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Dirk Beerbaum
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INTRODUCTION
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Financial Information & Decision-Making
SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
OBJECTIVES
• This course is an advanced course which emphasizes the role of financial accounting in
investor decision making and manager performance measurement.
• On successful completion, this course participants will have a thorough comprehension of
the state of the art theories of modern financial accounting.
• The course aligns the theoretical thinking with empirical and practical solutions within the
field of financial accounting.
• The course offers the diversity of solutions and helps to understand the industry specific
practices of financial accounting.
• This course will focus on the latest development in International Accounting Standards
and the role of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) for financial
accounting.
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
Competence
On successful completion of this module, students can take responsibility to transfer theoretical
concepts to typical leadership, management and consulting situations, i.e. they can
• guide decision-making based on financial data
• appraise the role of using accounting information in contracts
• demonstrate the impact of reporting incentives
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
AND ADDITIONALLY:
Social skills and self-competence
• Work independently writing analytical essays based on given material and apply it
empirically
• work effectively in a team in order to contribute appropriately to the production of a
group output, report and presentation
• participate in group and one-to-one discussions
Scientific skills
• use scientific argumentation skills in the discussions
• write a short research report based on academic papers and empirical material
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
CONTENT OF LECTURES
Sep 9 Fri Getting organized:
Theoretical Foundations of Financial Accounting
Sep 23 Fri Financial Accounting and the Financial Crisis
Oct 14 Fri Conceptual Issues in Financial Accounting
Oct 21 Fri Financial Accounting and Corporate Governance
Oct 22 Sat Financial Accounting and Management Accounting
Oct 29 Sat Accounting Data and Business Analytics
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
TIMELINE OF LECTURE 1
Sep 9 Fri Getting organized:
Morning session
Introduction 9:00-11:00
Group Formation 11:00-11:15
Break 11:15-11:30
Theoretical Foundations of Financial Accounting 11:30-13:15
Lunch 13:30-14:30
Afternoon session:
Decision Usefulness
Why markets react to disclosures 14:30-16:45
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
Pre-reading
Beerbaum, D., & Ahmad, S. (2015). Credit Risk According to IFRS 9: Significant Increase in
Credit Risk and Implications for Financial Institutions. Available at SSRN 2654120.
Impairment of Greek Government Bonds under IAS 39 and IFRS 9 (2015). Study for the ECON
Committee.
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
Pre-reading:
Beerbaum, D., & Piechocki, M. (2016). IFRS 9 for financial institutions - the case for IFRS and
FINREP taxonomies a conceptual gap analysis. Working paper (forthcoming).
Alles, M., & Piechocki, M. (2012). Will XBRL improve corporate governance?: A framework for
enhancing governance decision making using interactive data☆. International Journal of
Accounting Information Systems, 13(2), 91-108.
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
Each student selects (one publicly quoted) company for detailed analysis for its learning diary.
In learning diaries, do not simply repeat what the authors said, but try to explain in your own
words what the main issues were and adopt those to your case company.
During the lectures we will use students’ companies as illustrative cases on the discussed
topic. With these case companies students bring practice into the lectures. Students Group
reports and presentations offer an opportunity to go deeper in specific topics.
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
DIARIES III
• The diary report should be 2 pages and returned no later than Friday at 9:00 am for
lectures to beerbaumdirk@gmail.com. The first diary is due October 14 9:00 am!
• The file should be named as follows:
– d1lastnamefirstname (d1 indicates diary 1, d2 = diary 2).
– The diary should be returned in word-format.
– Use Times New Roman Font 12 and 1,5 line spacing.
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURSE
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Financial Information & Decision-Making
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
① Current
④Standard
value based
Setting
accounting
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson and own.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
①
CURRENT VALUE BASED ACCOUNTING
• Net amount of the discounted expected cash flows pertaining to the assets
• Four parameters need to be known
– Expected cash flow
– Timing of those expected cash flows
– Number of years of the remaining lifetime
– The appropriate discount rate
• Under Ideal conditions
– Economy has perfect and complete markets
– All firm’s future cash flows an their probabilities are known
– No information asymmetries exist and other barriers to market entry
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson and own.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
②
ADVERSE SELECTION (AKERLOFF)
• Occurs, as some persons such as form managers or insiders have better information
about the current condition and future than outside investors
• Adverse behaviour
– Delay or selectively release information early to selected investors or analysts
– Behave opportunistically by biasing information or managing information to
increase the value of own stock options
• Solutions
– Rational Investment Decision of investors and require information, which are
decision usefulness
– Financial accounting and reporting is a mechanisms to control such adverse
selection by extending insider information to outsider by proving full disclosures
– Information asymmetries are reduced to provide a level playing field
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
②
DECISION USEFULNESS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REPORTING
The Objective of financial reporting
• The main question addressed is how risk-averse investors make rational investment decisions
• Major professional accounting standard-setting bodies have adopted the theory as a guide to
the preparation of useful financial accounting information. (IASB/ FASB Conceptual Framework)
• Users of financial reporting
– Present and potential investors, lenders and other creditors, who use that information to
make decisions about buying, selling or holding equity or debt instruments and providing
or settling loans or other forms of credit
• Type of information
– about the resources of the entity not only to assess an entity's prospects for future net
cash inflows but also how effectively and efficiently management has discharged their
responsibilities to use the entity's existing resources (i.e. stewardship).
• This stewardship objective assumes that the information of financial statements serves for
providing information for investors about future firm performance as well as to inform about
managers performance
Source: IASB Framework, Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS AND ENHANCEMENT OF USEFUL ②
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
How to improve qualitative characteristics?
Fundamental
Comparability
Materiality Faithful Relevance
Verifiability
Entity specific
Completeness Predicitve
relevance
Timeliness
Neutrality Confirmative
Understandability
Freedom
from Error
Source: IASB Framework, Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
③
MORAL HAZARD (HOLMSTRÖM)
• Actions are taken by one party to a contractual relationship, which are unobservable
to the other contracting parties
• Example: Manager are motivated and involve a lot of effort, however investors due
to the separation of ownership can not observe, therefore managers may loose
motivation and blame bad performance to uncontrollable factors
• Principal (owner) are separated from agents (managers) and agents do not work in
full interest of the owners, but intend to maximise own interest and advantages
• Solution:
– Net income can serve as an input to management performance evaluation
through executive compensation; align unobservable performance of managers
with net income and interests of owners
– Accounting and reporting is the source for precise information of net income
– Net income can also inform the managerial labour market, so that managers
reputation declines and personal market value declines
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
④
THEORIES ON STANDARDSETTING – TWO MAIN STREAMS
Positive Normative
Source: Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: a ten year perspective.
Accounting review, 131-156 41
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Source: Burgemeestre, B., Hulstijn, J., & Tan, Y. H. (2009, July). Rule-based versus Principle-based
Regulatory Compliance. In JURIX (pp. 37-46). 42
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
④
US GAAP VS. IFRS-SYNOPSIS
Dimensions Typical Principles Typical Rules
Source: Benston, G. J., Bromwich, M., & Wagenhofer, A. (2006). Principles‐versus rules‐based
accounting standards: the FASB's standard setting strategy. Abacus, 42(2), 165-188 and Owm 43
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
BAYES’ THEOREM
P(H)* P(GN|H)
P(H|GN) =
• The posterior propability of the high state is: P(H)* P(GN|H) + P(L)* P(GN|L)
• P(H|GN) == the subjective posterior probability of the high state, given a good-news
financial statement
• P(H) = the subjective prior probability of the high state
• P(GN|H) = the objective probability that the financial statements show good news,
given that the firm is in the high state
• P(L) is the prior propability of the low state
• P(GN|L) = the objective probability that the financial statements show good news,
given that the firm is in the low state
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Source: Giner, B., & Arce, M. (2012). Lobbying on accounting standards: Evidence from IFRS 2 on
share-based payments. European Accounting Review, 21(4), 655-691. 46
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Source: IFRS.org: 47
• .
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Must Prepare
publish and issue
ED Standards
Form Review
Issue BC Steering
Committes comments
Full
Must discretion
undergo over
technical
Remain
field independant
agenda and
project
tests assignment
Source: IFRS.org: 48
Financial Information & Decision-Making
DECISION USEFULLNESS -WHY
MARKETS REACT TO DISCLOSURES
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DECISION USEFULLNESS
WHY MARKETS REACT TO DISCLOSURES?
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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WHY MARKETS REACT
WHY MARKETS REACT TO DISCLOSURES?
THE BALL & BROWN (1968) STUDY AND SUBSEQUENT EVIDENCE
Market response to accounting information
• The BB Study was the start of the empirical capital markets research, which analyse the value
relevance of accounting information; it is one of the most cited papers in accounting literature
Methodology
• A sample of 261 NYSE firms over nine years from 1957 to 1965
• Tested if firms with unexpected increases in accounting earnings had positive abnormal returns
and firms with unexpected decreases had negative abnormal returns
Findings
• Substantial evidence, that market responds to the good and bad news during a narrow window;
on average firms announced an increase in earnings experienced positive abnormal stock
returns (roughly 7%)
• on average firms announced a decrease in earnings experienced negative abnormal stock
returns (roughly 9%)
• 85-90% of earnings announcements is anticipated by investors
Source: Ball, R., & Brown, P. (1968). An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal of
Accounting Research, 6(2), 159-178.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
MAIN FINDINGS
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DECISION USEFULLNESS
WHY MARKETS REACT TO DISCLOSURES?
Source: Scott, W. R. (2014). Financial Accounting Theory (7th ed. ed.).Toronto: Pearson
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DECISION USEFULLNESS
OVERVIEW
• Hypothesis 2
– Since allowing financial reporting disclosures based on International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2008 by the SEC, governance reporting of non-
domestic corporations cross-listed on the NYSE indicates formal convergence.
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