IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

SUBJECT : ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

W.P. (C) NO. 13560/2006

Judgment reserved on : November 06, 2006

Judgment delivered on : November 16, 2006

Ex. Rect./GD Vinod Kumar .... Petitioner

Through: Ms. Rekha Palli,
Advocate.
Versus

Union of India and Ors.

Respondents
Through : Ms. Barkha Babbar,
Advocate.
Col. T. Parshad,Dy JAG

W.P. (C) NO. 16083/2006

Lt. Colonel S. Suresh Kumar .... Petitioner

Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sagar,
Advocate.
Versus

Ministry of Defence & Others .... Respondents

Through : Ms. Rekha Palli,
Advocate.

W.P. (C) NO. 12404/2005

UdaiBir Singh .... Petitioner

Through: Mr. V.S. Tomar,
Advocate.
Versus

Union of India and Ors. .... Respondents

Through : Mr. Mayank Goel,
Advocate.
 W.P. (C) NO. 11040/2004

V.K. Lamba .... Petitioner

Through: None

Versus

Union of India and Ors. .... Respondents

Through : Ms.Barkha Babbar,
Advocate.

AND

W.P. (C) NO. 12018/2006

Maya Prakash .... Petitioner

Through: None

Versus

Union of India and Ors. .... Respondents

Through : Ms. Barkha Babbar,
Advocate.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SWATANTER KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SISTANI

SWATANTER KUMAR, J.

1. Cause of action determines the Court of competent jurisdiction when a party

invokes extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. In discern contradistinction to the provisions of Section 16 to 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, Article 226 (2) restricts the principle of territorial jurisdiction only to
'cause of action'. The expression would take in its ambit partial or entire cause of action.
Part of cause of action is again a term of wide magnitude and thus, has to be construed
liberally. However, once the element of cause of action or any part thereof in its minutest
form is absent, the court may not have territorial jurisdiction, only on the basis of the
residence/ location of the party. The provisions of Section 20 of the Code states that
subject to the limitation contained in the preceding Sections, a suit could be instituted in a
court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the defendant or each of the defendants
voluntarily resides or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. Thus, there are
two factors which independent of each other, can grant jurisdiction for a party to institute
a suit in the court of competent jurisdiction. However, these provisions would not be
applicable to writ jurisdiction stricto senso. It is a settled principle of law that provisions
of the Civil Procedure Code would not apply in full vigour or strictly to the writ
proceedings. They are not applicable of their own force to such proceedings but
nonetheless the writ proceedings could be governed by principles analogous to those
contained in the Code particularly when they are not inconsistent with the writ rules of
this court or the constitutional mandate contained in Article 226. Unlike the provisions
of Section 20 of the Code which specifies different grounds for vesting jurisdiction in the
court, Article 226 contemplates location of the authorities and arising of cause of action
partly or wholly within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. By introduction of Article
226(2), great emphasis has been laid on the concept of cause of action. Even this
statement is further clarified by use of non-obstante clause that it would be so
notwithstanding the fact that seat of such Government or authority or residence of such
person is not within those territories. This manifestly shows that residence of the party is
not really a relevant consideration for determining jurisdiction of a court under these
provisions. In view of this constitutional mandate, the provisions of the High Court
Rules and Orders relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction have to be read ejusdem generis
to the constitutional provisions.

2. To appropriately discuss the rationale between the principle of cause of action

giving jurisdiction to a court, it will be useful to refer to the provisions of Article 226 of
the Constitution, which reads as under:-
“226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in
article 32 2[***], every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs,
including 3[writs in the nature of habeus corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III and for any other purpose].

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in
part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

4[(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or
stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition
under clause (1), without -

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the
plea for such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High
Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party
in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel for such party, the High Court
shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is
received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished,
whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before
the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the
application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or,
as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.]

1[(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of
the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.]

3. These provisions clearly exhibit the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
grant territorial jurisdiction to the court in whose jurisdiction the entire or part of cause of
action has arisen. The purpose of restricting jurisdiction of the court and relating it
directly to the cause of action, has also nexus to the expeditious disposal of the writ
petition. An aggrieved person should approach the court of competent jurisdiction and
not file writ petitions in the court in whose jurisdiction no cause of action or part thereof
has arisen merely on the ground that the respondents or the petitioners were residents of
an area falling under jurisdiction of that court. Article 226 (3)of the Constitution while
furthering the cause of expeditious disposal and prevention of unnecessary prolongation
of interim orders in the form of injunction or stay, makes it obligatory for the courts to
dispose of such applications within the specified time or within such time as the courts
may consider proper for reasons to be stated. Expeditious disposal has relevancy to the
administration of justice and, therefore, is essential to the issue of jurisdiction also.
Normally wherever cause of action or part thereof arises, the authorities would be in
power and possession of the relevant documents which can without any delay be
produced before the courts to help expeditious disposal. These are procedural provisions
but are mandatory in their form as they alone determine the court of competent
jurisdiction. Vesting jurisdiction in a court in whose jurisdiction neither any cause of
action or part thereof has arisen, would amount to defeating the very purpose of the
constitutional provisions. In a vast country like ours, the division of jurisdiction would
be necessary which in turn would link itself to the rationale behind these constitutional
provisions.

4. The 'cause of action' is an expression which is well-explained and well-

understood in the legal parlance. The analogous principles of the Code can be applied to
the writ jurisdiction but not in contradistinction or in conflict with the specific
constitutional provisions. If residence alone is contemplated under Section 20 of the
Code so as to vest jurisdiction in a Court, then it would amount to adding words to a
Statute, which is not permissible. Normally, the provisions relating to jurisdiction should
be construed strictly as they vest or divest jurisdiction in the court. To vest jurisdiction in
a Court where the law does not intend, would be impermissible as jurisdiction in a Court
can neither be vested by consent of the parties nor by implication. Jurisdiction is
conferred by a Statute. We have already stated that the expression 'cause of action' or any
part thereof appearing in Article 226(2) of the Constitution is of significant meaning and
consequences. To further analyse this expression in proper concept of law, we may refer
to some judgments of this Court as well as the Supreme Court which have explained the
concept of 'cause of action'. In the case of M/s. Capital Fire vs. State Bank of Patiala
2006 (2) AD (Delhi) 29, the Court held as under:-
“ From the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that the facts in regard to execution of
the agreement and performance of the contract are not in dispute. On merits, the
respondent bank may or may not have a defence to the claim of the petitioner but that is
not the subject matter of the present controversy. The bank has filed documents on
record. The agreement dated 10th July, 1995 clearly states that the agreement has been
executed at Patiala. Another agreement between the parties has also been filed on record
at page 73 of the documents, which again shows that the agreement was entered into
between the parties at Patiala and it was signed by the petitioner and the officers of the
bank at Patiala. There is no dispute to the fact that Registered and Head Office of the
Bank is at Patiala. The work order given to the petitioner by the respondent also shows
that fire fighting system was to be provided at the old and new building of the State Bank
of Patiala at Patiala. The petitioner only has filed some correspondence which is
addressed to the office of the petitioner at New Delhi. Once the agreement was entered
into between the parties at Patiala, the entire work of the contract is to be performed at
Patiala, payments were made at Patiala then the substantial as well as integral cause of
action has accrued if at all in favour of the petitioner at Patiala and not within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because some documents were addressed by
the respondent bank at Delhi in regard to execution of work would not divest the court at
Patiala and vest the jurisdiction in this Court.

The Supreme Court in the case of Oil Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar
Basu & Ors. JT 1994 (5) S.C. 1, held as under :-

“......Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose
within the jurisdiction of the advertisement in Calcutta and made representations
demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The
advertisements itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted at New Delhi and
that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at
New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira
in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted
the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our
opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere
fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would
not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of January
15, 1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejections of the offer as that fact occurred on
January 27, 1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ
petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within
the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. ....

The submission of the learned counsel for NICCO based on Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of
Calcutta had no jurisdiction, this Court should, in the absence of proof of prejudice,
refuse to interfere with the decision of the High Court unless it is otherwise found to be
erroneous. While the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may support
such a submission, we are afraid, the discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which
deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a Court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever for
ulterior motives. That would only encourage such type of litigation. The object
underlying the provisions in Section 21 is not to encourage ;such litigants but to avoid
harassment to litigants who had bonafide and in good faith commenced proceedings in a
court which is later found to be wanting in jurisdiction. In the instant case, we are
convinced, beyond doubt, that NICCO did not act bona fide in moving the Calcutta High
Court and, therefore, the submission based on Section 21 must fail.”

Even in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association vs. Union of
India and others AIR 2001 Supreme Court 416, the Supreme Court held as under:-

“The expression 'cause of action' has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the
restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the
right of the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means the necessary
conditions for the maintenance of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence
which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in 'cause of action.' It has to be let to be
determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises.”

In the light of the above enunciated principles it is clear that merely because some
incidental correspondence was sent to Delhi, which has no material or substantial bearing
and integral cause of action in favour of the petitioner, would not vest this court with the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present petition. As no cause of action,
much less a substantial or integral cause of action had arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this court, the parties by consent cannot confer jurisdiction, as otherwise
this court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit. The attempt of the
petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this court apparently is a deliberate attempt to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court where none was vested in the court. The provisions of
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked where the defendant or
defendants reside or carries on the business. The residence or carrying on of business by
the petitioner per se would not vest territorial jurisdiction in the court, as residence of the
plaintiff could not be a determining factor in this regard. The Supreme Court in the case
of New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor Krishanlal Jhanwar vs. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (2004) 4 Supreme Court Cases 677, while rejecting such a
plea raised by the plaintiff held as under:-

“By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two courts or more have
jurisdiction under CPC to try a suit or proceedings, an agreement between the parties that
the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such courts is not contrary to public
policy and in no may contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one court has jurisdiction, parties by
their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two courts. But by an agreement
parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to
deal with a matter.”
 Still in another case titled as Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay vs. Prasad
Trading Company (1991) 4 Supreme Court Cases 270, the Supreme Court while
commenting upon Section 20(a) Explanation held that where the defendant company has
a principal office as well as a subordinate office at different places and the cause of action
had arisen at the subordinate office, that Court alone will have the jurisdiction and not
where the principal office of the defendant is situated.

In the case of Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd. AIR 2002 Supreme Court
126, the Supreme Court while explaining the principle laid down by that Court in the case
of Union of India & Ors. vs. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. 1984 (2) Supreme Court Cases
646 explained the scope of territorial jurisdiction and held as under:-

“We are unable to accept this finding of the High Court. The view of the High Court
that this Court in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra) had held that the existence of the
registered office of a Company would ipso facto give a cause of action to the High Court
within whose jurisdiction the registered office of such a Company is situated, is not
correct. As a matter of fact, in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra), the question of
territorial jurisdiction in the sense with which we are concerned now, did not arise at all.
In that case, the observations of the Court were as follows:

“Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the Company is at Ludhiana and
the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one
would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The writ petitioners, however, have chosen the
Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory relief which is
sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta
Port. ...We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was
filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is
in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi.”

It is in that context of noticing the motive of the parties concerned in that case in
choosing a forum, the above observation as to the place of the registered office of the
Company was incidentally made in the judgment. Having perused the judgment in
Oswal's case (supra), we are of the opinion that judgment is no authority to decide as to
the requirement of law in regard to establishing the territorial jurisdiction of a court. We
must say in all fairness, Mr. Desai, learned senior counsel, has not placed any reliance on
this judgment nor on the basis of the finding of the High Court in this case in regard to its
territorial jurisdiction. He, however, contends that from the facts narrated in the civil
applications, more so in Paragraph 16 of the application, it is crystal clear that a
substantial part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the High Court
of Ahamedabad.”

As is clear in this very case, while explaining the principle that registered office
of a company within the territorial jurisdiction of the court would not ipso facto give a
cause of action to that Court, the Court also reiterated the principle that the entire facts
pleaded would determine the cause of action and not merely the happening of an
inconsequential event that would determine the cause of action, and held as under:-

“In order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special
civil application, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support
of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to
decide a dispute which has, at least in-part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear that
each and every fact pleaded in the application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion
that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction
unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is
involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in
the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the
Court concerned.”

5. Still in another case titled as The Federation of Motorsports Clubs of India vs.
Motorsports Association of India and Anr. CS(OS) No. 804/2002 decided on 25th
August, 2005 where the Court explained the concept of jurisdiction with reference to
other judgments, also described the 'cause of action' as under:-

“ In terms of the provisions of Section 16, 17 and 20 of the Code, a suit shall be
instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property, subject
matter of the suit, the defendant/defendants reside or where a cause of action wholly or in
part arises within the jurisdiction of that court. The cause of action necessarily must
constitute of certain facts which in law would give rise to an actionable wrong. No facts
have been averred in the plaint as to what activities were being carried out in Delhi by
defendant no.1 which directly or indirectly infringed the rights of the plaintiff, so as to
give rise to a 'cause of action as known in law'. The learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiff made a reference to the averments made in paragraph 42 of the plaint to the
effect that “the suit raises inter alia issues relating to recognition by Government of India
which are activities taking place in Delhi. Consequently, the cause of action arises
entirely and/or at least a substantial part thereof, at New Delhi in as much as defendant
no.1 while exercising the authority as the purported ASN in India has in fact written
letters pertaining to granting and cancellation of permits in respect of Motor Sports in
Delhi and providing its expertise pertaining to Motor sports to persons situated in and
operating from Delhi.

These averments are obviously incapable of conferring any territorial jurisdiction

on this court, ex facie. If the statement of the plaintiff as argued, though not pleaded, that
defendant no.1 has its registered office at Mumbai and carrying on activities all over
India, then the court has to see where the substantial cause of action has arisen, and not
merely an incidental activity of the other party. It will be too far-fetched to argue that on
such averments court all over India would get jurisdiction, particularly in absence of any
specific averment relating to an act infringing the rights of the plaintiff. The plaint in this
regard, is certainly vague, indefinite and on its cumulative reading, is incapable of giving
any territorial jurisdiction to this court. Whether the plaintiff is the only association
recognised by the Government of India, is a fact which can be proved or disproved by
leading cogent evidence from the concerned Department of the Government of India.
The Government of India, as already noticed, is not a party to the present suit and in any
case would neither be a proper nor a necessary party, as no relief is being claimed against
Government of India in the present suit, and rightly so, in view of the judgment of the
Bombay High Court and pendency of the writ petition between the parties before this
Court. Mere averments of certain facts in relation to exercise of power by another
authority or a Department of the State by itself would not make that Department a
necessary or a proper party to the suit.

The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Adani Exports
Limited and another even held that mere existence of an office of a company would not
ipso facto give a cause of action to the Court within whose jurisdiction such an office is
located (AIR 2002 Supreme Court 126). 'Cause of Action' must be relatable to the facts
as they existed on the date of institution of the suit and it is for the plaintiff to plead and
show before the court that such cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this court. In the present case, the plaint, as it stands, does not
even refer to any activity of the defendant, much less an act giving right to the plaintiff to
move the court. As far as the plea of plaint not disclosing the cause of action is
concerned, it could be partly accepted in so far as it relates to the plaint not disclosing
facts constituting territorial jurisdiction of this court, but in so far as the effect of the
judgment of the Bombay High Court as afore-referred is concerned, it may not be barred
by the principle of res judicata and the plaintiff being debarred from claiming such a
relief, would have to be gone into by the court only during the trial.”

6. The petitioner has heavily relied upon the judgments of a learned Single Bench of
this Court in the case of Bernard D'Mello vs. Industrial Finance Corporation Limited
and Ors. 2004 (V) AD (Delhi) 65 and judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Dinesh Chandra Gahtori vs. Chief of Army Staff and Anr. (2001) 9 Supreme Court
Cases 525. The judgment of the Supreme Court would have to be confined to the facts
and circumstances of that case as it does not enunciate any principle of law. To ensure
that this Court can follow a judgment as precedent on yardstick of ratio decidendi, the
judgment essentially must discuss the facts, principles of law and arrive at a clear
conclusion to be adopted as principle of law, universally applicable to the cases of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the emphasis of the judgment was more on the fact that the
writ petition had been pending for a period of 7 years and it was not quite just and fair to
dismiss the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction alone. A passing
reference was made by the Court stating that the Chief of Army Staff can be sued
anywhere in the country. This observation has to be read in conjunction with cause of
action. In fact, their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not interpret Article 226 (2) of
the Constitution to state any principle of law. Similarly, in the judgment of the learned
Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bernard D'Mello (supra), the Court while
emphasizing the concept of 'cause of action' in relation to territorial jurisdiction did
observe “but even the Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which the respondent
resides would have the jurisdiction. Residence of a juristic entity would be the place its
registered office is situated.” In that case the decision of the Board of Governors which
had accepted the recommendations of the Review Committee to retire the petitioner was
communicated to the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, a
part of cause of action had arisen at Delhi of which place the petitioner was resident.
Therefore, the issue was answered in favour of the petitioner.

7. Article 226 (1) clearly states that every High Court shall have the powers
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercised jurisdiction to issue writ or
orders to any person or authority. Exercise of this power to some extent stands enlarged
on the basis of a cause of action having been wholly or in part arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. There the non-obstante clause appearing in Article 226 (2)
provides the explanation to the normal rule of respondent being sued at his place of
resident by stating “notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or Authority or
residence of such person is not within those territories”. It tantamounts to enlarging the
scope of jurisdiction primarily founded on the ground of cause of action. Thus, it may
not be possible to accept the arguments based upon this judgment as an absolute
preposition of law, that residence or location of office of the Authority would be the
determinative factor for deciding the issue of Court of competent jurisdiction. It is more
so in light of the judgments of the Supreme Court and the interpretation of these two
clauses, keeping in mind the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

8. Article 226 (1) of the Constitution relates to the sources of power to the Court as
well as its territorial jurisdiction. Clause (2) amplifies that jurisdiction in relation to a
cause of action. These clauses have a clear demarcation but the location of office of the
Authority or Government, in absence of any cause of action having arisen within the
same territorial jurisdiction, ex facie may not be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the
Court. The power of the Court is not synonymous to jurisdiction of the Court. While
dealing with the cases of the present kind, it may be a proper exercise of jurisdiction not
to entertain the writ petitions where the office of the Ministry is located at Delhi but in
the entire events or facts constituting the cause of action, the said office had no role to
play. While discussing this principle we have to keep in mind the kind of cases that we
are dealing with. Shortly, we will proceed to record the factual matrix of each of the case
as well. In the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and Anr. AIR
2004 SC 2321, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the contention that the writ would be
maintainable in this Court simply because seat of Union of India is in Delhi. The Court
also held that 'cause of action' would include material and integral facts and accrual of
even a fraction of cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court would provide
territorial jurisdiction for entertaining the writ. The Court in that case held as under:-
“......However, even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a
determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In
appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by
invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens........

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

...When an order, is passed by a Court of Tribunal or an executive authority whether
under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place.
Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the
appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both
the places. In other words as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of
action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction
it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also
required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the
appellate authority.”

9. Still in another case titled as National Textiles Corporation Ltd. and Ors. vs.
Haribox Swalram and Ors. 2004 (9) Supreme Court Cases 786, while interpreting Article
226 (2) in relation to cause of action and territorial jurisdiction, the Court held as under:-

“......Cause of action as understood in civil proceedings means every fact which, if

traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the Court. It is the bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to
them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. Each and every fact
pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give
rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts
pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case.
Facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise
to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned.

Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 : AIR 2002 SC 126; State of
Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC 1289; Oil and
Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711, relied on

In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to
be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money
was paid to the mills at Bombay. The Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the
matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
The Division Bench reversed this finding on the ground that the concluded contract had
come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing
and consequently, the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would
constitute a cause of action. The view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous
in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant had initiated any
action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for
cancellation of the contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the
relevant statement was made in para 73 of the writ petition (set out in para 12). The mere
fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the
correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of
action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ
petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained.”
10. Various judgments of the Supreme Court had uniformally taken the view that
cause of action or any part thereof as understood in law would vest jurisdiction in the
Court. A party would not be entitled to invoke jurisdiction of the Court merely on the
basis that location of the Authority is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court,
though, no part of cause of action or even fraction thereof is attributable to the said
Authority and even no relief is claimed, against the said Authority.

11. In the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra vs. Union of India and Ors. 2002 (5)
Service Cases Today 606, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court took the view that
factum of residence of the petitioner would not determine jurisdiction and while noticing
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Chandra Gohatri (supra), it was
also stated that for a precedence to be binding, the facts of the case and the point decided
would be of relevant consideration and further held that where all proceedings were taken
in the places beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the Allahabad High Court
would have no jurisdiction. A similar view was also taken by a Division Bench of this
Court in the cases of Hans Raj vs. Union of India and Ors. W.P.(C) No. 4491/2003
decided on 8.11.2001, Lt. Col. S.K. Isawe vs. Union of India and Ors. W.P.(C) No.
14372/2005 decided on 6.12.2005, Ex. Constable Haripal Singh vs. DG, CISF and Anr.
W.P.(C) No. 5712/2006 decided on 19.4.2006 and another Single Bench judgment of
the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sep/Dvt (MT) Phool Chandra vs. Union of
India and Ors. Military Law Journal 2004 All 12. Therefore, the consistent view and the
principle that emerges from the above discussion is that before a petitioner can invoke
jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India in cases of
the present kind, he is required to satisfy the Court that cause of action or part thereof and
even a fraction of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court.

12. Before introduction of Article 226(2) in the Constitution of India, Article 226(1)
was the subject matter of judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court on different
occasions. However, the consistent view in regard to scope and limitation of jurisdiction
under Article 226, as it stood on that date, was stated by the Supreme Court to say that
there are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. One is that the power is to be exercised
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction that is to say, that
the writs issued by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction.
The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High Court has been
empowered to issue writs must be within those territories. The dictum of the Supreme
Court also stated that a tribunal or authority permanently located and normally carrying
on its business outside the territorial limits of a High Court, cannot be regarded as
functioning within those territorial limits and therefore, amenable to jurisdiction to that
High Court merely because it exercises jurisdiction within those territorial limits so as to
affect the rights of the parties therein. In a case where the question was with regard to
right to sit and vote in Legislative Assembly in Madras, it was held that the State of
Madras could not give jurisdiction to the High Court of Madras to issue a writ against
Election Commission (Refer Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. UOI & anr. AIR 1961 SC 532,
K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission and others AIR 1954 SC
207 & Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao SCR 1953 1144). In the
case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), the Supreme Court was also concerned with the
question whether there is any scope for introducing the concept of cause of action and
basis of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. The court said that Article 226, as it
stood at that time, does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the
jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues
within its territorial jurisdiction. If such a provision was available, then it could be said
that the court can issue writ against a person or authority even though it may not be
within its territories and simply because the cause of action has arisen within those
territories.

13. The view taken in these judgments was that if the seat of the Government is not
located within the territories of the High Court having jurisdiction under Article 226, the
writ would not be hit for lack of territorial jurisdiction. As a result of this consistent view
of the Supreme Court, probably Article 226(2) was introduced which clearly relates to
exercise of jurisdiction if the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the
territories of the court.

14. However, in the later judgments, the Supreme Court has unambiguously taken the
view that even if the seat of the Government or the concerned department is located
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but no cause of action or any fraction or
part thereof has arisen within the jurisdiction of that court, the court may not answer the
issue of jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. Constitutional mandate is that the High
Court would exercise jurisdiction in relation to the territories of which it is the High
Court. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 have to be read and construed in conjunction
with each other but none of them would be capable of extending jurisdiction of the court
normally beyond its prescribed territorial jurisdiction. To take benefit of this enlarged
jurisdiction, it would be obligatory upon a petitioner to show that any cause of action or
part thereof had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that court.

15, We are dealing with the cases where the Forc_s are operating under Special
Statues like Army Act, CRPF Act, CISF Act & BSF Acts. These Acts have an inbuilt
remedial system. They provide for statutory appeal provisions and representations. In
fact, any order passed can be complained of to the higher authorities under the provisions
of the Act. In the event, all these authorities are located beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the court and the petitioner has exhausted such remedies, then he can hardly invoke the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the central or main office or seat of the
department is located within the jurisdiction of this court. Such an interpretation would
result in prolongation of cases and also cause prejudice to the parties. The records of all
the authorities whose jurisdiction the petitioner might have invoked during the pendency
of departmental action or proceedings would be available in the offices of the authorities
beyond the local limits of the court. We have already noticed that expeditious disposal is
one of the underlining features of the amended provisions of Article 226 and to ensure
balancing of convenience between the parties to the lis, it may be appropriate that the
courts determine the question of jurisdiction at the very threshold of the proceedings.
Proper exercise of jurisdiction would ex facie take in its ambit remedies which are
effective and efficacious. If both or any of these ingredients are not satisfied, it would be
a factor which will tilt the view of the court against exercising its jurisdiction. The court
is expected to deal with the issue of jurisdiction right at the initial stages and normally
while taking the petition as framed to be correct. Article 226 (2) opens with the words
“The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions.......” which clearly indicates
amplification of jurisdiction and that the provision is meant to aid the powers vested in
the High Court for issuance of writ, order or direction located within their territorial
jurisdiction. The expression 'may also' would have to be given their true meaning while
ensuring that such connotations are in consonance with the law enunciated by the
Supreme Court and also spirit of constitutional territorial jurisdiction of a High Court.

16. It is a paramount principle of law of jurisdiction that the court has to determine
whether it has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a case brought by a litigant before it.
Undue hardship is one of the factors which the court would consider while answering
such an issue. The doctrines of forum conveniens & forum non conveniens are the legal
doctrines used by the court to determine the issue of jurisdiction. Ubi jus ibi remedium –
there is no wrong without a remedy, is an effective legal maxim often applied to
administration of justice but the question is which is the proper and convenient legal
forum or court whose jurisdiction a party ought to invoke. The petitioner being dominus
litus is master or has domain over the case but these rights are subject to law of
jurisdiction. The laws and procedure provided under the Code are lex fori and wherever
in terms of such law, the ingredients of territorial jurisdiction are not satisfied, the court
would not assume jurisdiction merely on the ground of residence (office of one of the
respondents is within the court's jurisdiction). The doctrine 'forum non conveniens' has a
limited application but certainly is not an irrelevant factor, while adjudicating question of
jurisdiction under the terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court would
examine whether a claim should or should not be entertained for forum non conveniens
for the reason that there is another forum i.e. clearly more appropriate than the one whose
jurisdiction has been invoked. This is of course only a relevant consideration and not a
determinative factor.

17. There could be cases where the statutory proceedings have been carried out in the
jurisdiction of a different Court but the petitioner, by filing a representation before the
Chief of Army Staff or a statutory complaint could bring his case within the jurisdiction
of the Courts at Delhi, if such a petition was pending and/or was wrongly decided and the
averments in the writ petition were made against such authority claiming some relief or
direction against that authority.

18. Thus, in the cases of the present kind, it is essential on the rule of statutory
interpretation as well as forum conveniens seen in light of consistent view of the Supreme
Court that the cause of action or any part thereof even in its smallest fraction should have
arisen within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. The High Court obviously has the
power to issue writ or order to Government or any person within its territorial jurisdiction
but such vesting of jurisdiction would be doubted where the authority concerned is
neither effectively nor remotely concerned with the process of decision or decision
questioned in the writ petition and no relief is claimed against that party. Location of its
office per se particularly when it is not coupled with any fraction of cause of action may
not be sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction to effectively determine the matters
in issue. Such approach would further the cause of effective, expeditious and effectious
disposal of petitions and would cause least inconvenience to the parties concerned.

19. In W.P.(C) NO. 13560/2006, the orders impugned in the writ petition were
passed by the Commandant and Office of the Directorate General, Assam Rifles,
Shillong. They were served upon the petitioner there. The relevant claim in the writ
petition is also against respondent no.3 i.e. the Commandant, Assam Rifles Training
Centre and School, Dimapur, Nagaland. Mere impleadment of the Union of India,
through Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, without any averments in the writ petition
that the cause of action or any part thereof had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Court and/or any order was passed by the said authorities, would render the petition
liable to be dismissed on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner was
selected for appointment in the Army Rifles in August 2003. He was undergoing training
in Assam Rifles Training Centre and School, Dimapur and during the course of training,
he had a fall due to which his right foot was fractured and he was sent for treatment.
Later on, he was downgraded to low medical category A3 (t-8) temporarily for a period
of 8 weeks. After availing his sick leave, the petitioner was directed to report to Review
Medical Board, which opined that he was fit for training with effect from 3.12.2004. It is
alleged that the petitioner reported for training at his Company, being fit, but was not
allowed to join. Thereafter, he was discharged on 6.1.2005, according to the petitioner
ostensibly, on the ground that he is unlikely to become a good soldier. This order was
also passed at the Training Centre against which the petitioner filed an appeal on
25.4.2006 to respondent no.2 which was also rejected by the authorities at Nagaland.
From these admitted facts, it is clear that no cause of action or any part thereof has arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present
writ petition and the same is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. However, the petitioner
is at liberty to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law.

20. Accordingly, the petition stands disposed of, while leaving the parties to bear their
own costs.

WP(C) No. 16083/2006

21. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 read with
Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying that respondents be restrained from
recovering arrears of Damage Rate of Rent in view of Order dated 21st April, 2006 and
25th April, 2005 of respondent No.5 and pay the petitioner his pay on regular basis. It is
further prayed that respondent No.1 be directed to refund the salary of petitioner
reco_ered for the month of August, 2006 under the garb of recovering arrears of Damage
Rate of Rent under orders of respondents 6 and 7. Further it is prayed that order dated
22nd December, 2005 passed by respondents 5 and 7 to respondent No.6 be also quashed.
22. The necessary facts are that the wife of the petitioner as well as the petitioner
joined the Indian Army in the year 1987 and 1991 respectively. The petitioner was
working as Officer Commanding No.1 Detachment, 31 Composite Intelligence Unit at
Khanabal District, Jammu and Kashmir. On 27th May, 2005,the petitioner was
transferred from Coimbatore to Jammu and Kashmir as officer commanding. Vide his
letter dated 17th August, 2005, the petitioner requested respondent No.5 i.e. Station
Commander, Station Head Quarters, Red Fields, Coimbatore-18 to permit the petitioner
to retain married accommodation as the petitioner was being posted to a non-family
station. He further stated that his wife and two children need the accommodation. This
request was declined by respondent No.5 vide letter dated 3rd September, 2005 and
petitioner was directed to vacate the quarter. The respondent No.5 again issued a letter
dated 8th November, 2005 initiating action under Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971 as
well as charging damage rate of rent with effect from 12th August, 2005 when the
petitioner was required to vacate the premises. The petitioner had been approaching the
said respondents time and again but of no consequence. The petitioner was charged
damages against which the petitioner protested and according to the petitioner, the
damages on account of rent were being charged in violation of the rules and guidelines as
contained in the relevant rules. The petitioner was then declared as an unauthorised
occupant and this was informed to the petitioner vide letter dated 26th November, 2005
and orders with regard to charging damage rate of rent were issued. On 25th January,
2006, the petitioner was again directed to vacate the married accommodation at
Coimbatore and he was apprised that damage rate of rent would be charged by
respondents 6 and 7 i.e. Station Headquarters, Coimbatore and Controller of Defence
Accounts (Officers), Golibar Maidan, Pune with effect from 12th May, 2005.
Respondent No.4 vide his order dated 21st April, 2006 had cancelled the order dated
22nd December, 2005 passed by respondent No.5 declaring the petitioner as an
unauthorised occupant. However, according to the petitioner, despite direction issued
vide order dated 25th April, 2006, the damage rate of rent was still being recovered from
the petitioner. His wife, who is also member of the force, was not permitted to retain the
premises. According to the petitioner, the respondents are recovering Rs.1.5 lakhs
towards damage rate of rent and recoveries were being made from his salary. In light of
the above facts, the petitioner has claimed the following reliefs in the present petition:-
“(i) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent no.2 to 7 not to
recover any arrears of Damage Rate of Rent in view of order dated 21/4/06 (Annexure P-
2) of respondent no.4 and orders dated 25/4/06 (Annexure P-4) of respondent no.5 & pay
the petitioner his monthly salary on regular basis.

(ii) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction to respondent no.1 to refund the salary of
petitioner recovered for the month of August 2006 under the garb of recovering arrears of
Damage Rate of Rent under the orders of respondent no. 6 & 7.

(iii)Issue appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing orders dated 22/12/05 of
respondent no.5 & 7 to respondent no.6 and also quash all such related orders.

(iv) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction to pay adequate compensation to the
petitioner in view of the unnecessary and avoidable expenditure caused as also to for the
unnecessary financial hardship and mental harassment caused, due to the treatment meted
out to the petitioner.

(v) And, to issue such further order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in
the circumstances of the case.”

23. We may notice that all the respondents, whose orders are challenged by the
petitioner in these proceedings and against whom issuance of appropriate directions have
been prayed for are situated at Pune, Coimbatore or Chennai. Though the Chief of Army
Staff and Minisry of Defence have been impleaded as respondents 2 and 1 respectively,
the petitioner has apparently made no statutory complaint or petition under Section 27 of
the Army Act to any authorities at Delhi, which is stated to be pending or upon which any
order has been passed by respondents 1 and 2. In fact the petitioner has not claimed any
relief against respondents 1. Respondent No.2 has not issued any recovery order against
the petitioner.

24. The respondents at the very outset have taken a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the present writ petition before this Court on the ground of territorial
jurisdiction. It is evident from the above facts that no cause of action or any part thereof
has arisen at New Delhi i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. All the
correspondence placed on record have been addressed to the authorities at
Pune/Coimbatore/Channai. Even the order dated 21st April, 2006 cancelling the order
dated 22nd December, 2005 by which the petitioner was declared as an unauthorised
occupant of Govt. married accommodation was issued by the competent authority
situated at Chennai.

25. In view of the aforestated law and the undisputed facts of this case, we hold that
this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present writ petition.
The same is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court of competent
jurisdiction. The petitioner is at liberty to press his request for allocation of the same
official premises in the name of his wife before the competent authority and we do hope
that if such request is made to the competent authority, the same shall be considered
sympathetically.

26. Accordingly, this petition is disposed of with the above observations, while
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
WP(C) 12404/2005

27. The petitioner was enrolled in Assam Rifles on 24.10.1993. He was invalided out
of service on medical grounds on 30.9.2003 after rendering 9 years 11 months and 6 days
service with the respondents. His order of discharge was passed by the Commandant of
Assam Rifles whereafter he did not receive any reply and made a representation to the
Commandant, 16, Assam Rifles, C/o 99 APO. The Dy. Commandant of 16, Assam
Rifles on 27.1.2005 informed the petitioner that his request had been sent to Dte. General,
Assam Rifles, Shillong. On 8.2.2005, the said Dte. Informed the petitioner that he was
not entitled to disability pension as the same was not attributable to service. He filed an
appeal to the Dte. General, Assam Rifles to which he did not receive any reply.
Whereafter a legal notice was sent by the petitioner through his counsel to these
authorities at Shillong as well as to the Secretary, Ministry of Home, Government of
India. In the notice served, no claim was raised against the Ministry of Home and even in
this writ petition the petitioner has prayed that the order passed by the authorities at
Shillong be quashed and the petitioner be granted all consequential benefits w.e.f.
30.9.2003. No relief has been claimed against the Ministry of Home, New Delhi. The
order dated 8.2.2005 was also passed by the Record Officer for Director General, Assam
Rifles vide which the petitioner was denied the prayed relief.

28. From the above narrated facts, it is clear that no cause of action or any part
thereof had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. None of the respondents
who are effectively concerned with the case of the petitioner are also resident within the
territorial jurisdiction of this court. The petitioner has not made any averments of breach
of any duty or obligation against respondent No. 1 and in fact no substantive relief has
been claimed against the said respondent.

29. In view of the principles discussed by us above, we have to accept the objection
taken by the respondents in relation to territorial jurisdiction and consequently this
petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the court of competent
jurisdiction.
WP(C) No. 11040/2004

30. The petitioner was enrolled as the member of the Armed Force. On 22nd March,
1999, he was placed under suspension by the order of Group Commandant on the
allegation that he was involved in a criminal case registered by Mumbai Police. On
16.4.1999 charge sheet was served upon the petitioner under Rule 34 of CISF Rules,
1969 by the Commandant Officer. According to the petitioner, he was falsely implicated
in the case. However, without considering the reply of the petitioner, an Inquiry Officer
was appointed, who submitted his report on 31st December, 1999 wherein it was stated
that charges were not proved. The Commandant vide order dated 4th January, 2000 had
disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Copy of the same was furnished to the
petitioner, who filed his detailed reply to the disagreement note issued by the
Commandant on 25th January, 2000. The Commandant vide his order dated 31st
January, 2000 removed the petitioner from service. Against this order of the
Commandant, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General, which
was also dismissed on 29th December, 2000. After the decision of the criminal Court on
25th August, 2003, the petitioner filed a representation to the DG for review of order
dated 31st January, 2000. Since the competent authority for considering the
representation of the petitioner was Inspector General, CISF, RCFL Mumbai, therefore,
his representation dated 25th August, 2003 was sent to the said Inspector General for
appropriate action. The said representation was treated as revision by the Inspection
General, CISF and the same was dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by
time and was not maintainable. This order was passed by the authorities on 31st
December, 2003. Validity of this order is in question in the present writ petition.
31. As is evident from the above narrated facts, all the orders were passed by the
authorities, which are situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The
petitioner had invoked remedies before the authorities, which are located at Mumbai or at
his own Battalion, which is posted in that sector. None of the authorities at Delhi have
dealt with the case of the petitioner. Original, Appellate and Revisional orders on the
reply/appeal/representation/revision filed by the petitioner were passed at Mumbai and
other places. No cause of action or part thereof has arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, we accept the objection taken by the respondents with
regard to maintainability of the present writ petition before this Court on the ground of
territorial jurisdiction.

32. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to
approach the court of competent jurisdiction. However, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
WP(C) No. 12018/2006

33. The petitioner was serving with Central Reserve Police Force. He was posted in
Battalion Head Quarter Shillong but was attached with 6th Battalion at Guwahati. On
22nd June, 1995, a charge sheet along with memorandum was served upon the petitioner.
Three article of charges were framed against the petitioner in relation to consuming
liquor while on bona fide government duty, misbehaving with a Nepali Girl and
assaulting her and firing two shots of live Amn. (7.62 mm) when he was scuffling with
the local girl and surrounded by the public without any provocation to scare the crowd
and lost 23 rounds of 7.62 mm Amn issued to him. As a result of this, the petitioner was
punished and dismissed from service. However, in May, 1997, IGP, NES, CRPF had set
aside the order of dismissal and ordered to conduct a de-novo departmental inquiry
against the petitioner. On 5th June, 1997, the petitioner was rein_tated in service with all
consequential benefits. On 26th November, 1997, the Inquiry Officer had submitted his
report at the place of posting of the petitioner. In furtherance to the said report, the
petitioner was dismissed from service in March, 1998. The petitioner filed an appeal
against the said order of dismissal on 25th January, 1999, which was also dismissed. The
revision petition filed by the petitioner was also rejected vide order dated 14th December,
1999. All these orders have been questioned by the petitioner in the present writ petition
primarily on the ground of illegality, arbitrariness and that the order of dismissal was
passed without holding any inquiry much less denovo inquiry.

34. We may notice that impugned order was passed by the Deputy Director General
of Police, CRPF Gauhati-23 on 29th April, 1999 and by the Commandant 6th Battalion
CRPF Chimukedima Dimapur (Nagaland) in March, 1998. Revisional order dated 14th
December, 1999 dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner was passed by
Director General, North-Eastern Sector, CRPF Guwahati. The petitioner had filed
appeal/revision against the order of dismissal before the authorities at Guwahati. Even
the second appeal/representation filed by the petitioner in July, 1999 was addressed to the
Inspector General of Police at Shillong, who was the competent authority to take decision
upon the representation. The disciplinary proceedings and all other proceedings against
the petitioner were taken place at Gauwahati or Shillong i.e. beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. No cause of action or part thereof has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the Office of the Director General,
CRPF is located at Delhi would not by itself vest this Court with territorial jurisdiction.
In fact it would be putting the parties to great inconvenience as all the records would have
to be summoned before this Court, which are available at different places in those areas.

35. Resultantly and in view of the above ennunciated principles of law, we are of the
view that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present writ
petition. The same is accordingly dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the
Court of competent jurisdiction. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
parties are left to bear their own costs.

SD./-
SWATANTER KUMAR,J

SD./-
G.S. SISTANI,J