INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Norwegian Shipowners’ Mutual

War Risks Insurance Association
Intelligence & Operations Centre

8. December 2023
DNK IOC SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE
REPORT (SUPINTREP) – Threat towards shipping
in the south-eastern Red Sea
Executive Summary
• The Houthi Insurgents conducted aerial attacks on three merchant vessels in the
south-eastern Red Sea on 3 December 2023 during day light. The intention was
HIGHLY LIKELY to strike Israel affiliated merchant vessels in which they were only
partly successful. This activity will HIGHLY LIKELY increase in the time to come:
• The threat from INSURGENTS (Houthis) (Deliberate Attack) towards merchant
vessels affiliated with Israel in the EASTERN PART OF THE SOUTHERN RED SEA
from YEMEN TTW to the MSTC is HIGH – with a STABLE forecast. (Change)
• The threat from INSURGENTS (Houthis) (Deliberate Attack/Collateral Damage)
towards merchant vessels not affiliated with Israel in the EASTERN PART OF THE
SOUTHERN RED SEA from YEMEN TTW to the MSTC is LOW – with a STABLE
forecast. (Change)

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Background
(United States Central Command (U.S. CENTCOM)) On
29 November 2023 at 11:00 LT, the U.S. Navy destroyer
USS CARNEY (DDG 64) shot down an Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) at an unknown position in the Red Sea.
Reportedly it was an Iranian manufactured KAS-
04/SAMAD-3 type UAV. The SAMAD-3 is part of the
Houthi Insurgent UAV arsenal.
See picture to the right of another SAMAD-3 UAV, taken
on a Houthi exhibit on 7 July 2019. (Late reporting)

(U.S. CENTCOM/Equasis/Open Sources/Vesseltracker) On 3 December 2023 at 09:15 LT,

the Bahamas-flagged and Israel affiliated (Unity Ship Management owned by Israeli Danny
Ungar) bulk carrier UNITY EXPLORER was attacked by a missile or a UAV in the south-
eastern part of the Red Sea while steaming southbound at an unknown position close to
the Bab el-Mandeb. The exploding flying object impacted in the vicinity of the UNITY
EXPLORER. The UNITY EXPLORER was not shining AIS in her transit through
the Red Sea.

(U.S. CENTCOM/DNK Sources) On 3 December 2023 at approximately

12:00 LT, the U.S. destroyer USS CARNEY (DDG 64) shot down a UAV at an
unknown position in the south-eastern part of the Red Sea, fired from
Houthi Insurgent controlled areas of Yemen.

(U.S. CENTCOM/DNK Sources) On 3 December 2023 at 12:28 LT, a UAV hit

UNITY EXPLORER and caused minor damage. The UAV was reportedly
flying from west to east and exploded approximately 30 m above deck and
in between the second and third crane onboard.
See pictures to the right of debris found on deck originating from the UAV.

(U.S. CENTCOM/DNK Sources) On 3 December 2023 at 15:21 LT, a third

explosion was reported approximately 1 nm in front of the UNITY EXPLORER, this
explosion was reportedly due to another UAV being shot down by the USS CARNEY.

(U.S. CENTCOM/United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations

(UKMTO)/Equasis/Vesseltracker/Open Sources) On 3 December 2023 at 15:30 LT, the
Panama-flagged container vessel NUMBER 9 was attacked by a UAV in the south-eastern
part of the Red Sea while steaming northbound approximately 70 nm north-west of
Hodeidah (Yemen). During the incident the vessel was ordered on the VHF to alter course
by an entity claiming to be Yemeni authorities. The vessel was previously operated by the
Israeli company Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd (ZIM) until 9 November 2021. The
NUMBER 9 was shining AIS in her transit through the Red Sea.

(U.S. CENTCOM/Vesseltracker) On 3 December 2023 at 16:30 LT, the Panama-flagged bulk

Carrier AOM SOPHIE II was struck by a missile or a UAV in the south-eastern part of the
Red Sea while steaming southbound approximately 30 nm north of Bab el-Mandeb,
reportedly without doing significant damage. The AOM SOPHIE II was shining AIS in her
transit through the Red Sea.

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(Open Sources) On 3 December 2023, General Yahya Sarea (aka Ansar Allah) the military
spokesman of the Houthi Insurgents officially confirmed the targeting of the UNITY
EXPLORER and NUMBER 9. General Yahya Sarea also said “the two ships rejected warning
messages from the Yemeni naval forces, and that the Yemeni armed
forces continue to prevent Israeli ships from navigating the Red and
Arab Seas until the Israeli aggression against our steadfast brothers
in the Gaza Strip stops. The Yemeni Armed Forces renew their
warning to all Israeli ships or those associated with Israelis that they
will become a legitimate target if they violate what is stated in this
statement and previous statements issued by the Yemeni Armed
Forces.”
See picture to the right of the announcement on Twitter/X.

(UKMTO/Risk Intelligence) On 6 December 2023 at 10:20 LT, the U.S. destroyer USS
MASON (DDG 87) shot down a UAV approximately 47 nm south-west of Hodeidah.

(Risk Intelligence) On 7 December 2023 at 19:45 LT, an entity claiming to be deployed by

Yemeni authorities, ordered unknown merchant vessels to alter course at an unknown
position in the Gulf of Aden. The position that the call told the vessels to avoid was 14:17N
042:14E off Hodeidah in the south-eastern part of the Red Sea.

The map below is depicting incidents not covered in the DNK IOC Monthly Threat
Assessment – forecast for December 2023, distributed on 30 November 2023.
These new incidents are covered in this SUPINTREP representing an update to the DNK IOC
Monthly Threat Assessment for the Red Sea for December 2023:

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DNK IOC Comment

(Open Sources) On 14 November 2023, the Houthi Insurgents released a statement in
Arabic, English and Hebrew where they stated they would “sink your ships”, the statement
also contained a graphic showing an Israeli vessel on fire.

(Open Sources) On 15 and 23 November 2023, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS THOMAS
HUDNER (DDG 116), shot down multiple UAVs launched from Yemen while on patrol in the
Red Sea. Some of these were heading in the direction of the USS THOMAS HUDNER,
though its intended target is unknown.

(Open Sources/UKMTO/TankerTrackers) On 19 November 2023 at 14:00 LT, the Bahamas-

flagged and Israel affiliated vehicle carrier GALAXY LEADER with 22 crew was boarded by
Houthi Insurgents deployed to the vessel from a helicopter and seized while steaming
southbound without shining AIS in the Red Sea around 50 nm west of Hodeidah.

(DNK Source/UKMTO/ U.S. CENTCOM) On 25 November 2023 at approximately 10:00 LT,

the Liberia-flagged and Israel affiliated tanker CENTRAL PARK was called upon on VHF from
an entity declaring itself to be Yemeni Naval Forces ordering her to alter course towards
Hodeidah while steaming without shining AIS on a southbound course in the southern Red
Sea. The CENTRAL PARK was later on 26 November 2023 at 09:01 LT, boarded by five
armed perpetrators originating from Somalia from two small fast boats west of point A of
the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. The U.S. Navy
destroyer MASON (DDG 87) later came to her rescue and all crew were reported to be
unharmed. The perpetrators were later arrested while attempting to escape. On 27
November 2023 at 01:41 LT, at least one ballistic missile was fired from Houthi Insurgent
areas in Yemen and landed 10 nm from the USS MASON and the CENTRAL PARK.

The map below is depicting all known incidents in the Red Sea and western Gulf of Aden
related Houthi Insurgents (and/or Iran) and their involvement in the ongoing war between
Israel and Hamas and which is affecting shipping:

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DNK IOC Assessment

The Houthi Insurgents have repeatedly threatened Israeli interests, claimed UAV and
missile attacks aimed at Israeli territory and recently re-stated their intent to specifically
attack Israel affiliated merchant vessels. The continued firing of UAVs and missiles from
Houthi Insurgent controlled areas in Yemen is therefore HIGHLY LIKELY a continuation of
Houthi Insurgent support for Hamas on the Gaza strip.

As the Houthi Insurgents claim that both the UNITY EXPLORER and the NUMBER 9 are
Israel affiliated it is HIGHLY LIKELY this claimed affiliation is the main reason for targeting
these ships specifically. As NUMBER 9 no longer seems to have any LIKELY Israel affiliation,
the targeting of NUMBER 9 show the Houthi Insurgents LIKELY used outdated information
by mistake to determine her Israel affiliation. Regardless, this is a reminder that it is up to
the Houthi Insurgents to both decide the level of Israel affiliation to a merchant vessel
passing through the south-eastern Red Sea and that mistakes or outdated Intelligence
could be used when deciding vessels to be attacked (targeted).

As the AOM SOPHIE II was traveling in the vicinity of UNITY EXPLORER at the time of the
incident and the vessel has no apparent Israel affiliation, it is LIKELY this attack happened
due to her proximity to the UNITY EXPLORER and that the damage sustained to AOM
SOPHIE II was due to collateral damage (mistake). The fact that the Houthi Insurgents only
took responsibility for the attack on the UNITY EXPLORER and the NUMBER 9, and not the
AOM SOPHIE II, is strongly consistent with this hypothesis. The LIKELY mistaken attack on
AOM SOPHIE II is therefore a reminder that the possibility of collateral damage for vessels
operating in the vicinity of ongoing military lethal (kinetic) activities is always present.

By these recent attacks, the Houthi Insurgents have HIGHLY LIKELY again proven both
their intentions and capabilities to attack Israel affiliated merchant vessels in the south-
eastern part of the Red Sea during light hours (sunrise approximately 06:09 LT and sunset
approximately 17:33 LT in the south-eastern Red Sea. All reported Houthi attacks in
November and December 2023 have occurred when sun is up). The Houthi Insurgents also
HIGHLY LIKELY have access to Intelligence capabilities to detect and identify merchant
vessels in the Red Sea that is not shining AIS. The HIGHLY LIKELY Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) affiliated and Iran-flagged cargo vessel BEHSHAD (IMO 9167289)
permanently anchored and shining AIS at 15º 52' N 41º 10.4' E north-west of Hodeidah, is
LIKELY playing an active role in the operational support of the Houthi Insurgents.

Confusing and threatening VHF-traffic is one of many means employed towards shipping in
the south-eastern Red Sea before, during and after attacks. The VHF traffic in the cases
seen lately is HIGHLY LIKELY a ploy used by the Houthi Insurgents. The LIKELY aims of the
VHF traffic is both to try and trick vessels closer to the Houthi Insurgents controlled
coastline and to confuse and intimidate the onboard crew.

As the war in Gaza between Hamas and Israel continues, it is HIGHLY LIKELY the Houthi
Insurgents in Yemen will continue to show their support for Hamas. Houthi Insurgent
support will HIGHLY LIKELY be shown by both attempting to fire long range UAVs and
missiles at Israel, and by attacking Israeli interests wherever the Houthi Insurgents have

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the capability to do so. Attacks towards mainland Israel remain LIKELY to fail at impacting
their intended targets.

And as attacks towards what the Houthi Insurgents perceive to be Israel affiliated
merchant ships is where the Houhti Insurgents have had most success, it is HIGHLY LIKELY
these attacks will continue. UAV and missile attacks have been the preferred attack tactics
employed by the Houthi Insurgents in the south-eastern Red Sea so far, but other types of
capabilities such as Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED) and heliborne
boardings or boarding from small craft are also HIGHLY LIKELY still available to the Houthi
Insurgents and should be expected as well.

As we have seen an escalation in attacks both at the Gaza Strip by Israel and in the
southern Red Sea by the Houthi Insurgents during the last week, and there is no apparent
reason for the Houhti Insurgents to scale back their attacks towards Israel affiliated
shipping at this time, it is HIGHLY LIKELY attacks towards merchant ships deemed to be
affiliated with Israel, will be undertaken by any means available to the Houthi Insurgents in
the south-eastern Red Sea in December.

But as long as Iran and their Houthi Insurgent proxy continue not to see a need to engage
western shipping in general in connection with the Israel-Hamas war, attacks from Iran or
the Houthi Insurgents on shipping not affiliated with Israel in general in the south-eastern
Red Sea are UNLIKELY in December - but cannot be ruled out.

There is no available proof of direct targeting of U.S. naval ships in the Red Sea, rather the
proximity of these warships to kinetic strikes is due to their role in protecting merchant
vessels and engaging any threats to these. Direct targeting of U.S. naval ships by the
Houthi Insurgents will LIKELY be considered a major escalation by the U.S. And if it can be
proved, it can LIKELY be expected to be met with harsh retribution towards land-based
infrastructure as happened when U.S. naval assets were unsuccessfully attacked by the
Houthi Insurgents in the southern Red Sea with Chinese manufactured and Iranian
modified C-802 Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM) back in October 2016.

At this time deliberate Houthi attacks on U.S. naval assets in the south-eastern Red Sea
seems UNLIKELY but should not be ruled out if the Houthi Insurgents should decide to join
the HIGHLY LIKELY Iranian backed uprise against U.S. forces in the Middle East HIGHLY
LIKELY aimed at exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to expel U.S. forces from Iraq and
Syria.

Forcing the removal of the U.S. military is one of Iran’s most important strategic objectives
in the Middle East, and the Houthi Insurgents being an Iranian proxy force, such a
development should not be ruled out as the war in Israel continues. And the continued
and increasing attacks on U.S. military positions in Syria and Iraq since 7. October 2023 by
the so-called Axis of Resistance (a label used by pro-Iranian commentators to refer to an
informal anti-Israeli and anti-Western political and military coalition led by the Iranian
government) is HIGHLY LIKELY a reminder of the Iranian intentions.

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DNK IOC Threat Summary South-Eastern Red Sea

The threat from INSURGENTS (Houthis) (Deliberate Attack) towards merchant vessels
affiliated with Israel in the EASTERN PART OF THE SOUTHERN RED SEA from YEMEN TTW
to the MSTC is HIGH – with a STABLE forecast. (Change)

The threat from INSURGENTS (Houthis) (Deliberate Attack/Collateral Damage) towards

merchant vessels not affiliated with Israel in the EASTERN PART OF THE SOUTHERN RED
SEA from YEMEN TTW to the MSTC is LOW – with a STABLE forecast. (Change)

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Standardisation
The threat: The threat is derived from DNK IOC’s knowledge of threat-actors' capabilities, hostile
intentions, and their opportunities to inflict future damage deliberately/directly towards vessels-
/units and their crew, limited to defined areas. The threat could also be of an indirect nature,
caused as collateral damage when vessels/units plausibly could be affected by mistake or by
coincidence.

Words of Estimative Probability (Confidence Levels): Words of estimative probability (WEP) are
standardized terms used to convey the likelihood of either a context or a future event occurring.
DNK IOC is using the following WEPs:
HIGHLY LIKELY - LIKELY – (EVEN CHANCE) - UNLIKELY - HIGHLY UNLIKELY

Threat Levels: Threat levels are designed to conclude the future threat posed by each threat-actor.
DNK IOC is using the following Threat Levels (NATO and Norwegian standards) related to the
different WEPs:

• LOW means future hostilities towards merchant vessels are UNLIKELY (but cannot be ruled out)
• MODERATE means future hostilities towards merchant vessels are LIKELY
• HIGH means future hostilities towards merchant vessels are HIGHLY LIKELY
• CRITICAL means hostilities towards merchant vessels are expected imminently
A Threat Assessment should not be mistaken as a Security Risk Assessment. DNK IOC does not
consider each vessel and their vulnerabilities, nor risk mitigation measures taken or not taken by
the member. The Threat Assessment should, however, be understood as an input to our member’s
Security Risk Assessments processes.

The DNK IOC Threat Assessment is valid only from the date of dissemination and until a revised
Threat Assessment is disseminated by DNK IOC. Out-dated Threat Assessments should never be
used as inputs to Security Risk Assessments or as any kind of decision support on Security matters.

Specifications and Contact details

Information Cut-Off: 2023-12-08 0900 UTC
Intelligence & Operations Centre (IOC) 24/7 Contact details:
Duty Officer e-mail: current.intel.ops@warrisk.no |
Duty Officer Office: +47 22 93 68 30 | Duty Officer Mobile: +47 48 111 900 |
Duty Officer SATCOM: +88 16777 06404 | Crisis & Emergency Number: +47 48 111 900

Caveats
This Intelligence product is Business Confidential and shared in confidence: Feel free to share the
Intelligence product, but only within your organization. Do not post the Intelligence products on the
www. If you are to refer to elements from the Intelligence products, please quote accurately and
give reference to DNK IOC – to avoid Intelligence loops. This report has been compiled from
multiple sources. DNK does not accept responsibility for verifying information provided in this
document, nor for the outcome of action taken or not taken because of information provided, our
comments and/or advise.

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