always think the same about flies, though some do. But then they need not. They may claim that although flies have a place in the natural scheme of things, it may not suffice to lend them sufficient value in our eyes. There may be further considerations as to whether we should want to preserve a species. The way in which I wish to use the idea of inherent worth builds on this basic intuition, albeit in a somewhat different way than it has been used by environmentalists. | first want to restrict it to claims about the inherent worth of “forms of life.” A form of life is a natural way438 Yotam Lurie living and behaving on the part of a given life form such as whales or human beings. I want to use the idea of inherent worth it to claim that, other things being equal, a form of life has inherent worth in that it should be left alone and not tampered with unless detrimental to justified goals, It is this basic outlook on forms of life that are integral to various creatures that has many of us turn our eyes away with shame at the spectacle of dancing bears led on a leash. To the extent that we judge the natural life of bears valuable, we commit ourselves to valuing their natural forms of life in which dancing is not included. The moral to draw from the idea put forward about inherent value may not be that which environmentalists have wanted to put forward. It is that it makes sense to speak of the inherent value of natural forms of life, albeit this value does not always suffice for determining a course of action. Other considerations will have to be included, particularly with regard to species that are detrimental to human utility. Nonetheless, both the concept and the basic intuition that it embodies can be used to support the claim that sport as a practice has an inherent value. Turning to sport, [ want to flesh out the notion of inherent worth by appealing now to the idea of a human “form of life.” The idea of a human form of life was put forward by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations as part of his attempt to provide a naturalized conception of language (Wittgenstein, 1958). In this view of language asking questions, giving orders, telling stories and so forth are linguistic practices that are part of the natural history of human beings as are walking and sitting. Human beings differ from one another in many respects, just as human cultures vary widely. Nevertheless, despite these differences and variations, they all share the same human forms of life. Wittgenstein’s remarks about “forms of life” may be understood in two somewhat different senses (Hunter, 1968, pp. 233- 244). In the first it is used to describe an organic, natural way of responding to things, very much in the way in which an animal would respond. It is non-reflective and immediate. An example in point might be the way in which human beings tend to grab the place on their body where they feel pain, or how as children we tend to respond to pain by crying. Another example would be how we tend to smile at someone who smiles at us, how we turn our face towards the place from where a sudden noise is heard, and so forth. Such ways of behavior are basic to us. They belong to our nature and are part of what comprises our basic human forms of life. More sophisticated modes of behavior are then built upon them through teaching and education. Linguistic practices of asking question, telling stories, describing things, giving orders and the like are one example of shared forms of life which are built on such basic natural inclinations by means of education. A second sense in which this idea may be used is to refer to cultural forms of life. These can be manifested in the practice of wearing a suit or a dress to the office, the practice of cating by dining, and so forth, and may vary from place to place. Such cultural practices are refined manifestations of basic human forms of life, which embody our ability to learn techniques, adopt customs, follow rules, and create norms. Although they are often the products of education and conventions, they are possible because human beings arc creatures possessing forms of life that enable them to create and adopt such conventions. While the practice of speaking a language by human beings is manifested in such cultural practices as speaking either English or Hebrew, the very practice of speaking a language is a form of life that is natural for human beings to acquire and to integrate into their lives, I do not mean that it is innate, but it is natural for human beings to develop into speakers of a language and users of tools, as it is for birds to learn how to fly. Those who lack the ability to do so lack a veryThe Significance of Sport: Intrinsic Values and Inherent Worth 439 basic feature that is part of what is to be a human being. Within the scope of the natural abilities typical of human forms of life is also our ability to experience all kinds of complex psychological states: we can intend, hope, expect, and imagine. Similarly, within the scope human forms of life is this wonderful ability to fall in love and find humor in jokes. Of course, some people don’t find love and some don’t care about love. Similarly some fail to understand jokes by not finding them funny. Nonetheless, these capabilities are part of the makeup of the nature of human beings that are manifested in their cultural ways of life. Without them we would be a different species, exhibiting different forms of life. We would be totally different creatures, if we were not inclined to react to pain as we do, if we could not fall in love, or if we could not understand the humor in jokes. The idea of a basic, human “form of life” should not be confused with the liberal idea of a “way of life” or its use in philosophical discussions regarding various cultural features of our behavior. It is important, therefore, to differentiate the concept of human ways of life from that of forms of life. In light of Wittgenstein’s tremendous impact on western Philosophy in the twentieth century, the phrase “forms of life” has been adopted by many for their own purposes. The school of “interpretive social science,” including the philosopher of social science Peter Winch, the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, and the philosopher of Science Thomas Kuhn often makes use of this term. Winch extends its use to say that religion, art, and history as well as other cultural ways of life are forms of life. Their extended usage of the phrase is different from the way I have introduced it here, which I believe also accords more with the way in which Wittgenstein made use of it. Used in this inflated fashion, every cultural or personal habit can be regarded as “a human form of life.” However, when it is inflated in such a manner, the currency loses its ability to buy insight in the philosophical market of ideas. Sport, as I have been arguing, is not merely a way of life for certain cultured human beings; it is a basic, human form of life. There are different ways people manage and organize their lives: As suggested earlier, one can choose between being a carpenter, a lawyer or a professional athlete. These are different yet equal “ways of Ii These ways of life have to do with choices that people make regarding their vocations and different cultural modes of life. But there is an aspect to an activity such as sport that places it in a different category. It is at its very origin a natural, human form of life, and it should be understood, regarded and valued as such: as having inherent worth because it is part of our more benevolent nature as human beings. It is within the scope of this idea of a human form of life that I want to argue that the kernel in the concept of sport, as a physical activity that is pursued in play, is a natural human form of life, and as such a form of behavior that has inherent worth for human life forms. To elucidate the last claim, note that sport is a human activity that is not very different from those I have now described as constituting basic human forms of life. It is the expression of something that is very basic and natural to human beings. Sport is the way human beings express and experience playfulness, spontaneity and joy at their ability to control their bodies and move about. At the very beginning they do this without being taught or educated, later carly playfulness develops into more structured rule-governed sport games through which we express and experience ourselves. In many respects rule-governed cultural activities, such as sport games, provide us with more freedom to express ourselves than just being left alone to our own natural playfulness. I believe it was the German poet Johann Goethe who claimed against the licentiousness of his younger romantic colleagues that there is only freedom within limitation. By mastering the German language and its constraining grammar, poets like440 Yotam Lurie Goethe gain more power to express themselves. Similarly, by mastering the rules of the game, an athlete learns how to do whatever he likes with them. For example, a basketball player must learn the rules of the game in order to score points and win games. A superb player, one who has truly mastered the rules of the game, uses them to play with grace and power. It is in this sense that sport is a basic, natural human form of life. For we are creatures who by their very nature take pleasure in moving our bodies and limbs, in jumping and walking and running. We do these things as children by inclination, and we do them without any teaching. We find joy in simply doing them. This is not the place to get into fine distinctions between sport per-se and other movement activities that might not be sport per-se, for it is not an argument against sport that other movement activities, such as yoga, mime or dance, might somehow also connected with humans basic forms of life. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, basic activities such as sport are (natural) human forms of life, as are crying, laughing, learning to speak a language and to manipulate utensils by hand. Later, they are built upon within our cultures, where they are turned into rule-governed cultural activities and games in which some human beings compete and others come to enjoy by observation. But at their heart is the basic human form of life from which they emerge. In need of a label, one might describe this argument for the inherent worth of sport as a basic human form of life as one in which sport is naturalized. From this perspective the modern institution of sport and its refined practices are built upon natural human drives and passions that are transformed and cultivated within the context of a particular cultural setting. Appealing to Nietzsche, who sought to naturalize our conception of human beings as cultural beings, can further flesh out this idea of sport naturalized. Nietzsche tells us that some drives. such as hunger, are relatively more rigid than others and, hence, require nourishment for their satisfaction. One’s dining practices and culinary preferences do not exactly matter if one is under conditions of true hunger in which continued existence is in jeopardy. One’s hunger must be satisfied. Other drives, however, are more flexible and can be satisfied in a variety of ways within the context of different cultural practices. Such drives might be repressed, sublimated or transformed within the context of a particular culture. The same drive might take upon itself a very different shape within different customs (Nietzsche, 1982). It should be noted that it is not only sport as a human form of life that is being naturalized in this manner but also its inherent worth for human beings. Sport has inherent worth for human beings because it is a human form of life and, as such, part of what we are. To note that this argument is based on a teleological conception of nature and what it means to naturalize a given activity is not to fault it. It is to reaffirm a basic conception of natural behavior. Given this conception we can now say that sport is a human form of life and as such something that has inherent worth for us in that it is the way we human beings express something very basic about our nature, about what we are, even as we develop into refined, cultural beings having all sorts of modes of life. To engage in sport is to do what is natural for us as human beings. That is to say that it has value in and of itself in the sense that human life without it is a life in which an inherent part of our more benevolent human nature is destroyed. To say that sport is a basic human form of life is to say that a human culture which did not give expression to this aspect of our nature would be poorer and impoverished for lacking it, in the way in which it would not be missing from the lives of beings for whom sport was not a natural form of life. Clearly this does not entail that there are not otherThe Significance of Sport: Intrinsic Values and Inherent Worth 441 practices that might be an inherent part of human life. It does entail that different practices are not all on par. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS The remarks I have made here about the nature of sport and its inherent worth are not an argument in favor of a claim that everyone should participate in sport. The fact that sport is a basic human form of life, does not entail that all people must participate in sport in order to be fully human. Some choose sports; others choose other practices that provide for other important values. The many different facets of the totality of human life are manifest and expressed in different individuals in different ways. By way of analogy, imagine a particular basketball team that is described as being naturally very active. Does this entail that any individual who is a member of the team must be very active? Similarly, even if sport is an inherent part of human life, there are clearly individuals who are fully human and yet do not participate in sport. The main implication of these remarks is much more general and cultural. They are intended for formulating a conceptual framework that can enable us to cherish what belongs to our very nature, such as the ability to take pleasure in sport. The argument put forward is geared to show that sport is a valuable activity. Its point may be summed up by stating that in the same way that our culture endangers certain animal species, it also endangers our ability to appreciate certain basic human forms of life. As sport is a natural activity for human beings, the attempt to dismiss sport as something of no value is not unlike an attempt to change the nature of certain species. To the extent that our ability to fall in love and to find humor in jokes is part of our basic human nature, so is our ability to take pleasure in sport. To note that sport is an inherently worthwhile activity for human beings is to compare it in this respect to falling in love or to finding humor in jokes. Human beings who lack these abilities are impoverished. To see to it that we do not grow into impoverished human beings, is to make certain that we can find appropriate cultural ways to express what is natural for us and what, as such, has inherent worth for us as human beings. Sport is one of those things, and we should do our best to lend it a proper cultural expression. Having inherent worth, it is worth educating people to better appreciate sport and to make room for it in their lives. REFERENCES Amold, Peter J. Sport, Ethics and Education. London: Cassell Education 1997, pp. 12-21. Blackstone, William T. “The Search for an Environmental Ethic” in Tom Regan, (ed.) Matters of Life and Death. New York: Random House, 1980, pp. 301-302. DesJardines, Joseph R. Environmental Philosophy. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1993, pp. 140-163 Fraleigh, Warren P. Right Action in Sport. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1984, pp.93-206. Hume, David. 4 Treatise on Human Nature (London, 1740) ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clanderon Press, 1978. 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