SERIES III

ARC-FLASH HANDBOOK

ANDBOOK
SERIES III

ARC-FLASH

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ARC-FLASH
HANDBOOK

Published by
InterNational Electrical Testing Association
ARC-FLASH HANDBOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Verify Performance and Safety of Arc-Flash Detection Systems................................. 5
William Knapek and Mark Zeller

Electrical Safety – A Program Development Guide............................................... 10

Terry Becker

Low-Voltage Metal Enclosed Bus Duct Wetting Events............................................ 18

Dan Hook

Arc-Flash Hazard Mitigation by Transformer Differential Relay Protection................ 24

Randall Sagan and Mose Ramieh III

Safety Aspects of Breaker Protection and Coordination......................................... 29

Bruce M. Rockwell

Arc-Flash Mitigation Using Differential Protection................................................. 32

Brian Cronin

Metal Enclosed Medium-Voltage Air Switches: .................................................... 36

Condition Analysis and Hazard Awareness
Scott Blizard and Paul Chamberlain

Electrical Hazard Facts.................................................................................... 38

James R. White

Make Your Electrical Safety Program Your Own,

Part One: Why Won’t a Generic Program Work?................................................ 43
Don Brown

Published by

InterNational Electrical Testing Association

3050 Old Centre Avenue, Suite 101, Portage, Michigan 49024
269.488.6382
www.netaworld.org
Make Your Electrical Safety Program Your Own,
Part Two: What Should be in an Electrical Safety Program?.................................. 45
Don Brown

Make Your Electrical Safety Program Your Own,

Part Three: Implementation of an Electrical Safety Program................................... 48
Don Brown

Arc-Flash Analysis is Going Global.................................................................... 50

Lynn Hamrick

Arc-Rated Clothing and Electrical Hazard Footwear............................................. 53

Paul Chamberlain

Methods to Limit Arc-Flash Exposure on Low-Voltage Systems................................. 55

Scott Blizard

Why Do a Risk Assessment?............................................................................. 57

James R.White

Do I Need to Wear Arc-Rated PPE When Working

Around Energized Equipment?.......................................................................... 60
Ron Widup and James R.White

Published by

InterNational Electrical Testing Association

3050 Old Centre Avenue, Suite 101, Portage, Michigan 49024
269.488.6382
www.netaworld.org
 Published by
InterNational Electrical Testing Association
3050 Old Centre Avenue, Suite 101, Portage, Michigan 49024
269.488.6382
www.netaworld.org

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 Arc-Flash
VERIFY PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY OF
ARC-FLASH DETECTION SYSTEMS
PowerTest 2014
William Knapek, OMICRON Electronics Corp.
Mark Zeller, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
ARC-FLASH HISTORY
Protecting workers from electrical hazards is not a novel idea.
Since the first power generating station was built in 1877, the
benefits and hazards of electricity have been recognized. The top
engineers in the power industry have continuously worked to make
electric power more economical and reliable, as well as safer.
There have been many papers highlighting the hazards and
possible prevention of electrical arc flash; a new focus was
initiated in 1985, when Ralph Lee published the paper “The Other
Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc-Blast Burns.”
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) published NFPA
70E®: Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace® to document
electrical safety requirements.1 It defines specific rules for determin-
ing the category of electrical hazards and the personal protective
equipment (PPE) required for personnel in the defined and marked
hazard zones. The United States Occupational Safety and Health
Administration enforces the NFPA arc-flash requirements under its
general rule that a safe workplace must be maintained. These regu-
lations are forcing employers to review and modify their electrical
systems and work procedures to reduce arc-flash hazards.
IEEE 1584-2002 provides information on how to calculate arc
energy and establish boundary distances for personnel when work-
ing around energized electrical equipment. IEEE 1584 provides an
incident energy2 calculation method using the following formula:
E = 4.184 (Cf ) (En) (1)
where:
E is the incident energy in joules/cm2.
Cf is a calculation factor (1.0 for voltages above 1 kV, and 1.5 for
voltages below 1 kV).
En is the normalized incident energy.
t is the arc duration in seconds.
D is the distance from the arc in millimeters.
x is the distance exponent.
As shown by (1), the energy produced by an arc-flash event
is proportional to the voltage, current, and duration of the event
(V • I • t). IEEE 1584-2002 concluded that arc time has a direct
effect on incident energy. Therefore, reducing fault-clearing times
proportionately reduces arc-flash hazards.
5
There are several key elements in clearing an electrical arc. The
first step is detecting the flash, second is accurately determining if
the flash is part of an electrical fault, third is signaling the circuit
interrupting breaker, and the last is interrupting the current flow to
the fault. Each step in the process contributes time to the overall
time needed to clear the fault; therefore, a significant amount of
research has been invested in each part.
Many of the safe work practices, personal protective equipment,
approach boundaries, and warning labels are dependent on the
protection system that is in place to perform at the speed and
sensitivity specified by the equipment manufacturer. A performance
(by any of the components) that is slower than specified can
dramatically increase the available incident energy. Personnel
protection and procedures are based on properly working and
performing equipment. Until recently, no proper test system was in
place to evaluate the arc-flash detection equipment performance.
Users are now able to verify not just the performance of the
arc-detection equipment but also the system as a whole by in-
cluding the breaker in the commissioning circuit. Although this
paper only evaluates arc-flash detection systems, it is a straightfor-
ward extrapolation to include feeder and main breakers as well as
communications links in the system while commissioning the
arc-detection system.
TYPES OF ARC-FLASH DETECTION SYSTEMS
Arc-hazard detection systems have been evaluated that are
triggered from sound, pressure, current, and light, as well as
predictive systems based on ion detection or thermal imaging.
This paper focuses on arc-flash detection methods and leaves the
predictive methodologies to present their own merits. Although an
arc blast contains considerable sound and pressure waves, in the
race to fastest detection, these waves are much slower than light.
The fastest detection systems on the market today all use light as
the primary arc-detection medium. They include the following:
●● Light detection
●● Current detection
●● Combined light and current detection
Light detection systems have been commercially available for
many years and have proven to be reliable and effective. Arc-flash
6 Arc-Flash

safety considerations over the last few years have elevated an

interest in detecting and interrupting arc-flash incidents faster and
with high security. Table I provides a general range of response
times published by arc-flash detection system manufacturers.

Table 1: Detection Technology in Arc-Detection Systems

Published
Detection Technology Fig. 2: Fiber-optic cable and arc-flash point sensor
Response Time
Light only 1 to 7 ms
The main disadvantage of a light-only detection system is the
Current only, instantaneous 24 ms risk of tripping from a light source not related to an arc flash. These
Light with current supervision 1 to 7 ms sources include arc-welding reflections, camera flashes, spotlights,
Light and overcurrent 1 to 3 ms and even light fixture failures. Any source of light exceeding the de-
tection level in the relay will initiate a trip. Because of the very high-
Light-Only Detection Systems speed trip times of light-only systems, security is a serious concern.
Light detection systems are based on the principle that during
an arc-flash event, enough light will be detected by the receptor
Over-Current Only Detection Systems
to indicate a flash. This is generally accepted as a sound principle Over-current only detection schemes, although not intended
because the amount of light given off during an arc flash is signifi- specifically for this purpose, were the first arc-flash detection sys-
cant and contains nearly the entire light spectrum. Light is fast and tems invented. Generally, they were built to protect the equipment,
relatively easy to detect.3 not the people in the area. Because they were initially installed
for equipment protection, settings were normally chosen based on
Generally, there are two types of light detectors. The first is a
equipment damage, not personnel safety. As personnel safety has
remote-mounted receiver that converts the light given off by the flash
become a higher priority, the trip settings have been modified to
to some other form of signal that is transmitted to the tripping device.
provide separate levels of protection for equipment and personnel.
This type of sensor often uses a copper conductor for the transmission
signal carrier, as shown in Fig. 1. Copper wire is common, reliable, A common practice today is to implement a maintenance
and flexible but also has the capability to carry current in the event of switch (Fig. 3) that changes the protection settings in a relay
contact with the bus bars or other current-carrying conductors. from time-coordinated protection (equipment-level protection) to
instantaneous (personnel-level protection) settings while people
The second type of detector acts as a lens to collect the light
are working in or around the energized equipment. Although
produced from the flash and channel it back to a receptor in the
instantaneous settings can reduce the arc-flash hazard under some
tripping device. This channeling of the light is accomplished
conditions, they can also create hazards if misapplied.
through fiber-optic cables (see Fig. 2). Fiber-optic cables have
the advantage of not conducting electricity, thereby avoiding the
installation of a conductor in the electrical gear. Fiber optic also
has the advantages of electrical isolation between the receptor and
the tripping device, easy installation, online complete functional
testing, and choice of sensors. The disadvantages of fiber-optic
cables include that they are easy to damage during installation,
with either a too-tight bending radius or scarring of the fiber wall,
and the possible need for special splicing tools.

Fig. 3: Breaker control with maintenance switch

IEEE defines an instantaneous setting as having no intentional

Fig. 1: Arc-flash sensor with copper wires
delay in the output.4 Notice, however, that this does not specify
how fast a trip element needs to respond in order to qualify as
instantaneous. This allows for significant variation in the response
times of instantaneous elements between manufacturers and even
from model to model of protective relays. All instantaneous trip
elements are not created equal. Instantaneous trip response times are
dependent on the magnitude and duration of the overcurrent. Internal
 Arc-Flash
signal filtering and the speed of the processing logic within the relay
result in variations in instantaneous responses. Historic testing has
found that traditional instantaneous elements have a pickup time of
two cycles.
When protection engineers build protective relays, they must
balance the often competing characteristics of sensitivity and
security. For a protective relay, security is defined as the ability
to trip when needed and not trip when not needed. Although
this is a simplistic definition of security, differentiating between
an overcurrent signal and noise on the input channel must be
carefully considered. Protective relay manufacturers have a
detailed understanding of current transformer signal variation
and the effects of saturation on the current signal; this may not be
true of all manufacturers of arc-flash detecting devices. Therefore,
when selecting a relay to be used for arc-flash hazard mitigation,
carefully evaluate each manufacturer for experience, speed,
sensitivity, and security.
One challenge of a current-only detection system is selecting the
proper trip settings. The settings must be high enough to ignore nor-
mal variation in current, yet low enough to quickly detect an event.
Instantaneous settings that are too high endanger personnel and pro-
vide a false sense of safety. For example, by changing the settings on
a feeder relay from the time-coordinated delay of 0.5 seconds to an in-
stantaneous setting of 0.12 seconds, you could assume the arc-hazard
energy dropped from 29 cal/cm2 to 4.5 cal/cm2 .5 This assumes that the
current remains at the calculated available fault current. If the fault cur-
rent is reduced (because of higher-than-expected impedance) to below
the instantaneous setting, the relay would not trip on the instantaneous
element. In that case, even with a lower fault current, the available
arc-flash energy would be higher than the previously calculated level
and personnel working in PPE rated for the lower hazard would be
in jeopardy.
A second issue with this method is determining the trip time to use
in the incident energy calculations. Since the trip time varies with
the magnitude of the fault, the protection engineer is left without
fixed time duration to use for incident energy, approach boundary
conditions, safety procedures and personal protective equipment.
Light With Current Supervision Systems
Any arc-detection scheme that only evaluates a single quantity has
serious security concerns. One security improvement is to supervise
the light detection with a current element. This system measures the
current and only enables the light detection trip element if the current
is above some predetermined level. This application does not moni-
tor for a fault current; it only disables the light trip element when the
current is below a preset point. Supervision systems typically recom-
mend current enable levels just below the expected normal operating
load. Setting the supervision level too high disables the light portion
of the arc detection. Setting it too low removes the security benefit of
current monitoring. Current supervision systems only provide a mod-
est improvement in security during low-current conditions.
7
Light and Overcurrent Detection Systems
Modern protection systems make full use of both overcurrent
and light detection to create a scheme that is both fast and secure.
Combining fault current detection AND logic manner with the
light detection element, tripping only when both are present, cre-
ate a very secure scheme.
One of the challenges of combining the two elements is to make
sure the fault detection element for the current is as fast as the light
detection element. This is accomplished by using special high-speed
sampling and logic to match the response times of both elements with
no delay. Although there is some reduced security with the faster
current detection element, the combination of overcurrent and light
detection more than compensates for any sacrifice in the current
security.
Consequences of Misoperation
The consequences of misoperation of the arc-flash detection
scheme depend on the process and arc-suppression system. When
isolating the fault with a standard circuit breaker, the result of
a false trip (tripping when no fault is present) can be evaluated
based on the consequences of the load lost. Failure of the system
to trip when a fault is present will result in normal circuit protec-
tion with the associated incident energy. If personnel working in
an area with PPE expect high-speed arc detection and the system
responds with slower overcurrent protection, serious injury may
result. Therefore, it is imperative that the system is reliable and
tested often. Self-checking systems can increase confidence and
provide warning in the event of a failure before personnel enter the
risk zone. Modern arc-flash systems continuously test not just the
relay, but the continuity and function of the sensors as well.
Some systems, rather than just isolating the faulted circuit, also
provide an alternate path to ground for the fault circuit. These
systems use a crowbar circuit or an arc-containment system to
redirect the current. In addition to the concerns previously stated,
a false trip (tripping when no fault exists) creates a strain on all the
equipment in the system. Fault current, although not from a fault,
is created by the system itself as it attempts to divert the system
current to ground while isolating the presumed circuit.
TESTING PROCEDURES
Arc-flash detection systems were tested in the configurations
designated in the respective manufacturer instruction manuals.
The testing was executed with the same test system and used a
single arc-flash test device to generate the flash. The block diagram
of the testing setup is shown in Fig. 4.
The purpose of the tests was to demonstrate the performance of
each type of arc-flash detection system. Testing included subject-
ing the systems to a light flash, an overcurrent surge, and a combi-
nation of both light and overcurrent.
8 Arc-Flash

Current to Relay
Multifunction
IRIG Clock for Arc-Flash
Relay Test
Synchronization Relay
Device Trip Outputs From Relay

Synchronized
IRIG Flash

Arc Arc-
Flash Test
Flash Detection
Device
Unit

Fig. 4: Test system block diagram

In setting up the tests a multifunction test set was used that provid-
ed current output, IRIG-B synchronization, high speed binary/analog
inputs to measure the contact response time, and binary outputs to
control the IRIG-B signal to the flash. The test set also provided a DC
power supply to the relays that needed power. A single-phase test set,
current output, was connected to the current input of the relay. The
high-speed output contact of the relay was connected to the test set.
The high-speed outputs required a wetting voltage and a load so a DC
relay was used as the load and 110vdc was applied. This required that
the test set inputs be configured to trigger on a wetted contact.
Fig. 5: Typical test screen showing fault initiation and time to trip
One of the variables in setting up the testing procedure was the
use of analog adjustment knobs (shown in Fig. 6) on some of the
arc-flash detection systems. Modern relays avoid this subjectivity
by using digital settings to exactly program the sensitivity. The
adjustment knobs on some of the systems made the sensitivity
setting inexact and nonrepeatable.

The tests were set up using a state sequencer program; prefault, fault,
and post-fault states were used. The flash was synchronized so that it
was applied with the current at the start of the fault state. A current
value above the pickup level was used in the tests that evaluated current
supervision. After the first tests, it was found that the flash generator
would flash with each IRIG pulse. This led to misoperations, so a
binary output contact from the test set was inserted in the IRIG signal
to the flash generator. This caused a delay in the activation of the flash
generator, so a two-pulse delay state was inserted before the fault state.
The first test performed was an overcurrent surge test or normal
overcurrent event. This test included a prefault state, a IRIG-B
starting state, a fault state that included the fault current and a post Fig. 6: Arc protection analog setting knob
fault state for timing purposes. This test did not produce a flash
when the current was applied.
TESTING RESULTS
The second test was a flash without current. In this test sequence,
The response times from the tests are shown in Table 2. Overall,
the same set up was used but no current was applied to the relay.
the systems tested matched the actual performance with published
The third test performed was a flash and overcurrent fault applied
specifications from the manufacturers. Each system was tested for
to the relay using the same test sequences. Finally, a test was
possible false trips by subjecting the systems to flashes of light
performed with nominal load current, one amp secondary, and a
without the corresponding current, as well as current without light.
flash to confirm the security of the relay with current supervision.
This setup was used for all the relays in the study. The timing
was evaluated using the time signal view of the test set software. Device
Detection Published Response Actual Response
The beginning of the IRIG pulse to the initiation of the output Technology Time Time
contact was measured, and the results are shown in Fig. 5 and in
Table 2 (later in this paper). A Light only <2.5 ms 0.6 ms

A Current only, instantaneous No overcurrent element NA

 Arc-Flash 9

A Light with current supervision <2.5 ms 0.7 ms

using current alone, such as instantaneous trip maintenance sys-
tems, have the difficult task of balancing security and sensitivity,
A Load current and flash No trip No trip
along with the variation in trip times encountered from different
B Light only <1 ms 1.3 ms fault levels and manufacturer variations.
B Current only, instantaneous <1 ms Did not trip
REFERENCES
B Light and overcurrent <1 ms 1.2 ms
1
 FPA 70E®: Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace®,
N
B Load current and flash No Trip Tripped
2012 edition.
C Light only 2 to 5 ms 3.3 ms 2
I EEE Standard 1584-2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-
C Current only, instantaneous 24 ms 22 ms Flash Hazard Calculations.
C Light and overcurrent 2 to 5 ms 3.0 ms 3
 . Hughes, V. Skendzic, D. Das, and J. Carver, “High-Current
B
C Load current and flash No trip No trip Qualification Testing of an Arc-Flash Detection System,” pro-
D Light only <1 ms 0.9 ms ceedings of the 9th Annual Power Systems Conference, Clem-
son, SC, March 2010.
D Current only, instantaneous <1 ms 6.5 ms
4
I EEE Standard 100-1996, The IEEE Standard Dictionary of
D Light with current supervision <1 ms 1.5 to 2 ms
Electrical and Electronics Terms, 6th ed.
5
 . Zeller and G. Scheer, “Add Trip Security to Arc-Flash
M
Detection for Safety and Reliability,” proceedings of the 35th
D Load current and flash No trip No trip
Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA,
October 2008.
Table 2: Arc-Flash Relay Testing Results

Relay A has no separate overcurrent output, so the overcurrent
element could not be evaluated. Relay B would trip with light only.
Relay B has an overcurrent unit that provides a blocking signal
when an overcurrent event occurs; this function did not work on
the relay used in this study.
CONCLUSION
Personnel safety while working around energized electrical
equipment depends on the proper performance of several key devices.
Personal protective equipment is specified based on published
performance specifications from the equipment manufacturers.
While this paper was only able to evaluate four arc-flash detection
systems, it does reflect well that the equipment performs as expected.
The authors of this paper are continuing to test available arc-flash
detection systems and will update this paper with the results.
All the arc-detection relays were able to detect and signal a trip
at the published interval. Evaluation of the arc-detection system
should be based on the quality, reliability, sensitivity, security,
and usability of the system. Fast trip times do not necessarily
make the best overall protection system. Security against false
trips from electrical or light noise can be as important as the
speed of the system.
When selecting arc-hazard mitigation schemes, engineers need
to understand the pros and cons of each technology. The fastest
detection and trip times are accomplished with arc-flash light de-
tection systems. These systems can use light only or can be made
more secure with the addition of current supervision or best with
overcurrent detection. Systems using either light or current alone
are not as secure as the combination of both technologies. Systems
William Knapek is the Technical Support and Training Manager
for OMICRON Electronics Corp. USA. He holds a BS from East
Carolina University and an AS from Western Kentucky University,
both in Industrial Technology. He retired from the U.S. Army as a
Chief Warrant Officer after 20 years of service, of which 15 were
in the power field. Will has been active in the testing field since
1995, and he owned and operated a testing company for 10 years.
He is certified as a Senior NICET Technician, Certified Plant
Engineer, and a former NETA Level IV technician. Will is also a
member of IEEE.
Mark Zeller received his BS from the University of Idaho in 1985.
He has broad experience in industrial power system maintenance,
operations, and protection. He worked over 15 years in the paper
industry, working in engineering and maintenance with respon-
sibility for power system protection and engineering. Prior to
joining Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL) in 2003,
he was employed by Fluor to provide engineering and consult-
ing services. He has held positions in research and development,
marketing, and business development. Mark has authored several
technical papers and has patents pending through SEL. He has
been a member of IEEE since 1985.
10
ELECTRICAL SAFETY – A PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE
PowerTest 2016
Terry Becker, P.ENG., CESCP, IEEE Senior Member
The Upstream Oil and Gas Industry (UOGI) in Canada is
significant in size and employs thousands of workers who are
exposed daily to workplace hazards, which include arc flash and
shock. Occupational health and safety management systems are
common and mature within the companies that are producers
and within the services industries that support the producers,
but there is a lack of content included related to arc flash and
shock or the development and implementation of stand-alone
Electrical Safety Programs that effectively address proactive
management of arc-flash and shock hazards.
The “Safety Association” for Canada’s Upstream Oil and Gas
Industry was solicited by its six member associations to address
the implementation of a “Guide” to assist the member associations
in reviewing a “systems approach” to effective management of
electrical hazards and the development and implementation of an
Electrical Safety Program.
Consistency in policies, practices, and procedures related to arc
flash and shock was a desired state for the Upstream Oil and Gas In-
dustry. It was assessed that providing guidance on how to build, im-
plement, and maintain a discipline-specific Occupational Health &
Safety Management System (OHSMS) for arc flash and shock, an
Electrical Safety Program would provide direction to the Upstream
Oil and Gas Industry with the goal of consistency and sustain-
ability. The “Safety Association” initiated a project and a steering
committee with representatives from the six Upstream Oil and Gas
member associations was constituted to draft a guideline. Once de-
veloped, the “Safety Association” would provide the Guideline for
reference to member companies and individuals. This third-party
“Safety Association” provides training and documentation tools for
the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry in Canada.
THE SAFETY ASSOCIATION
Representing hundreds of individual companies, the “Safety
Association” was constituted with the following mandate:
●● Help companies improve their safety performance with
proven practices and certification tools.
●● Provide training, guidance, and other support to help
companies adopt and apply practices to improve safety
performance.
●● Gather, analyze, report, and use industry-safety
performance data.
Arc-Flash
●● Foster and promote a strong industry safety culture with timely
and targeted communications and advocacy.
The Vision and Mission of the “Safety Association” are as follows:
●● Vision: No work-related incidents or injuries in the Canadian
Upstream Oil and Gas Industry.
●● Mission: An advocate and leading resource for the continuous
improvement of safety performance. Our mission is to help
companies achieve their safety goals by providing practices,
assessment, training, support, metrics, and communication.
SCOPE OF GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT –
GUIDELINE CONTENT
As quoted in the developed Guideline, the intent and purpose was
to develop a Guideline written specifically for the oil and gas industry
and provide a framework to develop and address electrical safety
within a company’s Occupational Health and Safety Management
System (OHSMS). The Guideline discusses Electrical Safety
Programs (ESP) as they apply to large and small employers and
would actually apply to any employer in the industrial, commercial
or institutional sectors.
The Guideline for Electrical Safety Programs Development
deals with safe work practices and not safe installations.
For guidance on safe installations practices, the user of the
Guideline should reference the Canadian Electrical Code
Part 1, C22.1 or the National Electrical Code NFPA 70 and
jurisdictional specific requirements.
For member companies of the “Safety Association” the Guideline
can be used by producers, drilling companies, service companies,
transportation companies, seismic companies, exploration
companies, and other companies that provide specific support to the
UOGI in Canada (electrical and instrumentation services providers,
construction services providers, cathodic protection service providers,
hydrocarbon transmission companies, and other companies).
The Guideline was developed with reference to industry related
publications, however it is not exhaustive. The user of the
Guideline is advised to defer to published standards and applicable
legislation for specific guidance. The document was intended as
a guideline and not as a compliance standard. The Guideline was
not intended to be a protocol for the audit of an ESP.
 Arc-Flash
GUIDELINE INTRODUCTION
The “Introduction” of the Guideline provides background and
identifies the need for the development and implementation of
an ESP. Businesses are impacted by the requirements imposed
related to Occupational Health & Safety Regulations.
OHSMS standards require that all hazards related to a worker
completing a work task be documented. Recognition is given to
the fact that the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry employs thousands
of workers on a daily basis and that incidents can and have occurred
related to the electrical hazards of arc flash and shock.
The Guideline recognizes that the application of industry
practices such as those outlined in consensus based standards like
the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Standard, can provide
useful information.
There is immediate recognition in the Guideline that a discipline-
specific OHSMS for electrical hazards, an “Electrical Safety
Program,” can be created as a stand-alone document or integrated
within an overall OHSMS. Either way, a safety management system
provides for good due diligence in documenting policies and practices
and ensuring sustainable and measurable performance.
The Guideline specifically outlines that an employer is obligated
under the requirements of Occupational Health and Safety Law
(OHSL) law to identify workplace hazards, and apply controls to
reduce risk. The Guideline stresses that an ESP can provide for
effective due diligence. The best due diligence is comprised of
establishing an OHSMS, ensuring the system is adequate and that it
shall be monitored to confirm its effectiveness.
The Guideline further emphasizes the need for a methodical
process and increased due diligence to be followed by clarifying
that the electrical hazards of arc flash and shock can lead to serious
harm or death. It recommends the following process be followed:
●● Identify electrical hazards related to work tasks.
●● Assess the electrical hazards and associated risk related to the
work task.
●● Document the application of preventive and protective control
measures to reduce risk to as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP).
●● Train workers to identify electrical hazards and to apply
appropriate preventive and protective control measures to
reduce risk.
●● Monitor the effectiveness of the control measures in reducing
risk by performing audits.
In order for UOGI employers to understand why an ESP is
needed, the Guideline poses several questions to have the employer
better understand their business risk. Examples of specific UOGI
work task scenarios are provided to place specific emphasis on
worker roles and work tasks in the UOGI where electrical hazards
are present. The Guideline recognizes that all workers on a worksite
can be exposed to electrical hazards.
11
DEVELOPING AN ELECTRICAL SAFETY PROGRAM
The Guideline advises that an Electrical Safety Program (ESP)
documents policies and practices that are directly related to the
work tasks completed where electrical energy is present. When
considering the development of an ESP an employer should consider
the overall OHSMS first. The ESP that is developed can be a detailed
and comprehensive document, a more simplified document or, where
the organization is small and undertakes work of a low risk, may
only need to add a small amount of content directly into the overall
OHSMS. The Guideline provides a simple “Electrical Safety
Program Development Checklist” that can be referenced and used
at the beginning of the project to review what a company should do.
In developing an ESP an employer should ensure that they
review and understand the existing OHSMS practices and
requirements. The Guideline outlines that the overall OHSMS’s
framework may be modeled after the elements outlined in the
CSA Z1000 Occupational Health and Safety Management
Standard (or ANSI Z10 for the United States).
Developing and implementing an ESP should consider the
culture of the organization and the specific behaviors of workers.
The ESP can include concepts that influence worker behavior such
as TEST-BEFORE-TOUCH.
When considering developing an ESP, a key to its success will be
ensuring senior management commitment and leadership. Ensure
that management is involved and understands the benefits that the
ESP will provide. When involving management ensure that the cost
benefit of electrical safety is clearly identified.
Involving stakeholders in the development and implementation
of an ESP is key to its short and long term success. Constituting an
Electrical Safety Steering Committee (ESSC) of representative
stakeholders (management, safety, supervisors, engineering,
qualified electrical workers, operations, non-electrical task
qualified workers, planners/schedulers), who are consulted and
directly involved, provides a mechanism for consensus-based
decisions and buy-in at all levels of the organization that would
be impacted.
At the beginning of the development project, the Guideline
advises that a thorough review of Occupational Health & Safety
Regulations (OHSR) is required to understand legal obligations.
In Canada, provincial and federal OHSRs differ and an
organization needs to understand what regulations apply, to their
business. It is noted that whether provincial or federal regulations
apply, they will both include requirements for an employer to
identify workplace hazards, and that steps would be required to
protect workers from those hazards (“General Duty Clause”). In
Canada, depending on the province, there may be specific detailed
requirements for electrical safety. The Guideline provides a list
of standards that an organization may want to reference when
developing an ESP. Due diligence to regulations can be fulfilled
by applying applicable industry standards.
12
Project Manager-
Electrical Safety
Program Manager
Senior
Management
Sponsor
Engineering Engineering- Planners/
Safety
Projects Maintenance Schedulers
Before undertaking the development of an ESP there should
be a clear understanding of the status quo and how the existing
OHSMS addresses workplace hazards and key areas that need
to be considered with respect to electrical hazards. It is recom-
mended that part of the plan in how to and what to develop starts
with completing a “Safety Audit or Gap Analysis” of the compa-
ny’s existing OHSMS. This process would also assist the ESSC
in gaining an understanding and becoming educated on what the
ESP can accomplish. Some key questions that the “Safety Audit
or Gap Analysis” can address are:
●● What are the electrical hazards?
●● What energized electrical work tasks are performed and by
what worker role?
●● What needs to be done to mitigate or control electrical
hazards?
Phase 1 Project Manager/Electrical
Safety Program Manager assigned.
Get organized. Management commit-
ment and sponsor. Safety engaged.
Electrical Safety Steering Committee
(ESSC) constituted. Schedule. Gap
Analaysis. Deliverables.
ESP
Phase 3 Electrical Safety Program
is finalized. Management approval
received.
Arc-Flash
E&I Qualified
E&I
Operations Maintenance Electrical
Supervisor(s)
Manager Worker(s)
●● What controls are currently in place (e.g. any existing proce-
dures developed and used)?
●● Are the controls adequate to ensure safety?
●● Have any engineering incident energy analysis studies been
completed? Where do they need to be completed, under
what priority?
●● What is needed in terms of training?
●● What is needed in terms of Electrical Specific PPE, Tools
and Equipment?
The Guideline provides a “Site Assessment Checklist” that can
be used in completing the electrical hazard specific “Safety Audit
or Gap Analysis.”
It is recommended that the development of the ESP be com-
pleted as a defined “project.” The project could be divided into
four (4) distinct phases:
Phase 2 ESSC reviews require-
ments and develops Electrical
Safety Program. Project based
approach. Educated ESSC. Gap
Analyis. Consensus.
Phase 4 is rolled out to QEWs
and other workers. ESSC meets
annually. Internal Electrical Safety
Audits. Every 3 years major review
and MOC to update.
 Arc-Flash 13

ELEMENTS OF AN ELECTRICAL ●● CSA Z1000 Occupational health and safety management

SAFETY PROGRAM
With a detailed review completed, a clear understanding
that there are gaps in what may have been undertaken to date,
a constituted ESSC in place and engaged to be used for the
development of a Electrical Safety Program (ESP), an orga-
nization, can then move to defining the “elements” or “frame-
work” of the ESP that would be suited to their company and
their existing OHSMS. When considering the ESP for an
organization, the Guideline provides a list of “elements” that
should be considered. The resulting developed ESP then needs
to be approved by management and implemented to achieve
the desired outcome of sustainable and measurable electrical
safety, and in the UOGI in Canada, consistently. With respect
to the “elements” to consider, the Guideline makes reference to
processes and content in relevant standards and government-
sponsored programs in Canada such as:
Standard (the equivalent in the United States is ANSI
Z10 Occupational Health and Safety Management)
●● Provincial Certificate of Recognition (COR) framework for
an Occupational Health and Safety Management System (e.g.
OSHA Voluntary Protection Program in the United States).
A key philosophy promoted in OHSMS standards is a
continuous improvement process for safety and electrical
safety. This is also promoted in the Guideline: a PLAN,
DO, CHECK, ACT (PDCA) philosophy, as depicted in the
diagram below.
The following is a list of “elements” that can be considered when
building an ESP. The Guideline provides comments on what may
be considered with each element of the Electrical Safety Program.

Act
• Management review
• Contrual Improvement
Plan
• Planning Review
• Legal and other requirements
• Hazard identification and
risk assessment
• OHS objectives and targets

Check
• Monitoring and measurement
• Incident Investigation and analysis
• Internal Audits
• Preventative and corrective action
Do
• Infrastructure and resources
• Preventive and protective measures
• Emergency prevention, preparedness,
and response
• Competence and training
• Communication and awareness
• Procurement and contracting
• Management of change
• Documentation

Fig.1: Model of an occupational health and safety management system

14 Arc-Flash

Hazard
Safe Risk
Identification
References Installations Assessment
Policies &
Practices
Program
PPE, Tools &
Management
Equipment

Roles &
Responsibilities Training

Incident
Principles Reporting & Emer-
gency Response

Scope Audit

Purpose Management
of Change

Policy, Purpose and Scope The ESP would provide a risk assessment process and expect a
hierarchy of controls to be applied to reduce risk. The hierarchy of
The ESP should include a clear statement of the intentions of the
controls outlined are:
program, the “Principles” the program will apply, what it will
be used to accomplish, what work is authorized, what facilities ●● Elimination of the hazard;
it applies to, what workers it applies to, etc. These are summary ●● Substitution;
statements, with the detailed content to be provided in the body
of the program. ●● Implementation of engineering controls;
●● The use warning signs and barricading;
Roles and Responsibilities
●● Implementation of administrative controls, through safe
Important to not only the development and implementation of the work procedures and training;
ESP, but key to the day-to-day application of the program is a clear
understanding of the specific roles and responsibilities of everyone ●● Personal protective equipment.
involved. Two of the primary roles of workers in the field that
The Guidelines provides specific information related to the
are directly impacted are the Qualified Electrical Worker and Non-
hierarchy of controls that can be considered.
Electrical Worker.

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Electrical System Data

The ESP will rely on electrical system data to be made avail-
The ESP should provide for a documented process that is uti-
able to affected workers and this information will play a criti-
lized by the affected worker to identify and quantify electri-
cal role in safe work planning and executing procedures. The
cal hazards. Industry accepted processes, such as Job Hazard
ESP should outline requirements and identify specific electrical
Analysis (JHA) Job Safety Analysis (JSA), or Field Level
system data such as: single line diagrams and other drawings,
Hazard Analysis (FLHA), may be available for the worker
equipment labeling requirements for arc flash and shock and
to use. The ESP would outline a process where the employ-
electrical rooms, and buildings and substation signage to warn
er works with employees and provides them tools to apply.
workers and identify restrictions.
The ESP would provide specific information on the process
to determine voltage of equipment, on establishing approach
boundaries for shock and on determining the level of arc-rated Electrically Safe Work Condition
clothing at an assumed working distance and what the arc-flash The most important element of an ESP should be a clear statement
boundary is. and details related to de-energizing electrical equipment before
working on it. In the applicable industry standards, this process is
 Arc-Flash
referred to as an “Electrically Safe Work Condition.” Critical to
this process is determining the absence of voltage and applying
a TEST-BEFORE-TOUCH process.
A priority of the ESP should be to minimize the amount of
energized electrical work performed and ensure that the risk
associated to that work is understood and reduced to as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Power Line Safety
The Guideline identifies that in the Upstream Oil and Gas In-
dustry, high voltage power lines both overhead and buried pose
a significant risk related to transportation and movement of high
loads, excavation activities, hoisting and reaching, and drilling
and boring.
Any work task or activity in proximity to high voltage “Utility”
transmission, distribution and substation facilities will require
employees to identify, assess and control exposure to electrical
hazards. Safe “Limits of Approach” shall be established for
work by contacting the “Utility” owner if work will be completed
within 7 metres (approx. 23 feet) of the high voltage transmission,
distribution lines or substation.
Workers must be trained in emergency response procedures
should they find themselves near a downed power line or if an
underground power line is contacted or if they are involved in a
collision with an overhead power line.
Job Planning Meetings
An ESP should specify requirements that assigned work tasks,
where there may be exposure to electrical hazards, require pre-job
planning that would include:
●● Identification and evaluation of the hazards associated with
the work task and, specifically, electrical hazards.
●● Completion of a risk assessment related to the work task.
●● A plan for executing the work task, including the
development of procedures that would be utilized.
●● Identifying required Electrical Specific PPE, Tools &
Equipment for the work task.
The ESP would also outline that a pre-job briefing be completed
for all workers involved. The Guideline identifies that examples
of a pre-job briefing and planning checklist are provided in the
CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Standard (or NFPA 70E
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace).
Operating Fixed Electrical Equipment
Within the ESP Roles & Responsibilities section, workers will
be identified that will be authorized to operate circuit breakers,
disconnect switches, push buttons, relays, etc. The ESP should
include information on:
15
●● Qualifications and training requirements for workers who
operate electrical equipment.
●● Proper body positioning when operating electrical equipment.
●● Ensuring the equipment is in a normal operating condition
(all doors closed and latched).
●● Identifying if any PPE is required depending on the specific
work task and equipment conditions.
●● I dentifying abnormal conditions while operating the
equipment, and if an abnormal condition is identified,
ensuring it is reported to a Qualified Electrical Worker for
further investigation.
●● Proper investigation of tripped protective devices by a
Qualified Electrical Worker.
Portable Electric Equipment and Extension Cords
Portable electric equipment and the use of extension cords can
pose a significant shock risk to all workers in the workplace. The
Guideline advises that an effective ESP will identify the risk of
exposure and specific requirements. Often in the workplace this
equipment is overlooked or poorly managed. This equipment
is approved for use and must be maintained or an increased risk
of shock and electrocution can result. Safe installation Codes
identify the need for equipment bonding and grounding; the
degradation or damage to these controls can increase risk of
exposure. All workers should follow specific procedures when
using this equipment. A key control related to reducing risk is
the use of Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters (GFCIs) when the
portable equipment and extension cords are used in indoor or
outdoor locations where water may be present. A Class A GFCI
must be used when this condition exists.
Extension cords are used in all workplaces and by all workers. If
improperly assembled and not maintained, they pose a shock and
electrocution risk to the worker. Qualified Electrical Workers are the
only authorized workers to assemble and maintain extension cords.
In the United States an Assured Equipment Grounding
Conductor Program can be implemented.
Temporary Power Distribution Systems
The Guideline outlines that in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry,
during construction and maintenance turnarounds, extensive
use of temporary power distribution systems are used to provide
power to portable electric equipment and other loads such as
lighting. The temporary power systems need to be installed to
the requirements of the applicable safe installations Code and
procedures put in place to ensure identification of potential elec-
trical hazards. The temporary power distribution systems must
be inspected for damage and proper electrical protective devices
installed and functioning (GFCIs).
16
Electrical Specific Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
The Guideline identifies that the ESP should provide
information on the employers specific requirements to protect
Qualified Electrical Workers from arc flash and shock. Specific
requirements should be documented related to:
●● Specification of Electrical Specific PPE, Tools & Equipment.
●● When Electrical Specific PPE should be worn.
●● How to select appropriate PPE, tools and equipment.
●● Minimum requirements.
●● Requirements for proper care and maintenance.
●● Requirements for testing rubber insulating gloves every
6 months.
●● Requirements for testing “live-line” tools every 24 months.
●● Requirements for testing Temporary Protective Grounds
every 36 months.
Equipment and Tools for Electrical Work
Where work tasks are justified and authorized to be completed
related to energized electrical equipment, the ESP should provide
policies and requirements for the specification and use of the
following: test equipment such as digital multi-meters used to
test circuits for the absence of voltage, test equipment for use on
high voltage equipment (i.e. >1000V), insulated hand tools, and
insulating “live-line” tools.
The ESP will outline that test equipment must be appropriately
rated for the intended use and be in good working condition. The
test equipment and insulated or insulating hand tools shall be pre-
use inspected and checked by the Qualified Electrical Worker
before it is used.
Training
The ESP should outline the specific electrical safety training
requirements for each worker role. The training should consider
the work tasks performed by the worker role and what level of
training is required. A training matrix is identified and should
be developed for all workers that operate and maintain energized
electrical work.
The ESP should identify the training frequency for different
worker roles and the Guideline recognizes that CSA Z462
Workplace Electrical Safety Standard (or NFPA 70E Standard for
Electrical Safety in the Workplace) recommends that the training
interval should not exceed three (3) years.
The ESP should outline how the training is delivered and that
training documentation is required to be retained.
The Guideline also outlines that beyond “qualification” training
a specific documented competency validation process should be
used. This may be of critical importance for Qualified Electrical
Workers that perform critical high-risk work tasks. The process of
Arc-Flash
validation can be completed by the worker’s supervisor or another
delegated Qualified Electrical Worker that has demonstrated and
has been deemed competent. The Guideline provides a sample list
of what may be required for electrical safety competencies.
Maintenance and Housekeeping
The Guideline outlines that the ESP should address the
requirement for electrical equipment maintenance to be performed
on a regular basis and that general housekeeping around electrical
equipment is required.
Specific mention is made with respect to the importance of
arc-flash incident energy for circuit breakers to be exercised and
tested at a regular frequency. The maintenance performed will
ensure that the circuit breaker will operate in the specific amount
of time required in order to limit incident energy in the event that
an arcing fault occurs on energized electrical equipment.
Depending on the electrical equipment, simple maintenance, such
as cleaning dust and other contaminants, can reduce the probability
of arcing faults occurring. Visual inspections should be completed
on a regular basis to identify excessive corrosion, overheating or
damage to electrical systems such as grounding. Examples of non-
intrusive electrical inspections are infrared and ultrasonic.
Safety by Design
As identified in the Guideline and as a priority control in the
hierarchy of controls to reduce risk, engineering “Safety by Design”
related to new electrical equipment and upgrades should be
documented in the ESP. This should be considered by the employer
(the owner of the electrical equipment) and the design engineer.
The Guideline outlines that in all instances, electrical hazard risk
exposure should be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable at
the design phase of an electrical power distribution system.
Safety related design requirements may consider the following:
●● Reducing the risk by eliminating or limiting the need for
interaction.
●● Reducing incident energy where technically possible and
considering reliability.
●● Reducing risk of exposure to shock by segregation,
additional guarding, insulated bus and terminations, and
finger safe components.
●● Increasing the working distance.
●● Installing infrared and ultrasonic inspection ports.
●● Installing permanent voltage and current meters.
●● Installing neutral grounding resistors to limit a single phase
fault from escalating to a three phase fault.
It is recognized that there are a variety of “Safety by Design”
options that can be applied and that implementation may be
limited by technical feasibility and cost. A cost benefit analysis
is required during design.
 Arc-Flash
Emergency Response to Electrical Incidents and Fires
The Guideline outlines that if electrical incidents occur, they
must be properly reported to the jurisdiction having authority and
managed. The employers’ overall Emergency Response Plan
must consider emergency response requirements to electrical
incidents that would be outlined in the ESP.
The ESP should provide specific policies and procedures
related to who can implement emergency response and what
must be considered. Specific mention of requirements related
to emergency release of a shock victim should be documented
in the ESP.
Training requirements related to first-aid and CPR for emergency
response shall be provided in the ESP.
Where emergency responders of the Upstream Oil and Gas
Industry are available to respond to fires, they should receive
appropriate training related to the risk of exposure to electric shock
and what they must do.
IMPLEMENTATION
Finally after the development of an ESP, as identified in the
Guideline, is completed, it will be required to be implemented and
maintained on a go-forward basis.
The Guideline identifies 6 key components to successfully
implementing the ESP:
●● People – involve people with the required knowledge and skills.
●● Resources – allow sufficient time and resources.
●● Budget – ensure budgets have been identified for implemen-
tation and maintenance of the program.
●● Structure – ensure the role of an ESP Manager has been as-
signed and that regular Electrical Safety Steering Committee
meetings are held.
●● Systems – Use the safety management system to track progress
and establish performance milestones. Ensure that the required
Internal Electrical Safety Audit and/or Gas Analysis is completed
every 12 months and corrective actions implemented.
●● C
 ulture – Create an environment that connects employees to
the ESP and develop creative consequences for achieving or
not achieving targets.
Use the Plan, Do, Check, Act continuous improvement phi-
losophy to drive the success of the ESP. Get affected workers
engaged and encourage feedback and suggestions on how the
ESP can be improved.
Ensure that the ESP is working, responsive, and current by
implementing audits and/or gap analysis. The ESP should
outline requirements and frequency for detailed review and
implementation of appropriate corrective actions to identified
deficiencies. Methods that can be used are: Supervisory
Level Audit, Internal Electrical Safety Audit (system audit),
17
External Electrical Safety Audit (system audit), and Peer to Peer
review (practices and behaviors). Regularly review applicable
Occupational Health and Safety legislation and standards and
update the Electrical Safety Program as required. When audits
are completed, a report is generated to document findings and
corrective actions to improve the Electrical Safety Program and
the implementation of the hierarchy of controls.
SUPPORTING CONTENT OF THE GUIDE
Additional resources are provided in the Guideline, in support
of the information presented, that can be used to assist in applying
the content in the Guideline and in the ultimate development of
a comprehensive ESP suitable to an organization and integrated
with the requirements of the overall Occupational Health and
Safety Management System.
REFERENCES
Csa Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Standard.
NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.
CSA Z1000 Occupational Health And Safety Management.
ANSI Z10 Occupational Health and Safety Management.
United States Department of Labour, Occupational Safety &
Health Administration, Voluntary Protection Program, An OSHA
Cooperative Program, https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/.
 overnment of Alberta, Canada, Jobs, Skills, Training and
G
Labour, Occupational Health & Safety, Certificate of Recognition,
https://work.alberta.ca/occupational-health-safety/334.html.
Enform, www.enform.ca/default.aspx.
Enform, Electrical Safety – A Program Development Guide,
http://www.enform.ca/safety_resources/publications/
PublicationDetails.aspx?a=72&type=guidelines.
sa Z1002 Occupational Health And Safety – Hazard
C
Identification and Elimination Risk and Asessment Control.
CSA Group, Canadian Electrical Code Part 1, C22.1.
NFPA, NFPA 70 National Electrical Code.
Terry Becker, P.Eng., is the owner of ESPS Electrical Safety Pro-
gram Solutions Inc. in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Terry has over
24 years experience as an Electrical Engineer, working in both
engineering consulting and for large industrial oil and gas corpo-
rations. He is a Professional Engineer in the Provinces of Alberta,
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. Terry is the past
Vice Chair of the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Stan-
dard Technical Committee, and currently an Executive Committee
member, voting member, and leader of Working Group 8 Annexes,
as well as a member of the IEEE 1584 Committee, the CSA Z463
Guideline for Electrical Equipment Maintenance Standard Com-
mittee, and a member of the NFPA 70E Annexes Working Group.
18 Arc-Flash

LOW-VOLTAGE METAL ENCLOSED

BUS DUCT WETTING EVENTS
PowerTest 2014
Dan Hook,PE, Western Electrical Services

INTRODUCTION Troubleshooting ensued and the wetted piece was identified

and removed from the installation. The project team explored
Over the last ten years I have been involved with approximately
the option of having the wetted piece replaced with a new
a dozen wetting events involving low voltage metal enclosed
custom built piece, however the cost and delivery time ruled
non-segregated bus duct. The source of the water in each event
this option out as viable. Another option presented was
varied; Rain, HVAC systems, a swimming pool, and permanent
to dry the piece in an industrial oven of appropriate size by
and temporary plumbing systems in the buildings were all
maintaining a temperature less than the rated temperature of
culprits.
the equipment, but high enough to evaporate any moisture
In response to the first of the events, I simply applied the industry present. The temperature rating of the equipment published by
recognized testing standards to determine suitability for continued the manufacturer was 130C.
service, and in one instance dried out a single piece of bus duct
The drying took place over the course of several days at
until it met the applied specification. As the events continued in our
approximately 80C with special attention paid to temperature
service area, I recognized some commonalities in the events. These
correction of the values to a 20C standard temperature. Final
commonalities were useful combatting the technical aspects of the
insulation resistance readings were 10,000 Mega-Ohms. With
projects themselves as well as managing the expectations of the
insulation resistance once again meeting the applied specification,
owner, contractor, and consultants commonly involved. The events
an over potential test was performed in accordance with the
grew increasingly more complex, with more at stake financially for
current ANSI/NETA ATS Specification with passing results.
the owner. This combination justified the resources to explore the
A final report of the activities was submitted to the owner and
published guidance and regulations, and improve my knowledge
accepted. The installation has been in service since the second
pertaining to these situations. The series of events culminated in
half of 2005 with no reported issues.
one project where significant research and empirical testing and
data gathering were authorized, yielding significant results I would
EVENT #2
like to share.
In 2009, a customer experiencing an outage on a motor con-
Additionally, in the midst of one of the projects, I was given
trol center contacted me. The motor control center was fed by
a report for a similar instance where the project team was being
NEMA 3R metal enclosed bus originating from an electrical
asked and asking the same types of questions I had in my mind.
room, routed along the ceiling of a multistory parking garage
I will present four events I was directly involved with as well
directly under the motor control center, and then angling up 90
as a summary of this similar project based on the information
degrees and entering the motor control center in a bottom feed
contained in the final report.
type configuration. A fused switch in the originating electri-
cal room protected the feeder type bus duct, and all three fuses
EVENT #1
were blown.
In 2005, during the construction of a low voltage double-
Preliminary visual inspections by the customer revealed some
ended substation, a custom piece of NEMA 1 bus duct,
carbon deposits surrounding a small area with arcing damage
designed to connect one transformer to one end of the
and water leaking on top of the bus duct. The water source was
switchgear, was left outside inadvertently. Over the course
traced back to an overflowing swimming pool located on top of
of at least 24 hours, the elbow was exposed to a significant
the parking garage. Temporary power was routed to the motor
amount of rainfall. The exposure was not noted or reported by
control center to allow the building to return to normal operation,
the installing contractor.
while the project team planned the repairs and recovery. In this
During acceptance testing of the substation, the insulation case, with stable building power and a clearly faulted section of
resistance test results for the run of bus duct with the custom bus duct requiring extensive repairs, the project team elected to
elbow installed did not meet the applied specification. order a new section of bus duct from the factory and wait the
Insulation resistance readings were 0.82 Mega-Ohms with the required 3-4 week lead time.
minimum required per the specification of 100 Mega-Ohms.
 Arc-Flash
The faulted section of bus duct was removed and the
remaining upstream and downstream assemblies were tested
using ANSI/NETA MTS specifications to ensure no other
sections were subjected to water damage. Upon replacement
of damaged section with the new section, the entire bus duct
run was again subjected to testing in accordance with ANSI/
NETA MTS specifications with passing results.
This same run of bus duct has been wetted at least one other time
since the repairs in 2009, however with no failure of the bus duct.
When the building operators recognized the wetting occurring
again from the overflowing swimming pool, the system was
de-energized and tested using ANSI/NETA MTS specifications
and was determined to be suitable for continued service. This
installation with repeated water exposure of NEMA 3R bus
duct, forced me to recognize the fact that “exposed to water”
and “water damaged insulation,” as it applies to metal enclosed
bus duct, is not the same thing. Proper testing procedures and
data must be utilized to ensure defective equipment is repaired
or replaced, while also ensuring equipment that has not been
damaged is not unnecessarily discarded.
EVENT #3
During the course of my study and research on the lengthy
event #4 to be covered later in the article, I was sent a final report
for an event covered by others that did not happen in my service
area. The report suggested that my thoughts and approach to
these events, happening many times a year, was shared by at
least one other person and encouraged me to proceed. The event
description is based solely on my review of that final report.
In 2004 a medical facility under construction experienced a
wetting event on the 8th floor. The report is unclear as to what the
exact source of the leak was, however two new NEMA 1 bus duct
assemblies were wetted. Due to the fact this equipment was new
and still under manufacturers warranty, consideration was given to
whether the manufacturer would still honor the warranty. The report
covered insulation resistance testing and over potential testing of
the intact bus duct assemblies. Due to the high capacitance values
of the relatively long assembly of bus duct sections, supplemental
inductors were required to allow the Doble M4100, used as the
voltage source, to build the voltage to the required voltage levels.
The insulation resistance results were considered acceptable at
approximately 100 Mega-Ohms. The over-potential test was
assigned a PASS result due to no indications of break down and
no tripping off of the voltage source due to over current conditions.
The leakage current recorded was consistent in the phase-to-phase
and phase-to-ground tests conducted.
The approach described in this report was enlightening to
me in the choice of the test voltage source. AC over-potential
testing of a large assembly of many bus duct sections can often
be problematic due to the large amount of losses not allowing the
required voltage level to be attained.
19
EVENT COMMONALITIES
The previous three events followed a common approach to
determine if, in fact, the insulation system was compromised during
a wetting event. The decision of replacement versus repair or
reconditioning, so to speak, was left up to the customer and the rest of
the project team. The approach is grounded in the testing procedures
and specifications contained in ANSI/NETA specifications as well
as manufacturers guidance. Insulation resistance testing and over-
potential testing were sufficient to satisfy the project team of the
suitability of the equipment for continued service. The next two
events required me to research further into the codes and regulations
that were specific to my service area, including the Washington
Administrative Code and the Seattle Electrical Code.
EVENT #4
A bus duct assembly was wetted from the 7th floor electrical
room of a 13-story structure. A building water system leaked on
service-aged NEMA 1 plug in type bus duct, and then travelled
down the riser to the basement where the bus duct transitioned to
a horizontal configuration to the electrical room entering the top
of the switchgear. The bus duct was de-energized when building
personnel discovered the event. No catastrophic event occurred. I
was contacted as a consultant to advise the customer on the need to
replace any or all of the bus duct sections. In a quick conversation
over the phone, prior to mobilization, the customer stated that
another testing company had been onsite and test results showed
the insulation quality was compromised and the test data did not
meet ANSI/NETA specifications. The electrical contractor onsite
also stated that the position of the electrical inspector was that any
piece of bus duct that was exposed to water required replacement
per the Seattle Electric Code Article 110.11, Fine Point Note #4
(This Fine Point Note directly references the state administrative
code, Washington Administrative Code, 296-46B-110-001.2.a-b,
reproduced below.
296-46B-110, General Requirements for Electrical
Installations
●● 011 Deteriorating Agents
●● Electrical equipment and wiring that has been submerged or
exposed to water must comply with the following:
○○ 
All breakers, fuses, controllers, receptacles, lighting
switches/dimmers, electric heaters, and any sealed device/
equipment (e.g., relays, contactors, etc.) must be replaced.
○○ All other electrical equipment (wiring, breaker panelboards,
disconnect switches, switchgear, motor control centers, boiler
controls, HVAC/R equipment, electric motors, transformers,
appliances, water heaters, and similar appliances) must be
replaced or reconditioned by the original manufacturer or by
its approved representative.
20 Arc-Flash

The customer was having a difficult time accepting the wholesale
replacement of 13 floors of bus duct, when clearly the floors from
the 7th floor up were not exposed to water, and after examination
in the basement, after about 3 feet of horizontal displacement from
the riser area, no evidence of wetting was present. The language
“submerged or exposed to water,” offers an extremely large range of
conditions, which the AHJ was interpreting in a way the customer
was not appreciating. In an attempt to understand the interpretation
myself, I discovered a NEMA document titled “Evaluating Water-
Damaged Electrical Equipment,” ©2011. This document used the
phrase “subjected to water damage,” which offers a bit more insight
in that the language expresses that the equipment must be damaged
for the guidance to apply. The specific language must be dealt with
rigorously as interpretations by Authorities Having Jurisdiction
have real operational and financial impacts on facilities unfortunate
enough to experience wetting events.
In an attempt to discover which sections of bus duct could truly
be considered to have suffered water damage, a new test routine
was proposed. The plan called for the removal of splice joint
packs from the bus risers in two places, such that the vertical
sections from the 7th to 13th floors could be tested separately from
the 7th floor down to the basement, including the vertical sections
and the vertical to horizontal transition elbow section, and finally
the remainder of the horizontal section to the switchgear room.
Insulation resistance was the only test performed.
The results showed clearly which portions had compromised
insulation and which did not. Given the inclination to remove
more bus splices and continue testing, I was confident the number
of sections actually showing failed test results would have shrunk,
however other factors dictated we conclude our testing and submit
our report after one day of testing.

Fig. 1: Insulation Resistance Floor 7 and Up

Fig. 2: Insulation Resistance Floor 7 to B level

Fig: 3. Insulation Resistance B Level to Switchgear

 Arc-Flash
EVENT #5
The last event I will discuss was the largest in terms of
implications for the owner, and therefore, the willingness to
gather data, study equipment specimens, and perform additional
testing was the greatest. All of my previous experiences resulted
in a better understanding of strategies to deal with wetting events,
as well as the guidance provided by manufacturers, and finally the
stance of many representatives of the authority having jurisdiction
in my service area. The additional efforts and expenses to allow
me to paint a more complete picture of wetting events and the
associated test results, proved to be very beneficial.
Seven bus duct assemblies in a 30+-story building were wetted
when HVAC piping failed on the 14th floor. The water from the
HVAC system travelled down the riser space to the basement where
the bus ducts transitioned to a horizontal configuration in the same
way as in the previous event. In a relatively short period of time, one
of the seven bus-duct assemblies suffered a catastrophic failure in
the basement, specifically on the elbow that transitioned the bus duct
from a vertical to a horizontal orientation. Preliminary test results
on-site, prior to my involvement in the project, were performed by
removing an “elbow” from one of the other assemblies and applying
a insulation resistance tester to the vertical sections extending
upward. The test results indicated results that met the ANSI/NETA
specifications deeming the bus duct suitable for continued service.
Based on input from the authority having jurisdiction that the
entirety of all seven bus-duct assemblies needed to be replaced,
as in event #4, the customer proceeded with demolition of all
sections on every floor. Upon my arrival at the site, I inquired
as to testing sections of the bus duct in place to determine if, in
fact, any water had damaged the insulation. I was denied the
opportunity to test any bus duct in place, but was given approval
for extensive testing after removal. Individual sections of bus
duct were subject to insulation resistance tests and over-potential
tests utilizing a power factor test set at the voltage source; and
all power factor/dissipation factor data was also recorded in
accordance with the test set manufacturers instructions. At the
conclusion of the project, 135 sections of metal enclosed bus
duct had been subjected to these tests. Performing the industry-
recognized testing routine on the specimens per ANSI/NETA
MTS specifications easily identified the bus duct sections that
experienced water contamination of the insulation system when
a power factor test set was used as the voltage source, such that
valuable power factor data could be gathered. The final test results
identified seven pieces of bus duct that did not meet the applied
specification as determined by field test results. Predictably the
failed pieces were located lower in the riser, and in every case but
one, was in the basement with horizontal orientation on at least
some of the section, allowing for collection of water and pooling.
As I stated earlier, the implications of the project approach and
test results were uncharacteristically high for this project, so the
testing and data gathering continued.
21
Following the field tests, four bus duct sections were packed
and sent to a testing laboratory in the southeastern US. The test
specimens were selected to represent two different sizes of bus duct
removed from lower floors and one section that yielded questionable
and unacceptable test data during the measurements made in the
field. The purpose of this exercise was to re-measure each section
with laboratory standard dissipation factor and insulation resistance
equipment. In addition, testing was scheduled to address the effects
of moderate and severe applications of water to bus duct sections.
When NEMA 1 bus ducts are introduced to moisture from
rain, broken water pipes or leaking drainpipes, there is always
a question of how much water has gained entrance and, in turn,
contaminated the bus bar insulation system. For this reason the
employment of dissipation factor measurements are extremely
useful and allow for accurate assessment of the presence of
moisture in the bus duct. Although the dissipation factor may
be a little more difficult to measure, the improvement of portable
equipment has allowed for accurate field measurements and the
correct assessment of damaged insulation systems.
To demonstrate how effective dissipation factor measurements
can be when moisture ingress is suspected, testing was completed
in the laboratory with two levels of water contamination. The first
application of water was sprayed on the sample until the entire
exterior surface of the bus duct was wet. The sample was re-
measured and the data showed no significant change in dissipation
factor or insulation resistance.
The sample of bus section was then subjected to a severe soaking
of water that was forced into the end of the bus duct. Following this,
the dissipation factor could not be measured between parallel bus
bars, while the insulation resistance measurements between phases
were measured at 100 Giga-Ohms and showed a value of 11 and
20 Mega-Ohms between the outer buses and the case. Dissipation
factor for the bus bars to the case was high at 25.1% and 8.8%.
The bus duct section was then load cycled with current circulated
in each bus until the dissipation factor improved to a satisfactory
level between the bus bars. This data is shown as #438-5 in Figure
4. The insulation resistance data would meet manufacturers
specifications and more stringent ANSI/NETA specifications for
all buses indicated. However, the dissipation factor data between
buss bars and the case was higher than the original measurement
and suspect.
The bus duct was then dismantled and the terminals were
cleaned. An outer shield consisting of copper braid was wrapped
around the encapsulated bus bars and the dissipation factor mea-
surements still showed moisture present in the outer bus bar in-
sulation. However, examination of the insulation resistance data
showed values greater than 100 G-ohms.
22 Arc-Flash

CONCLUSIONS ●● Manufacturers have an inherent conflict of interest in

evaluating electrical equipment for continued service and
●● Metal enclosed bus ducts can sustain rather liberal amounts
their literature contains conflicts in direction as it pertains to
of water and experience no significant loss of insulating
wetted bus duct:
properties.
○○ N
 EMA BU 1.1-2010 General Instructions For
●● ANSI/NETA ATS and MTS specifications are the industry-
Handling, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance
recognized standard for determining if new bus duct is
of Busway Rated 600 Volts or Less, Section 9 Care
suitable for initial energization and if service aged bus duct
and Maintenance;
is suitable for continued service. However, consideration
should be given to power-factor testing if moisture contami- ○○ NEMA: “Evaluating Water-Damaged Electrical
nation is suspected. Equipment.”

Fig. 4: Laboratory Test Results

 Arc-Flash
●● The Professional Electrical Apparatus Recyclers League
(PEARL) publishes a reconditioning standard for metal
enclosed bus duct. PEARL is accredited by ANSI as a stan-
dards developer.
●● Common terms used when discussing wetting events
“exposed” and “subjected to water damage” and
“submerged,” mean different things. As the test results and
data clearly show, a piece of bus duct with Mylar insulation
can be exposed to water without the insulation being
subjected to water damage. Further, the drying of moisture-
contaminated insulation in bus duct sections is possible. In
the cases where chemicals, dirt or other contaminants are
present, they can be removed as well, consistent with NEMA
BU 1.1 2010 and PEARL reconditioning standards.
●● Metal enclosed bus duct oriented horizontally is much more
susceptible than vertical bus duct to a wetting event. This is
due to the fluid actually seeping into the insulation of a bus
duct assembly, compromising the ability of the insulation to
perform as required vice running down the protective metal
enclosure with no affect on the insulation.
●● Power Factor/Dissipation factor test results can determine
definitively whether a wetting event has compromised
the insulation system of metal enclosed bus duct or is a
superficial wetting of the metal enclosure. In some cases,
a simple insulation resistance test may meet the applied
specification, however moisture contamination is present.
●● State and local authorities having jurisdiction may diverge
from industry-recognized standards, such as NEMA and
ANSI/NETA guidelines. Understanding these regulations
can be of high importance when part of a project team is
attempting to deal with an emergent type of situation.
○○ Example: WAC article, which directs replacement of all
circuit breakers subjected to wetting events, is in direct
contradiction to NEMA guidelines, differentiating between
molded case circuit breakers and low voltage power circuit
breakers or medium voltage circuit breakers.
23
REFERENCES AND INFORMATIONAL SOURCES
ANSI/NETA ATS and MTS Section 1.1.1-1.1.2
ANSI/NETA ATS and MTS Section 7.4
ANSI/NETA ATS and MTS Table 100.1 and 100.14.1 or
100.14.2
ANSI/NETA ATS and MTS Table 100.17
NEMA BU 1.1-2010 “General Instructions for Handling,
Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Busway Rated 600
Volts or Less”
NEMA “Evaluating Water-Damaged Electrical Equipment”
©2011
PEARL Reconditioning Standards, Low Voltage Bus Duct Plug-
in Type Section 2010 Revision #5 11-2008
PEARL Reconditioning Standards, Low Voltage Bus Duct
Feeder Type Section 2010 Revision #5 11-2008
Washington Administrative Code 296-46B-110-001.2.a-b
Seattle Electrical Code 110.11 FPN#4
Dan Hook is the Executive Vice President in charge of Business
Development at Western Electrical Services, Inc. where has previ-
ously held Field Service Engineer, Sales Engineer, and Chief Op-
erating Officer positions. He has been in the industrial electrical
industry for over 20 years with US Navy and civilian experience.
Dan holds a master’s degree in Electric Power Engineering from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, and he main-
tains his professional engineer’s license in Washington, Utah,
Arizona, and Oregon. He earned an MBA in 2012 from Pacific
Lutheran University with a concentration in Entrepreneurship and
Closely Held Businesses.
Dan is a certified NETA Certified Senior Technician Level IV as
well as a NICET Level IV.
24 Arc-Flash

ARC-FLASH HAZARD MITIGATION

BY TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL
RELAY PROTECTION
PowerTest 2016
Randall Sagan, Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.
Mose Ramieh III, Power & Generation Testing, Inc.

INTRODUCTION personnel must utilize appropriate personal protective equipment

(PPE) while racking out the breaker. This includes arc-rated
Unit substation transformers in industrial facilities are commonly
clothing and protective safety equipment rated for the arc-flash
protected by fuses installed at the primary disconnect switch. This
hazard levels present at the secondary main breaker. Due to the
arrangement is relatively inexpensive, provides good protection of
slow clearing time of the primary fuses, these hazard values can
the primary windings, and coordinates well with the protective relay
sometimes exceed the maximum safe ratings of such PPE.
on the upstream feeder breaker. However, fuse clearing time for a
secondary winding fault is much slower and results in dangerously
high values of arc-flash incident energy (AFIE) at the secondary TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL RELAY
circuit of the transformer. A transformer differential relay scheme requires more components
This paper describes the use of a transformer differential relay and is much more complicated than a fuse protection scheme (see
scheme as one method to reduce the arc-flash hazard at the secondary Diagram 1). Current transformers (CT’s) are used on both the primary
circuit of the transformer. Other significant benefits in protection and secondary sides of the transformer. A primary circuit breaker
and control are also discussed. Testing and commissioning of the and associated controls (including the differential relay) replace the
overall unit substation is reviewed with emphasis on the key points fuses in the primary switch. For medium-voltage applications, this
that require special attention. breaker is equipped with vacuum contactors to safely interrupt fault
current. The CT circuits feed analog current signals to the transformer
differential relay, which in turn provides trip functions to the circuit
TRANSFORMER PROTECTION
breakers. All of the circuit elements between the two sets of CT’s
When a downstream short circuit occurs (called a “fault”), the links make up what is called the “zone of protection.” By locating the CT’s
inside the fuses melt to interrupt the fault current. “Downstream” on the line-side of the primary circuit breaker, and on the load-side of
could mean the primary windings of the transformer or could mean the secondary breaker, both breakers can also be protected by being
a feeder circuit fed from the unit substation. All downstream faults included in the differential relay’s zone of protection.
will be sensed by the fuses. If the current magnitude is high enough
and is sustained long enough, then the fuse links will melt and open
the circuit. If only one or two of the fuses open on a three-phase
transformer, then additional equipment failure or damage could occur
from the resultant voltage imbalance. This is called a “single-phase”
condition.
Although most medium voltage primary switches are rated to
interrupt load current, the preferred practice is to only use the
secondary main breaker for interrupting load current. A key
interlock scheme between the primary switch and the secondary
main breaker is often used to prevent opening or closing the
switch when the breaker is closed. This means that whenever
the transformer needs to be de-energized (for maintenance or any
other reason) the secondary main breaker must be opened before
the primary disconnect switch can be opened and locked out. Diagram 1: Typical transformer differential relay scheme.
Some arrangements even require racking out the main breaker All components between the primary and secondary sets of CT’s
before the interlock key can be released. In this case, maintenance are contained within the differential relay’s zone of protection.
 Arc-Flash
This scheme operates based on the concept that transformer
power IN equals power OUT. The differential relay uses signals
from the two sets of CT’s to monitor the current passing through
the transformer. If a fault occurs within the zone of protection,
then the relay senses a difference between IN and OUT and
operates to trip the breakers connected to the transformer. If a
fault occurs downstream of the zone of protection, then the fault
currents passing through the transformer will sum to zero and the
relay will not trip its breakers. Because a differential relay is much
more sensitive to faults anywhere within its zone of protection
(even on the secondary windings), it is able to operate much faster
than a fuse protection scheme.
CT LOCATION AND ACCURACY
To ensure that the transformer differential relay does not
misoperate for a downstream fault outside of its zone of protection,
the accuracy ratings of both sets of CT’s need to match. Higher
accuracy class CT’s, however, will probably not fit in the low-
voltage main breaker cubicle. In this case, the CT’s may have
to be installed on the low-voltage busbars inside the transformer
enclosure (see Diagram 2). Unfortunately, this leaves the
secondary main breaker outside of the differential relay’s zone of
protection. By utilizing additional overcurrent elements the relay
can still provide exceptional protection compared to traditional
fuse protection.
On the other hand, if the secondary CT’s are located inside the
transformer, then the control power transformer (CPT) will also be
excluded from the differential relay’s zone of protection. This allows
more sensitive settings to be applied to the differential relay, and
therefore, provide even better transformer protection. The tradeoff
between transformer protection and arc-flash hazard must be weighed
when considering the location of secondary CT’s in a differential relay
scheme. Both options provide improvements over traditional fuse
protection schemes.
Diagram 2: If secondary CT’s do not fit in main
breaker cubicle, then they may be installed on low-voltage
busbars in the transformer enclosure. In this case, the
differential relay can be set very sensitive since the CPT
is excluded from the zone of protection.
25
The transformer differential relay settings must account for
the transformer turns ratio, phase shift due to delta-wye winding
configurations, differences between primary and secondary
CT ratios, and phase rotation. Using all of this data, the
relay currents are normalized in per-unit values to accurately
represent load current flowing through the transformer (see
Diagram 3). Under normal load conditions, the sum of input
and output vectors for each phase will be equal to zero. When
there is a fault within the zone of protection, then the magnitude
of the resultant vector sum will cause the relay to operate and
issue a trip signal.
Diagram 3: Normalized per-unit current vectors are
added together by the relay software. For normal load
conditions, each phase should sum to zero.
ARC-FLASH HAZARD MITIGATION
Fault current on the secondary windings of a transformer will
be detected by the primary fuses, but at a magnitude reduced
by the ratio and impedance of the transformer windings. This
reduced-magnitude fault current means the fuses will take much
longer to clear the fault than they would if the fault were on the
primary windings. The longer fuse clearing time results in much
higher values of AFIE at the secondary circuit of the transformer.
For a typical industrial three-phase transformer (e.g., 2-MVA,
13,800/480-volts, delta-wye) using primary fuse protection, AFIE
at a distance of 24-inches at the secondary circuit can be as high
as 80-cal/cm². This is generally considered too high for safely
working energized (Category Dangerous), even with appropriate
arc-rated clothing and PPE. For AFIE values above 40-cal/cm² at
the working distance, NFPA 70E recommends greater emphasis on
de-energizing equipment if at all possible.
The faster clearing time of a differential relay scheme however,
can reduce the AFIE at the secondary circuit of the same transformer
to less than 1.2-cal/cm². This is the main reason differential
26
relay protection is becoming more prevalent in industrial power
distribution systems. Even if the secondary main breaker is not
included in the differential relay’s zone of protection, faster fault
clearing using backup overcurrent elements can still reduce the
AFIE to less than 20-cal/cm². This is well below the maximum
acceptable level and provides a much safer system.
ADDITIONAL DIFFERENTIAL RELAY BENEFITS
A differential relay scheme provides several other benefits in addi-
tion to reduced arc-flash hazard. One benefit is better overall trans-
former protection. By quickly de-energizing the transformer in the
early stages of a fault, the extent of the damage can be greatly reduced.
This could potentially save a transformer from catastrophic failure and
possibly mean that it can be repaired instead of having to be totally re-
placed. This leads to reduced cost of repair and less downtime after
a failure, especially if the faulted transformer can be repaired on site.
Because a differential relay scheme requires a primary circuit
breaker instead of individual fuses, the risk of voltage imbalance
due to a “single-phase” condition is eliminated. This protects other
downstream equipment from being damaged in the aftermath of
a transformer fault. Again, restoration and recovery is much less
expensive and faster if multiple other components do not also have to
be repaired or replaced.
If the secondary main breaker can be included in the differential
relay’s zone of protection, then all of the components of this
breaker benefit from the enhanced protection of this scheme.
Additionally, secondary circuit overcurrent elements in the
differential relay provide backup protection to the secondary main
breaker’s tripping unit. If the differential relay has a breaker failure
function, then the transformer primary breaker can trip quickly for
a secondary breaker trip failure. All of this improves the reliability
of protection for the unit substation.
ACCEPTANCE TESTING
Unit Substations and their associated components require
acceptance and maintenance testing as described in the ANSI/NETA
Standards.3, 4. Typical components and associated tests include,
but are not limited to:
●● Medium-Voltage Fused Switch:
○○ Visual and mechanical inspections and mechanical
operations
○○ Insulation resistance
○○ Contact resistance of contacts, pivot points and primary
fuses
●● Liquid or Dry Type Transformer:
○○ Visual and mechanical inspections
○○ Insulation resistance and polarization index tests of
windings
○○ Turns ratio testing
Arc-Flash
○○ Winding resistance testing
○○ Power Factor testing of windings (optional, but
recommended)
●● Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers and Switchgear:
○○ Visual and mechanical inspections of both the breakers and
switchboard
○○ Insulation resistance of circuit breakers and switchgear bus
○○ Contact resistance of breaker current path (contacts) and
switchgear bus
○○ Breaker Trip Unit Testing:
– Primary injection of circuit breakers is recommend for
acceptance testing
– Secondaryinjection with primary verification for
maintenance testing
○○ AC over-potential testing of switchgear bus (optional, but
recommended)
Unit substations that include a transformer differential relay
scheme require additional component testing, commissioning,
and functional verification of the overall differential relay system.
These components require a slightly higher degree of technical
competence as well as the expertise of a protection and control
(P&C) engineer or technician. Particular components and tests
include, but are not limited to:
●● Medium-Voltage Vacuum Circuit Breaker (VCB):
○○ Visual and mechanical inspections and electrical functions
○○ Insulation resistance
○○ Contact resistance of current path and contacts
○○ Vacuum bottle integrity test
Technician Pro-Tip on vacuum bottle testing:
– In a typical unit substation arrangement, the VCB is fixed
and cannot be drawn out for testing. This can present
additional challenges during the high potential portions
of vacuum bottle testing.
–
You should expect to have to disconnect associated
medium-voltage cable and lightning arresters.
Additionally, covers and barriers will need to be removed
to gain access to the bus.
– Consult the manufacture’s literature for test voltage and
duration recommendations.
●● Current Transformers (CT) on the Primary and Secondary of
the Transformer:
○○ Visual and mechanical inspections to include polarity dot
orientation where accessible
○○ Turns ratio testing to include polarity orientation
○○ Excitation test (knee point)
○○ Injection of primary current to verify:
 Arc-Flash
– Completeness of current path to the protective relay
– Test switches properly interrupt the secondary circuit
without creating an open CT circuit
– Relay software settings for CT ratios (e.g., 50 amps of
primary current should be indicated as “50 amps” on the
relay display)
Technician Pro-Tip on CT testing:
– Polarity orientation (determined with electrical testing and/
or visual inspection) shall be compared to the substation
drawings. As a general rule, these “dots” should be pointed
away from the protected transformer (See Diagram 3).
– Bring discrepancies to the attention of the appropriate
project lead or engineer to avoid unnecessary delays
during the commissioning and functional testing portion
of the project.
– Include as much of the secondary wiring as possible
(ideally to the test switch) in the ratio/polarity testing.
This will help to identify and eliminate wiring errors
between CT and relay.
●● Differential Relay Testing:
○○ Obtain and review the relay settings in the appropriate
software version for the selected relay
○○ Program relay and begin with current metering checks of
the primary and secondary CT circuits
○○ Conduct pick-up and timing tests of applicable protective
elements:
○○ Restrained and unrestrained differential elements as well
as through fault testing
– Over-current elements (High and Low side elements)
○○ Verify that relay inputs work and are activated by the
designated device(s)
○○ Verify that relay outputs work and operate the designated
devices. This includes actually tripping lockout devices
(86) and circuit breakers
Technician Pro-Tip on Input/Output Testing:
– Avoid using a jumper to simulate inputs and outputs. Find
a method that proves the circuit(s) in the most “real world”
situation as practical
There are several key points that need to be considered when
performing acceptance tests on a transformer differential scheme.
These include CT ratios, polarities, and locations. The CT ratios are
critical for the relay to appropriately calculate the secondary current
being provided by the primary and secondary CT’s and in turn,
performing the per-unit current differential calculations. An incorrect
value entered in the relay settings could result in a misoperation of
the relay when the transformer is under normal load. CT nameplates
should be compared against shop drawings and relay settings. It
27
is also important to verify the CT polarity by checking the polarity
marks on the CT’s as well as the physical orientation of the CT’s.
If the polarities of the CT’s are wrong, then the vector summation
calculated by the relay will indicate that there is differential current
where none truly exists. This could lead to false tripping of the relay
when the transformer is under normal load.
Major components of the overall unit substation are often not
manufactured or assembled in the same location. The primary
breaker, transformer, and low-voltage substation sections will never
be coupled together as an entire unit until they are assembled in the
field. This means large portions of the differential relay’s current
circuit and control circuit wiring will have to be field-installed. The
opportunity for an initial factory quality check is then eliminated.
Relay test currents should be injected at the CT secondary test
switches in order to prove that CT phasing and polarity are main-
tained throughout the current circuit. This should include pickup
and trip tests as well as through-fault tests of the relay.
FUNCTIONAL AND SYSTEM COMMISSIONING:
The final and most critical step of a differential relay installation is
the functional and system commissioning checks. Even if you take
every effort to verify CT ratio and orientation and test the relay by in-
jecting test current at the appropriate shorting terminal blocks or test
switches, inevitably problems could still exist. Take the following
steps to eliminate any potentially remaining or hidden wiring issues:
1. Simultaneously inject primary test currents through the pri-
mary and secondary CTs at the correct magnitude and phase
angle (typically 30o out of phase for a delta/wye transformer)
○○ Use the relay metering function to verify that the differential
operating current is 0.0 amps and the appropriate restraint
current (these values can be calculated but that is beyond
the scope of this paper)
2. Energize the substation with the protective relay active and
all low-voltage breakers open
3. Close the secondary main circuit breaker
4. Review the relay metering to verify that operating current is
0.0 Amps (at this point you should have no restraint current)
5. Disable the relay differential trip output (typically with a test
switch)
6. Select and close a feeder breaker(s) that will place load
current on the substation
7. Monitor the relay metering and verify that the operating
current remains at 0.0 amps and that you begin to see some
level of restraint current
8. If you get the results in step 7, then you have completed the
commissioning of the system. Should you see operating
current (even as little as 0.1 Amps) you have troubleshooting
to perform. Continue to step 9.
28
9. Use the relays metering functions to view the phase angles.
Typical phase angles will be 150o out of phase for a delta/
wye transformer. If all phases are at the appropriate angle
for your transformer configuration then go to step 10.
The transformer nameplate should be reviewed when confirming
phase orientation and winding configurations. All transformers
are not wound alike! Special attention should be paid to the
polarity of the primary and secondary windings. Three-phase
delta and wye configurations, with differing polarities, will result
in a difference in the phase-shift from primary to secondary
currents. Relay settings that account for this phase shift must be
verified in order to continue this trouble shooting.
10. R
 eview the magnitudes of the metered current and verify
that they match the calculated values for primary and
secondary transformer currents
11. M
 ake the required wiring changes or relay software
changes to correct any problems found
Technician Pro-Tip on Differential
Operating Current:
●● N
 ever, ever, assume that a “little bit” of operating current
is not a problem. The only acceptable value of operating
current is 0.0 amps!
Microprocessor-based, solid-state transformer differential
relays are capable of selectively operating for true fault conditions
and restrain operating for magnetization inrush, harmonic
distortion, or CT saturation. This can also make setting the relay
more complicated. In these cases, it is important to note where
the secondary CT’s are physically located. If they are located in
the breaker cubicle of the secondary main breaker, then the unit
substation CPT could also be included inside the relay’s zone of
protection. This will normally only be connected to two phases,
which means the relay settings will have to be carefully adjusted
to account for load current to the CPT.
CONCLUSIONS
With more and more emphasis on electrical safety in industrial
environments, and especially as it relates to arc-flash hazards,
transformer differential relay schemes are becoming more popular.
Not only is this scheme an extremely effective method for mitigating
transformer arc-flash hazards, it provides several other benefits
in terms of protection and reliability of the entire unit substation.
Electrical test technicians need to be familiar with the operation and
control of the overall system in order to safely and effectively test and
commission the equipment associated with such a protection scheme.
REFERENCES
“ARTICAL 130: Work Involving Electrical Hazards, Table
130.7(C)(15)(A)(a), ‘Arc-Flash Hazard Identification for
Alternating Current (ac) and Direct Current (dc) Systems’,”
Arc-Flash
in 2015 NFPA 70E: Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace: 70E-35.
“ARTICLE 130: Work Involving Electrical Hazards, Paragraph
130.7 (A), ‘Personal and Other Protective Equipment’,”
Informational Note No. 3, in 2015 NFPA 70E: Standard for
Electrical Safety in the Workplace: 70E-30.
“INSPECTION AND TEST PROCEDURES,” in 2013 ANSI/
NETA Standard for Acceptance Testing Specifications for
Electrical Power Equipment and Systems: Section 7.
“INSPECTION AND TEST PROCEDURES,” in 2011 ANSI/
NETA Standard for Maintenance Testing Specifications for
Electrical Power Equipment and Systems: Section 7.
Randall Sagan earned his Electrical Engineering degree from the
University of Kentucky. Upon graduation, he worked as a relay
engineer at Kentucky Utilities, then became a facility electrical
engineer at Toyota Motor Manufacturing. In 1994, he joined
the groundbreaking design team at Mercedes-Benz U.S. Interna-
tional (MBUSI) where he currently serves as Electrical Engineer
in the Factory Planning Department. Randall recently designed
and implemented the safest medium-voltage switchgear in any
Mercedes-Benz facility worldwide. Randall is a Senior Member
of the IEEE, a member of the Association of Energy Engineers,
NFPA, and NETA. He has served as a Ballot Pool Member for the
ANSI/NETA Standards for Acceptance Testing, Maintenance Test-
ing, and Electrical Commissioning Specifications. In addition to
teaching and speaking engagements, Randall has presented at nu-
merous technical conferences.
Randall retired from running after two marathons and multiple
half-marathons. Kayaking and hiking have now become some of
his favorite activities. He also finds cooking, theatre, and college
sports great diversions to his busy schedule.
Mose Ramieh III is a Texan, University of Texas graduate (BA) and
former US Navy Lieutenant, Mose Ramieh knows a thing or two
about getting things done. He is the Manager of Business Develop-
ment for the Southeast for CE Power and has over 20 years in the
electrical testing and maintenance business. Over the years, he has
held numerous technical and management positions in the industry
and in the US Navy. In 1997, Mose joined PGTI eight months after
it was founded. The company served industrial and utility custom-
ers in Tennessee and the greater Southeast market. Last year, he
was instrumental in the company’s transition to CE Power.
He is a certified NICET Engineering Technician, NETA Level IV
Technician, Level II Thermographer and a Steam Engineer with
Turbine Endorsement (Los Angeles, CA). He has served on the
NETA safety committee and is currently a SME for the NETA
exam development and CTD Reviewer. Mose is a master at using
simple processes to solve seemingly complicated problems, lead-
ing and teaching others to do the same.
 Arc-Flash
SAFETY ASPECTS OF BREAKER
PROTECTION AND COORDINATION
NETA World, Fall 2013 Issue
Bruce M. Rockwell, P.E., American Electrical Testing Co.
OVERCURRENT COORDINATION
Compliance with arc-flash hazard work rules, as defined by
OSHA, NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace,
and NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, requires evaluation of
arc-flash hazards and subsequent posting of the hazard on electric
equipment. The arc-flash hazard can be dramatically affected by
the overcurrent protective device settings. Faster response and
trip times can significantly reduce the hazard. Acceptance and
periodic maintenance testing serve to confirm the arc-flash hazard
analysis predictions based on NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584, Guide
for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations.
This article reviews protection schemes and application methods
that can be applied to enhance time-overcurrent (TOC) protection
to improve safety, such as: directional overcurrent, bus differential,
partial differential, zone interlocking, blocking, and other
schemes. Historically, TOC settings that were once acceptable to
protect equipment are no longer suitable as they may not provide
adequate protection of personnel. More recent changes in worker
safety standards challenge protection professionals to further
optimize settings. Advances in protective device technology allow
application of enhanced protection that can reduce fault clearing
time without compromising selective coordination or sensitivity.
Changes in industry practice are also driving change. The decision
to remove instantaneous protection settings was widely adopted in
the 1980s and 1990s by some utilities as a means to stop customer
complaints for blinking digital clocks. Today, where continuity of
service is critical to business operations, the application and use of the
instantaneous function is a very important consideration. In 2011, the
NEC added article 240.87 in an attempt to address increased hazards
on power systems that operate without instantaneous protection.
Basic TOC protection coordination operates based on a time-
current curve (TCC). Multiple TOC protective devices, connected
in series, are generally applied to protect the power system. TOC
elements may have fixed response curves or may require selection
of one or more current and time-delay pickup setting pairs: long
time, short time, and ground fault that allow piecewise continuity
of various time bands and selection of multiple response curves.
The time delay associated with the TOC element can produce a
slower-than-desired response since it is applied for protection over
a wide range of fault current values.
29
Identifying faults sooner or sending a trip signal faster can
reduce arc-flash hazard energy during faults. The goal is to reduce
I2T by responding quicker to reduce the time and/or quick enough
to reduce the fault current. An understanding of the available
fault current(s) should be sought prior to engaging work, such that
the desired range of settings or number and type of schemes to
be applied can be fully considered. This can be accomplished by
preparing or reviewing an existing short-circuit study. Industry
standards recommend an updated study every five years. Bolted
three-phase and line-ground faults, as well as reduced fault
currents that may occur from arcing faults, should be considered.
Being able to recognize the possible range of fault current values
and how they affect trip-time response and production of arc-flash
energy is necessary to work safely.
The following information should be obtained prior to
working on a protection system:
●● Bus Configuration and Operational Sequence
●● Desired Protection Scheme
●● Minimum Three-Phase Fault Current
●● Maximum Three-Phase Fault Current
●● Minimum Line-to-Ground Fault Current
●● Maximum Line-to-Ground Fault Current
●● C
 urrent Transformer Location, Ratio, Accuracy Class,
Saturation Curve
●● Relay Type and TCC’s
●● Setting Calculations
For some protection schemes, such as some of the differential
schemes, unequal performance of CTs is important to define, as an
offset will need to be applied to the settings. Modern relays tend
to eliminate this concern; thus, it is important to understand that all
differential schemes are not created equal.
PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL SCHEME
This scheme may also be referred to as a bus overload or selective
backup scheme. It is considered a variation of the differential
scheme, yet one or more circuits are not included in the phasor
summation of current to the relay. This scheme is typically applied
for differential backup, primary protection for stations with fused
feeders, and local backup protection for feeder circuit breakers.
30
One such scheme is shown in Fig. 1. In this scheme, only the
sources are differentially connected using a high set TOC relay.
The CTs protecting the feeders are not included. Sometimes this
scheme is applied to save on the cost of CTs. This scheme provides
TOC bus protection with feeder backup protection. The sensitivity
and speed are not as good as a differential scheme.
In modern multifunction numerical relays, this scheme can be
applied using communications to apply protection to the source
and feeder breakers. Feeders can be equipped with nontripping
Fig. 1: Partial Differential Scheme
For a bus fault, the block signal is absent and the source
breaker trips at high speed. Some schemes use distance
relays to achieve faster and more sensitive operation than the
TOC scheme.
DIFFERENTIAL SCHEMES
There are many types of differential schemes. Here we will consider
the following differential schemes: Bus differential with TOC relays,
improved TOC, comparator, multirestraint, and high impedance.
Bus Differential with TOC Relays
This scheme uses TOC relays. A typical scheme is shown in
Fig. 2. CTs are connected in parallel with the relay. Aux CTs can
be used to match ratios, but should be avoided in this scheme. A
critical issue for setting the relay is that the maximum CT error
for a fault (phase and ground) needs to be established. Also, the
time delay selected needs to be set, such that it delays tripping
if CTs are saturated by the dc component of the primary current.
To achieve this, the CT primary rating is selected, such that the
maximum external fault current magnitude, If , is less than 20
times the CT rating; and for this fault value, the CT burden can
be no more than its relay accuracy class voltage divided by 100.
The relay operating time cannot be less than three primary time
constants and the current pickup setting should be greater than the
Arc-Flash
low-set instantaneous time overcurrent (IOC) set just above the
maximum load. The sources have IOC with a slight delay set
above the maximum load of the bus and use status inputs from
the feeder breakers.
For a feeder fault, the low set IOC operates and sends a
block to the source relay. The IOC of the source relay oper-
ates but does not trip due to blocking. The TOC element for
the source breaker is not affected and the backup protection
remains active.
exciting current of the CT for If . Typical settings are a current pickup
of 10 amperes or more and a time delay not less than 18 cycles.
This scheme is not suitable for expensive systems or for
enhanced safety. Faster tripping for this scheme is achieved by
applying TOC relays with extremely inverse TCC response. This
allows for relay trip times of eight cycles.
Improved Bus Differential Scheme with TOC Relays
The scheme can be improved by applying a stabilizing resistor in
series with each overcurrent relay. If an external feeder fault causes
the feeder CT to saturate, the CT excitation reactance approaches
zero and the CT error current that flows through the relay can be
defined. Applying a resistor to the circuit allows reduction of the
CT error and thus improves the scheme sensitivity. This allows for
lowering of the current pickup and thus faster relay trip response.
Multi-Restraint Differential Scheme
This scheme is very sensitive and secure for external faults, as it
addresses the CT error and CT saturation issues. It is reasonably
fast and responds well, even when applying auxiliary CTs. It
tends to be inflexible in applications where the system may be
expanded, as all the circuit wiring needs to be brought back from
the switchyard to the relay house.
 Arc-Flash
Fig. 2: Bus Differential w/ TOC Relay
High Impedance Differential Scheme
This scheme uses a high impedance voltage element instead
of a low impedance current element and resistor. This scheme
is effective in forcing the CT error current through the CTs in
lieu of the relay operating coil. This scheme achieves high speed
operation and can respond with a trip signal in 25 milliseconds
(1.5 cycles).
When using this scheme, an important safety issue is to make
sure that all CTs are applied at their full tap position to avoid
induced high voltage that can appear on any unused tap positions
if a lower tap position is applied.
Differential Comparator Scheme
This scheme achieves the fastest trip response speed. It can
operate in 9 - 16 milliseconds (1/2 to 1 cycle). This scheme is
very secure against misoperation for external faults. This scheme
is indicative of the enhanced protection that can be achieved using
modern numerical relays. The scheme is shown in Fig. 3.
DIRECTIONAL OVERCURRENT
In some medium-voltage distribution systems and most high-voltage
transmission systems, faults can occur in two directions. For these
systems, the directional overcurrent scheme can be applied for pro-
tection. This relay is not useful in a system with only one source.
Fig. 3: Differential Comparator
31
This protection scheme uses a TOC relay that incorporates the
phase relationship of voltage and current to identify the direction of
a fault. Numerical relays use sequential components or quadrature
voltage to sense fault direction. They also use memory to address
close-into-fault protection where voltage is nearly zero. This pro-
tection system scheme, when applied with a numerical relay, can
achieve four-to-six cycle trip response time. This relay is sometimes
applied with blocking schemes to perform sequential tripping.
ZONE INTERLOCKING
Zone interlocking schemes are readily available in low-
voltage and medium-voltage trip units and can be easily applied
using modern relays. This protection scheme is based on using
communication between protective devices to improve (speed up)
protection. The scheme also improves selective coordination by
applying a blocking signal to delay upstream tripping.
Downstream devices communicate with upstream devices if
the downstream relay detects fault current. The main (disconnect)
service trip device is identified as Zone 1, with each level of
downstream protection being assigned a new Zone level number.
These schemes typically utilize a three- or five-wire system to
communicate phase and ground fault conditions in the zones. If a
fault is seen by the downstream device and if it exceeds the short time
pickup, it signals the upstream device to block high-speed tripping that
may occur from the instantaneous setting. If the downstream device
fails to trip for a fault, the upstream device will override the blocking
signal and trip instantaneously, applying a slight (three cycle) delay.
Continuity of power system operations and worker safety are com-
peting objectives when designing power system protection schemes
and applying device settings. Modifying protection schemes and / or
applying newer technology allow the designer to improve protection
to enhance safety. This improved safety is achieved by the applica-
tion of faster responding protection schemes and devices as well
as taking advantage of the multiple protection elements and logic
in numerical relays. Communication features are also available to
enhance protection schemes by using logic that can apply blocking
signals or release blocking signals to further enhance speed, selec-
tivity, and reliability of protection system operation.
Bruce Rockwell, P.E. has been Director of American Electrical
Testing’s Engineering Division for the last nine years. He has over
thirty years of business development, management, construction
and engineering experience; specializing in the T&D utility sector.
Bruce holds an MBA from Monmouth University and received his
BSEE from New Jersey Institute of Technology. Bruce is a Certi-
fied Co-Generation Professional with the Association of Energy
Engineers and a Continuing Education Instructor for the State of
New Jersey.
 32
ARC-FLASH MITIGATION USING
DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION
NETA World, Winter 2014 Issue
Brian Cronin, CSA Engineering Services, LLC
With the revision of the NFPA 70E, the Standard for Electrical
Safety in the Workplace, one thing remains constant: the risk of
an arc-flash hazard will need to be performed. Although the risk
hazard tables are presented in a different manner with the latest
revision of NFPA 70E, one of the goals to this analysis will
continue to ensure the proper personal protective equipment (PPE)
is used under specific conditions.
When performing arc-flash hazard calculations, all factors must
be included to accurately predict the incident energy. Some of
these factors include short-circuit current, fault clearing time and
worker distance to source. The procedures set forth in IEEE 1584,
Guide to Performing Arc-Flash Calculations, are most commonly
used in calculating incident energy and the arc-flash boundary. The
basic formulas presented in IEEE 1584 are as follows:
Where E: Incident Energy [J/cm2]
E=4.184CtEn DB= 4.184Cf En
Ct: Calculation Factor
En: Incident Energy Normalized
t: Arcing Time [sec]
D: Working Distance [mm]
DB: Arc-Flash Boundary [mm]
EB: Incident Energy at Boundary [J/cm2]
Upon inspection of these equations, it can be seen that the
arcing time will directly affect the incident energy and, in almost
all cases, have a direct effect on the arc-flash boundary. Since
reducing the time to clear a fault directly affects the incident
energy, the application of differential relaying should be consid-
ered because its operation is independent of any other protective
devices, so clearing time is minimized. Although not shown in
this equation, the level of fault current will also have a direct
effect on the incident energy. The pickup level of a differen-
tial relay is typically well below fault current levels, so arcing
currents do not tend to have an effect on the trip time of the relay.
In an effort to reduce incident energy levels, various methods
have been implemented to allow for increased worker safety.
The method that should always be considered first is to perform
work on de-energized equipment; however, this is not possible in
all cases. A system available from several manufacturers applies
a temporary low level instantaneous overcurrent device to reduce
Arc-Flash
the fault clearing times; however, these devices tend to reduce
or eliminate coordination between adjacent protective devices.
Differential relays are high-speed protection devices. Because
current through the differential relay is nearly zero for all condi-
tions, except for a fault in its zone of protection, it can be set to be
much more sensitive than a fast instantaneous overcurrent device
and not affect coordination and can also remain in service under
all conditions. The effectiveness of differential relaying is often
overlooked when evaluating arc-flash hazard. Other methods to
improve worker safety include increasing worker distance to the
arc source with the use of remote control and remote racking
equipment. The application of differential protection provides
improved coordination and arc-flash hazard mitigation.
A typical system depicted in Fig.1 shows a 1500 kVA trans-
former supplying low-voltage switchgear. Fig. 2 graphically il-
lustrates the coordination of typical protective devices found on a
system of this type. Ideally, the feeder breaker, for example CB3,
should operate to clear a fault before the main circuit, CB2. To
allow for coordination, the main circuit breaker protection must
be delayed to allow for the feeder breaker to clear a fault. This
time must be increased as more protective devices are installed
in series. Many applications apply an instantaneous element on
the main circuit breaker, but the application of instantaneous pro-
tection on the main circuit breaker prevents coordination with
downstream devices for fault levels above the pickup setting. To
ensure coordination, the delay set on the main circuit breaker
typically leads to a dangerous arc-flash condition. A bolted fault
of 29.7 kA would be typical for the system shown in Fig. 1.
Applying the incident energy calculation for a fault with bolted
fault current of 29.7 kA, arcing fault current of 15.6 kA, and a
clearing time of 1.9 seconds, values typical for the system shown
in Fig. 1, results in an incident energy value of 273 J/cm2.
PPE ratings are typically in units of cal/cm2 . Converting the
metric 273 J/cm2 yields a value of 65 cal/cm2. This is considerably
greater than the 40 cal/cm2 level, above which the NFPA 70E in-
dicates that there is no safe level of PPE available. If a temporary
instantaneous setting is applied during periods of maintenance, the
arc-flash hazard can be reduced to a Category 2 because the oper-
ating time is reduced to about 80 msec. During this period of main-
tenance, the arc-flash hazard is reduced; however, there will be a
loss of coordination with downstream protective devices. While
procedures will be written to turn on and turn off this temporary
setting, human error may prevent either its use or prevent coordi-
 Arc-Flash
nation during normal conditions, if the temporary setting remains
after maintenance is completed. Also, the unanswered question
that remains at many facilities is, “How is the equipment to be la-
beled?” The use of a differential relay in this application would re-
duce the incident energy to 5.2 cal/cm2 and would not be required
Fig. 1: Basic One Line
ential relays could be used to protect the zones individually. When
the transformer is included in the zone of protection, the effects of
the phase shift and voltage difference must be incorporated into the
application of the relay. When selecting current transformers (CTs),
the classical approach would require the available fault current not to
exceed 100 amperes (20x nominal) on the CT secondary and the con-
nected burden be less than the rated burden. This approach does not
take time to saturation into consideration. With the use of numerical
relays, the burden on the CT in a differential relay is significantly less
than an electromechanical relay, but CT secondary winding and cable
impedances remain the same. Care must be given when selecting the
CT to avoid saturation. If the transformer and bus are protected as
a single zone, a set of CTs must be installed on the transformer pri-
33
to be switched in and out of service. Additionally, the traditional
reason for using a differential relay applies, which limits the dam-
age caused by the fault due to the reduced clearing time.
Depending on the application, a single differential relay could be
used to protect the transformer and the bus or two separate differ-
Fig. 2: Time-Current Curve
mary and a set of CTs must be installed on each feeder, as shown
in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, an internal fault is marked by F1 and an external
fault is marked by F2. If a fault occurs at F1, a differential relay will
clear the fault without intentional time delay, much like a temporary
maintenance setting. However, should a fault occur at F2, the dif-
ferential relay will restrain and not operate, where the maintenance
setting will not be able to distinguish between an internal and external
fault, causing an unnecessary outage to the entire bus. Also, under
normal conditions, the damage of fault F1 is minimized when differ-
ential protection is applied because it can clear a fault much quicker
than the time delayed overcurrent protection on the secondary main.
Differential protection can be summarized by understanding that
the current into the zone of protection must equal the outgoing cur-
34
rent or else an internal fault exists. Again, referring to Fig. 3, for a
fault at F2 current flows through the high side CTs (CT1) and also
flows through the feeder CTs (CT4); CT4 provides the balance cur-
rent that allows for the relay to restrain – essentially the input cur-
rent matches the output for a result of zero. For a fault at F1, current
flows in CT1; however, no current flows out of any other CT, so the
relay has no restraint. Should a power source from any of the feed-
ers be present, the direction of current from the feeder is reversed,
so the relay will see additional current, not less current. The direc-
tion of the CT and its wiring are often the cause of differential relay
misoperation, so it is important that the installation of the differen-
tial relay is correct and verified during acceptance testing. When
numerical relays are used, internal settings can compensate for the
different CT ratios and the phase shift in the transformer. When an
electromechanical relay is used, taps are available to adjust for the
difference in the CTs and the CT wiring must adjust for the phase
shift. It should be noted that the above description is based on low
impedance differential relays. High impedance relays are typically
not suited to include a transformer in its zone of protection.
Differential protection has not typically been applied to trans-
formers less than 10 MVA, unless there was some critical im-
Fig. 3: Relay One line
Arc-Flash
portance. This size limitation is mostly due to the cost-benefit
relationship to the use of differential protection. Worker safety is
an intangible aspect of the cost-benefit analysis. Due to the rela-
tively low number of worker injuries that could have been pre-
vented with the installation of differential protection, it is difficult
to make an argument using a cost-benefit basis; however, the cost
associated with electrical injuries is also difficult to quantify. The
transformer identified in Fig. 1 is typically protected using three
single phase fuses. Depending on the specifics of the application,
the installation of a three phase fuse may cost $25k. This is far
less than the cost to install a medium-voltage circuit breaker, CTs,
a relay, and all other required control work. The circuit breaker,
or similar device, may have the added advantage of protecting
against single-phasing conditions. The differential relay may be
able to clear certain faults that cannot be isolated by high-side fus-
es. Fuses do not have metering and monitoring capabilities like
numerical relays, so certain operational improvements are avail-
able with the installation of relay based protective systems. Main-
tenance costs are also greater for relay based systems than fuse
protection. Relays, CTs, circuit breakers and batteries require
significantly more resources for maintenance than fuses. Also, the
 Arc-Flash 35

cost to repair or replace a small transformer or switchgear may Mr. Brian Cronin, PE is the President of CSA Engineering Ser-
not be significantly different if the system is protected by fuses vices, LLC. and has extensive control and protection engineering
or relaying. Where coordination is paramount, the installation of experience, both as a Senior Protection Utility Engineer for a pri-
differential protection has merit. If the only purpose of installing vately owned electric utility and as a field applications engineer/
the differential relay is to reduce arc-flash levels on the secondary business development manager for a major OEM. Mr. Cronin
bus, there would be no need to install a high-side circuit breaker. holds a BEE from Manhattan College, an MBA from New York In-
Tripping the low-side main would perform the same function at a stitute of Technology. Additionally, he is a registered professional
substantial cost reduction. engineer, a member of the NYC Electric Code Interpretation Com-
In considering the coordination in Fig. 2, one can see the fuse mittee, a member of IEEE, and a member NFPA.
is not fully selective with the low-voltage circuit breaker. This
condition is often required because the upstream fuse must
coordinate with the transformer fuse or else an even larger outage
could occur unnecessarily. Since the operation of the transformer
fuse and the main circuit breaker will result in the loss of the same
load and coordination requires compromise, this area offers a good
point of compromise. A drawback to this sort of compromise is
seen when trying to determine the location of the fault. If the fuse
operates, it is assumed the fault is between the fuse and the main
circuit breaker; however, when coordination is not fully selective,
the device upstream may operate faster than the downstream device,
which can lead to confusion. R1 in Fig. 2 represents a relay curve,
which can be set to better conform to the characteristics of the
downstream device. If transformer and bus differential protection
are provided, coordination with adjacent protective systems
becomes less troublesome because the differential protection acts
to clear the fault without any unnecessary time delay. Although
coordination will still be required with backup protection, more
compromise between protective devices can usually be found
when using differential protection.
Overcurrent protection using fuses is a far simpler and less expen-
sive approach than the installation of a relay system; but the added
benefit of a relay system should be understood. With respect to arc-
flash hazard, differential protection will reduce the incident energy
relative to time-delayed overcurrent protection. When considering
coordination, numerical relays offer a superior alternative to fuses
because of the myriad of possibilities to shape the protective charac-
teristic. The added metering, monitoring, and recording features of
a numerical relay can provide tremendous operational information,
which may be a feature to include in the cost-benefit analysis. Zone
Interlocking offers a similar alternative to differential protection, but
performing primary simulation can be cumbersome. Maybe not
every 1500 kVA transformer should have differential protection,
but given equipment available today and its capabilities, it may be
prudent to consider the 10 MVA limit as too high.
36
METAL-ENCLOSED MEDIUM-VOLTAGE
AIR SWITCHES: CONDITION ANALYSIS
AND HAZARD AWARENESS
NETA World, Spring 2016 Issue
Scott Blizard and Paul Chamberlain, American Electrical Testing Co., Inc.
When performing a condition analysis on medium-voltage air switches located in metal-enclosed switchgear, the person performing
the task must be aware of all potential hazards. Furthermore, the individual must be qualified to perform the task and also have a
solid understanding of each hazard and ways to mitigate those hazards.
To better understand the hazards involved with the analysis,
testing, and maintenance of metal-enclosed, medium-voltage air
switches, take a look at what sources contribute to each hazard.
LOCK OUT/TAG OUT OF ELECTRICAL AND
MECHANICAL ENERGY
Prior to performing work on any electrical equipment, it
must be de-energized and locked out to prevent inadvertent
re-energization. Failure to properly perform lock out/tag out
when performing maintenance on metal-enclosed, medium-
voltage air switches contributes to many injuries. Controlling
the electrical energy of the air switch is the first and most
obvious hazardous energy source that could cause injury.
Prior to the start of a lock out/tag out procedure, review the
electrical drawing and the arc-flash study to identify the
personal protective equipment (PPE) required during isolation.
Additionally, the task performer must identify the type of
switch to be serviced and the electrical source(s) to be de-
energized when isolating the switch.
Be aware of the air-switch compartment layout. Medium-
voltage air switches come in several configurations, and the
task performer must ensure that the line side of the switch is
properly identified. Do not bypass interlocks or keyed systems.
Secure the proper instruction manual for the make and model of
the equipment prior to starting work. The air-switch operating
compartment may be isolated, meaning that the operating
devices may be located in one compartment while the air switch
is located in a different compartment. During this step, electrical
and mechanical energy are potential hazards, depending upon
the type of air switch involved.
Electrically de-energize the air switch from its primary
energy source, and ensure that the air switch is disconnected
from all sources of power, including control voltage sources,
if applicable. Once de-energized, verify that the air switch is at
a zero-energy state using the manufacturer’s approved method.
Verify the accuracy of the detection or voltage measuring device
Arc-Flash
against a known source, then check for zero energy on the
de-energized equipment, and test the detection equipment
against a known source again. This will verify that the testing
device was functional during the check for voltage.
Testing for voltage requires its own level of PPE, depending on
the voltage and equipment type per the tables in NFPA 70E 2015
or OSHA 1910.269, “Appendix E.” Determine which is applicable
for the installation, whether commercial or utility, based on where
the work is being performed. For example, in the NFPA 70E, use
“Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(b)–Arc-Flash PPE Categories for Alter-
nating Current (ac) Systems.” This table will tell you whether arc-
flash protection is required based on the equipment condition and
the task to be performed. If it is determined that arc-flash protection
is required for the task, then reference “Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(b)–
Arc-Flash PPE Categories for Alternating Current (ac) Systems”
or “130.7(C)(15)(B)–Arc-Flash Hazard for Direct Current(dc)
Systems,” whichever is applicable. These tables will identify what
level of arc-flash protection is required for the task as well as the
arc-flash boundary. Performers can then reference “Table 130.7(C)
(16)–Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)” to ensure that they are
performing the task using all the appropriate PPE. Additionally,
rubber gloves, sleeves, insulated tools, and other rubber goods may
be required during the isolation procedure. These specialized pieces
of PPE and other equipment must be rated for the voltages worked
with and tested per the applicable ASTM Standard.
However, electrical energy isn’t the only energy that requires
lock out/tag out. The air switch may contain a large amount of
mechanical energy. This energy must be dissipated prior to servic-
ing or serious injury could occur. Once the air switch has been dis-
charged, lock out/tag out the charging mechanism, if feasible. In
the case of a motor-operated switch, ensure that remote operating
handles are tagged in a local or manual mode. This will prevent
someone from inadvertently operating the air switch.
For motor-driven operating systems, make sure the motor has
been locked out or disengaged prior to starting work.
 Arc-Flash
OTHER PHYSICAL HAZARDS
Gravity is also an energy that needs to be controlled. The size and
weight of a medium-voltage air-switch panel cover can be heavy and
awkward to remove prior to performing maintenance; therefore, take
proper precautions. These may include getting another person to aid
in removal of the panel or removing by mechanical means.
INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE
GROUNDS
Refer to OSHA (29 CFR 1910.269) and NFPA 70E for specific
guidance on grounding locations and sizing of grounds required
for the task. Grounds must always be applied upstream and
downstream of the equipment and as close to the work as possible.
Always ensure that work is done between the grounds and that
you remove them once the work is complete.
PROPER PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Prior to beginning any work, verify that the metal-enclosed
medium-voltage air switches are electrically de-energized; in
some cases, this may be accomplished through remote operation.
Ensure that proper PPE is used for the class of air switch serviced
or any adjacent energized equipment. Adjacent equipment may
require different levels of PPE if the work is performed within its
limited approach boundary.
Refer to the three applicable tables in the NFPA 70E 2015 or
to OSHA 1910.169 Appendix E again. It will indicate the level
of protection required and will aid in preventing electrical shock
and protect personnel from arc flash. However, this table provides
information based upon known values of the short-circuit current
available, the clearing time in cycles, and minimum working
distance. If those factors are unknown, more information must be
gathered prior to performing the work to ensure personnel safety.
CHEMICAL HAZARDS
Some lubricants and cleaners may pose a respiratory and skin
irritant if used in enclosed areas or on bare skin. Knowledge of
the material, reading its label, and checking the Safety Data Sheet
(SDS) is advised to identify any potential health effects from its
use. Once again, use of proper PPE is necessary for using some
cleaners and lubricants. For example, nitrile gloves, safety glasses,
face shield, and even respiratory protection may be needed.
HUMAN ERROR MITIGATION
Simply put, human error is a person (or persons) making a
mistake. To prevent an error, follow a procedure or checklist
while performing the task. If one doesn’t exist, create one.
Nomenclature should be verified, and re-verified upon approach-
ing a piece of equipment. Perform a self-check and a peer-check to
ensure that the task is being performed on the correct component.
37
When working around similar-looking pieces of equipment, use
markings such as flagging to identify the components that should
not be touched. Flagging can take several forms, depending upon
the company or client’s policy and procedures. Do not forget to
identify, mark, then lock out/tag out all associated equipment (e.g.
associated cables and compartments). Flagging could be used to
indicate a component that is not operating normally.
Barricading off a safe work zone prevents other workers from in-
advertently entering the work area. This will ensure that maintenance
and testing is conducted in an area under your control. Use a test stand
in this area, if applicable. Ensure that any control voltage required to
operate the switch during testing is within the secured area.
CONCLUSION
There are many potential hazards to watch out for when
performing maintenance and testing on metal-enclosed medium-
voltage air switches:
●● Obtain all service bulletins, maintenance documents, arc-
flash studies, and manuals prior to beginning work for that
specific device.
●● Review all prints and one-lines associated with the equipment.
●● Establish a safe work area, and barricade off the work area.
●● Perform a pre-job brief with all employees on site.
●● Wear proper PPE.
●● Disconnect any control circuits and test equipment before per-
forming visual or mechanical inspections or during maintenance.
●● If applicable, verify zero energy (test, check, test) and
discharge all stored energy.
●● If possible, lock out/tag out (mechanical and electrical energy
sources).
●● Connect grounds where, and if, applicable;
●● Identify, visually mark, and/or flag the equipment worked on.
Following these steps will lead to a safer work environment
while performing maintenance and testing of metal-enclosed me-
dium-voltage air switches.
Scott Blizard has been the Vice President and Chief Operating
Officer of American Electrical Testing Co., Inc. since 2000. Dur-
ing his tenure, Scott acted as the Corporate Safety Officer for nine
years. He has over 25 years of experience in the field as a Master
Electrician, Journeyman, Wireman, and NETA Level IV Senior
Technician.
Paul Chamberlain has been the Safety Manager for American
Electrical Testing Company Inc. since 2009. He has been in the
safety field for the past 12 years, working for various companies
and in various industries. He received a Bachelor’s of Science
degree from Massachusetts Maritime Academy.
38
ELECTRICAL HAZARD FACTS
NETA World, Winter 2013 Issue
James R. White, Shermco Industries, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that before OSHA was
created in 1970 there were some 14,000 job-related fatalities an-
nually, with 2.5 million disabling injuries. In 2011, there were
4,693 fatalities in the workplace, while there were 908,300 lost-
time injuries. The workforce has more than doubled in size since
1970, which means the rates for fatalities and injuries has dra-
matically fallen since then. As an example, the 1980 fatality rate
was 7.7 per 100,000 workers; in 2011 it was 3.5 per 100,000
workers. Even though that decrease is very significant, one
might choose to look at these statistics in another way: 4,693
workers were given capital punishment for the crime of going to
work. When it is put in those terms, this statistic doesn’t sound
nearly as good, does it?
PRE-1996 ARC-FLASH PPE INADEQUATE
The three primary hazards of electricity have been well known for
decades. The hazard of electrical shock has been known since the
first electrical devices were designed in the 1800’s. Arc flash and arc
blast have also been recognized, but due to the inability to quantify
these two hazards, there was nothing that could be done to effective-
ly protect the worker from them. In the late 1980s, the first arc-flash
suits began to appear. Most were made from NOMEX® and used
polycarbonate windows. It was found later that the polycarbonate
windows would actually fail at a very low value of incident energy,
causing the window to melt. Figs. 1a and 1b show an example of
the early, unrated arc-flash PPE and clothing. One tip-off is the clear
window in the hood. The other is the lack of required markings,
“ATPV, ASTM F1506”1 and “NFPA 70E”2 on the label.
Fig. 1a Fig. 1b
Arc-Flash
This type of flash suit is still used by uninformed technicians and
contractors and presents a very real threat to their well-being. All
arc-flash protective clothing and PPE must have a label giving the
arc rating and show that it complies with ASTM F1506 and NFPA
70E. If it does not, do not allow the person possessing it to work
on or near any electrical power system or device that may be en-
ergized. There are arc-rated flash suits that have a similar appear-
ance, but meet the requirements above. These would be sufficient
to perform tasks on or near energized conductors and circuit parts.
In 1996, the first arc testing of clothing and PPE took place and it was
soon discovered that the existing PPE and clothing were inadequate,
especially for higher values of incident energy. As the industry was
then able to determine the hazard created by an electrical arc flash,
protective equipment was designed to provide that protection, and
NFPA 70E (in the 2000 edition) provided the first generally available
guide to choosing PPE to protect workers from the arc-flash hazard.
In this author’s opinion, “Table 130.7(C)(9)(a)” [now “130.7(C)(15)
(a)”] did more to increase workers’ awareness of the arc-flash hazard
and how to protect themselves than any other single factor.
Advancements have been made, both in our understanding of
the arc-flash hazard as well as how to design more effective PPE
and clothing that provides a higher level of protection and is more
comfortable to wear. This includes lighter weight arc-flash clothing
and arc-rated windows and face shields and hood windows that
have better light transmission through them. These two factors
have increased the acceptance by workers of the provided arc-
rated PPE and clothing and have encouraged their usage.
THE HAZARDS OF ELECTRICITY
The three recognized hazards of electricity are shock, arc flash
and arc blast.
The Department of Labor estimates that there are 4,000
nondisabling and 3,600 disabling injuries in the workplace due to
electrical shock each year. A nondisabling injury is one which
is a lost-time injury, but the person can return to work doing his/
her normal job. A disabling injury means the person either could
not return to work or could not return to work in the position held
prior to the injury. Another 2,000 traumatic electrical burn injuries
are estimated to occur each year. The term traumatic indicates
that there is a second-degree burn on more than 50 percent of a
person’s body. The DOL figures mean that there are approximately
10,000 serious injuries from electrical shock and arc-flash events
each year. Arc-blast injuries and fatalities are not currently tracked
by OSHA or the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
 Arc-Flash
THE ELECTRICAL SHOCK HAZARD
When exposed, energized electrical conductors or circuit
parts are contacted by an unprotected part of the body, electrical
current flows through the person to either ground or some nearby
grounded object such as a metal enclosure. Phase-to-phase
contact is rare, but substantially increases the shock hazard and
injury. The pathway the electrical current takes through the body
plays an important part in determining the seriousness of the
resulting injury. The most common pathway is from the hand
to the foot followed by hand-to-hand contact. Head-to-hand or
head-to-foot contact is much less likely, but since the electrical
current passes through the stem of the brain, serious injury can
occur at much lower voltages.
The Most Recent Available Data
ESFI (Electrical Safety Foundation International) updated a CDC/
NIOSH study of electrical shock injuries and fatalities over a ten-
year period. (See Fig. 2.) The event that causes the greatest number
of electrocutions in the workplace is contact with an overhead
power line (42%), followed by contact with transformers, wiring or
other electrical devices (26%), and contact with machines, tools or
appliances (16%). In the event category of contact with overhead
power lines, approximately half of those fatalities were from cranes,
bucket trucks, and other types of mechanical equipment making
contact. The other 50 % is from people making contact by long
dimensional objects such as conduit or making accidental contact
during the performance of their job duties. It is clear that the three
major causes of electrocution have remained virtually unchanged
during this period of time. (See Fig. 3.) 3
Fig. 2
39
Fig. 3
In a study conducted by CDC/NIOSH on just electrical workers,
it was found that 24% of the lost-time injuries/fatalities were due
to troubleshooting and voltage testing activities, while 19% of the
recorded events occurred during normal operation of electrical
machines, tools, or appliances. 18% of the recorded events occurred
due to repair or repair-related activities.4
There are several factors contributing to the severity of
electrical shock:
●● Voltage magnitude
●● Current magnitude
●● Pathway through the body
●● Duration
●● Physical condition of person being shocked
Electrical current is what actually causes damage to the
body. The voltage is the force that pushes the current. As the
voltage increases, more current, will flow through the body.
This relationship to voltage, current and the body’s resistance is
explained through Ohm’s Law, shown below:
Current though the body = Voltage
Resistance of Body
The Differences That Electrical Shock Has on
Men vs. Women
According to IEEE standard 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substa-
tion Grounding, the average resistance of a man’s body is approxi-
mately 1,000 ohms. This will vary some (but not much) depending
on a person’s weight. For 1,000 ohms body resistance contacting
a 120-volt conductor, the resulting current is 120 mA through the
body. This current is usually lower, as the most common path is
for electricity to flow from hand-to-foot. Shoes, socks, flooring
(carpet, wood, tile, and dry concrete) all provide some additional
resistance. Women have about 2/3 the body resistance, due to fac-
40
tors such as size, bone mass, and body composition. This means
that for the same exposure, women face a greater risk of injury
from the shock hazard. Instead of having approximately 120 mA
current pass through them for a 120-volt shock, they would have
approximately 160 mA passing through them.
In 1961, Dr. Charles Dalziel presented a paper describing the
results of experiments he had conducted on student volunteers at
the University of California, Berkeley. The results are summarized
in Table 1.5.
mA Current Effect on Person
These Are All Possible Effects from Low-Voltage Contact
0.5 to 3 Slight Tingling
3+ May Be Painful
10+ Muscle Contractions and Pain
30+ Respiratory Paralysis
75+ Ventricular Fibrillation Threshold
These Effects Only with High-Voltage Contact
4+ Amps Heart Paralysis
5+ Amps Tissue and Organ Burning
Table 1: Effects of Electrical Current (From Deleterious
Effects of Electric Shock, Dr. Charles Dalziel,1961)
The second part of the equation is that when shocked, wom-
en are more likely to suffer injury, and their injury is likely to be
greater than what a man would be expected to receive. Table 2 is
also from Dr. Dalziel’s experiments and shows the relationship be-
tween ac and dc, as well as men vs. women. Look at the last exam-
ple effect shown on Table 2, “Shock, Painful and Severe, Muscular
Contractions, Breathing Difficult.” A 60 Hz contact with 23 mA
of current is required to cause this effect for a man, but only 15mA
of current is required to produce the same effect for a woman. Fe-
male technicians need to be aware that they are more susceptible
to injury than their male counterparts, if they make contact with
exposed energized conductors or circuit parts.
Table 2: Effect of Electrical Shock; Men vs.Women (From
Deleterious Effects of Electric Shock, Dr. Charles Dalziel,1961)
Arc-Flash
Electrical shock kills and injures more than twice as many peo-
ple each year as electrical arc flash. That being said, arc-flash in-
juries are often more serious and, on average, require much more
hospitalization and recovery time.
ELECTRICAL ARC FLASH
An electrical arc occurs when an energized conductor or circuit
part makes contact with either a grounded object or, much more
rarely, another conductor. Approximately 97% of all electrical arcs
begin as phase-to-ground faults. Often the grounded object is a tool
or materials being held by a person. Once initial contact is made, the
intense heat of the electrical arc ionizes the surrounding air, creating
a pathway from the grounded object to the energized conductor or
circuit part. If the arc occurs inside a metal enclosure, the arc plasma
will reflect off the back and sides of the enclosure, enveloping the
other two phases, which may not have been originally involved.
This will cause the arc to develop from a single-phase arc to a
three-phase arc, substantially increasing the incident energy. If the
voltage is less than 240 volts, the arc is usually self-extinguishing,
although, if it is fed from a large source, the available short circuit
current could establish the arc. At higher voltages, the arc is able to
establish itself and will continue until the circuit is de-energized by
an overcurrent protective device (OCPD).
There are five primary factors that determine the severity of an
injury from an electrical arc:
●● The distance from the arc
●● The absorption coefficient of the clothing worn
●● The arc temperature
●● The arc duration
●● The arc length
The Distance from the Arc
The heat of an electrical arc is referred to as the incident energy.
This is because the heat is made up of the radiated heat (infrared)
and convection heat (heat flow through air). Incident energy de-
creases by the inverse square of the distance. In other words, as
a person moves away from an arc, the heat will decrease rapidly.
This aspect is critical to understanding how to protect oneself from
an arc. Body position is a primary factor to consider when per-
forming energized work. One should stand no closer to the device
than necessary in order to perform the work effectively because
the incident energy that person will receive, if there is an arc-flash
event, increases as one moves closer to the device. The standard
working distance for power systems of less than 600 volts is typi-
cally 18”, while that of 2.4 kV to 15 kV is a 36” working distance.
The Coefficient of Clothing Worn
The type and fabric weight of clothing being worn affects the heat
that is transferred to the body. NFPA 70E recommends wearing
either flammable, non-melting clothing as underlayers (cotton,
 Arc-Flash 41

wool or silk) or arc-rated underlayers for additional protection.
The general rule of thumb is that each layer of clothing under arc-
rated clothing reduces the heat to the body by approximately 50%.
Flammable underlayers do not increase the arc rating of a clothing
system, but will reduce the probability of a burn underneath arc-
rated clothing.
The Arc Temperature
The temperature of an electrical is arc is significantly affected
by the power available to create it (instantaneous power levels in
the megawatt range are present within many types of electrical
equipment arcs). Other factors include electrode material and
shape, length of arc travel, constraints on arc volume, etc.
The Arc Duration
The arc duration is the second most critical factor in an arc-
flash event. Incident energy is proportional to time. If a person is
exposed to an arc flash for 0.08 seconds, he would receive twice
the incident energy as an arc of the same magnitude that lasted
0.04 seconds. This is why the NFPA 70E technical committee
inserted “Section 205.4,” which states, “Overcurrent protective
devices shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturers’
instructions or industry consensus standards.”
Poorly-maintained circuit breakers and other OCPD are
unreliable. If an OCPD malfunctions, it will increase the time it
takes to clear and extinguish the fault. Even though this may be
only fractions of a second, it can effectively double or triple the
incident energy received by a worker.
The Arc Length
The arc length becomes a factor at higher voltages (>600 V). It
has been demonstrated that, with all other factors being the same,
a longer arc creates more incident energy than a shorter arc. Low-
voltage power systems cannot sustain a longer electrical arc, as arc
resistance causes a voltage drop of approximately 75 to 100 V/inch.
death by impacting a person’s body.
At this time there are no equations to calculate the pressure wave
that would be created by electrical arc blast as there are for the arc-
flash hazard. IEEE and NFPA are conducting a joint collaboration
project to develop the needed equations, but those results have
not been released as of this date.6 It has been shown that as the
short circuit available current increases, the pressure wave also
increases. The pressure wave has been measured at greater than
2,160 lb/ft2.
At about the same instant in time as the pressure wave is created,
an acoustic wave is also created. The acoustic wave is created by
the near instantaneous heating of the air surrounding the electrical
arc, similar to the way lightning is created. This sound intensity
has been measured at greater than 160dB. This level of intensity
will cause instantaneous hearing loss.
Current-Limiting Devices – Not a Cure-All
Current-limiting fuses have been found to be an effective
method of reducing both the incident energy and potential pressure
wave by limiting available short circuit current from the system
and by greatly reducing the duration of the arc (Fig.4). When
properly applied, current-limiting fuses will have a clearing time
of less than ½ cycle. Current-limiting fuses cannot be applied in
all circumstances, and, if the short circuit current does not push the
fuse into its current-limiting region, it will act as a dual-element
time delay fuse. Some manufacturers produce current-limiting
circuit breakers for low-voltage protection that have similar
characteristics as current-limiting fuses.

The Onset of a Second-Degree Burn

Unprotected skin has a very low tolerance for heat. A temperature
rise of 1760F for 1/10th second will produce the onset of a second
degree burn. This is the point at which NFPA 70E requires arc-
flash protective clothing and PPE to be worn. This level of injury is
considered to be non-life threatening as the skin is still mostly whole
and not uniformly blistered; therefore, the risk of infection is less
than a second-degree burn, which will have uniform blistering.

ELECTRICAL ARC BLAST

Electrical arc blast refers to the pressure wave created by the
rapidly expanding vaporized metal (arc plasma ball) when an arc
occurs inside metal-enclosed equipment. This pressure wave can Fig. 4
distort the enclosure, causing it to rupture, create shrapnel from
parts and components that are broken loose, and cause injury or
42 Arc-Flash

SUMMARY James White is the Training Director for Shermco Industries,

Inc. located in Irving, Texas. He is a Senior member of the IEEE,
In 1999, the 2000 edition of NFPA 70E was released, containing
the recipient of the 2011 IEEE/PCIC Electrical Safety Excellence
the first method of choosing arc-flash protective clothing and PPE.
Award, the 2008 IEEE Electrical Safety Workshop Chairman,
In 2002, IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Alternate interNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA)
Calculations was released. Together, these two standards provide
representative on NFPA 70E®, Primary NETA representative on
guidelines for companies to protect their workers from the hazards
NEC Code Making Panel 13, Primary representative on NFPA
associated with an arc-flash event. The equations developed in
70B®, and is the Primary NETA representative to ASTM F18®.
IEEE 1584 will be further refined, once the members of the IEEE/
James is also a certified Level IV Senior Substation Technician
NFPA joint collaboration finish their work. The effects of vertical
with NETA, an inspector member of IAEI and serves on the NETA
vs. horizontal bus will further revise the equations used by IEEE
Safety and Training Committees. James is the author of Electrical
1584, and equations for calculating the effects of a dc arc flash will
Safety, A Practical Guide to OSHA and NFPA 70E and Significant
be available.
Changes to NFPA 70E – 2012 Edition both published by American
A solid understanding of the hazards of electricity is important to Technical Publishers.
working safely. OSHA’s electrical safety regulations were written
before the hazards of arc flash and blast were as well known as they
are today, but they were written in such a way that they are still
relevant and enforceable today. Sometimes it seems as though the
hazard of electrical shock has been forgotten, or overshadowed by
the hazard of electrical arc flash. This is unfortunate, as electrical
shock injures and kills twice as many workers as arc flash. This is not
to downplay the arc-flash hazard, as the injuries received from an arc
flash are often more serious and result in more medical intervention
than shock. The important point is that one should neither forget nor
minimize either of these life-threatening hazards.
The arc-blast hazard is much less understood. The IEEE/NFPA
joint collaboration is just now finishing some of the field tests it
has been performing. One of i ts mandates was to provide a means
of calculating the pressure wave that is likely to be created during
an arc event. Until that information is compiled and released, the
arc-blast hazard will remain an incompletely defined quantity.

REFERENCES
1
ASTM F1506, Standard Performance Specification for Flame
Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by
Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and
Related Thermal Hazards
2
“Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace,” NFPA
70E®, 2000 and 2012 editions.
3
James Cawley and Gerald Homce, “Trends in Electrical Injury,”
IEEE PCIC, 2006; Electrical Safety Foundation International,
Workplace Electrical Injury and Fatality Statistics –
Additional Charts 2003 – 2010.
4
Kathleen Kowalski-Trakofler, Ph.D., “Non-Contact Electric
Arc-Induced Injuries in the Mining Industry: a Multi-Disciplin-
ary Approach,” IEEE/IAS Electrical Safety Workshop, 2004.
5
Dr. Charles F. Dalziel, “Deleterious Effects of Electric Shock,”
Meeting of Experts on Electrical Accidents and Related Matters,
Geneva, Switzerland, 1961
6
IEEE/NFPA Joint Collaboration on the Arc-Flash Hazard Reports
 Arc-Flash 43

MAKE YOUR ELECTRICAL SAFETY

PROGRAM YOUR OWN, PART 1:
WHY WON’T A GENERIC PROGRAM WORK?
NETA World, Fall 2014 Issue
Don Brown, CESCP, Shermco Industries

This is the first in a three-part series in the creation of an Electrical Safety Program (ESP). Part 1 will address the need for a company-
specific ESP and why a copy of a generic program will most likely get you into trouble. Part 2 will discuss the criteria for the contents
of a company-specific ESP, and Part 3 will explain the implementation process of your newly created program.

The Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, Title 29 USC 654 Sec. 5. Duties:
●● Each employer
○○ Shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment that are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees;
○○ Shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under this Act.
●● Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and
health standards and all rules, regulations, and orders issued
pursuant to this Act that are applicable to his own actions
and conduct.
We have all heard this time and time again. Many of us have
heard it so many times that we can recite it verbatim to each other.
It is known as the General Duty Clause, and it gives the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) the authority to
fine you on nearly any unsafe condition or circumstance you may
have present on your job sites.
If there are rules and regulations in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), then how can the General Duty Clause be
used to issue a citation to a company? Simple: not every situation
or potential event can be predicted on every job site. Conditions
change, personnel change, and so does the work. It is for these
reasons that the General Duty Clause exists.
While it is very important to have a good safety program for
your company, we will be focusing on the ESP, which should be
separate from, but consistent with and a part of, the company’s
overall safety program. There are many excellent resources
available to use for creating an effective electrical safety
program. The NFPA 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace (National Fire Protection Agency), Electrical Safety
– A Practical Guide to OSHA and NFPA 70E (James R. White,
American Technical Publishers), and The Electrical Safety Program
Guide (Ray A. Jones, Jane G. Jones, Jones and Bartlett Learning)
are among the best resources. However, using these as your ESP
alone, or copying the example safety programs word for word, will
not only get you into trouble, it actually does a disservice to your
company and could place your workers in hazardous situations.
Your ESP must be company specific, hazard specific, and cover the
work your employees do each and every day. These documents are
a great starting point, but they don’t know what your employees do
and what they face in their daily work.
It is the responsibility of each employer to provide a safe working
environment for its workers. In order to do this, the specific hazards
one may face must be identified and a way to perform work safely
must be determined. One of the key phrases in the General Duty
Clause is “…free from recognized hazards….” Is electricity a rec-
ognized hazard? Of course it is. Knowing this is a key point to being
able to create a company-specific electrical safety program. Looking
at the key job duties of each employee and how they are exposed to
those hazards will help in the creation of an excellent ESP.
It is up to the employer to conduct a hazard assessment to deter-
mine what hazards are present at the place of employment and to
create a program that ensures the employees work safely around
those hazards. The Safety and Health Program Management
Guidelines, dated January 26, 1989, was issued as a guideline for
employers to use to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses.
The guidelines represent a set of program elements used by em-
ployers that are successful in the protection of their employees.
Along with the hazard assessment comes the risk assessment.
Just what is a risk assessment? It can be defined and conducted
in many ways, but it is simply this: a risk assessment is a careful
examination of what could harm your workers, so that you can
determine whether or not you have taken the proper precautions
to prevent the harm or if you need to take additional precautions
to help eliminate those hazards. Looking at the combination of the
hazards to which your employees are exposed, in addition to the
tasks being performed, is the best way to conduct a risk assess-
ment. For example, you can have a high level of hazard around
electrical equipment, but if there is no work being performed, there
is little risk. On the other hand, there may be a low level of hazard,
and a lot of work going on in the area of that hazard, and that in-
creases the potential of an incident occurring. It just gives a level
of protection to the workers when they are exposed to hazards in
44
the workplace. Workers all have a right to be protected from harm,
and you, as the employer, have the responsibility to provide that
protection. See the Risk-ometer, below in Fig. 1, for a comparison
of some common tasks.
Pulling fuses with bare hands on live circuit with no PPE
Inserting MCC”bucket” into energized motor control center
Troubleshooting 480v AC control circuit
Opening hinged covers on live electrical panel
Fused switch operation with doors closed
Fig. 1
Another key component is the inclusion of management’s com-
mitment to the program. Without the commitment of management
to the safety program, there will be no employee commitment, and
with no employee commitment, there will be accidents and fatali-
ties. A culture of safety can only come from the top down.
So now you have management commitment, employee involve-
ment, and a great program has been created. What do you do next?
Whatever you do, don’t put it on the shelf and not tell anyone
about it! Too many times that is exactly what happens. Another
part of any good electrical safety program is getting the informa-
tion out to the employees. Training is not only an essential part
of the program, it is also a requirement per OSHA and NFPA. No
matter what the employees’ job or task is, they have to be trained
to be able to recognize and avoid the hazards they could be faced
with while performing their daily duties. The training has to be
either classroom, hands-on, or a combination of both, and it must
address the hazards to which they are exposed.
One of the last items this article will address is the need for site-
specific safe work practices. You can have the best written plan
and the best training program and provide the employees all of
the personal protective equipment and tools that they need to do
their jobs, but if they don’t work safely, the chance of an incident
increases dramatically.
29CFR1910.333 – Selection and use of work practices states:
 (a) General. Safety-related work practices shall be employed
“ Professional (CESCP). He has written electrical safety programs
… The specific safety-related work practices shall be consistent
with the nature and extent of the associated electrical hazards.”
and NFPA 70E 110.3(B) – Awareness and Self-Discipline states:
Arc-Flash
The electrical safety program…shall be developed to
“
provide the required self-discipline for all employees who
must perform work that may involve electrical hazards.”
The old saying, “That’s the way we have always done it,” doesn’t
work anymore. Work practices change, regulations and standards
change, and the hazards in the workplace change. Your employees
must change as well. With the updates to the NFPA 70E, and the up-
coming changes to OSHA regulations, workers must be prepared to
change with them. Working safely is not an option, it must be a condi-
tion of employment and must be upheld to the fullest. There is not a
person out there that goes to work with the thought that, “Hey, I think
I am going to hurt myself today.” Unfortunately, injuries are still hap-
pening. Many of the injuries that occur on the job today occur from
two different work groups: the inexperienced workers and the more
seasoned workers. The inexperienced workers are learning from the
established workers, and sometimes pick up bad habits. With the right
mentoring and the right training, those workers can have a lifetime of
safe employment and will be able to go home at the end of the day.
The seasoned workers, those that have been in a given industry for
quite a long time, sometimes have the thought process that they have
been doing something a particular way for their whole career and have
not been hurt, so they must be doing something right. They need to be
aware that things change in the workplace, equipment gets upgraded,
equipment may not be maintained as well as it should have been, or
tasks just get so routine that they are not paying attention to the haz-
ards to which they are exposed.
Invest the time and effort in your safety program to make it specific
to your jobsite. It does not matter if it is a construction site, a manu-
facturing facility, or a customer site during a turn-around. Make sure
that the specific hazards you will be facing are identified, the risks
assessed, and the work is done safely. We all want to go home at the
end of the day in the same condition that we came to work that day.
In the next part of this series, we will be talking about some of the
specific requirements of putting together a complete electrical safety
program. Too many times things get overlooked and left out, only to
come back at a later time and rear its head. Part three of this series puts
the whole puzzle together and takes a look at the company-specific
electrical safety program, looks at the specific requirements of an ef-
fective ESP, and shows how to implement a program that not only
keeps workers safe, but helps reduce delays and equipment damage
and decreases downtime by preventing incidents.
Don Brown is the Senior Programs Developer for Shermco Indus-
tries in Irving, Texas. He has been in the electrical industry for over
40 years and has been implementing and training electrical safety
for the last 15-plus years. Mr. Brown just completed his certifi-
cation through NFPA as a Certified Electrical Safety Compliance
for large data centers, petrochemical facilities, and manufacturing
facilities, and is in the process of updating many of these to include
the upcoming changes in the NFPA 70E—2015 Edition.
 Arc-Flash
MAKE YOUR ELECTRICAL SAFETY PROGRAM
YOUR OWN, PART 2: WHAT SHOULD BE IN AN
ELECTRICAL SAFETY PROGRAM?
NETA World, Winter 2014 Issue
Don Brown, Shermco Industries
This is the second in a three-part series in the creation of an Electrical Safety Program (ESP). Part 2 will discuss what should be
included in a company-specific ESP. Part 1 addressed the need for a company-specific ESP. Part 3 will explain the implementation
process of your newly created program.
A complete ESP consists of many parts. Some of the components
of an effective ESP are safe work practices, including the need
for an energized electrical work permit, personal protective
equipment, training requirements, and insulated tools We will be
discussing these in a broad overview of each category. Keep in
mind that it is essential that the safety program be based on your
site-specific needs as were outlined in Part 1 of this series.
INTRODUCTION
This section includes the purpose for the ESP; the scope of
the policy; the responsibilities of the employer, employees,
and contractors; disciplinary procedures for noncompliance;
auditing; and documentation. It should also include a list of all
of the referenced documents that are a part of the ESP. These
can be ASTD, IEEE, NFPA, and ANSI standards as well as
references to applicable portions of the OSHA regulations. The
referenced sections should be called out specifically, such as
29CFR1910.147—The Control of Hazardous Energy, and NFPA
70E-2012, The Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.
TRAINING
Training must be identified for each person that will be
exposed to the hazards of electricity, whether that person is
a qualified electrical worker or someone that is not generally
going to be working on the electrical components, but may be
exposed to the hazards in normal daily work. There are different
classifications of electrical hazards, such as shock, arc flash and
arc blast. These hazards must be addressed in the individual’s
training requirements. Keep in mind that a person can be trained
to a specific level of qualification on some equipment, but not be
qualified to work on other equipment.
Once the training is finished, it must be documented.
Documentation is a key component of the EPS as far as being
able to prove that someone has had the necessary training for a
particular job. There are many ways to document the training that
an individual has taken. It can be in the form of the class sign-
45
in sheet, a copy of the course-completion certificate, if awarded,
or computer tracked identification badge log-in. The correct
information must make it to the individual’s personnel or training
file to show that the student attended the course.
Just as important as documenting the training, is documenting
the content of the class that was completed. NFPA 70E 110.2(E)
Training Documentation states, “The documentation shall contain
the content of the training, each employee’s name and the dates
of the training.” The “content of the training” means not just a
short description of the course, such as safety training, but what
information was covered in that training session.
The last part of the training documentation outlined in NFPA
70E 110.2(E) states, “This documentation shall be made when the
employee demonstrates proficiency in the work practices involved
and shall be maintained for the duration of the employee’s
employment.” Broken down into two parts, the main topic here
is the “demonstrates proficiency” section. To demonstrate, one
has to “explain workings of something; to explain or describe
how something works or how to do something; show validity of
something; to show or prove something clearly and convincingly.”
And proficiency is defined as “mastery of a specific behavior
or skill demonstrated by consistently superior performance,
measured against established or popular standards.” Put very
simply, that means that one has to prove that they have mastered
a particular skill set by performing that skill. This also means
that one cannot demonstrate proficiency by taking a written test
or taking a class on line. Once the demonstration is done, the
documentation is completed and the record placed in that person’s
training or personnel record for the duration of their employment.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND
VOLTAGE-RATED TOOLS
We are all aware that personal protective equipment is required,
but how much is really needed, and do we have to wear it all?
There is a simple answer to this question, and it goes like this:
you need to wear all of the PPE that will protect you from all
46
of the hazards you will face in a given situation, every time. If
there is no chance of electrical shock, but there is the possibility
of an arc flash, you must wear arc-rated clothing to protect you
to the level of that arc flash. If there is no possibility of an arc
flash, but there is the potential for an exposure to shock, you have
to be protected from the shock by wearing the proper protective
insulating clothing, whether that is rubber insulating gloves with
leather protectors, rubber insulating sleeves, or installing rubber
insulating blankets over the exposed energized parts. And in many
cases, you may be required to wear clothing and PPE that will
protect you from all of these hazards. That means that you need
to do a hazard assessment as well as a risk assessment for each
potential hazard and provide the proper level of PPE for each
worker to wear based on that hazard.
Personal protective equipment can range from rubber insulating
gloves to arc-rated clothing to arc-rated faceshields and hoods. Also
required is that the workers be provided with electrically insulated
tools and equipment for the work to be performed. Voltage-rated
tools such as screwdrivers, wire strippers, wrenches, and socket
sets are fairly common things to provide to each worker. Many of
those tools can be used in daily activities. However, equipment
such as hot sticks, shotgun sticks, and personal protective ground
sets also fall into this category. These are the types of tools that
are specialty tools and need to be identified for a specific job task,
unlike insulated hand tools.
EEWP
An Energized Electrical Work Permit (EEWP) is required
any time that work is performed on electrical equipment that
has not been placed in an electrically safe work condition and
work is performed within the Limited Approach Boundary or
the Arc-Flash Boundary. This does not include basic testing and
troubleshooting. However it does include repair and installation
of equipment while energized.
There are a number of requirements for inclusion in an EEWP.
Some of these are the description of the circuit or equipment to be
worked on, the justification for working on energized equipment,
a list of the specific safe-work practices to be employed
while working, the results of the arc-flash and shock-hazard
assessments, methods used to limit access to the area while work
is begin performed, documentation of holding a job briefing, and
last, but by no means least, the energized work approval which
should be signed by the responsible manager, safety manager or
facility owner. Each of these requirements must be documented
on a single form (multipage, if necessary) and signed by that
person responsible for the work. The document should be succinct
enough to make it a user-friendly document, but detailed enough
to include all of the listed information. General forms such as the
one included in “Annex J” of the NFPA 70E are a good starting
point, but the document needs to be site-specific enough to cover
the requirements of the facility.
Arc-Flash
SAFE WORK PRACTICES
A strong case can be made that safe work practices include all
that has been described previously─and with good reason. These
are all part of the safe-work practices outlined in the NFPA 70E.
What is being discussed in this part of the article is the actual work
that is being performed, lockout/tagout, testing, troubleshooting,
selection of PPE, and all potential emergency responses or
emergency action plans that need to be addressed.
The best and safest way to protect from the hazards of
electricity is to engineer out the hazard during the design phase
of a project. If you can totally eliminate the hazard, then everyone
would be safe. Is that always possible? No. However, there are
ways to minimize the hazards that are faced. One way is to control
the hazardous energy using correct lockout/tagout procedures.
There is not enough time or space in this article to address all
of the requirements for an electrical lockout/tagout of a piece
of equipment. We will leave that for another time. Just keep in
mind that it is not always possible, for reasons that will vary from
facility to facility and from company to company, that electrical
equipment may not be able to be de-energized and locked out.
This is when good, safe-work practices come into play. Looking
at the equipment that needs to be worked on, one must look at not
only the electrical hazards that he or she faces, but other potential
hazards such as falls, other equipment operating in the area, other
people working in the area, and many others. There will be times
when a worker faces multiple hazards in a work environment.
The authority having jurisdiction may grant special provisions to
allow the worker to wear clothing that is not arc-rated, provided
that it can be shown that the level of protection is adequate to
address the arc-flash hazard (NFPA 70E-2012, “Article 130.7 (C)
(12): Exception 2”). That does not give permission to ignore the
shock- or arc-flash hazard. Those hazards must still be addressed.
For example, this addresses the issue of work being performed in
an area that may require such PPE as respirator protection.
Not only is the person performing the work required to
be protected, but the other workers in the work area must be
protected as well. There are many ways to protect other workers.
One of the best ways to protect others is by communication; keep
everyone informed of the hazards of the work being done on
equipment while energized. Another way is to set barricades to
limit, or prevent, access by unauthorized and unqualified workers.
If you can keep others from coming into the area where work is
being done, that will help protect them from the hazards, as well
as keeping the worker doing the work from being distracted while
working.
We could go on for a long time discussing safe work practices
when it comes to working on or around electrical equipment.
However, if you approach it from the perspective that you should
look for a way that you could get injured while working, then
take whatever precautions necessary to prevent that injury from
happening, you will be well on your way to a safe work day.
 Arc-Flash 47

CONCLUSION
These items are by no means the only components of an EPS.
These are meant to be building blocks for your specific program.
As we mentioned in the first part of this series, you need to have
your EPS custom tailored to your company, then to your individual
facility. Since some companies have multiple locations, there is
no one way to address each and every situation throughout the
company. There can be a corporate electrical safety policy, but
each facility must have an individual program at that location.
Some facilities may have mobile equipment, such as cranes and
forklifts operating, while others may not. Some may have control
of the substations that power their buildings, while others may
not. And some companies may have instances when workers
could be in remote locations with no one around. These issues are
company and facility specific and must be addressed as such. At
the end of the day, it come to this: Where are you working? Who
are you working with (if anyone)? What are the hazards you are
working around? How are you going to control those hazards? If
you cannot address these simple items, you have some work to do.
If you have addressed these, you are on your way to a safe work
environment.
One thing to remember: your EPS is a living, breathing document
that needs to be used daily. Don’t create a program and put it on a
shelf. It will do you no good there. Keep your workers safe.
The next and final article in this series will discuss how to im-
plement the safety program that you have just created. We will put
all of the pieces together and show you how to make it work for
you, as long as you keep it in front of your workers.

Don Brown is the Senior Programs Developer for Shermco

Industries in Irving, Texas. He has been in the electrical indus-
try for over 40 years and has been implementing and training
electrical safety for the last 15-plus years. Mr. Brown just complet-
ed his certification through NFPA as a Certified Electrical Safety
Compliance Professional (CESCP). He has written electrical
safety programs for large data centers, petrochemical facilities,
and manufacturing facilities, and is in the process of updating
many of these to include the upcoming changes in the NFPA
70E—2015 Edition.
48 Arc-Flash

MAKE YOUR ELECTRICAL SAFETY PROGRAM

YOUR OWN PART 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF
AN ELECTRICAL SAFETY PROGRAM
NETA World, Spring 2015 Issue
Don Brown, Shermco Industries

This is the third and final part of a series about creating and implementing an effective electrical safety program (ESP). Part 1
discussed the need for a company specific ESP. Part 2 discussed the requirements for that program. Here, in the final part of the series,
we will discuss the implementation of the program that you just spent all that time and effort creating.

Now that you have this wonderful, new creation in your
possession, what do you do with it? The one thing you do not do is
put it on a shelf and leave it there. There are too many companies
with a very well written program that they don’t know how to
implement, so they just do nothing! This does a disservice not only
to your development team, but to your employees as well. Safety is
about one thing and one thing only: sending your workers home at
the end of the day in the same condition that they arrived at work
in that morning, maybe a little tired or a little sore, but all in all,
completely intact. No one wants to go home after a side trip to the
hospital or with bandages. Most of all, everyone wants to go home.
Being the person that has to make the call or visit to the family
of someone who has been hurt or fatally injured at work is not a
position that anyone wants. This is why proper implementation of
your new ESP is important.
Before implementation begins, safety must be a part of the
company’s culture. It cannot be a priority. Yes, you read that right;
safety cannot be a priority. It has to be a part of the company culture
and the way that everyone lives his or her daily life. Everyone
knows that priorities change, not only daily, but sometimes minute
by minute. If safety becomes a priority, it can be changed to a
lower priority and you will be putting your employees at risk. In
order for safety to be a part of the company culture, it has to be
brought into the values and the mission of the company, and this
comes from upper management and flows downward, not the other
way around. Everyone from the CEO to the company president to
the directors to the managers to the supervisors to the front line
workers needs to be a part of the process of implementing the
safety program you just finished creating.
Using the right team is crucial in the rollout of the program,
but so is incrementally implementing the program. A phased
rollout is one in which the program is introduced to the
company’s employees one section at a time. This could be
something as simple as introducing a new training matrix for
qualified and unqualified workers. In most cases, everyone will
start with the unqualified person training and move into more
detailed training for the qualified person. Not every employee
will need to be designated as a Qualified Person for electrical
work, but there are some that definitely need additional training,
even if they have been doing a specific task for a number of
years. The key part of the training is the documentation of that
training as discussed in Part 2 of this series. Remember, if the
training is not documented, the training never took place! Once
the first part of the new program has been introduced to the
masses, a second part, such as a section on personal protective
equipment (PPE), can be introduced. It does not matter which
section of the program gets introduced. The main issue is that
you do not want to create the whole program, throw it out there,
and tell everyone “Here it is! Now you have to do it.” Think
of it like drinking from a fire hose or a glass. Which is easier
to handle? By introducing and training your people on the
program one section at a time, there is a much higher adoption
rate and a higher success rate. These in turn will lower accident
and incident rates, which will in turn help lower insurance
premiums, etc. It is all connected.
Putting together the proper implementation team is critical
before taking it to the rest of the employees. There needs to be
representation from each level of the organization from the top
all the way down. However, you also need to include someone
from each department. Now, before you turn away, hear this out.
You need someone from operation, someone from maintenance,
someone from human resources, someone from safety, and
someone from each pertinent department in the company and the
person from each department must be committed to the program,
which also means they need to be a part of the creation process.
You can have a safety professional create the baseline program,
but there must be input from each department to help with the
necessary customization. Each company will be a little different,
but it all comes down to the team. Each member of the team
with, support from the safety department will, be responsible for
explaining to his or her own department how the new program will
impact the coworkers in that department.
ANSI/AIHA Z10 – Occupational Health and Safety Manage-
ment Systems states that top management leadership and effective
 Arc-Flash 49

employee participation are crucial for the success of an occupa- Conditions change that may have an impact on your program; new
tional health and safety management system (OHSMS). From Sec- workers may show up on the jobsite; new equipment and proce-
tion 3, as paraphrased below: dures that your employees are not familiar with may come up. That
●● Top management shall direct the organization to establish, is just a fact of life. That is the reason for conducting your site
implement and maintain an OHSMS. safety assessments. That is why you conduct job briefings before
work starts each and every day. If you have a good ESP, and you
●● The organization’s top management shall establish a docu- take care of it by following it and updating it as standards and
mented occupational health and safety policy. regulations change, your program will take care of you. If you do
●● Top management shall provide leadership and assume overall not know what your ESP contains, it is time for you to look into it
responsibility. and begin asking questions. Now, go out there and plan your work
●● The organization shall establish and implement process to and work your plan. Be safe and come back to work tomorrow so
ensure effective participation in the OHSMS by its employ- you can do it over and over again.
ees at all levels (AIHA).
Don Brown is the Senior Programs Developer for Shermco Indus-
The content of this is fairly straightforward. It is up to top man-
tries in Irving, Texas. He has been in the electrical industry for over
agement to ensure that a complete and comprehensive safety pro-
40 years and has been implementing and training electrical safety
gram is established and implemented. By utilizing members from
for the last 15-plus years. Mr. Brown just completed his certifi-
top management as well as those on the front lines, the organi-
cation through NFPA as a Certified Electrical Safety Compliance
zation will be able to get full participation in the newly-created
Professional (CESCP). He has written electrical safety programs
ESP. When everyone is involved, and there are many owners of for large data centers, petrochemical facilities, and manufacturing
a program, a higher level of participation and acceptance occurs. facilities, and is in the process of updating many of these to include
Then the program permeates the organization and becomes a part the upcoming changes in the NFPA 70E—2015 Edition.
of the culture of the company.
Once we have the electrical safety program created, the imple-
mentation process has been finished, and everyone believes and
participates in the program, the final part of the process comes
into play. Reviews and updates are very important pieces of the
puzzle. NFPA70E states that ESPs must be audited with a fre-
quency not to exceed three years. ANSI/AIHA Z10 says that the
organization shall establish and implement a process for top man-
agement to review the OHSMS at least annually. It would appear
that this is a conflict in recommendations. However, there are other
ways to look at it. NFPA 70E covers the electrical safety program,
while the ANSI/AIHA Z10 covers the organization’s entire safety
program. If the organization reviews the entire safety program ev-
ery year, is not the 70E requirement being met? Of course it is. But
does it require an extensive overhaul every year? Absolutely not.
If the standards have not changed, the main review will consist of
corporate changes to procedures and policies. If the standards have
changed, then there may be a need to overhaul the particular sec-
tions of the corporate safety program, such as the ESP. The NFPA
70E standards change every three years with few exceptions. In
most cases, there will be a few changes to your ESP every three
years. Currently there are changes being brought about due to the
sweeping changes to the OSHA electrical regulations in 1910 and
1926, and these will have an impact on your program. During the
times that the electrical standards and regulations are not being
changed, you can focus your efforts on the other portions of the
corporate safety program.
Your ESP is a living, breathing document that needs to be uti-
lized, updated, and cared for every single day you are working.
50
ARC-FLASH ANALYSIS IS GOING GLOBAL
NETA World, Winter 2014 Issue
Lynn Hamrick, Shermco Industries
NFPA 70E is a well-recognized standard for specifying arc-
flash personal protective equipment (PPE) and provides a good
overview of arc-flash hazard calculations. The Canadian Arc-
Flash Standard CSA Z462 has been developed in collaboration
with the NFPA of the United States, so it is essentially an adaptation
of the NFPA 70E standard. The result is that North America is
very consistent in its approach and application of standards for
protection against arc-flash hazards. These standards are living
documents that are updated at regular intervals to accommodate
technological developments and new information. Most of the
global community has embraced these standards and is applying
them as their own. However, in some of the global community,
mostly within the European Union, alternate standards are being
developed to address arc-flash hazards. This article will discuss
some of the challenges one might face when performing arc-
flash analysis and implementing the use of arc-flash personal
protective equipment (PPE) outside of North America.
ARC-FLASH ANALYSIS
Generally, the calculations in NFPA 70E are based on a paper pub-
lished by Ralph Lee in 1982.1 Lee used simple theoretical models
and basic electrical understanding to calculate a distance at which
a person could walk away from an arc flash with a second-degree,
or curable, burn. These models were based on a spherical heat
source with a heat absorber at a distance. He used skin burn models
postulated by Stoll and Chianti to derive his equations.2 In 2000,
Doughty, Neal and Floyd, added a piece to the puzzle by publishing
a paper on their research that considered variations in incident ener-
gies in open air versus incident energies from an enclosure or box.3
A combination of these efforts resulted in the basis for the arc-flash
analysis calculations in NFPA 70E. From there, IEEE performed
more practical testing and empirically-derived calculations were
presented in IEEE 1584.4 After IEEE 1584 was published, the next
version of NFPA 70E added that it has an acceptable, alternative
method for performing arc-flash hazard analysis.
Currently, IEEE 1584 is the most widely used standard for arc-
flash incident energy calculations globally. With the exception of
the calculations provided in NFPA 70E, IEEE 1584 is the only
generally-accepted methodology for performing these calculations
for three-phase, low-voltage systems. When using this standard,
it should be noted that it is limited to arc-flash analyses for infra-
structure below 15 kV. Fortunately, the empirically-derived cal-
culations suggested within the standard have weathered the test
Arc-Flash
of time in that they appear to be fairly accurate in low-voltage
applications (< 1000 V), which is the majority of the applications
where arc-flash analysis is most beneficial. However, IEEE 1584
has received some criticism from the international community
with regard to its methodology and test setup.5 Further research
on arc-flash calculations is being carried out as a collaborative ef-
fort of NFPA and IEEE. This effort includes some international
involvement, so it is hopeful that this criticism will be minimized
with future revisions of the standard.
The latest revision of the European electrical safety standard,
EN 50110, requires that an arc-flash risk assessment (analysis) be
performed.6 Unfortunately, there is no specific guidance or con-
sensus methodology for performing an arc-flash analysis in Eu-
rope. Germany’s BGI 5188 was published in October 2012 and is
similar to the NFPA 70E methodology in that it calculates a heat
flux in various configurations (open air, in a box, against a wall,
etc.) in combination with Stoll’s burn model to evaluate an arc-
flash hazard.7 However, it will probably be years before the Euro-
pean community agrees to endorse this or any other guide as a con-
sensus standard. Until that happens, and specifically with North
American-based companies, IEEE 1584 is being used extensively
throughout Europe to meet the EN 50110 requirement.
There are some things to consider when using IEEE 1584 out-
side of North America. When performing an arc-flash analysis
in accordance with IEEE 1584, information associated with the
electrical infrastructure is used as input (voltage levels, bolted
fault currents, fault clearing times, etc.) to perform the calcula-
tions. Specifically, the source of the bolted fault information has
resulted in some concern as to the effectiveness of the analysis.
In North American, bolted fault calculations are typically per-
formed using IEEE 141 as the methodology for evaluating bolted
fault currents.8 This methodology uses a comprehensive network
approach to determine bolted fault currents. For most applica-
tions, the European community prefers the use of the method-
ology in IEC 60909 for evaluating bolted fault currents.9 This
methodology uses the fault current associated with the first ½ cy-
cle of the fault to determine the bolted fault current. This article
will not discuss the merits of either methodology for determining
bolted fault currents. It should be noted that the results using
either methodology will be similar; however, there may be some
disagreement as to which methodology is appropriate for use in
this application. Typically, the selection of the bolted fault cur-
rent determination methodology for use in evaluating arc-flash
 Arc-Flash
hazards is not a problem. However, when performing arc-flash
analysis anywhere other than North America, it is highly recom-
mended that the methodology to be used is agreed upon prior to
performing the analysis.
It should be noted that most of the available comprehensive
modeling tools for performing power system studies can perform
short-circuit analysis using either the IEEE 141 or IEC 60909
methodology. However, the companion arc-flash evaluation pro-
gram may not be fully integrated with the IEC 60909 modeling
version of the tool. This means that you may have to manually
enter the short-circuit information into the arc-flash evaluator to
perform an arc-flash analysis.
ARC-RATED PPE SELECTION
Another challenge that may be encountered when implementing
protective measures associated with arc flash is the methodology
used in determining the appropriate arc-flash PPE. In the US, arc-
rated PPE is selected based on the incident energy at a given work-
ing distance. This arc rating for the PPE is established by determin-
ing the arc-thermal performance value (ATPV) of the material in
accordance with ASTM F1959, which is endorsed by NFPA 70E.10
Concurrent with the development of this US standard, the inter-
national community has been developing the IEC 61482 series of
standards. IEC 61482-2 is also provided as the requirements por-
tion of the standard series.11 IEC 61482-1-1 is equivalent to ASTM
F1959 in that it evaluates the ATPV of the material.12 This standard
is preferentially used in North America. IEC 61482-1-2 is based on
a European standard (formerly ENV 50354) which uses a specific
box test and heat flux measurement to classify the material for use in
an application.13 Both of these standards are acceptable; however,
they are not interchangeable. In Europe, arc-rated clothing receives
a CE certification that is based on the specific type of risk analy-
sis that is used to determine the extent of the arc-flash hazard. This
means that clothing certified to IEC 61482-1-1, or by ATPV testing,
should be used when IEEE 1584 is the method used for the arc-flash
analysis. Further, clothing certified to IEC 61482-1-2, or by box
testing classification, should be used when a guide like BGI 5188 is
the method used for arc-flash analysis.
CONCLUSIONS
NFPA 70E is a standard for specifying arc-flash PPE and pro-
vides a good overview of arc-flash hazard calculations. Addition-
ally, IEEE 1584 is the most widely used standard for arc-flash
incident energy calculations. Most of the global community has
embraced these standards and is applying them as its own. How-
ever, in some of the global community, mostly within the Euro-
pean Union, alternate standards are being developed to address
arc-flash hazards. So, there are some things to agree upon prior to
performing an arc-flash analysis outside of North America:
51
●● The methodology for determining bolted fault currents
(IEEE 141 or IEC 60909).
●● The selection of certified arc-rated PPE (ASTM F1959 and
IEC 61482-1-1, or IEC 61482-1-2).
If IEEE 1584 is to be used as the methodology for performing an
arc-flash analysis, the appropriate bolted fault calculation method
must be defined. If IEC 60909 is to be used with a comprehensive
modeling tool, verify that the companion arc-flash evaluation pro-
gram is fully integrated with the IEC 60909 modeling version of
the tool. Further, the arc-rated PPE to be used must be certified in
accordance with IEC 61482-1-1 or ASTM F1959.
REFERENCES:
Lee, R. The Other Electrical Hazard: Electrical Arc Blast Burns,
1 
IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. IA-18, no. 3,
pp. 246--251, May/June 1982.
Stoll, AM and Chianta, MA. Method and Rating System for Eval-
2 
uation of Thermal Protection, Aerospace Medicine, Vol. 40, No.
11, pp. 1232-1238, Nov 1969.
3 
Doughty, RL., Neal, TE, and Floyd HL. Predicting Incident En-
ergy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600-V Power
Distribution Systems, IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., Vol. 36, No. 1, pp.
257--269, Jan./Feb. 2000.
4 
IEEE Standard 1584---2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-
Flash Hazard Calculations.
5 
Stokes, AD and Sweeting, DK. Electric Arcing Burn Hazards,
IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp.
134--140, January/February 2006.
6 
EN 50110-1: 2013, Operation of Electrical Installations. Gen-
eral Requirements.
7 
BGI/GUV-I 5188 E, Thermal Hazards from Electric Fault Arc-
- Guide to the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for
Electrical Work, October 2012.
8 
IEEE Standard 141---1993, IEEE Recommended Practice for
Electrical Distribution for Industrial Plants.
9 
IEC 60909-0---2001, Short Circuit Currents in Three Phase A.C.
Systems---Part 0: Calculation of Currents.
10 
ASTM Standard F1959/F1959M-14, Standard Test Method for
Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Materials
for Clothing.
11 
IEC 61482-2---2009, Live Working---Protective Clothing
Against the Thermal Hazards of an Electric Arc---Part 2: Re-
quirements.
12 
IEC 61482-1-1---2009, Live Working---Protective Clothing
Against the Thermal Hazards of an Electric Arc---Part 1-1: Test
Methods – Method 1: Determination of the Arc Rating (ATPV or
EBT50) of Flame Resistant Materials for Clothing.
52 Arc-Flash

IEC 61482-1-2---2007, Live Working---Protective Clothing

13 

Against the Thermal Hazards of an Electric Arc---Part 1-2: Test

Methods – Method 2: Determination of the Arc Protection Class
of Material and Clothing by Using a Constrained and Directed
Arc (Box Test).

Lynn Hamrick brings over 25 years of working knowledge in de-

sign, permitting, construction, and startup of mechanical, electri-
cal, and instrumentation and controls projects as well as expe-
rience in the operation and maintenance of facilities. Lynn is a
Professional Engineer, Certified Energy Manager and has a BS in
Nuclear Engineering from the University of Tennessee.
 Arc-Flash
ARC-RATED CLOTHING AND
ELECTRICAL HAZARD FOOTWEAR
NETA World, Summer 2016 Issue
Paul Chamberlain, American Electrical Testing Co., Inc.
Everyone wears clothes. However, not everyone needs to wear
clothes designed to protect from the inherent hazards in their job.
If employees work on electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution equipment, then special clothing is necessary for
certain tasks.
Per OSHA Regulation 29 CFR 1910.269, employers need to
assess a workplace and whether an employee will be exposed to
the hazards of flames or electric arcs. Upon finding a potential
for exposure, the employer must estimate the potential incident
heat energy the employee could be exposed to and provide the
employee with the appropriate personal protective equipment
(PPE). In addition, if employees will be exposed to flames and arcs,
the employer must ensure that the material worn by employees is
not untreated meltable fabric (polyester, rayon, fleece, natural fiber
blended with meltable fibers, etc.). Available materials are listed
in “Flame Resistant and Arc Rated Textile Materials for Wearing
Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary
Electric Arc and Related Thermal Hazards,” ASTM F1506.
Further, in regulation 1910.269, OSHA states:
“ The employer shall ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn
by an employee, except for clothing not required to be arc rated,
is flame resistant under any of the following conditions:
●● The employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit
parts operating at more than 600 volts,
●● An electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work
area that, in turn, could ignite the employee’s clothing,
●● Molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the
work area could ignite the employee’s clothing, or
●● The incident heat energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm2.”
Per NFPA 70E 2015 Standard for Electrical Safety in the Work-
place, the employer must provide arc-rated (AR) clothing for poten-
tial arc-flash hazards in an atmosphere not regulated by the OSHA
1910.269 standard. “Section 130.4 and 130.6” of NFPA 70E clearly
states that it is the employer’s responsibility to identify the hazards
and provide the necessary AR clothing to mitigate those hazards. It
also instructs the employee in proper inspection of that PPE.
Once it is determined that flame-resistant clothing is required,
the employer must provide clothing that is appropriately rated for
the potential hazard. In 1910.269, OSHA further states:
53
“The employer shall ensure that each employee exposed to
hazards from electric arcs wears protective clothing and other
protective equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to
the heat energy estimated whenever that estimate exceeds 2.0
cal/cm2. This protective equipment shall cover the employee’s
entire body, except as follows:
●● Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee’s
hands when the employee is wearing rubber insulating
gloves with protectors, or, if the estimated incident energy
is no more than 14 cal/cm2, heavy-duty leather work gloves
with a weight of at least 407 gm/m2 (12 oz/yd2),
●● Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee’s feet
when the employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or
boots,
●● Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee’s head
when the employee is wearing head protection meeting §
1910.135 if the estimated incident energy is less than 9 cal/
cm2 for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air or
5 cal/cm2 for other exposures,
●● The protection for the employee’s head may consist of head
protection meeting § 1910.135 and a face shield with a mini-
mum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 if the estimated incident-energy
exposure is less than 13 cal/cm2 for exposures involving
single-phase arcs in open air or 9 cal/cm2 for other expo-
sures, and
●● For exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air, the arc
rating for the employee’s head and face protection may be 4
cal/cm2 less than the estimated incident energy.”
As the potential incident energy increases, so must the protec-
tion level provided to the employee. Again, it is the employer’s
responsibility to assess the workplace, identify potential hazards,
and provide adequate protection to the hazard.
Training employees in the proper use and care of the PPE
provided is very important. Employees’ ability to identify
electrical hazards, their knowledge of electrical equipment and its
nominal voltage, and understanding when proper PPE is required
are vitally important and will go a long way in ensuring that they
are protecting themselves from potential hazards.
54 Arc-Flash

electrical circuits, electrically energized conductors, parts, or

apparatus. It must be capable of withstanding the application of
18,000 volts at 60 hertz for one minute with no current flow or
leakage current in excess of one milliampere under dry conditions.
Should the assessed potential exceed this, protection such as
rubber dielectric over boots or shoes will be required.

The other aspect to employee training is care of their PPE. If it is

worn, damaged, or deteriorated, then it cannot adequately protect
them from potential hazards. Employees must learn to inspect all
PPE prior to and after use. A guideline in the inspection and care of
AR clothing is found in ASTM F1449 Standard Guide for Industrial
Laundering of Flame, Thermal, and Arc Resistant Clothing and
ASTM F2757 Standard Guide for Home Laundering Care and
Maintenance of Flame, Thermal and Arc Resistant Clothing. These
Proper care of footwear is also very important. Exposed toe caps
ASTM standards are a requirement for management of AR clothing,
indicate a breakthrough in the leather of the boot, providing less
whether laundered at home or commercially. Many AR clothing
arc and flame protection. Simple things such as broken, missing,
manufacturers offer helpful online aids to provide guidance to
or overly long laces can pose a simple trip hazard, which can cause
employees on the proper use, care, and maintenance of AR clothing.
serious injury. Wear in the sole of the boot exposes the employee
to step potential during a ground fault. Spilled flammable materials
can soak into a leather boot, possibly causing a flame hazard.
Therefore, cleaning and maintaining boots and shoes used for
protection is highly important.
Wearing the correct AR clothing and boots protects employees
from many potential hazards. Ensuring that this equipment is clean
and well maintained is an important step in providing adequate pro-
tection to the wearer. Knowledge of how to inspect, clean, and main-
tain these garments and footwear must be given to the employee by
the employer to ensure a safe and productive workplace.

If they will be exposed to the hazard of flames or electrical arc,

Paul Chamberlain has been the Safety Manager for American
employees must also wear heavy-duty work boots or shoes. Per
Electrical Testing Company Inc. since 2009. He has been in the
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.136(a): “Each affected employee shall wear
safety field for the past 12 years, working for various companies
protective footwear when working in areas where there is a danger
and in various industries. He received a Bachelor’s of Science
of foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects, or objects piercing
degree from Massachusetts Maritime Academy.
the sole, and where such employee’s feet are exposed to electrical
hazards.”
Likely, the boot or shoe will also need to be safety-toed and
meet ASTM F2413 Standard Specification for Performance
Requirements for Protective (Safety) Toe Cap Footwear.
Additionally, the boots must be electrical hazard-rated footwear
(EH). EH footwear is manufactured with non-conductive,
electrical-shock-resistant soles and heels. The outsole provides
a secondary source of electric shock-resistance protection to the
wearer against the hazards from an incidental contact with live
 Arc-Flash
METHODS TO LIMIT ARC-FLASH
EXPOSURE ON LOW-VOLTAGE SYSTEMS
NETA World, Winter 2013 Issue
Scott Blizard, American Electrical Testing Co., Inc.
As the electrical industry addresses arc-flash safety concerns,
the industry is realizing the high risks associated with what used
to be normal maintenance tasks. In many cases, the excessively
high arc-flash incident energies make it so all maintenance must
be done with equipment de-energized, which is not always
feasible. The methods discussed below will address several ways
to significantly lower arc-flash incident energy exposure by new
system design and products, retrofits, equipment modifications,
and alternate protection settings, etc. In most cases, NFPA 70E-
2012 Hazard Risk Category 2 or lower can be obtained.
One of the best and most efficient ways to lower the incident
energy, which inherently lowers the Hazard Risk Category of
electrical equipment, is to clear the fault quicker by making the
protective device trip faster. Some of the methods to reduce the
clearing time of an electrical fault, using various protective devices
and schemes, are described below.
Implementation of a bus-differential scheme increases the
speed to trip the circuit, which will reduce the arc-flash hazards.
The concept of a bus-differential protection (87B) scheme has
been around for a very long time. Because of the space and
cost constraints, it was typically only used for high-voltage or
medium-voltage applications. The scheme measures 100% of the
current into and out of a bus. It requires three additional current
transformers on every breaker. Simply put:
●● If 100% 1IN = 100% 1OUT, then do not trip.
●● I f 100% 1IN ≠ 100% 1OUT, then trip all bus breakers
instantaneously.
Zone selective interlocking (ZSI) improves the level of protection
in a power distribution system. ZSI is a control logic system
communicating between feeder breakers and upstream feeder
breakers or the main breaker. The main breaker is zone 1 and
subsequent downstream breakers establish one or more additional
zones. The control system is built into the electronic and digital trip
units of low-voltage breakers. Its design functionality and use have
grown over the last 20+ years. Assuming a high-level short circuit
occurs on the load side of a feeder breaker, digital trip units on the
main breaker and the feeder breaker sense the fault. The feeder
breaker sends a blocking signal to the main breaker, letting it know
that the fault is in the feeder breaker’s zone of protection or in a lower
zone. The blocking signal tells the main breaker to delay tripping per
the trip unit’s time-delayed settings (backup to the feeder breakers),
while the feeder breaker trips with no intentional delay.
55
When a fault occurs in the switchgear on a primary side of a
feeder breaker, no blocking signal is sent to the main breaker.
Since the main breaker senses the fault, but does not receive a
blocking signal, its control logic bypasses the short time or ground
fault time delay setting characteristics and trips almost instantly as
described for the feeder breaker in the paragraph above. It lowers
its time-delay settings to approximately two cycles, just enough
time-delay to assure nuisance tripping does not occur.
When applying ZSI, as an arc-flash solution, one must be aware
of the following:
●● It is automatic - no special precautions are required.
●● I t only affects the short time delay and ground fault
time-delay setting characteristics.
●● T
 he arcing fault current must be above the short-time pickup
settings or ground fault pickup settings for ZSI to be initiated
and to reduce the arc-flash incident energy.
●● I t adds two to three cycles maximum to the breaker clearing
time of three cycles compared to an instantaneous trip resulting
in five to six cycles total clearing time (83 ms – 100 ms).
●● It requires slightly different breaker testing procedures
during maintenance testing and calibration to prove the
integrity of the system.
A very effective way to lower arc-flash incident energy is to
apply a maintenance switch. This option can be retrofitted or
purchased new in low-voltage and medium-voltage protective
devices. An external override switch and circuitry are connected
to a breaker’s trip unit and is adjustable between 2.5X - 10X the
breaker rating. The basic operation of the maintenance switch is
to lower incident energy at downstream protective devices. When
performing maintenance, the maintenance switch is closed. This
automatically overrides all of the breaker’s delay functions and
causes the breaker to trip without any intentional delay when a
fault is detected. Upon completion of the maintenance, the
maintenance switch is manually opened and all previous trip unit
settings are again reactivated without need for recalibration.
Another method of reducing arc-flash incident energy is
arc-detection sensors which provide a visual measurement of an
arc flash. The light emitted during an arc-flash event is significant-
ly brighter than the normal substation light background. The light
surge is available from the initiation of the arc flash and is easily
detected using proven technology.
56
The most common sensors are lens point sensors and bare
fiber optic sensors. The light is channeled from the sensor to the
detector located in the protective relay. Monitoring of the system
integrity is accomplished using a fiber optic loop. In the case of
the lens sensors, each lens has an input and output connection.
The input is connected to a transmitter in the relay, and the output
is connected to a detector in the relay. This loop connection
allows periodic testing of the system by injecting light from the
transmitter through the loop and back to the detector. This loop
connection system works with either the lens sensor or the bare
fiber sensor. The bare fiber sensor consists of a high quality plastic
fiber optic cable without a jacket. The clear fiber cable becomes
a lens, bringing in light from the area. Using a bare fiber sensor
makes detection in large areas possible using only one sensor. The
cable is constructed of a one millimeter plastic material that can
withstand a 25-millimeter bending radius without damage. The
cable can be cut to length in the field and fit to the application
without excess cable.
Arc-detection systems typically use a combination of lens and
bare fiber sensors returning to a single relay. Proper installation
of the sensors and relays provides logical detection and trip points
in any system. Sensors should be located where arc detection for
the specific sensor will trip the corresponding upstream circuit
breaker. Using more than one sensor provides 100% coverage even
during one-millisecond testing intervals. Installation of sensors
varies depending on the switchgear manufacturer, type of gear, and
number of sections. Multiple sensor inputs provide coverage and
sectioning options. One bare fiber sensor can provide excellent
coverage of the entire bus section. Using lens sensors allows better
control in small, confined spaces.
One obstacle in using light sensors is the need to measure and
adjust for changing ambient light levels. Measuring light and current
in the protective relay can make use of the analog measurements
and event reporting capabilities in the relay. By monitoring the
incoming light as an analog signal, the user is able to view and set
the normal light levels for the application. The event reporting also
provides a troubleshooting tool with time-tagged events including
arc-sensor light levels. Tracking the arc-light intensity provides
the detail needed to reach the root cause of an event. The added
advantage of processing the arc-flash detection in the protective
relay is the ability to use a true overcurrent measurement as a
supervising element to improve security.
In order to reach the fastest trip times, some arc-detection
systems use a current setting level below the normal expected
load to enable the arc-flash detector as the trip mechanism. Using
current in this manner removes any time lag determining if a fault
exists, but sacrifices selectivity and makes the system dependent
on light detection alone. Superior security can be obtained using
a high-speed overcurrent element in conjunction with the light
sensor without sacrificing trip speeds.
Arc-Flash
In the system presented above, a true high-speed overcurrent
element is used in parallel with the arc-flash detector. The current
used to trigger a trip is derived by sampling the feeder current
and using a fast detection algorithm to signal that a fault has
occurred. This fault is then compared with the trip levels of the
arc-detection sensors to determine if an arc-flash trip is warranted.
Many standard overcurrent elements have response times between
6 and 20 milliseconds. This delay is unacceptable for arc-flash
detection supervision. To avoid introducing additional delay, the
high-speed overcurrent protection must act as quickly as the arc
detection. The combination of fast overcurrent and flash detection
must be present at the same instant; the combined security is much
higher than either system alone. Adding arc-flash sensors reduces
the total fault clearing time. The time reduction has a dramatic
effect on arc-flash energy.
These are just some of the methods being used today to
reduce arc-flash energy in electrical switchgear. Compliance with
arc-flash hazard work rules, as defined by OSHA, NFPA 70E
(Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace) and NFPA 70
(National Electrical Code), requires evaluation of arc-flash haz-
ards and subsequent posting of the hazard on electrical equipment.
All of the methods described above require the electrical system
to be maintained to assure proper operation. It is always best to
work on de-energized equipment when possible. When you must
work on energized equipment, make sure you wear the appropriate
personal protective equipment to perform the task.
Scott Blizard has been the Vice President and Chief Operating
Officer of American Electrical Testing Co., Inc. since 2000.
During his tenure, Scott acted as the Corporate Safety Officer for
nine years. He has over 25 years of experience in the field as a
Master Electrician, Journeyman, Wireman, and NETA Level IV
Senior Technician.
 Arc-Flash
WHY DO A RISK ASSESSMENT?
NETA World, Fall 2016 Issue
Jim White, Shermco Industries, Inc.
This article discusses the whys of performing a job-safety
assessment (JSA) or a job-hazard assessment (JHA). This often
comes up during safety classes where attendees say, “Oh, I had
no idea why we did those. It was just something we were told
to do.” While employees should comply with standard operating
procedures (SOPs) or company directives, since we are dealing
with adults, they also need to understand why we do things. Once
they do, compliance goes way up.
RISK VS. FREQUENCY
Risk is defined by NFPA 70E as “a combination of the likelihood
of occurrence of injury or damage to health and the severity of
injury or damage to health that results from a hazard.” Risk
assessment is defined as “an overall process that identifies hazards,
estimates the potential severity of injury or damage to health,
estimates the likelihood of occurrence of injury or damage to
health, and determines if protective measures are required.” NFPA
70E adds this to the definition of risk assessment: “Informational
Note: As used in this standard, arc-flash risk assessment and shock
risk assessment are types of risk assessments.” Frequency, of
course, is how often a task is performed during the work day. Fig.
1 shows the four quadrants comparing risk to frequency.
Fig. 1: Risk vs. Frequency
High Risk/High Frequency tasks include utility work on
overhead lines or live-line bare hand work on energized electrical
lines or equipment. Most industrial companies try to limit or
eliminate tasks such as these to prevent electrical events. Utilities,
however, operate in this environment frequently. High Risk/Low
Frequency tasks include racking a circuit breaker in or out of its
enclosure, removing or installing a MCC bucket or a bus duct fuse.
57
These tasks are rarely done, but the risks involved are high. Low
Risk/High Frequency tasks are things like driving a car, walking
or climbing stairs. These tasks are performed thousands of times
each day, but accidents are infrequent. Examples of Low Risk/Low
Frequency tasks are riding a merry-go round, playing billiards, or
other similar activities.
Of these four types of tasks, which one would have more injuries?
Surprisingly (or, maybe not), most events happen in the Low Risk/
High Frequency category. We perform these tasks day in and day
out, hardly giving them a thought; and that is where we get into
trouble. Our brain goes into auto-pilot mode and we just go through
the motions. For example, as we drive on an interstate highway, we
tend to use only that portion of our brain really needed to get us
from point A to point B. Since our brain is the biggest energy user of
our entire body, it automatically throttles back to conserve energy.
We don’t consciously do this; it just happens. If a police car comes
up behind us with its lights flashing and siren blaring, we go into
full alert mode. Once that police car passes us, we drop back into
interstate driving mode. We are conserving energy.
Many would argue that driving a vehicle is not low risk, but
consider how many millions of miles are driven each year and the
number of vehicles on the road at any given time. According to the
National Highway Safety Traffic Administration there were 32,719
deaths attributed to traffic accidents in 2013. That’s a lot, but there
were also about 212 million drivers who drove about 2.96 trillion
miles. This works out to 1.13 fatalities per million miles driven.
Those fatalities were not in any way acceptable, but for the number
of miles driven, the fatality rate is relatively low.
The implications of the way our brain operates are tremendous.
The first time we perform a task, we are focused and sharp. As
we perform the task repeatedly, we tend to be less focused. Our
brain is conserving energy, perserving our energy stores in case
we have to run from a saber tooth tiger, climb a tree, or some
other survival-related task. We go through the motions, not
really paying attention. If anything different should happen —
anything not planned for — we could quickly be in a safety-
critical position.
PROBABILITY VS. CONSEQUENCE
We are all familiar with the concept of probability. We constantly
weigh probabilities, sometimes more successfully than others. If
we make a sudden lane change or we decide to answer a cell phone
call, we are weighing the probability of an accident, and we all
deal with the consequences of decisions made every day.
58
Fig. 2 shows probability vs consequence. Low Probability/High
Consequence would be a task such as racking a circuit breaker
in or out or inserting/removing MCC buckets. We don’t do these
often, and the probability of failure is small; but if a failure does
occur, the consequence of failure could be very high — even life-
threatening. High Probability/High Consequence tasks are those
that have a high probability of injury and the consequences would
be high. Going back to utility linemen as an example, they work in
close proximity to energized lines and equipment. If they should
make contact, the consequences would be high. Low Probability/
Low Consequence tasks are such tasks as sharpening a pencil or
brushing your teeth, etc. The chances of injury are small, and,
if it did occur, the resulting consequence would be very minor.
High Probability/Low Consequence tasks are those that have a
high probability of an accident, but the consequences would be
very minor. This might include tasks such as playing dodge ball or
playing rock-paper-scissors. You know you’re going to get it, but
if you do, the resulting consequence won’t be serious.
Fig. 2: Probability vs. Consequence
Once we begin to roll the dice on the job, we are headed for
trouble. Once a person performs a task incorrectly and is not
immediately injured or killed, it becomes his way of doing it.
Trying to convince people that their way is not the safest way
to perform that task is very difficult because these people may
have years of experience telling them it is safe. And if everything
goes just right, it probably is safe. But if something changes or
if something is missed during their visual assessment, they are
likely to be injured. The worst part is that they don’t understand
why they were injured because they have used their way
successfully for so long.
On-the-job safety is not about being safe most of the time or
even being safe when you think it is important. It’s about being
safe all of the time. If a person wants to take unreasonable risks off
the job site to satisfy their sense of adventure, so be it. But on the
job, that same person has to work according to rules established
by the company. That is where job-safety assessments (JSAs) and
job-hazard assessments (JHAs) and all the other seemingly useless
paperwork comes in. Because we tend to conserve energy, we also
tend to lose focus on the details involved in performing a task. A
Arc-Flash
JSA/JHA forces us to focus on the task we are about to perform and
to think all the steps through. At the same time, we are assessing
whether or not this task is safe to perform given the equipment,
preparation, and experience of those involved. We have to evaluate
the consequences of a failure and the steps that can be taken to
prevent it or at least lessen its effects.
As required by NFPA 70E, a risk assessment creates the focus
needed to perform tasks safely when we are exposed to electrical
hazards and risks. In NFPA Section 130.2(B)(2), an energized
electrical work permit (EEWP) helps to satisfy the requirements of
a JSA/JHA because a shock risk assessment and an arc-flash risk
assessment are required to complete it. Steps required to control
risk are also part of an EEWP, as are the PPE requirements of the
task. Many companies fold the EEWP into their JSA/JHA and
cover non-electrical as well as electrical risks.
SUMMARY
Don’t make the mistake of thinking paperwork serves no
purpose. The paperwork, no matter how inconvenient it may
seem, is needed to keep us on track and focused. Going into auto-
pilot on an interstate is bad business, but when performing a task
with electrical risks, it can turn a benign task into a potentially
fatal situation. Technicians need to be aware of the risks involved
with a task, the probability of an accident, and what the potential
consequences would be if an accident occurs. The two important
categories are:
●● Low Risk/High Frequency tasks. These are the ones we do
every day, so we tend to be less aware of the risks.
●● Low Risk/High Consequence tasks. Even though the
chances of a mishap are low, if something does go wrong,
the consequences could be severe.
No one wants to be a statistic, but we all have human failings.
The safety industry has worked diligently to provide methods
to help us overcome these failings, but we have to make use
of them. As companies grow and expand, their challenge is to
promote a work culture that enhances safe workplaces. How this is
accomplished varies from blunt force to training and counseling,
or a combination of the two. In boot camp, troops are told that
those who can’t do their job well will be an example for everyone
else. The smart soldier tries to let someone else be the example.
An event that occurred in 2009 highlights the importance
of performing a risk assessment. An employee was tasked with
closing a medium-voltage circuit breaker after the switchgear was
cleared by the contractor installing it. The Company A employee
assessed the risk and wore the 40 cal/cm2 arc-rated flash suit
provided by his company. The contractor did not remove the
personal protective ground set they had installed earlier, and when
the employee of Company A closed the circuit breaker, an arc-
flash resulted, blowing the door open. Because that employee was
wearing his arc-rated flash suit, he received no injuries.
 Arc-Flash 59

The photo shows the result of the arc event. If this employee
had not assessed the risk, or had downplayed the risk and not
worn the required PPE, there’s no doubt he would have been
seriously injured or killed. For the time it took to complete the risk
assessment, this worker saved himself several weeks or months of
painful recovery. Was it worth it? You bet.

Fig.3: Aftermath of the Arc Event,

Works Arc-Flash Event, 12-11-2009

REFERENCES
“National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Press Release
50-14,” December 19, 2004. Public Works Arc-Flash Event,
12-11-2009

James White is the Training Director for Shermco Industries,

Inc. located in Irving, Texas. He is a Senior member of the IEEE,
the recipient of the 2011 IEEE/PCIC Electrical Safety Excellence
Award, the 2008 IEEE Electrical Safety Workshop Chairman,
Alternate interNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA)
representative on NFPA 70E®, Primary NETA representative on
NEC Code Making Panel 13, Primary representative on NFPA
70B®, and is the Primary NETA representative to ASTM F18®.
James is also a certified Level IV Senior Substation Technician
with NETA, an inspector member of IAEI and serves on the NETA
Safety and Training Committees. James is the author of Electrical
Safety, A Practical Guide to OSHA and NFPA 70E and Significant
Changes to NFPA 70E – 2012 Edition both published by American
Technical Publishers.

Note: The author would like to thank Ray Crow of DRC Consult-
ing and Tony Demaria and Gary Donner of Tony Demaria Electric
for their permission to borrow content for this article from their
joint presentations. The author and these colleagues have co-
presented tutorials at the IEEE Electrical Safety Workshop and at
NETA’s PowerTest Conference.
60 Arc-Flash

DO I NEED TO WEAR ARC-RATED PPE WHEN

WORKING AROUND ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT?
NETA World, Summer 2013 Issue
Ron Widup and Jim R. White, Shermco Industries

At this year’s IEEE Electrical Safety Workshop several people to-bus connection. If an arc were to occur, it most likely would
asked the same question, “Do I need to wear arc-rated PPE when be a serious event. Contrast that with the operation of a circuit
working around energized electrical equipment?” This question breaker or switching device, which is designed to operate under
seems to come up frequently, so there must be some confusion in load. These devices have arcing contacts and arc extinguishers
the industry about when to wear arc-rated PPE. In each case the that contain the arc, stretch it and cool it, and then extinguish
people asking the question referred to “130.7(C)(15) Informational it (see Figs. 1a and 1b), whereas the bus connection (primary
Note No. 2” which states: “The collective experience of the task disconnect) that makes during racking operations is more like an
group is that, in most cases, closed doors do not provide enough electrical disconnect and is not designed to operate under load
protection to eliminate the need for PPE for instances where the (see Fig. 2).
state of the equipment is known to readily change (for example,
doors open or closed, rack in or rack out).” (Remember that
“Article 130.7(C)(15)” is “Selection of Personal Protective
Equipment When Required for Various Tasks.”) The rationale was
that if the doors do not provide protection, there exists an arc-flash
hazard even if the doors are closed.
There are several things wrong with this line of reasoning.
The first is that electrical equipment with the doors closed and
properly latched and secured is considered guarded. This means
they are not accessible and, therefore, do not normally present a
risk to people around them. The second problem with this line of
reasoning is the informational note (IN) attached to the definition
of arc-flash hazard in “Article 100,” which states, “Informational
Note No. 1: An arc-flash hazard may exist when energized
electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed or when they are
within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, provided
a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that
could cause an electric arc. Under normal operating conditions,
enclosed energized equipment that has been properly installed
and maintained is not likely to pose an arc-flash hazard.” This
informational note contains important information which is
intended to clarify when an arc-flash hazard may or may not be
present. An arc-flash hazard may be present when energized
electrical equipment is in a guarded condition, if a worker
interacts with it in a manner that could cause an electrical arc.
Electrical equipment that is operating normally and is not being
interacted with is not designed to create an electrical arc.
An electrical arc could occur during abnormal operations
or during periods of interaction such as inserting or removing Figs. 1a and 1b: Arc-Extinguishing Components
a circuit breaker (racking), or installing or removing fuses, or in a 480-Volt Circuit Breaker
whenever a device is connected or disconnected to an energized
source (MCC buckets, bus duct fuses, circuit breakers, etc). The
risk of an arc flash is increased during these operations because
the equipment has no arc extinguishers at the circuit breaker-
 Arc-Flash
Fig. 2: Circuit Breaker-to-Bus Connection
The second part of IN No. 1 in “130.7(C)(15)” states that
equipment that is properly installed and maintained is not likely
to pose an arc-flash hazard under normal operating conditions.
This means that if it is operating normally and has been installed
and maintained in accordance with local and national codes
and standards, it presents no increased risk of failure and arc-
flash hazard. It also means that if the equipment is operated in
the manner that the manufacturer designed it to operate such as
starting, stopping, opening, and closing – no increased risk of
an arc flash is present. Some people have difficulty with this,
as they believe opening and closing a switch or circuit breaker
is interacting with equipment. It is, but it is not interacting in a
manner that could cause failure such as racking or the other tasks
that could cause an arc flash.
To illustrate this fact further, “Article 130.6(K)” states, “(K)
Routine Opening and Closing of Circuits. Load-rated switches,
circuit breakers, or other devices specifically designed as
disconnecting means shall be used for the opening, reversing,
or closing of circuits under load conditions. Cable connectors
not of the load-break type, fuses, terminal lugs, and cable splice
connections shall not be permitted to be used for such purposes,
except in an emergency.” Switches and circuit breakers are load-
rated devices and are specifically designated by the NFPA 70E for
the purpose of opening and closing of circuits while energized.
To further clarify what is meant, the NFPA 70E Committee added
“Article 130.7(A), Informational Note No. 2:” It is the collective
experience of the Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the
Workplace that normal operation of enclosed electrical equipment,
operating at 600 volts or less, that has been properly installed
and maintained by qualified persons is not likely to expose the
employee to an electrical hazard.” This is virtually the same
language used in the informational note for the definition of an
arc-flash hazard.
HIGHER VOLTAGE EQUIPMENT
So the informational note in “Article 130.7(A)” references 600-
volt and below equipment, but what about electrical equipment
rated above 600 volts? Higher-voltage, electrical equipment can
present additional risks that are not present with 600-volt class
61
equipment. The higher voltages stress insulation to a greater degree,
and if there is an arc flash, chances are it could be more severe. Many
older installations, or newer installations that have been modified
after initial construction, may not have adequate clearances between
the switchgear and walls or other structures. The 70E Committee
decided to err on the safe side with the higher voltage equipment
and not put forth the same assertion as stated with the 600-volt rated
equipment.
EVERYONE TAKE A DEEP BREATH
NFPA 70E provides minimum safe work practices. We would
never tell workers not to wear additional protection if the worker
feels it might be needed. Circuit breakers and switches have been
known to fail, even though they appear to be normally operating.
If we were operating higher amperage circuit breakers or switches,
we would have HRC-2 arc-rated PPE and clothing on, just in
case. NFPA 70E does not require this level of protection, but for
peace of mind it would be our choice. What level of discomfort
does this really present? Not much, really; in fact, it is likely that
we already have arc-rated coveralls on (many companies already
require HRC-2 daily work wear), a balaclava, and arc-rated face
shield along with hearing protection and rubber insulating gloves/
protectors. The wearing of this level of PPE is preferable to
spending weeks or months in a hospital recovering from an arc-
flash event. NFPA 70E cannot possibly foresee any and all risks,
nor can it account for any and all circumstances. It is the worker
about to perform the tasks(s) that has to make judgment calls as to
what is needed.
Companies are responsible for the safety of their employees
and may require any level of protection, or institute any safe
work practice they believe necessary to provide a safe workplace.
Workers may or may not agree with these work rules, but OSHA
will hold companies to them if they are part of the company’s
safe work practices. Several companies require workers to wear
rubber insulating gloves if they are within 18 inches of energized
conductors or circuit parts. NFPA 70E says 12 inches. Who is
correct? The company, as it has the responsibility for worker
safety at its site. Any work practice that meets or exceeds NFPA
70E minimum requirements is acceptable.
62 Arc-Flash

If a worker approaches energized electrical equipment and does

not believe it is normally operating, for any reason, that worker
should re-evaluate what protective equipment is required. In most
cases that equipment should be shut down before working on it if
there is any doubt that it is safe to proceed. If a worker receives a
trouble call about a piece of equipment and has to operate it, he/
she should be wearing all the arc-rated PPE and clothing required,
as it is no longer normally operating. Any type of troubleshooting
task requires full arc-rated PPE and clothing. Electrical equipment
that is out-of-date for maintenance, equipment that is visibly
deteriorated or equipment that has no maintenance labels attached
and has no record of its last maintenance, is not to be considered
normally operating.

SUMMARY
Everyone likes to hit the EASY button.
The problem is, when working on or around
energized electrical equipment, there is no
EASY button. Each task and each device has
to be evaluated at the time the work is to take place
in order to proceed. What was true last year, last month or even
earlier in the day may not hold true at the moment you are about
to perform a task on equipment. Things change rapidly in the
real world, and we need to be alert to those changes. Being alert
also means being alert to faulty Job-Hazard Analysis information,
lockout/tagout processes, other workers who may demonstrate a
lack of concentration or focus, or any other potential issues in and
around the equipment. Don’t be myopic when viewing safety, and
don’t be lazy. Arc flash doesn’t kill as many workers as electrical
shock, but the injuries are much more substantial and may require
months of rehabilitation to recover. Don’t be a statistic; be smart,
work smart. It’s that easy.

Ron Widup and Jim White are NETA’S representatives to NFPA

Technical Committee 70E (Electrical Safety Requirements for
Employee Workplaces). Both gentlemen are employees of Sherm-
co Industries in Dallas, Texas a NETA Accredited Company. Ron
Widup is President of Shermco and has been with the company
since 1983. He is a Principal member of the Technical Committee
on “Electrical Safety in the Workplace” (NFPA 70E) and a Prin-
cipal member of the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70) Code
Panel 11. He is also a member of the technical committee “Recom-
mended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance” (NFPA
70B), and a member of the NETA Board of Directors and Standards
Review Council. Jim White is nationally recognized for technical
skills and safety training in the electrical power systems industry.
He is the Training Director for Shermco Industries, and has spent
the last twenty years directly involved in technical skills and safety
training for electrical power system technicians. Jim is a Principal
member of NFPA 70B representing Shermco Industries, NETA’s
alternate member of NFPA 70E, and a member of ASTM F18 Com-
mittee “Electrical ProtectiveEquipment for Workers”.
 NETA Accredited Companies
Valid as of Jan. 1, 2019

For NETA Accredited Company list updates visit NetaWorld.org

 Ensuring Safety and Reliability
Trust in a NETA Accredited Company to provide independent, third-party
electrical testing to the highest standard, the ANSI/NETA Standards.

NETA has been connecting engineers, architects, facility managers, and users of electrical power equipment and systems
with NETA Accredited Companies since1972.

UNITED STATES 6 Sentinel Power Services, Inc. 12 Western Electrical Services, Inc.
1110 West B Street, Ste H 5680 South 32nd St.
alabama Russellville, AR 72801 Phoenix, AZ 85040
(918) 359-0350 (602) 426-1667 Fax: (253) 891-1511
1 AMP Quality Energy Services, LLC www.sentinelpowerservices.com
352 Turney Ridge Rd carcher@westernelectricalservices.com
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Somerville, AL 35670
arizona Craig Archer
(256) 513-8255
brian@ampqes.com
www.ampqes.com 7 ABM Electrical Power california
Brian Rodgers Services, LLC
2631 S. Roosevelt St
13 ABM Electrical Power
Tempe, AZ 85282 Services, LLC
2 Premier Power Maintenance 720 S. Rochester Ave., Suite A
Corporation (602) 722-2423
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(256) 355-1444 8 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
1230 N Hobson St., Ste 101 www.abm.com
johnnie.mcclung@premierpower.us Rob Parton
www.premierpowermaintenance.com Gilbert, AZ 85233
Johnnie McClung (480) 633-1490
www.epsii.com
14 ABM Electrical Power
Services, LLC
3 Premier Power Maintenance 6940 Koll Center Pkwy, Ste 100
9 Electrical Reliability Services
Corporation Pleasanton, CA 94566
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4301 Iverson Blvd Ste H (408) 466-6920
Chandler, AZ 85286
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(256) 355-3006 info@electricalreliability.com
kevin.templeman@premierpower.us www.electricalreliability.com 15 ABM Electrical Power
www.premierpowermaintenance.com Services, LLC
Kevin Templeman 10 Hampton Tedder 3585 Corporate Court
Technical Services San Diego, CA 92123-1844
4 Utility Service Corporation 3747 West Roanoke Ave. (858) 754-7963
PO Box 1471 Phoenix, AZ 85009
Huntsville, AL 35807 (480) 967-7765 Fax:(480) 967-7762 16 Accessible Consulting
(256) 837-8400 Fax: (256) 837-8403 www.hamptontedder.com Engineers, Inc.
apeterson@utilserv.com Linc McNitt 1269 Pomona Rd, Ste 111
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Alan D. Peterson 11 Southwest Energy (951) 808-1040
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Phoenix, AZ 85040 Iraj Nasrolahi
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Corporation dave.hoffman@sesphx.com 17 Apparatus Testing and Engineering
7301 E County Road 142 www.southwestenergysystems.com 11300 Sanders Dr, Ste 29
Blytheville, AR 72315-6917 Dave Hoffman Rancho Cordova, CA 95742-6822
(870) 762-2100 (916) 853-6280
kevin.templeman@premierpower.us info@apparatustesting.com
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Kevin Templeman Harold (Jerry) Carr

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and Engineering
7083 Commerce Cir., Suite H
Pleasanton, CA 94588
(916) 853-6280
www.apparatustesting.com
21 Applied Engineering Concepts
894 N Fair Oaks Ave.
Pasadena, CA 91103
(626) 389-2108
michel.c@aec-us.com
www.aec-us.com
Michel Castonguay
22 Applied Engineering Concepts
8160 Miramar Road
San Diego, CA 92126
(619) 822-1106
michel.c@aec-us.com
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Michel Castonguay
23 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
7925 Dunbrook Rd., Ste G
San Diego, CA 92126
(858) 566-6317
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24 Electrical Reliability Services
5909 Sea Lion Pl, Ste C
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2743A N. San Fernando Road
Los Angeles, CA 90065
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gigaelectrical@att.net
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Hermin Machacon
28 Halco Testing Services
5773 Venice Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90019
d.genutis@halco.net
(323) 933-9431
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Don Genutis
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29 Hampton Tedder Technical
Services
4563 State St
Montclair, CA 91763
(909) 628-1256 x214
chasen.tedder@hamptontedder.com
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Chasen Tedder
Industrial Tests, Inc.
30
4021 Alvis Ct., Suite 1
Rocklin, CA 95677
(916) 296-1200 Fax: (916) 632-0300
greg@indtest.com
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Greg Poole
31 Pacific Power Testing, Inc.
14280 Doolittle Dr.
San Leandro, CA 94577
(510) 351-8811 Fax: (510) 351-6655
steve@pacificpowertesting.com
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Steve Emmert
32 Power Systems Testing Co.
4688 W. Jennifer Ave., Suite 108
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(559) 275-2171 x15
Fax: (559) 275-6556
dave@pstcpower.com
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David Huffman
33 Power Systems Testing Co.
6736 Preston Ave., Suite E
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34 Power Systems Testing Co.
600 S. Grand Ave., Suite 113
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35 RESA Power Service
13837 Bettencourt Street
Cerritos, CA 90703
(800) 996-9975
many.sanchez@resapower.com
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Manny Sanchez
36 RESA Power Service
2390 Zanker Road
San Jose , CA 95131
(800) 576-7372
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37 Tony Demaria Electric, Inc.
131 West F St.
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Fax: (310) 549-9747
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39 ABM Electrical Power Services, LLC
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40 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
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41 Electrical Reliability Services
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42 Magna IV Engineering
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44 RESA Power Service 51 CE Power Solutions 60 Electrical Testing, Inc.
19621 Solar Circle, 101 of Florida, LLC 2671 Cedartown Highway
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45 Advanced Testing Systems
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53 Electric Power Systems, Inc. (770) 667-1875 Fax: (770) 667-6578
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54 Electrical Reliability Services illinois
46 American Electrical
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Ft. Myers, FL 33966 62 Dude Electrical Testing, LLC
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jpoulin@aetco.us 55 RESA Power Service (815) 293-3388 Fax: (815) 293-3386
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Gerald Poulin Plant City, FL 33563 www.dudetesting.com
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47 EPS Technology www.resapower.com
29 N. Plains Highway, Suite 12 63 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
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s.miller@eps-technology.com 56 ABM Electrical Power Services, LLC (815) 577-9515
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Alpharetta, GA 30005
(770) 521-7550 64 High Voltage Maintenance Corp.
48 High Voltage Maintenance Corp.
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57 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
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49 Southern New England Electrical (770) 416-0684
65 Midwest Engineering
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Consultants, Ltd.
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Wallingford, CT 06492 58 Electrical Equipment Upgrading, Inc.
(203) 269-8778 Fax: (203) 269-8775 Moline, IL 61265-6954
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dave.asplund@sneet.org Savannah, GA 31415 (309) 764-1561
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David Asplund, Sr. www.midwestengr.com
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66 Shermco Industries
50 C.E. Testing, Inc.
59 Electrical Reliability Services 112 Industrial Drive
6148 Tim Crews Rd.
2275 Northwest Parkway SE, Suite 180 Minooka, IL 60447-9557
Macclenny, FL 32063
Marietta, GA 30067 (815) 467-5577
(904) 653-1900 Fax: (904) 653-1911
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Mark Chapman

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 indiana 74 Shermco Industries 82 Electrical Reliability Services
2100 Dixon Street, Suite C 9636 St. Vincent, Unit A
67 CE Power Engineered Des Moines, IA 50316-2174 Shreveport, LA 71106
Services, LLC (318) 869-4244
(515) 263-8482
3496 E. 83rd Place info@electricalreliability.com
Merrillville, IN 46410
(219) 942-2346 75 Shermco Industries
www.cepower.net 5145 NW Beaver Dr. 83 Saber Power Services, LLC
Johnston, IA 50131 14617 Perkins Road
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68 Electric Power Systems, Inc. (515) 265-3377
(225) 726-7793
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www.epsii.com kentucky 84 Tidal Power Services, LLC
Daniel Douglas 8184 Highway 44, Suite 105
76 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC Gonzales, LA 70737
69 Electrical Maintenance 1803 Taylor Ave. (225) 644-8170 Fax: (225) 644-8215
& Testing, Inc. www.tidalpowerservices.com
Louisville, KY 40213 Darryn Kimbrough
12342 Hancock St.
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(317) 853-6795 Fax: (317) 853-6799 bob.sheppard@cepower.net 85 Tidal Power Services, LLC
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77 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. www.tidalpowerservices.com
70 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. 10704 Electron Drive Steve Drake
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Indianapolis, IN 46239 (859) 371-5355
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86 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC
78 Premier Power Maintenance 72 Sanford Drive
71 Premier Power Maintenance
Corporation Gorham, ME 04038
Corporation
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Jay Milstead 87 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
Kevin Templeman
56 Bibber Pkwy #1
Brunswick, ME 04011-7357
72 Premier Power Maintenance
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Corporation
www.epsii.com
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Crawfordsville, IN 47933 79 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
88 POWER Testing and
(317) 879-0660 1129 East Highway 30
Energization, Inc.
kevin.templeman@premierpower.us Gonzalez, LA 70737 303 US Route One
www.premierpowermaintenance.com (225) 644-0150 Fax: (225) 644-6249 Freeport,ME 04032
Kevin Templeman www.epsii.com (207) 869-1200
www.powerte.com
iowa 80 Electrical Reliability Services
73 Shermco Industries 245 Hood Road
Sulphur, LA 70665-8747 maryland
1711 Hawkeye Dr.
(337) 583-2411
Hiawatha, IA 52233 89 ABM Electrical Power Solutions
info@electricalreliability.com
(319) 377-3377 3700 Commerce Dr., #901- 903
info@shermco.com Baltimore, MD 21227
81 Electrical Reliability Services
www.shermco.com (410) 247-3300 Fax: (410) 247-0900
3535 Emerson Pkwy, Ste A
www.abm.com
Gonzales, LA 70737
(225) 755-0530
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90 ABM Electrical Power Solutions 98 Electrical Engineering & 106 Powertech Services, Inc.
4390 Parliament Pl., Suite S Service Co. Inc. 4095 South Dye Rd.
Lanham, MD 20706 289 Centre St. Swartz Creek, MI 48473-1570
(301) 967-3500 Fax: (301) 735-8953 Holbrook, MA 02343 (810) 720-2280 Fax: (810) 720-2283
christopher.smith@abm.com (781) 767-9988 kirkd@powertechservices.com
www.abm.com jcipolla@eescousa.com www.powertechservices.com
Christopher Smith www.eescousa.com Kirk Dyszlewski
Joe Cipolla
91 Harford Electrical 107 Premier Power Maintenance
Testing Co., Inc. 99 High Voltage Maintenance Corp.
Corporation
1108 Clayton Rd. 24 Walpole Park S
Walpole, MA 02081-2541 7262 Kensington Rd.
Joppa, MD 21085 Brighton, MI 48116
(508) 668-9205
(410) 679-4477 www.hvmcorp.com (517) 230-6620
testing@harfordtesting.com brian.ellegiers@premierpower.us
www.harfordtesting.com 100 Infra-Red Building and Power www.premierpowermaintenance.com
Vincent Biondino Service, Inc. Brian Ellegiers
152 Centre St
92 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. Holbrook, MA 02343-1011 108 RESA Power Service
9305 Gerwig Ln., Suite B 46918 Liberty Dr
(781) 767-0888
Columbia, MD 21046 Wixom, MI 48393-3600
tom.mcdonald@infraredbps.com
(410) 309-5970 Fax: (410) 309-0220 (248) 313-6868
www.infraredbps.com
www.hvmcorp.com bruce.robinson@resapower.com
www.resapower.com
93 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. michigan Bruce Robinson
14300 Cherry Lane Court, Ste 115
Laurel, MD 20707 101 CE Power Engineered 109 Shermco Industries
(410) 279-0798 Services, LLC
12796 Currie Court
www.hvmcorp.com 10338 Citation Drive, Ste 300
Livonia, MI 48150
Brighton, MI 48116
(734) 469-4050
94 Potomac Testing, Inc. (810) 229-6628
info@shermco.com
1610 Professional Blvd., Ste A ken.lesperance@cepower.net
www.cepower.net www.shermco.com
Crofton, MD 21114
(301) 352-1930 Fax: (301) 352-1936 Ken L’Esperance
110 Utilities Instrumentation
kbassett@potomactesting.com
102 Electric Power Systems, Inc. Service, Inc.
www.potomactesting.com
11861 Longsdorf St. 2290 Bishop Circle East
Ken Bassett
Riverview, MI 48193 Dexter, MI 48130
95 Reuter & Hanney, Inc. (734) 282-3311 (734) 424-1200 Fax: (734) 424-0031
www.epsii.com gewalls@uiscorp.com
11620 Crossroads Cir., Suites D-E
www.uiscorp.com
Middle River, MD 21220
103 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. Gary E. Walls
(410) 344-0300 Fax: (410) 335-4389
24371 Catherine Industrial Dr., Ste 207
mjester@reuterhanney.com
Novi, MI 48375 minnesota
www.reuterhanney.com
(248) 305-5596 Fax: (248) 305-5579
Michael Jester
www.hvmcorp.com 111 CE Power Engineered
Services, LLC
massachusetts 104 Northern Electrical Testing, Inc. 7674 Washington Ave. S
1991 Woodslee Dr. Eden Prairie, MN 55344
96 American Electrical Testing Co., LLC
Troy, MI 48083-2236 (877) 968-0281
25 Forbes Boulevard, Ste 1
(248) 689-8980 Fax: (248) 689-3418 jason.thompson@cepower.net
Foxboro, MA 02035
ldetterman@northerntesting.com www.cepower.net
(781) 821-0121
www.northerntesting.com Jason Thompson
sblizard@aetco.us
www.aetco.us Lyle Detterman
112 RESA Power Service
Scott Blizard
105 POWER PLUS Engineering, Inc. 3890 Pheasant Ridge Dr. NE, Ste 170
Blaine, MN 55449
97 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC 47119 Cartier Court
(763) 784-4040
40 Washington St Wixom, MI 48393-2872
michael.mavetz@resapower.com
Westborough, MA 01581-1088 (248) 896-0200
www.resapower.com
(508) 881-3911
Mike Mavetz
www.cepower.net
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113 Shermco Industries 121 Electrical Reliability Services 128 Burlington Electrical
998 E. Berwood Ave. 6351 Hinson St., Suite A Testing Co., Inc.
Saint Paul, MN 55110 Las Vegas, NV 89118 198 Burrs Rd.
(651) 484-5533 (702) 597-0020 Fax: (702) 597-0095 Westampton, NJ 08060
info@shermco.com www.electricalreliability.com (609) 267-4126
www.shermco.com waltc@betest.com
122 Electrical Reliability Services www.betest.com
missouri 1380 Greg St., Suite 217 Walter P. Cleary
Sparks, NV 89431
114 Electric Power Systems, Inc. (775) 746-8484 129 Eastern High Voltage
6141 Connecticut Ave. Fax: (775) 356-5488 11A South Gold Dr.
Kansas City, MO 64120 www.electricalreliability.com Robbinsville, NJ 08691-1606
(816) 241-9990 Fax: (816) 241-9992 (609) 890-8300 Fax: (609) 588-8090
www.epsii.com
Hampton Tedder bobwilson@easternhighvoltage.com
123
115 Electric Power Systems, Inc. Technical Services www.easternhighvoltage.com
21 Millpark Ct. 4113 Wagon Trail Ave. Robert Wilson
Maryland Heights, MO 63043-3536 Las Vegas, NV 89118
(314) 890-9999 Fax:(314) 890-9998 (702) 452-9200 130 High Energy Electrical Testing, Inc.
www.epsii.com www.hamptontedder.com 515 S. Ocean Ave.
Roger Cates Seaside Park, NJ 08752
116 Electrical Reliability Services (732) 938-2275 Fax: (732) 938-2277
400 NW Capital Dr 124 National Field Services hinrg@comcast.net
Lees Summit, MO 64086 3711 Regulus Ave. www.highenergyelectric.com
(816) 525-7156 Fax: (816) 524-3274 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Charles Blanchard
info@electricalreliability.com (888) 296-0625
howard.herndon@natfield.com 131 J.G. Electrical Testing Corporation
117 POWER Testing and www.natlfield.com 3092 Shafto Road, Suite 13
Energization, Inc. Howard Herndon Tinton Falls, NJ 07753
12755 Olive Blvd., Ste 100 (732) 217-1908
Saint Louis, MO 63141 125 National Field Services
2900 Vassar St. #114 www.jgelectricaltesting.com
(314) 851-4065
Reno, NV 89502 Howard Trinkowsky
www.powerte.com
(775) 410-0430
www.natlfield.com 132 M&L Power Systems, Inc.
nebraska 109 White Oak Ln., Suite 82
Howard Herndon
howard.herndon@natfield.com Old Bridge, NJ 08857
118 Shermco Industries
4670 G. Street (732) 679-1800 Fax: (732) 679-9326
Omaha, NE 68117 milind@mlpower.com
new hampshire www.mlpower.com
(402) 933-8988
info@shermco.com 126 Electric Power Systems, Inc. Milind Bagle
www.shermco.com 915 Holt Ave., Unit 9
133 RESA Power Service
Manchester, NH 03109
311 Bay Avenue A
nevada (603) 657-7371
Highlands, NJ 07732
www.epsii.com
119 Control Power Concepts (888) 996-9975
353 Pilot Rd, Suite B trent.robbins@resapower.com
Las Vegas, NV 89119 new jersey www.resapower.com
(702) 448-7833 Fax: (702) 448-7835 Trent Robbins
jtravis@ctrlpwr.com
127 American Electrical
www.controlpowerconcepts.com Testing Co., Inc. 134 Scott Testing, Inc.
John Travis 91 Fulton St. 245 Whitehead Rd
Boonton, NJ 07005 Hamilton, NJ 08619
120 Electric Power Systems, Inc. (973) 316-1180 (609) 689-3400
5850 Polaris Ave., Suite 1600 jsomol@aetco.us rsorbello@scotttesting.com
Las Vegas, NV 89118 www.aetco.com www.scotttesting.com
(702) 815-1342 Jeff Somol Russ Sorbello
www.epsii.com

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135 Trace Electrical Services 142 BEC Testing 149 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
& Testing, LLC 50 Gazza Blvd 319 US Hwy. 70 E, Suite E
293 Whitehead Rd. Farmingdale, NY 11735-1402 Garner, NC 27529
Hamilton, NJ 08619 (631) 393-6800 (919) 210-5405
(609) 588-8666 Fax: (609) 588-8667 ddevlin@banaelectric.com www.eps-international.com
www.tracetesting.com www.bectesting.com
Joseph Vasta Daniel Devlin 150 Electrical Reliability Services
6135 Lakeview Road, Suite 500
new mexico Charlotte, NC 28269
143 Elemco Services, Inc. (704) 441-1497
136 Electric Power Systems, Inc. 228 Merrick Rd. info@electricalreliability.com
8515 Cella Alameda NE, Suite A Lynbrook, NY 11563 www.electricalreliability.com
Albuquerque, NM 87113 (631) 589-6343
(505) 792-7761 151 Power Products & Solutions, LLC
courtney@elemco.com
6605 W WT Harris Blvd, Suite F
www.eps-international.com www.elemco.com
Charlotte, NC 28269
Courtney Gallo
(704) 573-0420 x12
137 Electrical Reliability Services
adis.talovic@powerproducts.biz
8500 Washington Pl. NE, Suite A-6 144 High Voltage Maintenance Corp.
www.powerproducts.biz
Albuquerque, NM 87113 1250 Broadway, Suite 2300
Adis Talovic
(505) 822-0237 Fax: (505) 822-0217 New York, NY 10001
www.electricalreliability.com (718) 239-0359 152 Power Test, Inc.
www.hvmcorp.com 2200 Hwy. 49 S
138 Western Electrical Services, Inc. Harrisburg, NC 28075
620 Meadow Ln. 145 HMT, Inc. (704) 200-8311 Fax: (704) 455-7909
Los Alamos, NM 87547 6268 Route 31 rich@powertestinc.com
(505) 469-1661 Cicero, NY 13039 www.powertestinc.com
tking@westernelectricalservices.com (315) 699-5563 Fax: (315) 699-5911 Richard Walker
www.westernelectricalservices.com jpertgen@hmt-electric.com
Toby King www.hmt-electric.com
ohio
John Pertgen
153 ABM Electrical Power Solutions
new york 1817 O’Brien Road
north carolina
Columbus, OH 43228
139 A&F Electrical Testing, Inc.
146 ABM Electrical Power (724) 772-4638
80 Lake Ave. S., Suite 10
Services, LLC www.abm.com
Nesconset, NY 11767
6541 Meridien Dr, Suite 113
(631) 584-5625 Fax: (631) 584-5720 154 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC
Raleigh, NC 27616
kchilton@afelectricaltesting.com 4040 Rev Drive
(919) 877-1008
www.afelectricaltesting.com Cincinnati, OH 45232
www.abm.com
Kevin Chilton (800) 434-0415
147 ABM Electrical Power info@cepower.net
140 A&F Electrical Testing, Inc. www.cepower.net
Services, LLC
80 Broad St., 5th Floor Brent McAlister
3600 Woodpark Blvd., Suite G
New York, NY 10004
Charlotte, NC 28206
(631) 584-5625 Fax: (631) 584-5720 155 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC
(704) 273-6257 Fax: (704) 598-9812 8490 Seward Rd.
afelectricaltesting@afelectricaltesting.com
ernest.goins@abm.com Fairfield, OH 45011
www.afelectricaltesting.com
www.abm.com (800) 434-0415
Florence Chilton
Ernest Goins tim.lana@cepower.net
141 American Electrical www.cepower.net
148 ELECT, P.C. Tim Lana
Testing Co., Inc.
375 E. Third Street
76 Cain Dr.
Wendell, NC 27591 156 Electric Power Systems, Inc.
Brentwood, NY 11717
(919) 365-9775 2888 Nationwide Parkway, 2nd Floor
(631) 617-5330 Fax: (631) 630-2292
btyndall@elect-pc.com Brunswick, OH 44212
Bfernandez@aetco.us (330) 460-3706
www.elect-pc.com
www.aetco.com www.epsii.com
Barry W. Tyndall
Billy Fernandez

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157 Electrical Reliability Services oklahoma 173 EnerG Test, LLC
610 Executive Campus Dr. 165 Sentinel Power Services, Inc. 204 Gale Lane, Bldg. 2 – 2nd Floor
Westerville, OH 43082 7517 E Pine St Kennett Square, PA 19348
(877) 468-6384 Fax: (614) 410-8420 Tulsa, OK 74115-5729 (484) 731-0200 Fax: (484) 713-0209
info@electricalreliability.com (918) 359-0350 dbuehler@energtest.com
www.electricalreliability.com Gellis@spstulsa.com www.energtest.com
www.sentinelpowerservices.com Dennis Buehler
158 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. Greg Ellis
5100 Energy Dr. 174 High Voltage Maintenance Corp.
Dayton, OH 45414 166 Shermco Industries 355 Vista Park Dr.
(937) 278-0811 Fax: (937) 278-7791 4510 South 86th East Ave. Pittsburgh, PA 15205-1206
www.hvmcorp.com Tulsa, OK 74145 (412) 747-0550 Fax: (412) 747-0554
(918) 234-2300 www.hvmcorp.com
159 High Voltage Maintenance Corp. info@shermco.com
7200 Industrial Park Blvd. www.shermco.com 175 North Central Electric, Inc.
Mentor, OH 44060 69 Midway Ave.
(440) 951-2706 Fax: (440) 951-6798 Hulmeville, PA 19047-5827
oregon
www.hvmcorp.com (215) 945-7632 Fax: (215) 945-6362
167 Electrical Reliability Services ncetest@aol.com
Power Solutions Group Ltd. www.ncetest.com
160 4099 SE International Way, Suite 201
425 W Kerr Rd Milwaukie, OR 97222-8853 Robert Messina
Tipp City, OH 45371-2843 (503) 653-6781 Fax: (503) 659-9733
(937) 506-8444 176 Reuter & Hanney, Inc.
www.electricalreliability.com
bwilloughby@powersolutionsgroup.com 149 Railroad Dr.
www.powersolutionsgroup.com Northampton Industrial Park
168 Taurus Power & Controls, Inc.
Barry Willoughby 9999 SW Avery St. Ivyland, PA 18974
Tualatin, OR 97062-9517 (215) 364-5333 Fax: (215) 364-5365
161 Power Solutions Group Ltd. (503) 692-9004 Fax: (503) 692-9273 mjester@reuterhanney.com
2739 Sawbury Blvd. www.reuterhanney.com
robtaurus@tauruspower.com
Columbus, OH 43235 www.tauruspower.com Michael Jester
(614) 310-8018 Rob Bulfinch
sspohn@powersolutionsgroup.com south carolina
www.powersolutionsgroup.com pennsylvania
Stuart Spohn 177 Power Products & Solutions, LLC
169 ABM Electrical Power Solutions 13 Jenkins Ct.
162 RESA Power Service 317 Commerce Park Drive Mauldin, SC 29662
4540 Boyce Parkway Cranberry Township, PA 16066-6407 (800) 328-7382
Stow, OH 44224 (724) 772-4638 raymond.pesaturo@powerproducts.biz
(800) 264-1549 www.abm.com www.powerproducts.biz
www.resapower.com Raymond Pesaturo
170 American Electrical
163 Shermco Industries Testing Co., Inc. 178 Power Products & Solutions, LLC
4383 Professional Parkway Green Hills Commerce Center 9481 Industrial Center Dr. Unit 5
Groveport, OH 43125 5925 Tilghman St., Suite 200 Ladson, SC 29456
(614) 836-8556 Allentown, PA 18104 (844) 383-8617
info@shermco.com (215) 219-6800 www.powerproducts.biz
www.shermco.com jmunley@aetco.us
www.aetco.com 179 Power Solutions Group Ltd.
164 Utilities Instrumentation Jonathan Munley 5115 Old Greenville Highway
Service - Ohio, LLC Liberty, SC 29657
PO Box 750066 171 Burlington Electrical Testing Co., Inc. (864) 540-8434
998 Dimco Way 300 Cedar Ave. fcrawford@powersolutionsgroup.com
Croydon, PA 19021-6051 www.powersolutionsgroup.com
Dayton, OH 45475-0066
(215) 826-9400 Fax: (215) 826-0964 Anthony Crawford
(937) 439-9660 www.betest.com
180 POWER Testing and Energization, Inc.
172 Electric Power Systems, Inc. 1041 Red Ventures Dr., Suite 105
1090 Montour West Industrial Blvd. Fort Mill, SC 29707
Coraopolis, PA 15108 (803) 835-5900
(412) 276-4559 www.powerte.com
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 tennesee 189 Electrical Reliability Services 197 POWER Testing and
1057 Doniphan Park Cir Ste A Energization, Inc.
181 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC El Paso, TX 79922-1329 16825 Northchase Drive
480 Cave Rd (915) 587-9440 Houston, TX 77060
Nashville, TN 37210-2302 info@electricalreliability.com (281) 765-5536
(615) 882-9455 www.powerte.com
bryant.phillips@cepower.net 190 Electrical Reliability Services
www.cepower.net 1426 Sens Rd Ste 5 198 Saber Power Services, LLC
Bryant Phillips La Porte, TX 77571-9656 9841 Saber Power Ln
(281) 241-2800 Rosharon, TX 77583-5188
182 CE Power Engineered Services, LLC info@electricalreliability.com (713) 222-9102
10840 Murdock Drive info@saberpower.com
Knoxville , TN 37932 191 Grubb Engineering, Inc. www.saberpower.com
(800) 434-0415 2727 North Saint Mary’s St.
don.williams@cepower.net San Antonio, TX 78212 199 Saber Power Services, LLC
www.cepower.net (210) 658-7250 4703 Shavano Oak, Suite 104
Don William joy@grubbengineering.com San Antonio, TX 78249
www.grubbengineering.com (210) 267-7282
183 Electric Power Systems, Inc. Robert D. Grubb Jr. www.saberpower.com
684 Melrose Avenue
Nashville, TN 37211-3121 192 Magna IV Engineering 200 Saber Power Services, LLC
(615) 834-0999 4407 Halik Street Building E, Suite 300 1315 FM 1187, Suite 105
www.epsii.com Pearland, TX 77581 Mansfield, TX 76063
(346) 221-2165 (682) 518-3676
184 Electrical & Electronic Controls aproskurniak@magnaiv.com www.saberpower.com
6149 Hunter Rd. www.magnaiv.com
Ooltewah, TN 37363 Aric Proskurniak 201 Shermco Industries
(423) 344-7666 Fax: (423) 344-4494 2425 E Pioneer Dr
eecontrols@comcast.net 193 National Field Services Irving, TX 75061-8919
Michael Hughes 651 Franklin (972) 793-5523
Lewisville, TX 75057-2301 info@shermco.com
185 Electrical Testing and (972) 420-0157 www.shermco.com
Maintenance Corp. www.natlfield.com
3673 Cherry Rd Ste 101 Eric Beckman 202 Shermco Industries
Memphis, TN 38118-6313 1705 Hur Industrial Blvd
(901) 566-5557 194 National Field Services Cedar Park, TX 78613-7229
r.gregory@etmcorp.com 1890 A South Hwy 35 (512) 267-4800
www.etmcorp.net Alvin, TX 77511 info@shermco.com
Ron Gregory www.shermco.com
(800) 420-0157
jonathan.wakeland@natfield.com
186 Power Solutions Group, Ltd. www.natlfield.com 203 Shermco Industries
172 B-Industrial Dr. Jonathan Wakeland 33002 FM 2004
Clarksville, TN 37040 Angleton, TX 77515-8157
(931) 572-8591 195 National Field Services (979) 848-1406
www.powersolutionsgroup.com 1405 United Drive, Suite 113-115 info@shermco.com
Chris Brown San Marcos, TX 78666 www.shermco.com
(800) 420-0157
204 Shermco Industries
texas info@natfield.com
www.natlfield.com 12000 Network Blvd, Buidling D
Matt LaCoss Suite 410
187 Absolute Testing Services, Inc.
San Antonio, TX 78249-3354
8100 West Little York
196 Power Engineering Services, Inc. (210) 877-9090
Houston, TX 77040
9179 Shadow Creek Ln info@shermco.com
(832) 467-4446 www.shermco.com
www.absolutetesting.com Converse, TX 78109-2041
(210) 590-4936
dstaudt@pe-svcs.com 205 Shermco Industries
188 Electric Power Systems, Inc. 3807 S Sam Houston Pkwy W
www.pe-svcs.com
1330 Industrial Blvd., Suite 300 Houston, TX 77056
Daniel Staudt
Sugar Land, TX 77478 (281) 835-3633
(713) 644-5400 info@shermco.com
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206 Shermco Industries 214 Electric Power Systems, Inc. 222 Western Electrical Services, Inc.
1301 Hailey St. 120 Turner Road 4510 NE 68th Dr., Suite 122
Sweetwater, TX 79556 Salem, VA 24153-5120 Vancouver, WA 98661
(325) 236-9900 (540) 375-0084 (888) 395-2021 Fax: (253) 891-1511
info@shermco.com www.epsii.com tasciutto@westernelectricalservices.com
www.shermco.com www.westernelectricalservices.com
Electric Power Systems, Inc. Tony Asciutto
207 Shermco Industries 215
306 Ashcake Road, Suite A
2901 Turtle Creek Dr.
Ashland, VA 23005 wisconsin
Port Arthur, TX 77642
(409) 853-4316 (804) 526-6794
info@shermco.com www.epsii.com 223 Electrical Energy Experts, Inc.
www.shermco.com W129N10818, Washington Dr.
216 Reuter & Hanney, Inc. Germantown,WI 53022
208 Tidal Power Services, LLC 4270-I Henninger Ct. (262) 255-5222 Fax: (262) 242-2360
4211 Chance Ln Chantilly, VA 20151 tim@electricalenergyexperts.com
Rosharon, TX 77583-4384 (703) 263-7163 Fax: (703) 263-1478 www.electricalenergyexperts.com
(281) 710-9150 www.reuterhanney.com Tim Casey
monty.janak@tidalpowerservices.com
www.tidalpowerservices.com washington 224 Electrical Testing Solutions
Monty C. Janak 2909 Green Hill Ct.
217 Electrical Reliability Services Oshkosh, WI 54904
209 Titan Quality Power 2222 West Valley Hwy. N., Suite 160 (920) 420-2986 Fax: (920) 235-7136
Services, LLC Auburn, WA 98001 tmachado@electricaltestingsolutions.com
1501 S Dobson Street (253) 736-6010 Fax: (253) 736-6015 www.electricaltestingsolutions.com
Burleson, TX 76028 info@electricalreliability.com Tito Machado
(866) 918-4826 www.electricalreliability.com
www.titanqps.com 225 Energis High Voltage
218 POWER Testing and Resources, Inc.
210 Titan Quality Power Energization, Inc. 1361 Glory Rd.
Services, LLC 14006 NW 3rd Ct, Ste 101 Green Bay, WI 54304
7630 Ikes Tree Drive Vancouver, WA 98685-5793
(920) 632-7929 Fax: (920) 632-7928
Spring, TX 77389 (360) 597-2800
chris.zavadlov@powerte.com info@energisinc.com
(281) 826-3781
www.powerte.com www.energisinc.com
www.titanqps.com
Chris Zavadlov Mick Petzold

utah
211 Electrical Reliability Services
9736 South 500 West
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 975-6461
info@electricalreliability.com
212 Western Electrical Services, Inc. 220
3676 W. California Ave.,#C-106
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
(888) 395-2021 Fax: (253) 891-1511
rcoomes@westernelectricalservices.com
www.westernelectricalservices.com
Rob Coomes
virginia
213 ABM Electrical Power Solutions
814 Greenbrier Cir., Suite E
Chesapeake, VA 23320
(757) 364-6145
www.abm.com
Mark Anthony Gaughan, III
219 Sigma Six Solutions, Inc. 226 High Voltage Maintenance Corp.
2200 West Valley Hwy., Suite 100 3000 S. Calhoun Rd.
New Berlin, WI 53151
Auburn, WA 98001
(262) 784-3660 Fax: (262) 784-5124
(253) 333-9730 Fax: (253) 859-5382
www.hvmcorp.com
jwhite@sigmasix.com
www.sigmasix.com
John White
Taurus Power & Controls, Inc.
19226 66th Ave S. #L102
Kent, WA 98032-2197
(425) 656-4170
www.tauruspower.com
Western Electrical Services, Inc.
221
14311 29th St. East
Sumner, WA 98390
(253) 891-1995 Fax: (253) 891-1511
dhook@westernelectricalservices.com
www.westernelectricalservices.com
Dan Hook

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 CANADA 236 Pacific Powertech, Inc. 245 Pace Technologies, Inc.
#110, 2071 Kingsway Ave. 9604 - 41 Avenue NW
227 Magna IV Engineering Port Coquitlam, BC V3C 6N2 Canada Edmonton, AB T6E 6G9
Suite 200, 688 Heritage Dr. SE (604) 944-6697 Fax: (604) 944-1271 (780) 450-0404
Calgary, AB T2H 1M6 Canada Jkonkin@pacificpowertech.ca cleavitt@pacetechnoligies.com
(403) 723-0575 Fax: (403) 723-0580 www.pacificpowertech.ca www.pacetechnologies.com
www.magnaiv.com Josh Konkin Craig Leavitt
228 Magna IV Engineering REV Engineering Ltd.
237
1103 Parsons Rd. SW 3236 - 50 Ave. SE
Edmonton, AB T6X 0X2 Canada BRUSSELS
Calgary, AB T2B 3A3 Canada
(780) 462-3111 Fax: (780) 450-2994 (403) 287-0156 Fax: (403) 287-0198 246 Shermco Industries
info@magnaiv.com rdavidson@reveng.ca Boulevard Saint-Michel 47
www.magnaiv.com www.reveng.ca 1040 Brussels, Brussels, Belgium
Virginia Balitski Roland Nicholas Davidson, IV +32 (0)2 400 00 54
229 Magna IV Engineering Fax: +32 (0)2 400 00 32
238 Rondar Inc. info@shermco.com
106, 4268 Lozells Ave. 333 Centennial Parkway North www.shermco.com
Burnaby, BC VSA 0C6 Canada Hamilton, ON L8E2X6
(604) 421-8020 (905) 561-2808 CHILE
www.rondar.com
230 Magna IV Engineering Gary Hysop 247 Magna IV Engineering
141 Fox Cresent Avenida del Condor Sur #590
Fort McMurray, AB T9K 0C1 Canada Officina 601
239 Rondar Inc.
(780) 462-3111 Fax: (780) 450-2994 Huechuraba, Santiago 8580676 Chile
9-160 Konrad Crescent
info.fmcmurray@magnaiv.com Markham, ON L3R9T9 +(56) -2-26552600
www.magnaiv.com
(905) 943-7640 chile@magnaiv.com
Ryan Morgan www.rondar.com Henry Mendoza
231 Shermco Industries Canada 240 Shermco Industries Canada 248 Orbis Engineering Field
3434 25th Street NE 233 Faithfull Cr. Services Ltd.
Calgary, AB T1Y 6C1 Saskatoon, SK S7K 8H7
(403) 769-9300 Badajoz #45, Piso 17
info@shermco.com (306) 955-8131 Las Condes, Santiago
www.shermco.com www.shermco.com +56 2 29402343
info@shermco.com www.orbisengineering.net
232 Shermco Industries Canada
3731-98 Street
241 Magna IV Engineering
7, 3040 Miners Ave. PUERTO RICO
Edmonton, AB T6E 5N2 Canada
Saskatoon, SK S7K 5V1 249 Phasor Engineering
(780) 436-8831 Fax: (780) 463-9646
info@shermco.com (306) 713-2167 Sabaneta Industrial Park #216
www.shermco.com www.magnaiv.com
Adam Jaques Mercedita, PR 00715 Puerto Rico
info.regina@magnaiv.com (787) 844-9366 Fax: (787) 841-6385
233 Shermco Industries Canada rcastro@phasorinc.com
1033 Kearns Crescent Pace Technologies, Inc. www.phasorinc.com
242
RM of Sherwood SK S4K 0A2 #10, 883 McCurdy Place Rafael Castro
(306) 949-8131 Kelowna , BC V1X 8C8
info@shermco.com (250) 712-0091
www.shermco.com www.pacetechnologies.com
234 Shermco Industries Canada 243 Advanced Electrical Services
1375 Church Ave. 4999 - 43rd St. NE, Unit 143
Winnipeg, MB R2X 2T7 Canada Calgary, AB T2B 3N4
(204) 925-4022 Fax: (204) 925-4021 (403) 697-3747
www.shermco.com
zakhouk@aes-ab.com
www.aes-ab.com
Orbis Engineering Field Zachary Houk
235
Services Ltd.
#300, 9404 - 41st Ave. 244 Orbis Engineering Field
Edmonton, AB T6E 6G8 Canada Services Ltd.
(780) 988-1455 Fax: (780) 988-0191 #228 - 18 Royal Vista Link NW
lorne@orbisengineering.net Calgary, AB T3R 0K4
www.orbisengineering.net (403) 374-0051
Lorne Gara www.orbisengineering.net

REV 01.19 For additional information on NETA visit netaworld.org

 ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL
ELECTRICAL TESTING ASSOCIATION
The InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) is an accredited standards developer for the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and defines the standards by which electrical equipment is deemed safe and reliable. NETA Certified Technicians
conduct the tests that ensure this equipment meets the Association’s stringent specifications. NETA is the leading source of specifications,
procedures, testing, and requirements, not only for commissioning new equipment but for testing the reliability and performance of
existing equipment.

CERTIFICATION
Certification of competency is particularly important in the electrical testing industry. Inherent in the determination of the equipment’s
serviceability is the prerequisite that individuals performing the tests be capable of conducting the tests in a safe manner and with com-
plete knowledge of the hazards involved. They must also evaluate the test data and make an informed judgment on the continued ser-
viceability, deterioration, or nonserviceability of the specific equipment. NETA, a nationally-recognized certification agency, provides
recognition of four levels of competency within the electrical testing industry in accordance with ANSI/NETA ETT-2018 Standard for
Certification of Electrical Testing Technicians.

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE TESTING ORGANIZATION

An independent overview is the only method of determining the long-term usage of electrical apparatus and its suitability for the
intended purpose. NETA Accredited Companies best support the interest of the owner, as the objectivity and competency of the testing
firm is as important as the competency of the individual technician. NETA Accredited Companies are part of an independent, third-party
electrical testing association dedicated to setting world standards in electrical maintenance and acceptance testing. Hiring a NETA Ac-
credited Company assures the customer that:
●● The NETA Technician has broad-based knowledge — this person is trained to inspect, test, maintain, and calibrate all types
of electrical equipment in all types of industries.
●● NETA Technicians meet stringent educational and experience requirements in accordance with ANSI/NETA ETT-2018
Standard for Certification of Electrical Testing Technicians.
●● A Registered Professional Engineer will review all engineering reports.
●● All tests will be performed objectively, according to NETA specifications, using calibrated instruments traceable to the
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST).
●● The firm is a well-established, full-service electrical testing business.

Setting the Standard

Remote Switching
Solutions
RSA-1
RSA-12 A

Remote switching
solutions allow
technicians to stay
outside the arc-flash
danger zone

Remote switching
solutions available for
all manufacturers and
models

No equipment
modifications required

RSO-1 AR RSO-III D

CBSArcSafe.com info@CBSArcSafe.com

Contact us now for a demo, pricing, and availability

(877) 4-SAFETY (472-3389)
All CBS ArcSafe remote racking and remote actuation solutions are battery- or AC-powered
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 Stay Safe with RRS-1,
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RRS-1 RRS-1LT RRS-4

The unique design of the CBS ArcSafe RRS-1, RRS-1LT, and RRS-4 remote racking
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Stay outside the arc-flash danger zone with our remote racking solutions.

CBSArcSafe.com info@CBSArcSafe.com

Contact us now for a demo, pricing, and availability

(877) 4-SAFETY (472-3389)
All CBS ArcSafe remote racking and remote actuation solutions are battery- or AC-powered
portable units that do not require any modifications to your electrical equipment.