File

>.
%)■■■ yS '
J j%
fl-ttf^
U )t/ ^
Asian Nationalism and the W est
The Institute of Pacific Relations
The Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial and non-partisan organization,

founded in 1925 to facilitate the scientific study of the peoples of the Pacific area.
It is composed of autonomous National Councils in the principal countries having
important interests in the Pacific area, together with an International Secretariat.
It is privately financed by contributions from National Councils, corporations and
foundations. It is governed by a Pacific Council composed of members appointed by
each of the National Councils.
In addition to the independent activities of its National Councils, the Institute o r
ganizes private international conferences every two or three years. Such conferences
have been held at Honolulu (1925 & 1927), Kyoto (1929), Shanghai (1931), Banff, Canada
(1933), Yosemite Park, California (1936), Virginia Beach, Virginia (1939), Mont Trem-
blant, Quebec (1942), Hot Springs, Virginia (1945), Stratford, England (1947), and
Lucknow, India (1950). The Institute conducts an extensive program of research on
the political, economic and social problems of the Pacific area and the Far East. It
also publishes the proceedings of its conferences, a quarterly journal, Pacific Affairs,
and a large number of scholarly books embodying the results of its studies.
Neither the International Secretariat nor the National Councils of the Institute ad
vocate policies or express opinions on national or international affairs. Responsibility
for statements of fact or opinion in Institute publications rests solely with the au
thors. '
NATIONAL COUNCILS
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Canadian Institute of International Affairs
Comite d Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique
Indian Council of W orld Affairs
Japan Institute of Pacific Relations
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs
^Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations
Royal Institute of International Affairs
IPR INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N.Y.
ASIAN NATIONALISM
AND THE WEST
A Symposium Based on Documents and
Reports o f the Eleventh Conference
Institute o f Pacific Relations
Edited by
W IL L IA M L. H O LLAN D
Contributors
c
G E O RG E M cT. KAH IN
PH ILIPPE D E VILLE RS
T . H. SIL C O C K and U N G K U AZIZ
THE M A C M I L L A N COM PANY

NEW Y O R K — 1953
C o p y r ig h t 1953 b y
International Secretariat
IN S T IT U T E O F P A C IF IC R E L A T IO N S
1 East 54th St., New York 22

Preface
h e o m i n o u s m a r c h o f events in A sia since the ou tb reak of the Korean
T w ar has served to heighten the p u b lic interest in the o ld er and more

massive grow th of A sian nationalism , and m ore recently in the relatio n
ship betw een n atio n alist and Com m unist m ovem ents in the F ar East. T h e
im portance of those m ovem ents fo r A sia an d fo r the W estern w o rld has
become all too p lain and fo rtu n ately is now m uch m ore w id ely recognized
by political leaders and the gen eral p u b lic than it was even in O ctober
1950 w hen m any aspects o f A sian n ation alism w ere considered at the
E leventh Conference o f the Institu te of Pacific R elation s at Lucknow,
India.
T h e present volum e is-in ten d ed to serve as som ething m ore than the
Proceedings o f th at conference, though it does in clu d e the sum m aries of
the rou nd-tab le discussions. T h ree o f the m ore im p o rta n t docum ents p re
pared fo r the conference have subsequently been revised and enlarged.
T h e y p ro vid e useful illu stration s, and d ifferen t facets, o f the developm ent
o f n atio n alist m ovem ents in a B ritish colony (M alaya), a fo rm e r French
colony (Vietnam ) and a fo rm er D utch colony (Indonesia), each being at a
d ifferent stage o f p olitical evolu tio n and subjected to differin g extern al
forces. In add ition an in tro d u cto ry ch ap ter has been com piled by the
E ditor, in corp oratin g excerpts from o th er conference papers dealing w ith
variou s aspects o f nation alism in the Philippines, C eylon and Jap a n and
also inclu din g some su pplem entary m aterial on B urm a, N ationalist
C hina ancl India. No attem pt has been made, how ever, to present a tru ly
com prehensive su rvey o f m odern nation alism in Eastern and Southern
Asia. It is w orth notin g th at a good deal o f in fo rm a tio n on th at broad
prob lem is contained in recent and forth com in g books p rep ared fo r the
Institu te o f Pacific R elations, p a rtic u larly N ationalism and Communism
in East A sia by W . M acM ahon B all, N ationalism and R evo lu tio n in In d o
nesia by George M cT. K ahin, The L eft W in g in Southeast A sia by V ir
ginia T hom pson and R ich ard A d lo ff, in several chapters of The State of
Asia by L aw rence K. R osinger and Associates, and in not yet published
studies dealing w ith Indochina (by E llen J. H am m er) and Burm a (by J . S.
F urn ivall).
v
vi PREFACE
For assistance in preparing the introductory chapter and in editing the

volume, I am indebted to P hilip E. Lilienthal, M ary F. Healy, B runo
Lasker and S. B. Thomas. It is to be regretted that com pletion of the vo l
ume has had to be delayed, owing largely to the demands imposed upon me
by recent unforeseen developments affecting the work of the Institute in
the U nited States. It should be noted that, though the volum e is issued
under its auspices, the Institute of Pacific R elations does not accept
responsibility for opinions expressed by the various contributors, these
writers being solely responsible for their respective chapters.
International Secretariat W IL L IA M L. H OLLAN D , E ditor

Institute of Pacific Relations
New York, October 1 5 ,19 5 2 .
Contents
P reface v
I n t r o d u c t io n : N e w T r e n d s in A sia n N a t io n a l ism 3
P h ilip p in e N ationalism 10
N ationalism in Ceylon 28
Burm ese N ationalism 33
Chinese N ationalism 38
In d ian N ationalism 51
Part One INDONESIAN PO L IT IC S AN D N A T IO N A L ISM by

George M cT. K ahin 65
Introduction 67
I. M ajor Indonesian P olitical O rganizations and Programs

up to th^ T ran sfer o f Sovereignty 73
o
1. Islam ic P olitical Organizations 73
M asjum i 74
P artai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islam ic Associa
tion Party) 81
2. P artai N asional Indonesia (Indonesian N ational Party) 83
3. Persatuan Indonesia R a ja (G reater Indonesian U nion) 87
4. P artai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) 88
5. Com m unist Organizations 93
P artai K om unis Indonesia 94
P artai M u rb a (P roletarian Party) 100
6. D a ru l Islam 104
II. Political D evelopm ents Since the T ran sfer of Sovereignty
7. T he M ovem ent fo r a U nitary State HI

8. Disturbances in East Indonesia 120
v ii
CONTENTS
9. The Structure of the New State 128

10. The N atsir Cabinet and the Parties 134
1 1 . M ain Problem s of the H atta, N atsir and Sukim an G overn
ments 147
12. Indonesia's Strengths and Weaknesses 178
13. Supplem ent: M ajor Developments, Ju ly 19 51 to M ay 1952 188
Part Two VIETNAM ESE N ATIO N ALISM AND FRENCH
POLICIES by Philippe Devillers 197
1. From Pacification to C ivil W ar 199
2. Through C ivil W ar to the Bargaining Table 220
3. The Tasks of Reconstruction 251
Part Three N ATION ALISM IN M A L A Y A by T . H. Silcock and

Ungku A bdul Aziz 267
1. Demographic and H istorical Background 269
2. Components of Prewar Nationalism in M alaya 280
3. The Impact of the Japanese Occupation 289
4. Immediate Postwar Developments 298
5. Political Developments Since A p ril 1946 308
6. The Interplay of Communist and Nationalist Factors 322
T* Postscript: M ajor Developments, 1950—1952 331
Part Four SUMM ARIES OF LU C K N O W CONFERENCE DIS

CUSSIONS 347
Opening Address by Prime M inister Jaw ah arlal Nehru 349
1. South Asia
357
2. Southeast Asia
365
3. East Asia
372
4. Political Problems 385
5. Economic and Social Problems 403
6. Economic and Financial Problems 4 12
A p p e n d ix
423
Conference Membership 425
List o f Conference Papers 432
I ndex 435
EDITOR’S
INTRODUCTION
NEW TRENDS
IN ASIAN NATIONALISM
Introduction
N E W TRENDS IN A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM
a force o f such m agnitude and persistence in

a tio n a lis m h a s b eco m e
N the contem porary A sian w orld that it is h ard to exaggerate its im
portance fo r the fu tu re stability and developm ent o f th at region. W h eth er
in India or Indonesia, where it was the ideological and em otional spear
head of a m ovem ent fo r the elim ination of W estern colonial ru le; or in
China, where it became a pow erful tool o f a m ilitan t Com m unist m ove
m ent; or in Japan, where it was fo r a time corrupted b y a chauvinist
oligarchy, Asian nationalism has certainly been one of the most potent
factors contributing to the spectacular decline o f W estern pow er in the
Far East.
In the five years since the end o f W o rld W a r II the w hole p olitical bal
ance of pow er in Asia has been dram atically altered. A fte r decades or
centuries of subjection to W estern control, eight new nations (India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burm a, Indonesia, Vietnam , the Philippines and Korea)
have suddenly come into existence. A ll of them have inherited immense
economic and social problem s and m any operate under serious handi
caps of in tern al disunity, adm inistrative inefficiency and the ever-present
threat of economic deterioration.
Dram atic as all these changes have been, it is d ou b tfu l w hether the
long-term consequences in this shift of pow er vis-^-vis the W estern w orld
have yet been fu lly appreciated by either Asian or W estern leaders. This
arises in part from the fact that the very concept o f nationalism in Asia
is a changing one. Its earlier and most w idely accepted m eaning was
crystallized during a period of active struggle against W estern colonial
ru le or W estern economic dom ination, b u t in most parts o f Asia that
phase has now ended. T his is not to say that nationalist movements them
selves have disappeared or are becoming less im portant as operative
political forces in Asia. On the contrary, in m any areas it can be argued
that they are only now beginning to m anifest themselves in their true
3
4 ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
colors. O nly now can the political observer begin to analyze their distinc
tive qualities and to see whether they hold w ithin themselves the capacity
for-flexible and progressive developm ent in the interests o f the mass of the
people in the various new nations of Asia, or w hether (as in N ationalist
China) they w ill become ossified and discredited.
Pow erful though the nationalist forces have been, it is im portant to
remember that the political changes which have come over the face of
the postwar Far East are not attributable solely to nationalism . It must
never be forgotten that the Japanese played an immense catalytic role in
energizing and accelerating movements which m ight otherwise have re
mained weak and unsuccessful for many years to come. T h e Japanese
occupation of Southeast Asia and their attacks on the' eastern frontiers of
India autom atically advanced the cause of the various n ationalist m ove
ments by destroying the authority and prestige of the W estern colonial
administrations. In addition, the Japanese, as a deliberate p art o f their
anti-W estern policy, utilized and encouraged many of the n ationalist
leaders and occasionally gave them at least the appearance o f exercising
authority in the administration of their countries. T h e nationalists were
often bitterly disillusioned in the subsequent failure of the Japanese to
give them either authority or economic assistance, but they had had at
least a taste o£ self-government and had been fed a steady diet of anti-
W estern ideas. '
More important still, many of them acquired some m ilitary train ing
t a ei tae Japanese surrender, also obtained quantities of Japanese
arms and ammunition. This fact was to have decisive im portance w hen
the Western nations attempted to restore their control at the end of 1945
and it still remains a factor of great significance in explaining the
strength and persistence of rebellious factions in M alaya, Burm a, Indo
nesia Indochina and the Philippines. Even India, though n ot occupied
by the Japanese, was affected by the Japanese policy of organizing in
M alaya a so-called Indian National Arm y and of w inning the support of
the Indian nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose.*
Asian nationalism may be pictured as a huge and often uncontrolled
source of energy. It is often not clearly form ulated either in ideological
slogans or m concrete economic and political programs. It is, rather, a
1. For a valuable account of Japanese policies and practices regarding Southeast
Asian nationalist movements, see W illard H. Elsbree, Japan and the National M ove
ments tn Southeast Asia, 1940-45 (To be published by the Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, 1952).
NEW TRENDS IN ASIAN NATIONALISM 5
huge em otional reservoir w hich can be tapped and used fo r good or ill
depending on the kind of leadership which captures it. In recent years
and especially since the victory of Communism in China, there is a n atu
ral, though sometimes oversimplified, tendency on the p art of W esterners
to think of Asian nationalism chiefly as a possible alternative to Com
munism. Recognizing (often belatedly) that the Chinese Communists
owed much of their success to their skill in taking over the leadership of
Chinese nationalism , leaders of the W estern dem ocratic nations are
deeply concerned that the nationalist em otions of southern and south
eastern Asia shall not be sim ilarly captured by a m ilitan t Communism
now reinforced by the new m ilitary and p olitical prestige of Communist
China.
In the hope of averting this disaster, the U nited States has em barked
on considerable programs of economic, technical and m ilitary assistance
to this part o f the w orld. On a sm aller scale, this effort has been p aral
leled by the sim ilar programs of the U nited Nations agencies and by the
Com m onwealth countries in the Colom bo Plan for the economic develop
m ent of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burm a and M alaya. It is, of course, still
too soon to know how far these measures w ill in themselves succeed in
preventing the spread of Communism in this area2
H itherto, most W estern analysis of Asian nationalism , and indeed most
Asian preaching and thinking about it, has been concentrated on the
“lib eration ” or anti-colonial phase, the throw ing off of alien ru le and the
struggle of competing factions w ithin the n ationalist movem ents to
achieve power. In most areas, w ith the p artial exception of Indochina
and the decided exception of M alaya, this phase has now passed and the
problem of nationalism has taken on a w h olly different aspect. B ut one
o f the ironies in the situation is that the fu ll significance o f this change
seems not yet to have been fu lly realized bv m any of the nationalist
leaders themselves. T h e ir w ritings and speeches still tend to be dom i
nated by ideas and slogans which had valid ity in the pre-liberation stage
b ut have increasingly little relevance to the problem s o f today. T his in
tellectual and political lag is a phenom enon o f decided im portance and
some real danger.
2. For recent discussions of these problems in South Asia see Morris Watnick, "The
Appeal of Communism to the Peoples of Underdeveloped Areas.” Economic D evelop
m ent and C u ltu ral Change, No. 1, March 1952. See also Jean Lyon, *‘U. S. Aid Pre
scription for India,” T he R eporter, October 14, 1952. On Indonesia see the anonymous
article, "Foreign Technical Assistance in a Newly Independent Country,” Economic
D evelopm ent and C u ltu ral Change, No. 1, March 1952.
W h at is the new phase of Asian nationalism ? Few serious attem pts

have thus far been made to define it. Partly it may be described as a
search by the new' nationalist leaders to find a distinctive content to their
own particu lar nationalism , to discover (and in some cases to in ven t or
deliberately fabricate) a body of national ideals, institutions, attitudes,
myths, traditions, history, literature and even language. P artly also it
consists of efforts to consolidate the political pow er and privileges of
dom inant political factions or vested interests. Sometimes it is the struggle
to provide the bare m inimum machinery o f governm ent needed to m ain
tain and operate the modern state and to prevent it from fa llin g into
anarchy or dictatorship. Part of it is the effort, still not a proved success,
to adapt to a very different and uncongenial Asian background the
peculiar W estern political forms of democracy and especially (in most
areas) t e more specialized forms of parliam entary governm ent.
T h e need for much more intensive study of all these new phases, not
mere y y outside scholars but even more by Asian students and pol itical
J? M 7 overemphasized.3 T h e difficulties, however, are
formidable. Most Asian nationalist leaders have been too busy struggling
vestTe-esTf I Pnm ary aims of getting rid o f foreign ru le and the
snective eC° n° m k contro1 to become self-conscious or intro-
set of ideals the 6 Special * aracteristics of whatever political system and
adopt Even after Y ° hke “ ^ l i s h and persuade their peoples to
cated D e o ! h ° f P° Wer’ the desPerate o f edu-
• . ^ ‘ S meant that the more articulate and thoughtful national-
P , °. t<\n , a^ .t0 become bureaucrats or diplom atic officers abroad.
tio n ^ irfp T V lme t0 deV° te themseIves to form ulating a code o f na-
vamipl a s or ° giving specific political and economic content to the
hitherto sl°S ans and aspirations which their leaders have
hitherto used to arouse popular support.
ne result is that many of the new nationalisms rem ain in a very
even r r : T are, hard t0 describe in people!

tory ideas of wh gr° UpS’ have on ly dim and sometimes contradic-
• j . T .* <” “ “ re-
patriotic veneration, national heroes
hgtous and social institutions or aspirations). In this fact thereTurks a
th e ’ l n d S Z n tt;Pr 0 M klNg R oy w h o ^ r d ' A " “ i * * h“ IeC“ t,y b ee" o !t m d *

See his articles on ^
and Nationalism in Asia” (Pacific Affairs, June 1952). Democracy
considerable potential risk. On the one hand extrem ist or chauvinist

groups of either the right or the left may try to seize positions of emo
tional and sometimes quasi-religious dominance, even though such
groups are only small minorities and not yet pow erful in over-all political
influence. Examples of this are to be found in the D arul Islam movement
in Indonesia, the R.S.S. in India, some of the Moslem extrem ist groups in
Pakistan, and the ultra-nationalist societies which are beginning to re
vive on a small scale in Japan.
On the other hand there is real danger in the fact that in Asian eyes
great prestige does not always attach to that special com bination of
political democracy with capitalism, private property and individualism
which much of the W estern w orld has so long extolled and preached in
its propaganda against the Communists. T o the extent that these ideas
were associated in the m ind of the Asian nationalist w ith alien ru le and
economic exploitation (real or imagined), they tend to be regarded w ith
suspicion or at least w ith little enthusiasm. By the same token, some of
the latter-day forms of W estern totalitarianism , w hether of the Commu
nist or the Fascist variety, often find a ready response in the new Asian
nations where there have been long traditions o f autocracy and obedi
ence and where individual liberty and dem ocratic m ajority ru le have
been little understood or venerated by the mass of the people.4
It is w orth noting that in all the countries, w ith only the partial excep
tion of the Philippines, there is a widespread but ill-defined acceptance
of socialist or near-socialist ideas in economic and social policy. T here has
been a far-reaching perm eation of M arxist and Communist, as w ell as
socialist, concepts and cliches. These have become an essential part of
the intellectual equipm ent of not m erely the intelligentsia b u t also the
political leaders and, curiously enough, m any of the businessmen. This
body of ideas is seldom based on any intensive study of the M arxian
classics or of W estern socialist thought. It can often be criticized as super
ficial and unrelated to the cultural traditions and the political environ
m ent of the new Asian countries. Nevertheless, it has a considerable hold
on the articulate sections of these nations. T his is one of several reasons
w hy Communist propaganda, w hich utilizes the fam iliar jargon and
philosophical assumptions of M arxism and socialism, finds such a ready
response throughout these areas.
A n other im portant factor in the developm ent of Asian nationalism is
4. Tor a more extended discussion of this and related problems see W. MacMahon
Ball, Nationalism and Communism in East Asia, Melbourne and New York, 1952.
o
° ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
religion. Its influence has differed greatly, both in strength and in the
forms of its political manifestations, and in many areas it is not easy to
define precisely the role it plays or is likely to play as the new nations
evolve.5 In some countries, for exam ple Pakistan, which is form ally dedi
cated as a nation to the Moslem faith and tends to regard itself as having
a special mission to preserve and strengthen that faith, religion has a
prom inent if not dom inant political and educational role in developing
the new sense of nationhood. Critics have indeed argued that Pakistan
as many of the characteristics of a theocratic s ta te -a notion which m any
Pakistanis, however, dispute as being a misleading sim plification. Islam
also plays a m ajor role in the new Indonesian R epublic where several of
the mam political parties (notably the Masjumi) are strongly influenced
-° S, e!n K eas and practices. Mohammedanism is also a significant
po itica orce m Malay nationalism and, in a more geographically re-
s ncted form, among the Moros in the southern islands of the predom i
nantly Catholic Philippine Republic. Buddhism, of course, exerts a pro-
ound and pervasive influence upon the national character and especially
upon some of the nationalist leaders in Burma, T hailand, Cam bodia and
rb Urma and Thailand especially the educational influence of
or", f m° naSteries is b r e a c h in g . C hristianity too is a political
Burma r h H ™ portance in several ^b-areas such as the Karens of
Vie mam ° f Tndonesia« and the larSe Catho1* groups of
natfon?âdi°Wr g’ am l. sometimes menacing, the stability of the new

' <n( traditions of democratic and civilian control of their
governments ,s the continuing problem of internal disorders inspired by
n J , i t T P° h t’Cal or m ilitary factions. T he Huks in the Philippines, the
mu * 1™, s° * er dissident groups in Java, the few thousand Com-
1 Malaya, the Communist and the Karen insurrectionaries
nist aidTdV iJ! t hreateni nS of a,1> the ^ g e and Chinese Commu-
1 ^ 3rm,eS ° £ * e s e are serious challenges
o the established governments, since a„ of them claim to have a na-
ru e n !e ■T T . , ' ther ^ lve,‘ T heV have a serious secondary conse-
, that they lead the new governments to depend upon m ilitary
measures to control or suDDress thpm Thnt ic *. j i
. . f auiJlJIC5S tnem. 1 nat, in itself, tends to strengthen
he role of the m ilitary in the new governments and increases the'lone-
term dangers of m ilitary cliques becoming politically dom inant, as has
Chicago 1949ler aCC° Um Kenneth P’ Landon- Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religion,

NEW TRENDS IN ASIAN NATIONALISM *
happened in T hailan d . M oreover, it adds enorm ously to the financial

burdens o£ the new governments and thus blocks or retards many uigently
needed economic and social reforms. T h e dem oralizing and debilitating
eil'ect of m ilitarism in N ationalist China is now w ell know n; the buiden
of armaments in India and Pakistan, because of the Kashm ir dispute and
m utual suspicions, weighs heavily upon the economies of both countiies,
the political role of the arm ed forces and their leaders may w ell become
a thorny problem in Indonesia.
On the other hand, it should be rem arked that these new nations,
despite their very different political and social backgrounds, have all
chosen to establish democratic, and fo r the most p art parliam entary,
forms of government. T h e problem of developing this form of govern
m ent in areas where the great mass of the people is illiterate and poverty-
stricken and where there is a vast gap between them and the sm all groups
of leaders at the top of the political pyram id, is a disquieting one. One
need only look at the experience of Siam and the earlier failu re o f p arlia
m entary democracy to take root in China to realize some of the dangers
which may lie ahead. W h a t is often puzzling and alarm ing to the out
side observer is the fact that most o f the p olitical leaders are decidedly
W esternized in their thinking and methods and it is very h ard to find
examples of where they have found effective ways of communicating
these W estern ideas to the illiterate populace or of linking W estern in
stitutions and practices to Well-known and respected trad itio n al social
forms.
No doubt this gap w ill gradually be reduced w ith the spread of ele
m entary education and by such devices as cheap radios and newspapers.
F or the present, however, the ordinary villager throughout Southern Asia
must sometimes feel that the nationalist governments are almost as re
mote and alien to the institutions and traditional codes of conduct which
govern his daily life as were the form er colonial regimes.
T h e new political leaders, therefore, face an urgent task in deliberately
and quickly creating new symbols, slogans, precepts, patriotic ceremonies,
by w hich the masses can more read ily identify themselves w ith their new
governm ent. In many ways India was fortunate in having part of this
task perform ed by Gandhi, whose distinctive w ay o f life and set of values
made a deep impress on the ord in ary Indian citizen as w ell as on India’s
nationalist movement. It is hard, however, to find any real equivalent to
G and hi’s role in the other new nations of Asia. President Soekarno’s ef
fo rt to expound the so-called Five V irtues (Pantja Silo)* represents a

recognition of this need in Indonesia.
P hilippine Nationalism
These deliberate techniques of accelerating and controlling the growLh
of new nationalisms can be profitably studied in the m odern h istory of
the Philippines, where leaders have had the task o f almost m anufacturing
a new cultural nationalism in a society which had long been dom inated
by centuries of Spanish and decades of Am erican civilization. T h e fo l
lowing excerpts from a recent Philippine study7 p ortray some o f the
methods used and perhaps foreshadow sim ilar developm ents in other
new Asian nations.
P h ilip p in e nationalism has n o t been confined to the p o litica l phase It
poT teritVldCr e m‘CtraSPeCtS' ? “ Pre” rV“ ion ° f the ^

before the an nrova? n f ° i ? l I l pmo b u ™iess enterp rises by F ilip in o s. E ven
S S TT.e’ f f i L a n ^ C o nsntut.on th ere w ere laws designed to p ro te c t na-
citizens of the Ph Unni™ T ' i T * 1 ^ Sale and lease ° f ^"ds to the
60 percent of w lio Jc a o k n r Stat“ and to “ ^ ra tio n s at least
be purchased b v a T i n Z l T 5 0'™ed by * * * nationals- Th= that could
corporation was lim ited to n ot moreThVn f o M h e 't^ h e? tarf S’ whiIe th at by the
period w ith in w hirh nnW .v 1 j . hectares. In the case o f leases, the
no t exceed 25 years. . . ^ n 0 t exceed*nS *°24 hectares m ay be leased m ay
generations, the C o m t k u t T o n ^ im ^ n a tio n a l resources fo r la te r

tion o f all agricultural Hmhpr i • exPloitatIon> d evelop m en t an d utiliza-
Pines o r to a ^ C o ^ o n nr J ^ ™ n ^ , lands. to the citizens o f the P hilip -
owned by F ilipino citizen* T sociatlon at_ least 60 percen t o f w hose cap ital is
to operate any nuhUr f T t n* an er section o f the C o n stitu tio n , die a u th o rity
the m ajo rity of whose canitJl ^ reserv®d fojL.F lllP ino citizens o r fo r co rp o ratio n s
sions J e r e i ° L am ended to inT ude A Y ^ o im p o rta n t p ro vi-
lim its the transfer o r assifmmpm f m encan Cltizens- T h e co n stitu tio n also
zen^ an d corporations ^ ^
on the BelfA^t^herebÛie^Conslitution0^ ^ 1946 dUrinS the discuss;° ns

parity rights to American cftize" n T e x l k a t i o V I T ^ * giVe
and in the operation of public utilities whM r l ? ° Ur Ura’ rcsources
F ilip in o citizens by o u r C onstitution It*was n i r w ere o n S in a lly lim ite d to
people, prostrate a fter the w ar, decided to am end^h” * m Pers.uasion th at the
ci to am end th eir con stitution in o rd e r to
- . Ts . s ; s k s x t , s ’i i r “ - *—
NEW TRENDS IN ASIAN NATIONALISM II
secure advantages fro m the A m erican g o vern m en t w hich w o u ld have been im

possible otherw ise.
In aw ard in g contracts fo r the con struction o f p u b lic bu ild in gs, the L aw gives
p referen ce to F ilip in o con tractors o r dom estic groups. T h e y m ay be aw arded the
con tract to con struct p u b lic w orks p ro v id ed th e ir b id does n o t exceed m ore
th an fifteen p ercen t o f the low est foreig n bid.
T h e Flag L a w protects the in terest o f F ilip in o n ation als givin g p reference to
n a tive p rodu cts and dom estic groups in the purchase o f articles fo r governm ent
use. In the purchase o f books an d su p p lem en tary readers, fo r exam p le, locally
bou n d an d p rin ted m aterials are p re fe rre d to those o f fo reig n m an u fa ctu re p ro
vid ed th ey can be o b tain ed w ith o u t p re ju d ice to the p u b lic interest.
F rom tim e to tim e the P h ilip p in e Congress, in consonance w ith the n a
tio n alistic feelings o f o u r p eople, has taken up m easures designed to foster eco
nom ic nation alism . T h e latest o f this class o f leg islatio n w as the n ation alizatio n
b ill w hich was presented in Congress in 1950. T h e b ill aim s a t d isq u alifyin g
aliens engaging in certain en terp rises an d to encourage F ilip in o capitalists and
businessm en to engage in them .
O n e o f the im p o rtan t agencies fo r the c u ltiva tio n o f econom ic n ation alism is
the N EPA, N ational Econom ic P rotectionism A ssociation. T h e p rin c ip a l objec
tives o f this o rgan ization are: (a) to organize an d conduct p u b lic ity cam paigns
to pro m o te greater consum ption o f locally-m ade p ro d u cts an d keep alive the
d o ctrin e o f n a tio n a l econom ic p rotectionism ; (b) to p ropose an d su p p o rt legisla
tio n ten d in g to d evelop new indu stries and increase F ilip in o p a rtic ip a tio n in
dom estic an d fo reig n trade, an d oppose any m easure in im ical to P h ilip p in e
business an d lab o r; an d (c) to tak e m easures fo r the p ro tectio n o f F ilip in o eco
nom ic interests against foreig n com petition. T o im p lem en t these objectives, the
N E PA conducts a cam paign fo r the g re a te r use an d con sum ption o f lo cally
m ade goods. Schools an d social'&nd civic organizations are m obilized to inculcate
am ong o u r peo p le the need o f econom ic protectionism .
P erhaps the best expression o f econom ic n a tio n alism is co n tain ed in the
D ecalog o f the A n g Bagong K atip u n a n w h en it p ro claim ed : “W e h o ld th at o u r
co u n try is the in alien ab le p atrim o n y o f o u r p eo p le. W e w ill conserve an d de
v e lo p o u r lands, forests, m ines, w ater pow er, and o th e r n a tu ra l resources, and
w ill insist th at th e ir disposition an d co n trol be k ep t in the hands o f o u r peoples.
W e w ill practice econom ic nation alism . W e w ill organize an d struggle fo r eco
nom ic self-sufficiency. W e w ill strive to p rodu ce w h at we need and b u y w h at we
produce. W e w ill encourage the d evelo p m en t o f o u r hom e industries. W e w ill
patronize o u r cou ntrym en w ho are engaged in business b u t condem n those who
e x p lo it th e ir custom ers. W e w ill b u y fro m ab road o n ly those com m odities which
w e d o n o t produce, givin g p referen ce to articles com ing fro m countries which
b u y o u r produ cts.”
A lo n g w ith p o litical an d econom ic n ation alism the F ilip in o s have a well-
d evelop ed cu ltu ra l nationalism . N o tw ith stan d in g fo reig n d o m in atio n in p o litical
an d cu ltu ra l life, the in tellectu al leaders tried to conserve the elem ents o f cu l
tu ra l life w hich distinguish the P h ilip p in es as a n atio n . A m o n g the lite ra ry pieces
w hich expressed nation alism d u rin g die Spanish p e rio d are: Sagot ng E spana sa
H ib ik ng F ilip in o s b y M . H. del P ila r; L iw an ag a t D ilim by E m ilio Ja c in to ;
Kartilla by Bonifacio; Sa Mga Tagabangon ng Bayang Filipino by Mabini, and

The Reign of Greed and The Social Cancer by Rizal.
D u rin g the A m erican regim e, esp ecially in the e a rly years b e fo re E nglish b e
cam e p o p u la r an d b efo re the a d ven t o f the ta lk in g p ictures, th ere w ere sev era l
lite ra ry societies w hich aim ed to c u ltivate an d foster F ilip in o lite ra tu re . N o tab le
am o n g these w ere the associations o f T ag a lo g w rite rs lik e Sam ah ang M an an ag a-
log, P an itik a n g T agalog, Ilaw at P a n itik , an d A k la ta n g B ayan . D u rin g this
p e rio d th ere w ere also m an y F ilip in o w rite rs in the v e rn a c u la r lik e P a tric io
M arian o , w h o 'wrote ab o u t sixtv dram as, the m ost n o te w o rth y o f w hich are
Sam paguita, Silan gan an an d A n ak ng D agat; A u re lio T o le n tin o , w h o p ro d u ce d
the classic K ah ap o n , M gayon at B ukas; J u lia n Balm aseda, w h o w ro te Sa B u n -
ganga v g P atin g ; and Severin o Reves, a u th o r o f W a la n g Sugat. M in d a , M ga
P u so vg D akila and Puso ng Isang F ilip in a. T h e re w ere also novelists lik e L o p e
K . Santos, w ho ■wrote B anaag at S ik a t; V a le ria n o H ernandez, the a u th o r o f N en a
a t N eneng: In ig o Ed. R egalado, w h o w ro te M a d a lin g A r a w ; an d F au stin o
A g u ila r, the au th o r o f Busabos ng Palad.
*.n the /\nS K atip u n an proclaim ed in n o u n ce rta in term s the
F ilip in o s d eterm inatio n to evolve a cu ltu re o f th e ir ow n. It said: “W e w ill d e
velo p o u r ow n cu ltu re w ith o u t rejectin g the best o f o th e r n ation s. W e w ill give
expression to t e soul o f o u r ow n race in the a rt and lite ra tu re , in o u r customs
an m o u r civilization. W e w ill release o u r n a tive genius and stim u late o u r
cr®fVv ^.P®'vver; e preserve and keep u n co n tam in ated those fine q u a litie s
w hich distinguish o u r p eople.”
v ^ Uringf th. e1C ° mm0nWeaUh Pe r*°d th ere was a strong m o vem en t fo r th e culti-
10^ ° 1 !Pino nationalism . P resident Q uezon advocated sp iritu a l recon -
resiHenf1 w ante tIie F ilipinos "to grow and be lik e the m o lave, stro n g an d
Executive o m E u n a ^raic^ ° f the r a g‘ ng flood.” H e issued an
in all schools in th e ^ h iU p p T n e f PreSCribed the e th k a l Prin c iP '^ “ be ta llSh t
m nvrTnnn^Ll0 ^?6 S ' ^ oco^ ° became Secretary o f E ducation, he sp earh ead ed the
. e *0rm u latio n o f a F ilip in o m oral code, based p rim a rily on
f o C *ncestra tra *ts and C hristian virtues, and secondarily on the p rin c ip les
? k CCI enta cu ture and O rien tal philosophy. T h e n a tive ancestral traits w ere
o e c osen rom (1) the F ilipino proverbs, legends, and an cien t songs; (2) “ the
w ritings and^speeches o f F ilipinos, liv in g and d ead ” ; (3) “the deeds o f F ilip in o
f 1 iG custpm s o f prim itive, non -C hristian F ilip in o s” ; (5) “ the
u i e o un ettered C hristian F ilipinos w ho have n o t been spoiled b y m isin-
erp re a ion o cci ental life and ideas.” He w ou ld use the im p o rta n t p ro verb s
o un m a regions, he w ritings o f Rizal, M ab in i, Jacin to , a n d B o n ifacio w ere
to be utilised fo r this laudable purpose.
Tr.|
D u rin g J aPancse occupation, a strong m ovem ent fo r the c u ltiva tio n o f
F ilip in o nationalism took place. T h e developm ent o f the N atio n al L angu age
was carrie on w it m ore vigor and greater com pulsion. It becam e the language
used in official transactions and in some ju d icial decisions. Y o u th associations
called K a p a n z w ere organized as adjuncts o f the schools to in te n sify the teach
ing o f nationalism .
A fte r the establishm ent o f the R epublic, the m ovem ent fo r F ilip in o n a tio n al-
ism w as le d by G e n e ra l C arlos P. R o m u lo , S ecretary o f F oreign A ffairs. H e

w an ted to d evelop F ilip in o n a tio n alism th ro u g h th e c u ltiva tio n o f the N ational
L a n g u ag e, an d a d e ep v e n e ra tio n fo r o u r h eroes as re p re se n te d b y th e u n kn o w n
S o ld ier. In itia tin g the m ovem ent, h e d eclared in a speech a t T a rla c on J u ly 9,
19 5 0 :
“L e t us teach o u r p eo p le again to be p ro u d th at th ey are F ilipinos. L e t us
te a d i them to rem em b er w h at it m eans to be a F ilip in o . L e t us teach them to
realize an ew th at being a F ilip in o m eans h a vin g as rich an d n o b le a heritage
o f language, cu ltu re, p a trio tism an d h e ro ic deeds as any n a tio n o n earth . . . .
“ YVe have, o n o u r in itia tiv e , started o r ra th e r re v iv e d the w an in g interest
in the use an d d eve lo p m en t o f the N atio n al L anguage. W e h a ve re v iv e d the
cu lt o f R izal, b u t a cu lt th at m ust in clu d e good w orks in im ita tio n o f his ex
am ples. . . . W e h ave suggested the en sh rin em en t o f the F ilip in o un kn ow n
so ld ie r . . . as a b eaco n u g n t fo r o u r p e o p le in a n y n a tio n al crises th a t m ay
com e.
“L e t the school teach er in every b arrio , the p rin c ip a l teach er in the tow n,
assume the lead ersh ip in the cam paign o f n a tio n alism by organ izin g a p p ro p ri
ate program s h o n o rin g o u r heroes a n d asking the y o u th organ izations to take
fu ll charge."
O ne o f the significant featu res o f F ilip in o n a tio n alism is th a t it is b ro ad and
sane. W h ile it stresses the valu e o f 1'iJ.ipino cu ltu re, it seeks to absorb die
good elem ents o f o d ie r cultures. It takes p rid e in o u r cu ltu ra l h eritag e w ith o u t
being b lin d to d ie d esirab le elem ents o f fo reig n civilizatio n w hich e n ric h o u r
ow n.
T h e F ilip in o s d u rin g the R e v o lu tio n a ry era m an ifested th e ir n a tio n alism in
ed u cation , i n the P ro visio n al C o n stitu tio n o f Biac-na-Bato, d ie freed o m o f ed u
cation was p ro claim ed an d law s w ere issued p ro v id in g fo r the o rgan ization o f
d ie U m ve rn d a d L ite ra ria de i" lip m as. In the M alolos C o n stitu tio n , sep aration
o f the church a n d the state was p ro vid ed . Schools w ere organized to inculcate
a n d foster l'ilip in o nation alism . It was the desire o f d ie rev o lu tio n ists to train
o u r ch ild ren as freem en in a dem ocracy.
T h e n a tio n alistic tendencies in o u r ed ucation fo u n d th e ir best sources in the
decalogues o f B o n ifacio an d M ab in i. B o n ifac io ’s decalogue e n tid e d “D uties o f
d ie Sons o f the P eo p le” says in p a rt:
“A lw ays b e ar in m in d th at the tru e lo ve o f G o d is the lo ve o f d iy country,
an d th at this lo ve is also d ie tru e lo ve fo r d iy fello w m en .
“E ngrave in thy h e a rt th a t the h eig h t o f h o n o r an d happiness is to die in
o rd e r to save o n e’s co u ntry.
“Calm ness, constancy, reason, a n d fa ith in a ll w o rk an d actions crow n every
good desire w ith success. . . .
“I t is incu m ben t u p o n all to d e liv e r an d aid, a t the risk o f th eir ow n lives
a n d p ro p e rty, an yone w ho ru n s g re at risk in the p e rfo rm an ce o f his duties.”
M ab in i's decalogue says in p a rt:
“T h o u sh a lt lo ve d iy co u n try a fte r G o d an d th y h o n o r and m ore than thy
self: fo r she is th e o n ly P aradise w h ich G o d has given d iee in this life , the
o n ly p a trim o n y o f th y race, th e o n ly in h e ritan c e o f th y an cestors an d the

o n ly h op e o f th y posterity; because o f her, th o u hast life , lo ve, an d interests,
happiness, h o n o r an d G od.
“T h o u shalt strive fo r the happiness o f thy co u n try b e fo re th y ow n, m ak in g
o f h e r the kingdom o f reason, o f justice an d o f la b o r: fo r i f she be h a p p y,
th ou , together w ith thy fam ily, shall likew ise be happy.
“T h o u shalt strive fo r the independence o f thy co u n try fo r o n ly th ou canst
h ave any re a l interest in h e r advancem ent and ex a ltatio n , because h e r in d e
pend ence constitutes thy ow n lib e rty ; h e r advancem ent, thy p e rfec tio n ; and
h er exaltatio n , thy ow n g lo ry and im m ortality.
T h o u sh alt n o t recognize in thy cou ntry the a u th o rity o f an y person w ho
has n o t been elected by thee and thy countrym en; fo r in the conscience o f
every m an, the person designated an d proclaim ed by the conscience o f a w h o le
peo p le is the o n ly one w ho can use tru e authority/'
W h e n A m erica came and proclaim ed the separation o f the C h u rch an d State

as one o f the cardinal princip les o f A m erican dem ocracy, the p u b lic schools
assumed a significant ro le in the train in g o f citizens. T h e y aim ed to d e ve lo p
lo yalty to the State, n ot devotion to the C hurch. T h e an noun ced p o licy o f the
A m erican occupation o f the P hilip p in es was "to d evelop the p eo p le in to a self-
governing people, and in doing that, p o p u la r ed ucation . . . is the first an d
most im p o rtan t m e a n s.. .
W h en A m erican education was tran sp lan ted alm ost to ta lly to a fo reig n soil
and the English language im posed u p o n the people, there was sile n t resen tm en t
on the p a rt o f some F ilipinos. T h is was n atural, fo r language is the soul o f the
use°Pof theV P°r lgIT thGir languuaSe is to i^nore th^ r aspirations. When the
wTre penalized for* S T * P™h lb lted m the scho° ^ =>nd the yo u n g ch ild ren
X Jo u n d fn n e r P g th eir ,n a tive tonSu<? ™ the classroom s an d in the
F n tS m fT A0"* WCre ra m * e m inds o£ the P c ° P le 35 to the tru e
° f V A.m enca" s- T here dCTel°pecl the idea th at the schools w ere
trying to tram Filipinos to be American citizens.
P hni1n ninpSa.inh ^ teXtbo° ks and the teaching m aterials ad op ted fo r use in
A m erican children r " " ‘hose Pre P , f ed b7 A m erican authors p rim a rily fo r
^ » J ™ the £oIIowinS exam ples: Newsom F irst H eader,
Z L FirS‘ B ° ok in A rith m etic, B o n sall-M ercer
Stevem oiVs T * J , *^ f ™ EnS lish- Lam b’s T ales fro m Shakespeare,
T hom as1 H J t o n T f h n ' ^ lv a n h o e ‘ C o° P e r’s L ast o f the M ohicans,
Am
ro lnerican
’s “Cpftvchnrrr >■ c u i “memorize
1 ° ! “ 'lite/ “ra
^ ry
" °mChiIdrCn
asterpieces lik e“ “LS’1'
in-
w , 7 a' Schoolroom s w ere decorated w ith A m erican pain t-
FrfnkH n, etc Am enCan heroes- lik e L incoln , W ash ington , Jefferso n ,
A gainst this A m erican atm osphere and these A m erican scenes, was the n o ta b le
and total lack o£ F ilipino m aterials. T h e P h ilip p in e schools w hich w ere estab-
hshed to tram F tlip .n o children fo r self-governm ent w ere conspicuous fo r the
absence o f F ilip in o m aterials o f instruction. T h e results o f such an u n fo rtu n a te
setting w ere inevitable. A fte r a decade o f instru ction in the E nglish language
in schools p a tte rn e d a fte r the A m erican system, d irected b y A m erican adm inis
trators, an d using A m erican textbooks an d A m erican songs, the F ilip in o ch il
d re n w ho w ere the products o f the p u b lic schools came to k n o w m ore o f A m e ri
can poem s an d to ad m ire A m erican heroes m ore th an th e ir ow n.
T h is p a ra d o x in the fu n ctio n s o f P h ilip p in e ed u cation becam e glarin g ly ob
vio u s in la te r years. It d id n o t take lo n g fo r F ilip in o n atio n alists to discern the
iro n y o f A m erican ed ucation in the P h ilip p in es. In 1930 S p eak er M an u el A.
R oxas charged th at the p u b lic schools w ere tra in in g the F ilip in o s to becom e
A m erican citizens. H e said: “ I tell you , g en tlem en o f the C om m ission, th at the
p resen t system o f p u b lic ed ucation is ca rry in g on a sub tle p ro p a g an d a to k ill
the n a tio n alistic sen tim en t o f the p eo p le o f the P h ilip p in es. P erh ap s th at was
the o rig in al pu rpose o f the A m erican ad m in istratio n in the h o p e th a t the F ili
pinos w ill fo rg et th e ir asp iratio n s fo r freedom . S h a ll w e le t o u r ch ild ren grow
u n d e r the influ ence o f such a system? W e can n e v e r p e rm it th a t o u r ch ild ren
w ill grow and becom e m ore A m erican th an F ilip in o .”
W h ile the use o f the P h ilip p in e p u b lic school as the agency o f th e state fo r
the tra in in g o f F ilip in o citizens le ft m uch to b e desired, in fairn ess to the
fo u n d e rs o f the P h ilip p in e school system, it sh o u ld be ad m itted th a t it was n o t
to ta lly th e ir ow n fa u lt—n o r th e ir choice. It was caused by th e circum stances
arisin g fro m the situ atio n . T h e E nglish language was ad o p ted as th e best so lu
tion to the p ro b le m presen ted by the d iv ersity o f P h ilip p in e languages. A n d
w ith its use as a m edium o f in stru ctio n it was n a tu ra l th a t th e m a te ria l o f in
stru ctio n shou ld fo llo w the m eans.
N atio n alism was the fu n d am en tal o b jective a n d k eyn o te o f ed u cation d u rin g
the Japanese-sponsored P h ilip p in e R ep u b lic. D r. L a u re l e x p la in e d the objec
tive o f ed ucation in the fo llo w in g w ord s: “ I b e lie ve th at the n a tio n a listic spirit
m ust be in cu lcated in the m inds o f o u r y o u th , n o t o n ly fo r self-p ro tection an d
self-p reservatio n , b u t also fo r the pu rpose o f in te n sifyin g lo v e o f co u n try and
o f b rin g in g ab o u t a type o f citizenry a fte r o u r great h ero, R iz a l.”
A reo rg an izatio n was m ade in the B u reau o f E ducation an d in the Office o f
P riv a te E ducation. T h e B u re au o f P riv a te E ducation w as affected by several
m easures. E xecu tive O rd er No. 10 prescribed th at the m a jo rity o f the m em bers
o f the g o v ern in g b o ard o f a p riv a te school, college o r u n iv e rsity m ust be F ili
p in o citizens. T h e d eve lo p m en t o f the F ilip in o lan g u age received great en
cou ragem ent from the g o vern m en t. S everal in stitu tes w ere o rgan ized fo r the
teach in g o f the F ilip in o language. G re a t em phasis was p laced on the teaching
o f the F ilip in o language, ch aracter ed u cation , an d social studies as a m eans o f
d e ve lo p in g nation alism in the secondary schools.
A n E xecu tive O rd er defined the q u alificatio n s o f teachers a n d the re q u ire
m ents th at th ey shou ld m eet. T h e teach in g p ro fessio n w as reserved o n ly fo r
those w h o “sincerely b elieve in an d earn estly en d e a vo r to h e lp carry o u t the
d eclared policies o f the State. T h e teachers in a ll types o f schools, inclu ding
supervisors an d ad m in istrators, w ere re q u ire d to secure a teacher's license before
th ey could engage in any ed u cation al w ork .
T h e teaching o f the n a tio n a l language, ch aracter ed ucation and P h ilip p in e
histo ry in a ll ed u cation al in stitu tio n s w as reserved to F ilip in o citizens only. T h is
re q u ire m e n t w as in strong con trast w ith the practice d u rin g the A m erican re-
f f i m e T . . ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
F ilipinos
fu themselves
tu re enera[ion andth no
than o ther
d r ow n ppeoples c^ b
eople^ can wetter m old'P tlie ch
bCUCr than
aracter thc
o f the
A ttem pts w ere made to cu ltivate an H ™
the conservatories o f music, F ilipino com ^ m ° re o f P h 'l>ppine m usic In
o r indirectly to F ilipino life) (‘ h° Se P ie“ s related d rectlv
X T : reeach-req n red in tbe schools ' G rad ed * « * o f F ilip in o c o m ^
lum o f the different coll* acc°niplishm ent o f this -C artS’ llte ra tu re

num bers o f L - e r e ^ curricu-
culture. e ISati°n a l Language P h i l f J ^ ,re r _to Prescribe specified
By Executive O rder No 4, , ^ ^ ° rie n ta l
training o f teachers fo r the el ’ StatG reserved to the tm
w ere to be trained pvH f em entary schools T h P 7 S o vern m en t alo n e the
s a s a jE w s i “ "
- 2 a s s
the e x te n t o f the
£ most effecIive t ^ m L t T ^ S° me d » ™ «S
objective studies were cnnH V he deveIopm ent n f V v ■ p u b lic school was
nationalism in the schools f * dc* " S e n a t i o n a l ™ . T w o
to an<^ lê câracter ed u r f -a n m macIe a study o f the ° tIlC teachl‘ng o f
to find out the percentage H te*ts from G rade i n ! c° n te ilts o f the basic
30.24 percent o f the total numhV° te r t0 PhiIiPPine nat/n <J . G rad e VIT *" o rd er
se ectlons are nation alist^ Cf ^ pa"es and 29 30 ner 1Sm’ H e fo u n d th at
things P hilippine » ThT Z T j* , #timuI=*ting i n Z ^ t 1 ° f * * total " u m b er
d o n ? r C d£Voted ^ such ^
life pV?*Ut tJie anc* the nan'
30'24 Percent out nr
35 biographies of
T “P o t i o n of
• * 16 t0ta* n u m ber of
h f ^ Phd.ppine history_ and7 n<i anthem’ n atural r m ,nent F ilipinos, selec-
™ s ; fter ^ p ' C r s0£M . rces' Phiiip'’ine h- '
e rest o th er co n n '
In consonance w ith the sp irit and aims o f the C onstitution, the schools adopt
various techniques to foster effective Filipinism . One o f the means is through
the curriculum . T h e spirit o f F ilipino nationalism is taught through the stories
about heroes exem plifying th eir deeds and exaltin g th eir virtues. Love o f fam ily
and F ilip in o trad itions is portrayed in the d ifferen t selections. T h e lives of Jose
R izal, G eneral Luna, G regorio de Pilar, P laridel, J u a n L u na, M abini, and other
F ilip in o heroes and m artyrs are studied w ith the end in view o f using them as
em bodim ents o f F ilip in o nationalism . Selections dealing w ith the F ilipino flag,
n atu ral resources, p atrio tic pledges, the P h ilip p in e hym n and p atrio tic poems
are read. New textbooks w ere p repared by tne Bureau o f P ublic Schools ex
pressing F ilip in o ideals and depicting the life and conditions o f o u r people.
E ven the supplem entary m aterials are co n trib uting m uch tow ard the develop
m ent o f F ilipino nationalism . T his is clearly exem plified in one o f the supple
m en tary readers ap proved by the B ureau o f P ublic Schools and now used in
m any schools. A p o rtio n o f the book contains die follow ing:
“P atriotic F ilipinos m ust see to it th at these riches are conserved o r p roperly
utilized by o u r ow n people. Every boy o r girl should do som ething to preserve
the gifts o f o u r cou ntry fo r ourselves. I f we do n o t do this, we shall fa il in
o u r duties. O ther people m ay take o u r p atrim o ny away from us. T h e fe rtility
o f o u r soil and the abundance o f o u r resources w ou ld n o t m ean an yth in g u n
less they w ere p ro p e rly used by o u r people.
“B ear in m ind th at there is always som ething to do and to produce in ou r
country. A ll we need is industry, w illingness to w ork, and desire to use ou r
hands and m inds. G od has given us a big country and a rich land . W e can
best express ou r love to G od and to o u r country by preserving fa ith fu lly and
using w ise ly the ab und ance w ith w h ich th e y h a ve blessed us.”
W h ereas in the early days o f the A m erican regim e, the school cu rricu lu m dealt
m ostly w ith the English language and A m erican history, the cu rriculum now
has a num ber o f subjects the p rim ary purpose o f w hich is to acquaint F ilipino
ch ild ren w ith F ilip in o traditions, history and culture. T h e course in P h ilip p in e
history and governm ent deals w ith the progress o f the P hilip pines. It presents
fro m the earliest years to the present tim e the social and religious progress o f
the P hilippines, h er n atu ral resources and industries, h er advancem ent o f com
m erce and com m unication, the struggle o f the F ilipinos fo r p o litical inde
pendence, the organization and fu n ctio n o f the governm ent, an d the fu n d a
m ental rights and obligations o f the F ilipinos.
In high school, “P h ilip p in e Social L ife ” and P h ilip p in e histo ry are the
most im p o rtan t citizenship subjects. T h e aim o f “P h ilip p in e Social L ife ” is to de
velop in the F ilip in o yo u th “ the ab ility to ad ju st h im self to the situations affect
ing hum an relationships so th at he m ay b etter be able to get along w ith other
people and to live a socially efficient, abundant, an d h appy life.” O ne o f its
co n tro llin g themes is F ilip in o nationalism . In this course, the students are made
acquainted w ith com m unity problem s, w ith th eir non-C hristian brothers, the
fam ily, n a tio n al objectives and ideals, n a tio n a l traits and culture, and present
social problem s.
C itizenship traits and nation alism are also developed in a variety o f co-cur
ric u la r activities. A m o n g th em are the fo llo w in g : a lo yalty pledg e d u rin g the

o p en in g exercises o r flag-raising cerem onies; school m useum s an d excu rsion s; a
citizenship code; the p a trio tic calen d ar; the use o f the N atio n al L angu ag e; m ili
tary tra in in g ; an d special program s.
T h e p a trio tic calen d ar consists o f three im p o rta n t groups o f even ts. T h e first
g ro u p o f events relates to the cu ltu ra l progress o f the F ilipinos. U n d e r tiiis g ro u p
are the first contact o f the O ccidental and the O rien tal cu ltures an d the p u b li
cation o f the first new spaper. T h e second g ro u p consists o f those dates o r events
connected w ith the lives o f o u r heroes. H ere are fo u n d the b irth d ays o f R izal.
M ab in i, D el P ilar, the heroic sacrifice o f G reg o rio del P ila r, an d the execu tio n
o f Burgos, Gomez an d Zam ora. T h e th ird class includes the even ts re la te d to
the struggle o f o u r people fo r lib e rty an d justice. Som e even ts in clu d ed in this
grou p are the declaratio n o f P h ilip p in e In dependence, the p ro m u lg a tio n o f the
Tydings-M cDu(fie Law, and the in au g u ration o f the C om m o n w ealth .
T h e p rim ary o bjective o f com m em orating these p a trio tic even ts is to p ro m o te
sound nationalism . 1 he fo rm er Secretary o f E ducation, D r. J o rg e C . U ocobo,
u n d e r whose in itiative this policy was in au gu rated had this to say:
T h e objective o f the new p la n o f observing these even ts in an im pressive

m anner i s ‘ ° , £0CUS a “ em io n th r° “ g h o u t the y e a r u p o n n a tio n a l
i n t nn f ' f m f h od' p h lllPPine histo ry w ill c a n y a p u rp o se fu l m ean-
dren anri'vIUS,(i a StUrdy sP in t in to the hearts an d m inds o f the F ilip in o chil-
dem hs nmnn mg ^ the n a tio n a l sP irit « thus stirre d to its
c a te ? n g , r SmS S e n e ra u o n ------- L ° v e o f co u n try w ill thus be incul-
cedure w h k h r V ? h ‘ " I 1 " f ' ' T K ay th an by the OTdinary classroom p r o
cedure, Which is thereby rein fo rc ed ------- L ove o f co u n try am o n e the citizens
a L L r t h e ncteTnsmoU£Stan« CeS5arily ^ inten* and mOTe resolute than

sources. W e m ust P ™ er- tw i t h -£ °™ idable arm ies a n d vast re-
in a sm all nation It is the ,le spi™ o£ defeatism w hich is lik e ly to d e ve lo p
cultivate the crft anrl h ? . ° Ur schooIs an d colleges to u n fo ld an d
seasT n fra r l ? , h Y °5 ^ M a I a y anC estors w h ° d a r c d to cro ss v a st
to establish W h COnci “ ered an d fo rb id d in g N atu re in these Islands
^ ld fe rs w ho M ‘ T USt illSti" the “ " y ie ld in g s p irit o f F ilip in o
soldiers w ho died in countless battlefields d u rin g the R evo lu tio n ."
strucdone in a^9M af hor,iz"d £° be “ ed as an a u x ilia ry m ed iu m o f in-

the local dialects w h e n e v e / t h e ^ u p ib d o the teach er“ au th o rized to use
E nglish In G radp TIT s>nfi n i Tw t un d erstan d the q u estio n g iv e n in
non-English subjects- b u f . de 1 ™e of the local dialect is permissible in
Enf sh condnues to the medium
m in ed , w hile in the T a ^ a k g p tv fn ^ e s X T s ' e ^ ’ ° Cal “ pQ>
beinff th at Tae-aln* a iJ f u T a galog is re q u ire d , th e reaso n
m Z e Since M 4 T ^ r t y Proclairaed « th e basis o f the n a tio n a l Ian-
f u l f e s o f the P h i l t n ’ , gal° ? haS beCn ad° P ted as o n e o f the official la n
guages o f the P hilip p in es and it is now prescribed as an im p o rta n t su b ject in
e lem en tary an d secondary schools and in n o rm al schools. P J
E verybody in school from the age o f 10 to 18 years is su b ject to m ilita ry train -
1 g w hich is conducted u n d er the supervision o f the d istrict co m m an d er in co
o p e ra tio n w ith p erso n n e l o f the B u re a u o f P u b lic Schools. A cco rding to the

N atio n al D efense Law , ch ild ren are classified in to tw o categories according to
th e ir ages, an d in stru ctio n is g iven according ly. E lem en tary school ch ild ren w h o
are ten years o ld o r o v e r are called ju n io r cadets; those in th e secondary schools
are called high school cadets; an d those w ho are b etw een the ages o f 18 an d 21
are called ju n io r reserves. T h e p rim a ry o b jectives o f m ilita ry tra in in g are: (1)
to d e ve lo p the n a tio n a l sp irit; (2) to m ake the yo u th p h ysically strong ; (3) to
m ake them m o ra lly con fiden t; an d (4) to p re p a re the y o u th fo r m ilita ry service.
T h e re are special days o f the y e a r w hich are celeb rated to d riv e hom e certain
them es re la tin g to P h ilip p in e life an d n ation alism . T h e re is N E P A D ay w hich
is o bserved in the p u b lic schools to fo ster econom ic n a tio n alism . O n this oc
casion, the ch ild ren are m ade to w e a r n a tive costumes, an d p ro g ram s are held
to im press u p o n the ch ild ren the necessity o f p a tro n izin g hom e in d u stries. O n the
a n n ive rsa ry o f th e in au g u ra tio n o f the R e p u b lic o f th e P h ilip p in es, the schools
are re q u ire d to observe the e v e n t w ith a p p ro p ria te ce leb ratio n s a n d program s.
For a ll their diversity, the varied n ationalist m ovem ents of the East
have in common certain qualities and problem s. T h ey a ll assert their
ab ility and rig ht to p revent o r shake off alien political, economic, and
cu ltu ral dom ination; to establish fo r their people a position o f equality
(legal if n ot economic and m ilitary) in the w orld ; and to construct forms
and conditions of nation al life that w ill m eet the people’s needs and
withstand foreign attacks. T h ey claim, in oth er words, that they can
solve the crucial problem s of liberation, su rvival and grow th raised in
m odern times by foreign m ilitary conquest or ideological and economic
penetration. It is a familiar- fact that, as A sian nation alist movements
have attained political power, social and economic problem s come to the
fore. T his has been a notable developm ent in recent years. Nevertheless,
it should be recalled th at these n ationalist movem ents have alm ost al
ways been concerned in some degree w ith social and economic problems
and that a p urely political nationalism intent solely on political inde
pendence is difficult to find. Some w ill m aintain that the old m ilitarist
and bureaucratic ru lin g groups in p rew ar Japan brought about a m axi
m um of technical and adm inistrative m odernization, w hile keeping
fundam ental social and ideological change especially in ru ra l areas to a
m inim um . Even so, Ja p a n ’s tightly-knit p olitical nationalism was ac
com panied by profound changes induced by m odern education and in
dustrialization. Jap an was, indeed, som ething o f an exception and, al
though its exam ple and propaganda inspired m any other Asians to hope
fo r the resurgence of their own countries, it seems unlikely that other
Asian nationalist movements can follow the Japanese path w ith its
peculiar characteristics.
One m a jo r difference was that Jap an in the second h a lf o f the 19th

century was resourceful enough to avoid becoming a W estern colony (al
though it had to accept some W estern-im posed political disabilities for
a time). Even before the W est forcibly opened its doors Japanese feu d al
ism was disintegrating, and the economic and em otional foundations of
a nationalist movem ent were being laid. U n d er the W estern im pact this
native evolution was greatly accelerated, and new, m odernizing forces
(curiously exploited by some of the feudal factions) came into con trol of
the Japanese state. No other Asian area had experienced a sim ilar type
o f early nationalist developm ent p rio r to the coming of the W est. U n
equipped to hold off the W estern powers (or, later in W o rld W a r II, to
repel Japan's own im perialistic expansion) the other countries o f S o u th
ern and Eastern Asia became colonies or subject to various foreign con
trols and had to start their nationalist movements w hile still u n d er va ry
ing degrees of alien control. T his was largely true even o f such legally
independent countries as China and Siam.
Japanese Nationalism
T h e combination of historical and political factors th at determ ined
the unique character and vigorous growth of m odern Japanese national-
study-s descnbed m the following excerpt from a recent Japanese
Follow m g the successful establishm ent o f a centralized nation -state a fte r the
D ohticiôn'i^^^nf !?a*IonaÎsni in Ja p a n had crystallized itself in the d o m in a n t
in h eren t r W ■ ^ COUJn r y and constituted, u n til h er d e fe at in w ar, an
S "I ' ;en5tl • °nf hCr St3te S>'Stem- J aPan ’ in resp o n d in g to the w orld-
totalitarian ^ V? J*e" ces since 1930, was able to tran sfo rm h e rse lf in to a
in te rn a l n o litirs i J u in tern al reorganization an d a sh iftin g o f em phasis in
w ith out o-ninw t/ir a v *n^ êr trad itio n al state stru ctu re su b stan tially intact, and
T h is was nnfsihlp0 ^ 3 *cist re v olu tio n from b elow lik e G erm a n y an d Italy,
h fch ly H,eCaUSe Jrapanese co n tain ed w ith in it a
n o u ly) ' W a r a l l e t T e m ? nationaIism - T h e ™ *ch boasted k c k u ta i (n atio n a l
flip ro n n frv n r u S„ Lr0lve

Z tma ’ case
™ o ?f em
strong,y
ergencycor
a ll plidated m° r„al and
a rtisa n conflicts in
m n se au e n tlv no n p ^ * f ° rm s o f organized mass o p p ositio n . T h e re was,
centu ry. necessity m Japan to in ven t any special "m yth o f the tw e n tie th
G e n e ra lly speaking, m odern nation-states in E urope w ere b o rn o u t o f the

dissolution o f the m edieval universal com m unity as sym bolized by the H oly
R om an E m pire and the R om an C atholic C hurch. As a re su lt n a tio n a l conscious-
8. Masao Maruyama, Nationalism in Postwar Japan. Japan Institute of Pacific R e
lations, Tokyo and New York, 1950.
ness in E u ro p e, as i t grew u p w ith in each n a tio n , recog nized fro m the ve ry

b eg in n in g d ie n a tio n ’s m em b ersh ip in a la rg e r in te rn a tio n a l com m unity, the
C h ristia n w o rld . T h e tra d itio n o f E u ro p e as a re lig io u s an d c u ltu ra l com m unity
c o n tin u e d lo n g a fte r E u ro p e w as b ro k en u p in to m an y nation-states.
In A sia, o n the o th e r h a n d , th ere n e v e r has b een a n in te rn a tio n a l com m unity
in th e E u ro p ea n sense. W h a t w e h a v e w itn essed in A sia -was at best the p a ra lle l
existence o f a n u m b e r o f d iffe re n t c u ltu ra l co m m u n ities a n d h a p h a zard in te r
course b etw een them . A sia tic co u n tries h a ve been b ro u g h t in to an “in te rn a tio n a l
c o m m u n ity” in tiie E u ro p ea n sense, m o re o r less fo rc ib ly by o u tsid e pressure. It
was as a re a c tio n to this p ressu re b ro u g h t to b e a r o n A sia tic co u n tries by the
E u ro p ea n w o rld as a w h o le th a t e le m e n ta ry n a tio n a listic fe elin g s first began
to take shape in a ll these co u n tries. A n d th e first g ro u p s to becom e k een ly
conscious o f these feelin g s w ere, as m ost ty p ic a lly seen in C h in a a n d J a p a n , the
p riv ile g e d ru lin g classes o f d ie o ld regim es in these co u n tries. T h e ir “n a tio n a l
consciousness" im p lie d ab ove a ll d ie d e fe n ce o f th e tra d itio n a l p o litic a l an d
social system against the p e n e tra tio n o f E u ro p e a n C h ris tia n ity an d in d u s tria l
ism . (in c id e n ta lly , this d e v e lo p m e n t in A sia w as a d istin c t c o n tra st to the state
o f affairs in E u ro p e, w h ere aristo cracy as th e o ld r u lin g class te n d e d to w ard
cosm o p o litan ism a n d it w as the risin g b o u rg eo isie th a t w as the p ro p o n e n t o f
n a tio n alism .) N atio n alism in th is first, p re -m o d ern , state d e v e lo p e d in the fo rm
o f the id eo lo g y o f “e x p e llin g th e b a rb a ria n s.”
A s d iey w ere a c tu a lly b ro u g h t to face th e p re p o n d e ra n tly s u p e rio r ind u stry,
techn ology, an d m ilita ry stren g th o f th e E u ro p e a n w o rld , the m o re prog ressive
elem en ts o f the Ja p a n e se r u lin g classes in d ie o ld reg im e becam e k e e n ly con
scious o f the n ew w o rld , an d re a liz e d th a t ev en in o rd e r to d e fe n d th e ir old
w o rld against p e n e tra tio n by d ie new , it w as necessary to le a rn som e o f the
fo reig n techn iq ues. T h e se prog ressive lead ers o f th e o ld reg im e, h o w ever,
d iscern ed fo rm id a b le difficulties f\n d ie a tta in m e n t o f th e ir aim s. F o r alth o u g h
th ey fo u n d it n o lo n g e r possible to p e rp e tu a te th e o ld reg im e w ith o u t a d o p tin g
v a rio u s n ew p rin c ip le s an d in stitu tio n s o f the W e s te rn w o rld , th ey w ere also
aw are o f the fa ct th at the w h o lesale tra n s p la n ta tio n o f such n e w p rin c ip le s and
in stitu tio n s in to J a p a n w o u ld h a ve re s u lte d in ra d ic a l changes in th e o ld regim e
a n d d ie co n sequ ent d o w n fa ll o f th e ir o w n p o litic a l p o w er.
T h e a d ro it course tak en by these lea d ers to reso lve this p a ra d o x w as to lim it
the a d o p tio n o f E u ro p ea n civ ilizatio n to its “m a te ria l” aspects, such as in d u stry,
tech n o lo g y a n d m ilita ry art, a n d a t the sam e tim e to re ta rd as m u d i as pos
sible the in filtra tio n o f id eo lo g ical an d p o litic a l p rin c ip le s, such as in d iv id u a lism
o r lib e ra l dem ocracy. T h e idea o f such selective a d o p tio n o f W e s te rn civilizatio n
w as best exp ressed by the w ord s o f S an ai H ashim o to , a w ell-k n o w n Jap an ese
p o litic a l le a d e r in the tu rb u le n t p e rio d ju s t b e fo re the M e iji R e sto ra tio n , w hen
h e said, “M a c h in ery a n d tech n iq u e w e sh a ll take fro m th em , b u t m o ra l v irtu es
w e h a ve am o n g us.” T h ro u g h d iis selective a d o p tio n o f W e s te rn civilization,
J a p a n ca rried o u t its “re v o lu tio n fro m a b o v e ” in a sp ecta cu lar m a n n e r an d suc
ceeded in estab lish in g the first cen tra lized n ation -state in th e F ar East.
O n the o th e r h a n d , in C h in a, w h ile the W e ste rn iz a tio n m o vem en t was started
b y such prog ressive elem ents o f the p re v a ilin g ru lin g class as L i H ung-chang,
K a n g Y u-w ei a n d others, th e ir a tte m p t w as cru shed b y the o ve rw h e lm in g ly
pow erfu l conservative influences in the Ching dynasty, w ith the resu lt that die
country became the prey o f W estern im perialism and was finally reduced to a
sem i-colonial status.
It is n o t necessary here to analyze the reason why Ja p a n succeeded, and China
failed in its in itial contact w ith W estern civilization. W h at needs to be em
phasized is the fact that the subsequent developm ent o f nationalism in Japan
an d in China follow ed com pletely opposite courses as the resu lt o f this initial
divergence.
In China the fact that the country was long exposed to the encroachm ent of
W estern imperialism, owing to the lack o f ad aptability on the p a rt o f the old
ru lin g class, had the effect o f imposing the task o f basically revo lu tion izin g the
old socio-political structure upon the nationalist m ovem ent, w hich has been
fighting against foreign imperialism. T his probably explains the com bination in
varied form s o f anti-im perialist m ovement and social revo lu tio n that form ed an
unbroken tradition o f Chinese nationalism from the days o f Sun Yat-sen through
Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Tse-tung.
In contrast to this developm ent in China, the men w ho destroyed the o ld re
gime and seized political control o f a unified state in Ja p a n w ere them selves re p
resentatives o f feudal forces. Prom pted by the need o f cou ntering the pressure
from W estern powers, they achieved the unification o f the cou ntry u n d er the
authority o f the T hrone by rap id ly liq uidatin g the decentralized feu d al forces,
an a carried through m odernization “from the to p ” by ad op ting the policy of
creating a wealthy nation and a strong arm y.” U nder these circum stances, the
extent and torm of m odernization were natu rally determ ined by the suprem e
objective o f strengthening the ru lin g pow er as rap id ly as possible.
s t i ^ a r m l " ^ i!°riC1- CXCCUtion o f this P ° Iicy o i "a w ealthy n a tio n an d a
opm ent oT the r f “ w u T 0 ™ unevenness in the social and econom ic devel-
£ thG countIY- W h ile, on the one hand, it retain ed m ajo r elem ents of
eudalism—p articularly m agricultural production and la n d te n u r e -o n the
otner iiand, it brought into existence at a very early stage huge concentrations
o i capital in a num ber o f industries which w ere lib erally patronized by the gov
ernment. I his serious unbalance o r contradiction in the social and econom ic
developm ent o f Japan , in turn, has prevented die healthy grow th o f dem ocratic
lorces and has perpetuated labor conditions characterized by low wages an d pa-
' I , / atl0nj at home* while it has also in evitab ly pushed Ja p a n , fro m an
t io n l 3 m ihtary-,m Periali5tic expansion policy in h er e x tern a l rela-
coOTdLidtion°wi,hnl mOVem5nt ° f J aP anese nationalism have grow n u p in close

wnrH, T Z , dCTdoP ™ " t o f the Jap an ese E m pire. In o th e r
n stter’n o f snr 1 n a t,1 0nahsm has im plicitly justified the w hole o f this p ecu liar
p attern o f social and economic developm ent o f J a p a n since the M e iji R estora-
W ith few exceptions, the nationalist m ovem ent am ong the p eo p le in Ja p a n

since the tim e o f the notorious nation alist society, the G enyosha, has been car-
n e d on, n o t as a genuine opposition against the existing regim e, bu t as a m ove-
m ent to w hip up the expansionist m otive in h eren t in the regim e. C onseq uently,
fa r from being com bined w ith social revo lu tio n ary tenets, the Jap an ese n a tio n
alist m ovem ent has associated itself ra th er w ith the co u nter-revolutionary and
anti-dem ocratic tendency in the country. T o be sure, the Japan ese nation alist
m ovem ent in the past occasionally reflected the p o litical an d econom ic demands
o f u n d erp rivileg ed victim s o f the incom plete m odern ization o f Ja p a n . T h e so-
called jiy u m inken undo (the m ovem ent fo r lib e rty and civil rights) in the early
A feiji era, w hich u n doub ted ly h ad a distinctly nation alistic aspect, and the anti-
E uropcanization and N ational P u rity P reservation M ovem ent in the early tw en
ties o f the M eiji era, m ay serve as exam ples. In m ore recen t times, m en tion m ay
be made o f the “radical elem ents” in the rightist m ovem ent since 1930, as typi
fied by the M ay 15 incid en t o f 1932 and the F ebru ary 26 incid en t o f 1936, since
these reflected to a certain ex ten t the an ti-capitalistic sentim ents o f the peasant
pop u latio n , w ho had been struggling against disastrous agrarian depression. In
all these instances, how ever, “dangerous” elem ents in the m ovem ent w ere u lti
m ately eith er suppressed o r neutralized, w ith the resu lt th at o n ly the chauvinistic
and expansion istic aspects o f the m ovem ent w ere effectively utilized by the ru l
ing p o litical forces o f the country.
T hus, because p rew ar nationalism in Ja p a n came to be m ost p o w erfu lly em
bodied in the p o litical oligarchy w hich had ru le d Ja p a n since the M e iji R es
toration, nationalism as a m ovem ent am ong the p eo p le d id n ot acquire any
strong autonom y o r independence, and p layed a ro le subsidiary to the ch ief
actor in the dram a; the m ost p o w erfu l n ation alistic elem ent in the adm inistra
tive stru ctu re was rep resen ted by the m ilitary clique and bureaucracy. T o sum
up, the w rite r m ay be justified in saying that n eith er dem ocratic nation alism o f
the nineteenth -centu ry E uropean type, n o r re v o lu tio n ary nationalism o f the
m odern A siatic type, has taken ro o t in Ja p a n .
T hese historical circum stances have given distinguishing characteristics to the
ideological stru ctu re o f Japanese nationalism . O w ing to the persistent sway, even
after the R estoration, o f the m ain tenets o f the ideological p attern o f Sanai
H ashim oto, w hich has been re ferred to above, the deeply-rooted feudalistic or
p a tria rch al ideology o f the Japan ese people has n ot only been insufficiently liq
uidated b u t has ra th e r been strengthened in certain aspects to serve as a m oral
su p p o rt fo r seem ingly W estern ized p o litical and econom ic institutions, and
m ore ch aracteristically to the n ation alist ideology and psychology.
Because o f this pecu liar p a tte rn o f d evelop m ent in Ja p a n since the M eiji
R estoration, the leaders o f the new governm ent, having been unable to depend
on the spontaneous rise o f n ation al consciousness am ong the people, had to p ro
m ote such consciousness hastily by state education. Instead o f p a vin g the w ay fo r
the g row th o f conscious solid arity in civic life based on the p rin cip les o f lib erty
an d eq u ality through breaking up feud alistic loyalties, these ea rly M eiji leaders
m obilized such trad itio n a l loyalties to be concentrated on the E m peror as the
suprem e sym bol o f the n ation al u n ity. C hukun aikoku (loyalty to the E m peror
an d patriotism ) was thus advocated as the highest m oral v irtu e o f the Ja p a n
ese p eople. A decisive feature o f this ideology was th at d evo tio n to the Em peror
shou ld precede love o f the country; the latter was a reflection o f the form er.
T h is in cid e n ta lly indicates the predom inance o f person alism in Japanese n a
tionalism .
F u rth erm ore, since the fiction th at the E m peror's household was the head
fa m ily o f th e e n tire n a tio n an d th a t the E m p ero r was the su p rem e h e ad o f a ll

fa m ilies—th e co n cep t o f the fa m ily state—was em phasized, p a trio tism itse lf in a
re m a rk a b le d egree assum ed the ch aracter o f d irec t exten sio n o r re fle c tio n o f
p rim itiv e attach m en t to th e p rim a ry groups. Because o f these circum stances, the
d iv o rc e o f in te rn a l fro m e x te rn a l m o rality , to g eth er w ith the co m p lex o f fe a r
a n d con tem pt, o f arrogan ce an d h u m ility, to w ard o utside g ro u p s, w h ich are
ty p ica l in an exclusive com m un ity, h a ve been expressed in Ja p a n e se feelin g s
to w a rd fo reig n countries. H ere it m ay perhaps sullice to rem e m b er the ideology
o f e x p e llin g the b a rb arian s.” V ario u s creeds o f tra d itio n a l m o ra lity h a ve been
con spicuou sly u tilized in m ilitaristic ed ucation (e.g., the g lo rific a tio n o f B u sh id o
p rin c ip le s such as u n co n d itio n a l d e vo tio n to the lo rd , co n tem p t fo r life an d e x
a lta tio n o f death, the sp irit o f "w in a t a ll costs,” an d the sense o f u n p a rd o n a b le
disgrace fo r a re tre a t in com bat o r fo r bein g m ade a p riso n e r o f w ar).
T h is n a tio n a l consciousness, d e lib erate ly an d efficiently created by in te n sive
education, w as fu rth e r stren gthen ed by v ic to ry in a series o f fo re ig n w ars a n d
im p erialist expansions. W e m ust n o t o ve rlo o k the fact, h o w ever, th a t the n a tio n
alist feelin g and patrio tism o f the Jap an ese people, w h o h a ve a c q u ire d fam e
the w o rld o ver fo r th eir fo rtitu d e and fanaticism , in re a lity c o n ta in e d a serio u s
p o in t o f in h e re n t weakness. T h is la y in the fa ct th at n a tio n a lism in J a p a n
lacked the basic factors essential in the concept o f m o d ern n a tio n a lism .
M odern nationalism , b o rn o f the F rench R e v o lu tio n , th o u g h re ta in in g irra -
msU.n.ct.iye asPects as an exten sio n o f p re-m od ern trib a lism , is char-
np r ^ a 11^ 1 ° P ec* sP irit o f self-d eterm in atio n , a s p irit w h ich Er-
l~ WOrdS: <*’“ » * «<>“•<” *
In Ja p a n , how ever, w hile the consciousness o f n a tio n a l u n ity a n d lo y a lty to
the central regim e was ra p id ly created tliro u g h m o b ilizatio n o f tra d itio n a l id e o l
ogy and m o rality, n o satisfactory g ro w th in the. id ea o f p o litic a l self-d eterm in a-
'I ,natI° n COuld be seen‘ A s the re su lt o f ^ is , Ja p a n e se p a trio tism , in
essence, has to a p re d o m in an t degree been characterized by e m o tio n a l re li-
th* ° ? i estabhsbed o rd er o f tlie state; the Ja p a n e se p eo p le, s till la c k in g in
renrW l t SCnSe resPo nsibih ty an d in d ep en d en ce o f a m o d e rn citizen, h a v e
tended to en tru st everyth in g to the d iscretion o f the au th o ritie s ev en in tim e o f
n n / °n n lv em erênCî ®es*des» egoism based o n fa m ily a n d p ro v in c ia l ties has
b r n u X yf n S eVenr d ^ £UU re a liz a tion o f n a tio n a l so lid a rity b u t has also
L ce rtL n S J ^ m aU paFtS ° f J aPanese society, w ith the re s u lt th at
L e T w e w nP T t i? lCy ° l n a tio n a l Se n e ra l m o b iliz a tio n w as sabo-
in the m a n Z e Z e t f YP examPles d u ri"g the last w a r w h en difficu lties aro se
n m anagem ent o f conscripted w ork ers an d the p ro g ra m o f d isp e rsin g p o p u
la tio n fro m u rb an centers.') C ircum stanrpc i ; u i i PUP
i^non v.^ 1 ____ r i ^ 1Icumstances lik e these h a ve b een the costly p rice
to dem ocratize herselL ” " p reservatio n o£ tra d itio n a l m ores a n d h e r fa ilu re
The feudalistic elements in Japanese nationalism had their most characteristic
and intensive expression in the various aspects of prewar rightist movements.
For instance practically a 1 rightist organizations were organized on the basis
of the so-called oyabun-kobun (boss-henchman) system; consequently, different
factions and groups in the movement were extremely exclusive of each other
an d this in te rn a l dissension co n tin u ed to the end. T h e m ovem ent in all its

v a rie ties had less logical consistency in its th eories and program s an d m ore u to
p ian an d u n realistic traits th an its co u n terp arts in G e rm a n y and Italy. T h is was
show n in the extrem e a n tiq u a ria n views, the an ti-urban ism an d an ti-in dustrial
ism advocated by p ra ctically all groups o f the Jap an ese re a c tio n a ry m ovem ent.
T h e m o vem en t was u su ally w eak in o rgan izin g masses an d was characterized by
intense p erson al heroism . T o sum up, w e find th at the p re w a r Jap an ese rig h t
ist factions w ere v ery fa r fro m b ein g q u alified as m odern p o litical parties, and
w ere n o t easily distinguishab le fro m gangs o f roughnecks o r groups o f n o n
p o litical outlaw s.
T h e Jap an ese rightists, u n til the W o rld W a r II p erio d , w ere u n a b le to usurp
p o litica l p o w er by the use o f mass organ izations lik e the Nazis o r Fascists, bu t
w ere co n ten t to p la y the ro le o f accom panists to the m ain p erfo rm ers o f u ltra
nation alism . T h is was b asically due to the p e cu liar character o f the Jap an ese
state, as p revio u sly ex p la in ed ; b u t a p a rtia l reason u n d o u b ted ly lay in the cir
cum stance th at the fcud alistic elem ents in h e re n t in these groups had m ade it
extrem ely difficult to organize the m ovem ent in a m ore in ten sive m an n er.
T h is does n o t m ean th at u ltra -n atio n a lism in Ja p a n , b o th as an ideology and
as a state system, has been n o th in g b u t an accented m edievalism . Ja p a n could
n o t have grow n in to a p o w erfu l im p erialist state w ith o u t h a vin g to pass through
the process o f m o d ern izatio n in a ll aspects o f h e r society, even th ou gh the
process was un b alan ced . T h e pre-m odern ch aracter o f Jap an ese nationalism
m ay h ave been too m uch stressed in the ab ove d escription, since the w rite r’s
p rim a ry concern was to p o in t o u t its h istorical un iqueness. B u t w ith o u t recog
nizing this p e c u lia r ch aracter it w o u ld p ro b a b ly be im possible to v iew post
w a r Jap an ese politics in correct perspective, m uch less to gauge its possible d i
rec tio n in the fu tu re.
T h e re are n o t a few fo reig n ers w ho h ave w o n d ered a t the sudden d isap pear
ance in the po stw ar years o f fan atical an ti-A m erican and an ti-B ritish sentim ent
an d also at sim ultaneous appearance o f a p ro -A m erican tendency in the post
w a r rig h tist m ovem ent in Ja p a n . T h is is, h o w ever, n o t to be specially w ondered
at w hen w e reflect th at Jap an ese n ation alism has alw ays tended to depend on
th e p re va ilin g e x te rn a l circum stances an d to accept o p p o rtu n istica lly the ru lin g
tren d in cu rren t w o rld politics. T h u s th ere is a co n tin u ity betw een the psy
chological o rie n ta tio n o f the Jap an ese p eo p le to w ard G erm an y and Italy in
the p re w a r days an d th eir adherence to W e stern dem ocracies a t present.
Outside Japan, Asian nationalism , operating not through b u t against

the power of the state, could hope fo r strength only to the extent that it
aroused m ajor groups of the population by prom ising far-reaching
changes. Adm ittedly, pledges arousing the support of one section of the
population m ight alarm o r alienate another, and certainly the social-
economic programs of the nationalist movements have varied widely. Yet
a broad trend can be observed through the decades tow ard an increasing
emphasis on enlisting mass support, and most nationalist movements
te n d e d , i n th e p h a s e o f t h e i r s tr u g g le f o r l i b e r a t i o n f r o m f o r e i g n r u l e , to
d e v e lo p a r a d i c a l c h a r a c t e r . T h i s c a n b e s a id d e s p ite th e f a c t t h a t h u n
d r e d s o f m i lli o n s o f p e o p le in A s ia r e m a i n p o l i t i c a l l y i n e r t , t h a t e x c e p
tio n s to th e g e n e r a liz a t io n e x is t, a n d t h a t r a d ic a lis m i n ta c tic s (e.g ., th e
u s e o f fo r c e o r r e b e lli o n to o b t a in p o w e r ) w a s u s u a lly g r e a t e r t h a n i d e o
lo g i c a l r a d ic a lis m i n s o c ia l a n d e c o n o m ic p r o g ra m s .
A s i a n n a t io n a lis m , w i t h th e e x c e p t io n o f J a p a n , b e g a n l a r g e l y as a
m o v e m e n t o f th e m id d le class, th e a r t i c u la t e , m o d e r n iz e d s e c tio n o f s o
c ie ty . T h e p e a s a n t r y —th e o v e r w h e lm in g m a j o r i t y o f th e p o p u l a t i o n —w a s
u n a w a k e n e d , a n d a la r g e b o d y o f m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l la b o r e r s d i d n o t
e x is t. T h e e a r ly m id d le -c la s s le a d e r s o f n a t i o n a lis m f r e q u e n t l y s h o w e d a
d e e p a n d s y m p a th e tic in t e r e s t in th e p e o p le a n d t h e i r w e lf a r e , b u t t h e r e
w a s a t firs t l i t t l e fe e lin g t h a t th e v illa g e m a sse s—i l l i t e r a t e , i n e r t , s u n k in
s u p e r s t i t i o n —c o u ld b e a n a c t iv e fo r c e i n s h a p in g t h e i r o w n a n d th e c o u n
t r y ’s f u t u r e . I n d e e d , th e w e a k m i d d le cla ss o f t e n h a d l i t t l e c o n fid e n c e
e v e n m its o w n a b i l i t y to o r g a n iz e a n d le a d a n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t .
u t o f fa ilu r e s a n d in e ffe c tiv e n e s s , m u c h s o u l- s e a rc h in g d e v e lo p e d
a m o n g I n d ia n a n d C h in e s e n a t io n a lis t s i n th e y e a r s b e f o r e W o r l d W a r I.
W r i t i n g o n I n d ia , a n A m e r i c a n o b s e r v e r r e p o r t e d a t th e tim e :
th a / th V ^ t . W PthS ° f n a tive life h a ve n o t b een stirred , b u t signs are p le n tifu l

T h e inteU erti i S b efo re lo n S be d ra w n in to th e p o litic a l w h irlp o o l.
S i r le S c r sh in ; ^ 5 f I n d ia haV£ corae to c o n c lu sio /th a t
la r fo llo w in g T h posed .to ster*hty o n accoun t o f the lack o f a b ro ad , pop u-
w ill bp nni ti, w rite anc* ta^ t0 th e ir hearts' co n ten t, b u t th e ir h e a re rs
Io n ? as tho 7 mseIves7 alread y persuad ed to satiety . . . th ey k n o w th a t so
v ear rem ain .in e rt’ th e ir congresses m ay go on m ee tin g y e a r a fte r
the Povpm I6 sai? e Jns*stent reso lu tio n s, w ith o u t h a v in g as m u ch effect o n
m en o£ In d ia as the articles in an E nglish p ro v in c ia l newspaper.**
W o r l d W a r I a n d th e B o ls h e v ik R e v o l u t i o n f o r m a m a j o r d i v i d i n g lin e
m m e h is to r y o f A s ia n n a tio n a lis m . T h e w a r w e a k e n e d th e W e s t e r n
f h T b ? -S tre n g th e f d A s ia n i n d u s t r y a n d th e A s i a n m i d d le c la ss, c r e a te d
f t >h- j in ? S ° i a T nodern p r o le t a r ia t , d im in is h e d W e s t e r n p r e s tig e
n l a n T . J rCCeiVed " m a j ° r S e tb a c k i n J a P « * d e f e a t o f T s a r i s t
Russia m 1904-05), and ultim ately aroused deep d isillusionm ent in the
East as a result o f unfulfilled W estern pledges o f “self-determ ination."
I he R evolu tion in Russia had both an im m ediate and a long-term ef-
“ ' “ ° n Chm a and ° n Chinese N ationalist re vo lu tio n of
7 1S wel1 know n- Its im pact in India and Southeast Asia, although
New YoUr l ’^ w f 1 pp- 1Cb"06’ 108. Remsch was later

C U m n ‘S in t h ‘ F a T E a s t ’ B ost° n
U.S. M inister to China
weaker, was also significant. Even in Ja p a n its effects were felt, especially
in intellectual circles. Moscow and the Com m unist In tern ation al showed
an early interest in A sian nationalism , w hich Bolshevik leaders regarded
as a direct means of w eakening other powers and strengthening the posl*
tion of the Soviet U n ion and, historically, as a prelude to an ultim ate
victory of Com m unism in various parts of Asia. A id and encouragement
were given by the Soviet U nion after W o rld W a r I to A sian “bourgeois
nationalism ” at the same time that C om m unist movem ents were fos
tered.
Before the Bolshevik R evolu tion , A sian nationalism had been deeply
influenced by the radical individ u alist thought of the m odern W est. In
static societies chained by trad itio n the idea of in d ivid u al em ancipation
from customary forms of conduct exerted a p ow erfu l appeal. T h e feeling
developed in some minds that on ly if the energy laten t in the passive or
in ert in d ivid u al was released could the new strength necessary fo r na
tional liberation or reconstruction be developed. T h is nationally-m inded
individualism had become linked m ore and m ore w ith W estern non-
M arxist thought that was critical of W estern society, o r w ith older W est
ern revolu tion ary thought (for instance, Rousseau’s ideas) th at was now
fo r the most p art o f only historical interest in the W est, b u t still possessed
the pow er to incite Asians to action.
In contrast to this individ u alist tendency one m ust note that early
Asian nationalism arose in an age w hen the role of the state and of p ri
vate aggregations o f economic pow er was grow ing in the W est. T h e Asian
peoples themselves lacked a laissez-faire tradition. M oreover, n ot on ly im
p erial Germ any, Russia, and Jap an , b u t also the liberal-dem ocratic W est
ern countries appeared in the East in an au th o ritarian form , p olitically
and econom ically. F or colonial ru le was in evitab ly au th oritarian , no
m atter how enlightened it m ight aspire to be and m ight vary from place
to place. N ot least im portant, the exam ple of Jap a n suggested to many
Asian nationalists that au th o ritarian measures m ight be essential to
create strength for underdeveloped countries in the m odern era.
M arxism , in its present Leninist-Stalinist form , also exerted a strong
au th o ritarian appeal fo r m any intellectuals in India, China, and else
where. Its analysis of im perialism and its unceasing attacks on the colo
n ial powers had, and continues to have, great influence on Asian p oliti
cal and intellectu al leaders. A M arxist or quasi-M arxist interpretation
of history came to be w idely accepted in A sia—sometimes in rather half-
baked form s even among anti-Communists. T h e fact that Soviet Russia
carried o u t an extensive p lanned developm ent beginning in the late

tw enties excited great interest, fo r A sian nationalists were seeking a fo r
m u la th a t could lead them to rap id econom ic advancem ent. By and large,
th eir desire to find a practical path to victory fo r th eir own p olitical
m ovem ents outw eighed th eir interest in theory as such. Yet w hen all
this has been said, it m ust be recognized th at non~Communist n a tio n a l
ism was the dom inant form of A sian p olitical activity th rou g h ou t the
p erio d from the Russian R evo lu tion to the end of W o rld W a r II. Even
today, after the spectacular victory of Com m unism in C hina, non-Com-
m unist n ationalist movem ents continue to lead a larger nu m b er o f Asians
than do the Communists. In the m idst o f the cu rren t unrest in Asia, it is
w ell to rem em ber that m illions of politically-conscious A sians have not
adopted extrem ist courses of action and appear convinced th at Com
m unist methods are not leq u ired to achieve the objectives they consider
indispensable.
N ationalism in Ceylon
Because o f its intrinsic interest and also because it serves to illu strate
some, though n ot all, of the tendencies w hich have characterized oth er
a r e ^ m T 7° mmUrniSt n a tl° naliSt movem ents- th e fo llo w in g excerpt from
a recent analysis of nationalism in Ceylon™ is w orth q u otin g here:
h a lesre'fK an d y^ n ^ an c^ L m v^ b 61^ C e>'lonC5e: th ere w ere B u rg h ers, Sin-

WCl'C tliew in ■> -C ountry), T am ils, Iiidians, M o o rs an d M alays. N o r
the Sinhtlpcp i°nS£ P *tical &ro u Ps: th ey w ere n o t ev en social u n its, fo r
vi , , ra, T am ils w ere collection s o f castcs, w h ile th e u n ity o f the
thpT nH v y,S u aS thG Unity o f Jsla m - In d e ed, th e B ritish began to u n ify
e d .in .iin enOUiS in habitan ts, though q u ite unconsciously, p a rtly th ro u g h E nglish
into F an ^T?rt ^ o u Sh the classification w hich d iv id e d the p o p u la tio n
came k dnp ^ “n atives ” T h e B u rg h ers an d th e "natives" be-
lones'e Tr k ourse’ u n d e r die stim u lu s o f the n a tio n a list m o vem en t, th e C ey-
invemed in the prese^^century.11. * ^ aS * ^

causes w 7 r e S m * 4' 18- p ro ,v ld ed a &re a t stim ulus tow ards n a tio n alism . P a rtly , the
throusrh slitrhtlv r T h v ^ educated Geylonese saw the w o rld m a in ly
o n ly lu ro D e a n Ian t S sP ectacleSj n o t o n ly because E nglish w as the
p u b lid r ^ r e t e d ^ f ' * * * bUt alS° beCaUSG th c ir in stru m e n ts o f
even 2 t h e S n l ? ^ n d ? n ' U n tl1 r e c e n t l y t h e l o c a * P « S 8 used E nglish, a n d
tran slatio n s o f th E nglish ^ P -p o se s

^ n e w sp a p e rs. C irc u la tio n s w e re in e v it a b ly s m a ll,
th ou gh th ey are increasin g ra p id ly w ith the spread o f ed u catio n . T h e space de-
/ p Sf Ivo r J e n n i" f - N ationalism and P o litical D evelop m en t in Ceylon. I n stitu te
of Pacific Relations, New York, 1950.
vo ted to in te rn a tio n a l new s h ad to be sm all because cables w ere exp en sive—

th ou gh ch eap cr fro m L o n d o n th an fro m o th e r cap itals—a n d separate rep resen
tatio n , excep t in L o n d o n , im possible. M an agers an d ed ito rs w ere eith er B ritish
o r C eylonese train ed o r ed ucated in E n glan d . M an y o f the fe a tu re articles have
been taken fro m E nglish new spapers an d perio dicals. In short, the English
new sp apers are E nglish in a d o u b le sense, an d in d eed are v e ry lik e p ro vin cial
new sp apers in E ngland.
T h e w artim e p ro p agan d a, unofficial as w e ll as official, w h ich asserted th at
B rita in was fighting fo r the freed o m o f sm all n ation s, the rig h t o f self-deter
m in atio n , the p re ve n tio n o f im p erialist aggression, an d so fo rth , becam e fo r the
n atio n alists p ro p ag an d a fo r the " freed om ” o f C eylon . E ve ry th in g said about
“b ra ve little B elg iu m ” could be ad ap ted to “b ra ve little C e y lo n ,” the essential
differen ce bein g th a t b ra ve little B elg iu m h ad been in v a d e d in 1 9 1 4 an d b rave
little C eylon in 1505. W h e n P resid en t W ilso n in clu d ed am o n g his F o u rteen
Points the rig h t o f every n a tio n to g o vern itself fre ely, he en u n ciated a d o ctrin e
w hich the educated C eylonese could h a rd ly fa il to a p p ly to them selves. . . .
C eylonese n ation alism was essentially a p ro d u c t o f W e ste rn ed u cation , and
its ideology w as n o t fu n d a m en ta lly d iffe re n t fro m th a t o f n in e tee n th -ce n tu ry
E urope. F req u en tly those w h o h ave passed b eyo n d this stage find it to be sin
g u la rly V ic to ria n . It lacked a G a rib a ld i, a P alm ersto n o r even a P a rn e ll. N or
w as th ere a G an d h i o r a N ehru. T h e T a m il b ro th ers, S ir P o n n am b alam A ru n a-
chalam a n d S ir P o n n am b alam R a m a n a th a n , w ere o n ly co m p a rative ly em inent,
fo r th ey w o u ld n o t have achieved em inence in the n e ig h b o u rin g sub contin ent,
an d th ey b ro k e aw ay fro m the Congress in 19 2 1. S ir Jam es P eiris an d S ir B aron
Ja y a tila k a w ere com petent, each in his ow n w ay; b u t n e ith e r h a d m uch p o p u
la r ap p eal. T h e C eylon N atio n al Congress, u n lik e th e In d ia n N a tio n a l Congress
u n d e r M ah atm a G andhi's in sp iratio n , n e ve r succeeded in a ro u sin g the e n th u
siasm o f the com m on p eo p le. Possibly the consequences w ere ben eficial, fo r C ey
lo n n a tio n alism n e ve r w en t to extrem es. It h ad in an y case some special charac
teristics. T h e y m ay perh ap s be classified as fo llo w s:
R acialism . F o r reasons alrea d y given, n ation alism w as sup erim posed u p o n ra
cialism . T h e Sinhalese an d the m in o rities liv e d in the sam e co u n try, w hich as
an islan d w as cle arly a geographical u n it an d was th e re fo re th o u g h t to be a
p o litic a l u n it. T h o u g h it has been alleg ed —fo r instan ce b e fo re th e S o u lb u ry
C om m ission—th a t the Sinhalese lead ers w ere aim in g a t “Sin halese d o m in a tio n ”
an d th ou gh th ere has been a g e n u in e attem p t by some o f the leaders, n o ta b ly
M r. Sen anayake, to ign ore racial divisions, the existence o f th e S in h a la M aha
Sabha, a com m un al o rgan isatio n headed by a C a b in e t M in ister, shows that
even am ong the Sinhalese, w h o can afford to be generou s since th ey possess a
m a jo rity , racial com m unalism plays an im p o rta n t p a rt, w h ile am o n g the m in o ri
ties politics have been th ou gh t o f p rim a rily in com m un al term s. N ationalism
w o u ld h a ve been stro n g er had it b een m o re n e a rly un an im o u s.
R eac tio n to C o lo u r P reju d ice. T h e fact th a t in the caste system the S in h a le se
an d the T am ils op erated the w orst type o f illo g ical an d unscien tific social dis
tin c tio n d id n o t p re v e n t them fro m o b jec tin g to th e m ild e r type practised by
m an y E uropeans. O n the co n trary, the assu m p tion th at m em bers o f the h ig h er
castes w ere su p erio r beings led them to react fiercely to the assum ption b y a n
o th e r caste w ith w h ite faces th a t those w ith b ro w n faces w e re in fe rio r. I t m ust,

h o w e v e r, b e re a lise d th a t th e caste an alo g y is n o t accu rate, fo r c o lo u r p re ju d ic e
w as n e v e r u n ifo rm . A t th e o n e e x tre m e w ere th e C h ristia n m issio n aries in
ch arg e o£ schools, w hose selfless d e v o tio n to th e cause o f C ey lo n ese e d u c a tio n
re c e iv e d u n iv e rs a l re c o g n itio n . A t the o th e r e x tre m e w e re m an y o f th e p la n te rs,
a n d s till m o re m an y p la n te rs’ w ives, w hose co n tem p tu o u s tre a tm e n t o f "th e n a
tiv e s aro u sed a cold fu ry ag ain st the c o u n try w hich p ro d u c e d th em . O n th e
w h o le , co lo u r p re ju d ic e w as m o re n o tice ab le in C e y lo n th an in E n g lan d . M a n y
ed u c a ted C eylon ese w ere ch ee rfu l e x tro v e rts w h o fitted w e ll in to E n g lish u n i
v e rs ity life an d could tre a t w ith co n tem p t th e occasion al in su lt, th o u g h th ere
w ere o th ers to w hom a single in su lt co u n ted m o re th an a h u n d re d frie n d sh ip s.
e com m on o p in io n , th ou gh , was th a t th e E nglish a t hom e w e re m o re lib e ra l
t i a n t i e E nglish ab road. P ossibly the difFerence w as m o re a p p a re n t th a n re a l,
o r m *n g lan d the C eylonese m o ved in a circle o f his o w n d e visin g , w h ereas
on oarc s l i p an d in C eylon he was p e rfo rc e in co n tact w ith E n g lish m en o f
c i e re n t types. T h e p u b lic sch oolb oy w h o becam e a p la n te r te n d e d to be less
!,n e, *®e n j 1 la n the p u b lic schoolboy w h o becam e an u n d e rg ra d u a te a n d his
public-school m a n n e r” w as m ore o b je c tio n a b le . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e sec-
a,^ S,C 100 w h o jo in e d a C o lo m b o b a n k o r co m m ercial firm , th ou gh
rpcrat-Z ^ ° Je<jtlo n a b le *n his m an n er, was even m o re in clin e d to social seg-
SimP y because he was n o t in terested in th e c o u n try o r its p e o p le an d
W h '1^ 5 13 VCry. odd *êas ab o u t w h a t so rt o f p e o p le th ey w ere.
r lrn rv e tr.eL S£ ^ e S utIOn ™aS due to c o lo u r p re ju d ic e , to the E n glish m an 's ten*
presence r! ° m h o m c- to th e c o n stra in t w hich m an y feel in the
u n til r e re m lv I^ fr e n t socm l, co n ven tio n s (p a rtic u la rly w h ere, as w as com m on
to th eir hi,.bn ,C. W° mCn eU her COuld n o t sPeak E ne Iish o r lc ft a U th e ta lk in g
was askrrl ^ i i ° r l ° an y o th c r re a son, th e re su lt w as the sam e. W h y , it
p reju d ice Vnr ° \ ^ .p e o p le b e lia v e lik e dei’ni-gods in o u r co u n try ? C o lo u r
C eylonese n rp-> ^ ev e r lt(iw as) thus created a com m on b o n d am o n g ed u cated
eifm ers” our n f Cfh ° n t0 *B ritish im p eria lism ” an d an a n x ie ty to get th e "for-
from p a te rm l ^ co u ntry. In e v ita b ly it m ad e d ifficult a g ra d u a l tra n sitio n
>rom p a tern a l g o vern m en t to self-governm en t.
th a t ex c av at'ons a t A n u ra d h a p u ra an d P o lo n n a ru w a show
hitrh le v e l n f r it t0j a ousand years ago the S in h alese h ad reach ed a v e ry
X e r n c lJ is to T ^ a tta in m e n t- N atio n alism , a n d esp ec ially
“ e S i n h f “ " ‘S ' k d t0 an exaSSe ra tio n o f th is a tta in m e n t. T h e
o b vio u sly c in ta ls ^ a * f is o b v io u slV ***** o n fact, b u t e q u a lly
Ion, it is said was t h F r m a n y fa b les- T h e se fab les h a ve b een ad d ed to. Cey-
m o d ern L o n d o n - the n ra ? ar7 the East: A n u r a d h a p u ra w as g re a te r th a n th e
m an y mHIions fone n n ? V ° " ° £ C ey l° n b e f° re th e E u ro p ean s ™ m e ra n in to
civil,-sed w h ^ (Z \ l t n T l * Z e “ 8 4 ” ^ 0 “ ): the S in h a le se w e re
S in halese civilisatio n by r b o ^ S “ * ^ W° ad - w h i d * “
U n o rtu n a te ly , ,f this was h isto ry it was n o t C eylon ese h isto ry b u t S in h a lese
history, t w as indeed the T am ils w h o tu rn e d the S in h a lese o J o f A n u ad h a
p u ra an d P o lo n n a ru w a . H istory thus su p p o rted n o t n a tio n a lism b u t co m m un al-
ism. In som e m easure this tendency was co u n tered , a p p a re n tly q u ite u n c o n
sciously, by q u ie tly ig n o rin g the th re e h u n d re d years w h ich sep arated the P olo n-
n a ru w a p e rio d an d the P ortugu ese p e rio d . In a n y case h isto ry has little to say
ab o u t th a t p e rio d ; a n d th ou gh it was n e v e r a c tu a lly alleg ed because it was
m an ifestly u n tru e , th ere w as a so rt o f tra d itio n th a t C e y lo n was a la n d o f cu l
tu re u n til the P ortugu ese a rriv e d . U n d o u b te d ly th e P ortu g u ese d id n o t im
p ro v e the Islan d c u ltu ra lly , fo r th ou gh th ey d e ve lo p ed a rts an d crafts an d left
b e h in d a m usical tra d itio n , th ey also d estro yed the tem p les w ith in th e ir ju ris
d ictio n . O n the o th e r h and, th ey d id n o t d estro y th e c u ltu re o f the K an d yan
kin gd om , w hich they n e ve r co n q u ered ; an d it can h a rd ly be a lleg ed th at K an d y
sustained a great c u ltu ra l tra d itio n .
L an gu ag e. M o d e rn cu ltu re was in tro d u ced to C e y lo n by th e P ortu g u ese and
the process co n tin u e d u n d e r the D utch an d the B ritish . E ach g ro u p used its
o w n lan g u age fo r this pu rpose, ancl in d eed P ortugu ese o b ta in e d such a w id e
cu rren cy th at it was used even by the B ritish in the e a rly years o f th e ir occupa
tio n . M an y P ortugu ese w ords, a few D u tch w ords, an d some E nglish w ord s have
been in c o rp o ra te d in to S in halese a n d T a m il, b u t th ey re la te m a in ly to the com
m on things o f d a ily life , fro m b read to m otor-buses, w h ich h a ve filte re d in
w ith the E uropeans. N eith er the S in h alese n o r the T a m il lan g u age has been
used in any su b stan tial m easu re to express m o d ern le a rn in g , n o r w o u ld eith er
b e cap ab le o f use fo r th is pu rpose w ith o u t a g re at d eal o f d e ve lo p m en t. T h e
language o f ed u cation b eyo n d the ele m e n tary stage is E nglish, a n d ev en fo r
ele m e n tary ed u catio n E nglish is m uch m o re u sefu l, n o t o n ly because a ll the
p a ra p h e rn a lia o f teach in g is re a d ily a v a ila b le in th a t lang uage, b u t also b e
cause it expresses m ore easily the things w h ich h a ve to be tau g h t—arithm etic,
gram m ar, histo ry, g eo grap h y an d the rest. H ig h er lea rn in g , in fact, su p p lies the
language fo r e le m e n ta ry teaching, an d th ere is little h ig h er le a rn in g in S in h a
lese o r T a m il ex cep t in m atters o f relig io n . F u rth er, the best teachers—an d o n e
m ight even say the o n ly good teachers—are those w h o use E nglish an d cannot,
excep t w ith g reat difficulty, teach in S in halese o r T a m il.
N atio n alism has necessarily sought to raise th e p restige o f w h a t are called,
significantly enough, the n a tio n a l languages. U n fo rtu n a te ly th ere is n o t one
n a tio n a l language b u t tw o such languages, S in halese a n d T a m il. T h e n a tio n a l
languages, in o th e r w ords, d o n o t u n ify th e n a tio n ; th ey d iv id e it. W h a t is
m ore, th ey d iv id e it by sep aratin g the p eo p le in to lan g u age gro u p s w hich are
also racial groups. T h e fact is o fte n glossed o v e r b y th e use o f the phrase
“ the m o th cr-to n gu e.” W h e n the Special C om m ittee o n E d u catio n was taking
evid en ce in 1 9 4 1 -4 2 , the first item in its q u estio n n a ire w as “A re y o u in fa vo u r
o f ed u cation th rou gh the m other-tongu c?” T h e an sw er was alm ost in v a ria b ly
in the affirm ative, an d it w as le ft to a E u ro p ea n to ask th e o b viou s second
q u estio n : “ W h a t is the m o th er tongue?” E v e n tu a lly the C om m ittee achieved
a d e fin itio n w hich show ed cle arly the racial im p lic atio n . T h e m other-tongue o f
a Sin halese is Sinhalese an d the m o th er-to n gu e o f a T a m il is T a m il. T h is p ro
duced the o dd resu lt th at a child a p p a re n tly o f S in halese an cestry w ho spoke
T a m il at hom e—an d th ere are m an y such cases in the areas fo rm erly d o m inated
by the T a m ils —had to be tau gh t th rou g h Sin halese. T h e C om m ittee could n o t
decide th a t the m other-tongue sh o u ld be the hom e language because the hom e
language o f m an y m em bers o f the m id d le class w as E nglish an d the n ation alists
w a n te d to fo rce p a re n ts to sp eak S in h a le se o r T a m il to th e ir c h ild re n . T h e ru le

th a t a T a m il-s p e a k in g S in h a lese m u st be ta u g h t th ro u g h S in h a le se has n o w
b e en m o d ified , b u t it is still tru e th a t an E nglish-sp eaking S in h a le se m u st be
ta u g h t th ro u g h S in h alese o r T a m il ev en if he k n o w s o n ly E nglish.
N e v e rth eless, th e n a tio n a lists are fig h tin g w h a t m ay p ro v e to be a lo sin g b a t
tle . T h e C h ristia n m issio n aries d id n o t in an y w ay d isco u rag e th e use o f S in
h a le se a n d T a m il; o n th e c o n tra ry, th ey le a rn e d o n e o f those lan g u ag es an d
p ro d u c e d the necessary books. T h e y p ro v id e d E nglish e d u c a tio n fo r those w h o
w a n te d it—at first th e B u rg h ers—a n d fo u n d the d e m an d fo r E nglish fro m the
S in h a lese a n d th e T a m ils to be c o n stan tly risin g because o f its eco n o m ic v a lu e .
N o r co u ld the n a tio n a lists urge the c o n tra ry in th e e a rly years o f th e ir m o v e
m en t, fo r E nglish w as th e m ean s b y w h ich th e C eylo n ese c o u ld re p la c e the
E u ro p ea n ad m in istrato rs an d urge th e ir claim s in the le g isla tu re . W h e n in
1 9 1 1 an E nglish e x p e rt m ade the o b vio u s suggestion th a t p rim a ry ed u c a tio n
o u g h t to be in S in halese o r T a m il, his ad vice was scou ted as an im p e ria lis t d e
vice to p re v e n t th e p o litic a l ad van cem en t o f th e C eylon ese. T h e a ttitu d e h ad
changed th irty years la te r because u n d e r the D o n o u g h m o re C o n s titu tio n the
C eylon ese h a d co n tro l. T h e y co u ld th en blam e th e B ritish fo r h a v in g in tr o
du ced a n d p o p u larised E nglish ed u catio n , w h ich h a d “d e n a tio n a lise d " the
C eylonese.
T h e official p o licy is n o w to d e ve lo p b ilin g u alism b y m ak in g S in h a le se o r
T a m il the first language a n d E nglish the second lan g u ag e. So fa r th e re s u lt has
b een to give every b o d y an ele m e n tary k n o w led g e o f S in h a lese o r T a m il an d
en o rm o u sly to increase the dem and fo r E nglish. W h ile th e p o litic ia n s as a b od y
d em an d m o re an d m ore Sinhalese an d T a m il, as in d iv id u a ls th ey d em an d m o re
an d m ore E nglish schools in th e ir constituencies. M e a n w h ile lit tle e ffo rt has
been d evo ted to the task o f p ro d u cin g lite ra tu re in S in h a lese a n d T a m il. A
b ilin g u al schoolboy reads S in halese o r T a m il textb o o ks a t school, b u t a t h o m e
he reads E nglish ch ild ren ’s books fo r am u sem en t; an d th o u g h S in h a le se o r
T a m il is the language o f the m iddle-class n u rsery, E nglish is th e la n g u a g e o f
the veran d ah , a m uch m o re im p o rta n t p lace. Sin ce a k n o w le d g e o f E n g lish is
spreading dow nw ards th ro u g h the social classes, i t is ea sier to im ag in e the
triu m p h o f E nglish th an th a t o f the “n a tio n a l languages."
R elig io n . C h ristian ity an d Islam are w h at C ey lo n calls “p ro selytizin g " r e li
gions: they seek, th at is, to m ake con verts. Sin ce its g re a t ex ten sio n a fte r the
b irth o f the P rop het, Islam has been re la tiv e ly stab le: it has re ta in e d th e a lle
giance o f the fa ith fu l, b u t it has n o t m ad e m an y co n verts. O n th e o th e r h a n d ,
e v ery m in ister o f the C h ristian relig io n is a m issio n ary w h o takes se rio u sly the
B ib lic al ad m o n itio n to carry C h ristia n ity to a ll peo p les. H in d u ism is n o t m e re ly
a re lig io n b u t a w ay o f life ; an d th is im plies, if th e ta u to lo g y m ay be fo rg iv e n ,
th a t H in d u ism is a re lig io n fo r H in dus. B ud dh ism is fu n d a m e n ta lly a p h ilo s o
p h y w hose professors are exp ected to achieve e n lig h te n m e n t by m e d ita tio n .
It fo llo w e d in e v ita b ly th a t in C ey lo n C h ristia n ity w as th e aggressive re lig io n .
T h e P ortugu ese, in C ey lo n as elsew here, sought to fo rce C h ris tia n ity o n the
p eo p le, a n d the R o m a n C ath o lics are the largest g ro u p in spite o f th e D u tc h
atte m p t to suppress them . T h e D utch, too, allo w ed n o to le ra tio n o f o th e r r e li
gions th an th e ir o w n b ra n d o f P ro testan t C h ristia n ity . In fact, th ou gh , th e g re a t
NEW TRENDS IN ASIAN NATIONALISM S3
mass o f th e p e o p le h a ve re m a in e d B ud dh ists, H in d u s a n d M uslim s. B ritish to l

e ra tio n w as a c tu a lly m o re effective, fo r it a llo w e d the m issionaries o f a ll sects
to p ro p a g ate th e ir fa ith and, u n til rec e n tly , th ey fo u n d n o o p p o sitio n . E ven now ,
w ith E nglish ed u catio n w id ely spread, fo rty p e r cent o f th e U n iv e rsity students
are C h ristian s. T h e re was a tim e w h en an A n g lic a n b ish o p co u ld pro p h esy th at
th e p e o p le o f C eylon w o u ld becom e e n tire ly C h ristian .
T h is has n o t h a p p e n e d because the n a tio n a list m o ve m e n t harnessed relig io n
to th e ir ch ariot. H in d u ism a n d B ud dh ism becam e aggressive, n o t through
the priests b u t tliro u g h the p o litician s. T o d a y th e C h ristia n p o litic ia n suffers
fro m a serious h a n d icap , fo r p o litic a lly he rep resen ts a m in o rity . A m o n g die
Sin halese, indeed, con versio n to B ud dh ism is som etim es a sign o f an aw ak en
in g in te rest in p o litic a l questions. T h e d iv isio n am o n g the H in d u s an d the
B ud dh ists has n o t, h o w ever, caused an y co m m u n al ten sio n , fo r th ey are b o th
to le ra n t relig io n s, an d the n a tio n a list is in to le ra n t, if at a ll, o n ly in re la tio n to
C h ristia n ity , w hich is an im p o rta tio n fro m the W e s t a n d th e re fo re o b jec tio n ab le .
Some Characteristics of Burm ese N ationalism

T h e exam ple of B urm a provides some illu m in atin g and distinctive
aspects o f m odern A sian nationalism . M uch m ore than C eylon, Burm a
has been pro fou n d ly influenced in its n atio n alist evo lu tio n b y the B ud
dhist faith. T h e earliest m anifestations of m odern Burm ese nationalism
w ere first reflected in the activities o f B urm a’s B uddhist monks (pongyis).
Inspired, as were some other A sian countries, b y Ja p a n ’s victo ry over
Russia in 1905, num erous Y oung M en’s Buddhist Associations (YM BA)
w ere founded in the succeeding years. O rig in ally concerned w ith prom ot
ing a re viva l of interest in B urm a’s cu ltu ral and religious past, these as
sociations soon engaged in political activities and became a leading po
litical force in the country. T h e y w ere transform ed a fter the first w orld
w ar in to the G eneral C ouncil of Buddhist Associations (G CBA), or W un-
thanu, w hich was som ewhat m odelled on the In d ian N ation al Congress
and which, organizing its p olitical activities arou n d a m inim um program
of hom e rule, boycotted elections and refused to p articip ate in the B rit
ish-sponsored governments. T h e earliest secular n atio n alist p olitical p ar
ties developed out of the G C B A, and close ties between Buddhism and
nationalist political movem ents continued into the 19 3 0 ’s.
T h e existence of the vern acu lar m onastic schools throughout Burma
w ere a key elem ent in the strength o f Buddhist influence. Each village had
such a school w hich Buddhist trad itio n req u ired every boy to attend fo r
some period at least, and w hich were responsible fo r the high degree of
m ale literacy in Burm a. T hou gh accepted fo r basic education on the p ri
m ary school level, the large m ajo rity o f these schools were not incorpo
rated in to the governm ent-regulated system o f education, received no gov

ern m en t financial assistance, and tended to be overshadow ed by the lay
and m issionary-sponsored schools developed u n d er the B ritish. In 1939—
40, there w ere estim ated to be some 18,000 o f these “unrecognized" m o
nastic schools in Burm a, w ith an attendance o f 200,000 pupils. Y et the
very fact th at the Buddhist schools were being pushed in to the back
g round tended to set the priesthood against the B ritish. As F u rn iv a ll notes
(in a lecture given in 1952), the British system o f education “p rovid ed lay
schools w hich enabled boys to pass through the standards and q u a lify
fo r a jo b more rapidly. Education was debased from a social to an econom ic
asset. U nder this economic stim ulus the w ealthier and ab ler boys deserted
the monastic schools, and the monastic schools deteriorated. T h is d eprived
the monastic order o f one of its chief social functions. R eligion was thrust
back into the m iddle ages and became a stronghold o f reaction ary na
tional sentiment. T he members o f the ord er had good reason to resent
the decline of their form er inHuence, and m any became active opponents
of the Governm ent. Thus religion was distorted to serve the cause of
nationalism , and one of the chief troubles du rin g the later years was the
disorderly conduct of the monastic order.”
Aggressive, polnically-active pongyis thus played a key ro le in p rew ar
Burmese nationalist politics. Local leaders o f the W u n th an u (GCBA),
RiirmaamP T ' 6 aCt-IVe in the "Saya San” reb ellion of 19 3 0 -3 1 in low er
T T a UPnSmg Whidl) th° Ugh oste* sibIy directed p rin c ip ally at
r 1f n ettyar money"lenders, became a serious m ovem ent w ork
ing for the overthrow of British rule. M ost o f the leading p rew ar parties
fh ™ , .Clans had close ass°ciations w ith monks. Even the leaders o f
a ln Pa rty» a predom inantly M arxist-oriented organization of
young Burmese intellectuals founded in the m id-1930’s, accepted B ud
dhism as a m ajor component of Burmese culture, though they were free
10 m e irect inHuence of the priesthood itself. T h e T h a k in party,
w i a political program of immediate and complete freedom fo r Burm a,
and a radical economic reform program, was the precursor o f the A nti-
Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL), which" won Burmese inde
pen c , as w ell as of the Communist and Socialist parties. In the
postwar period, Buddhism has continued to be a m ajo r force in Burmese
life. T h e date set for Burmese independence (Jan u ary 4, 1948) is re
ported to have been recommended by astrologers. Prem ier U Nu ffo r
m erly known as T hakin Nu), a Socialist who succeeded A u n g San as
leader of the AFPFL, is a devout Buddhist, and a Buddhist re viva l is ap
p aren tly being encouraged, p a rtia lly as an ad d itio n al w eapon against the
influence of the Communists.
T h e character of Burm ese nationalism has been m uch influenced by
the fact th at about fo u r m illio n of the over seventeen m illio n population
of B urm a consist of m inorities such as the Kachins, the Chins, and the
Karens. T hou gh most of these m inorities live in h illy fro n tie r regions
surrounding the central plains of the country, a great num b er of the K a
rens have m oved into the latter area. T h ey have tended, how ever, to
m aintain their separate identity, and C hristian m issionaries have had a
strong influence among them. W h en most o f the Burm ese refused to
participate in the form er governm ent, the B ritish enlisted K aren, as
w ell as Indian and Chinese, support. T h e Karens also were an im p ortan t
source of m anpow er fo r the B ritish-controlled m ilita ry establishm ent.
T h e long-standing anim osity between the Karens and the Burmese
flared up during the Japanese campaign of conquest in Burm a, during
w hich some Burmese forces are reported to have killed and looted among
the Karens. T h e legacy of hostility continued in to the postw ar period
w hen m any Karens were considered to be less anxious than the Burmese
fo r independence. T hough prom ised an im p o rtan t degree o f autonom y
w ith in the Burm a U nion, the m ore m ilitan t o f the K arens took up arms
against the new governm ent, and later set up th eir ow n state, “Kaw thu-
lay,” at Toungoo. T h ou gh they have now ap p aren tly been brought
larg ely un der control, some fta re n groups are still in action against gov
ernm ent forces.
E qually im portant has been the influ en tial position o f B u rm a’s alien
m inorities. In the prew ar period, over a m illion Indians and 200,000
Chinese resided in the country. W h ile the B ritish held the top rungs of
the economic ladder, Indians played a leading role in business and agri
culture, the M adras C hettyar banking caste hold in g a dom inant position
in agricu ltural finance. Indian laborers, w illin g to w ork at cheaper wages
than Burm ans, were also becoming predom inant in the R angoon labor
m arket just before the war, when Indians constituted some 45 percent of
the city’s population. T h e Chinese had a position o f some influence in
m ercantile and m ining activities b u t w ere less im p ortan t economically
than the Indians, and n ot n early as m uch disliked by the Burmans. A nti-
Indian resentm ent in the p rew ar period was a vita l elem ent in the de
velopm ent of Burmese nationalism . As already indicated, the “Saya
San” rebellion had a definite anti-Indian character and was in tu rn fo l
low ed by the serious anti-Indian riots of 1938. T h e British were often
blam ed by B u rm a’s nation alist leaders fo r allow ing unrestricted Indian

im m igration, and economic exp loitatio n by Indians. D rastic restriction of
In d ian im m igration was always an im portant p a rt o f the Burm ese na
tionalists’ p olitical program .
Some 400,000 Indians, including most of the Chettyars, fled B urm a
at the time of the Japanese invasion, b u t in the postw ar years relatively
few have returned. T h e new Burmese governm ent has indicated its de
term ination to prevent any large revival o f Indian im m igration, and to
place severe lim itations on Indian economic activities w ith in Burm a.
Strong action along these lines, however, seems to have been h eld in
abeyance, p artly because of protests from India. H owever, large nu m
bers of Indian civil servants in Burm a have been dismissed and the In
dian grip on the Burmese economy has been greatly weakened. O ther
outstanding unsettled questions are the problem of com pensation to the
Chettyars,^ whose lands in Burm a were taken over, and the adjustm ent
o f Burm a s national debt owed to India from pre-independence days.
It should be emphasized, however, that despite the existence o f such
potential sources of hostility between the two countries and the strong
OS|U l° n th e I n d ia n g ° v e r n m e n t to s u p p o r t its n a t i o n a ls a b r o a d ,
o ffic ia l r e la t io n s b e tw e e n th e tw o g o v e r n m e n ts h a v e th u s f a r r e m a in e d
g e n e r a lly c o r d ia l.
3 m - T !! OX1CaUy' thOUgh Burmese nationalism has had an im p ortan t

anti-Indian content, it has at the same time leaned on In d ia to advance
• ° b-iectlves- Burm a was attached to India afte
Hnn t R e ’ and the burm ans consistently dem anded applica-
nowprf 1 T T n£W concessions won from the British by the more
"a tl° naKst movement. T h ey thus dem anded th at they
Governm ent !!f 6 pof ' W orId W a r 1 reform program fo r India (the
was extended'to Burma “ i t n ’ 9 ^ °£ dem ands*
^ranted in in™. ■ t I921)j and in the succeeding two decades were
t a d consdtmin r S 7 aUt° noraous adm inistration, p arallelin g the lim-
Burm a from TrH ^ ° n In d ia' W h en a - P o t i o n of
B irm a from India was recommended by the Simon Commission in 1930
(and implem ented in the Governm ent of Burm a A ct o f 935) eadine
B u r m a n n a t io n a lis t le a d e rs n n n n c ^ u v o o ), le a d in g
leaders opposed such a separation, even though it
provided fo r a larger degree of self-government than before, fo r fear that
British promises to India of eventual fu ll self-government w ould not
now be applied to Burma. (The separation proposal was actually re
jected by the Burm a electorate in 1932, but it nevertheless w ent in to ef-
feet in 1937, u n d er the terms of the G overnm ent of B urm a A ct of 1935.)

A lso, as already noted, the organization o f the W u n th an u (GCBA) was
inspired to an im portant extent by the exam ple o f the Indian N ational
Congress.
In the postw ar period as w ell, it was the success of In d ian nationalism
in achieving the rem oval o f B ritish pow er th at essentially determ ined
the B ritish decision to leave Burm a. U K yaw M yint, head o f the Burmese
delegation to the A sian R elations Conference in 1947, thus told the In
dians, “You are now about to be free. W e have always had the good luck
to be able to follow you r exam ple w ith very little effort. Because you
are about to be free, we are ab ou t to be free. H owever," he added, “we
have also contributed ou r little m ite.”
T o a rem arkable degree p rew ar B urm a lacked an indigenous business
class. In F u rn iv a ll’s words, “A ll th at stood fo r the m odern w orld in
B urm a, commerce, industry, com m unication and the m odern professions
o f m edicine and engineering, were in foreign hands.” T h e m odern edu
cated Burm ans w ere alm ost all lawyers, journalists, clerks or governm ent
employees, m any of w hom gravitated n a tu ra lly towards politics. These
developm ents m ade fo r two kinds o f n ationalist politics. O ne was an
o p p ortu nist type, w ith no real popular'base, characteristic o f most post-
1937 parties and governm ents in Burm a. T h e oth er type, represented
orig in ally by the T hakins, adopted a very rad ical program and devel
oped links w ith peasant ancM abor groups. T h is situation was also a con
trib u tin g factor to the “rad ical” character o f a ll Burmese nationalism ,
p a rtic u larly of the M arxist-influenced T h a k in group. T his characteristic
was evident in the postw ar period, too, w hen a ll b u t the discredited
“rig htist” politicians o f p rew ar days talked in M arxist terms. T h e new
governm ent itself im m ediately announced socialist economic plans, in
cluding the proposed nationalization of foreign enterprise, and even
talked, in a T w o-Year P lan adopted in 1948, o f investigating the possi
b ility o f the eventual collectivization o f agriculture.
A deep-rooted trad ition of violence has long been apparent in the ru ral
life and the nationalist movem ents o f Burm a. It was aggravated by the
breakdow n of social and economic stab ility in the countryside, prim arily
due to the rap id com m ercialization o f agriculture under British rule,
w ith the creation of a landless, transient agricu ltu ral laborer class, and
general ru ra l dissatisfaction. T h is problem was trem endously accentu
ated by the economic depression o f the 1930’s w hich brought a catas
trophic fa ll in rice prices. By 1936 the C hettyar money-lenders alone
ow ned o u trig h t ap p roxim ately one q u a rte r o f the ten m illio n acres of
L o w er B urm a paddy land and held mortgages on perhajDs a m illion and
a h a lf m ore. By 1939, fifty-nine percent o f the agricu ltu ral land in L ow er
B urm a and thirty-tw o percent in U p p er Burm a was leased, and forty
to seventy percent o f the tenants were reported to be changing holdings
after less than three years of occupancy. T h e grow ing distress of this lan d
less, debt-ridden ru ra l population became a m ajor factor in the rem ark
able grow th of b an d itry in ru ra l Burm a.
M any Buddhist monks took an active role in the ru ra l areas in gaining
peasant support fo r their own nationalist aims; and the T h ak in party,
in the late 1930 s, organized num erous peasant unions and created a
strong ru ra l com ponent o f their political activities. T h e w artim e A F P F L
and its N ational A rm y were largely recruited in the countryside, as was
A ung San’s postwar p aram ilitary organization, the People's V o lu n teer
Organization (PVO). T h e presence of ample Japanese and A llie d arms
m urm a as a legacy of the w ar also contributed to the continued post
w ar violence m the countryside, some of it p olitically controlled and
irected, but much of it simple dacoity (armed gang robbery). T h e v a ri
ous jssi ent movements today are based to a large extent on this ru ra l
instability, which is likely to rem ain a threat to nation al u n ity u n til the
economic Problems of the countryside have been
the p v * t ° Uf B u r m a ' s ^dependence was "peacefully” negotiated,
is ence of armed forces and groups, all opposed to B ritish ru le
operating largely from a countryside com pletely out of control, was
cisive actor m the victory of B urm a’s nationalist movem ent. T his
X ]Qd7 Vr ’ I611™ Was reflected in the « m a r k o f a Burmese delegate at
! n ! rt , T " Relatxons Conference: “I have the deepest possible re-
av L T .1 a pm iratl0n f0 r M ahatm a Gandhi. A t the same time I have to
say that the Burmese are a nation of fighters.”
Chinese Nationalism
tionôf6^ * °* W ° rId ' Var 11 was an°th e r great watershed in the evolu-
tarist n a d o n ? rnatl0n Sm' Surrender in A u S “ t 1945 saw Jap an ’s m ili
tarist nationalism prostrate, at least fo r the time being; K uom intang non-
Communist nationalism ossified and gravely weakened; Chinese Com m u
nism m aking a pow erful bid for the leadership of Chinese nationalism ;
non-Communist nationalism apparently on the road to victory in South
east Asia as a whole; Communism taking the leading role in Vietnamese
nationalism ; Indian non-Communist nationalism close (w ithout fu lly
realizing it) to the achievem ent o f p o litica l freedom ; and the p a rtly re
ligious nationalism of In d ia’s Moslems eq u ally close to the establishm ent
o f the new nation al home, Pakistan. Since then India, Pakistan, Indo
nesia, Burm a, and the Philippines have achieved independence: Ceylon
has become a D om inion in the Com m onw ealth; the Com m unist-led Viet-
m inh m ovem ent and the forces o f France and o f the non-Com m unist
“Associated States” of Indochina have been at -war; the K uom intang has
been overthrow n on the Chinese m ainland and Chinese Com m unism has
come to pow er; Jap an after six years o f m ilitary occupation has begun
to rediscover a new and less chauvinist form of nationalism ; and tragi
cally-divided K orea has been the victim o f civil and in tern atio n al war.
Everywhere nation al independence has become a prelu d e to a m ore
active consideration o f fundam ental problem s o f econom ic life. W ith o u t
underestim ating the in tern ation al factors w hich p o w erfu lly affect the
situation, one must recognize th at in Asia today b oth non-Com m unist
nationalism and Communism are likely to stand or fa ll to the extent
that they solve, or fail to solve, the vast economic and social issues con
fron tin g the Asian peoples.
T w o m ain approaches to these issues are, in effect, com peting w ith
each other: the non-Com m unist Indian approach and the Chinese Com
m unist approach, em bracing roughly 350 m illion and 480 m illion people
respectively. A lth ou g h Jap an ’s resurgence as a vigorous and distinctive
nationalist force can by no means be ru led out, it is Peking and New
D elhi w hich are today the focal points o f A sian thinking about Asian
problems. H ow C hina and India evolve (w ithin th eir own borders, in
rela tio n to each other, and in relation to other A sian countries) w ill con
stitute a m ajor p art o f the story of the com ing decades in the East.
It m ay therefore be useful to exam ine a few salient points in the devel
opm ent of Chinese and Indian nationalism from th eir beginnings to
the present.
Im perial China, w hen the W est knocked at its d oo r in the m iddle of
the nineteenth century, was a non-national society. In d aily life the
fam ily came before all else, and the p revailin g C onfucian philosophy
gave the Em peror the status of a father. T h e country contained a num
ber of sm aller nationalities (Manchus, Mongols, T urkis, Uighurs, Lo-
los, Tibetans, etc.), w ith the Chinese form ing the overw helm ing m ajo r
ity of the people. B ut the im perial fam ily came from the M anchu m i
nority. A lth oug h fa irly w ell assimilated by the nineteenth century, the
40 ASrAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
M anchus, as a tin y m in o rity w ith a h ig h ly p rivileged position, clearly

could n o t become the leaders o f a nation alistic C hina.
T h e co u n try was decentralized, and even a t the en d o f the M anchu
d ynasty (1912 ) was largely w ith o u t m odern tran sp o rta tio n an d com m uni
cation. T h e re was a w idespread sm all m erchant class b u t no n a tio n al
m arket. T h e m ain functions o f the im p erial g overn m en t w ere to collect
the g rain tax, re p air irrig atio n works, p u t dow n reb ellio n , and conduct
foreign relations. T h e m onarchy was absolute, but its in te rv e n tio n in
local life was necessarily lim ited by the vastness o f the co u n try and the
n a tu re of its economy. P rovincialism and localism reigned suprem e, and
society was regulated m ainly by the fam ily and villag e elders, the gentry
being the key p olitical force. M odern in d u stry d id n ot exist u n til the
late nineteenth century; handicrafts w ere chiefly carried on by peasants
and artisans in or near th eir homes.
T h e Confucian philosophy was cosm opolitan, n ot n atio n alistic, in its
w or out oo . B ut at the same time there was a strong b e lie f—a t least
among t e sc o ar-officials—in the su p eriority o f Chinese cu ltu re to th at
of outside barbarians,” and a conviction th at C hina was in every w ay
the center of the w orld. M oreover, even in the heyday o f the M anchus,
anti anc u sentim ent favorin g the establishm ent of a Chinese dynasty
never entirely disappeared. W h e th e r o r n ot these attitudes constituted
L a ^ 2 n a U 0 "f th e y u n d o u b £ e d ly aided the g row th o f na-
A fte h O ^ end ° f the nineteenth century.
with mo lern P,Um ■ r ar ° f ’ 84°' CWna foUnd that could deal
The a Z rn ?• thr°''Sh ks traditional forms of adaptation.
o / th e 'W e s te r ° ffiCialS 'c° yal t0 the Manchus wished to adopt the tools
- a maintaining Con-
Manchu monarchy, carrying out , dlanSe des,red a constitutional
were non-nationJ,tic r ^ T ' V"
gam zation was founded in 1894 bv s v fo rm al n atio n alist or-
tellectual from the Canton area Tr Yat_sen' a W estern-educated in-
cessor organization was established5i^ lO O *11 ^ * m? d ^rRte one.' Ac suc*
w hich its membership oath sum mer i T * re vo lu tlo n a ry P ^ tfo rm ,
u T -11 A summarized m these words: “I swear u n d er
H eaven that I w ill do my utmost r., i r , , U11UC1
u j . ; uimost to w ork fo r the overth ro w o f the M an-
chu dynasty, the estabhshm ent of the R epublic and the solution o f the
agranan questton on the basis of the equitable redistribution of the
lan d .” Even before this, Sun Yat-sen h a d form u lated his doctrine o f the
San M in Chu I (the T h ree Principles o f the People), w hich may be des
cribed roughly as N ationalism, Democracy, and the People’s Livelihood.
T o Dr. Sun these were the three essential objectives o f the nationalist
revolution.
I l is w orth rem em bering th at Sun Yat-sen’s n ationalism a t this time
was already revolu tion ary; its m ain emphasis was on opposition to the
M anchus ra th er than the foreign powers; its d octrin al source was p ri
m arily W estern lib era l dem ocracy though it had some socialist character
istics. T his nationalism was in some ways a form of Chinese “ra cia l” feel
ing against alien A sian rulers. T h e aim was to create a strong China
im m une to aggression, but the program was n ot “an ti-im perialist” in the
later sense o f that term. Sun m odeled his three principles on L in coln ’s
phrase, “governm ent of, by, and for, the people,” b u t he was also fam iliar
w ith M arxist ideas, as w ell as w ith radical non-M arxist thought (such as
th at of H enry George).
T h e spearheads of revolu tion ary activity w ere the Chinese students,
the various anti-M anchu secret societies, and the Overseas Chinese. Sun
Yat-sen's movem ent, however, was quite weak and was on ly one of the
forces of discontent. T h e R evo lu tion of 19 11—12, w hich ended the dy
nasty, was a clear instance of a regime fallin g m ore through its own de
cay than through the positive strength of its opponents. Once the form al
p olitical system of the old C hina had collapsed, the trad itio n al society
w ith in gave Chinese nationalists little to b u ild on. B efore an effective
new structure could be erected, the foundations of Chinese life w ould
have to undergo m a jo r changes. C hina could n ot repeat the history of
Japanese nationalism by replacing the old regim e w ith a m odern na
tion al state through changes imposed from above.
Chinese social and p olitical conditions were such as to produce in
creasingly sharp criticism of Chinese society. If a strong n ational govern
m ent had been created quickly, self-criticism m ight have been inhibited
o r m ade unnecessary. O n the oth er hand, if C hina had sim ply become a
colony, the nationalists m ight w ell have glorified h er past in an effort
to prom ote self-confidence and to m obilize sentim ent against the govern
ing power. B ut the existence of a weak M anchu governm ent and later
of weak Chinese governments, basing themselves m ainly on Chinese tra
ditions, could only make the Chinese nationalists uncom fortably aware
of the inadequacy of those traditions in the m odern world.
C hina’s developm ent after 1912 encouraged h er own intellectuals to
criticize tra d itio n a l Chinese society. T h e revo lu tio n aries saw the re p u b
lic o f w h ich they h ad dream ed taken from them b y an im p e ria l gen eral
(Y uan Shih-kai) and converted in to a facade fo r the old ineffectiveness
an d co rru p tion . P arliam en tary governm ent p ro ved a fa ilu re from the
beginning, and a fte r a few years the co u n try was sp lit in to fragm ents,
iu le d by p ro vin cia l w arlords, a ll ostensibly in ten t on '‘n a tio n a l” lead er
ship. T h e effect of the first victory o f Chinese n atio n alism was to dis
cred it constitu tion al procedures and to accentuate d ecen tralization. M ili
tary pow er was revealed as an essential key to p o litica l p o w er in C hina.
I t also became clear th at the m ere attain m en t o f p o litic a l p o w er was not
enough and th at nation alist purposes and m ethods had to be m ore
carefu lly defined and propagated.
D urin g W o rld W a r I the economic influences m aking fo r n atio n alism
w eie strengthened by the progress (h altin g b u t appreciable) o f Chinese
industry. T h e m iddle class grew, and a sm all m od ern w ork in g class
emerged. In the intellectual w orld, especially in Peking, there was an
increasing ferm ent o f opinion against Confucianism , in clu d in g the old
fam ily system, the trad ition al m orality, and m any oth er aspects o f the
ancient society. A crucial step in n atio n alist developm ent was taken w ith
liT erarvT ^ r® ^ * ™°vemeIU’ u ltim ately effective, to replace the dead
t c r a r y language w ith pat hua, the speech of the people T h e a ttitu d e
bu the m teIlectuak ^ time was m oderate and n o t in“

and TannWere nat.10” allsts nevertheless. If they at first adm ired the W est
strength b T u , t hat beCaUSe they thought C h in a could gain
ene f nf f l Wmg 1656 11 th^ Struck ^ c i l e s s l y at the old
tenets of Chinese m orahty, it was because they fe lt a new code was
needed fo r survival. T h eir hopes and thoughts began and ended w ith
moUv e m l ! t n m UlUS ° £ in tem a l ^ in tern a ti° ™ l forces, this cu ltu ra l

movem ent became ever more politically-m inded. News o f the 19 17 R evo-
l h ^ , ; ^ “ t ^
movement against the pro T a p a n i P “ ^
r pr
T ^ ^^
ion in C h i n a - N a tio n a iis m a n d
Fourth
of the Versailles Treaty that assk n eclr"15 g° Vf rnment and the clauses
tung province to Tanan aSS1Sned G er™ n y s special rights in Sh an
tung piovince to Japan. T he m ovem ent spread from Peking to oth er
c itie s , f r o m th e s tu d e n ts to o t h e r e rm in e « u ,
, r , groups such as m erchants and workers,
and from unrest over a sinele issu e tn *• , ’
Chinese life. agnation em bracing the w hole o f
D uring W o rld W a r I Sun Yat-spn W ? . • r *
5 s e n « a d b e e n t r y i n g f u t i l e l y to s t r e n g t h e n
his forces—p a rtly through his w ork w h ile in exile, p a rtly through p o liti
cal activity in the C anton area. T h e leading w artim e nation alist develop
m ent—the intellectu al “renaissance”—had been led b y men who looked
d o u b tfu lly at the K uom intang’s qualifications fo r n atio n al leadership
and regarded it, at best, as on ly one among several parties to be included
in a new national governm ent. N or w ere Sun Yat-sen and the Kuom in-
tang the force behind the student m ovem ent o f 1919, although they
joined w ith it after it broke out. One observer notes that dow n to 1919
the K uom intang “could scarcely be considered to be a n atio n al party;
it was in the m ain a Cantonese party, or, at all events, a southern party,
and was composed largely o f students educated abroad.”11
In the early twenties the K uom intang and oth er re vo lu tio n a ry p o liti
cal elements began to draw closer together. In 1921 a Chinese Com m unist
party was founded, largely by intellectuals who had introduced M arxism
in to China at the tim e o f the M ay F ourth m ovem ent. Soviet Russia made
increasing efforts to achieve an alliance w ith Chinese nationalism and
was aided tow ard its goal by the h ostility o r indifference o f the other
powers at that tim e to the K uom intang. Some p olitically conscious C hi
nese favored rejecting Moscow’s overtures, others were enthusiastic for
acceptance; b u t the dom inant group consisted o f those who, despite res
ervations, regarded Soviet Russia as a useful a lly in achieving Chinese
objectives. B efore m aking a final decision about the K uom intang’s in ter
national orientation, Sun appealed to other powers fo r help, b u t w ith
ou t success. A t the end o f 1923 he declared: “W e no longer look to the
W estern Powers. O u r faces are turned tow ard Russia.”
Form al cooperation between the K uom intang and the Chinese Com
munists was realized in Jan u ary 1924. T h e K uom intang was reorganized
stru ctu rally along the lines o f the R ussian Com m unist party, and a p ro
gram attacking foreign im perialism and Chinese w arlordism was adopted.
A vigorous appeal was directed to the m ain discontented groups in C hi
nese society, the peasantry, the city workers, and the intellectuals. T he
K uom intang enforced stricter p arty discipline, developed a party army,
and overhauled its party propaganda. In short, u n d er Soviet inspiration,
the K uom intang was reform ed, adopting a program that joined, fa r more
than before, the nationalist doctrine o f anti-im perialism w ith the social
and economic doctrine of agrarian and lab o r reform s. T his pow erful
com bination o f ideas was strengthened by a restatem ent o f Kuom intang
11. H arley F. MacNair, China in Revolution, Chicago, 1931, p. 67.
ideology in a series o f lectures b y Sun Yat-sen, published as the Sa?i

M in C hu I.
D u rin g the united fro n t o f 19 24-27, the K u o m in tan g became fo r the
first tim e a genuine mass m ovem ent. T h e Com m unists w ere fa r w eaker
n u m erically than the non-Com m unist nationalists, b u t gained substan
tia lly in influence, becom ing the spearhead (along w ith the left w in g of
the Kuom intang) in the organization o f urban w orkers and the peasantry.
T h e left w ing was also highly influ en tial in the Chinese in tellectu al
w orld . T h e Chinese Com m unist p arty operated w ith in the fram ew ork
of C om intern directives, and the K uom intang itself had Soviet advisers
in crucial posts. B ut it w ould be w rong to conclude th at the Chinese
R evo lu tion of 1924—27 was not an au th en tically Chinese m ovem ent.
W h a t is clear, however, is th at in this key period non-C om m unist na
tionalism was strikingly dependent fo r ideological and organizational
leadership on the foreign and Chinese Communists w ith w hom it was
allied.
Sun Yat-sen died in 1925 and was apotheosized as a n atio n al hero. Sev
eral rivals sought his m antle, b u t it was G eneral Chiang Kai-shek who
gradually achieved power. I t was sym ptom atic of Chinese p olitical re a li
ties that leadership u ltim ately w ent to the man who controlled the K u o
m intang armies and not to a civilian com petitor. In 19 2 6 -2 7 the K u o
m intang gained strikingly rap id victories against the w arlords o f the
Yangtze valley, and won the return to China of some of the special for-
eign rights. T he spread of nationalist ideas among the peasants, labor,
and the m iddle class was astonishing. B ut the greater the success o f the
Kuomintang, the sharper became the in n er conflict between the rig h t
and left wings over the purposes of the n ationalist m ovem ent. In the
spring of 1927 the breaking point came, w hen the conservative w ing
under Chiang Kai-shek sw iftly suppressed its opponents. G reat num bers
of them were imprisoned or executed, and the Chinese Com m unist
leaders had to retire to a m ountainous in lan d retreat in Kiangsi.
T h e N ational Governm ent, established at N anking in 19 27-28, con
trolled more of the country than any regime since the beginning o f war-
lordism. Yet Nanking s ru le was fa r from complete, and its d irect ju ris
diction was lim ited to a group of key provinces of the low er Yangtze
valley. A lthough soon recognized in tern ation ally and at hom e as the
national governm ent of China, it never succeeded in fu lly im posing its
w ill on eith er foreign Powers or in tern a l foes. U nification o f the country

was carried to a new level, b u t n ot completed.
T h e K uom intan g in pow er faced enorm ous econom ic and adm inistra
tive problem s. Perm anent unification req u ired a great expansion of ra il
roads and industry, currency unification, and oth er measures. From
1928 on, and especially d u rin g the two or three years before the Japanese
invasion o f 1937, considerable adm inistrative and technical progress was
made. B u t Japanese aggression in 1931 and again in 1937 weakened the
regime, and the technical changes did n ot m aterially im prove the lot of
the people. In the countryside, despite the existence o f agrarian reform
laws on the statute book, much needed reform s, such as the reduction of
lan d rents and the provision o f farm credit a t tolerable interest rates,
were not carried out. T h e K uom intang became m ore and m ore a party
o f people w ith a stake in things as they w ere—the w ell-placed few o f the
u rb an and ru ra l areas and those w ho made, or hoped to make, their liv
ing as officials. Econom ically it offered little to the vast poverty-stricken
mass o f the population. P olitically, the central governm ent was under
the d om ination of C liiang Kai-shek and was m arked by com plex intrigues
o f several p olitical cliques.
T h e fund am ental issue posed by K uom intang policies d u rin g 19 2 7 -3 4
was w h eth er a Chinese governm ent carrying ou t technical and adm inis
trative im provem ents, b u t abstaining from fun d am en tal economic and
social reform s, could u n ify ajid stabilize the country through the ru le of
a “strong m an.” U n d er the conditions prevailin g in C hina and the w orld
this approach proved inadequate. In the face of J a p a n ’s great m ilitary
superiority, a w eak underdeveloped C hina m ight have survived (though
this is a m atter fo r argum ent) by m obilizing its hum an resources through
reform s that w ou ld w in mass support. T h is was a ll the m ore probable,
since Ja p a n ’s attacks, by w eakening the nation al governm ent and height
ening Chinese discontent, facilitated Chinese Com m unist com petition
w ith the K uom intang on a m ilitary, political, and econom ic level, even
though the Communists w ere fa r w eaker than the governm ent.
In 1927—28 the Chinese Communists began the process of adjustm ent
to C h in a’s ru ra l society th at played so large a p a rt in finally bringing
them to power. T h e K uom intang rath er quickly destroyed the urban
p olitical strength of the Communists, confronting them, in effect, w ith
a choice between an n ih ilation and su rvival in the ru ra l areas. T h e
m ethod o f th eir su rvival was to develop ru ra l governm ents through
g u errilla operations accompanied by land reform s that gave them support
am ong the peasantry. T h e h ea rt o f th eir p ow er was a h ig h ly disciplined

p a rty a n d a party-led arm y m ain tain in g in tim ate contact w ith local
pop u lation s. A lth o u g h rem ain ing firm ly wedded to the in tern a tio n a l
C om m unist cause, they were by force o f circum stance increasingly forced
to re ly on themselves, fo r they w ere geographically isolated, deep in the
Chinese interior.
T h e years from 1928 to 1935 witnessed h o t in tra-p arty controversies
am ong the Chinese Communists between a group aligned w u h M ao Tse-
tung, who was then on ly m oving tow ard suprem e pow er, and o th er C h i
nese Com m unist figures, such as L i Li-san, who were d o m in an t in the
p r y leadership. T h e differences centered on m ilita ry strategy, and there
3 S r m% l Z tW° r r grOUpS: thOSe Wh° t00 k “W n c e as

ence should govern" T h e debauT argU6d ^ Chinese exP eri_
a head w hen m ilitary defeat forced The r ™ PhaSe5' C° m in S *°
M arch” of 1934-35 ,1 , Communists to m ake the "Long
supremacy of Mao Tse tu n e ° ° ” hweSt' a " d reS“ ld n S in the com plete
luded to the debate in t h e s e V o r d ^ Y ^ 193G’ ^ a1’
R ^ o °u tio n a r7 ^ W a r1Ilu:snits o r u n w iU in S know , llie fa ct th a t C h in a ’s

(Chinese) R ed A rm y an d the K . la rac ten stlcs’ reg ard e d the w a r b e tw een the
in general or from d i e C i v i l C r o f ' r " ! Tr," ^ Irom a
the same m ilitary directive and even th ° ,m ° n and theref° re adopted
these have been pro ved to be c L n f , Same m 'h^ ry Prin c iP * « in toto. A ll
p ro ved to be com pletely erro n eo u s d u rin g o u r ten years o f w ar.
^ C W n a a ThWere wa" ^ * “ T * ^ o f C om m unism

Tut a m o J n a l ™ I " WeakeninS o£ the G eological bond w ith Russia,
Phases on the ne° y‘° n en ted P m y 3nd doctrine emerSed- Mao’, em-
shaping policy, c ^ p r a c ' t i ^ r r 1115 conditions the criterion in
pects of the process. ca 1 V m aP P ty m g doctrine, were im p o rta n t as-
m l k ' i n i i ' l ^ 1'8 Were occurri"g within the Chinese Com-

Chinese Nationalists For T aSS! esSlon was creat>ng new issues for the
churia in 1931 the' Kuom' T T yCarS ^ the invasion of Man-
croachments of Japan aZ o u h" ^ l° ^ ‘° the
tions against the C om m un^ tf its irUernaI miIitary opera-
Since Chinese urban op inion became
12. Mao Tse-tung, "Strateiric Pvnhi
(Hong Kong), May 31, 1949,' p. 22. China’s R evolutionary W ar," China D igest
restive a t this com bination o f civil w ar and non-resistance to a foreign

enemy, the N anking authorities freq u en tly suppressed anti-Japanese ac
tivities. B u t p op u lar criticism o f policy on nation alist grounds gradually
approached the boilin g point.
In the sum m er of 19B5, and in concert w ith the Com m unist In tern a
tion al in Moscow' then launching its “p op u lar fro n t” policy, the Chinese
Com m unists began to call fo r a Chinese united fron t to resist Jap an . In
Decem ber of that year, the students of Peking held mass dem onstrations
urging resistance, cessation of civil w ar, and the abandonm ent of p o liti
cal repression b y Nanking. T his resurgence o f student activity m arked
the b irth of a pow erful “nation al salvation” movem ent, b ro ad ly non-
Com m unist in character, b u t w ith the Communists taking an active p art
in it.
T h e Communists w ere calling fo r policies w hich m any non-Com m unist
Chinese desired, b u t w hich the K uom intang leaders were hesitant to
adopt. U tilizing this fact to claim that they had m ore of a nationalist
character than the Kuom intang, the Communists w ere able to establish
• t
new, close contacts w ith urban non-Com m unist elements. T h is was a key
developm ent in the long-term com petition o f the two m ain parties for
leadership of w hat was later called the “m iddle group"—students, profes
sors, journalists, and businessmen w ho form ed the educated class. T he
m iddle group was sm all and p olitically weak, b u t nevertheless o f great
im portance, because it had w ide prestige and was the repository of the
m odern scientific knowledge and adm inistrative skills of the country.
D iscontent w ith appeasem ent of jap a n grew among the Nationalists,
and even the arm y was affected (as indicated by the seizure o f Chiang
Kai-shek by some of Chang H sueh-liang’s troops at Sian in December
1936). Kuoinintang-Com m unist u n ity negotiations were carried on, and
an agreem ent to h a lt the civil w ar was form ally announced some two
m onths after the new Japanese invasion o f Ju ly 1937. Once the K uom in
tang adopted the p op u lar course of fighting Japan, its predom inance
over the Communists became obvious. Chiang Kai-shek was regarded
as a natio n al hero, and the overw helm ing m ajority of politically-con-
scious Chinese looked to him fo r leadership.
T h e subsequent war, however, was a cruel test. It threw into the
crucible the fate not only of the country, b u t also o f every political ele
m ent w ith in it. Follow ing an in itial honeym oon period, several outright
Kuom intang-Com m unist m ilitary conflicts occurred. B ut during the
eight years of w ar w ith Jap an the civil struggle was usually waged in a
sub tler w ay: the m an n er o f resisting Ja p a n became, in effect, the m ain

m ethod o f contesting fo r postw ar p ow er in C hina.
T h is is n o t the place to re te ll the story o f w artim e C h in a in detail.
W h a t happened essentially was th at after w ell-in ten tio n ed b u t lim ited
reform s in the ea rly phase o f the w ar the N ation alist regim e becam e in
creasingly weak, and incom petent as the w ar dragged on. D riven from
its m ain urban and coastal centers, u nable to m obilize the p o p u la tio n of
the m ore backward in terio r through ad m in istrative, agrarian , and m ili
ta ry reform s, the governm ent came m ore u n d er the influence o f its
right-w ing factions. T h ey sought to retain leadership largely th rou gh
m ilita ry methods, p atrio tic exh ortation , and a considerable am ou n t of
p olitical repression. Jap an was fin ally defeated in C hina, b u t n ot by the
Chinese armies and the K uom intang em erged from the w ar g ravely
weakened, w ith little assurance o f su p p ort from the mass o f the people.
On the other hand, the later years o f the w ar witnessed a p henom enal
expansion of the Com m unist forces. T h e m ilitary problem s o f the C om
munists were not less than those o f the K uom in tan g (w hich had, in fact,
consi erable advantages in m anpow er and m ateriel over its rival). T h e
Communists, however, continued th eir previous policy o f com b in in g na-
^Th™ v reform “~b u t in a shrew der and m ore flexible fashion.
ar ler policy of land exp rop riation was m odified to one o f red u c
ing mtcrcst-rates and rents and was used as the basis fo r establishing
guerrilla governments in the areas overrun by Jap an . T h e C om m unists
unfailingly m aintained political and m ilitary suprem acy in th eir areas,
but through mass organization, economic reform s, and o th er activities
won considerable peasant support. I t is essential to rem em ber th at the
Communists at this period w ere not com peting w ith a dem ocratic gov
ernm ent for the allegiance of a people im bued w ith W estern lib e ra l con
cepts, but w ith a decaying, m ore overtly au th o rita ria n regim e fo r the sup
port of a people to whom freedom largely m eant food and the rig h t n o t
to be mistreated by officials, landlords, and m oneylenders.
Furtherm ore, the Chinese business class had been gravely w eakened
durin g the w ar by Ja p a n ’s seizure of leading cities, the serious in flatio n
in ationa ist territory, and the com petition o f official N ation alist eco
nom ic enterprise w ith p rivate firms. T h e discontented in tellectu al m id d le
class, w hich lived mostly in N ationalist areas, was increasingly d isil
lusioned in the governm ent. In the continuing riv a lry w ith the K u o m in
tang fo r leadership of the m iddle elements, the Com m unists registered
new successes, as is indicated by the close w ork in g relation sh ip w hich
they developed w ith the various m inor parties and organizations form ing
the D em ocratic League.
T h e defeat of Jap an gave the N ationalists another chance. T h e people,
especially in m any of the cities form erly occupied by Jap an , expected
great things from the victorious Nationalists and looked to Chiang Kai-
shek w ith hope. B u t it was a declining K uom intang, incapable of self
renovation, that took up the reins o f postw ar power. In the ensuing
com petition w ith the Communists, who ru led m ajor n orth ern areas and
now had the benefit of captured Japanese arms and covert Russian sup
port, the N ationalists lost ground in every sphere. Each party continued
to adhere to essentially the same form ula as before in approaching the
vast non-political mass of the population. Since the course of events in
C hina during 19 45-49 is now fa irly well-known, it may be instructive to
exam ine the riv a lry of the two m ain Chinese parties on the level o f in
ternational relations. For it was on this plane that the Kuom intang, as
the trad itio n al leader of Chinese nationalism , m ight w ell have shown its
greatest strength.
T h ree countries were prin cip ally involved in Chinese discussion of
foreign policy du rin g 1945-49; the U.S.S.R., the U nited States, and
Jap an . T h e K uom intang m ight w ell have been expected to use against
the Communists their lin k w ith the Soviet U nion and the fact that v a ri
ous Soviet actions in M anchuria (such as the rem oval of machinery) were
open to attack on Chinese nationalist grounds. But, in fact, the Chinese-
Soviet treaty of A ugust 1945, providing fo r special Soviet privileges in
M anchuria, had been concluded by th e.K u om in tan g on the advice of
the U nited States, and not by the Communists. M oreover, w hile the C hi
nese Com m unist forces almost certainly benefited from some Soviet aid
in 1945-46, they rem ained essentially self-supporting m ilitarily and eco
nom ically, relying largely on captured Japanese and, later, Am erican
arms and equipm ent. T h e Kuom intang, on the other hand, developed a
m arked sp irit of dependence on outside h elp .13
W ith the failu re of the M arshall mission and the resum ption of civil
w ar on a large scale after the m iddle of 1946, the Communists used anti-
13. On these points the “W hite Paper” issued by the United States Department of
State in August 1949 is quite clear. On September 20, 1947, U.S. Ambassador J. L.
Stuart declared in a message from Nanking to Secretary of State Marshall: "Most dis
heartening features of present Chinese situation in economic as in other spheres are
overt reliance on deus ex machina of American aid to extricate China from its pressing
problems and corresponding lack of self-reliance and self-help in tackling them.”
(United States Relations with China, Washington, 1949, p. 831.)
A m erican prop ag an d a to the fu ll in addressing themselves to a w ar-w eary

Chinese p u b lic. Insistently they asserted th at N anking was sub servien t to
W ash in g on and was n ot re a lly in dependent in its policies, Lhus stren gth
en in g a b elief alread y cu rren t in Chinese “m iddle group" circles, n am ely
th a t the K uom intang survived on ly on A m erican aid or die hope o f it.
Increasing num bers o£ Chinese came to believe th at the K u o m in tan g
was fo rfeitin g its title to n atio n al leadership. T h e A m erican A m bassador
to C h in a declared as early as J u ly 1, 19-17, th at "the overw h elm in g m a
jo rity in the n a tio n ” were “dissatisfied w ith, dislike and w o u ld w elcom e
freedom from the present N ationalist regim e.” T h e Com m unists used
every device to spread the idea that they could better carry ou t the doc
trines o f Sun Yat-sen than the p a rty Sun had founded. In fact, m any
= o ^ r ainV ere HOt in faVOr o1 Com m unism were rep elled
w ere fherefore “n 7 ^ K u o m in tallS “ self. T h e Com m unists
„»n M t0 COme t0 p ow er n ot o n 'y w ith Hie su p p o rt o f th eir
population.215' ^ ^ WUh ^ ta d t acci uiescence o f large sections o f the
i £ t s r in Chi? and in china's reiati°ns with Lhe wesi since

and the r S c / Cc™ nist in terven tion in K orea
m i e c L r d e T S , lCI Cy “ a lip l lhemselves ™ th the Soviet and
Ke U i n a dependent on Russian policy and aid— Invp r
changed the Dim,™* .r, 1 , , , 1 — nave, o f course,
ments should not h II “ arkable deg‘ ee. Nevertheless these develop-
Z L r n rlt? ^ * ° bSCUre ^ d ™ m stan ces o f the p r e c e i
faU of th K °r COn the f ° rce ° f n ation a«»t f i l i n g . T h e down-
p e arh e ad ^ V £ hide a " d th e o riS in a l r e v o lu tio n a r y
sp earh ead of n o n -C o m m u n ist n a tio n a lis m in C h in a , w as n o t s im p ly a
u lig n ffie d w h e d °USfh ^ miUtarV “ llapSe sPectacula>' decisive.

£ ^ a ’t i o ^ hCr ° r , a Sh0“ ° r a lon S Pel i° d - that the leadership of
— lsm *iac* passed into Com m unist hands
quently saeneymedSb > r S; ^ Pr0baW y *° in C h ln a * subse-
pow er boasT nt th r yh Ir0niCaI that the Com m u"^ts, w ho had come to
themselves becoming w i L ^ u L ^ ^ ™
t • i . S allies, if n ot tools, o f K rem lin policies and
reshaping their country more and more upon the p attern o f 0 e Sovie
U m on. How fa r that trend w ill go before the still p ow erfu l feelings o
tru ly Chinese nationalism beo-in tn 9WW, ,u i s
p 11 TT ■ S ssert thernselves is difficult indeed to
foretell, l e w serious students
ucms o otf tne
tfm Chinese scene *today
i w ou ld p u t m uch
reliance on the ea rlier glib predictions o f a “T itoist" m ovem ent in C hina
m the n ear futu re. M oreover, the Soviet leaders themselves are p ro b ab ly
less likely today to repeat their b lu n d er in Y ugoslavia or their earlier

mistake in C hina in 1927. Yet when fu ll allow ance has been made fo r
these facts, it rem ains true that the force o f the old er nationalism remains
too potent an ingredient in the p olitical substance o f C hina fo r even the
most doctrinaire Chinese Com m unist leaders to ignore o r repress it.
W h en it can no longer find a substitute outlet fo r expression in anti-
Am ericanism and the Korean war, it m ay w ell m anifest itself in other
places and in ways not necessarily pleasing to Moscow.
T h e preceding discussion of C h in a’s experience, though traversing a
good deal of fam iliar ground, is justified if only b y the im m ensity of the
social and political changes occurring in that vast country and by the
incalculable, b ut certainly profound, influence those changes w ill exert
upon the neighboring nations. T h e explanations o f how China, w hich
was being hailed only a few years ago as one o f the em erging great powers
in the non-Com m unist w orld, passed so read ily into the Soviet orbit w ill
command the attention of statesmen and scholars fo r decades to come.
T hey have provided fuel fo r one o f the bitterest controversies in A m eri
can foreign policy in m any years. T h ey are of vita l significance fo r the
fu tu re developm ent o f A sia’s second largest nation, whose fro n tier now
borders on a T ib e t under Chinese Com m unist control. It is thus ap
p ropriate to turn now to a b rief exam ination of India's nationalist evo
lution.
Indian N ationalism
T h e basic economic conditions u n d er which Indian nationalism de
veloped resembled Chinese conditions in m any ways, w ith ou t being
identical. Before the era of British conquest India, too, was an over
w helm ingly peasant country, w ith an essentially decentralized life, and
w ithout m odern industry (although possessing highly developed handi
crafts). T h ere were flourishing cities, b u t the village was the fundam ental
center. M uch more than in China the W estern impact shattered key in
stitutions of the old order. H andicraft industries bowed to British ma
chine goods; in m any areas the status of peasants declined (e.g., in Bengal
as a result of the “Perm anent Settlem ent,” w hich turned Indian tax col
lectors into landlords and peasant proprietors into tenants); and the In
dian economy was oriented tow ard Britain's needs. British supremacy
was accompanied, however, by railw ay construction and other economic
and adm inistrative developments that k n it the country together more
closely than ever before and laid the basis fo r an Indian m iddle class of
professional men, m erchants, and adm inistrators .11
A s in C hina, there w ere elem ents o f n ationalism in trad itio n al India,
b u t m odern In d ian n ationalism is clearly the p rod u ct o f the past cen
tu ry. T h is nationalism developed from m any factors, in clu d in g the spirit
o f resistance to foreign ru le, the economic changes occurring u n d er
B ritain , and the influence w ith in India o f certain In d ian concepts, as
w ell as o f W estern ideas of freedom . W estern p olitical philosop h y (not
o n ly British, b u t Am erican, French, and Russian) as w ell as influences
from the East itself, including China and Jap an , a ll played a part. In one
sense it m ay be said that the British helped to create In d ian n ationalism
b u t w ithout w illin g it, and they found themselves m ore and m ore obliged
to resist its developm ent up to about 1937.
T h e Indian nationalist m ovem ent had its inception even before the
founding o f the Indian N ational Congress, b u t the creation o f th at or
ganization in 1885 brought into existence the body th at was u ltim ately to
lead the country to independence.
It may be instructive to compare Indian and Chinese nation alism in
t eir m ain aspects during the sixty-odd years p rio r to the establishm ent
ot an independent India in 1947.
In ônt*?st to China, the m ilitary factor was alm ost negligible in the
I epti* n n.at*ona^smj anc* the constitutional factor quite pow erful,
n ma, it w ill be recalled, constitutional processes were discredited
rat er early, and naked m ilitary pow er was an essential prerequisite for
po itica power in the decades follow ing the overthrow o f the im perial
in T his was the result not on ly o f Chinese in tern al in-
S3 ^ a*S° ôre*&n m ilitary operations on Chinese soil. In India,
on t e ot er hand, the population was v irtu a lly disarm ed (except fo r the
an pic ed and carefully supervised Indian com ponent o f the arm ed
orces). o political party or m ovem ent had an arm y at its disposal or
m a position to develop one, and the relationship o f the various
^ was essentially non-m ilitary. M oreover, the centralization
o n la^ un er British ru le prevented the developm ent, as in C hina, of
regiona y ase opposition movements w ith arm ed power, and no fo r
eign invader broke the pax Britannica.
T h is does n ot mean that Indian politics was p u rely peaceful. On the
contrary, t ere was no lack o f violent tendencies in Indian nationalism
14. For a more detailed Indian account, see A. R. Desai, Social Background of In
dian Nationalism, Bombay and London, 1948
over the decades. In fact, one of the m ain themes o f Indian politics has
been the conflict between the advocates of peaceful constitutionalism and
the exponents of forceful, including terroristic, measures. B ut the dom i
nan t approach, especially in the key period o f G andhi's leadership
(roughly from the end of W o rld W a r I u n til 1947) was to eschew the more
vio len t methods and to concentrate on the use of p op u lar dem onstrations,
“non-cooperation,” the boycott of British goods, and the em ploym ent of
constitutional techniques (e.g., the participation of the Congress in the
1937 provin cial elections and the subsequent establishm ent o f a num ber
of p rovincial Congress m inistries du rin g 1937-39). “N on-violence” was,
to be sure, a form of force, and it sometimes spilled over in to violence
itself; but the Indian p olitical m ilieu was substantially different from
th at of China.
T h e tactics w orked ou t by the Congress u n d er G andhi reflected not
only G an d h i’s personal philosophy, b u t also In d ia’s unarm ed state, cer
tain aspects of the trad itio n al H indu outlook, and the desire of the na
tionalist leadership to avoid an uncontrolled upsurge of the general p op u
lace. A t the same time Indian methods were, at least in part, a response
to the fact that in ru lin g India B ritain had recognized the d esirability of
even tu al Indian self-governm ent and em ployed techniques o f negotiation
as w ell as o f repression. T h e conciliatory side o f B ritish policy was most
dram atically symbolized by the final decision to w ith d raw from India by
agreement.
A s a result, India in 1947 possessed a foundation fo r a non-violent con
stitu tional evolution. On the oth er hand, w hile a section o f the p olitically
articu late classes was attracted by p arliam entary procedures, these p ro
cedures had never become p art of the life of the mass o f Indians (for one
thing, the franchise was extrem ely lim ited). T ra d itio n a l governm ent in
In d ia (under B ritish ru le and in pre-British days) was essentially au
th oritarian, and on both the rig h t and the left an im p ortan t section of
Indian educated opinion was not parliam entary-m inded in its basic out
look. Yet, in its non-m ilitary, constitutional tendency In d ian politics con
trasted sharply w ith Chinese politics in the first h a lf of the tw entieth cen
tury.
Indian nationalism , in contrast to Chinese, tended to g lorify ancient
traditions. As already indicated, Chinese nationalism was in im portant
ways a re vo lt against the Chinese past—against Confucianism , the tradi
tional fam ily system, and other aspects of im perial China. Indian na
tionalism , too, incorporated m any m odern ideas; b u t in the search fo r
self-confidence and fo r ideological weapons against foreign ru lers iL

g rad u a lly tu rn ed to ancient tradition. T h e outlook o f m any In d ian re
form ers o f the early nineteenth c e n t u r y — R am m ohun R o y and oLhers—
was rationalistic and W estern-oriented in a conscious fashion. In the
la tte r p a rt of the nineteenth century there were the beginnings o f a na
tionalistic H indu revival (Ram akrishna, V ivekananda, etc.), and the
early years of the tw entieth century saw a H indu Renaissance (perhaps
best symbolized by the radical Congress leader T ila k ) in w hich ancient
H indu society and its doctrines were admired.
T h e religious contrast between C hina and In d ia is notew orthy. A l
though religious questions have entered in to relations between the C h i
nese m ajority and certain m inorities, such as the Chinese Moslems and
Mongols, religion has been a m inor factor in the politics o f C hina proper.
T h e conflict between Confucians and anti-Confucians in the ea rly period
of the R epublic resulted in the defeat o f the form er. Efforts to re in tro
duce a quasi-religious factor into Chinese thinking (e.g., the re tu rn to a
Confucianistic official attitude by the K uom intang in the thirties and
forties, and the effort to develop a “New Life M ovement") had little ef
fect. In short, Chinese politics revolved rath er openly about p o litica l and
economic questions, largely w ithout the intervention of relig ion as a force.
In India, on the other hand, religion was a m ajo r p o litica l factor of
considerable em otional and intellectual significance—a factor entering
into virtu a lly all aspects of national life. R eligion was sim ultaneously
a stim ulant to Indian nationalism and an obstacle. T h e caste system, for
example, cut across national lines, com partm entalizing H indu society.
The rise of nationalism also stim ulated a strong group consciousness on
the part of both Hindus and Moslems.
T he growing sense of separateness on the p art o f H indus and Moslems
ultim ately led to partition, w ith tragic and far-reaching effects. F or the
H indu m ajority the revival of Indian national traditions necessarily in
volved a revival of the H indu past. T he Indian N ation Congress always
had a secular platform , which it invited Indians of a ll religions to sup
port, b u t the thinking of key H indu leaders has freq u en tly had a con
scious or unconscious H indu coloration. T ilak, as alread y suggested, was
a m ilitan t H indu; and Gandhi, although welcom ing m en o f a ll creeds in
a sp irit of universality, was unm istakably a H indu in philosophy and
political practice. In a real sense, the predom inant nationalism o f India
was not on ly Indian, but also H indu. It is true th at the left w in g o f the
nationalist m ovem ent placed m ajor emphasis on econom ic and social
matters, in addition to the dem and for independence, and that in this
q u arter the religious factor was weakest. On the oth er hand, various
right-wing H indu groups, notably the H indu M ahasabha, developed an
openly avowed H indu nationalism , w ith strongly anti-M oslem connota
tions.
Moslem nationalism developed more slowly than H indu nationalism ,
p a rtly because the Moslems, for a num ber of reasons, lagged behind the
H indus in m odern education and in creating a m iddle class. Some Mos
lems became staunch supporters and even leaders of the Indian N ational
Congress (such as M aulana A bul K alam Azad, form er Congress President
and a member of the Cabinet of independent India). T h ere have also
been periods (for instance, the half-decade beginning in 1916) when
H indu-M oslem political cooperation was at a high point. B u t in general
the awakening Moslems tended to develop a self-consciousness ap art from
the H indu com m unity and marked by a degree of fear o f the m ajority
community. T his situation did not in itself mean that H indus and Mos
lems could not live together satisfactorily w ithin a single state. B u t under
the concrete conditions of Hindu-Moslem antagonism and B ritish policy,
a single indej>endent state did not actually emerge in the Indian subcon
tinent.
A central p art in the developm ent o f Moslem separatist nationalism
was played by Sir Syed Ahm ed Khan, who established the M uham m adan
A nglo-O riental College (later Âligarh U niversity) in 1875. T his institu
tion helped to reintegrate Indian Islam by p roviding it w ith an in tel
lectual focal p oint and ideology and by m aking U rd u the nation al lan
guage of Indian Moslems. A sense of Moslem nationalism was fo r a long
time confined to a sm all upper-class Moslem group—at first led by land
owners and later by the m iddle class. From the late thirties the Moslem
League, led by M ohammed A li Jin n ah , became a mass organization. The
dem and fo r Pakistan, adopted by the League in 1940, was based on “the
two-nation theory,” nam ely the view th at the Indian subcontinent con
tained two incom patible nations, Hindus and Moslems, freq u en tly living
side by side, but distinct in outlook and custom. W h atever the outside
observer’s opinion of this theory, it must be recognized that by the end
of W o rld W a r II the great m ajority of p olitically conscious Indian Mos
lems accepted the two-nation approach and its p olitical implications.
T h e nationalism of the Moslem League was theocratic in outlook, al
though the leaders (e-g-> Jin n ah ) were not necessarily very orthodox Mos
lems. T h e m ajor emphasis du rin g the period o f mass grow th in the
56
ASIAN i\/\i
'voj/nv NATIONALISM
ifJiN A L ISM AND THE
T H E WEST
W EST
ctmmunitvd W3S ° n ° PP° sition t0 the Congress and the Hindu

com m unity and economic and social issues were largely relegated to the
sa m ^ r n S Wt ere H indu-M ° sle'» N a tio n s were" i n E I t the
a s ig n ifie d ;:t; r x 2 i^ eveiopmei,t wuhin ihe Leasue °f
K oran sanctions socialistic policies O ^ T h T " ! ’" ^ ^ ^
was considerably to the right ol the f „ ’ hoWever- the LeaS l,e
It is evident from the above disn,- ' ngl? S econom ically and socially,
lationship proved a key factor in thp10" i ^ thg mai o rity-m in ority re‘
T h e situation contrasted rather sharDl^ 0 i' ^ 11 ° £ Indian nationalism .
Moslems were about one-founh T h e Indian
the Chinese m inority groups at P°PuIation before partition ;
more than one-tenth of th<f mV,i ^ ° nSols- and others) totalled no
the Indian Moslems were found af ° n and PerhaPs less. M oreover,
concentrated in some of the kev ll0U ® ° Ut Lbe subcom inent and were
Punjab), while the Chinese m i n l - v ^ ° f the COUntl7 (Bengal and the
mces of the northwest and southwest" V T ^ " th' bortler ProV'
between the Chinese and the min '■ ^ n 0t t0 say that the relations
but that they were less c r u c tl th ln ^ n a lio n al* « were unim portant,
Language and nationalism usually }COrrCS>ponding situation in India,
necuon, and in India no l e i so1 an h " T -^ in ra te con-
problem, however, is extremely c o Z w T ^ T he Indian IinS uistiC
t o r T o f ^ d 5 n ° reaU y n a tio n a l lan g u a g e a t “ p r in c iP le> th£
ory of India is divided into a number nf r P resen t time. T h e terrz-
Speech (EenSali in Bengal r , , ' ? UlsUc areas, each possessing
of Madras and Hyderabad, e t c T n ^ T T W in parts
ought to be spoken by 1 2 5 -1 5 0 m illio ^ be£°re p artitio n H indi was
hnf USSef ° £ nOMh India have a S T in n° « h India, that the
h tve H- a"gUaSes o£ * e south are also "m in ^Hig ibiIity, and
have Hindi ultimately £ulfill the T he in ten tion is to
this remains an objective for the h r ° f a n ational language but
Z •* — * b“ >“ — “ * “» « - ;« » »
w S in r T r "e * I l i ; ; U >»■>>»•
m «“ ,: r 1 8h- u r“ -
existence of separate traditions,TiteraetuWlthin In d ‘a are linked w ith the

w i T n 't h T 0therS' T h e em ergence of ^ £° lk l° reS am o n g B e n g alis,
v ith in the fram ew o rk of a larg e r Con Various re g i° n a l n a tio n a lism s
1Sm haS b£ en c h a « c t e r i s t i c o f L eaS - n a t io n a l-
la* le c °ngress p a rty several
decades ago recognized this fact by organizing itself on the basis of pro
vincial committees representing linguistic areas as far as possible. (Thus
there was no provincial Congress committee for the whole of Madras, but
a Tam ilnad Provincial Congress Committee for the predominantly
Tamil-speaking section of Madras, and an Andhra Provincial Congress
Committee for the Telugu-speaking section of the province.) The Con
gress also incorporated in its program a demand for the organization of
an independent India into linguistic provinces, so that changes would be
made wherever existing administrative divisions violated linguistic reali
ties.15
There is no need to exaggerate Indian internal differences. Indian na
tionalism is unquestionably a real and powerful phenomenon. Nor is
India alone among the countries of the world in being confronted by
internal problems arising from nationalism. But to appreciate the magni
tude of India’s problem of national development, it is necessary to recog
nize the great variety within India’s overall national framework.
In contrast with India, China has the linguistic advantage of a single
w ritten language embracing the entire Chinese-speaking area. It is true
that, since Chinese w riting is non-phonetic, it is pronounced differently
in various parts of the country. But, broadly speaking, the dialect varia
tions are of such a character as not to prevent m utual intelligibility
among the vast m ajority of the population. Only in the coastal area from
Shanghai through Kwangtung province are the main dialects of such a
nature as to constitute separate spoken languages. Moreover, during the
past thirty years the educated class throughout the country has learnt
the kuo yii (national language). As a result, an educated person from
Shanghai, although not perhaps speaking kuo yii w ith a good pronuncia
tion, is likely to have no difficulty in conversing w ith a resident of
Peking (whose ordinary speech is kuo yii). In short, one may conclude
that the linguistic problems of national development are less serious in
China than in India, both in origin and as a result of several decades of
Chinese progress in developing a national spoken language. On the
other hand, India has an advantage in that its languages are alphabetic
and therefore in some ways more suitable as vehicles for modern educa
tion and thought.
Soviet and local Communist influence played a part both in India and
15. In addition to linguistic area loyalties, constituting forms of sub-nationalism
within the all-India framework, there were interregional north-south differences that
still exist For example there is considerable distaste among the educated elements in
the south for the adoption of a northern language, Hindi, as a national language.
^ ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
China during the period of developing nationalism , b u t much less so in

ndia. T here were a num ber of reasons for the difference. T h e fact that
India was a colony inhibited Indian relations w ith the entire w orld (ex-
1, W e r r r P 3m ° f the EmPire) over an extended period. This
never a J o lo T the U -S S -R- China, on the other hand, was
eo v ~ n K -an, r the freed0m 10 deal w ilh a variety o f foreign
feparatTd ee; r K ‘"if U 'S'S'R ' A lth ou Sh Russia India were
no e a s ™ ! from n ^ ^ StWp ° f Iand> there in
tain frontier. This L'le fo rb id d in S' m olin‘
extensive and fairly open The e ^ f =‘Russian b ord cr>" hich "■aS
been a m aior feature nf r ■ ■ t clusion of R u ssia from India had long
developed a position for itself f n S n 1 ° ^ TSa’ iSt
fluence in Outer MonimH i c- , lu n a ’ as w ell as a degree o f m-
thing of this M antûrian n > * The U.S.S.R. r e t a r d some-
acquired a stake in M 'mri ° S1*I0I\ U ntl1 ^ m id‘thirties and then re-
A u g u s t 1 9 1 5 . This position a u b 1 lro u Sh the Chinese-Soviet pact o f
(m the mid-twenties and after W o r f d W 1 * in Chinese politics
golia was incorporated into thp S * ^ ^ oreover, O u te r Mon-
U-S.S.R. also exp an d ed ^ e ^ tW£ntieS' a n d * *
In certain key periods o f Ph S in ^ a n g .
27 and the years of the C h i n p ^ ^ natl0nalist developm ent (e.g., 1924-
and non-Communist War ° £ ^ 7 - 1 5 ) the U.S.S.R-
ance. In these periods, as alreadv !, tna, S? 'Were in alIiance OT near-alli-
Communists had a similar relah n ° T 16 Kuotnintang and the Chinese
that developed in the twenties also"5!?'15', •" IntUa the C om m unist party
siderable degree, and C o m m i t s With "“‘ “ "alUm to a con-
as through their own p a r t y I J ; * ' 1 Withi" the Congress as well
nationalists were never in the nos? ; ‘ g( Umil I942)' the Indian
Gandhism was an in d ig e n o u f W lUrni" B l° Russia tOT suPPo rt'
strength, which galvanized the co " " Ph~ n o n of considerable
he Communists, frequently worked , !', ^ P° litical 6 ™ p s . °S
ang-Chmese Communist re la tio n ^ ' V ConSi'ess- b u t the Kuoniin-
really paralleled i„ India. ^ 'P °£ 1924-27 or 19 37-39 was not
the Indian middle class was c o n s f d e S t in Pa“ - th ^ *><* ^
T he foregoing remarks help to exnl ^ StronSer than that of China,
of Communism in India at the time 6 ^ v e l y w eaker position
the corresponding period. But it w o u lri°llndependence than i" C hina at
mumsm has not had a significant in Z L ^ £° Conclude that Coffl-
Ce on Indian thought and action-
NEW TRENDS IN ASIAN NATIONALISM
It became from the late twenties a powerful force in the Indian labor
movement, and in the thirties entered the field of peasant organization.
In the intellectual world Marxism had a considerable impact in wide
circles, many of whose members could not by any stretch of the imagina
tion be regarded as belonging to the radical wing of nationalism. Marx
ism also influenced the Congress from the late twenties through some of
its younger leaders, notably Jaw aharlal Nehru, who was at that time far
to the left in his outlook. It also influenced the Socialist group which
was organized within the Congress in the thirties and played a large role
in the increased attention of the Congress to the problems of labor and
the peasantry at that time. A part from all questions of theory, the in
dustrialization and other economic changes in Soviet Russia after the
beginning of the first Five Year Flan had an influence on many Indians
who hoped for the economic modernization of their country.
Since this summary has stressed points of divergence between Indian
and Chinese nationalism, so that each may be better understood as a
distinct movement, it is well to emphasize that m India, as in China, the
basic environm ent in the period under discussion was that of a pie-
dom inantly peasant economy of some hundreds of millions of impov
erished cultivators, supplemented by a small body of impoverished urban
workers, and a small middle class, many of whose members were frus
trated and deeply unhappy over the plight of their country. These
similarities (together w ith the restless nationalism they helped to en
gender) probably outweighed the differences that have been discussed.
One of the crucial questions that non-Communist nationalism faced in
India was whether it could solve the problems the Kuomintang had been
unable to solve in China.
The establishment of the Indian Union in August 1947 brought In
dian nationalism face to lace w ith the basic problems o£ the country's
economic political, and social life. W ith in a fairly short time a number
of previously crucial issues ceased to dominate Indian thinking. For ex-
ample partly because of the manner in which Britain yielded political
control anti-British feeling became a minor factor and even gave way to
sentiments ot friendliness for B rita in -a ll the more so since many na
tionalists felt a kinship w ith the British Labor Party, which was m power
u n til late in 1951 The fact that the Indian government, despite opposi
tion, found it politically possible to remain as a republic within the Com
m onwealth was indicative of this sentiment.
W ith the passing of British power went the princely states that Britain
had so ca re fu lly preserved. L arg ely by diplom atic means the n etw ork of
m a jo r an d petty m onarchies was subordinated to the new cen tral au
th o rity. O u trig h t force was em ployed in three areas: Ju n ag ad h , H ydera
bad, a n d Kashm ir. T h e unexpected ease w ith w hich the late D eputy
P rim e M inister, Sard ar Patel, directed the disposition o f the states re
flected n o t on ly his own skill and the in h eren t outmodedness of the sLates,
b u t also the fact th at the Indian governm ent offered the princes as a
group generous term s-pensions, positions o f h o n o r and, in some cases,
influence— and concentrated on adm inistrative in corp oration o f the states
ra th e r than on reform s w ithin them.
A fte r independence the philosophy o f non-violence th at had played
so large a p a rt in the nationalist struggle receded in to the background.
ere are, of course, in India today m any m en and wom en w ho have
been deeply influenced by this philosophy, including some w ho are in
tensely loyal to It. B ut the Indian governm ent has not considered it
iK ftm 6! any T re than any ° ther S ° vern m en t—to adopt G andhism as
its fundam ental approach. G andhi him self showed signs o f being ill-at-
ease m the new w orld o f Indian nationalism a fter A ugust 19 17 an d his
thedp “
ne period of G
of G andhian
mai r £nded 311
nationalism ,thhowever,
3t WaS “ there
£aCt already OVer- From
survive certain tac
tic sa n d attitudes that can continue to be influential, fo r e x a m p le 'th e use
to leaders of an ascetic character. (Both of these, in fact have roots in

e remote Indian past.) Some of the specifically G andhian features of
Which
w hich hnatb °naIiSt
has been enacted rm alS0
p la tf°into law SUrViVe’ e'g-
in several the advocac>' ° £ p ro h ib itio n
areas.
T he top leadership of Indian nationalism has undergone an obvious
change w u h the death of Gandhi, and later Patel, leaving N ehru alone
o f the original key figures. Most o f the other m ain leaders are, like N ehru,
older men, and there is little evidence as yet of a vigorous group of
younger m en m the Congress p arty capable of stepping in to t h f hM rest
positions T his situation has seemed to some ob serve,, sym ptom atic of
a loss o f fighting spirit w ithin the party in the past five years. T h e Congress
rem ains, however, the political p arty of India, m ore p o w e rfu l than all
oth er In dian parties combined. B ut its great strength is to a considerable
extent a legacy of its past services.
Its most difficult problems have been economic ones, arising from a
host o f long-term and recent factors: oppressive ru ra l conditions, p a rti
tion of the subcontinent, lack of capital and train ed personnel, in d u strial
underdevelopm ent, black m arkets and fam ine. M ilita ry expenses have
been high and have consumed about h a lf the budget. T h e governm ent
has succeeded in holding the country together and has m ade progress in
certain fields, such as transportation. In the agrarian field reform s have
been enacted into law in several instances, though n a tu ra lly the position
of the peasantry does not yet seem to have appreciably changed. R ecently
there has been much new discussion o f official plans fo r villag e im prove
m ent and industrial developm ent. In general, the Indian governm ent is
w ell aw are in p rin cip le of the necessity of lin kin g p olitical nationalism
w ith economic progress, especially in the ru ra l areas. But, as develop
ments since 1947 suggest, there can be a considerable gap betw een a
verb al recognition of realities and the practical measures in volved in re
organizing a largely pre-m odern society.
F or several years after independence the com m unal issue b ulked large
in India. Feelings aroused by the H indu-M uslim -Sikh massacres at the
tim e o f p artitio n and by the later exodus o f H indus from Pakistan to
India were intense. L ivin g in m iserable conditions, the refugees them
selves w ere a force fo r strong policies tow ard Pakistan, and some right-
w ing Indian groups—such as the R.S.S. and the H indu M ahasabha—agi
tated to the same end. These groups also advocated a non-secular Indian
state, retu rn in g to ancient Indian trad itio n or, as they p u t it, H indu
tradition. W h a t they j^roposed in effect was a H indu nationalism as op
posed to an Indian nationalism . In his presidential address at the Banga
lore session of the Indian N ational Congress in O ctober 1951, N ehru
called com m unalism “the Indian version o f fascism” and said th at it at
tracts to its fold reactionary and anti-social elem ents w ho try to prevent
social progress u n d er cover o f religion or some form o f extrem e n atio n al
ism, w hich really can only be applied to one com m unity.”
T h e struggle between the com m unal and non-com m unal approach to
Indian problem s showed itself n ot on ly in questions affecting Hindu-
M uslim relations, b u t also in connection w ith H indu life alone. F or ex
ample, the H indu Code b ill, w hich N ehru backed, p a rtly as a means of
liberalizing the status o f wom en in H indu society, has n o t yet been
passed, p a rtly because im portant elements in the Congress have been op
posed, lukewarm , or at least fearfu l o f the effects. T h ere is no doubt, how
ever, that the com m unally-m inded elements in In d ia have weakened as
a political force, after showing considerable strength in the first years of
independence. A resurgence on their joart is always possible, b u t the
recent Indian elections, in w hich they made a p oor showing, indicate th at
62
A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W EST
Can'y m ° re WCight
pressed withfne t h r C o n ^ s 1 "T™ riesn d f CUltUral COnservatisnl was eX'

dency o£ that body in 19 5 0 -5 1 Tn M surroundi,1S the Presl‘
Tandon, an advocate of i L l * e ,summer o£ >950 Purushottam das
Patel, was elected to the presidency' of ' t h e V ^ b>' Sar^ r
over Shankarrao Deo, who had P rim , M Cong>css by a great m ajority
a narrow er margin over Acharya K rim l miSte‘ N ehru’s SUP P °« - and b?
had resigned from the presidency in th "’l “ Veteran Congressman (who
against the deterioration of n u rn l ^ part ° £ 1 9 1 7 in ProteSt
organization). Kripaiani -mrl Se and actlon he said he found in the
the spring of 1951 after orsra nUm ” ° £ £ollowers Ieft the Congress in
position was that he agreed J T f , “ ^ P° litical Pa n >' K rip a la n i’s
Congress and the governmem Congress platform , b u t that the
other expressions of d i S l " k T his m ove and
ably exerted an influence on N e lJ u * “ ndllIons in the country prob-
C onpess presidency in August 195, a '; , " , Ced T an d o n o llt o£ thC
tion.a S6t ack f° r thc comn'un aHy-mjncj ej ° 1 Post h i"'SL’IC- T.hiS
. Yemenis w ithin the organiza-
1 he issue about which TnW
independence is that of r e l a ^ S p ^ ^ been most — d since
ing took place m Kashmir, and at t‘ Stan' For a Period active fight-
ies has seemed imminent. But t l J T 3 .?Cneral w ar of the two Conn
ie in f 6 g° '’erning parties of both coi ° minance o£ m oderate elements
“ interesting to note, as far as IndTa ^ S° £ar a'’erted w ar. It
theT l nght'winS groups for w ar n t “ CO" cer.ned' that the appeals of
cnhe^ro^'e™"”" ^ ' ^ t ^ r d a t f o ^ ^ k ^ ^ a s h m ir a n d
r : r : r « ■
Kashmir has also become ,
would'3, “ Unifying India- O n r r e l 01 T * * e problem s ° f na'

would like to see Kashmir penna aSOn 7 ^ Indian nationalists
" P; ; ndf° T r a,n -ly M0slera‘ a"d its in ‘ndUded in India * that Kashm ir
basis T, ° -r as a secular state com b i^ 013"110" m ight strengLlien the
, 1S slSniacant that in 1953 aft ? mg various creeds on an equal
lah th e 1" 11 pdireCt “ ^ P lete income1011® SEeming a su p p er
h ’ * e Pro‘Congress Kashmiri Mo “ ° T ° n in India> Sheikh Abdul-
m leader- ^ o k e out strongly fo r the
autonomy of Kashmir. He apparently favors joining India, but he feels

that he can lead Kashmir effectively only if his emphasis in speaking to
its (predom inantly Moslem) people, with their own language and tradi
tions, is on the integrity of Kashmir rather than on opposing Pakistan or
supporting India. Although Kashmir is an area of special conditions, be
cause of the stake of India and Pakistan in it, the regional (or linguistic)
nationalism to which Abdullah is now attempting to appeal is similar to
that found in other areas of India, and also in Pakistan.
In its overall foreign policy Indian nationalism has been moderate and
cautious. This has reflected a practical desire to avoid being drawn into
the great power struggle, as well as many aspects of traditional nationalist
political theory. The dominant leadership of Indian nationalism is
drawn from the middle class in character and certainly does not support
Communism. But this dominant group for the most part grew up in
resistance to Britain, a capitalist power, and was nurtured on anti-imperial-
ism as a political ideal. The facts that Russia and China are nearby and
that in recent years China has gone Communist have added to the prac
tical reasons for official Indian caution. A t the same time there is no
doubt that the revolutionary events in China have had a strong influence
on much Indian thinking.
A host of factors therefore tend to push the Indian government now
in one direction, now in another, w ith a “middle course” as the outcome.
In a long-term sense, however, the prevailing Indian leadership, includ
ing N ehru’s, has grown more conservative in the past five years and at
present is leaning more toward the West th an before. In this evolution
the facts that India’s key economic ties are w ith the non-Communist
world, and that the conflict between the government and the Indian
Communists has sharpened, both play an im portant part.
T he story of Indian nationalism in power is still unfolding. It would
be prem ature to pass a definite judgment on it until many more years
have passed and its components, characteristics and tendencies have
manifested themselves more clearly than hitherto. In its recent general
elections it has shown a rem arkably encouraging capacity for orderly and
democratic procedures. Its land reform programs, its ambitious industriali
zation projects, and more recently its partly foreign-aided community
development schemes hold genuine promise for the future. Yet in its
persistent food shortage and dangerously increasing population it faces
staggering difficulties which could defeat even the most enlightened and
devoted leadership. Its success or fa ilu re is o f the most vital concern,

not o n ly to the W estern dem ocratic countries, but also to the sm aller
new nation s of southeastern A sia w hich look to it fo r leadership and for
an a ltern a tive to the course taken by China.
P A R T ONE
to
INDONESIAN POLITICS
A N D NATIONALISM
by
GEORGE McT. K A H IN
o
Assistant Professor of Government and Executive
Director, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University
Author of t(Nationalism and Revolution in lndonesia}>
Introduction
V*
h e p a tte rn o f Dutch colonial rule in the Indies differed in many re
T spects from the colonial regimes in other parts of Asia. Partly because
of this fact and partly because of the distinctive cultural background of die
people of Indonesia, the nationalist movement which has developed there
exhibits numerous special characteristics which distinguish it from the
other colonially-conditioned nationalisms of south Asia.
For many centuries the Indies were a crossroads not only of commerce
but of ideas. It is probably because of this that so large a part of the popula
tion, particularly in Java and Sumatra, has exhibited such notable toler
ance and hospitality to religious and intellectual currents from outsi e.
U ndoubtedly it was largely because of this disposition that Islam, vin e
significantly was carried to Indonesia by merchants and teachers rather
than by the sword, assumed a character in Indonesia different from w la
it has in other Mohammedan countries. The Islamic culture of most o
that 90 per cent of the Indonesia population which professes Moham
medanism forms only a top layer of Indonesian culture, of which the older
lower layers—Hinduism, Buddhism, and Javanese m ysticism -are often
just as deep and important. In Indonesia during the past h alf century m
particular there has been a receptivity to new and progressive currents
generated in the Islamic world, to a degree that has been rare among
Mohammedan countries.
T he final stages of the spread of Mohammedanism in the 16th and 17th
centuries was coincident with the first m ajor impact of the Christian West
Even at this early period Islam in Indonesia tended to become a symbol of
local patriotism standing against the alien and aggressive Christian West
In a lim ited sense one could say that when the impact of Dutch polltica
power was first felt in Indonesia there was foreshadowed the role which
Islam was to play in the early 20th century as the first important channel
of an organized, articulate nationalist movement.
Among the aspects of Dutch colonial rule most im portant in shaping e
character of the Indonesian nationalist movement were: (11 a land^pohcy
which after 1874 tended to preserve the pattern of agricultural holdings
67
68
ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
and discouraged the developm ent of a large alien lan d lord group; (2 ) an
economic system which in general tended to stifle business enterprise
amongst Indonesians and elim inate most of the indigenous m erchant class;
n a re 'UCtance to allow Indonesians experience in self-governm ent, the
Dutch being m this respect far behind the U nited States in the Philippines
and Britain m India and Burma; (4) an unwillingness to p rovid e facilities
popu a r o n ' L ,tIOn 3nd 3b0Ve l° m° re tlWn 3 “ A c t i o n o f the

L e t o more’ ^ -° ° pen j ° bS “ c u r a t e w ith this train-
education “ Sm3 P° r “ 0n ° £ the ln d °"esians who received such an
PhaSC ° f In d ° neSia'S
leadershio ThP c gely ow inS t0 the lack o f effective
nesia utilized the old a r is t o c r a t ^ m ^ em pl° yf d lhe D utch in Ind° ’
ment. Thereby the traditional , • ° nesian ellte as lts p rim ary mstru-
of the Netherlands colonial re ” dtlV® leadershlP became more the agent
people’s interests. It w-k nnt gl™e uthan the guardian of the Indonesian
the increasingly politic*]II U m *1 1 C nSC ° f a new Indonesian elite tIiat
ing urban “ “T “ d
th£ 1CaderSll,P
TT ^
Islam ic thought, p a r tic u llr ly w h ir" ^ °£
nom ically hard-pressed resid u al Z T m t° COntact w ith Lhe eC° '
Several of the first m em bers of th mentS tlle J a v anese m e rc h a n t class-
emerge during the second decade of ?h e 9 n fa,hSt IeadershiP w hich beSan W
impact. However, it was prim arilv ■ century were products of this
during this same period that l ln tr° duction o£ W estern education
sible. Western education, along- w ith 1 ^ e™ergence of this new elite pos-
creasingly on Modernist Islamir ™ 2 M ° hammedan education based in
tact with political ideas which w e J ^ T ^ n brou&ht ^ d o n esian s into con-
order. Moreover, this W estern eH V COmPatib le w ith the colonial
elite group m0St of whose memh pT * 10” reaulted in form ation of a neW
of those Indonesians who had acquirrderew tremeIy dissatis^ d . For many
financial sacrifice, were confronted bv " education, often at great
government and business em ployment ^ i ° ^ ieS ° f dlscrim ination in both
of the better positions requiring su c h 11 TG$GTVed for Europeans most
that this growing new elite should n r n v - i ^ 1011, U Was th erefore n atural
with the leadership it needed to becorrJ &nt Incl°n esian nationalism
It was the Islamic-oriented Partm c .*!* a° tive m ovement.
aietat IslamIndonesiawhich first
69
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM
commanded the center of the stage of the Indonesiannatio"alut m i n t

ment W ith a membership which reached nearly 2,500,000 in 1919 on y
seven years after its founding, its demands for full independence caused
the Netherlands real concern. Soon thereafter an intense competition for
domination of the nationalist movement developed between this Islamic
party and the newly-founded Indonesian Communist Party. T h e r e ensued
a bitter struggle between them which was accompanied by increasingly
ffe e P a s s iv e policies on the part of the Dutch D unng the course
of this both groups lost much of their mass backing. W hen the Communist
a he end of 1926 attempted a coup d'etat, they so lacked supporters that
the Netherlands East Indies government suppressed ,t easily and promptly.
T he after, until the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, the Commu-
nisTs split into two m utually hostile groups, o p e r a t e d underground as a
weak ’ nd ineffective political force, while the Sarehat Islam never was able
to recapture its once commanding position within the nationalist niove^
S w o T in the late 1 9 2 0 , and early 1930's these l e a d e n ^

by the Dutch and not released from their places of detention until just
before or just after the Japanese invasion early in 1J4A
I t inS outlook.
3non-capitalist E - SThey
B have
S t been
, ~ drawn"almost enu
“i Sy " -
that extremely narrow sector of Indonesian society made up o^m iddk a
lower rank civil servants, the few lawyers, doctors, engineers, a n d
small, residual In d o n esian merchant group. It is important^ to note d
most members of this small group have had no vested intere P
ism. They have regarded it prim arily as a part of a co lo n a econom y
tem, which b r o u g h t no benefits to them. Few of them h a J
• i tn he alienated bv socialist ideas. In general uiey
sonal m aterial reason to be alienated y overlord and
have looked upon capitalism as the way of their European
his eq u ally resented Chinese associates. M any have tended to equate capi
talism ancl colonial rule, and fo r them hostility to colonial ru le quite
n a tu ra lly entailed hostility to capitalism. Because o f this, and freq u en tly
also fo r m oie ration al reasons, the orientation of alm ost the w hole o f the
n ation alist leadership in Indonesia, even much of the m erchant group,
was and remains definitely socialistic.
A m in o iity has espoused Communism. However, the opportunism dis
played by Soviet Russia towards the issue of colonial independence and
the im portance o f religion to m any nationalist leaders has Lurned most
of them away from the path of Communism and towards some Indonesian
va rian t o f social democracy.
A lone this small group was not able to perform the decisive role so
oi ten filled by the broader middle-class groups in nationalist movements
e sewhere It could not by itself marshal sufficient strength to challenge
tie y t c i seriously. T o attain national independence it was necessary
lo r this tiny nationalist elite to develop an effective organizational link
wit t ie peasantry and with urban and plantation labor. T h ou gh sus
tained efforts were made in this direction before the war, the repressive
pow er of the colonial governm ent was too great. Never p rio r to the in
vasion o£ the Japanese was this elite able to establish such a lin k w ith the
Indonesian masses.
thr6e and 3 haU >earS ° f J aPanese occupation the Indonesian

even term , m° Ve"leI“ became stronger and equipped to fight on more
their control' Th T * "’hen they returned and attem pted to reassert
Tapanese dp It f ' defense put up by the Dutch arm y against the
neither effectively^protected^he ^ e|êr^?nC^S P™«'‘g e -T h e D utch, having
to nm fprf y protected the Indonesians n or perm itted them the arms
ships the neonlp VCS’ Weê consi<Iered as largely responsible fo r the hard-
; X . t „ S T ” “ 7h>
panda hv th* L
h “ ,< i i
yCarS ° f Persistent anti-D utch propa-
Dutch sentim entpanese 0ccupatlon authorities, served to spread anti-
ever before. m° le W X am° ng the mass o£ the p op u latio n than
t h ^ W o t f eat im p° rtance was the latitude which the Japanese allow ed

he I donesian nationalist leaders, Soekarno in particu lar, in bu ild in g
up
j the nationalist
. , movement
T Thic mi-
1 ills the Japanese were w illin g to do in or-
er to gain much-needed cooperation in m obilizing m anpow er and p ro
duction foi the Japanese w ar economy and for the train ing and in d octrin a
tion ot an Indonesian m ilitia as an au xiliary of the Japanese occupation
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM /A
army. T hough these nationalist leaders did give the Japanese some help,
p articu larly in the recruitm ent of forced labor, Indonesians generally be
lieved that their leaders got much the best of the Japanese in this bargain
ing. T h e direct contact which Soekarno and others were allow ed w ith
ru ra l and urban labor and the skill of the Indonesian underground organi
zations, particularly those led by Sjah rir and Sjarifuddin, in supplem ent
ing their work resulted in a much greater stim ulus to the n ationalist m ove
m ent than the Japanese had expected. By 1945 Indonesians were not only
keyed to a higher pitch of nationalism than ever before, b u t the orienta
tion of that nationalism was as much anti-Japanese as it was anti-Dutch,
and though it was anti-Dutch, it was for the most part w ell disposed
towards the other Allies.
T h e surrender of Japan served to remove very quickly the repressive ap
paratus that had for so long held the Indonesian nationalist m ovem ent m
check. A t the same time Indonesians came into possession of the arms
they needed to contest attem pts to reimpose outside control. W h en the
Japanese com m ander in Java made it clear that rath er than prom ote
Indonesian independence he w ould abide by A llied orders to m aintain
the status-quo pending the take-over by A llied troops, Soekaino and
I-Intta, urged on by the underground organizations and student groups,
on August 17, 1945 proclaim ed Indonesia’s independence. Some arms
were already in the hands of the now predom inantly anti-Japanese Indo
nesian m ilitia which the Japanese had trained. A dd ition al quantities
were obtained from the Japanese, either by fighting for them or because
some Japanese officers vo lu n tarily turned them over.
By the time the British, the first A llied troops to arrive, landed in Java
some six. weeks after the declaration of independence they were amazed to
find the new ly-born Indonesian R epublic a reality possessing an armed
m ilitia and a functioning, if somewhat rudim entary, adm inistration.
M oreover, they found that it was solidly linked to, and backed by, the
Indonesian masses. A fter a brief, bitterly contested and unsuccessful at
tem pt to secure m ilitary control over the whole of Java, the British, u n
w illin g to commit more troops, began a policy of negotiation w ith the
R epublic. T hey urged the Dutch authorities, whose troops they were con
fining to the port areas they held, to do likewise.
It is unnecessary here to review the abortive efforts of the Dutch by m ili
tary and political means to establish an Indonesian governm ent in accord
ance w ith their desires. Suffice it to say that the struggle did much to in
tensify the forces of nationalism . By the late spring of 1949 it was evident
that the D utch could not m ount sufficient m ilitary strength in Indonesia
to enforce a decision and that prolongation o f the costly m ilitary effort
w ou ld m ean only a continuing heavy drain o f m anpow er and w ealth while
achieving no positive results. A grow ing disposition in the N etherlands to
com prom ise w ith the Indonesian R epublic was u ndoubtedly increased by
A m erican pressure, p articu larly by m ounting sentimenL in the Am erican
Senate fo r cutting off E.C.A. assistance to the N etherlands unless it carried
ou t the U.N. s long-ignored directives for release of R ep u b lican political
leaders and the retu rn of the Jogjakarta area to their control.
A t the Hague conference during the late sum m er of 19 19 a settlem ent
was finally reached. In essence the N etherlands exchanged its claim to
sovereignty over all Indonesia except W estern New G uinea for preser
vation of its economic position in Indonesia (subject to R epublican law
as determ ined by the economic interests of the country) and a ship
ping agreement and a debt settlem ent distinctly favorable to the Dutch.
n ecem b er 27, 1949 the n e w a n d fu lly in d e p e n d e n t I n d o n e s ia n state,
t e e p u b lic o f the U nited States o f Indonesia, was proclaim ed, and a
le w m o n th s la te r it w as a d m itte d as th e s ix tie th m e m b e r o f th e U n ite d
I. Major Indonesian Political Organizations and Programs
up to the Transfer of Sovereignty
1. ISL A M IC P O L IT IC A L O R G AN IZATIO N S
lit M o h a m m e d a n r e l ig io n p r o v id e d th e e a r lie s t c h a n n e l o f d e v e lo p
ment of modern, m ature Indonesian nationalism . Its influence on
Indonesian nationalism and on in tern al politics is still extrem ely strong.
Less w ell known has been the pow erful influence which it has exerted and
continues to exert on social-economic thought and developm ent w ithin
Indonesia.
M odernist Islamic teachings as they developed du rin g the first decades
o f this century in C airo, found a response in Indonesia out of all p ropor
tion to that which they elicited in other Islamic countries. Danger to
Dutch ascendancy in the Indies came not so much from the pan-lslam ic
ideas Lhat Indonesian students at Mecca brought back w ith them, of
which the N etherlands Indies governm ent was so much afraid, as from
the M odernist Islamic ideas1" being taught in Cairo, in particu lar those
stem m ing from the teachings o f M oham med A b d u h .2
T h e A bduh M ovem ent emerged into prom inence about the tu rn of the
century and has continued as a potent force ever since. Islam, its ad
herents believed, could be defended only if M uslims understood W estern
knowledge and methods and the reasons fo r the progress of the W est and
if they purified Islam of corrupt and superstitious influences and prac
tices. M uslim higher education was to be reform ed by inclusion o f study
o f the m odern sciences, E uropean history and C hristianity. Political and
social justice was emphasized, and defense against the W est was thought
1. G ibb defines th e “ M odernists” as “ those w ho do care, an d som etim es care deeply,

ab o u t ih c ir relig io n b u t who are, in vario us degrees, offended b y the trad itio n al do g
m atics and by th e insistence of the conservatives upon the san ctity of the trad itio n al
in stitu tio n s in the M uslim w orld. For the m ajo rity the issues in d isp u te are m ain ly
those re la tin g to the p ractical d uties an d the social in stitu tio n s o£ Islam ." H .A .R. G ibb,
M od em Trends in Islam, Chicago, 1947, p p . 52-3.
2. For a discussion of the ideas of M oham m ed A b duh an d of h is background, see
G ibb, op. cit., p p . 33-43.
73
o f in terms o f nationalism ra th e r than o f Pan-Islam. It was the im p ortan t

al M an ai branch of the m ovem ent ,3 w ith its attem pt “to restate the p rin
ciples o f Islam ic ethics in terms o f social values ”4 and its p articu lar con
cern fo r social and p olitical justice, w hich exercised the chief attraction
fo r Indonesians .0 As M anarist ideas filtered down into Indonesia, at first
p rin cip ally through the com m unalistically-oriented M inankabau society
o£ west-central Sum atra, their nationalistic content took on strongly anti-
im perialist overtones and in general they were so in terp reted as to ren
der them more easily reconcilable w ith socialist economic principles.
These ideas exerted a tremendous influence, finally m anifesting them
selves in the first pow erful Indonesian nationalist m ovem ent, the Sarekat
Islam (Islamic Association). D uring the decade follow in g 1912, this move-
m ent om inated the Indonesian nationalist struggle and thereafter as
the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Association Party),
ro le ^ irnimshed in influence, continued to play an extrem ely im portant
proclam ation of Indonesian independence on A ugust 17,

1J45, the role of Islam in Indonesian political life again assumed the
r r r r “ lLThad hcld during the second and third decades o f the twenti-
under^ n T FimP °nance has not* however, been matched by foreign
u n d e rsta n d in g o f u s p rin c ip le s.
M asjumi
£a I ! r ; ritT A f0reign observers generally in rath er cavalier

don in T l tbeMasi Umi>W - t of the Islam ic p o litical organiza-
“riehtist ” ■■ C ° Ver'slmPllfied and inaccurate terms as “reactionary,”
rightist, conservative,” “middle-class,” “bourgeois,” etc In reality none
tion wTthTTr Ui Th£ MaS,Umi iS 3 high ly COmP‘ex P °lit k a l o i^ n iz a -

r s x r S
hpri hpri ” cot, c* c
i r ^nized.^
t 7^
1-" is the ^
T h e M a s ju m i is a n e le p h a n t w ith
lessTofj it; lack

. 0f C aganization—
n L nt i ^ Wlranef ra- ° oTf almost
a weakness ° f * all the laree
BUt oarties
m Indonesia—most non __ • i i lcll5 c paiucs
oer cent of ihp v f ■ Mas]llmi leaders expect it to w in from 25 to 50
p er cent of the votes m coming elections.
j?roup was form ed after the dpnrh at i ■

>
of h is ch ief disciples, R ash id R id a who from M ° ham m cd A bd“ h ab o ut 19(* b y one
m agazine, A l M an a r (T h e Lighthouse^ w hirh ap Pro xim atcIy 1900 Lo 1930. ed ited a
4 G ibb, op. cit., p. 5 2 . L lg ‘UhoUSC>’ w hlch ™ ex trem ely in flu e n tia l in In don esia.
5. At least they so interpreted its emphasis.
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM 75
T h e M asjum i (M adjelis Sjuro M uslim in Indonesia— Council of In

donesia Moslem Associations), founded on Novem ber 7, 1945, at Jogja
karta, was the in h erito r of the ideas o f M ohammed A b d u h and of the
Sarekat Islam tradition and form er membership. It enrolled all the non
political Islam ic organizations subsumed under the “M asjum i” o f the
Japanese period, such as the thirty-ihree-year-old M oham m adijah and the
slightly younger N ahdatul Ulama, as w ell as such prew ar Islamic political
organizations as the P a rtai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. F or alm ost two years
it rem ained the only Islamic political organization w ith in the R epublic
o f Indonesia. Because of the support from the m ajor non-political Moslem
social organizations, and particu larly from village religious leaders, the
M asjum i was able to b u ild up a huge, if unintegrated and unorganized,
mass backing. In addition to en rollin g the support of almost all Moslem
religious leaders o f Java, M adura, and Sum atra, the M asjum i attracted
the backing of most of the vestigial Indonesian commercial and indus
trial m iddle class throughout that area and the m ajority o f the larger
Indonesian landow ners .0
These groups, though exercising influence, have not dom inated the
M asjum i. As m ight be expected, the old-line Islamic nationalist leaders,
such as Dr. Sukim an, A bikusno Tjokrosujoso, and Samsuddin, have
exerted a strong influence on its policies. W h a t does not seem to be gen
erally appreciated, however, is the fact that an increasingly dom inant in
fluence w ith in the party has been exerted b y a dynamic younger genera
tion o f M anarists, u sually referred to as the “Religious Socialists.” T hey
derive th eir point of view in p art from the early M anarist leaders o f the
prew ar P a rtai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, p articu larly T jokroam inoto and
H adji Agus Salim . T jokroam in oto in his influential book Islam dan
Socialisme, published in 1926, m aintained that the social reform s advo
cated by the M arxist socialists can be achieved b etter b y the Moslems ac
cording to the tenets o f Islam. H adji Salim , today still active and a
venerated influential elder statesman, in the early 1920’s debated vigor
ously and effectively against some of the ablest Com m unist leaders,
arguing that anti-capitalism and the social-economic reform s advocated
by the M arxists had been preached by M oham m ed twelve centuries be
fore M a rx ’s birth. However, the views of this young and dynamic group
6. F req u en tly th e re lig io u s le a d e r w as a t th e sam e tim e a m em ber of th is indigenous
m id d le class or lan d lo rd grou p. T h is arose from th e fact th a t o n ly a m an of some m eans
co uld afford th e costs of th e p ilg rim a g e to M ecca. T h ose w ho h ad m ade the P ilgrim ag e,
th e H adjis, en jo yed co nsiderable p restig e in th e eyes of th e M oslem com m unity. H ow
ever, m an y o f th e greatest relig io u s lead ers a re no t H adjis.
are in a large m easure th eir own and new. T h ey represent the im pact of
the Indonesian revolu tion upon sincere young Moslems possessed of en
ligh tened m inds and a strong sense o f duty to society.
T h e influence of this group suffered a b rie f set-back in conjunction
w ith the general anti-L eft sentim ent th at swept the R ep u b lic follow ing
th e violence attending the Com m unist reb ellion of Septem ber-O ctober
1948. H owever, it soon more than recovered the strong position w ithin
the p arty w hich it had come increasingly to h old after the beginning of
1946. Even before the rebellion in early Septem ber 1948, six o f the seven
teen members o f the M asjum i Party C ouncil were members of this group.
T hey included Dr. A b u H anifah, M oham m ad N atsir (C hairm an o f the
M asjum i Political Council), M oham m ad Roem , Sjafru d d in Prawirane-
gara,^ and Ju su f W ibisono. W ith several other members o f the Council
lolding views close to theirs, this group came to exercise m ore influence
over M asjum i policy than the rem ainder of the C o u n cil’s members to
p p e r Its growing influence was reflected by a gradual shift in Lhe out-
'T'v, ° J 11051" tbe other leaders of the p arty to positions closer to its own.
hough during 1949 dom inance o f the R eligious Socialists w ith in the
M asjum i was by no means as yet definitely established, the prospects for
their achieving this appeared substantial.
beTune^ ? 7'7 t 0£ 1949 and likewise the M asi um i ° f the present cannot
O nlv a VtH ^ re£erence to its C onstitution of N ovem ber 1945.
of ,b ! 1 mOTe S1X m ° nths later the broad and ^ u tio u s phrasing
l a n ^ l 7 r nt WaS,ecliPsed by the vigorous and socially dynam ic
, parL>'s Ul'gency Program, o f w hich the R eligious Social-
this c a lled ' for- ^ th£m Wer£ * e architects' Am ongst oth er things
to fae^bleô e«nhlllthe *Sla™ c geology in matters concerning the state in order

with teachings of Islam.5 ^ ° n popular SOTCreignty and justice in harmony
w o rk in g hour"âccid'enT w *u c l|‘ g u a ra n te e w o rk e rs m in im u m w ag es, m a x im u m

a n d h o u sin g . ” ° a llo w a n c e s, p ro te c tio n as to s e c u rity , h e a lth
the peasant private °" ™ rShiP «£ iand

g en eral e n h ^ e n t " I S t j T * P r° teCti° n “ th e 5ale ° £ p r ° duCtS' 3 n d
F inally, w ith regard to the general organization o f the economy, the

program stated: 3
al/citizens^111^ ^ ^ StatG mUSt be t0 ° pen the PossibiIity ° f work to

2. The economy should be based upon collectivism in which individual initia
tive is not detrimental to the general interest and which is directed towards gen
eral prosperity.
3. The right of private ownership is recognized, subject to limitations laid
down in religion (taxes, charity, etc.).
4. Capitalism that is obviously concerned with individual interest alone [i.e.,
socially harmful capitalism] must be opposed.
Not only did the party press the governm ent to adopt this program,
but it undertook to im plem ent much of it directly. It financed the meas
ures which it introduced by means of the Islamic system o f zakat1— a form
of charity incum bent upon all who can afford paym ent. In W estern
parlance zahat w ould be recognized as akin to the tithe that form erly was
paid to the Church. In Islam, however, there is no organized church to
undertake its collection, so that, if it is to be taxation distinct from that
of the state, the com m unity itself must organize it. W ith o u t such com
m unity organization the in d ivid u al is not apt to pay. M asjum i leaders
m aintain that the K oran stresses that zahat does not mean m erely giving
beggars the funds collected, but must be an organized system to expand
the economic w ealth of the com m unity as a w hole and must not be sterile
investm ent. Late in 1946, in the residency o f K ediri, the M asjum i under
took the collection of zahat in order to carry out the social reform s to
which it was committed. For this purpose it established the Sarekat T ani
Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Islamic Peasants). T h e govern
ing board of each local branch of the Sarekat T an i was elected by all the
landowners of a village or village-com plex. Each board assessed the zakat
that the landowners of the area should pay. Those assessed then had the
option of giving their assessment either to the Sarekat T ani or to support
schools or mosques. W hereas previously the relatively sm all am ount of
zakat collected by local religious leaders had gone almost exclusively to
the support of Islamic schools and mosques, a m ajor p ortio n o f the much
larger am ount now collected w ent to the Sarekat Tani.
U nder the guidance of M asjum i leaders, the Sarekat T an i utilized its
zakat funds for helping poor and landless peasants. In each community
w here it operated, waiting-lists o f the most diligent landless peasants were
draw n up by the local boards and land was bought each year fo r those
whose diligence had p u t them at the top of the list; no repaym ent was
7. In In d on esia zakat calls for th e fo llo w in g y early p aym en ts: 5 p er cent of the crop
from irrig a te d la n d ; 10 p er ccnt of the crop from n o n -irrig ated lan d ; 2i/2 p er cent of
m oney saved d u rin g the y e a r; 2 p er cent of reserve c a p ita l; 2 p e r cent of a m erch an t’s
trad e c ap ita l.
dem anded o f ihem. In addition, selling and buying cooperatives were

organized amongst the peasants to free them from dependency on
itin e ra n t Chinese moneylenders, previously their p rincipal source of
credit. These cooperatives m arketed the crop and bought at wholesale
tools and fertilizer for the peasant w hile advancing him sufficient credit
to tide him over u n til the crop was harvested and sold. Loans were at the
extrem ely low rate (for Indonesia) of 10 per cent per annum , did n ot re
q u ire the usual collateral, and could be repaid either in money or in kind.
So successful were Lhese cooperatives sponsored by the local Sarekat T ajji
th at w ith in two years the large m ajority o f the peasants in the areas
served by them had turned to them and away from Chinese moneylenders.
M any of these Chinese were forced to em igrate to Dutch-occupied areas,
in particular the Residency of Pekalongan, in order to make a living. By
m id-1948, there were over 30,000 members of the Sarekat T an i in K ediri
and M adiun residencies and more than 10,000 in the M agelang-W onosobo
area. Branches were being set up throughout most o f Republican-con
trolled Ja v a 8 in what was envisaged as a tremendous program o f expan
sion.
I n e a r l y 1 9 4 7 th e Sarekat Dagang Islam Indonesia (In d o n e s ia n Islam ic
ommerce Association), an organization of merchants roughly p aralleling
the Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia, was established under the auspices of
t e Masjumi. This undertook to organize the merchants for the collection
o z a k a talong the same lines as in the case 01 the landowners. Zakat funds
co ecte y the local Sarekat Dagang Islam branches were utilized to
establish a Bank Pembanguman Umat (Bank fo r the R econstruction of
oociety). Its function was to advance credit at low rates w ith a m inim um
o security requirements to small merchants and to w orthy poor persons
nee ing capital to start in business. By m id-1948, the success o f the
Sarekat Dagang Islam had been established and its num ber o f branches
was rap idly expanding.
T h e feeling of M asjum i leaders in m id-1949 was that, w ith the attain
m ent of independence, the governm ent should coordinate the activities
of the; local units of the Sarekat Tani Islam and the Sarekat Dagang Islam,
bu t should not interfere in their local adm inistration. For th ty fe lt that
the pop ulation must not lean on the governm ent, but m ust be made
br dccmed - >■«
a g ric u ltu re rem ain s stro n ger th ere an d p len ty of la n d ' is a v a 'f a b lT ™ ° rg an U atl° n ot
conscious of its own responsibility and ab ility to take action on its own
initiative.
D uring the years after the M asju?ni’s Urgency Program of early 1946,
the ideology o f the Religious Socialists became more and m ore distinct,
and they became increasingly articulate in expressing it. One of the
clearest expositions of their ideas is to be found in the pam phlet, Politick
dan R evohtsi K ita (Politics and O u r R evolution), published in the m iddle
o f 1948 by one of their most influential leaders, Sjafru d d in Praw irane-
gara.n T h e follow ing excerpts from this m ay help to illu strate the view
point of this increasingly influential left w ing of the M asjum i:
What is the aim of our national revolution? The aim is the unity of the Indo
nesian people and the realization of social justice and prosperity to our people.
Therefore the abolition of the colonial system alone is not enough. We need an
economic and political structure which can guarantee the realization of social
justice and this could not be realised in the Dutch time which was colonialistic
and capitalistic in nature.
Our constitution is also influenced by socialism, as is proved by Article 33.
However socialism in the construction has no spiritual connection with Marx-
Socialism, because Article 29, Clause One, stipulates that our state is based on
Religion. The followers of the constitution who are now following Marx-Socialism
unconsciously pursue a wrong path.
Collectivism without individualism is like a flock of sheep which can be dis
persed easily. It is fascism if a certain ideology will impose collectivism upon the
people by forcefully eliminating a class of people.
Islam forbids the forcible imposition of a certain ideology. Individualism is
properly respected by Islam, each individual is responsible for himself to God.
Islam calls for the reaching of agreement by means of discussion among the peo
ple. In our revolution many Moslems are forgetting the principles of Islam, sup
port Marx-Socialism and participate in actions which merely create troubles and
hamper the revolution.
Our national revolution needs an ideology ■which can guarantee the realiza
tion of social justice. However, I believe that Marxism can not fulfill the need; also
Marxism is contrary to the constitution. The ideology which is suitable to our
society is Religious Socialism, an ideology which is in harmony with the constitu
tion. Religious Socialism does not abolish individualism, individual initiative
and individual responsibility. Thus, not only the freedom of the whole nation is
guaranteed but also the freedom of the individual, without closing the door for
possible nationalization or socialization of certain vital enterprises. This is the
ideal of our national revolution.
Therefore it is not correct to state that it is not yet the time to begin with
9. H is p o litic a l s ta tu re and in flu en ce in creased d u rin g th e D utch m ilita ry action
w h ich began D ecem ber 19, 1948. A t th a t tim e h e was in S u m atra an d was ap p o in ted
h ead of th e E m ergency G overnm ent of the R ep u b lic, a post h e h eld u n til the retu rn
of th e G overnm ent to Jo g ja k a rta an d in w h ich he acq u itted h im self w ell.
socialistic revolution. On the contrary, our n atio n al revolution obviously indicates

elem ents of socialism , which are sim ilar to M arx-Socialism . If the elem ents of
socialism do not exist, the national revolution m eans nothing' to us, as it does not
give new hope. However, the basis of socialism in our revolution is not the his
toric m aterialism of M arx, but its basis is the duty of m an tow ards m an and the
d u ty of m an towards God.
T herefore the means of realizin g socialism m ust be different from the means
used by M arx-Socialism w ith its class struggle. A ccording to R eligio u s Socialism
socialization is only a means to realize social justice and the people's prosperity.
T herefore to achieve socialization it is not necessary to elim in ate a certain class
or groups and it is also not necessary to introduce an overall socialization; it is
enough if socialization is introduced when necessary.
Competition arising out o£ private initiative as such is not bad, but the con
trary, because competition increases production and improves the quality ° £
goods. We must not forget that the progress of production and economy in Eu-
ope and America was possible because of competition. Only at a certain stage
n J : ' 1” economy does not increase production and there is a tendency to limit
L n nr that.sta8e the government must intervene by nationalizing cer
tain private enterprises or establishing enterprises itself
notbeYn&LSn rM lng ^ ,limitation on competition and/or socialization should
and circumsMnr mC y f ™ 56 0f a desirc to rcalize a «■»;>!" theory; the time
orpns are not vet l m'° cons!clcr:ttir>n■ If the government
u o ^ c ie i ; x
duction is not vetcnPT, ■
and - p - - - ihc * * * ~
capable persons, and if home pro
twice before we imrndi Sr PP. Y thC n.Ceds oE the Pct>ple, we m ust think
for the sake of re-iT 1 ^ S° ,zatlon or ]im it com petition. O therw ise m erely
sake of reahzm g a certain theory, we w ill cause our own people to die-
The success of the Religious Socialists in bringing the M asjum i as a
reached°'bv P ° iM ^ “ by th e e x te n t o f a g " * ® 6"*

z t J L V c 3stanr, r ajority °£the sevente- °f tbe
o f the n rin cin l 7 ^ ° £ 1 9 4 8 ' T h e l o w i n g is a p a ra p h ra s e
z £ s r ncii's majority - ^ ^ as far

1 . Complete independence o£ Indonesia.
' moera^foundîn UP° n ^ prindPles of sodaI Justice and ^
teen mem bers of the Party Council- Dr T h ° f the W riter w ilh flve oE th e 1
R oem , Sjafrud d in P raw iran eeara Dr ft n ifah > M oham m ad N atsir, M oham tf»a
leaders. The principles here listed'are of U lm an ~ and several n o n -M asjum i
enteen mem bers of the Council. M o re o v e ^ H ^ ’ ”0t uniformly in terp reted by the se: J
w ould p u t m ore em phasis upon Moslem e ! • conservative m in o rity of th e Con*1
upon the social-econom ic aspect of the Mn UCat! on an d form al relig io u s p ractice th »
m uch less h o stile th an the m aio ritv tmvar^ JUmi ProSram - A few of th a t m in o rity ar
Jo n ty towards cap u alistic econom ic enterprise.
3. Government of the state according to the w ill of the m ajority, with its
principal officers being chosen through direct elections.
4. Opposition to capitalism in principle, but acknowledgment of the neces
sity tor its continuance for some time in certain spheres.
5. Acceptance of m ixed e c o n o m y —cooperative, socialistic and capitalistic.
6. Emphasis on the cooperative sector, with the state advancing credit to de
velop this.
7. G radual nationalization of transportation, communications, m ining, oil
production, large plantations and any large-scale industry as long as such
nationalization is to the country's best interests. N ationalization should be
accompanied by paym ent of reasonable compensation to those whose
property is expropriated. ,
8 Agreem ent that small-scale economic enterprise on an individual b asis-as
long as it is not uncontrolled-is socially healthy, in particular because it
develops individual initiative and responsibility.
9. Small-scale economic enterprise to rem ain in the hands of the individual.
B ut only where it cannot be integrated into cooperatives should it rem ain
on a purely capitalistic basis. <
10. Foreign capital to be welcome as long as it is non-political and so con
trolled that the Indonesian worker is protected and excessive profits are
not taken out of the country.
11 M atching of wages with the social value of the work performed.
19 Assurance by the government that owners of capital in non-nat.onalized
" economic enterprises do not take excessive profits and that the workers
share in the profits. c_
13. Absolute n eutrality in the “cold war”; alignm ent with neither the U.S.S.R.
nor the U nited States.
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia ( P .S .I .I .- I n d o n e s ia n Islamic Association

Party)
The increasing dominance of the young Religious Socialists within the
M asjumi created a strong negative reaction among many of the older
leaders of the prewar P.S.I.I. within the party. Many of them felt that
their positions in the M asjumi were not as high as they merited on the
basis of the positions they had held in the prewar Islamic nationalist
movement. In addition some of them, in particular the group led by
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Vice-Chairman o the Masjumt were lu teriy
opposed to the general agreement of the Religious Socialists with S ja h n s
no icv of negotiation with the Dutch. These two currents combined to
create a s c h iL within the M asju,m, a small part of its leade^ ^ P
ting off to form a separate party, the P.S.I.I. The consensus amon ; M o*
jum i and other political circles is that p o l i t i c a l . ^ T d A b t a s n o
chief impulse towards formation of the new P.S.I.I. Indeed, Abikusno,
present C h airm an of the P.S.I.I., has stated that the p arty was re-estab
lished in J u ly 1947 against his express wishes by W ondoam iseno and
A ru d ji K artiw in ata as a result of a deal between them and A m ir Sjarifud-
din. Sjarifu d d in needed Islamic political support in the cabinet which
he was then trying to form , the M asjum i having refused to support him.
As quid p ro quo fo r the re-establishment of a P.S.I.I. pledged to support
him , they were given, respectively, the posts of M inister o f In terio r and
Vice-M inister of Defense in the C abinet that Sjarifu d d in form ed on Ju ly
3, 1947.11 Six others of the new party were offered Cabinet posts; fo u r ac
cepted.
On J u ly 5, 1948, a conference o f the P.S.I.I. at K ediri called fo r the re
placement of W ondoam iseno by Abikusno as party C hairm an. A fter
refusing for several months to relinquish the post, W ondoam iseno finally
yielded his place to Abikusno on October 15, 1918.
T hough after A bikusno’s assumption of its leadership the orientation
of the P.S.I.I. became more definite, its program rem ained fa r from clear.
It ivas strongly opposed to negotiations w ith the Dutch, w hich it feared
could not end in real independence fo r Indonesia. Ju st p rio r to the
Dutch attack, of mid-December 1948, its leadership was active in b u ild
ing the P .S . I .I ., the P / N . I . and the nationalist Com m unist P artai M urba
into a political federation to oppose the political concession to the Dutch
that they feared Prime M inister H atta was prepared to make.
The party s leaders, unlike those of the M asjum i, stressed that domestic
social reform w ould have to await the attainm ent of fu ll independence.
Perhaps because o f this their, social-economic program rem ained vague
fo r so long. According to Abikusno, the P.S.I.I. is opposed to socialism
and considers Indonesian socialists to be different from communists.
W e respect individual rights and private property,” he states, and he
insists that exports must rem ain in p rivate hands. "The activities o f the
individual are more intensive than the government's and the in d ivid u al
can be better relied upon.” B ut he qualifies his defense of economic indi
vidualism . “As long as p rivate enterprise is able to meet the needs o f the
people, he continues, “it is all right; otherwise the governm ent must
11. A b ik u sn o s in terp retatio n is g en erally sup p orted by d isin terested p o litic a l ob
servers. See^ also G u n tu r (chief M asjum i new spaper), O ctober 21 an d S ep tem b er 1,
1948; an d Sikap (independent progressive w eekly), O ctober 23, 1948, “A b ikusn o dan
P.S.I.I. S ja rifu d d in s C ab inet lasted u n til Ja n u a ry 29, 1949, w hen it was rep laced by
a P re sid e n tial C ab inet (responsible to the P residen t ra th e r th an d irectly to P arliam en t)
h eaded b y H atta. In H atta's R ep u b lican C ab inet (w hich lasted u n til th e tran sfer of
sovereignty) th e M asjum i had strong rep resen tation an d the P.S.I.I. none.
INDONESIAN PO L IT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM 83
regulate economic enterprise." If it is found to be in the country’s interests,

his party would, he states, countenance the nationalization o f transport
and key industries .12
On foreign policy, the p arty’s stand was approxim ately the same as diat
o f the M asjum i— strict n eu trality as between the U nited States and Rus
sia, and refusal to be draw n into either the cold w ar or a fighting war.
In itially the resurrected P.S.I.I. commanded very little p op u lar sup
port. In Ja v a it detached no more than a small fraction of the large
p o p u lar follow ing o f the M asjum i. Elsewhere, however, p articu larly in
Sum atra and Celebes, its prospects fo r attracting such support appeared
to be better. T o m any people there, “P.S.I.I.” brought to m ind the dom i
nant p rew ar Islamic political organization. Some were apt to jo in the
new p arty on the basis of tradition and hab it alone, even though a
m ajority of the old p a rty’s leaders stayed w ith the M asjum i and refused
to support the new P.S.I.I. T h e contest fo r political control of Islamic
organizations outside of Java began to be vigorously contested by the
M asjum i and P.S.I.I. T h e outcome was certain to have significance for
the future o f Indonesia.
12. Quoted phrases derive from conversations of the w riter with Abikusno.
2. P A R T A I N ASIO N AL INDONESIA
(.Indonesian N ational P arty)
political party in the R epublic o f Indonesia was

n it ia l l y t h e la r g e st
I the P.N.I. T hough w ithin a year of the proclam ation of Indonesian

independence (August 17, 1945) it was surpassed in size by the M asjumi,
it has since rem ained the second largest of Indonesian parties .1 The
present P.N.I. has no relationship to the prew ar party o f the same name
once led by Soekarno except for the fact that some of the leaders of the
old p a rty are active in the new one. B ut much o f its in itial mass follow-
I. Except during the first half of September 1948, when, with the brief fusion of the
Socialist Party of Sjarifuddin (Partai Sosialis) and the Labor Party (.Partai B aruh) with
the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or P.K.I.), it was prob
ably surpassed in size by the latter.
84 A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W EST
ing was attracted larg ely because its name was identified w ith Soekarno,
despite the fact th at he was not a m em ber of the new p a rty .2 For not
on ly h ad he led the p rew ar p arty of the same name, but he and Hatta
h ad officially backed a sh ortlived official governm ent p arty of th at name
w h ich had existed from August 22 to 31, 1045.3 T hus much of the initial
mass backing o f the P.N.I. rested on the fiction th at it was "the party
of Soekarno and H atta.” It took m any Indonesians a year or m ore and
several foreign correspondents much longer, to become disabused of this
fiction.
H owever, the P.N.I. had an im portant long-term means o f attracting
mass support. T his arose from the fact that it secured the backing o f a
probable m ajo rity of R epublican local adm inistrative officers, by and
large the same men who had made up the old aristocratic Indonesian
adm inistrative civil service th at had served the p rew ar D utch adm inistra
tion. In addition, the P.N.I. attracted strong su p p ort from th eir non-
aristocratic subordinates in the civil service, most of w hom had also
w orked in the Dutch adm inistration. T hou gh the revolu tion was making
a great im pact upon the long-ingrained a u th o ritarian habits o f Indo
nesian society, there still rem ained a strong tendency fo r the peasantry
in particu lar to look fo r p olitical guidance and directives 4 to its tradi
tional governors— the aristocratic Indonesian adm inistrative class. T h at
fact was the long-term political strength o f the P.N.I.
It was w idely believed that the peasantry's trad itio n al and habitual
response to au th ority gave the P.N.I. a strong com petitive advantage in
the projected elections, an advantage surpassed on ly by th at held by the
M asjum i w ith its religious tie w ith the peasantry. In ad d ition , the P.N.I.
had the support of a substantial p a rt of the sm all b u t in flu en tial profes
sional class as w ell as most of those members o f the tin y Indonesian com
m ercial and in dustrial m iddle class that were n ot attracted to the M as-
ju m i. It was because o f this and the fact it incorporated a p rob ab le ma
jo rity of the largest sector o f the Indonesian m iddle class ,5 the old-regime
Indonesian bureaucracy, that the P.N.I. has often been re fe rred to as “the
2. N either he nor Hatta belongs to any political party.
3. T he feeling that this party would be unnecessary after the establishm ent of
Parliam ent (K.N.I.P.) and the fear that Indonesians w ith au thoritarian, fascist tenden
cies were gaming control of the party led Soekarno and H atta to disavow it and to
encourage the form ation of a m ulti-party system.
4. In matters above the village level. A t the village level democratic political tenden
cies were still strong and were greatly invigorated by the revolution.
5. T h e term “m iddle class” is used in a relative sense.
INDONESIAN P O L IT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM 85
midclle-class p arty” of Indonesia. Finally, the P.N.I. developed a sm all left

wing, m inuscule at first, but of more substantial proportions by 1948,
though still definitely a m inority. Its num erical strength was based upon
the support of some non-communist M arxist intellectuals and sm all labor
groups led princip ally by M angunsarkoro and W ilo p o and a group of
progressive students. T h e leaders of these groups came to exercise in
creasingly vita l roles in the p arty’s over-all leadership.
B u t it was neither the old-line, aristocratic, civil servant leaders of the
p a rty ’s rig h t wing n or these increasingly influential leaders of its small
left wing that dom inated the p a rty’s leadership. T h at function was held
by a sm all but pow erful group of men who had held im portant positions
in the prew ar Indonesian nationalist movem ent. Am ong the most im
p ortan t of these were Sartono, A li Sastroam idjojo, Sidik D jojosukarto,
Sujono H adinoto, Susanto T irto p ro d jo and Suw irjo. T h e social-economic
ideology of this sm all b u t dom inant group was considerably closer to that
of the party's left wing than to that of its right wing.
T h e P.N.I. was an unw ieldy and awkward political organization. T he
uneasy alliance of such heterogeneous elements made it difficult for it to
pursue a clear and consistent policy. Members of the old-line, aristocratic,
civil servant group that constituted the p a rty’s right w ing felt that they
commanded the allegiance and control o f a m ajority of the P.N.I.’s mass
backing, and m any were dissatisfied w ith the slight share in the p a rty’s
leadership th at they held. T h e ir dissatisfaction increased as the date of the
long-planned R epublican elections 0 approached. For they were con
vinced that they held the keys to a large share of the votes that the P.N.I.
was likely to get in the election. T h ey were also disturbed by the increas
ing influence being gained by the left wing, p articu larly M angunsarkoro
and his group, in party councils. D uring 1948, there appeared to be an in
creasing u n ity of orientation and action between the p a rty’s center and
left wing. T his tended to develop a p olitical polarization w ith in the
party between the R ight and the Center-Left coalition w hich reduced the
R igh t to almost complete impotence in the form u lation o f p arty policy.
T h is was reflected by the party principles expounded at its third annual
congress on Ju n e 24, 1948, by Sujono H adinoto, its chairm an. T h e follow
ing are some of the more relevant passages o f Sujono H adinoto’s address : 7
6. T hey had been definitely set for March 1949.
7. Rhvajat dan Pasar-dasar Pcrdjoangan P artai (History and Principles of the Party
Struggle), a speech delivered at the third annual congress of the P.N.I. and later printed
as a pamphlet.
86 ASIAN N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W EST
“T h e so cial re v o lu tio n , w hich is to establish the new society w e are striv in g for,
m ust b e c a rrie d o u t th ro u g h the n a tio n a l re v o lu tio n . . . . O u r goal, th e estab
lish m e n t o f a socialistic society, w ill n e ve r be achieved as lo n g as n a tio n a l freedom
a n d a sovereign n a tio n a l State h ave n o t been attain ed . . . fro m the b eginn in g
th e P .N .I. has declared th a t n ation alism (socio-nationalism b u t n o t jin goistic
n atio n alism ) is the ro ad to a n a tio n al State; the la tte r w ill p ro v id e the bridge
w h ich w ill b rin g us to the realiza tio n o f a socialistic society . . . socio-nationalism
is a k in d o f nation alism w hich is based on b ro ad p rin c ip les and differs e n tire ly
fro m narro w -m in d ed o r jin g o istic nation alism , because socio-nationalism in its re
la tio n sh ip to the in te rn a tio n a l w o rld recognizes the du ty o f the n a tio n s to con
stitu te a com m unity o f nations, fre e fro m d o m in atio n an d opp ressio n , n o t only
in a p o litical, b u t in an econom ic and c u ltu ral sense as w ell. . . . N atio n al fre e
dom is the gate to p ro sp erity. T h e social stru ctu re and the w ay o f life w e seek can
o n ly be realized a fte r the achievem en t o f in d ep en d en ce.”
T h e envisagement of a socialist goal was certainly not congenial to some

of the more conservative members of the p a rty’s rig h t wing. Even more
were they antagonized by the party leadership's strong opposition to
H atta s negotiations w ith the Dutch in Novem ber and early Decem ber of
1948. T he dom inant leaders of the P.N.I. feared that H atta was prepared
to make concessions th at w ould lose Indonesia any prospects of real inde
pendence. T h eir iears were so great and their opposition so intense that
m early December they joined w ith the P artai Sarekat Islam Indonesia
and the Partai M urba in setting up an Indonesian People’s Congress,
which was to have held its first open meeting on December 25, 1948. The
objective of this Congress was opposition to H atta’s G overnm ent and to
what it conceived as the G overnm ent’s willingness to m ake dangerous
concessions to the Dutch.
It was this attack against H atta and his G overnm ent that finally de
cided many of the leaders of the P.N.I.’s right wing to secede from the
party. In early December they w ithdrew from the P.N.I. and helped estab
lish a new party, the Partai Indonesia R aja (P.I.R.), described below. As
a result of this defection, the P.N.I.'s membership took on a considerably
m ore homogeneous character. T h e shedding of the m ore conservative ele
ments of its right wing resulted in a closer adherence by the party as a
w hole to the social-economic tenets and ap p aren tly also to the p olitical
o rien tation of its left wing. T he increased activity in b u ild in g up labor
support recently displayed by the party is perhaps not o n ly a sign o f this,
b u t also an attem pt to compensate for loss of some of its previous peasant
support to the P.I.R.
INDONESIAN PO LIT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM 87
3. P E R SA T U A N INDONESIA R A JA
(G reater Indonesian U nion)
N D ecem ber 10, 1948, the dissident P.N.I. members join ed w ith and
follow ed the lead of a num ber of prom inent persons w ho had previ
ously belonged to no party in launching the new Persatuan Indonesia
R aja , or P.I.R. For the most part, the p arty’s founders were older-genera-
tion civil servants having aristocratic backgrounds. Am ongst die most
im portant o f them were YVongsonegoro, G overnor of M iddle Java, and
T ad ju d d in Noor, who were chosen as C hairm an and Vice-Chairm an of
the new party. T h e in itial membership o f the P.I.R. was only a fraction
of that of the P.N.I. B ut its p olitical p otential was considered to be sub
stantial. For most of its members— both those from the P.N.I. and those
who previously had not been connected w ith any party— were adm inistra
tive civil servants whose positions gave them an excellent op portunity to
organize the peasant vote.
T h e p oin t of view o f most o f its founders can be paraphrased as follows:
T h e P .I.R . is to be a m ass-backed p a rty w ith o u t the relig io u s o rie n ta tio n o f the
M asju m i an d w ith o u t bein g based u p o n the W e ste rn p o litica l concepts o f the
P .N .I. It is to be based u p o n tra d itio n a l In d o n esian p o litic a l an d social-econom ic
concepts p a rtia lly m odified an d ad ap ted to those o f the W est. T h e p resen t is seen
as a tra n sitio n a l p e rio d betw een the o ld a u th o rita ria n society an d the m ore
W e stern -o rien ted In d o n esian society th at is ye t to come. T h e b a llo t can n o t alone
serve to in su re d iat the interests o f the com m on p eo p le w ill be lo o k ed after. N ot
o n ly w ill m an y o f the com m on p eo p le n o t vote, b u t w h en th ey do th ey m ay w ell
v o te in a w ay th at does n o t serve th e ir interests. T h e y are n o t in d ivid u alistic
en o u g h to lo o k a fter th e ir o w n interests d irec tly an d are accustom ed to an d expect
a u th o rity fro m above. T h e great d an g er is th at the p easan t vo te w ill go to ir
resp on sib le dem agogues w h o do no t un d erstan d the p eo p le a n d are n o t in a posi
tio n to re p re se n t th e ir interests. T h e p eo p le n eed a n d exp ect gu idan ce from
ab ove; th is has been in g rain ed in them fo r centuries. T h e p eo p le them selves are
n o t accustom ed to p u shing th e ir o w n interests in the p o litic a lly a rticu late m an n er
an d ca n n o t be expected to becom e o ve rn ig h t p o litic a lly resp on sib le individ ualists
o f the ch aracter o f p eo p le liv in g in the W e ste rn dem ocracies. Som e m eans must
be fo u n d fo r g ivin g real rep resen tatio n to the ag raria n p o p u la tio n . Such re p re
sen tatio n w as given them in the past by the civ il servants, w h o w e n t o u t am ong the
p e o p le an d le a rn e d w h at th e ir interests an d desires w ere. Som ehow this virtu e
m ust be in c o rp o ra ted in to the stru ctu re o f In d o n esian g o vern m en t. T h e lead ers o f
th e g o v e rn m e n t m ust be able to k n o w the interests o f the p eo p le and m ust to a
v e ry large e x te n t d ep e n d u p o n them selves, ra th e r th an u p o n the p eople, to ascer
ta in w h a t th e ir interests are. T h e ch aracter o f Indonesian g o vern m e n t th a t is to

be d e v e lo p e d m ust allo w fo r “fa th e rly au thority" fro m ab ove to lo o k a fte r the
needs o f the peasantry.
W h e th e r or not these ideas are justified, they frightened away some of

the non-party group that was prepared to support the P.I.R. on the basis
o f its backing o f Hatta. Im po rta nt among these were two large organi
zations of older students, one of which, the T entara P e la d ja r (Student
A rm y), was among the most effective o f the sm aller constituent units of
the regular Indonesian army, the T .N .I .1 These w ith d rew their in itial
support from the P.I.R. when it became clear to them th at the older-
generation civil servants and their ideas w ould dom inate the party. They
were uneasy at w hat they termed an “overly jâternalistic” attitude
towards the peasantry evinced by the P.I.R. leaders w hich they feared
might eventuate in an au th oritarian p olitical p attern w ith fascist char
acteristics. T hey foresaw a party led by older-generation, aristocratic
civil seivants, endowed w ith w hat they felt were reactionary social-eco-
nomic ideas and non-democratic political ideas, in control of a large and
uncritical mass follow ing steeped in the ideas o f au th o ritarian ru le and
w illing to respond w ithout question to directives from above. T h ey felt
that im plantation of the ideas of the P.I.R. leaders w ould lead to a hard
e n in g o£ i lie authoritarian political m entality of the peasantry rather
than to its diminishment. Likewise they felt that the revolu tion had
already considerably underm ined this characteristic and th at the P I.R.
leaders greatly exaggerated it. T h e v ig o r'o f peasant dem ocracy at the
village level, they argued, augured w ell fo r peasant p articip atio n in poli
tics above that level in a m anner consistent w ith the real interests o f the
peasantry.
&
4. P A R T A I SO SIALIS INDONESIA
{Indonesian Socialist Party)
ls o
am o n g th e big three p olitical parties th at dom inated the first
A . two years of the R epublic’s existence was the Socialist Party. T his
was created early m December 1945, as a m erger of the p reviously estab
lished P artai Sosiahs Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) o f A m ir
1. T he T entara Peladjar had previously been a semi-independent armed organiza
tion. Its m orale and faghtmg ability were exceptionally high.
INDONESIAN PO L IT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM 89
Sjarifu d d in and the P artai R ak ja t Sosialis (Socialist People’s Party) o f

Soetan S ja lirir .1 T he new, combined Socialist P arty was headed by Sjah rir
and commanded great strength among the younger intellectuals, includ
ing m any of the secondary school and college students, most of the form er
members of S ja h rir’s anti-Japanese underground and a large percentage of
those from that of Sjarifuddin. It did not have the same large, loose and
unorganized mass follow ing as the P.N.I. and the M asjum i. B ut the popu
la r support it did have was more politically conscious and m ore solidly
and effectively organized behind it than was the case w ith the ran k and
file whose political allegiance was claimed by the other two m ajor parties.
Beginning in the m iddle of 1947, a split w ithin the Socialist P arty be
gan to develop between the group of leaders most closely associated w ith
S ja h rir and those associated w ith Sjarifuddin. D uring the last m onths of
1947 S jah rir’s group became antagonized by the growing emphasis of
the Sjarifu d d in group upon class w arfare and upon alignm ent w ith R us
sia .2 In December 1947, S jah rir w rote that Sjarifu d d in w ould have to de
cide w hether he was first a nationalist or first a communist. S jah rir and
most o f his group felt then as they do now th at application of the M arxist
doctrine o f class w arfare was absurd in Indonesia since there was practi
cally no Indonesian bourgeoisie, th at class in Indonesia being almost ex
clusively made up o f D utch and Chinese. Secondly they were strongly
opposed to a policy o f alignm ent w ith either Russia or the U nited States.
As between the great w orld powers, and in the context of the “cold w ar
in particular, Indonesia must, they were convinced, m aintain a “positive
n eu trality.” T his m eant no advance com m itm ent to either side by Indo
nesia and the follow ing of an independent course best suited to Indo
nesian interests as governed by the in tern ation al situation at any given
moment. In addition, “positive n eu trality” was seen as the course whereby
Indonesia could offer its m axim um contribution to the cause o f w orld
peace.
T h e split between the two groups became dangerously w ide in Jan u ary
1948, w hen S ja h rir’s group opposed the R en ville A greem ent ,3 sponsored
1. Sjarifuddin’s party had been established early in November and Sjahrir’s on No
vember 20, 1945.
2. This tendency towards alignment w ith Russia was in part a consequence of what
was felt to be American support of the Dutch. Many Indonesians wrere strongly im
pressed by Russian support of the Republic in the Security Council, in contrast to
w hat they conceived to be an American policy of indirect support of the Dutch.
3. T he Agreement was opposed also by the M asjumi, P.N.I., and Gerakan Revolusi
R akjat, a loose coalition of nationalist Communists who looked chiefly to T an Malaka
for leadership and most of whom later emerged as the P artai M urba (Proletarian Party).
90 A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W E ST
an d ap p ro ved by S jarifu d d in as Prim e M inister, his C abinet, and a ma

jo rity o f th e Socialist Party, as w ell as by the L a b o r P arty and Indonesian
C om m u n ist P arty (P.K.I.). T h e A greem ent was signed by S ja rifu d d in ’s
G o vern m en t and thereby became binding u p on the R ep u b lic. H owever,
because o f the strong opposition to it, S ja rifu d d in and his cabinet re
signed. Because of the emergency created by this, Soekarno appointed
H atta to form a Presidential C abinet responsible to him . T h is C abinet
was backed by those parties that had opposed the A greem ent, including
S ja h rir s faction o f the Socialist Party, and was m ade up o f th e ir repre
sentatives .4 T h ey fe lt obliged to im plem ent the R e n ville A greem ent, even
though they had opposed the successful effort o f the S ja rifu d d in G overn
m ent to ra tify it. For despite the subsequent resignation o f Sjarifu d d in 's
G overnm ent, at the tim e it signed the A greem ent it was the authorized
representative of the Indonesian State and its action was seen as binding
upon the successor G overnm ent headed by H atta. T h e confusing nature
o f this situation was increased because in late F eb ru ary S ja rifu d d in ’s
faction w ith in the Socialist P arty along w ith the oth er groups w h ich had
o rigin ally backed the R en ville A greem ent now came ou t in opp osition to
th at Agreem ent and in opposition to the G overn m en t o f P rim e M inister
H atta as w ell. It was this stand by S jarifu d d in and his faction w ith in the
Socialist P arty w hich precipitated the final breach in the p a rty and led in
e ru a ry 8 to w ith d raw al from it o f S ja h rir’s group. It was then that
the latter form ed themselves in to a new p arty— the P a rtai Sosialis Indo
nesia in contradistinction to Sjarifuddin's P a rta i Sosialis.
even m onths later the Ja v a branch o f S ja rifu d d in ’s P a rta i Sosialis
tT h it* 6 ^ om m unist P arty and p articip ated w ith it in the
if'il r? -1 u 6 ^ T h ° Se core S ja rifu d d in ’s group th at w ere not
p ? IfI ! 6 re ellion rem ain now w ith in the Indonesian Com m unist
tt y\ l n m any ° f US fringG elements w hich had been opposed to fusion
'pnrtni * ^l311? 11*11815 and to the reb ellion have jo in e d w ith S ja h rir’s
P artai Sosialis Indonesia, the P a rtai M u rb a, o r the P.N.I.
tv, ^ inCOrrect say» as some opponents o f the p a rty do, th at " S ja h rir is
the Indonesian Socialist Party.” T h e p a rty includes a p a rtic u la rly high
percentage of independent thinkers, some o f w hom J u b a d i o Sastrosa-
tom o and D johan Sjaruzah, fo r instance— w ield considerable influence on
soc.al thought outside as w ell as inside their party. B u t th ere is no doubt
that the ideas o f S ja h rir have been and continue to be o f p aram o u n t im
portance in the developm ent of the ideology and program o f the Indo-
4. Except those o f the Gerakan Revolusi Rakjat.
INDONESIAN PO L IT IC S AND N A TIO N ALISM 91
nesian Socialist Party. Knowledge of his ideas provides a general under

standing of the basic orientation of the party as a whole. Likewise it helps
one to gain a better appreciation of the ideas of m any non-party intel
lectuals as w ell as those of some other p olitical groups in Indonesia,
including the left wing of the M asjum i, the C hristian P arty (.Parkindo)
and even a m inority section of the left w ing of the strongly anti-Sjahrir
P.N.I. For S ja h rir’s ideological influence has not been restricted to his
own party.
T h e ideas of S ja h rir’s wing of the old Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis)
m entioned above are retained by him and the Indonesian Socialist Party
(Partai Sosialis Indonesia). S jah rir believes that a “third factor” in the
pattern of in tern ation al relations can and must be m aintained if w orld
polarization between a Russian and an A m erican bloc is to be averted.
He does not envisage this “third factor” as an organized, m onolithic,
sim ilarly-oriented group o f states. B ut he does see the possibility fo r states
such as Indonesia and India to m aintain sufficient political and economic
independence of the two G reat Powers to ensure a fa ir degree of inde
pendence of action. T hrough exercise of that independence they can, he
feels, best protect the interests of their own people and make their m axi
m um con tribution towards assuaging international friction, p articularly
in the East. T he fact that most Indonesians are ideologically protagonists
n eith er of communism n or of capitalism is held to be a factor both call
ing fo r and m aking m ore possible a foreign policy of “positive n eu trality”
wrhereby Indonesia’s weight is added to that of those few other states
capable of generating “third factor” influence on the course of interna
tion al affairs.
S ja h rir espouses a socialism w hich is eclectic in its approach to M arx
ism and adapted to Indonesian conditions. It is n ot m erely fortuitous
th at his party is called the Indonesian Socialist Party, fo r the socialism
of S ja h rir and of the leaders associated w ith him has a distinctively In
donesian character. S jah rir is a young man, only 43, b u t he does not be
lieve th at a socialist society can be established in Indonesia w ithin his
lifetim e. T h e society that he does envisage as possible of developm ent
durin g the next two or three decades and w hich he advocates is based
upon a m ixed economy, w ith a substantial sector of economic life left to
p rivate enterprise. For a long time it w ill be physically impossible, he
feels, fo r the state to direct more than a lim ited area o f economic life,
since there is not the adm inistrative personnel available to do more.
T here is no capitalist Indonesian m iddle class from which such personnel
92 A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W E S T
w it h th e r e q u is it e m a n a g e ria l s k ills c a n b e r e c r u it e d , a n d i t w i l l b e i m
p o s s ib le f o r a c o n s id e r a b le p e r io d to tr a in m o r e t h a n a s m a ll f r a c t i o n o f
th o s e n e c e s sa ry . S j a h r i r b e lie v e s i t u n lik e ly t h a t I n d o n e s ia n c a p i t a h s rn
w i l l d e v e lo p v e r y g r e a t ly a n d h e h as li t t l e fe a r o f a n y s ig n ific a n t d a n g e r s
a r is in g fr o m it. In d e e d , h e w o u ld w e lc o m e a c o n s id e r a b le m e a s u r e o f
c a p it a lis t d e v e lo p m e n t, b e ca u se th is w o u ld d e m o n s tr a te t h a t I n d o n e s *a n s
b a d r i d th e m se lv e s o f m u c h o f th e e n c u m b r a n c e o f t h e i r “ f e u d a l ” h e r it a g e
a n d h a d d e v e lo p e d in i t i a t i v e a n d i n d i v id u a li s t c la n . M oreover, to t h e
e x t e n t t h a t c a p ita lis t e n te r p r is e d o es d e v e lo p , h e th in k s t h a t it w i l l h a ' e
tw o c o n s id e ra b le a d v a n ta g e s : first, i t w i l l h e lp fill in th o s e g a p s in
e c o n o m ic life o f I n d o n e s ia th a t a s o c ia lis tic a lly -in c lin e d g o v e r n m e n t w i l l
n o t h a v e th e n e c e ssa ry a d m in is tr a t iv e p e r s o n n e l to m a n a g e —a t le a s t n o t
e ffic ie n tly e n o u g h to s e rv e th e n a t io n a l in te r e s t; a n d s e c o n d , i t w i l l d e
v e lo p p e o p le e n d o w e d w it h su ffic ie n t a d m in is t r a t iv e e x p e r ie n c e to p r o "
v id e th e g o v e r n m e n t w ith th e p e r s o n n e l n e c e ssa ry to o p e r a t e th e g r o w in g
g o v e rn m e n t-m a n a g e d sec to rs o f th e e c o n o m y .
It w ill be much better for Indonesia, Sjah rir believes, if the socia^sm
that is introduced is decentralized and adm inistered locally as much as
possible. He feels very strongly on this point; for his greatest fears are
totalitarianism and authoritarianism . Given the still strongly su rvivin g
heritage of a “feudalistic,” authoritarian m entality among m any Indo-
n«ians, he believes that his grounds for these fears are very real. T h e
Communists, he states, were able to exploit this heritage by build in g a
Powerful party organized along authoritarian lines. T h e C o m m u n i s t
leaders themselves, he says, exem plify the effect of this heritage; most o f
Ehem come from the old aristocratic families and a paternalistic au th o ri
tarianism is ingrained in them.
Because o f th is d a n g e r a n d b ecau se o f a s tr o n g b e lie f in th e d e m o c r a t ic
P o te n tia l o f th e I n d o n e s ia n p e o p le , Sjah rir a n d th e o t h e r le a d e r s o f t*ie
n d o n e sia n Socialist P a r ty in s ist t h a t th e e ffo rts o f t h e i r p a r t y b e devoted
to a political education of the people calculated to make them p o litically
critical, as mature as possible and endowed with the capacity fo r inde
pendent analysis and judgm ent of political issues. T h ey are seeking to
build up no mass party of blind, uncritical followers. R ather, they are
endeavoring to build up cadres of convinced and enlightened I n d o n e s ia n
socialists accustomed to act not merely on the basis o f orders from above
W in terms o f dogmatic doctrine, but in accordance w ith w hat they as
M dividuals conceive to be best suited to their own country u n d er the
Particular circumstances obtaining there at any given time.
INDON ESIAN P O L IT IC S AND N A T IO N A L ISM
93
5. C O M M U N IS T O n G A N lZA T l o m
in c e 1926, the Com m unist m ovem ent in i nc^
two p rin c ip a l factions, the P a rta i K om u ° nCSia has been sp lit in to
C om m un ist Party), o r P.K .I., and the m ore str ^ ^n d°nesia (Indonesian
C om m unists w ho h ave looked chiefly to T a n n a ti°n a list group of
m ost o f w hom are at present organized in t\ p lak.a fo r leadership and
P arty). T h e p rin c ip al cause fo r the schism tl M u rb a (P roIetarian
1 9 2 6 -2 7 was the d ispu te betw een its leaders o v ^ the ° ld P K I ' in
lio n in 1926 against the D utch regim e in the Ir^ r £easibility o f rebel-
A lim in and Musso w ere im p o rta n t leaders b * ° ne S™11*3' in w hich
non-exiled p a rty leaders fo r such a re b ellio n t ! decision o£ thef
his associates opposed it, deem ing it p rem atu re ^ ^ ^ akal and some °
it inadequate. F or several m onths p rio r to the mnK Pie Pa ratJ01^ or
in N ovem ber 1926, lieu ten an ts o f T a n M alak a t n i C ^
Su m atra an d Ja v a , circu latin g his b o o k let opposing the l a u n L n ^ ’o f'a
re v o lu tio n and arg u in g w ith local p a rty leaders no-.- c n i t
. , 1 1 ■ a • • '“clU(=rs against fo llo w in g the In
donesian-dom iciled le a d e rsh ip s decision fa vo rin g ■- •
., . , , 1 * 1 t u u n g it. T h e ir success was
considerable, and as a re su lt w h en the re b e llio n was launched, a sub
sta n tia l n u m b er o f the oca p a rty u n its refused to su p p o rt it T h e reb el
lio n was easily crushed by th e'N eth erlan d s Indies g overnm ent, and there
is little d ou b t th at the re b e llio n w o u ld have been effectively suppressed
even h ad a ll the local C o m m u n ist sections p a rticip a ted H ow ever, the
P.K .I. leaders w h o backed the reb ellio n s h eld th at T a n M alak a an d his
fo llo w e rs w ere resp on sib le fo r the debacle o f the re v o lu tio n a ry e f f o r t .
A cco rd in g to them it was because o f this an d his fo u n d in g o f an in d e
p en d e n t Southeast A s ia n -A u s tra lia n C o m m u n ist p a rty in B a n g k o k in
1927 th a t T a n M alak a cam e to be re fe rre d to as a “T ro tsk yist.” P robably
th e ir a ttitu d e was also d eterm in ed b y B u k h arin 's accusing h im o f being a
" T rotsk yist” a t the S ix th C o m in te rn C on feren ce in 1928 fo llo w in g T an
M a la k a ’s stron g attack against the p ro g ram B u k h a rin was attem p tin g to
p ilo t th rou g h . (T h is fact, th ou g h a v a ila b le in C o m in te rn records, never
ap p ears to h ave b een m ade p u b lic in Indonesia.) T h is m a jo r schism
am ong In d onesian C om m unists was n e v e r brid ged . T h e P.K.I. anc*
1. T an M alaka had been exiled by the D utch and was then in M anila.
2. A lim in and Musso were retu rn in g from Russia w hen the uprising began. T hey
had attem pted ap p aren tly w ith o u t success to secure Moscow’s backing fo r the rebellion.
94 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AN D T H E W EST
m ore n a tio n a listic groups o f Com m unists w ho fo llo w T a n M alaka have

co n tin u e d th eir divergent courses.
P a rta i K om u n is Indonesia
T h e P.K .I. was resurrected a few m onths a fte r the d eclaration o f Indo
nesian independence. H ow ever, its in itia l leaders had no connection with
the p rew ar p a rty n o r w ith the w artim e P.K.I. undergrou n d . N ot u n til the
re tu rn in M ay and A ugust 1946 o f the p rew ar P.K.I. leaders S ard jo n o and
A lim in did the p a rty develop able leadership. Even so, u n til 19-18 it re
m ained the num ber-tw o left-w ing party, fa r behind the Socialist P arty of
S ja h rir and Sjarifu d d in . In large m easure this was because o f the medi
ocrity o f its in itia l leadership as com pared w ith th at p rovid ed by S jah rir
an Sjarifu d d in and by T a n M alaka and some o f his lieutenants such as
bukarni. It m ay w ell be that, because o f this in itia l weakness o f the P.K.I.,
some o t i e Indonesian Com m unist leaders, upon re tu rn in g from the
et er an s in late 1945 and ea rly 1946, felt th eir p o litica l prospects
w ou e etter if they were associated w ith the m uch m ore pow erful
ocia ist arty. C ertain ly th eir in terp retation o f the D im itro v U nited
ro n t policy did not b ar such a course. T h e ir Com m unist affiliations were
2 lnh e " kTlOVm t o th c <>f th e S o c ia lis t P a r t y a n d t l i c i r r e c o r d
them h- MW<ir m thC Socialist-led underground in the N etherlands made
them highly acceptable as members and subordinate leaders.
P m v (Pn -f m^ n *st^ w ^ ° joined the Socialist P arty and the sm aller Labor
returned “u ! Indonesia)> some of the most im p ortan t o f w hom had
Auo-ust iQ'tR111 ^ ’ l a t e l y em erged in control o f them and in
Indonesians . ert° ° k to fuse them w ith the P.K.I. T h is has led some
the nart nF th C° n? ,U e t*la t there was a long-term conscious design on
parties to th* ^ , ° m rnunhts to in filtrate and w rest control o f these
in fact did h * n subverting them to Stalinist objectives. T h o u gh this
was their ('° nclusive Pro° f is lacking to dem onstrate th at this
first arrived in 'in d o n e s k L ™ £ T g « ^ T * - dear ^ Whe" ****

h erin g closely to Moscow's W r i Y ' 946’ thEy ^
N etherlands Com m unist P arty For “ * 7 * .in terp reted by the
R pnnhlir n«r l th e ir i n i t i a l o r ie n t a t i o n was anti-
* ri F fh T>m s ° f the N etherlands Com m unist Party. T hey
conceived o f the R epublic as Japanese-made and fascist, and their objec'
6 was “ e the N etherlands and Indonesia. T h u s the N etherlands
g overnm ent was happy to fly them ou[ foee q£ tQ Indonesia
first they sought to bring the R epublican leaders to accept tire proposals
INDONESIAN P O L IT IC S AND N A T IO N A L ISM 95
of the N etherlands governm ent. In this they m et no success; b u t in at

tem pting to do so they saw the R epublic from the inside.
T hey soon concluded that, instead o f being eith er a Japanese product
or a fascist dictatorship, the R ep u b lic had the enthusiastic su p p ort of the
p op u latio n and th at the fu tu re of the nationalist m ovem ent in Indonesia
lay w ith it. Being nationalists and w ishing to be realistic about th eir own
p olitical futures, they made an adjustm ent w hich constituted a sort of
synthesis between their own nationalist-cum -political am bitions and the
Com m unist line. W ith V an M ook’s consent, they join ed the R ep u b lic and
associated themselves w ith those p olitical forces w ith in the R ep u b lic that
were w illin g to try negotiating w ith the D utch fo r independence before
resorting to a policy of force alone. T h ey rationalized this conduct in
terms of the still prevailin g D im itrov doctrine, or at least in terms o f how
th eir own w ishful thinking prom pted them to in terp ret it. T hus A bdul-
m ad jid joined the Socialist Party, S etiad jit the L ab or Party, and M aruto
D arusm an the P.K.I. It should be noted that the P.K.I. was then dom i
nated by A lim in and Sardjono, men whose Stalinism appeared to be
m ixed w ith a ra th er substantial am ount of nationalism . D uring 1946 and
most of 1947, the leaders o f the P.K.I. as w ell as those unproclaim ed
Com m unists who had join ed die Socialist and L ab or parties appeared to
follow policies determ ined chiefly by w hat best served Indonesian interests
ra th e r than by w hat a conscientious Stalinist m ight have deemed best
served the K rem lin. Beginning on ly at the end o f 1947 did th eir attitudes
commence to show any significantly increased conform ity w ith Moscow
policy, and n ot u n til late F ebruary did this increase become substantial.
No approxim ation of real congruity was reached u n til A ugust 1948.
T h ere w ere two p rin cip al reasons fo r this increasingly orth od ox Stalin
ist orientation. In the first place, the actions of the U n ited States in the
N etherlands-Indonesian dispute im m ediately preceding, during, and
p a rticu larly after the Dutch m ilitary action o f the late sum m er of 1947
w ere conceived by Indonesians to be definitely pro-Dutch. P articu larly
did this sentim ent grow follow in g the U.N.-sponsored R en ville Agree
m en t o f Ja n u a ry 17, 1948. T h e m ounting conviction th at the U nited
States was backing the D utch brought m any left-w ing Indonesians, non-
Com m unists as w ell as Com m unists, to the conclusion that the force of
Indonesian nationalism alone was n ot sufficiently strong to w in independ
ence fo r th eir country. B elieving th at one o f the two G reat Powers was
backing the Dutch, they felt they had no altern ative but to tie themselves
m ore closely to the other G reat Power. M ore and m ore members of the
96
ASIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E WEST
P.K.L, along w ith som e o f their im portant ideological associates in other

parties, began to take seriously the Krem lin's claim that genuine inde
pendence for colonial areas could never be won u n til the U nited States
and its W estern allies were dom inated by Russia. T h e y w ere increas
ing y ready to believe that the narrow course of n ationalism had to be
abandoned in favor of a long-term struggle between the C o m m u n i s t and
non-Communist worlds, a struggle in which the role o f the I n d o n e s i a n
noUcv rntT1 T * t0 COn[ovm to the E l a t e s of Moscow's world-wide
Indonesian nationalists imraediate ^
c o I t t e d COw U l^ h Cir aI reaS? f° r thiS chanSe in o rien tation was closely
Of the party leadershin p-,i u- itseif ;t ^ wen, * s

t*°*1Thls was th* revolt o f the second rank
their top leaders For the l™- l l e . pollcles formulated and pursued by
■»« j Z T : r , m ' r p x :- ^ ^ 1
Stalinist line then being laid ,n VCry far from the ° rth °
conferences. It is impossible "n oscow and at the C om in fon 11
knew the content of the Zhdanov the t0p P K I ' leadersh,‘P
Cominform. But certainly it was reP° M l° lhe r'rst m eetinS oC .
any signs of reacting to and , 1^ any Months belore the P.K.I. showed
new international line for Cr, a,l8m ? lts Policies in accordance w ith the
tember I947 .3 Despite the mmUnists as Iaid down at the end o f Sep-
Italy and on November 18 ' Str^ es launched on N ovem ber 12 i J1
m ajor change in C o m m u n is / n ^ T " , (* e d earest of indications o£ a
three months of any change in P K T no sign d u rin g the ne**
In February 1 948, how eve^ P0 ' ^
munist leaders attending tlip r 1 Un® second-rank Indonesian Cort1
Soviet Asian republics. Thev l ! , COnIerences met delegates from * e
divided world basis and its anH.iw 16 ^ neW Com m unist line, w ith i®
leaders m Indonesia had not bee a r s ia 1 1 Plan emphasis, a line th at thei1
as bearers of the true gospel T ° llow ing- T h ey retu rn ed to Indonesia
m anded conformity With the new I-3* ldeological experts and they ^
Indonesian delegates returning f™™6- Then- dem and was reinforced bY
International Youth Conference a ^ P W 'F'T -U - Conference and the
older top leadership of the oartv I , gUe earl>' in the summer. The
„ a no alternative b u t to adopt the
3. The new program emphasized the divU-
gressive cap.ta ,st bloc led by the Unit d s°t" ° f the - t o two blocs-the
Russia—and called upon all Communists “ Stat« and the “democratic" bloc led W
"<#
the Marshall Plan.
policies communicated to their subordinates at Calcutta. Refusal would

have meant loss of their positions. Even so, they lost prestige and in
fluence to the younger second-echelon leaders. A t the end of February
1948, the line of the P.K.I. began to undergo a drastic change. No longer
could its members be reckoned amongst the moderates. The program
which they developed called for repudiation of all previous agreements
with the Dutch, including the Renville Agreement, which the P.K.I. had
so recently sponsored and defended. It called for nationalization of
foreign properties without compensation, cessation of negotiations with
the Dutch until they had withdrawn from Indonesia, and in general a
program almost identical with that supported from the inception of the
revolution by the more strongly nationalist group of Communists led by
T an Malaka and Sukarni. Yet the breach between the two groups re
mained and there was no cooperation between them.
On February 13, 1948, because of the increasing divergency of outlook
with the larger faction of Sjarifuddin, Sjahrir’s faction within the So
cialist Party had withdrawn and formed its own party, the Indonesian
Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia). The rump Socialist Party that
remained then came decisively under the influence of the Communists
w ithin it— particularly T an Ling Djie and Abdulm adjid, who came to
share control with Sjarifuddin. Partly because of disillusionment with the
Far Eistcrn policy of the United States, Sjarifuddm ’s outlook had be
come very close to theirs. W ith in the Labor Party, Setiadjit and his Com
munist colleagues had assumed dominance. Under the leadership of
Sjarifuddin, the Socialist and Labor parties and the P.K.I. formed at the
end of February a political coalition, the Front Demokrasi Rakjat
(People’s Democratic Front) or F.D.R., as it came generally to be known.
This powerful coalition opposed the recently-formed Hatta Government
and followed policies that became progressively closer to the orthodox
Stalinist line. However, it remained for a considerable period dominantly
energized by the power of Indonesian nationalism. But with the arrival
from Moscow of the old-line Communist leader, Musso, in mid-August
1948 the orientation of the P.K.I., and shortly thereafter of the leader
ship of the other parties of the F.D.R.S became very close to that of the
Kremlin.
Musso arrived with the prestige of a former top-flight revolutionary
leader equal to that of Alim in, but tremendously enhanced because o
4. This was not, however, true of most of the Sumatran leaders of these other parties,
nor of those from Bantam.
98 A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W E ST
his h a vin g come d irectly from Moscow, and obviously at its orders. He
eclipsed a ll the leaders of the F.D.R., including Sjarifu d d in , and became
im m ed iately the dom inant figure w ith in the P.K.I., pushing A lim in and
S a rd jo n o in to positions o f slight im portance. Musso came arm ed w ith
w h a t he called his “G ottw ald Plan," hoping to duplicate in Indonesia
w h a t G ottw ald had done in Czechoslovakia. H owever, his efforts to estab
lish a N ational Front G overnm ent, n om in ally u n d er H atta b u t w ith key
posts in F.D.R. hands, were fruitless. T h ereu p o n he called fo r a fusion
of the Socialist and L ab or parties w ith in the P.K.I. so that an integrated,
disciplined revolu tion ary organization could be form ed. U pon the base
o the tentative and hypothetical revo lu tio n ary plans o f S jarifu d d in and
ot er F.D.R. leaders, and relying upon the m ilita ry backing and the
m unitions dumps w hich they had b u ilt up, a new and definite revolu
tionary effort was organized.
T h e plans of Musso, Sjarifu d d in , Setiadjit, A b d u lm ad jid , and the other
know u ° i lhC nCW P K I ' or "P.K.l.-M usso.” as it now came to be
t i ? V ° r a revolu tion against the governm ent o f the R epublic
attained ^ 6 u*1 IS,ovember *948 or Jan u a ry 1949 if pow er had n ot been
that fhpv Y ° means M o r e . T h ere are some grounds fo r believing
A m e rirJr^ miC1^ te^ ^ SUCh revo lu tio n ary measures w ould provoke an
or after ‘Sa? Ctl0.n ed Dutch attack against the R ep u b lic eith er during
chaos nf <r,eir SÎZUre Pow er* Indonesia w ould then have become a
certain th ^ w arfare. In the course o f that w arfare the P.K.I. felt
ultim atelv f Xj . WOuId emerge in control o f the g u errilla m ovem ent and
o f Indonesia w 7 lng ^ CXpCCted exP u ^ ion o f the D utch, in control
fo r Musso and ^ 6X301 natu re of their P lans, u n fo rtu n ately
w ere stamnertp 1 ■S ieutenantSj some of the lesser re vo lu tio n a ry leaders
process of f u s i o n T t ^ R ^ ™°- m ° nthS ^ ° f sd ied llle'B T he
strum ent of revolution hnH i P^ ties m to an m tegrated, disciplined in
revolu tion were fa r frn ° n , gUn’ and the Plans fo r carrying ou t the
some o f their chief C° mP ^ BUt because o£ the stam peding of
back the prem ature r e b e l l Z n l ^ ” V, ^ t0P P 'K J ‘ WCre £° rCed C°
Septem ber 1948 T h rv m unc^ ed at Su rakarta and M adiun in mid-
sources o f arm ed S e i t h “ “ £° rePud iate some of
that was part of the government’*

th
5. These m ilitary leaders faced loss of «i-
v Posltlons in the demobilization program
officers being removed were C o r L t “ T a n d ‘T ^ <■*
the government did not believe that it could rel ^ u p o ^ t !*1 ° l° ^ faCt
INDONESIAN PO LIT IC S AND N A TIO N ALISM 99
W ith in a m onth the rebellion had been crushed. T h e pop u lar support
of the Communists had been slight and, where it existed, was largely
either forced or based upon misunderstanding due to false propaganda .6
T h e dom inantly Western-educated leadership of the P.K.I. had failed to
understand the character of Indonesian nationalism , and in particular
the loyalty of the people to “their R epublic” and to Soekarno and Hatta.
W h a t the Communists had taken for support of their m ovem ent was for
the most part nothing more than a general resentment arising from harsh
economic conditions and thwarted nationalist hopes. Most Indonesians
were outraged at the Communists’ attack against the R epublican gov
ernm ent at a time when it was under great pressure from the Dutch. T h eir
outrage and antipathy to the P.K.I. were increased by the frequently
w anton b rutality displayed by some Communist troops.
T h e popular anger and resentment against the P.K.I. follow ing its un
successful rebellion dealt it a blow from which it has not yet recovered.
T hough some of its ablest leaders, including Musso, Sjarifuddin, Suripno,
M aruto Darusman, and H arjono, were killed as a consequence o f the
rebellion, the party retains enough competent leaders to operate effec
tively if it could regain substantial p opular support. D uring 1949 it
encountered only slight success in its efforts to rebuild this su]Dport. A n
im portant factor m ilitating against its success was the policy of the R e
publican government in depriving the P.K.I. leaders of the role of
m artyrs and in keeping them .above ground and in the open. Repeatedly
the government, in p articular Prim e M inister Hatta, made it clear that
it did not oppose Communism as a doctrine, but only those Commu
nists— or advocates of any other ideology— who sought to overthrow the
governm ent by force. It consistently made clear that so long as Com
munists abjured the use of force and made Indonesia rath er than Russia
their chief object of loyalty, they would have the same freedom as anyone
else.
T h a t this position of the governm ent was no mere academic posturing
was borne out by the freedom accorded P.K.I. members who had not
participated in the rebellion. Though closely watched, they were free
even to hold high public office. T hus the leaders of the Sum atran branch
of the P.K.I., who did not jo in in the rebellion, m aintained their seats
in the Provisional Parliam ent. Members of political organizations (i.e.,
the L abor Party, Socialist Party, Pesindo, S.O.B.S.I. and the P.K.I. itself
6. For example, that Jogjakarta had been occupied by the Dutch and that Soekarno
and Hatta had agreed to work with the Dutch.
JOO ASIAN N A TIO N ALISM ANI) TIIE WEST
w hich supported the rebellion) had to be cleared by judicial hearing be

fore being eligible to hold government jobs. The leadership of the or
ganizations which had supported the rebellion had done so w ithout the
p rio r approval of their rank-and-file members. M any of these members
h ad not, as the hearings established, supported the rebellion, and these
were cleared. It was generally felt that the government was being more
than fair to the P.K.I., whose leaders found it difficult to derive any sub
stantial political capital from the complaint of persecution.
T he P.K.I. was not able to rid itself of the stigma which it inherited
from the M adiun rebellion— the widespread popular belief that its devo
tion to Indonesian interests was subordinate to its support of Soviet
Russia. On the other hand, the more strongly nationalistic Communists
o the T an M alaka-Sukarni group have demonstrated that their support
o Indonesia comes first. This and their strong support of the government
against the P.K.I. rebels provided a perspective that strengthened the
e ie o m a n y In d o n e sia n s in P .K .I. su b se rv ie n c e to M o sco w .
Tt \ ln d o i'csians believe that A lim in opposed the M adiun rebellion,
to n m h v n • at ^ USSQl shortIy after his arrival in Indonesia, managed
in the P k t 7 t 0 , backSround and to oust him from any effective role
following
iM rW fc- the jr eedemon,
te m o n 'Âlirm
ihiS n^ came to occupy
^ a position
^ re“
of °increased
nS why'
im nom nrp ZQWithin the P‘K *L ° £ etl ual and PerhaPs Sreater
associate n f ^ that AHmin had Rved for a tim e in Yenan as an
to M o s rn . a° ? C“tUng and k was increasingly to Peking rath er than
to Moscow that the P.K.I. commenced to look for leadership and even-
n o ^ e a n ? ! ! 115 PrestlSe wa» high and his influence great, A lim in was by
A b d u l m a d j i T w P° f ^ ^ ^ ^
in nartv r iL i l ,Sirigar,K
among; them c l 7 * l *1 Str° ng 3nd throuShout the course of 1949 rivalry
ea e attempts to rebuild a unified, integrated party.
P a rtai M urba (Proletarian Party)
n a d o n a fe tic c f m L u T isr , v i * Shaf ^ existence> the stl'ong>y

c ,,!,.™ ; i J , msts who have looked p rim arily to T an M alaka and
S a • l E . i S &anize
! aa ^political party,
bUt ’° they
T ,y concentrated
° lganiZed P° IitiCal
upon
establishing a wide political front which they sought to dom inate and
through w hich they hoped to capture the government. T hough in Febru
INDONESIAN PO LIT IC S AND N A TIO N ALISM 101
ary 1946 they were able to force Sjahrir's resignation as Prime M inister,
they were unable to supplant him because of the heterogeneous character
of their unw ieldy and undisciplined coalition of p olitical forces. T h eir
constituent elements were unable to agree upon the distribution of
power in the Cabinet which they were asked to form, and the mandate of
Cabinet form ateur reverted to Sjahrir. T hough jailed shortly thereafter
on a charge of plotting to overthrow the government, T a n Malaka,
Sukarni and some of their chief non-Communist associates escaped, and
attem pted a coup d ’etat at the beginning of Ju ly 1946, aim ed at ousting
both Sjah rir and his Cabinet and ultim ately Soekarno and H atta as well.
Sjah rir was kidnapped, but w ithin a few days the coup had been smashed
and its leaders arrested. For over a year T an M alaka and its other leaders
were kept in ja il .7 D uring this period, however, some of the younger fo l
lowers of T an M alaka and Sukarni, such as M aruto N itim ihardjo, Adam
M alik, Sutan Dewanis and Samsu H arja U daja, were active in spreading
his ideas and in building political organizations, the most im portant of
which were the P artai R akjat (People's Party), the P artai R ak jat D jelata
(Poor People’s Party), and the P artai B unth Indonesia M erdeka (Inde
pendent Indonesian L abor Party).
In February 1948 these and several other organizations whose aims and
programs were roughly sim ilar joined the Barisan Banteng (Buffalo
Legion) in form ing a loose federation, the G erakan R evolusi R ak jat
(R evolutionary People’s A rm y— G .R.R.). T hough the Barisan Banteng
was not a Communist organization, its im m ediate program was very close
to those of the strongly nationalistic Com m unist groups in the other
parties. T here was general agreement upon opposition to negotiation
w ith the D utch u n til after they had left Indonesia, nationalization o f all
foreign properties in Indonesia and opposition to the P.K.I. and w hat
they referred to as its “policy of opportunism .” T h e G .R .R . staunchly
supported the governm ent du rin g the M adiun rebellion. It was signifi
cant that the G .R .R . chose to suppress the fact that Soviet Russia had
given m oral support to the P.K.I. rebellion; it made the fantastic claim
that the P.K.I. had really acted as an agent of the Dutch. T hereby it
sought to dem onstrate that it, ra th e r than the P.K.I., was the only legiti
m ate representative o f the Soviet trad ition of M arxism -Leninism in Indo
nesia.
On N ovem ber 7, 1948, three o f the most im portant constituent or-
7. Some were released on August 17, 1948, and T an Malaka and the rest a month
later.
102 A S IA N N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W EST
ganizations o f the G .R .R ., the P a rta i R a k ja t (People’s Party), the Partai

R a k ja t D jelata (Poor People's Party), and the P a rta i B u rn h Indonesia
M erd eka (Independent Indonesian L ab or Party) m erged to form a new
an d p o w erfu l party, the P a rta i M u rb a (P roletarian P a rty ).8 T h is was, and
still is, led by some of the ablest follow ers o f T a n M alaka, fo r the most
p a rt young men possessed o f a m ilitan t idealism , and in clu d in g Sukarni
(Chairm an), M aruto N itim ih ard jo (Vice-Chairm an), Su tan Dewanis
(Second Vice-Chairm an), Samsu H arja U d aja (Secretary-G eneral), and
Pandu K arta W ig u n a (Secretary).
Am ong the im p o rtan t provisions o f the constitution o f the Partai
M u rba are the follow ing:
T h e basis o f the p a rty is anti-fascism , an ti-im p e ria lism , a n ti-c a p ita lism a n d it
ases its stru ggle o n the o rd e rly action o f the p ro le ta ria t.
h a ve IefÎndorTe1"1 ^ 'Dutc1^ o n t*ie ,;)as*s rcco S n i Lion a fte r fo re ig n troops
C onfiscation an d ex p lo ita tio n o f en em y p ro p e rties.

an fl c o lle c t iv i7 a tio n o f v i t a l e c o n o m ic e n t e r p r i s e s ( i n c l u d i n g
T o en 1 TT ,n g ’ ,ncUlstrY a n d t r a n s p o r t ) . ‘ ^ h
in tern a t io rrii Ir.l d o Pesia becom e a m em b er o f the U n ite d N atio n s a n d o th er
pu rp o se o f , r ? ! rVZatIOns on the basis o f eq u al status, d em ocracy an d w ith the
pu rp o se o f establishing a p ro le ta ria n w o rld g o vern m e n t.
C entralism "" ^ F a rta i M u rb a acco rd in g to th e p rin c ip le o f "D em ocratic
- j ^ ° ^ e.Ver' ^ P h r a s e o lo g y o f the p a rty ’s constitu tion gave o n ly a rough

th* ° ^ P ° cal orientation. It described points o f agreem ent held by
S ™en^kership; but there existed am ong p a rty m em bers con
t a i n tr? COUj Uc ° n 3nd divid ed op inion concerning the a ttitu d e to be
the iVTpac J ' r ° ^ et ^ ussia* Yugoslavia, the “cold w a r,” and some of
n ot p c fa h ri, an ^la la k a - Jt was perhaps because the P a rta i M u rb a did
was ahlp ^ dogm atic attitudes tow ards these questions th at it
an d ff ge
■ ouch people ° f often n o t actu
w ere l 0ally
n g Sen
t ro
StUdGntS
lle d as
8. T h ere have been a few «mnii
o f both the P.K.I and the Pn * .C° m™umst sphnter-parties in Indonesia, independent
been close. T h e ir orientation U n ° Ugh th eir connection ^ ith the latter has
are strongly influenced by it and i n V a n i r ^ °k'"h* Part<ZI M u rb a and in general they
these is the Acoma (Communist Youth) The" S ^ ^ ^ Str° nf St ° f
(Persatuan R akjat M arhaen I n d o n r iia - L hC.three next most im portant are Pcrmai
Kom unis Indonesia M erah (Red In d o n e t'a T r ^ Tnd° nesian P roletariat), Partai
Indonesia (this nam e is the same a s TbTt C° m ™umst P arty> and the P artai Comunis
“C om m unist” w ith a "C” rath er than a "K") P 'K J ” CX°Cpt th at members sPeU
INDONESIAN PO LITIC S AND N A TIO N ALISM 103
party members, but gave it a strong potential should events move in cer
tain directions.
T h ere appeared to be, however, a fa irly wide agreem ent w ithin the
party as to its economic program, its rejection of the Hague Agreement,
and the desire that Indonesia rem ain independent and outside the
spheres of control of both the U nited States and Soviet Russia. Emphasis
upon this last principle has been one of the most vita l elements of the
party’s ideology. Despite agreement among most of its members th at the
Soviet is the great champion of the proletariat in its struggle against
capitalism —a struggle to which the Partai M urba is com m itted and
despite the adm iration that most of them have voiced for Soviet Russia
and fo r Stalin, the party has refused to align itself w ith the K rem lin in
die m anner that orthodox. Stalinism demands. Indonesia’s interests
come first, they feel, and must not be jeopardized by dependency upon
or alignm ent w ith any outside power, even Soviet Russia. M oreover, a
few of the most influential party members are critical o f the Soviets
international policies, and some others are at least suspicious o f them. It
is undoubtedly this feeling that brings some of the p arty’s members to
consider themselves as Socialists and not as Communists, and to state that
Communists base their struggle on w orld revolution, w hile Socialists
base theirs on national revolution. T his distrust o f Soviet foreign policy
was forcefully expressed in a statement which T an Malaka, the party s
principal ideological m entor; is supposed to have made in 1946. He is
reliab ly reported as having warned his followers at that time against
substituting a new colonial relationship w ith Russia fo r the old one w ith
the Netherlands. W ritin g in the m iddle of November 1948, T an M alaka
wove among a long series of relatively orthodox Stalinist statements, in
cluding a long attack on the M arshall Plan, the follow ing dom inant
theme:
“We need time in order to be able to take a definite attitude [in the dispute
between the blocs led by the United States and Soviet Russia] although we know
that victory will be ours and the proletariat will win. . . . We cannot yet state
which powers will win the war. Because it might be that a present ally of the
Soviet Union will later become its enemy and the same is true of the United
States. The two giant powers are now competing to strengthen their positions.
The part of the globe in which our country lies cannot be excluded from the
world controversy. However, this does not necessarily mean that we must partici
pate in the dispute, that is, join one party in order to attack the other. The pri
mary conditions for an alliance are: ( 1 ) to increase one’s own strength and weaken
diat of die enemy; (2) to take care that you are not eaten up by your ally. Geo
graphically and strategically speaking, it is not yet tim e to c/ioose one o f the
parties. L an d , air, and sea distances are not yet favorable for in creasin g our power
if we m ade an allian ce w ith the F ederation of the S o cialist C o u n tries.”
&
6. D A R U L ISL A M
A
d e v e lo p m e n t w it h i n I n d o n e s ia th at h as c o m m a n d e d co n sid erab le
o u t s i d e a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n t h e D aritl Islam (Lhe I s l a m i c S t a t e ) . T h i s
h a s n o t m a n ife s t e d itse lf as a m e re co n ce p t, as the u s u a l id e o lo g ic a l fo rm u
l a t i o n o f t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d q u a l i t i e s t h a t t h e I s l a m i c s t a t e shou ld p o ssess.
T h e D aritl Islam i n W e s t J a v a h a s p u r p o r t e d to b e t h e a c t u a l p h y s ic a l
im p le m e n t a t io n o f the co n ce p t. I t h a s b e e n a p o lit ic a l o r g a n iz a t io n h av
i n g a n i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t , c o n t r o l l i n g its o w n a r m y a n d t e r r it o r y
an s e e k i n g t o e x p a n d it s a r e a o f c o n t r o l . D u r i n g t h e l a s t t w o years,
n er t e p ie s su r e o f as m a n y as six te e n b a t t a lio n s o f g o v e r n m e n t troops,
its p o w er a n d the a re a u n d e r its co n tro l h av e been s h r in k in g a n d its com-
(luldatlon 1S expected soon. I-Iowever, during most of 1918 and
1 ! „ w C° r t,tUted an a S S r e s s iv e - growing p olitical force w ith w h at ap-
p e a r e c l to b e a n o m i n o u s p o t e n t i a l .
w D arul Islam m o v e m e n t a ro s e in a n a r e a o f c e n t r a l a n d e a s t c e n tr a l
been I T * * re ^ i n flu e n c e o f m o d e r n is t I s la m ic t h o u g h t h a s n e v e r
s trn n 1 ° n ^ anC / V 1Cre t ^ a t m o r e o ld - fa s h io n e d M o h a m m e d a n le a d e rs ,
o o w e ? n i ° PTPOSr ° W e s t e r n l e a r n i n S a n d id e a s * h a s lo n g b e e n e x t r e m e ly
e x tre m e ! U .t lls a ie a d u r i n g th e la s t fiv e y e a r s t h e r e h a s o c c u r r e d an
w h n haH ” P , a l t e r a t i o n in th e P a t t e r n o f la n d h o ld in g s : m a n y p e a s a n ts
la n d o w n e r^ '” T " P’ ° tS ° f Ia'ld ^ loSt aI1 Pa « ° £ * d r la n d to
th e r e v o h i r * mOST h a d ° n l y m o d e r a t e h o ld in g s o f la n d p r i o r to
d s lo c a ttn n T ;, 15 ‘ le W riter'S belief that this has ^ chiefly to
nese o c c u n - T f 10 " 1 1 ° f agrarian credit d u rin g the Ja p a
nese occupat on and the subsequent revolution.
fo r the peasant m .T h ^ J apanese occupation the chief source o f credit
f , T e l t m e r a n t C h in e se m o n e y le n d e r. D u r in g th e course
o f th e J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t io n th ere o ccu rm A i
a . , • , , 1 n ic x c o c c u n e d a t r e m e n d o u s m o n e t a r y in-
a ion w hich resulted in the easy liqu id ation o f m any long-standing
IndraâûJlVIadjalenkân^Kunhigan! Tasikmalaja- Garut and Tjiamis and around

peasant debts to these Chinese. H aving been dealt a severe economic

blow thereby, and correctly an ticip atin g fu rth er inflation, the Chinese
m oneylender du rin g the last year of the Japanese occupation refused to
advance credit fo r money, but dem anded instead a specific percentage o£
the crop in re tu rn fo r the credit— usually in the form of cloth, agricul
tu ral implem ents, etc.— which he advanced to the peasant. S till desper
ately needing credit, most peasants acquiesced in this arrangem ent, but,
having already tasted the benefits brought to the d ebtor by inflation,
accepted the severe terms offered by the Chinese m oneylender w ith a good
deal more resentm ent than in the past. Because of this and because of the
increased anim osity towards those associated w ith the old colonial regime
(as the Chinese were), there was a tendency among m any of them to re
pudiate the debts w hich they owed to the Chinese.
T h is was in itself a revolu tion ary phenom enon. In the Preanger and
some adjacent areas of W est Ja v a the degree of landow nership concentra
tion, though slight as com pared w ith most other areas of the Far East,
was greater than in any other p art of Java. T his concentration of land
ow nership had given to the owners, freq u en tly absentee landlords living
in nearby towns and cities, a sm all (but large in Javanese terms) am ount
o f liq u id capital. Some of these W est Ja v a Indonesian landlords had
previously engaged in lending m oney to p oorer peasants, but their opera
tions had been restricted because o f Chinese com petition, which few were
com petent to meet. Now m uch Chinese com petition was removed, and
whereas the revolu tion m ight sanction rep u d iation of debts to the C hi
nese, it did n ot do so where the Indonesian creditor was concerned. Thus,
in m any places there was opened up to the Indonesian landlord-m oney-
len d er a v irtu a lly uncontested m onopoly in the lucrative field of agrarian
credit. B ut the Indonesian landlord-creditor did m ore than m erely re
place the Chinese. For the N etherlands East Indies A g rarian Laws, w hich
the R ep ublic inherited, had prohibited the sale of agricu ltu ral land to
any non-Indonesian. T h u s the Chinese creditor, no m atter how much he
was owed, could n ot obtain legal title to the d eb tor’s lan d .2 B ut there was
no such im pedim ent barring the Indonesian landlord-creditor. He could
and often did assume legal title to the d ebtor’s land. T h is has occurred on
an unprecedented scale during the last few years, and the w riter believes
that the consequent w idespread discontent amongst the peasantry
throughout much of W est Ja v a was utilized by the leaders of the D a iu l
2. Often he managed to obtain fairly complete functional control, but at least the
prestige and social perquisites of landownership remained with the legal owner.
106 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W EST
Islam an d has p ro vid ed them w ith an im p o rta n t p a rt o f th e ir political

capital.
T h e idea o f establishing a D a ru l Islam , a p u re ly Islam ic state governed
exclu sively by M oham m edan law , h ad been h eld by a n u m b er o f West
J a v a Islam ic leaders fo r some time. B u t n ot u n til the U n ited Nations-
sponsored R en ville A greem ent o f Ja n u a ry 1948 d id circum stances lend
them selves to the p ractical im p lem en tation o f th e ir idea. T h a t Agree
m en t called fo r the w ith d raw a l from W est J a v a o f the num erous units
o f the arm y of the Indonesian R ep u b lic (the T .N .I.) from the extensive
areas over w hich they had continued to m ain tain co n trol fo llo w in g the
attack by N etherlands forces. T h o u gh w ith in two m onths some 35,000
epubhc troops were w ith d raw n in to the sh runken area left to the Re-
public, about 4000 irregular troops—for the most part Hizbullah bat-
ons o t e M asjum i rem ained behind. T h e re was a tendency for
fpp] tJtr<f°*iS j ° r m uck îe p op u latio n of W est Ja v a in general to
the D m h V , beCn abandoned by the R epublic, p a rtic u la rly after
-Rer, -n C used to allow prep aration s fo r the plebiscite w hich the
^he reeular ^ " 1 ? , 1 £° r in the tcrrU or'cs they had overru n . For
i u S S 1™ tr° ° PS UP° n re tirin g had madG k Clear t0 the
the field rlpn f 61 ° n ^ reason the^ w ere leaving was in o rd er to leave
scite T h / soon-expected and supposedly U.N .-backed plebi-
peoples nf n atlon afist aspirations of the strongly Moslem
T.N .i. troonc hC<T tra m ountainous a reas o f W est J a v a from w hich the
much of the n / WU draw n* the increasing agrarian discontent among
most of t£ P TY° £ the area’ 3nd th£ £ortuitous circumstance that
Mohammedanr^ rUharnRepUbllCan trooPs le£t behind were the strongly
cially favorable ,UUah units o£ the Masjumi
combined to create espe-
£° r thOSe l0Cal M oham “ edan leaders w ho had
A conference ^ * * * ? “ * ^ ~ D a r u l Islam .
trolled by HizbuTlah “ " Vened’ an area o£ Preanger R esidency con-
Islam ic leaders o f W est T a ^ Y ^ f t 1948- by K a rto su w irjo and other
and somewhat mystical re l,V ad been an a rd en t’ sincere
Preanger. Before the w ar he had bee ^ ^ inflUence in south
Sarekat Islam and had set un his T ! “ p r° m m en t Ieader in the old
revo lu tio n he had joined the M n Slamic s c h ° o1 at T jiam is. A fte r the
b ra n c h e s in W est Tava A ^ u m i a n d h a d h e a d e d o n e o f its lo cal
a n d o u tlo o k h a d b een d o T e ^ o t h e ^ T ° £ ^ Masjumi h is r e la t io n sh iP
re-established the PartaiSarekatIslamTZ ^
Islam Indonesia. T h is m ust account at
least in part fo r his having been offered, in J u ly 1947, the post of Second
Vice-M inister of Defense in the C abinet of Sjarifu d d in , a post he did not
accept. T he in itial M arch Conference in Preanger was n ot called to
establish a separate state, b u t m erely to organize the p op u latio n o f the
area in coordination w ith the H izbullah fo r defense against the Dutch.
T his defense organization took the name of D aru l Islam and was con
sidered loyal to the R epublic and, as specifically stated b y K artosuw irjo,
to have no connection w ith the M asjum i.s
A t a second conference, held probably at the end o f M arch 1948, it was
decided to convert the defense organization o f D a ru l Islam in to an au
tonom ous state, the Negara D aru l Islam (State o f D aru l Islam). T his new
organization, w ith K artosuw irjo as President, undertook to govern as w ell
as to defend the population o f W est Ja v a over w hich its m ilitary pow er
extended. For some time it still did not oppose the R epublic, w hich its
leadership stipulated it w ould later jo in so long as its own in tern al
autonom y was respected. T h e new Negara D aru l Islam was organized
along theocratic lines. Not on ly were its chief civil officers kijahis, Moslem
religious teachers, b u t its laws were exclusively those o f Islam. In addi
tion to advocating complete conform ance w ith the prescripts of Islam, its
emphasis was on “anti-colonialism ” and “anti-capitalism .” Its arm y, the
T entara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islam ic Arm y), successfully cam
paigned against the Dutch and wrested territo ry from them. Its civil
service collected taxes and ran. schools. For a time ap p aren tly the Negara
D a ru l Islam was actually ru n in rough conform ance w ith the lofty p rin
ciples of the Islam ic concept of w hat a D a ru l Islam should be. B ut this
state o f affairs did not last long. T h e pressure o f continual w arfare against
the D utch created circumstances that made it difficult fo r the governm ent
to observe the theory to w hich it was dedicated. Even m ore im p o rtan t was
the in a b ility o f D arul Islam ’s original leadership to m ain tain effective
control over the organization.
As D a ru l Islam became the chief core o f resistance to the D utch in
W est Ja v a ,4 it attracted not only most of the religious leaders o f Preanger
and adjacent areas and the peasantry th at looked to them fo r guidance,
3. His statement was entirely true. His principal reason for going on record to this
effect was to avoid embarrassing theMasjumi and the Republic in their delicate nego
tiations with the Dutch that were being held under the supervision of the United
Nations Committee of Good Offices.
4. Except for Bantam (the extreme West), which remained Republican territory, and
the Krawang delta area, largely controlled by the
Army of West Java), supporting Tan Malaka.
LaskarRakjat DjawaBarat (People s
10 8 ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
b u t also m any am bitious p olitical and g u errilla leaders whose interest in

Islam was decidedly secondary to that in th eir ow n fortunes. Likewise,
m any o f the old-tim e professional bandit gangs o f the area felt th eir for
tunes m ight im prove if they were connected w ith the m ilitary pow er and
frie n d ly peasant base o f D a ru l Islam. K artosu w irjo and oth er religious
leaders were g rad u ally pushed out o f their positions of dom inance by the
m ore pow erful o f the unscrupulous, non-religious, and sometimes fanatic
adherents of the organization. W ith in a year o f the l’ reanger Conference
o£ M arch 1948, K artosuw irjo and others o f the origin al leadership had
lost much of their power. T h ou gh still retain in g most o f the top posi
tions in the central leadership, they freq u en tly and increasingly were un
able to control the activities o f m any o f th eir m ilitary and civil subordi
nates.
As the organization o f the Negara D aru l Islam, disintegrated, its local
m ilitary and civil leaders became m ore and more independent. T h e duties
w ich they imposed upon the peasantry increasingly took the form of
orce exactions. Non-compliance w ith th eir regulations and demands
o r ood and services was punished w ith sanguinary b ru tality. Peasant co
operation w ith D aru l Islam w a s in c r e a s in g ly s e c u rc d b y m e a n s o f te r
r o r iz a tio n r a t h e r th a n th r o u g h v o l u n t a r y s u p p o r t d e r i v i n g f r o m tc e lin g s
nationalism or religion, or as a reaction to pauperism . Even so, the
popu ation had little inclination to turn to the D utch; those th at wished
o o so were too fearfu l of retrib u tio n by D aru l Islam soldiers. W hen
tc patrol entered a D aru l Islam area, it ra rely encountered the
, ^ atI° n t*le VIilages. T h e villagers were afraid to rem ain, since if
ey id, upon the w ithdraw al of the patrol, D aru l Islam troops w ould
aCCUSe them of collaboration w ith the D utch, and w ould kill
some of the village leaders.*
UnabIe to o p p re ss or even to contain the grow th of
Tava m innpf" ? I’ ^ ^ 1948 and ea rl? 1949 as m uch of theh' W est
own troons ° Pasundan was controlled by D aritl Islam, as by their
State'* W iran officials> including the W a li N egara (C hief of
w ould be a b le Y 0em a' were convinced that on ly R ep u b lican troops
w ould be able to suppress the D aru l Islam
W h e n the all-out Dutch ;marV • n , , ,
attack, (officially know n as the second Police
This W3s the unanimous opinion r»P . u
interviewed by the writer in Febnnrv lo w r P Pasundan government officials when
see C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijre ‘'The i a r u
Affairs , Ju n e 1950.
DUt C* 3 w ysis ° f
"M slam Movement in Western Jav a,” P acific
Darul JsIamt
Action) was launched against the R epublic on December 19, 1949, the
R epub lic’s crack Siliwangi D ivision im m ediately m arched for W est Java.
Its reception at the end of its long trek was mixed. T h e peasantry en
thusiastically hailed it as their deliverer from the D a ru l Islam. But
the troops of the latter as w ell as the Dutch contested alm ost every step
of the last stages of its march. T h e fatigued 15,000 Siliw angi troops had
a difficult time in their attem pt to overcome the 5,000 to 10,000 well-
arm ed troops of the D aru l Islam, fo r their m ajor effort had to be directed
against the Dutch. Even w ith the transfer of sovereignty at the end of
1949, they were unable to devote more than a part o f their energies to
w inning territory from the D arul Islam, since their officers feared that the
N etherlands M inistry o f Defense m ight not be able to ensure that the
num erous K.N.I.L. (Royal N etherlands Indonesian Arm y) troops w ould
carry out the dem obilization agreed upon at the Hague Conference. T h eir
fears were w ell founded, as the W esterling affair demonstrated. Had die
m ajor weight of the Siliw angi D ivision been locked in combat w ith the
D aru l Islam forces in Jan u ary 1950, the prospects of W esterling and his
backers w ould have been much better. T h e wide deploym ent of Siliwangi
troops in Jak arta and other key cities at that time was undoubtedly of
great im portance in frustrating the W esterling coup.
W i t h the s u p p r e s s io n o f W esterling's organization and the K.N.I.L.-
backed dissident movements in East Indonesia by late 1950, the Indo
nesian arm y was in a position to devote its m ajor effort to the suppression
of the already much weakened D aru l Islam. T his weakening resulted from
educational propaganda as w ell as from m ilitary attrition. In the spring
of 1949, M oham m ad Natsir, Chairm an of the Political Council of the
M asjum i, led a M asjumi-sponsored education program in the D aru l Islam
area. Pamphlets and speeches emphasized the difference between the real
concepts of D aru l Islam and the distortions of it practiced by Kartosu-
w irjo ’s group. As a result a num ber of the more sincere adherents of
D aru l Islam drifted away from it and returned to the M asjum i. By June
1951 the strength of D aru l Islam appeared to have been largely broken,
w ith on ly a few sizeable units of the organization rem aining.
O f the fo u r chief factors which have generated the D aru l Islam move
m e n t-fru stra te d nationalism ; exclusive, xenophobic, fanatical Moham
medanism; over-stimulated personal am bitions; and agrarian discontent—
the first has been largely removed, and the second, strongly intertwined
w ith and in large measure a result of the first, has, w ith the increasingly
tangible symptoms of independence, appeared to have been diminished.
T h e th ird factor, personal am bition, is bou n d to rem ain as both a

destructive and constructive factor in Indonesian society fo r some time
to come. T h e Indonesian revo lu tio n blasted open the dam o f social
m o b ility so long m aintained by colonial ru le. T h is served as a tremen
dous stim ulus to am bitions— those governed p rin c ip ally by selfish mo
tives of position and pow er as w ell as those governed chielly by the
desire fo r service to the new nation. As the dam th at had contained In
donesian am bitions collapsed and the scope fo r th eir op eration expanded,
the intensity of th eir com petition increased. T h a t the m ore am bitious of
those m oved chiefly by selfish desire fo r position and p ow er w ould take
advantage of the extraord in ary opportunities offered them as a result
of the political dislocations attending the struggle between the Republic
o f Indonesia and the D utch is to have been expected. T h is urge was im
p ortan t in the puppet states established by van M ook, and it is one of the
central facts to be grasped in understanding D a ru l Islam.
T hough the D aru l Islam m ovem ent appears now to be w ell on the
w a n e , th e f o u r t h o f th e c h ie f fa c to rs u n d e r ly in g it —a g r a r ia n d i s c o n ic n t —
re m a in s, a n d v / ill p r o b a b ly c o n t in u e to p r o v id e p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l to th ose
opposed to the governm ent u n til the conditions responsible fo r it are re-
' “ gh the new J o n e s i a n governm ent is dedicated to better-
whprr^n C° ? ltlons’ *s h andicapped by the lack o f security in the areas
where D aru l Islam still operates.
II. Political Developments Since the Transfer of
Sovereignty
7, THE M O VEM EN T FO R A U N IT A R Y ST A T E
h e H a g u e A g r e e m e n t transferring N etherlands sovereignty to the
new Indonesian state endowed it w ith a “D raft C onstitution’' w hich

was federal in character. It was this w hich governed the political articula
tion of the new state— the R epublic o f the U nited States of Indonesia
(R.U.S.I.)— from its inception on December 27, 1949, u n til it was super
seded by a unitary constitution some seven months later.
T h e R.U .S.I. constitution provided fo r a federal state o f sixteen units.
These included the fifteen puppet or semi-puppet states origin ally set up
by the Dutch, ranging in population from 100,000 to a little over 11,-
000,000 and together totaling about 46,000,000. B ut the R epublic o f In
donesia was by fa r the largest constituent unit, having a p opulation of
over 31,000,000. Each of these states was represented b y two senators,
w ho were appointed by the local governm ent from a list of three candi
dates (for each seat) proposed by the R.U.S.I. House of Representatives.1
On m atters "referring particu larly to one, several or all p articip ant ter
ritories or parts thereof, or concerning the relation between the R epublic
o f the U nited States o f Indonesia” and the constituent territories, the
R .U .S.I. Senate (made up of these thirty-two senators) had equal legis
lative authority w ith the House of Representatives. It could initiate
legislation concerning these matters, and its agreem ent was required for
all legislation in this sphere unless at a meeting of at least two-thirds of
the members of the House of R epresentatives two-thirds of that num ber
should oppose the Senate decision.2
T h e R.U .S.I. House o f R epresentatives was made up of 150 members,
50 from the R epublic of Indonesia and 100 from the fifteen Dutch-
created states according to their respective populations, it being provided
1. Art. 81, Draft Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.
2. Ibid., Arts. 127-32.
Ill
that o f the total at least nine, six, and three m em bers should represent,
respectively, the Chinese, E uropean and A ra b m inorities. Each o f the
sixteen p o litica l units was free to decide the m an n er o f selecting its repre
sentatives, w hether by election or a p p oin tm en t.3 T h e House o f Repre
sentatives had the rig h t to introduce legislation, and the concurrence of
a t least h a lf of its q u oru m (50 p er cent o f m em bership) was req u ired to
pass any legislation.4
T h e “G overn m en t” (the President plus one or m ore M inisters) exer
cised equal legislative pow er w ith the House on all m atters, and w ith the
Senate as w ell in those m atters com ing w ith in the compass o f its authority.
It could introduce legislation, and its ap p ro va l was req u ired fo r all legis
lation. T h e President was the "Head o f the S tate” and commander-in-
chief of the arm y and was elected by the House and Senate in jo in t ses
sion. W ith the concurrence of these two bodies, the President appointed
a com m ittee of three for the purpose o f form ing a C abinet. In accordance
w ith the recom m endations of this com m ittee, the President ap p oin ted the
Prim e M inister (who had to be one of these three) and the oth er M inis
ters.5
A ccording to A rticle 139 (one th at assumed great im portance in the
liquidation o£ the constituent states), "the G overn m en t on its own au
thority and responsibility has the rig h t to enact em ergency laws fo r the
regulation of such matters o f federal governing pow er w hich demand
immediate provisions on account o f urgent circum stances.” T hereupon
sue regulations had to be presented to the House o f R epresentatives for
approval. H owever, the right o f in itiative w ith respect to these emer
gency aws lay exclusively w ith the G overnm ent, and in any case they
were operative u n til disapproved by the House.0
e power to amend the C onstitution was held by the House and
ate, an a quorum of two-thirds of the m em bership o f each was re-
W 611 thlS m atter was u n d er consideration. A tw o-thirds m ajority
o i quorum s or three-fourths of th at of the House alone was required
to make any constitutional change.*
December 16, 1949, eleven days before the tran sfer of sovereignty,
a J ° m m eeting of the House and Senate un an im ou sly elected Soekarno
as President of the R.U .S.I. Instead of three, he appointed fo u r c a b in e t
fo rm ateu rs, two Republicans (M ohammad H atta and the Su ltan o f Jogja-
3, Ibid.,forArtsthese
98-100 109, 110, (Within one year elections were to be held throughout
4, Ibid., Art. 108. positions. Art. 1 1 1 .)
Indonesia
g . 14-
°
5, Ibid., Arts. 68, 69, 74, 127-31. 7* AJ t' 190]

karta) and two "Federalists” from the Dutch-sponsored states (Anak

Agung Gde Agung of East Indonesia and Su ltan H am id II of W est
Borneo). T h e C abinet that emerged was headed by H atta as Prim e
M inister, and included eleven R epublicans and five Federalists. T he
membership of H atta’s Cabinet, w hich was to endure u n til Septem ber
6, 1950, included the follow ing:
M in istry M in ister P arty
P rim e M in iste r )
M oham m ad H atta N on-party (R ep u b lican )
F oreig n A ffairs j
In te rn a l A ffairs A n a k A g u n g G de A g u n g (Federalist)
D efense H am engku B u w o n o IX N on-party (R ep u b lican )
(S u ltan o f Jo g ja k a rta )
Finance S ja fru d d in P raw iran eg ara M asjum i (R ep u b lican )
E conom ic A ffairs D ju an d a N on-party (R epu blican)
E ducation A b u H an ifa h M asjum i (R epu blican)
Labor W ilo p o P.N.I. (R ep u b lican )
Ju stice Soepom o N on-party (R ep u b lican )
T ra n s p o rt an d Irrig a tio n H. L aoh P.N .I. (R ep u b lican )
Social A ffairs K osasih (Federalist)
R e lig io n W a c h id H asjim M asjum i (R ep u b lican )
H ealth Jo h an n es L eim ena C h ristian (R ep u b lican )
In fo rm a tio n A rn o ld M o n o n u tu 8 (Federalist)
W ith o u t P o rtfo lio M oham m ad R oem M asjum i (R ep u b lican )
“ H am id II (Federalist)
.. » Sup arm o (Federalist)
T h e federal system o f governm ent bequeathed by the Hague Agreem ent

rem ained intact fo r only a scant six weeks and thereafter began to disin
tegrate und er the m ounting pressure of a w idespread m ovem ent for its
replacem ent by a u n itary form of governm ent. A ctually, though this has
n ot been too w ell understood by some people, the terms of the Hague
A greem ent’s “C harter of the T ran sfer of Sovereignty” were not a legal
b ar to such a course. T h e terms were short and are w orth qu otin g:9
A rtic le 1
“ 1. T h e K in gd o m o f the N eth erlan d s u n c o n d itio n a lly an d irrevo ca b ly transfers
co m p lete so vereig n ty o v e r In d o n esia to the R e p u b lic o f the U n ite d States o f
8. Though he had been a member of the Parliam ent of the State of East Indonesia,
Mononutu had been head of the pro-Republican faction there and was considered to
be much more of a Republican than a Federalist. Of the five cabinet members desig
nated as "Federalists,” only Anak Agung and Hamid II strongly favored a federal form
of government.
9. United Nations, Security Council, “Appendices to the Special Report to the Se
curity Council on the Round Table Conference,” S/1417/Add. 1, p. 66.
In d o n e s ia a n d th e re b y recognizes said R e p u b lic o£ th e U n ite d S ta tes o£ Indonesia

as a n in d e p e n d e n t a n d so ve reig n state.
“ 2. T h e R e p u b lic o f th e U n ite d S tates o f In d o n e sia acccp ts said sovereignty
o n th e basis o f the p ro v isio n s o f its C o n s titu tio n w h ich as a d r a ft has b een brought
to th e k n o w le d g e o f th e K in g d o m o f the N etherlands*.
“ 3. T h e tra n s fe r o f so ve reig n ty sh a ll tak e p lace a t th e late st o n 3 0 December
1 9 4 9 .”
T h e rem aining article o f the docum ent d ea lt exclu sively w ith New
G u in ea and w ill be discussed later.
It is im p o rtan t to note th at the tran sfer o f sovereignty was complete
and unconditional. C onsequently there is no ju stification fo r in terpreting
the second p arag rap h as a cond ition of the tran sfer o f sovereignty. Obvi
ously an u n co n d itio n ally sovereign state has the legal rig h t to change its
ow n constitution as it sees fit. C ertain ly it has the rig h t to change a
d ra ft constitution. T h u s the fed eral p a ttern w ith w h ich the Hague
A greem ent endow ed the new Indonesian state was n ot by the term s o f the
agreem ent in violab le and sacrosanct.
H ow ever, to m a n y o u ts id e o b se rv e rs the v m ita iy m o v e m e n t a p p e a r e d to
develop w ith unnecessary haste and d isorder and w ith a ra th e r cavalier
isregard fo r legal am enities and fo r the sp irit, if n ot the actu al content,
of the Hague Agreem ent. B u t if one looks behind die ju rid ic a l facade of
the federal system of governm ent created by that A greem ent, the unitary
movem ent must seem not on ly en tirely n a tu ra l b u t h ealth y. Indeed, Indo
nesia w ould be p o litically and socially sick if this develop m en t had not
taken place. T h e federal system begun by van M ook and con tinu ed by
ms successors was essentially Dutch-created and D utch-m aintained. Un-
ou te y, genuinely altruistic D utch paternalism was a facto r behind
po icy. B ut it was n ot the on ly im p o rtan t factor and in any case
paternalism , no m atter how w ell-intentioned, is seldom appreciated by a
o utionary people em erging from colon ial status. W h a te v e r the u lti
ma e en s envisaged by those D utch w ho sponsored the fed eral system,
r , imi*ie late aim was control. W h a t chiefly distinguished the new
ed eral states from p rew ar colonial Indonesia was: (1) a new fo rm u la of
in d irect ru le w herein u ltim ate D utch control was m ore sk illfu lly camou
flage than previously; (2) m ore Indonesians h o ld in g m id d le and upper
adm inistrative posts, and having in a few states a sm all m easure o f gov
ernm en tal in itiative, subject to supervision and con trol from B atavia; (3)
m ore utc m i itary and police power; (4) m ore Indonesian nationalists
m ja il.
T h e essential p o in t is that the fifteen federal states established by the
Dutch (for the most p art in territo ry wrested from the R epublic) were not
Indonesian creations. From February to A p ril in 1949, the w riter made
on-the-spot studies of the governm ent and adm inistration o f six of these
federal units, including the two largest, East Indonesia and Pasundan. In
each of them it was abundantly clear that they w ere by no means the
spontaneous creations of Indonesian nationalists w hich the D utch claimed
them to be. In each case the m oving force behind th eir creation was
Dutch. T h e sm all m inority o f resident Indonesians whose positive sup
port the Dutch were able to enlist consisted largely of elem ents o f the
local aristocracies which feared loss of their political and economic posi
tions under R epublican ru le 10 and p olitical opportunists dissatisfied w ith
th eir positions under the Republic.
Once these Dutch-backed regimes had been set up, other elements
came to participate in them. In some cases sincere nationalists freely par
ticipated in their parliam ents out of the conviction th at by so doing they
could to some extent m oderate the anti-R epublican attitudes of their
governments. T h e chief reason fo r w hat passive Indonesian support
these regimes were able to command was economic. “Cooperate o r no jo b ”
was the form ula em ployed by the Dutch. Most members o f the tiny In
donesian m iddle and skilled-labor classes held out as long as they could
by selling the fam ily silver, fu rn itu re and finally most o f their clothes for
food. B ut after three and a h a lf years of Japanese occupation and a year
or two o f fighting the Dutch, most of them had little such “resistance capi
ta l” left. M oreover, non-cooperation was freq u en tly in terp reted as re
sistance and sometimes resulted in a person’s being sent to ja il fo r an in
definite period. A m an w ith a fam ily dependent upon him thought twice
before em barking upon such action. T he m ajority of the tiny Indonesian
m iddle class had been civil servants. W ith the D utch-controlled regimes
m onopolizing such jobs in the federal areas, the bargaining position of
the Indonesian nationalist was nil. If he was a m erchant or sought to
enter trade, he found that the licenses or foreign exchange necessary for
10. Frequently, however, such elements refused to work with the Dutch. Thus, in
Java the Sultan of Jogjakarta and the Paku Alam positively supported the Republic
from its inception. The Sultan of Jogjakarta has not only been one of the ablest leaders
of the Republic but has in his own realm pioneered many of the political and social-
economic reforms later adopted by the Republican government. In heavily-populated
South Celebes the Dutch were forced to jail, exile, or kill in battle 25 per cent of the
local aristocratic leaders, including the most important ones, and appoint more amen
able persons to rcplace them. The remainder of the pro-Republican majority of this
element was thereby convinced that retention of their positions depended upon their
supporting Dutch policy.
116
ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
^ ^ ^ r s and non-
- — ■* « jailing
jority of those elected were aWe to|insu« ! ^ the large ma-

these governments was further assured b T tl ^ amenability o£
minority of the members of thpiY r t*lat a substantial
with surprising frequency appointed « aPPointed- Even so,
been thought "reliable- by fhe Dutrh I “ e’eCted m<™bers who had
,Sm tUrned °M to be ardent RepubHcanf r,eaSOnab!e" ™ their national-
to them. In fac, the and » source of great embarrass-
staV T the Writer sP°ke- and al[ of allst government members
d e t elnofthe^ artifeial regimes were Wh° did ™ b - e a special
a S n t I ' ^S0Vernment they enioved " ” ! ‘ “ ‘"S that what limited
Du chtwtnhei ° Utch- "Had the're b Z ^ £° the RePub> -’s fight
Each of n0t haVe felt “ mpened ton° PUbliC-” ^ “ “ ed. "The
* ach o f these federal state, £ V glVe u t0 us.”
Ocularly on the K N I T m i P ed on D u tch mi l Y
Dutch-officered nr>l,v 'V
( yal N eth erlan d s Im l,, m illta r y p o w e r, p a r-
a v e r t e d into ‘‘state ^ S0VCraI ° f th e™ K N l T A ™ V) ^
Dutch, but Dutch r»*T- y battalions” so th \ 'u um ts w ere b e in S
Ir* March and A l.,Uary and police control r & • W ould lo o k less
Dutch described as^h I949’ the Writer v is*ted Urul u estio n ed -
of * e greatest degree0^ *dVanced of the fedet , nesia* which the
strength were scatrp ^ §overnment Dm u ^ states and possessed
°ffice- of the PX f £hr° ^ hout lhe prinr ^ U"itS in battalion
civilians The Prosecm^ Dutch* Dutch Ir AU the senior
Dutch ReS‘dents overrule^™*?31 made ^rests^n °® “ rs were arresting
jails were so overcrowd i officials of the n orders from Batavia.
“ “ <* the prin ' T n r i ^ P °*ical pr The
their health. T h e f ated that he couM * DUtCh doctor at
many political prisoners wer '?UStice stated that h 0 ^ resPonsible £or
Parliament had asked for Th "* jai1' Members not know how
ers but had been given no nUmber=>nd nam °/ * e East Indonesian
several other areasof So " h r T Wa«ssar th° £ theSC P ^ c a l prison-
,n er a “state of War anri kbes and ,h t CapitaI> together with
C‘VI1 libertieS' PuWic meetinS^ ’’ 1^ hicb prevlm ed1thefex eli’ « « *“

the Dutch Resident. Private political meetings required five days’ ad
vance notice to the police, permission from them and opportunity to at
tend should they choose. Indonesians were not allowed to travel from
Macassar to any other town without a pass. In areas where the state of
war and siege had been officially terminated, conditions were little better.
In the Minahassa area of north Celebes, for instance, troops of the
K.N.I.L. prevented the largest pro-Republican party there from holding
public meetings, while the Dutch Resident allowed Dutch soldiers of
both the K.N.I^L. and the K.L. (Royal Netherlands Army) stationed there
to vote in the local elections.
Initially it appeared that this modernized version of indirect colonial
rule was going to succeed along with the over-all policy of divide-and-
rule of which it was a part. Strong American pressure was important in
mducing the Republic in May 1949 to sign the Roem-van Royen Agree-
nient, wherein, amongst other things, it was agreed that two-thirds of the
representation in the future United States of Indonesia would be in the
hands of the federal states.
W hat induced a change in both American and Dutch policy was proba
bly the immediate and overwhelming opposition of Republican sentiment
to this Agreement, the increasing successes of Republican guerrillas
against Dutch troops and the mounting certainty both that the Dutch
would never be able to force a political decision by m ilitary means and
^ a t their further efforts to do so could only eventuate in long, bitter and
^decisive fighting, combined with the realistic fear that as a conse
quence of these factors the influence of Communist groups might grow
at tIje expense of the interned non-Communist leaders of the existing
Republican government.11 Possibly a promise of future American support
had been given to Republican leaders at the time of the Roem-van Royen
Agreement. A t any rate American policy appeared to undergo a basic
change at the Hague Conference a few months later. American pressure
Was n°w apparently predominantly upon the Dutch, urging them to
make the maximum concessions. A t the same time an increasing number
influential groups in the Netherlands were evincing a new willingness
to make real political concessions in order to safeguard their still sub
stantial economic stake in Indonesia, and added their considerable weight
to that of the large and anti-colonial Labor Party in Holland. The result
on^ j toP Republican leaders captured by the Dutch in their blitz parachute attack
J°&Jakarta on December 19, 1948, were interned by them for over live months,
to Security Council’s prompt request that they be released and allowed
e urn to Jogjakarta.
was a number of Dutch concessions to the Republican point of view

which seriously undermined the survival-potential of the whole artificial
federal structure. The provision that conclusively spelled its doom was
that which forbade the federal units to possess their own armed forces, fo r
this meant that in the long run the units could not be maintained against
the will of the local populations.
W ithin the federal R.U.S.I., the old Republic of Indonesia rem ained in
many respects virtually autonomous. Not only was its internal adm inis
tration independent of the federal capital at Jakarta (formerly Batavia),
but many civil servants in such states as Middle Java, East Java, and
Pasundan (West Java) looked to its capital, Jogjakarta, rather than to
Jakarta for their orders. Frequently this resulted in a confusing “double
administration,” with two sets of civil servants attempting to adm inister
the same territory. The already great prestige of the old R epublic as the
successful champion of Indonesian independence tended to increase be
cause of the relatively high level of law and order, adm inistrative effi
ciency and absence of corruption maintained within its area as con
trasted with conditions in the other constituent states of the federation.12
The great majority of Indonesians were profoundly dissatisfied w ith
the federal system with which they had been saddled by the Hague Agree
ment. In all the fifteen Dutch-created states this discontent soon began
to manifest itself in widespread popular demands for scrapping o f w hat
was conceived to be an alien-imposed federalism and for the liquidation
of the states and their merger with the old Republic. Open encourage
ment was given these movements by the government of the old R epublic
and by Soekarno and other leading Republicans in the R.U.S.I. govern
ment. As Dutch military and police authority was w ithdraw n from these
states, and as the several thousand strongly pro-Republican "political
prisoners were let out of jail, the force of the unitary movement became
overwhelming and met with real resistance only where large numbers of
Dutch colonial troops, the K.N.I.L., had not been demobilized and were
opposed to it.
Not only that majority of the population which was Unitarian in senti
ment but also many sincere advocates of a federal political system backed
this movement. Though advocating a federal system, the latter wished
Indonesia to have its own home-fashioned pattern of federalism, not an
12. It is also worth noting that Soekarno and Hatta never resigned as President and
Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia and that those who functioned in their
place, Mr. Assaat and Dr. Halim, held the titles of ‘'Acting President'* and “Acting
Prime Minister, respectively.
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM AA’
artificial legacy of their old colonial masters. In general they preferred

to wait upon the decision of an elected all-Indonesian Constituent As
sembly for the determining of whether or not Indonesia was to be federal
and according to what pattern. They recalled that within the Republic
there had been a steady trend towards decentralization,13 and few were
much impressed by the assiduously fostered Dutch argument that unifica
tion meant Javanese domination. They were aware that Soekarno was
half-Balinese, that every Prime Minister of the Republic down through
and including Hatta had been Sumatran, that only five out of the sixteen
members of the R.U.S.I. Cabinet were Javanese and that in the old Re
public’s parliament representation had been weighted strongly against
Java as compared to the areas outside. Moreover, die federalism which
they advocated was limited and conditioned by the fact that Indonesia
possessed fewer educated people than necessary for the adequate staffing
of even a modest central government. The tremendous duplication of
functions inherent in the federal system of autonomous, unbalanced units
(averaging in population from 100,000 to over 30,000,000) sponsored by
the Dutch was not, they realized, in harmony with the fact that Dutch
colonial rule had provided Indonesia with an educational system which
as late as 1940 had made possible the yearly graduation from high school
of only 240 Indonesian students from a total Indonesian population of
about 70,000,000.14
13. One of the last acts of the Republican government before the second Dutch
military action had been in this direction. On December 6, 1948, it passed a law pro
viding for the establishment of an autonomous province of East Java.
14. See In disch V erslag, 1941, 11, Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van N ederlandsch-Indte
over het J a a r 1 9 (0 , Batavia, 1941, pp. 106-7.
Graduates of high schools in Indonesia in earlier years were as follows:

A verage d u rin g
the years- E u ro pean s Indonesians Foreign O rientals a
1910-14* 49 4 3
1920-21 141 11 17
1925-25 161 32 32
1929-30 252 157 53
1934-35 374 204 124
1938-39 457 204 116
a Mostly Chinese.
Source: Brugraans and Soenario, “ Enkele Gegevens van Socialen Aard,” Verslag van
de C om m issie tot B estu d eerin g van Staatsrech telijk e H ervorm in gen (Report of the
Commission for Study of Constitutional Reform , generally referred to as the Visman
Report), Batavia, 1941, Vol. I, p- 73.
According to the terms of the Hague Agreement, the K.N.I.L., a force of

65,000 men, was to be dissolved by Ju ly 26, 1950. In fact, the process was
much slower than had been expected. Even as late as that date, 17,000
had still not been demobilized,15 and not until Ju n e 4, 1951, was it offi
cially announced that the process had been completed.10 On J u ly 26, 1950,
some 26,000 K.N.I.L. troops had been incorporated into the arm ed forces
of the R.U.S.I., 18,750 had been demobilized in Indonesia, and 3,250 had
departed for the Netherlands.
8. DISTURBANCES IN EAST INDONESIA
T hough t h e r e w e r e several thousand Dutch and Eurasians in the
K.N.I.L., the large majority of its troops were recruited from the
Christian Indonesian areas of the eastern part of the archipelago, p ar
ticularly Amboina, the Minahassa area of North Celebes, and T im or. Sol
diers from these areas were given a substantially higher rate o f pay than
were the relatively small number of Javanese, Sundanese and other Indo
nesian soldiers in the K.N.I.L. Many of their Dutch and Eurasian officers
had taken pains to convince them that in an Indonesia dom inated by
Republican elements they would lose not only their higher rate o f pay,
but their army retirement pensions. It was also drilled into them that in
a Republican-dominated Indonesia their own Christian areas w ould be
dominated by the Mohammedan Javanese. Thus many of them had
serious misgivings about the treatment they could expect after dem obili
zation, whether they were absorbed into the armed forces o f the R.U.S.I.
or returned to civilian life. A number of them already felt, or were easily
persuaded, that maintenance of a federal system of governm ent was the
course best calculated to protect their interests. A small num ber o f D utch
and Eurasian officers and Indonesian political leaders in some o f the
federal states helped convince them of this. Thus, p articularly in East
15. United Nations, Security Council, Report dated 28 Ju ly 1950 from the U nited
Nattans Commmwn fo r Indonesia Addressed to the President o f the Security Council
oncermng e issou ton of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian A rm y, and the N eth
erlands Army High Command m Indonesia, S/1663, p. 2. (At the time of transfer of
sovereignty there were approximately 80,000 troops of the Royal Netherlands Army
and 65,000 troops of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army in Indonesia. Ibid., p. 1.)
16. Aneta (one of the two principal Indonesian news agencies), June 4, 1951.
Indonesia, within which were Amboina, the Minahassa area, and Timor,
still-mobilized K.N.I.L. units as well as demobilized K.N.I.L. personnel
(who often possessed arms) were a force opposing the Unitarian movement.
Though this was the case in East Indonesia and to a lesser extent in
East Sumatra, a quickly-suppressed but extremely dangerous revolu
tionary coup in Pasundan (West Java) by K.N.I.L. elements, in which
both demobilized and active units were involved, had the effect of ac
celerating the unitary movement. By discrediting the Pasundan govern
ment and demonstrating the weakness of the federal units in dealing with
these powerful anti-R.U.S.I. as well as anti-Republican forces, it gave the
unitary movement an additional justification.
About mid-November 1949, Captain Paul (“T u rk”) Westerhng, who
had recently been demobilized from the K.N.I.L. and was the officer
chiefly responsible for the calculated killing of several thousand civilians
in South Celebes in late 1946, had begun organizing a force made up
chiefly of demobilized K.N.I.L. troops. A number of N etherlander, in
cluding two former police inspectors, were included in his group. He and
his officers made contact with some of the K.N.I.L. and K.L. troops still
garrisoned in Bandung, the chief city in Pasundan. According to the In
donesian Ministry of Defense, W esterling’s force approached Bandung
on the evening of January 22 and was augmented by regimental shock
troops of the K.L. stationed in Bandung. This total force of about 800
heavily-armed men, of whom the Ministry's communique estimated that
about 300 were soldiers of the K.L., entered Bandung on the morning of
the 23rd. Sharp fighting ensued, during which 60 men of the smaller
R.U.S.I. unit quartered there were killed.1 ’Westerling’s forces occupied
most key points within the city for part of the day but were finally pre
vailed upon by M ajor General Engles, commander of the K.L. garrison
of Bandung, to leave the city. On January 26, W esterling’s troops com
menced to filter into Jakarta, apparently with the purpose of launching
a major coup. Before they could reorganize, however, they were dis
covered and after some brief skirmishes were driven out.
Plans for this operation, later found by the R.U.S.I. government, indi
cated that the objective of the infiltration into the capital had been a
swift coup, in connection with which Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (the
Minister of Defense), Ali Budiardjo (Secretary-General of the Ministry
of Defense), and Col. Simatupang (the Acting Chief-of-Staff) were to have
been assassinated and the remainder of the Cabinet kidnapped. Accord-
1. Communique R.U.S.I. Ministry of Defense, January 24, 1950.
ing to R.U.S.I. sources, it later developed that Sultan Hamid II o f W est

Borneo, one of the leading Federalists and a member of the Cabinet, had
planned the whole affair, with Westerling acting as his m ilitary arm.
Upon the evidence of others involved in the coup, Hamid was arrested
on A pril 5. Government sources reported that on A p ril 19 he confessed
to having attempted to overthrow the R.U.S.I. government through
Westerling’s attempted coup of January 25 and through a later attem pt
on February 15 involving an attack on Parliament.2 A fter mid-February
Westerling s dispersed forces appeared to melt away, and on February
26 he was arrested in Singapore, after having been flown to M alaya in a
Netherlands military plane.
The Westerling affair did serious harm to Indonesian-Dutch relations.
Indonesians were outraged by the involvement of some Netherlands A rm y
officers in the affair and they felt that the Netherlands A rm y High Com
mand was seriously delinquent in its failure to control its own troops.
The suspicion that certain officials of Pasundan had made “arrange
ments with Westerling and the fact that a number of Dutch members
u- Pardy Dutch-officered Pasundan police force had deserted to
him did great damage to the position of the Federalists.3
Immediately there arose a widespread demand, which the R.U.S.I.
government leaders encouraged, for removal of the leaders of the Pasun-
an government. On February 8, the R.U.S.I. Cabinet drafted an em er
gency aw ca ling for the transfer of the powers of the Pasundan govern-
a ■tatG ^ omm*ss*oner appointed by the central government. On
p , owm§ daY W iranata Koesoema, W ali Negara (State Head) of
sun an, transferred his powers to Sewaka, the newly-appointed R.U.S.I.
Commissioner of Pasundan.
Sta.jted,^ e movement for implementing the unitary movem ent
c ^ February 10, the Representative Council of the State
°U Um^ a voted to transfer the powers of the State to the R.U.S.I.
r n n « e movement quickly entered this phase in most o f the
s ates. he general tendency, however, was for dissolution of
quartereVnSrby°Ut “ a Precaution a battalion of R.U.S.I. troops had been
p o s itta J t ta ° £ th d r Chie£ ChampionS' thC

reponed^^ncreashigâivit^by fevori™ Dutch:c0n;r0d’led Aneta news W
for diSS„IUti„„8
from various constituent states.” wmponucius
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM l * °
the states and amalgamation with the old Republic rather than with the
R.U.S.I. itself.
This formula was not resisted by most of the R.U.S.I. leaders. The
tide of nationalist feeling was so strong that even the overwhelming ma
jority of the members of the R.U.S.I. Senate, including many who had
been strong Federalists, appeared to believe that either objective wisdom
or the interests of their own political futures counselled that tiiey should
support the R.U.S.I. House of Representatives and Government in pass
ing an emergency law, based on Article 139 of the Constitution, which
made legal the dissolution of those constituent states whose governments
so requested and their amalgamation into the old Republic of Indonesia.
Such a law was passed on March 7, 1950, and two days later, following
votes of approval in the R.U.S.I. House, the requests of die governments
of East Java, Central Java, and Madura for dissolution and merger with
the Republic of Indonesia were approved. Similar requests by Pasundan
and other states followed in short order and were quickly approved. By
the end of March, only four states—West Borneo (headed by Sultan
Hamid), East Sumatra, East Indonesia, and the now much expanded
Republic of Indonesia—remained as constituent states within the R.U.S.I.
In West Borneo, after the discrediting of Hamid, popular demand
(developing into a general strike in the state capital of Pontianak) for
its dissolution and merger into the Republic increased. Upon the recom
mendation of a Government Commission sent to investigate conditions m
West Borneo, the R.U.S.I. House of Representatives on A p ril 22 voted
50 to 1 to approve this demand.
In East Indonesia, shortly after large popular demonstrations urging its
liquidation and merger with the Republic and a motion to this effect had
been offered by pro-Republican elements in its parliament, freedom of
political assembly was suspended and a number of strongly pro-Republi
can leaders who were not members of parliament were jailed by order of
Soumokil, the state’s Minister of Justice. Most of the troops stationed in
East Indonesia were K.N.I.L. units. Some of them, including the princi
pal armed force in the area of Macassar, capital of East Indonesia, were
ex-K.N.I.L. units which had recently been absorbed into the R.U.S.I.
army. Amongst these units there developed an increasing uneasiness over
the rapid course of the unitary movement. W hen on A p ril 5 they learned
that some 900 ex-Republican troops sent by the R.U.S.I. government from
Jakarta were about to land at Macassar, it must have seemed to many
of them that the old order in East Indonesia was about to collapse. The
landing of these troops would shift the balance of m ilitary power in the
area in favor of the pro-Republican unitary elements. There is some evi
dence that Soumokil and a few other leaders of the East Indonesian state
helped convince them that this was their last opportunity to act. Before
the Republican troops could land, about two companies of ex-K.N.I.L.
troops under the command of Captain Andi Aziz captured the few ex-
Republican R.U.S.I. troops in Macassar and seized control of the city.
They then drew up artillery and forced the R.U.S.I. troop transports in
the harbor to sail away. Aziz stated that he was acting to defend the
State of East Indonesia. However, the East Indonesian Governm ent, ex
cept for a few of its members, refused to indorse his actions, though it was
powerless to stop him.
On A pril 13 President Soekarno branded Aziz an insurgent, stating
that whether East Indonesia, East Sumatra, or the Jogjakarta Republic
remained autonomous states was no concern of the armed forces. He
called on the R.U.S.I. armed forces to restore order in South Celebes.
Sukawati, President of East Indonesia, affirmed that his Governm ent had
had absolutely nothing to do with Aziz’s revolt and had given it no as
sistance. On April 14 Aziz agreed to go to Jakarta for talks w ith the
R.U.S.I. government. There he was summarily arrested. On A p ril 21,
newly-landed R.U.S.I. army units entered Macassar without encountering
resistance.
W ith the balance of military power thus changed, the East Indonesian
met o Prime Minister Diapari found itself no longer able to muster
a majority in Parliament and was forced to resign. It was replaced by a
pro epu lican Cabinet headed by Mr. Putuhena. In Macassar and the
surroun mg territory of South Celebes an Emergency G overnm ent re-
sponsi e directly to Jakarta was set up. Political prisoners were released
rom jail and a state of martial law was declared. W ith the shift in the
a ance of power, pro-Republican guerrilla elements based in the hills
now e t strong enough to launch attacks on towns where some of the
oca ar^st0^rat^c elements, which had worked most closely w ith the
utc , ea ed the local administrations. This often involved sharp
fighting with K.N.I.L. units still stationed in these areas.
ough the Emergency Government decreed that “A ll officials o f the
prince y states [ ocal rajadoms] and other local governments should con
tinue t eir uties as a matter of routine,” at the same time it seemed to
give tacit encouragement to their removal by stating: “The adm inistra
tion of the princely states should be democratized and . . . the princes
adapt themselves to the new course o£ events in line with the wishes of
the people.”5 Occasionally the guerrillas in freeing political prisoners
from the jails released ordinary criminals as well. Many of these, as well
as some opportunist guerrilla leaders, exploited the situation to eniich
themselves or build up their own power. As a result, it was several months
before R.U.S.I. m ilitary authorities, in cooperation with the more re
sponsible guerrilla leaders, were able to establish a reasonable degree of
law and order in South Celebes. In late February 1951, agreement was
finally reached between the Indonesian government and ICahar Musakar,
the principal leader and spokesman for the 14,000 guerrillas of South
Celebes, for the incorporation of a major part of them into the army and
the demobilization of the remainder.0
In the meantime Soumokil had fled further east in East Indonesia to
the island of Amboina. According to R.U.S.I. government sources, he
was transported there in a Netherlands army bomber. Under the leader
ship of Soumokil and several local political and m ilitary leaders, the
South Moluccas Council, which had originally been constituted during
the period of Dutch occupation, proclaimed the independence of the
territory (■daerah) of the South Moluccas.7 The Council stated it had
taken this action because East Indonesia had been unable to maintain its
position as a constituent state of the R.U.S.I. and because the actions of
the R.U.S.I. with respect to East Indonesia were in conflict with the terms
of the Hague Agreement.
Amboina, by far the most populous island of the South Moluccas, had
for over a century been the chief recruiting ground for the K.N.I.L. A
large percentage of the families on the island were supported by a father
or brother who was either active in the K.N.I.L. or drawing a pension for
past service. Despite assurances of the R.U.S.I. government to the con
trary, there was a widespread fear that liquidation of the K.N.I.L. would
result in a loss of employment or pension for the bread-winners of these
families. In addition, the pre-colonial culture of Amboina had been more
completely lost than that of almost any other area in Indonesia, and there
was less consciousness of kind based on cultural affinity with the Javanese
and Sumatran bases of the Indonesian independence movement than was
5. Proclamation of the Emergency Government of Sulawesi Selatan (South Celebes),
May 3, 1950.
6. Later he broke the agreement.
7. T h e South Moluccas had been one of the 13 daerah s of the State of East Indonesia.
It included the islands of Amboina, Buru, Ceram, and the Uliassars. It had a popula
tion of about 450,000 and its capital was Ambon (on Amboina).
true of such East Indonesian daerahs as, for instance, South Celebes, North
Celebes (Gorontalo), Bali, or the North Moluccas. Thus, for reasons of
economic and prestige insecurity (because of uneasiness about the future
of K.N.I.L. soldiers) and because of cultural, particularly religious, d if
ferences,8 a large part of the population of Amboina was undoubtedly
disposed to support the rebellion. There is no way of telling whether or
not this was a majority of the population of Amboina. From the outset
the South Moluccas Republic was a m ilitary state, governed principally
by military law, with a considerable degree of compulsion exercised by
military elements, including a number of active K.N.I.L. officers. A t the
very beginning of the rebellion the special correspondent of the Dutch-
controlled Aneta news service learned from Netherlands m ilitary sources
in Jakarta that “the Royal Netherlands Indies Arm y (K.N.I.L.) troops
stationed at Amboina are backing the Moluccas proclamation o f inde
pendence/’ Its dispatch of A pril 26, 1950, went on to state: “C hief of
tafE, General Van Langen of the Netherlands Arm y in Indonesia w ired
ommander-in-Chief General Buurman van Vreeden today that, despite
persistent efforts to keep the Indonesian members of the K.N.I.L. on
m oina under military discipline, he was unable to do so.” W h eth er the
majority of the population of Amboina positively supported the rebellion
or were dragooned into doing so, it is impossible to say. In most of the
islands of the South Moluccas outside of Amboina it was, however, clear
at t e preponderant majority of the population had no interest in the
re e ion, an in a number of them there was no dissident movement
whatsoever.
■ the R.U.S.I, authorities sought to negotiate w ith the dissident
girae. However, the mission it dispatched, headed by Dr. Johannes
eimena, a distinguished Republican Ambonese who was M inister of
in t e R.U.S.I., met with failure. The rebel leaders refused to
n er into negotiations unless they were recognized as representatives of
an independent state. This being inadmissible from the R.U.S.I. gov-
ment s P°int of view, the latter was forced to undertake m ilitary
measures, he number of active and demobilized K.N.I.L. troops on
m oma was consi erable and they fought well. Several months of b itter
ghting took place before the back of the rebellion was broken. Not until
mid-November 1950 was organized military resistance on Amboina finally
overcome. 1
A fu rth e r d eterio ratio n in In d o n esian -D utch r e la tio n s w as a conse-
8. Well over half the population of Amboina was Christian.
quence of the Amboina rebellion. Since the Netherlands government was

responsible for K.N.I.L. units until they were demobilized, it was felt in
Indonesian circles that the Netherlands was to an important extent re
sponsible for events in Amboina. Illustrative of this point of view was a
Ministry of Defense communique, issued shortly after the outbreak of the
rebellion, which stated: “Armed units falling under the responsibility of
the Netherlands Government have forced some politicians to announce
the proclamation of the so-called South Moluccas Republic and they sub
sequently made arrests and committed killings.” Indonesians were dis
satisfied with the Netherlands m ilitary authorities' apparent unwilling
ness to do more than dismiss the mutinous Ambonese K.N.I.L. units from
the army. They pointed out that violation of m ilitary orders usually
called for court m artial and punishment.
In the meantime the unitary movement was proceeding at a rapid rate
elsewhere. As early as A pril 21, 1950, the President of East Indonesia,
Sukawati, had announced that his state was prepared to become part of
a unitary state if the Republic of Indonesia would agree to be absorbed
along with East Indonesia in such a state. The groups which wished to
see East Indonesia constituted as a republic separate from the R.U.S.I.
were, he said, small in size and number and it could be generally said that
the Indonesian people wished to remain one.9 A movement soon began
among all the thirteen member territories (daerahs) of East Indonesia,
except the South Moluccas, to separate from the State of East Indonesia
and incorporate themselves into the Republic of Indonesia. On A pril 30,
the Minahassa Daerah Council, by a vote of 19 to 0, with 3 abstentions,
decided to secede from East Indonesia and to join the Republic of Indo
nesia. It was significant that in Minahassa (a K.N.I.L. stronghold) at this
time—as contrasted with Amboina— all troops of the K.N.I.L. had been
confined to their barracks. Later that day the daerah of North Celebes
followed the example of the Minahassa, and during the course of the next
few weeks all the other daerahs of East Indonesia except the South Moluc
cas followed suit.
In a conference lasting from May 3 to 5, Mohammad Hatta, President
Sukawati and Dr. Mansur, Head of the State of East Sumatra, reached
agreement on the establishment of a unitary state. On May 13 the Pro
visional Council of East Sumatra endorsed this decision but stipulated
that it wished to join the projected unitary state via the R.U.S.I. and not
via the Republic of Indonesia. Despite strong pressure from a large part
9. Aneta report from Macassar, April 21, 1950.
of East Sumatra’s population for amalgamation via the Republic, Prim e

Minister Hatta staunchly supported the position of the State’s Provisional
Council. He felt, with justification, that the situation within the State
was too delicate to admit of such a course. Amalgamation with the R e
public might well have provoked the former K.N.I.L. soldiers of the
East Sumatra Security Battalion to undertake an adventure such as had
occurred in Amboina.10
9. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ST AT E
of negotiations between the leaders of the R.U.S.I.

A f t e r se v e r a l w e e k s
\ government and those of the Republic of Indonesia, agreement on
the formation of a unitary state was finally reached on May 19, 1950. T he
introduction to the Agreement read:1
T he Governm ent of the Republic o f the U nited States o f Indonesia w hich in
this case also acted with a full mandate on behalf of the G overnm ents o f the State
of East Indonesia and the State of East Sumatra, on the one side, and the G o v e rn
ment of the member state, the R epublic o f Indonesia, on the o th er side . . .
ereby declare: (I) that we agree to im plem ent in co-operation the fo rm atio n o f a
Unitarian State as a materialization of the concept o f the R ep u b lic o f Indonesia
aimed at m the Proclamation o f the 17th o f August, 1945 . . .
The Agreement provided that the provisional constitution of the

unitary state “shall come into being through revision of the R.U.S.I. Pro
visional Constitution in such a manner that it shall contain the essentials
of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, including: (a) A rticle
27, (b) Article 29, and (c) Article 33, and additionally appropriate sec
tions of the Provisional Constitution of the R.U.S.I.” Since these three
articles of the Republican Constitution were so stressed, it is im portant to
note them. They read:2
1°. Moreover, the position of the Communist Party was strong in East Sumatra. It had
to?!; ° ^ y resPonsiklp £°r a bloody uprising against local aristocratic elements in early
repeated ^ W3S W sPreai^ *ear at ^ fighting broke out such a process might be
1. Charter of Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of the United

States of Indonesia and the Republic of Indonesia.
2. The rendering of these three articles follows the official English translation of the
Constitution, originally published in the Voice o f F ree I n d o n e sia , October 1945.
Article 27
(1) A ll citizens have the same status in law and in the governm ent and shall,
w ithout exception, respect the law and the government.
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to w ork and to expect a reasonable
standard o f living.3
A rticle 29
(1) T he State shall be based upon belief in the God o f all M ankind.
(2) T he State shall guarantee the freedom o f the people to profess and to exer
cise their own religion.
Article 31
(1) Economy shall be organized co-operatively.
(2) Branches o f production which are im portant to the State and which affect
the life o f most people, shall be controlled by the State.
(3) Land and w ater and the natural riches therein shall be controlled by the
State and shall be exploited fo r the greatest w elfare o f the people.
In attempting to describe the right of property ownership more fully
than had been done in either of the constitutions, the Agreement stated
that “the Provisional Constitution shall contain an article laying down the
basic principle that ‘the right of property is a social function.' In
other words, the property owner was expected to use his property m a
way which was in harmony with the interests of society.0
Other major provisions of the Agreement follow:
(a) T he Senate was to be abolished.
(b) A Provisional Parliam ent for the new state was to be form ed from the com
bined mem berships o f the R.U.S.I. House of R epresentatives and the W ork-
3. T h e R.U .S.I. Constitution stated m erely that "Every citizen according to his ab ility
has the righ t to available work . . ” (Art. 27). (Italics supplied.)
4 T h e Dhrase is “Hak milik itu adalah su atu funksi s o s i a l ” and a lite ra l translation
would be* T h e righ t of property exists as a social function.” In the u n itary constitu
tion th a t'la te r em erged this phrase was added to the existing article concerning prop-
erty in the R U S I Constitution. T h is had read, and was so carried over into the new
unitary constitution: "Everyone has the righ t to own property in d iv id u ally as well as in
association w ith others. No one sh all be deprived a rb n ra n ly of his property (A n. 26
of the R U S I Constitution and Art. 26 of the new un ity Constitution.) Ph. 1, Art. 27,
of both the R U S I and un itary constitutions reads: “Expropriation of any property or
righ t for the general benefit cannot take place except w ith indem nification and in ac
cordance w ith regulations as established by law . ^
5. T h e official interpretation of this statem ent as given b y M inister of Justice Soe-
pomo shortly after the prom ulgation of the U nitary C onstitution, was: "T he social
function of property is fundam ental and m ust be interpreted so as to mean that prop
erty m ay not be used to harm society.” S u p p le m e n t to t h e R.U.S.I. Gazette, No. 37,
“Elucidation to Act No. 7, 1950, on the revision of the Provisional Constitution of the
R epublic of Indonesia, converting this into the Provisional Constitution of the R epublic
of Indonesia.”
ing Committee6 of the K.N.I.P. (provisional parliam ent o f the R e p u b lic o f

Indonesia), with such additional members as might be ap p o in ted by tAl
President "after consideration by the two Governm ents.”
(c) A provisional constitution for the new state was to be draw n u p by an
"Assembly for Changing the Constitution,” made up o f the H ouse o f R eP*
resentatives of the R.U.S.I. and the W orking Com mittee of the K.N.I-P*
(d) A Constituent Assembly was to be elected as soon as possible th erea fte r ° n
the basis of one member for every 300,000 inhabitants w ith due con sid er3’
tion for a fair representation of minorities/' and w ould fram e a fin al con
stitution.
(e) Soekarno was to be President o f the new state.
(f) The Cabinet of the government of the new state was to be resp on sib le to
its Parliament.
(g) Pending the introduction of new legislation by the un itary state, existing
acts and regulations were to remain in force, "with the u n derstand in g that,
wherever possible, the laws of the member-state, the R epublic o f Indonesia,
shall be adhered to/’
There followed a period of two months during which the r e p r e s e n t a

tives of the R.U.S.I. House of Representatives and of the R e p u b l i c a n
K.N.I.P. met together to work out a draft for the unitary constitution-
July 20th, they had completed their task and presented their d ra ft to
the R.U.S.I. House and Senate and the W orking Committee o f the
K.N.I.P. for ap p ro v a l. It had been agreed that these bodies could not
amend the draft, but could only approve or disapprove it. A fte r more
than three weeks of discussion, general agreement was finally reached. On
August 14, the R.U.S.I. Senate endorsed the draft by a unanim ous vote
and the R.U.S.I. House did so by a vote of 90 to 18. The W orkin g Com
mittee of the K.N.I.P. ratified the document by a vote of 31 to 2, w ith
7 abstentions. On the following day, August 15, 1950, President Soekarno
signed the draft bill and with the counter-signature of Soepomo, M in is t e r
o Justice of the R.U.S.I., the bill was promulgated as the “Provisional
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.”
The very name of the new State—"Republic of Indonesia”— s y m b o l i z e d
a return to the unitary pattern of the old Republic of Indonesia and a
triumph for the nationalism which it represented. More than anything
else, the change from the federal R.U.S.I. to the new unitary R epublic
represented the desire of the population to shake off the legacy o f Dutch
colonial rule. For, despite the full sovereignty enjoyed by the R.U.S.I-,
the preponderant majority of the Indonesian population regarded its
federal structure as having been Dutch-imposed and a relic of colonialism-
6. The 47-man interim agency of the K.N.I.P.
1 ESlAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM 131
tk
ftern the liquidation o£ federalism meant the final triumph of the
'T’k c Indonesia, proclaimed on August 17, 1945.
is ^ ? constitution of the new state is explicitly provisional and, indeed,
ries.esiSnated as the “Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indo-
e However, the general expectation is that the final version that
se C^ es following the deliberations of the projected Constituent As-
^ v w ill be very close to it.
^ he present provisional constitution is essentially a revision of the
t, ’ *S*I. Constitution so as to harmonize more completely with that of
e ° ld Republic of Indonesia, incorporating—with certain amendments
tJ*e Charter of Agreement of May 19 between the government of the
and that of the old Republic. The most important of these
‘^ ^ d r n e n t s was the decision not to have the President appoint addi-
tlo Hal members to the new state's House of Representatives, but rather
^ / ^ co rp orate the membership of the R.U.S.I. Senate and the Republican
Advisory Council into it along with the memberships of the R.U.S.I.
° u se and the W orking Committee of the Republican K.N.I.P.7 Thus
Membership of the single-chambered legislature of the new state, its
**°Use of Representatives, was made up of 237 members: 147 from the
**°Use of Representatives and 31 from the Senate of the R.U.S.I., 46
f r °m the W orking Committee of the K.N.I.P. and 13 from the High A d
visory Council of the Republic of Indonesia.8 This first House of Repre-
SeiHatives of the new state is considered temporary and is later to be re-
P!aced by one based upon countrywide elections, w ith one representative
fo r every 300,000 persons.9 A second amendment to the Charter was that
P roviding that the ratio of members to the projected Constituent As
sem bly should be one to every 150,000, rather than one to every 300,000,
^ h a b ita n ts.10
Except for its unitary organization and the elim ination of the Senate,11
7 * A rt. 77 T h e P r o v is io n a l C o n s t it u t io n of the R ep u b lic of Indonesia. See also “E lu
c id a tio n to Act. No. 7, 1950,” cit.
8 - A t the tim e of th eir fusion a ll these four constituent bodies h ad m em berships
s lig h tly sm aller than th eir m axim um . T h e R .U .S.I. House of R epresentatives had an
a u th o riz e d m em bership of 150, the R .U .S.I. Senate 32, the R ep u b lican W o rkin g Com
m itte e 47, and the H igh Advisory C ouncil 18. As far as the w riter knows, unfilled posi
tio n s a risin g from deaths or resignations w ere the chief reason for this discrepancy.
9 - See Art. 56.
10. “E lu cid ation to Act. No. 7, 1950, cit.
11- Sentim ent for provision for a senate w ith in the u n ita ry state was consiaeraDie
e n o u g h to in d icate th at when the projected C onstituent Assem bly fram es the final and
d e fin itiv e constitution, there is some chance th a t one w ill be provided for. S ja h rir’*
132 ASLAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
the general pattern of government established by the new constitution is

close to that of the R.U.S.I. It provides that legislative authority is to be
shared between the Government (President and Cabinet) and the House
of Representatives. Either can introduce legislation, and Presidential
decrees (including those concerning the President's authority over the
armed forces) require the assent of both.12 The Governm ent possesses the
right to enact emergency laws on its own authority. However, they must
be approved by the House of Representatives at its next sitting; other
wise they lapse.13 The Cabinet as a whole, as well as each M inister indi
vidually, is responsible to the House of Representatives. Even during the
period that it is provisional (i.e., before general elections are held), the
House has the right to compel the Cabinet or Ministers individually to
resign.14
Thus there are actually three lodgments of power: the President, the
Cabinet, and the House of Representatives. A ll ordinary legislation re
quires the immediate approval of all three. Emergency legislation re
quires the immediate approval of the President and Cabinet, and u lti
mate sanction by the Parliament, though it is operative while awaiting
that sanction. However, this interval need not be long, for the House can
assemble not only whenever requested by the Government but also w hen
ever at least one-tenth of its membership so desires.15 Moreover, since the
Cabinet is responsible to the House, it would be unlikely to approve such
legislation unless reasonably sure of later securing its approval.
The President’s16 power is considerable. In addition to sharing in the
a c tim r ^ f ^ h ^ ^ esta^ ls^ rnent *n the un itary government, both for the purpose of
tural differences C ^ 0Ver"basty legislation and in order to give rep resen tation to cul-
12. A m . 89-95.
13. Arts. 96-97.
niirft are not ma<*e clear in A rticle 83 itself, b ut are m ade ex-
cft. Elucidation" to the Constitution. "E lucidation to Act. No. 7, 1950,”
15. Art. 65.
in s t h e ° C o i p C T ^Tresident oE the un itary state by the Assem bly for C hang-
the K N I P 1 and th i r h House of Representatives plus the W o rkin g Com m ittee of
the -0£ Aereement of M ay 19. 1950, between the R .U .S.I. and
they agreed to estab lish ^ M th 1*111131**1 tha* he was t0 be President of the u n ita ry state
unitarv constitiifinn «t9f ^ rejpect to the election of the President, the provisional
J ■I . es only: 'T h e President and the Vice-President are elected in
am vi r m- £ Iaid down bV la w ” (Art. 45.) “For the first tim e,” this
article continues, the Vice-President is appointed by the President upon the recom
mendations subm itted by the House of Representatives.” Shortly after the form ation of
legislative power, he has the right to dissolve the House of Representa
tives and call for new elections.17 Also the President “forms the Ministries
and “appoints one or more Cabinet Formateurs” who in turn appoint the
other Cabinet Ministers,18 in conformity, of course, with the wishes of
the majority of the House of Representatives. Since the President, if he
so wishes, has the option of appointing only one Cabinet form ateui, he
can therefore appoint the Prime Minister—subject to the approval of a
majority of Parliament.
Though the provisional constitution is not federal, the governmental
apparatus which it provides is not monolithic. It stipulates that “the
division of Indonesia’s territory into large and small autonomous terri
tories and the organization of their administration shall be established by
law, observing and considering the principles of consultation and repre
sentation in the system of government of the state” and that the terri
tories shall be given the largest possible measure of autonomy, to manage
their own local government."10 Soon after promulgation of the new Con
stitution, the territory of Indonesia20 was subdivided into ten provinces.
These are Sumatera Utara (North Sumatra), Sumatera Tengah (Middle
Sumatra), Sumatera Selatan (South Sumatra), Djawa Barat (West Java),
Djawa Tengah (Middle Java), Djawa Timur (East Java, including Ma
dura), Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes), Malukku (the Moluccas,
including New Guinea) and Sunda K etjil (the Lesser Sundas—Bali, Lom
bok, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores, Timor, etc.). Though by mid-1951 some
administrative decentralization had developed along provincial lines, no
great amount of substantive governmental decentralization had yet oc
curred. Undoubtedly this was partly due to the amount of attention still
being demanded by the pressing problems of the central government and
to the inability of the latter to release sufficient personnel to staff ade
quately the provincial administrations. It was, however, also to an im
portant extent a consequence of the fact that these provincial administra
tions had not yet been granted the power to raise sums of any conse
quence through local taxation.
the first un itary Government, M ohammad H atta secured the support of a large m ajority
of the House of R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s as w ell as th at of Soekarno for this post, and became
the new state’s first Vice-President.
17. Art. 84.
18. Arts. 50 and 51.
19. Art. 131. . , ,
20. Which is considered as encompassing "the territory of the former Netherlands
Indies.” "Elucidation to Act. No. 7, 1950," cit. (Thus Western New Guinea is included.)
10. THE NATSIR CABINET AND THE P A R T IE S
22, 1950, a week after the establishment of the new state,

n a u g u st
O President Soekarno instructed Mohammad Natsir, C hairm an o f the

Leadership Council of the Masjumi, to form a new Cabinet. T h e Cabinet
announced by Natsir on September 6 symbolized the liquidation of the
old federalism and the fulfillment of the unitary movement. It contained
only one former Federalist,1 and all of its key posts were occupied by
former Republicans. It was based upon a coalition which derived its
principal strength from the Masjumi, the largest party in Parliam ent
(having 50 of its 237 seats). Other parties participating in N atsir’s Cabinet
were the Persatuan Indonesia R aja— 18 seats, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia
of Sjahrir— 16 seats, the Fraksi Demokrat (Democratic Faction)— 11 seats,
t e Parindra (Partai Indonesia R aja) (Great Indonesian Party)— 9 seats,
the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party)—8 seats, the Partai N asional Indo
nesia Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Nationalist Party)— 6 seats, the
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (P.S.I.I.)—5 seats, and the P artai Kristen
(Christian Party)—4 seats. In addition, more than h alf of the 24 non-
party members of Parliament supported Natsir's Cabinet. T h e principal
party m opposition to the new Cabinet, the P.N.I., had refused to enter
ecause it ad been offered fewer posts than it felt entitled to. It held
of pCK T T 5>arâmeiJt’ while the other chief opposition group, the block
Tnenr u f ° ' Stalinist parties, controlled 29 seats.2 Not in the Govern-
PartiA v, re atively neutral in position, were the Partai B uruh (Labor
/x j f3 e Y Abidin—7 seats, and the Barisan T ani Indonesia
(Indonesian Farmers’ Corps)—5 seats.
^ Ct t^lat not have the support of the P.N.I.,
and hicrhlv Wa;\a strong one. Most of its members were experienced
the most important p ^ t - h e l ^ T ^ f whom- P articu larly those in
rlnsp tn hk Ma«- • , , political and social views which were
close o his. Natsir and his Minister of Finance, Sjafruddin Prawirane-
1. M. A. Pellaupessy, M inister of Information
2. Of these the P.K.I. had 8 the S ,
In don esia (Indonesian Labor Partv—led hv c (Labor Front) 7, the P a rta i B u r u h
(People’s Sovereignty Party—led by L uat \ w Inf a„n) 5’ the Fa*tai K e d u a la la n R ak jat
Party) 2- T h e Partai M urba had only 3 reorp 5' ^ the/ flrtBI Sosiali* <Socialist
rhan its strength in relation to Uie “ ParllIimCnt’ consid- ^ l y less
gara, were the two principal leaders of the Religious Socialist group
within the Masjumi, and Mohammad Roem, who had been recalled from
his post of High Commissioner to the Netherlands to fill the post of
Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also from this group. Two others holding
important posts, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (previously Economic Min
ister Plenipotentiary to the United States), Minister of Commerce and
Industry, and Tandiono Manu, Minister of Agriculture, were members
of Sjahrir’s Indonesian Socialist Party and held social-economic views
close to those of the Religious Socialists.
Most of the other important posts were in the hands of non-party men
of proven ability. Among them was Hamengku Buwono IX, Sultan of
Jogjakarta, who held the position of Deputy Prime Minister. His work
in increasing internal security as Minister of Defense in Hatta s outgoing
Cabinet had enhanced his already great prestige. In Natsir’s Cabinet he
continued to devote himself primarily to this task. The other functions
of the Ministry of Defense were taken over by Dr. Halim, a non-party
man close in his outlook to Sjahrir and until then Acting Prime Minister
of the old Republic of Indonesia. The Minister of Interior, Mr. Assaat,
had a closely similar approach to social problems and had won much
prestige as acting President of the old Republic and before that as Chair
man of the K.N.I.P. and its W orking Committee.
The following was the membership of Natsir's Cabinet (September 6,
1950, to March 20, 1951):
M inister Party
M inistry
Prime M inister Mohammad Natsir Masjumi
Deputy Prime M inister Hamengku Buwono IX Non-party
Internal Affairs Assaat Non-party
Foreign Affairs Mohammad Roem M asjumi
Defense A bdul I-Ialima Non-party
Justice Wongsonegoro P.I.R.
Finance Sjafruddin Prawiranegara M asjumi
Sum itro Djojohadikusumo Indonesian Socialist Party
T rade and Industry
T andiono M anu Indonesian Socialist Party
Agriculture
Communications and
T ransport D juanda Non-party
Education and C ulture Bahder D johan Non-party
Public W orks and
Reconstruction Johannes P.I.R.
Health Johannes Leim ena Christian Party
* Resigned on December 8, 1950, because of ill health. (His duties were taken over by
N atsir and H am engku Buwono.)
M inistry M inister P arty

Labor P andji Suroso P arindra
Social Affairs F. S. H arjadi C atholic P arty
R eligion H adji W achid Hasjim M asjum i
Inform ation M. A . Pellaupessy D em ocratic Faction
State Harsono T jokroam inotob P.S.I.I.
Resigned on December 18, 1950, because of the opposition of his p a rty to the
Cabinet.
Some of the parties participating in Natsir’s Cabinet, it w ill be noted,

were new and had not been in existence during the period of H atta’s
R.U.S.I. Cabinet. In fact, they all emerged during or im m ediately follow
ing the establishment of the expanded Parliament of the new state.
The largest of these newly-established parties was the Fraksi Demohrat
(Democratic Faction), a rather loose coalition of representatives from
Celebes, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sundas, most of whom had, when
members of the R.U.S.I. House and Senate, belonged to no political
party. It enrolled a large number of former civil servants, including a
number of administrative officials closely tied to the local aristocracies
of the Lesser Sundas and some parts of the North Moluccas and southern
Celebes.
The second-largest of the new parties, the Parindra (Partai Indonesia
a1a reater Indonesian Party), was based largely upon the prewar
mem ers of the party of the same name who had not already elected to
La” ^ c ^ * ^êy were drawn primarily from Java, Celebes and the
ouslv^ i*n aSHanC* Were ôr t^le most part civil servants who had previ-
political t0 n° Party ar>d whose position with respect to
f ^ soc*al Problems was approximately mid-way between that
of the P.I.R. and the P.N.I.
/'Tnrlpn S™fêst lke new parties, the Partai Nasional Indonesia M erdeka
that h ^ rfnt ^nc*ones*an Nationalist Party), was a right-wing splinter
f r omp itSd£ fr° m the main bodV of the P.N.I. Its detection
"t j occurred in part because of the drift towards the left and
was probably6^ r ^ POli.Cy” ° f the larger body-
subordinate n V U * m° re the dlssatis£action of its leaders with their
" a tta in t r S ^ P'N J - and their a“ endant
f , . e. Sovernment positions which they sought. In their
old < ,,,117" ^ T ° n WaS "a reV° U aSainst the trust “ mpany of the
d d guard Several months after the formation of the Natsir' Cabinet, it
Party) 1 S nam£ t0 ârta‘ Rakjat Nasional (National People’s
During the course of H atta’s and Natsir’s Governments the competi

tion between the Masjumi and the P.S.I.I. (Partai Sarekat Islam Indo
nesia) for dominance within the formerly Dutch-occupied areas increased.
In Java the P.S.I.I. was able to offer the Masjumi little effective compe
tition, except to a limited extent in parts of East Java. Though by mid-
1951 it was clear that the Masjumi was the stronger of the two on Su
matra, the P.S.I.I. had a substantial following in the southern part around
Palembang. On Borneo the Masjumi, principally via its constituent social
organization, the Mohammadijah, was almost completely triumphant over
the P.S.I.I., but in Celebes the latter was probably slightly the stronger.
The success of the P.S.I.I. in the Celebes must have been partly a conse
quence of the fact that at least by early 1949 the Dutch authorities there
had allowed it to operate, while they had continued to refuse permission
for the Masjumi to do so. This, combined with die fact that the local
Islamic leaders were out of contact with political developments in Java
and knew little about the current political alignments of Islamic leaders
there, made it natural for them, after the transfer of sovereignty, to
associate themselves with the central leadership of the P.S.I.I. on Java
rather than with that of the Masjumi.3
W ithin the Masjumi during 1950 the strength of the Religious Social
ists increased. As of mid-June 1951, out of the 11 members of the party's
Central Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinin Pusat) seven were in the
camp of the Religious Socialists.* The four other members of die Leader
ship Council5 had come to hold social-economic views close enough to
those of the Religious Socialists to assure intra-party harmony in the
approach to mosL domestic problems. In addition, the three principal
party leaders outside the Council were either generally sympathetic with
the views of the Religious Socialists6 or with those of the group itself.7
3 W hen the w riter talked w ith Jak in Perm ata, Chairm an of the P.S.I.I. for a ll East
Indonesia in M arch 1949, he was surprised to find th at this leader knew nothing of
the differences in platform between the P.S.I.I. and M asjum i and th at he was equally
prepared to acknowledge the leadership of eith er Wondoamiseno or Abikusno. (Inter
view, Menado, M arch 26, 1949.)
4. These were M oham mad N atsir (Chairm an), Dr. Abu H anifah, Prawoto Mang-
kusasmito. Nonja (Mrs.) Sunario M angunpuspito, M oham mad Roem, Sjafruddin Pra-
wiranec[ara, and Sam suridjal.
5. Ki Bagus H adikusum o, W aschid H asjim , Maskoer, and Faki Usman.
I). Dr. Sukim an ( P r e s id e n t) , and Kasman Singodimedjo (First V ic e - P r e s id e n t).
7. Ju uf W ibisono (Second Vice-President). T h e party “Presidency” was establ she
at a m eeting of its Congress in December 1949. T h e President and two Vice-Presidents
had the right to attend all m eetings of the Leadership Council as advisers, but could
not vote in its decisions. However, the President had the right to summon a m eeting
No unbridgeable cleavages developed within the party. T o the extent

that differences did develop, they arose principally over questions of
political tactics and the character of working relationships w ith other
parties and secondarily over questions of foreign policy. In these questions
there was generally a tendency for the m ajority of the Religious Socialists
to back Natsir and for the older, more conservative leaders to back Suki-
man, with a few of the Religious Socialists occupying positions between.
The Natsir group, for instance, found it easier to work w ith the Indo
nesian Socialist Party of Sjahrir than with the P.N.I., and the opposite
was true of the Sukiman group. In addition, the foreign policy of N atsir’s
group was closer to that of Sjahrir’s, emphasizing independence from both
world power blocs somewhat more strongly than did Sukim an’s group.8
During 1950 and the first half of 1951 the M urba party continued to
grow in strength; however, the previously weakened and disorganized
Stalinists who looked to the Communist Party (P.K.I.) fo r leadership
grew much faster. It is probable that by mid-1951 the P.K.I. had caught
up with and somewhat exceeded the Murba in size. Though the popular
backing of the two parties together was probably less than h a lf that of
the Masjumi, it was not unlikely that by that date the size of the backing
of the P.K.I., at least, was not far from that of the P.N.I.
The strong point of the P.K.I. was organized labor and it was p rinci
pally because of the increasing support of labor that the party was able
to stage its rapid comeback. By mid-1951 almost the entire membership
o S.O.B.S.I. (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, the A ll Jntlo-
nesian Central Labor Organization) looked to the P.K.I. for leadership.
ws-s tftc l31g6St trade-union organization in Indonesia and enrolled
more than half of all Indonesian organized labor. Though it could not
e sai that all the constituent trade unions in S.O.B.S.I. were P.K.I.-
ormnated, most of them were, and practically all of the rem ainder were
more under the influence of the P.K.I. than of any other group. T he
Era e-union federation dominated by the M urba, namely, the Gabungan
Sarekat Buruh Revolusionari Indonesia (United Association o f R evolu
tionary n ° n^sian Labor), was probably no larger than one-fifth the size
° • ! Ci_ *t * i* * ’ . ^ ose trade-union federations associated most closely
with the Indonesian Socialist Party and with the P.N.I. appeared to be
of the fu ll (59-member) Party Council (D evon PartaV) should h e feel th at the L ead er
ship Council (interim agent of the Party Council) was not actin g in conform ity w ith
the views of the Party Council, to which it was accountable.
8. N either group was inclined towards alignm ent w ith Soviet R ussia.
about the same size as that connected with the M urba, while the Masjumi-
sponsored Sarekat Buruh Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Labor
Union) was considerably smaller.
During the course of 1950, the leaders of the P.K.I., of whom Alimin,
Aidit, and T an Ling Djie became probably the three most important,
adopted a new and different strategy. The idea of one large party, previ
ously advocated by Musso, was dropped in favor of building up a small
elite party whose task was to secure positions of leadership or at least of
influence in as many labor, peasant, and youth organizations as possible.
This tactic achieved signal success with respect to both the S.O.B.S.I. and
the more m ilitant of the new Indonesian youth organizations, the Pemuda
Rakjat (People's Youth). The latter was made up principally of ex-
Pesindo (Socialist Youth) members, many of whom had been involved in
the P.K.I.-led Madiun rebellion of September-October 1948. It also en
rolled a number of demobilized soldiers with non-Communist back
grounds. By mid-1951, the Pemuda R akjat appeared to be effectively
under P.K.I. control.
Though the P.K.I. had not become a threat to the government in a
m ilitary sense, it was able to work some damage through economic means.
W ithin the S.O.B.S.I., P.K.I. control was particularly strong in Sarbupri,
the Plantation W orkers Union This was the largest union in the Repub
lic, numbering over 700,000 workers, a preponderant majority of those
in the plantations devoted to large-scale export crops rubber, tea, coffee,
quinine, sugar, etc. In addition, a large m ajority of w aterfront workers
in most of the important ports of Java and Sumatra were organized into
longshoremen's unions within S.O.B.S.I. and dominated by the P.K.I.
Through repeated strikes of the plantation workers and through sabotage
and stealing of cargoes in the port areas, particularly Surabaya, these
unions did great damage to the nation’s economy, depriving it of an
important percentage of the foreign exchange which the government had
hoped to employ in implementing its plans for reconstruction and raising
the level of living. Finally, on February 13, 1951, by imposing a tem
porary ban on strikes and lockouts and insisting upon compulsory arbi
tration of differences by governmental agencies, th e Natsir G o v e rn m e n t
was able to bring the rash of strikes to an end and to restore the requisite
level of exports. By mid-1951 the problem of cargo losses through stealing
and sabotage, though brought to an end in some places, was still serious
in several m ajor ports; however, in conjunction with the general demand
for Lebaran (Mohammedan New Year) bonuses, a new rash of w aterfron t

strikes broke out.
For a time the P.K.I. was able to disrupt production on m any of the
tobacco and sugar plantations in parts of East Java. For the most part
it refrained from direct participation in armed raids on these enterprises.
Rather, its usual method was to use party funds to pay demobilized sol
diers and local criminal elements to carry out these sorties, which some
times involved murder as well as destruction. For a while their success
at this was considerable. However, after the appointment o f the able and
courageous Colonel Bambang Sugeng as M ilitary Commander of East
Java on June 6, 1950, Communist and Communist-financed arm ed bands
were progressively eliminated, and by mid-1951 the restoration of law
and order in these disturbed East Java areas was almost complete.
It is somewhat ironic, but nevertheless true, that one of the chief rea
sons for the resurgence of the P.K.I. has been that a num ber of its mem
bers, including some of its important leaders, have become practicing
capitalists. This has been a conscious and calculated party policy deriving
from the conviction that a small elite party, desiring to carry ou t the
broad program pursued by the P.K.I., needs considerably more funds
than can be raised by levies on its small membership. Thus the assigned
function of certain party members is to raise funds by going into business.
One of the chief businessmen in the P.K.I. is the son o f A lim in, and his
firm bears the father’s name. W ith such funds the P.K.I. is able to pay
adequate salaries to union organizers and to carry out illegal activities
such as those in East Java.
Though the P.K.I. has by no means yet lived down the discredit o f the
Madiun rebellion, its leaders have developed an interpretation of it
which is convincing to many who have a limited acquaintance w ith the
true facts. They refer, not to the Madiun rebellion, but rath er to the
Madiun provocation.” The P.K.I. was forced, they allege, to take arm ed
measures because it had been provoked to do so by Soekarno and H atta
and their Government. Since they were threatened with im m inent arrest,
they maintain, they and the deceased P.K.I. leaders had no recourse but
to engage in armed resistance to uphold their political rights. T h e R e
public s leaders, they state, undertook this repressive action against the
P.K.I. and its associated parties because of the insistence of the Dutch and
American governments.
It was more to Peking than to Moscow that the P.K.I. looked fo r direct
leadership during 1950 and the first half of 1951. Its Secretary-General,
Aidit, spent considerable time in Peking in late 1949 and possibly early
1950. Mao Tse-tung’s solutions to social problems are more apt to be
cited than Stalin’s. In a few places, such as Medan in Sumatra, where the
China-born Chinese are particularly strong and oriented towards Peking,
there have been indications of a significant amount of cooperation be
tween the P.K.I. and such local elements.
From the outset the Natsir Government was weakened because of the
absence of the P.N.I. from its ranks. Initially the leaders of the P.N.I.
were in general agreement with the new Cabinet’s program and an
nounced that they would conduct a “constructive opposition." In fact,
however, their opposition very soon became less and less constructive and
appeared increasingly to be dedicated prim arily to securing for the P.N.I.
the Cabinet seats which diey had formerly insisted upon as the price of
their support.
In large measure this attitude undoubtedly resulted from the tendency
towards political irresponsibility, a characteristic not confined to the
P.N.I., which was a consequence of the political system still operating
within Indonesia. National elections'had still not been held. Most mem
bers of Parliament from the formerly Dutch-controlled areas had achieved
their office via the previous, Dutch-sponsored (and frequently Dutch-
controlled) elections with their extremely limited franchises and similarly
restricted candidacies. The others had been elected by the membership
of the old Republic’s Provisipnal Parliament, most of whom had been
either appointed by Soekarno or elected by the party organizations (each
party being given its quota of seats in Parliament according to the assess
ment of its strength by Soekarno and Hatta in consultation with local
governmental officers), rather than directly by the electorate. Though it
is true that the House of Representatives was roughly representative of
the population of Indonesia,9 it was not directly linked to it and its
members could not feel the same responsibility to it that elected delegates,
particularly locally-elected delegates, would have felt.
Two months after the formation of the new cabinet, the P.N.I., in
conjunction with several of the smaller parties, launched a strong attack
against the Natsir Government, seeking to supplant it by a wider coali
tion government in which the P.N.I. would be prominent. On October
25, 1950, a motion was presented in Parliament calling on the President
to name three formateurs for a new cabinet, one from the Masjumi, one
from the P.N.I., and one from another group. However, Natsir and his
9. The Masjumi and Murba were almost certainly much under-represented in it.
cabinet refused to accept the self-liquidation im plicit in this dem and and
called for a vote of confidence. The P.N.I. voted w ith the various Com
munist groups against the Government and was joined by the Barisan
Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Corps) and one of the sm aller parties
which had previously supported the Government— the P artai Sarekat
Islam Indonesia. The small Parkindo (Christian Party), also previously a
Government supporter, abstained in the voting. By a vote of 118 to 73,
the Natsir Government weathered this first m ajor attack against it. H ow
ever, its strength and effectiveness could not be unaffected by the defec
tion of these minor parties and by the fact that the P.N.I. had swung
closer to a position of full political opposition.
Pending the holding of general elections, scheduled for late in 1951,
Natsir s Government had endeavored to give form to the provisional
Provincial, Regency and District representative councils origin ally p ro
vided for by Law 39 of Hatta’s old R.U.S.I. Government. By the end of
1950, Regency Representative Councils in most of Java and a Provincial
Representative Council for West Java had been established in accordance
with this law, and Provincial Representative Councils for C entral and
East Java were in the process of being established. Law 39 provided that,
prior to the holding of general elections, local representative councils
would be formed on the basis of the existing political parties and m ajor
occupational groups electing members to fill membership quotas on the
councils assigned to them. According to some members of the M asjum i
and of the Indonesian Socialist Party, members of the P.N.I., the P.I.R.
and some of the smaller parties (including the Parindra and the P artai
are at Islam Indonesia) were dissatisfied with the num ber o f seats as-
signe t em in these regional bodies and, principally because o f this,
attempted to stop their formation. On January 22, 1951, Hadikusumo
o t e . .1. intioduced a motion in Parliament calling for the revo
cation o Law 39 and the freezing” of the functioning of all regional
counci s ormed under its provisions. It called for replacing the law by
one providing that regional representatives be elected by the local popu-
ations as sue but it did not set forth how this might be accomplished
p o o r to the holding of general elections. In the vote then taken, m any
of the Government’s supporters abstained and the P.I.R., the P artai Sare
kat Islam Indonesia, and the Parindra joined with the P.N.I. in support
ing the Hadikusumo motion. The vote was 96 in favor against 48 in
opposition, the Masjumi being the Government’s only support.
Immediately Assaat, the Minister of Interior, tendered his resignation
to the Cabinet. A fter a long session, however, the Cabinet decided that it
fully endorsed Assaat’s policies of internal administration and insisted
that he remain until the Cabinet as a whole should resign. On January
27, Prime M inister Natsir in addressing Parliament stated that the Gov
ernment approved Assaat’s policy and that the Hadikusumo motion
would not be carried out by his Government. He said:
It was exp licitly set forth in the G overnm ent Statem ent on the Cabinet pro
gram that fo r practical reasons the G overnm ent deems it necessary to continue
effectuating Law No. 39 fo r die establishm ent o f Provisional R egional Councils.
. . . T his form s p a rt o f the G overnm ent’s undertaking to consolidate and perfect
the adm inistration. Since that statement [i.e., the originally-announced G overn
m ent program ] was given a vote of confidence the G overnm ent autom atically
considers th at the Provisional House o f R epresentatives [Parliament] agreed to
the im plem entation o f Law 39. . . . T he G overnm ent has been aware that to
im plem ent its program a prerequisite must be fulfilled: i.e., that the regional ad
m inistrations—the structure o f which was in disorder during the five years o f in
dependence struggle—be reconstituted im m ediately on the basis o f the existing
regulations. . . . T h e Hadikusumo m otion demands that the G overnm ent pull
down everything it has b u ilt up w ith so much pains. . . .
Thus Natsir affirmed that the Hadikusumo motion was contrary to the
vote of confidence already given the Government’s program. He made it
clear that a formal vote of non-confidence was in order if those supporting
the Hadikusumo motion wished to press the point further.
The answer of the P.N.I. was to order its membership to boycott all
local representative councils, and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia did
likewise. T heir action was effective in halting the formation of new
councils, and on March 1 it was announced that establishment of the
Provisional Assembly for East Java had been postponed indefinitely be
cause of the refusal of these two parties to elect delegates.
Though they had supported the Hadikusumo motion, the P.I.R. and
the Parindra were not willing, at least as yet, to join in a vote of non
confidence and sought to work out a compromise between the motion
and the stand of the Government. In the meantime Natsir endeavored to
relieve the political tension by bringing the P.N.I. into his Government.10
However, the adamant attitude of the P.N.I. with respect to the Hadi
kusumo motion and its insistence on unilateral abrogation of the Hague
10. There was some basis for hoping that this effort might succeed since the Minister
of Defense, Dr. Halim, had resigned because of ill health, thus leaving vacant one of
the most im p o r t a n t cabinet seats, and Minister of State Harsono T jo k r o a m in o t o —
because of opposition of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia to the Natsir Government-
had also resigned.
Agreement,11 combined with its insistence on more Cabinet seats than

the Masjumi and some of the other Government parties felt it was entitled
to, made these efforts fruitless.
The Parliament, after a month’s recess, was to meet again on M arch 20,
and its agenda provided that on that day it should discuss N atsir’s state
ment of January 27. However, the expected vote of confidence did not
take place. Instead, those opposing the Government merely stayed away
from Parliament, with the result that the Government could not muster
the quorum of 50 per cent of Parliament’s membership necessary to con
duct its business. Only 96 out of 235 members were present.12 On the
same day the P.I.R. announced that it would no longer back the G overn
ment, and withdrew its two ministers from the Cabinet. In the face o f all
this, the Natsir Cabinet felt it had no alternative but to resign and did
so at once.13
Because it was the largest opposition party, the P.N.I. was first asked
by President Soekarno to form a new Cabinet. On March 26 it was an
nounced that he had requested Sartono, a leading member o f the P.N.I.
and Chairman of the Parliament, to form a “national coalition cabinet
on a broad basis, but after more than three weeks of fruitless effort
Sartono was still unable to form a cabinet and on A p ril 18 returned his
mandate to Soekarno. Continued differences of opinion between the
Masjumi and P.N.I. had been principally responsible fo r his failure.
Sartono announced that a deadlock between them had been reached
because of differences of opinion between the two parties on foreign
policy and particularly about, relations between Indonesia and the Neth
er an s (in particular, handling of the New Guinea issue), differences
over t e Hadikusumo motion, and the question of which party would
hold the positions of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
e Masjumi s position, as laid down by the Chairman of its Parliam en
tary Delegation, Prawoto Mangusamito, was that, if it supported the
new Government, it could do so only if its policies were approxim ately
t e same as those of the Natsir Government; however, if the policies were
approximately the same, he held, there was no reason for not m aintaining
Natsir an Mohammad Roem in their positions as Prim e M inister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Neither party would make the necessary
concessions to the position of the other, and the impasse continued.
II' Îa^ umt. heI„d l.hat abrogation should be "legal and bi-lateral.”
12. The Indonesian Socialist Party, the Fraksi Demokrat, Parindra, and the Catholic
Party as well as the Masjumi were still prepared to support the Government.
13. It, of course, assumed caretaker duties un til a new Governm ent could be form ed.
Nevertheless, the opinion of several of the other parties and of many

politically objective individuals was that a strong government would
require the inclusion of both the Masjumi and the P.N.I. T o this wide
spread sentiment President Soekarno added the weight of his own power
ful w ill by appointing Dr. Sukiman W irjosandjojo of the M asjumi and
Sidik Djojosukarto, Chairman of the P.N.I. to form the still-awaited
cabinet. T hereafter the P.N.I. moved closer to the Masjumi with respect
to the program it was prepared to follow. Finally on A p ril 24 a major
obstacle was removed when the P.N.I. declared its willingness to have the
Masjumi fill the j>ost of Prime Minister. However, it attached one im
portant condition: that the post be filled by someone other than Natsir.
This qualification strongly antagonized some leaders of the Masjumi and
some of other parties as well.
It still proved impossible to form a Cabinet within the five days allotted
by the President. Soekarno then intervened by designating Dr. Sukiman
as Prime Minister.14 Dr. Sukiman accepted this appointment and on this
new basis again set about creating a Cabinet with the help of Sidik
Djojosukarto; but he did so without securing the consent of the Masjumi
Central Leadership Council, which had been of the opinion diat he
should have returned his mandate after his initial failure. Thereby he
antagonized not only Natsir but those Religious Socialists on the Council
who stood closest to him. The resulting tension within the Masjumi was
sufficient to induce several leading Jakarta newspapers to speculate about
the possibility of a split within the party. However, on A p ril 27, Natsir
made it clear that there would be no split and that the whole of the
Masjumi’s leadership would back the Cabinet that Sukiman had formed
the previous day.
On A p ril 26, Dr. Sukiman announced the composition of the Cabinet
which he and Sidik had formed. Its membership was as follows:
M inistry M inister Party

Prime M inister Sukiman W irjosan d jo jo M asjum i
Vice Prim e M inister Suw irjo P.N.I.
Foreign A ffairs Achm ad Subardjo M asjum i
Defense Sum itro K olopakinga P.I.R.
Internal Affairs Iskak T jok rohad isu rjo P.N.I.
a Resigned May II, 1951, and replaced by Sewaka (previously Governor of West Java)
of the same party.
14. T h is designation could, of course, hold only so long as the other fo rm a teu r , and
thereafter a m ajo rity of Parliam ent, concurred.
M inistry M inister P arty

Finance Ju su f W ibisono M asjum i
T rade and Industry Sujono H adinoto P.N.I.
Inform ation A rn o ld M ononutu P.N.I.
A griculture Suwarto C ath olic P arty
Communications D juanda N on-party
Public W orks U kar Bratakusumah P.N.I.
Labor Tedjasukm ana L abor P arty
Social W elfare Samsuddin M asjum i
Education W ongsonegoro P.I.R.
Health J . Leiraena C hristian P arty
Justice Mohammad Yam in1) N on-party
Religion W achid Hasjim M asjum i
General Affairs M. A. Pellaupessy D em ocratic Faction
Personnel Affairs Suroso P arin dra
Agricultural Affairs T o be appointed0 P.I.R.
t>Resigned Ju n e 15, 1951.
c As of Ju ly 2, 1951, still not appointed.
The new Cabinet was strong in the parliam entary support it could
muster on the basis of its wide party representation. Except fo r the P.K.I.-
led coalition of Communist parties, the only party w ith a large p arlia
mentary representation not participating in the new governm ent was
Sjahrir s Indonesian Socialist Party. However, most of the influential
Indonesian newspapers were in accord in the judgm ent that it was weak
in respect to the capacities of several of its key ministers.
The only major domestic political trouble encountered by the Sukim an
a met during the first two. months of its existence arose in early Ju n e
as a consequence of the action of Dr. Mohammad Yamin, its M inister of
Justice, n carrying out a Cabinet-sanctioned program fo r the release
rom jai of political prisoners, Yamin certified as eligible certain persons
w o i not meet the requirements stipulated by the act which he was
imp ementing. Apparently his former close connection w ith T an M alaka’s
group prompted him to release several members of an elem ent o f this
group responsible for armed political disorders in Bantam in late 1949,15
w o e ear y \ not qualify for release under the terms of the act. T his
action roug t strong protest from the Indonesian A rm y as w ell as from
a great many po itical leaders. On June 9, the Governm ent ordered post
ponement o all further releases of prisoners, and some of those released
were lmprisone again. On June 15 Yamin offered his resignation, which
was promptly accepted. Dr. Sukiman then made an explanation to Par-
15. Among them was Chairul Saleh.
liament, which he requested to give his Government “an opportunity” to

carry out its program. Sartono, Chairman of Parliament, noted that a
request for an “opportunity” did not constitute a request for a vote of
confidence,10 and by a vote of 119 to 30 Parliament voted to give his
Government such an opportunity.
V*
11. M AIN PROBLEMS OF THE H A T T A , N ATSIR, AND SUKIM AN
GOVERNMENTS
The Sukiman Government’s Program

he pro g ramannounced by Dr. Sukiman for his Government on May
T 28, 1951, was approximately the same as that announced by Natsir1
seven months before, and in most respects was close also to that followed
by the earlier Government of Prime Minister Hatta.2 For, throughout
16. A vote of confidencc would probably have given the Government a more modest
m argin.
1. T h e basic program of N atsir’s Government, announced September 7, 1950, con
tained the follow ing points: (1) to prepare and hold general elections for a Constituent
Assembly w ithin the shortest possible tim e; (2) to consolidate and perfect the structure
and m achinery of government in conformity w ith the Provisional Constitution; (3) to
strive vigorously for peace and security throughout the nation; (4) to develop and
strengthen the economy of the people as the means for realizing a strong national
economy, and to b rin g about harm onious relations between em ployers and workers;
(5) to expedite p ub lic housing and construction and to intensify efforts to raise the
standards of h ealth and education of the population; (6) to perfect the organization of
the arm ed forces and transfer demobilized troops from both the reg u lar arm y and
g u errilla units to civilian life; (7) to strive for the solution of the New G uinea problem
by the end of 1950; (8) to carry out an independent foreign policy.
2. T h e follow ing is a sum m ary of the seven-point program of H atta’s Government,
announced at the end of December 1949: (1) realization of an effective transfer of
sovereignty to Indonesia; reorganization of the R o yal N etherlands Indonesian Army
(K.N.I.L.), expediting the return of N etherlands troops to H olland and the building
up of the Indonesian state's arm ed forces; (2) establishm ent of law and order through
out Indonesia; (3) draw ing up of an election law and holding of general elections for
a Constituent Assembly; (4) development of the natio nal economy and improvement
of the state of natio nal finances; im provem ent of the conditions of housing, health and
com munications; (5) developm ent of an educational program in accordance with the
needs of Indonesian society, and intensification of the fight to elim inate illiteracy; (6)
conducting of Indonesia’s foreign policy so as to strengthen its position w ithin the
fam ily of nations, and strivin g for m em bership w ith in the U nited Nations; (7) arrival
at a peaceful solution of the New G uinea problem by the end of 1950.
1950 and the first half of 1951, except for the early emphasis upon effective
implementation of the transfer of sovereignty and upon the u n itary move
ment, the problems facing the Indonesian government rem ained basically
the same. The following were the chief points in the program announced
by Dr. Sukiman.3 In his introduction Sukiman stated:
It is not fair fo r us to expect that the H atta and N atsir C abinets sh o u ld have
been able to solve in a few months' time the com plicated fu n d am en tal problem s
o f our country, such as the questions o f security, people’s econom ic w elfare , o r
ganization of the State, healthy relations between em ployer and em p loyee, b rin g
ing W est Irian [New Guinea] into the territory o f the R ep u b lic o f Indonesia, elec
tion of members o f the Constituent Assembly and o ther questions o f this n atu re.
T he difference between the program o f the present G overnm en t and the program
o f the previous Governm ent should be sought in the im plem en tation o f several
decisions which were taken either by Parliam ent o r by the G o vern m en t itself, or
as a result of the new situation brought into existence by the fa ilu re o f the W est
Irian Conference.
W ith respect to internal security, Dr. Sukiman stated that its establish
ment “took first place in the Government’s program.” “T h e G overn
ment,” he continued, “is aware that a number of im portant prerequisites
must be met in order to establish such security and that these prere
quisites for the most part are in the social-economic field.” In consonance
with this Sukiman, in introducing his discussion of the G overnm ent’s
policy with regard to economic welfare, stated:
T he problem of economic w elfare is closely related to th at o f security. Since the

outcome of any debate as to which o f the two problem s is the most im p o rta n t w ill
only result in a vicious circle, the G overnm ent is o f the op in io n th at any attem pts
at solving the two problems must be carried ou t sim ultaneously.
The purpose of the Government's plan for economic welfare, he contin

ued, can be summarized as being the increase of production,” a plan “to
be carried out by the people themselves, while the G overnm ent w ill re
strict itself to giving direction and moral as well as m aterial support . .
In building up the national economy,” Sukiman emphasized, the In
donesian people "must not forget the present economic structure o f the
country and must fully realize the part played by foreign capital and
man power in our economy.” These foreign enterprises, he said, had an
“important function,” namely:
3. Statem ent of Dr. Sukim an to Parliam ent on M ay 28, 1951, concerning th e program
of his Cabinet. In the absence of any official English translatio n of this statem en t, the
w riter has undertaken his own translation from the Indonesian text.
to participate in raising the people's standard o f economic w elfare through ob

servance o f the interests o f the nation, such as labor conditions, training o f
Indonesian stafE personnel, developm ent of cheap and useful products fo r the
people and affording o p p ortu nity to national [Indonesian] capital to participate
in them.
As had been the case with the previous Government, Sukiman stated,
the policy of his administration was “to nationalize enterprises which are
important to the state and to the people, such as, for example, the Bank
of Issue.” He noted, as had the members of Natsir's Cabinet, that the fact
that the Bank of Issue, “the center of the economic and financial life”
of the new state, was still privately owned was a circumstance which did
“not allow the bank to work fully in the public interest.” Therefore, he
stated, “the Government is of the opinion that die Java Bank in its capa
city of a Bank of Issue4 shall be nationalized in accordance with the
decisions of the Round Table Conference [the Hague Agreement].”
A major plank in Sukiman’s platform, also contemplated by the Natsir
Government, was the re-writing of existing agrarian legislation. “The
existing agrarian laws,” he stated, “stem from the colonial period and
were introduced by the Agrarian Act of 1870, which was drawn up with
a view to enabling foreign capital to make big profits and so to attracting
foreign enterprise to invest as much capital as possible in Indonesia.” He
noted that these laws had been detrimental to the interests of the Indo
nesian people and had hampe’red their economic development.5 There
fore, the Government would gradually re-write these laws, he said,
drawing up regulations governing the use of lands leased by plantations,
with provision for cancellation of such leases if these provisions were
not observed. As soon as possible it would draw up a Basic Agrarian
Law, which would underlie all categories of the envisaged new agrarian
legislation. In addition, he said, the Government intended to continue
buying back privately-owned agricultural lands, if necessary through
expropriation. (This referred to the policy, begun by the Dutch ad
ministration three decades before, of purchasing so-called “private
lands” and making them available to Indonesian peasant-owners. Owner
ship of these large tracts, on which over a m illion Indonesians lived as
4. In its other capacities the Java Bank was not to be nationalized.
5. In most cases, lan d worked by foreign cap ital had been acquired on 75-year leases.
In some cases, the leases by the N etherlands East Indies government of such tracts had
violated Indonesian property rights, p a rtic u larly com m unal lan d rights.
late as 1940, carried with it many of the same semi-feudal rights granted
to the original owners by the Dutch East India Company.0)
In its endeavor to “improve the organization of the State, Sukiman
stated, his Government “would focus its attention on two problem s of
the greatest importance: the establishment of a Constituent Assembly as
quickly as possible and the speedy development of territorial autonomy.
“The Government,” he continued, shared the opinion of the previous
Cabinets "that the Provisional Constitution should be replaced by a de
finitive one established by a Constituent Assembly.” “In connection there
with,” he noted, "the Natsir Cabinet submitted to Parliam ent a d ra ft b ill
concerning the election of members of the Constituent Assembly, and
pending its promulgation preparations were made to carry out the elec
tions later.” His Government, Sukiman said, intended to bring these poli
cies to fulfillment soon.
On the problem of labor, Sukiman stated that his Governm ent planned
to draw up comprehensive legislation and hoped soon to be able to lift
the ban on strikes and lock-outs.
His Government, Sukiman stated, intended to follow an independent
and active foreign policy aimed at the establishment of w orld peace.7
The relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia wras to be
changed to that of an orthodox international treaty; the various agree
ments with the Netherlands deriving from the Hague Agreem ent would
be re-examined in the light of Indonesia’s interests, and those detrim ental
to Indonesia would be terminated. Finally, Sukiman emphasized his G ov
ernment’s determination to press Indonesia’s claim to W estern New
Guinea.
Problems of Internal Security
Throughout the course of 1950 and the first h alf of 1951, the problem
of internal security was one of the most serious confronting the Indo
nesian government. Two principal sources of domestic disturbances and
insecurity Darul Islam and the activities of K.N.I.L. elements and cer
tain Federalist functionaries—have already been described.
„_6’ W lth resPect 11113 of land, Amry Vandenbosch, writing in 1940, Etated:
The owners have the power of appointing native heads, of levying taxation in labor
on the male inhabitants, and of demanding a share of the crops of the occupiers. Abuses
have inevitably crept into the system and for the last two decades the Government has
been repurchasing the private lands. The unredeemed private lands still cover an area
of nearly 900,000 acres. The Dutch East Indies, Berkeley, 1944, p. 250.
7. With respect to Sukiman’s statement concerning the foreign policy of his Govern
ment, see p. 178, below.
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM iJ 1
There were two other principal sources. The first was the result o f the
activities of the P.K.I., the S ta lin is t-o rie n te d Indonesian C o m m u n ist
Party. Though its chief effort was dedicated to securing a dominant po
sition within the ranks of organized labor, it expended considerable effort
on attempting to weaken the existing Government both economically and
politically. T o achieve this latter object it had considerable man power
at its command. Though, following the Madiun rebellion by the P.K.I.
and its associated groups in September-October 1948, the Republican
government had rounded up and jailed some 35,000 of their members,
nearly all of these had been released when the Dutch launched their
all-out attack against the Republic on December 19, 1948. Only a few
of these 35,000 (many of whom had been dragooned into supporting the
rebellion or misled by false propaganda) had been brought to trial, and
it was the feeling of most Republican authorities in the places where
they were incarcerated that it was unjust to abandon men who had not
yet been tried to the rapidly approaching Dutch forces. Consequently
most of the authorities preferred to throw open the doors of the jails
before the Dutch arrived. Thereby almost8 all those prisoners who had
in fact been positive backers of the rebellion were set free, as were the
ordinary criminal elements who had been in jail before the rebellion.
Among these 35,000, the P.K.I. was later able to find a large number
of individuals who had had military training and were willing to con
stitute its para-military arm. It, was from them that it recruited a large
part of the membership of the armed gangs which it sponsored in East
Java.
A second source of armed disturbances and insecurity originated in
the demobilization of Republican troops as well as of K.N.I.L. armed
units. In early June 1950 it was estimated that there were at least 100,000
Republican ex-guerrillas in Indonesia—over half of them in Java—who
had still not been rehabilitated to civilian life.
The government made strenuous efforts to meet the critical situation
presented by these unemployed guerrillas, but it fell short of its mark.
Aside from incorporating many into the regular army, it established
rehabilitation centers to return them to civilian society on an individual
basis, and also launched large-scale mass resettlement projects, under
8. Notable exceptions occurred in Surakarta and M agelang. T h e M ilitary Governor
of Surakarta, Colonel Gatot Subroto, forced 11 top Communist leaders to accompany
him when he evacuated that city, and afterwards on his own authority had them
executed. A num ber of second-echelon leaders were executed in the M agelang ja il.
taking to settle some 20,000 ex-guerrillas from Ja v a in S o u th Su m atra

and South Celebes during the course of 1950.
Some of the guerrilla units, such as the Students’ A rm ies,0 strongly
supported the government and helped it and the reg u lar a rm y in forcing
other, more recalcitrant, units to demobilize. H owever, m any o f the guer
rillas had been leading their highly-specialized fighting existen ce fo r as
long as five years; generally they were very young men who k n ew n o oth er
trade and found it extremely difficult to adjust to the re la tiv e ly d u ll
routine of settled civilian life. Since the governm ent was n o t eq u ip p ed
to rehabilitate them through occupational train ing fo r c iv ilia n life as
rapidly as it was necessary to demobilize them, it was u n d erstan d ab le that
many refused to follow demobilization orders. A m ong the larg e m a jo rity
who submitted to the demobilization orders, many, ex tre m ely d isillu
sioned with the status to which they returned in civilian life, w ere acutely
discontent.10 In consequence, an im portant m in o rity o f th em eith er
joined existing recalcitrant guerrilla units or organized th e ir ow n gangs
of robbers or smugglers. Among those guerrilla units w h ich refu sed to
demobilize, a few were w illing to serve as mercenaries o f the C om m u n ist
P.K.I. in East Java. It is probable that some also jo in e d th e ran k s of
D arul Islam, while others apparently joined C h airu l Saleh in the ab ortive
coup which he launched in late 1949 in Bantam. M any sim p ly con tinu ed
to --- ^1___■
tn operate on ____
their own.
The actions of dissident K.N.I.L. and ex-K.N.I.L. organizations in W est
Java, Southern Celebes and Am boina, the concurrent a rm ed raid s of
Communist-sponsored groups on plantations in East Ja v a , a n d the fre
quently large-scale operations of D arul Islam units in so u th e rn and
central West Java during the first h a lf of 1950 com bined to p resen t the
Indonesian government w ith a dangerous situation. T h e m o n th o f Ju n e
1950 was, however, the turning point. T h ereafter the g o vern m en t
strengthened its position at the expense of the dissident elem ents. M uch
o us success was due to the efforts of Hamengku B uw ono I X (M in ister
ot Defense under Hatta, and Deputy Prim e M inister u n d er N atsir), of
ms able assistant A li Budiardjo (Secretary-General o f the M in istry of
t J L t Z l ' r J T " * , F *lad! ar (Students' Army, operating principally in W est Ja v a and

of“ he S H ? , f ^ » OSe £ ,“ ? ? t' ? T m t a r a R ^ p u b lih In d o n esia P e l a d j a r (A rm y
operating chiefly in EastRT
em in h n epU^ ° Indoneda. generally7 known as the “T .R .I.P." and
Java).
VJ ° ‘ ,EVnn am ° ng the “ " " g i y s ° « aI; m inded m em bers of th e S tu d en ts' A rm ies th e re was
keen disillusion m en t because of the inadequacy of th e e d u catio n al fa c ilitie s m a d e a v a il
able to them by the governm ent.
N*SIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM 153
Ba. P Se^ anc* suc^ outstanding army officers as Colonels Simatupang,

Sj_ a n g Sugeng, and Gatot Subroto in Java, Simbolen in Sumatra, and
^ e t R ija d i and Kawilarang in Amboina.
m id -19 5 l a^most t*ie wbole of Sumatra was completely restored to
a n d order. The strongest dissident guerrilla group, the Harimau Liar
th had been eliminated. Unarmed busses ran at night over
Qj?e *°n § road across the island from Padang to Medan. Almost the whole
C elebes and Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) were likewise tranquil,
t^ e same was true of the Lesser Sundas. The only places in the Moluc-
n o t u n d er the government's control were those such as the area in the
er io r o f Ceram to which Soumokil and some of his adherents were
f>.°r t ed to have fled, regions of intransigent, blowgun-armed inhabitants
0f t*le D utch had never attempted to control. In East Java the efforts
C o lo n e l Bambang Sugeng had restored law and order almost com-
P e tely. j n Central Java, under the direction of Colonel Gatot Subroto,
e few rem aining dissident groups were being systematically rooted out
* th e ir retreats in the difficult terrain around Mt. Merapi and Mt.
M erb ab u .
O n ly in W est Java were the dissident elements still strong. Here, in
P^rts o f the mountainous Preanger area, particularly around Tasik-
^ a la ja and Garut, the situation remained serious. There were still several
stro n g D a ru l Islam units in this area, and their depredations were sup
p lem en ted by raids of smaller ex-guerrilla groups, some of which had
C om m u nist connections. In addition, there were some strong armed
Sôups m ade up of ex-K.N.I-L. elements, at least one of which included
SeVeral Dutchmen.
T h o u g h by mid-1951 conditions in several of the port areas had im
p ro ved , they were still bad in some— particularly in Tandjong P rio k (Ja_
ârta), T andjong Perak (S u ra b a ya ) and Cheribon. Large-scale thefts of
cargoes w ere still occurring in these ports, sometimes under the eyes of
h a rb o r police. The fact that conditions were much better in ports where
longshorem en’s unions were not P.K.I.-dominated led some observers to
b elieve that the key to solving the problem lay i n strengthening ^
an ti-p .K .I. longshoremen's unions. Others felt that collusion between
co rru p t, and frequently P .K .I.-influenced, customs officials and the P-K-I--
^ om in ated unions was a factor which w o u ld be only partially eliminatec*
by strengthening of the anti-P.K.I. unions, and that bureaucratic corrup
tion hacl to be attacked with vigor if real improvements were to be ex
pected. C ertainly, of at least equal importance has been the low wage
scale of Indonesian longshoremen. A veraging only ab ou t bYo ru p ia h s per

day, and w ith a liter of rice selling fo r almost h a lf this a m o u n t, m an y
probably find it hard to support their fam ilies w ith o u t reso rtin g to theft.
Social-Economic Problems
T h e problem of internal political security has been reg a rd ed b y the
more enlightened Indonesian leaders as being clearly b ou n d u p w ith the
solution of basic social-economic problems. T hus, Dr. S u m itro D jojo-
hadikusumo, M inister of Commerce and Industry in N a tsir’s C ab in et,
wrote in mid-March 19 5 1 1 11
Only a program , bo ld in policy and bo ld in perspective, can in s till h o p e in o u r
people fo r the fu tu re so th at they can liv e u p to the ch allen g e o f th e tim es. By
the same token it is m y considered o p in io n th at it fu rn ish es the o n ly sa tisfa c to ry
solution to get the problem o f in tern al security u n d e r c o n tro l. I d o n o t a g re e w ith
the notion that the only thing to do should be the a p p lic a tio n o f th e iro n ro d
and arm ed action to establish ‘law and o rd e r’ an d o n ly then to la y th e fo u n d a tio n s
fo r econom ic w ork. Police and m ilitary actions alone w ill p ro v e fa r fr o m a d e q u a te
because they do not get to the roots o f the pro b lem . T h e issue o f s e c u rity is to a
great extent an econom ic problem , directly connected zoith loss o f p e rs p e c tiv e
am ong many groups concerning th eir fu tn re. L et it be c le a rly u n d e rs to o d , h o w
ever, that it does n ot in any way exclude drastic action bv the g o v e rn m e n t ag ain st
crim inal violations o f the law . 7
th T w ° ° f the ei&ht points announced by N atsir on Septem ber 7, 1950, as

tr e, Pr°gram of his Governm ent dealt w ith means fo r m eeting th e coun-
j-ys pressing social-economic problems. T hey were: (1) to d e v e lo p a n d
s rengthen the economy of the people as a means o f realizin g a sound
[Q 10? 3 ec°nomy; to promote am ity between em ployer an d la b o r; (2)
ssist in building houses for the people and to intensify efforts to raise
e standard of health and education of the p opulation. In elu c id atin g
ese points in his address to Parliam ent on Septem ber 21, 19 50, N atsir
emphasized the necessity for rectifying the distortions in the one-sided
omal export economy which the new Indonesia had in h e rite d . B u t
ne made clear that development of the required balance w as to be
achieved principally by adding to the existing economic stru c tu re ra th e r
man by any hasty scrapping of what was already fu n c tio n in g in an
endeavor to erect a completely reorganized economy. M uch o f his address
is w orth quoting, for the points he made are those em phasized by the
11. “Our W ay Out" printed in a special edition of The E c o n o m ic R eview o f In d o -
nesia (Jakarta), April 1951. (Italics are the writer’s.)
155
subsequent Sukim an Governm ent, and ren
t e m p o r a r y I n d o n e s ia n le a d e rs . H e s a id ;i2 rese n t th e view s o f m ost con-
. . . th e econom ic w ell-being o f o u r commun'

factors b eyo n d o ur control. T h is is in fact an ini ^ êPen^s largely on certain
stru ctu re o f the past, w hich is still casting its sh*6 )1^ 1106 ^le colonial economic
ture is s till one o f unbalance, aim ed at the p roj on us- ° ur economic struc-
fo r e x p o rt purposes. C onsequently, any flu c tu ^ ^ 011 raw m aterials' mai.n ly
strongly a n d directly influence the liv in g stan d-ir?00/ *n w or^ m arket pr ices
m unity. T h e establishm ent o f a sound national er th? me.m bers o f our. com't
the w h o le econom ic structure. T h e industrial field ° nom^ implies the changing o
variety o f ag ricu ltu ra l products be cultivated. w m u stb e enlarged and a greater
balanced econom ic structure, not dependent upon -mu.st endeavour £o achieve a
T o be a b le to b u ild up a sound n ation al e c o n o m - ® n ta l.for.eign factorS‘ , *.*
econom y—m ust be strengthened and revivified Oti ^ âsis—i.e., ^ P f°P e
ning w ill rem ain m ere dreams. . . . T h e endeavour a11 schemes, and P™1'
less d e p e n d e n t upon the w orld m arket and to est-ibr , m Indonesia s econ y
at hom e r e q u ir e s n o t o n ly hard w ork but also “e " ,ndeP?nden‘ T°Z
foreign m an -pow er and personnel from Indonesia w in ^ o T bring a b o u n d na-
tional econom y but, on the con trary w ill mean kill;*, 1 , • , 1ov, the
golden eggs. L e t nobody, therefore, expect such foolish steps from t i e present
G o vern m en t. 1
In regard to foreign capital he went on to say*
. . . the Government is of the opinion that in many fields forei-n capital is

badly needed. The Government will study which fields of enterprise call for in
vestment of foreign capital and will also determine definite terms. . - • The
determination of the fields of enterprise and tejms o[ investment wjn also in
clude the nature of the enterprise, the possibilities of remitting profits and of
participation by Indonesians in management and capital investment.
The existing foreign enterprises will be urged to provide suitable opportunities
for Indonesian personnel to obtain the training which would qualify them to
occupy the senior ranks, and also for Indonesian capital to participate. All this
will redound to the benefit of the enterprises themselves.
T h r e e w e e k s la te r , in r e p ly 13 to q u e s tio n s o f m em b ers o f P a rlia m e n t
c o n c e r n in g th e G o v e r n m e n t’s a tt it u d e to w a rd s fo re ig n c a p ita l, N atsir
m a d e i t c le a r t h a t h is G o v e r n m e n t w o u ld re se rv e sm all-scale econom ic
e n te r p r is e fo r In d o n e s ia n s a n d a llo w n o fo re ig n c a p ita l to e n te r this
s p h e re . H o w e v e r , h e s ta te d w ith p a r t ic u la r em p h asis: “ N o d isc rim ina£*on
12. A ddress by Prim e M inister N atsir a t the opening of the first session of the P arlia
ment of th e new u n ita ry state, Ja k a rta , Septem ber 21, 1950. . f
13. G overnm ent R ep ly to P arliam en tary C riticism of the Government Declaration ot
Septem ber 21. 1950, subm itted by Prim e M inister N atsir on October 10, 1950.
156 A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM AN D T H E W E ST
w ill be made between capital from ‘original’ and ‘new ’14 citizens. No
racial criterion w ill be applied to economic policy, the o n ly crite rio n
being the protection of the small producers. Foreign capitai m ay p a rtic i
pate in the building up of large-scale enterprises subject to c e rta in con
ditions so as not to prejudice this interest of the people.” T w o days later,
on October 12, in reply to further questioning in P arliam en t, h e stated
that the function of foreign capital in Indonesia had changed com p letely
since the transfer of sovereignty. Failure to recognize this change, h e said,
“indicates a lack of self-conlidence.” He w ent on to conclude th a t the
Government admitted foreign capital because it could c o n trib u te 10 in
creased national welfare and production.15
The prim ary concern of the Government, N atsir em phasized, was to
build up the economic position of the Indonesian peasant, b o th the
grower of domestically-consumed food crops and ihe g row er o f ex p o rt
crops. T o this end, his Governm ent planned to give high p rio rity to the
development of peasant cooperatives. T o make this program effective the
Government, he said, would establish centers in every R esidency fo r the
training of "cadres” to administer these cooperatives. By the en d o f 1951
this program was to have trained 5,000 cooperative ad m in istrato rs and
advisers, "the backbone of the cooperative movem ent th ro u g h o u t In d o
nesia.” In addition, the Governm ent planned to grant credits on easy
terms to the newly-established cooperatives. "Cooperatives,” h e said,
w ill have priority in credits, not only those active w ith in the fram e w o rk
of the village, but also cooperatives in other fields o f p ro d u ctio n . . - •”
is would include peasant-producers o f such exports as ru b b e r, copra,
'apok and tobacco as well as such indigenously-based enterprises as fish
ing and cattle-raising.
I n a d d it io n , N a ts ir s ta te d , e ffo r t s w o u l d b e m a d e t o t r a i n I n d o n e s i a n s
to f u n c t i o n o n m o r e e q u a l te rm s w i t h o u t s i d e r s i n t h e f i e ld o f t r a d e a n d
c o m m e rc e . N o t o n ly w o u ld th e g o v e r n m e n t h e l p s m a l l e x p o r t e r s a n d
rasians arfw ™ ^ t e d ly refers to those ex-C hinese an d e x -N e th e rla n d s [Eu-

15 A ntt “ H° llandersl cmzens who h a^ recently elected In d o n esian citiz e n sh ip .
A neta report from Jak arta , October 12, 1950
“Fore,Vne c°aV„Cr, T " " ' T ' S jafru d d iS p«>vi'ra „ eg ara. M in iste r of F in a n c e , s ta te d :
Ind n S a ? “ “ h a' m . s,nc.e the G overnm ent fixes th e r e g u la tio n s fo r it-
year we hT" P°P ulat.on increase of o n e-an d -a-h alf m illio n . T h u s e v e r y
ProsoeH. ab le o provide work for on e-a„d.a .ha lf m illio n p eo p le if th e le v e l o i
prosper.ty is not to fall. As natio nal cap ital u not 5trong, fo reign c a p ita l is o f g reat
m portance for m ain ta in in g this level and even a condition sin e q u a n o n .” A n e ta rep o rt
ttom Ja k a rta , F ebruary 24, 1951. r
NC>° N E S 1 A N PO LITICS AND NATIONALISM 157
bu ^ ? rte rs w ith credits, as it had during the term of the Hatta Cabinet,16
‘vvould establish an Indonesian Business Academy to give them the
necessary to participate effectively in these fields,
b a l 1U ally’ Natsir outlined his Government’s plans for remedying the im-
nce o f the economy through fostering the development of light in-
c StrV capable of satisfying the most urgent needs of the population for
th e SUmer goods—especially textiles and building materials. In addition,
G o vern m en t would purchase machinery for processing export prod*
s so th a t a larger portion of the world market price of these products
Qf° u ^ rem ain in Indonesia. The blueprinting of plans for this vital part
G overnm ent’s economic program was left to its able Minister of
^J^nierce and Industry, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.
■The Sum itro Plan became and remains the keystone of the Indonesian
^°v e rn m e n t’s short-term program of economic development. The plans
^ o n ly ju st been completed when the Natsir Government fell. How-
n o t only did the Sukiman Government indicate that it would con-
j-lr*Ue a lo n g the general lines of economic development already pioneered
y N a ts ir’s Cabinet, but Sujono Hadinoto, Sumitro’s successor as Minister
C om m erce and Industry, immediately made it clear that he would
ac*opt S u m itro ’s plan in full. He asked Sumitro to remain as his chief
at^v iser, and the latter agreed to do so.
T h e two-year Sumitro Plan calls for the construction during 1951-52
those consumer-goods industries that fall within the present range of
°P e ra tio n a l skill of Indonesian labor, that can produce* efficiently and
w ith o u t high tariff protection, and that meet critical needs for which
fo reig n exchange must now be allocated. Emphasis is upon textile fae
r i e s a n d cement and rubber processing plants. A second, longer-range
p lan fo r producing items meeting the same realistic requirements has
also b een drawn up, but w ill not yield results so quickly; here the emp^13'
s*s is u p o n the manufacture of paper, glass, artificial fertilizer and ply"
Wood.
F in an cin g of the Sumitro Plan and of the longer-range plans for build
*n S lig h t industries, as well as of the more expensive and already p aTt Y
Com p leted rehabilitation of the country s war-devastated transportation
ancl com m unications network, has thus far been considerably aided by
Uvo factors: (1) the heavy world demand17 for the most important In °
16. T h is w as m ade clear in Natsir's statem ent in Parliam ent on October 10»
17. T h o u g h the prices paid for these products on the world m arket have bef \ , m?ed’
th ey h a v e n o t increased so much over prew ar prices as have the prices of manu a
goods w h ic h Indonesia seeks to buy w ith the foreign exchange it gets from their sa
158 ASIAN N A T IO N A L ISM AN D T H E W E ST
nesian export products (rubber, tin, oil and copra), and (2) A m ericari
financial assistance (a $100,000,000 Export Im port Bank loan a n d E.C-
grants from mid-1950 to October 1951 totalling 59.339,000). I t is realized
by Indonesian leaders that both of these factors may be tem p o rary.
Should the present level of exports fall off considerably or sh o u ld A m e ri
can aid cease, the problem of financing the reconstruction o f w ar-
damaged sectors of the economy, and even more of financing cap ital
investment designed to expand the means o f production, w o u ld prove
extremely difficult. Should both these disasters occur sim ultaneously, the
situation would be critical for the Indonesian governm ent.
T o force a population, which has suffered from eight years o f extrem e
economic hardship and has only begun to experience any su b stan tial
amelioration of that condition, to reduce its level of consum ption suffi
ciently to achieve the minimum amount of domestic cap ital fo rm a tio n
necessary to make real headway in the government's program fo r recon
struction and expansion of the means of production w ou ld re q u ire an
extremely strong government capable of enforcing a high degree o f social
discipline. Under such circumstances it might w ell prove im possible to
avoid dictatorial and even totalitarian political measures. E n l i g h t e n e d
Indonesian leaders are acutely aware of this om inous p ossibility, and
this is one reason for their emphasis upon short-term projects fo r re
dressing the imbalance in their country’s economic structure. A s much
as possible, it is felt, must be done in this direction w h ile I n d o n e s ia
possesses the fin a n c ia l means, in particular the d o llar exchange, to ac
complish it. The principal difficulty now b e i n g encountered is n o t a lack
of d o lla r s , but r a t h e r th e inability to s e c u r e t h e n e c e s s a r y p rio ritie s from
the United States g o v e r n m e n t for th e purchase o f s o m e o f the m ach in ery
and equipment c a lle d for by Indonesia’s economic plans.
Labor Problems
Indonesian labor— both urban and plantation— believed th a t in d e
pendence would automatically bring higher wages and b etter liv in g con
ditions. Its disappointment in this expectation not u n n a tu ra lly caused it
to make liberal use of its constitutional right to strike. T h e H atta G o v
ernment initially showed considerable sympathy w ith la b o rs endeavors
to increase wages through this means.
Though many legitimate grievances often rem ained, d u rin g 1950
these strikes tended increasingly to assume an irresponsible character.
Often having strong political overtones. The fact that several o f th e chief
INDONESIAN PO LIT IC S AND NATION
ALlSi* jpjg
political parties were making str
of lab o r often caused the o rg a n '°n^ and cornpeting bids for the support
levels and working conditions w h ^ ^r° m êse parties to advocate wage
o£ the country’s economy. i n ,Were as yet well beyond the capacity
repeated strikes instigated by tlle p*°n was becoming clear that the
were intended to cripple the eco^ ^ * (Indonesian Communist Party)
support o f labor. As approximatel011^ ° f ^ country as weI1 as to win the
was progressively brought under f of a11 organized Indonesian labor
the P.K.I., the situation became in ^ COntro1 or Paramount influence of
T here developed a growing conv— 51^ 17 danSerous-
circles that the increasing rash of amonS responsible government
n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n ^ a s to c o n s t i / ^ ^ W3S S° d im in is h in § th e to£al
m ou ntin g i n f la t i o n . A vicious circ e ^ ^ ° aUSe ° f ^ COUntryS
p u t lo s t b y s t r ik e s f o r h i g h e r w a r n g C rea ted w h e re b y th e ° Ut‘
w a g e s w o n b y th e s tr ik e s , through i n f l ^ r Cai?C ellm & o u t th e in c f ases m
m oney w ages w e re p a id . In I d d id \ CU rrency in w h l d l
t h r e a t e n e d to r e t a r d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f l0SS ° f ^
c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e e Sove™ment’s p la n s f o r re-
C ! • 1 tile e c o n o m y . T h e N a ts ir G o v e r n m e n t
after lonsr and serious consideratiot-.io c ,, auc ixaisu w
„n , B „ ratlon finally concluded that the interests
of labor as well as of the country as a whole demanded that for the time
betng strikes m cnt.cal mdustries should be forbidden and that those in
other sectors of the economy should be curtailed as far as possible.
A law passed on February 13, 1951, temporarily outlawed s t r i k e s and
lock-outs m all vital economic enterprises^ and provided that all dis
putes be referred to a governm ent “Committee of Settlement”21 for arbi
tration and settlement. Disputes between workers and employers in
non-vital” enterprises were to be referred to local government arbitra-
18. It ivas estim ated th at the loss of production from strikes on plantations alone
d urin g 1950 was equivalen t to between 160 and 170 m illion ru ' l
19. A nd afte r settlin g a n um ber of strikes in favor of lahnr /Ft*315' • nnwer,
the N atsir G overnm ent was faced by the largest strike in rh i £ ° n cora‘n® 1 ro,m try—
that of som e 700,000 p lan tatio n workers organized into the p e f r ° ated Sarbvpr*.
■n Sep tem b er 1950 it settled this strik e by establishing a f o r p f a n u .t n
porkers w h ich was m uch h igh er than the previous averaee w3pp r ^ l T hree months
later the S a r b u p n was on strike ag ain .) S e*
20. " V ita l” enterprises in clud ed a ll p u b lic communications and transDortation fadU-
u cs, p rivately-o w n ed railroad s, h arb o r enterprises and 9 ™,;.- . ~i„,.m-oroducts
production an d sales, hospitals, dispensaries, state p rinting offiSs Electricity a » d Sas
services, th e p rin c ip al banks, and a ll workshops, arsenals anri 1 ’ ^ r»f« within the
M in istry of Defense. L ater p lan tatio n s w ere added to this deParImenIS
21. Com posed of the M inisters of Labor, Communications T r ^ P and In d u stry , Fi
nance, a n d P u b lic W orks.
160 ASIAN N A TIO N ALISM AND T H E W EST
tion boards, one in each provincial capital or m unicipality. If discussion

under the supervision of these local boards failed, disputes were to be
referred to the Committee of Settlement for final decision.
Though the strike ban encountered strong criticism from the P.K.I.,
which alleged a few days after its passage that it had been “clearly issued
in accordance with war preparations of imperialist America/' it was sup
ported either strongly or with moderate reservations by the large ma
jority of Indonesian political groups. Probably the middle-group view
point was expressed by the influential, pro-Indonesian Socialist Party
newspaper, Pedoman, which asserted22 that, in view of the existing eco
nomic structure of the Indonesian community, the consequences of the
strikes and the way in which the right to strike was being utilized were
detrimental not only to that community as a whole but also to labor itself.
Quite apart from instigation by “those people who systematically w ant to
paralyze the productive potential of the country in accordance w ith in
struction received from abroad,” it stated, the strikes had been indicative
of a lack of responsibility on the part of labor towards the Indonesian
community. “Measured by normal criteria, it cannot be denied that the
workers' demands are not exaggerated, but in a community where the
supply of goods is insufficient and where a strong inflationary tendency
exists normal criteria cannot be applied.” W ith respect to the argument
that strikes against enterprises owned by foreign capital meant a weaken
ing of the power of foreign capital and were therefore advantageous to
national capital, it stated: “the facts show that foreign concerns cannot
yet be replaced by Indonesian concerns and that cessation of production
of these foreign concerns only creates a vacuum in production."
The anti-strike legislation was effective through the rem ainder o f the
Natsir Cabinet. The law was continued in force by the Sukiman Cabinet,
during the first month of whose existence it appeared to be equally ef
fective in eliminating strikes. Beginning in June 1951, however, a series
of small-scale strikes broke out in Surabaya. Though by the end of the
month these had apparently been brought under control, the govern
ment had been confronted with a new and difficult tactic— the linking of
religion with strikes for higher wages. In conjunction w ith the advent of
the Mohammedan New Year, the civil servants demanded that the gov
ernment give them a New Year’s bonus. On June 22, it was reported that
the Minister of Finance had announced that these demands would be
met and that 75 million rupiahs were being reserved for this purpose.
22. Pedoman, February 15,1951.
INDONESIAN P O L IT IC S AND N A T IO N A LISM 161
Concurrently workers in several vital industries were reported to have

gone on strike, insisting, not unnaturally, that they, too, be given such a
bonus.23
W hether the Sukiman Government would then be able to carry out its
program of eliminating the strike ban and establishing an effective substi
tute providing for the over-all national interest was not certain.
The Western New Guinea Issue

The Hague Agreement, transferring sovereignty over Indonesia from
the Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, did
not settle the status of Western New Guinea, or West Irian, as it is called
in Indonesia. Indeed, the scope of agreement finally reached at The
Hague could not have been attained had it not been decided to defer for
a year the final settlement of this problem. It was agreed that in the
interim the status quo of Netherlands control over the area would be
maintained, “with the stipulation that within a year from the date of
transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indo
nesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined
through negotiations” between Indonesia and the Netherlands.24
23. Aneta, Ju n e 22, 1951. T h e drivers and porters of one of the largest petroleum
concerns, the B.P.M. (Batavia Petroleum Co.), and 700 shipyard workers of the Corde-
sius M etal Factory were reported to have gone on strike. Ibid.
24. A rticle II of the Charter of T ian sfer of Sovereignty reads:
“W ith regard to the residency of New G uinea it is decided:
(a) in view of the fact that it has not been possible to recondle the views of the
parties on New Guinea which rem ain, therefore, in dispute,
(b) in view of the desirab ility of the Round T ab le [H ague] Conference concluding
successfully on 2 November 1949,
(c) in view of the im portant factors which should be taken into account in settling
the question of New Guinea,
(d) in view of the lim ited research that has been undertaken and completed with
respect to the problems involved in the question of New Guinea,
(e) in view of the heavy tasks w ith which the Union partners w ill in itia lly be con
fronted, and
(f) in view of the dedication of the parties to the prin cip le of resolving by peaceful
means any differences that m ay hereafter exist or arise between them,
that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be m aintained w ith the stip u
lation that w ithin a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the R epublic of the
United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be de
term ined through negotiations between the R epublic of the U nited States of Indonesia
and the Kingdom of the N etherlands." (United Nations Commission for Indonesia,
A p p en d ices to t h e S pecial R e p o r t to t h e S ecurity C ouncil o n t h e R o u n d T a b le C on
f e r e n c e , S/1417/ Add. 1, p . 66.)
162 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W E S T
The agreement of the Indonesian leaders to this compromise brought

them immediately under severe attack at home. For Indonesians regard
W estern New Guinea as an integral part of their nation. It was a p art of
the Dutch colony of the Netherlands East Indies, which they consider to
have revolted as a whole against Dutch rule. The fact that a part of the
revolting colony remains in the hands of the colonial ru ler means to
them that part of their nation is still ruled by their old master and that
their independence is not complete. Moreover, they look beyoncl the be
ginnings of Dutch rule in the Indies, back to M ajapahit, the old Indo
nesian empire of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries which, they af
firm, exercised control over much of coastal W estern New Guinea. They
recall also that later, and until displaced by European power, the Sultan
of Tidore (an area now within the Indonesian province of the Moluccas)
exercised paramount power over the most important of these coastal areas.
Indonesians are not impressed by the Dutch argument that W estern
New Guinea cannot be considered as part of Indonesia because its in
habitants are ethnically different from the Indonesian people and are of
the same Papuan stock as those of Australian New Guinea. Indonesia,
they affirm, is made up of a variety of ethnic and cultural groups, and
they point to the fact that Papuans are the major ethnic group in a num
ber of islands of the Moluccas for which the Dutch have not attempted
to make the same claim.
Indonesians are similarly unconvinced by the argument that the
Netherlands has a historical responsibility towards the inhabitants of
New Guinea which obliges it to look after their welfare. T hey assert that
the only large development project sponsored by the Dutch in New
Guinea before the war was a concentration camp for Indonesian na
tionalists. 5 They criticize the lack of educational facilities provided for
the area by the Dutch,26 and they note that even these have been almost
entirely staffed by personnel of the local Christian missions.27 T he real
measure of the Netherlands' prewar interest in New Guinea, they m ain
tain, appears in the fact that nearly three-quarters of the area’s popula-
r a ”a/l M erah in the Upper D igul area, (M any non-Com m unist

ratio n alists ss well ConnnumQt^ nrpfA (An. . .1 • _ . __ ,
interned there.) v-‘ommunists were sent to this camp. Both H atta and S ja h rir were
tU26. Dutch •sources state that out of a fnrai

. n- nnr> u->,
•• c . i
population of ap p ro xim ately one m illio n ,
there were about 2u,000 children in school.
27. It is only fair to note, however, that these mission schools w ere subsidized by the
Netherlands Indies government.
tion had no contact with the Dutch administration and lived independ
ently of it.28
The Dutch argument that the political disposition of West New
Guinea should await a plebiscite determining die will of its population
and that in the meantime it should remain under Dutch control has
been greeted with the greatest cynicism. The tendency among Indonesians
has been to see this proposal against the background of Dutch statements
that the majority of the population is not yet politically mature enough to
make such a choice. Even those Indonesians who are inclined to agree
with the latter conclusions are quick to point out that it was precisely
this argument that was urged for decades by the Dutch as a reason for
their not granting independence to such culturally advanced areas as
Java and Sumatra. The historical record, they affirm, gives them good
cause for being suspicious of the real intent behind this Dutch proposal.
The outlook of most Indonesians was well expressed by Prime Minister
Natsir in his address to Parliament on January 3, 1951. Speaking of In
donesia's claim to Western New Guinea, he said:
A g ain st the m u ltifa rio u s o b jectio n s of an acad em ic n a tu re to th is c laim ad d u ced
by the D utch on eth n o g rap h ic, c u ltu ra l, a n d o th er such gro u n d s, In d o n esia can
p u t fo rw ard e q u a lly acad e m ic arg u m en ts . . . b u t o n e th in g is irre fu ta b le ; th a t
is th a t the aze-io n g co lo n izatio n of the In d o n esian n atio n has g iv en rise to the
co n victio n th a t th e In d o n esian p eo p le is b u t one n atio n , th a t In d o n esia's te rrito ry
form s b u t o n e c o u n try co v erin g the fo rm er D utch c o lo n ial te rrito ry o f th e fo rm er
N eth erlan d s E ast In d ies.
W h o ev er as a c h ild receiv ed scho o ling, the g re a te r p a rt g iv en to th e In d o
n esian p e o p le b e in g D utch scho o ling, w as ta u g h t th at th e c o u n try o f th e In d o
n esian p eo p le stretch ed from S a b an g [a t the n o rth ern tip of S u m a tra ] to M e rau k e
in N ew G u in e a. T h e o n e an d o n ly p rin c ip le of u n ity fo r a n a tio n is n o t th a t of
re lig io n or d escent, b u t the com m on, liv in g co n victio n th a t th is p eo p le has one
co u n try a n d form s o n e S tate . T h is is also the p rin c ip le u n d e r ly in g the rig h t of self-
d e te rm in atio n .
T h e refo re th e c la im o f th e In d o n e sian p eo p le is c le a r a n d p la in . A s a conse
qu en ce the D utch n a tio n can n o t m a in ta in th a t W est I r ia n m u st re m a in a p a rt of
d ie N eth erlan d s, u n less it w ishes to re m a in a c o lo n ia l p o w er in A sia. In the
p resen t e ra th ere is no lo n g er a n y p la c e fo r c o lo n ialism .
Following the Hague Agreement, the leaders of the Indonesian gov
ernment were continuously on the defensive over the New Guinea issue.
Popular sentiment from one end of the political spectrum to the other
was adamant in its insistence that Western New Guinea be quickly in-
28. No more than 267,000 out of the population of about one m illion have as yet
been brought under Dutch adm inistration.
164 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E S T
corporated into t h e new state. T he Government's fa ilu re to accom plish

this provided important political capital to the o p p o s i t i o n p arties, non
c o m m u n is t as well as C o m m u n is t. M oreover, the New G u i n e a issue
quickly b e c a m e intertwined w ith issues of foreign policy. T h is occurre
not only b e c a u s e of the involvement of the N e t h e r l a n d s in th e dispute
and A ustralia’s support of the Netherlands position, a su p p o rt w h ich was
losing Australia much of the good w ill she had won in ch a m p io n in g the
cause of Indonesian independence. It developed also because o f the
widely-held c o n v ic tio n that the U nited States was greatly in terested in
the fate of New G u in e a and that it tended to support the D u t c h position
there.
The fact that American policy towards the New G u i n e a issue has ap
parently been neutral has been viewed w ith suspicion by Indonesians.
Neutrality, they believe, favors the status quo, which means N etherlands
retention of New Guinea. Doubts about A m erica’s disinterestedness in
the issue were raised by their knowledge that 60 per cent o f th e stock of
the one large and valuable oil field in W estern New G u i n e a , th a t at
Sorong, is American owned. These doubts have been increased b y a w id e
spread belief that the United States wishes to keep the fo rm er n a v a l base
at Hollandia (at the eastern end of the north coast o f W e ste rn New
Guinea) available for its use and that it believes it can be m ost certain of
this if Western New Guinea remains under the control o f the N ether
lands, a member of the A tlantic Pact m ilitary alliance.29 T h u s m an y In
donesians tend to believe the allegation, advanced p a rtic u la rly by the
Communist groups, that Indonesian negotiators at T h e H ague w ere yield-
ing to American pressure when they agreed to a year’s d eferm en t o f the
settlement of Western New Guinea's status and its con tinu an ce u n d er
utch administration during that period.
A t the end of March 1950, in accordance w ith th e term s o f th e H a g u e
Agreement, a Netherlands-Indonesian Conference of M in isters began
discussions concerning the status of New Guinea. It set up a C o m m itte e
on New Guinea composed of three Dutch a n d th ree I n d o n e s ia n m em b e rs,
w hich it charged w ith stu d yin g the p ro b lem a n d s u b m ittin g a r e p o r t by
29 T h is opinion is by no m eans confined to the left-w in g p arties. T h u s A lb e rt M-
, 5 u n an ’ C hairm an oE the C hristian Party and also V ic e - C h a ir m a n of P a r l i a m e n t
an a C hairm an of its Foreign Affairs Committee, was rep o rted in m id -D ecem b er 1950
as statin g th at he thought the U nited States backed H o llan d in r e s p e c t to N ew G u i n e a
oecause n needed this territory for its Pacific defense lin e . H o llan d , lie n o ted , w as a
m em ber of the A tlan tic Pact, w hile Indonesia p ursued a p o licy of in d e p e n d e n ce A n e t a .
December 14,1950.
INDO^ st
A N P O L IT IC S AND N A T IO N A L ISM 16 5
ât end °* June. A fter having visited New Guinea, this Committee met
up a *e ,^-ague from Ju n e 21 until early in August but was unable to draw
deleD-^°!rit rePort, since the differences between the Dutch and Indonesian
p o rt . l0ris remained so great. Each delegation wrote its own lengthy re-
'vishe 1I1COrPorat*ng completely opposite points of view regarding the
h jst ® the population of New Guinea and the interpretation of the
ical, cultural and ethnical factors involved.
karri e reaction in Indonesia to this impasse was strong. President Soe-
0 £ j °* sPeaking on August 17, the anniversary of Indonesia's Declaration
siti . c Penc*ence, indicated the seriousness with which he viewed the
str t l° n ’ ar*d his forceful oratory drew from the Indonesian people a
n g a n d widespread sympathetic response. He stated:
Th*
d o e s IS n 0 t a tr iflin S q u e stio n ; th is is a m a jo r issue. I fear th at th e N eth erlan d s
n o t y e t u n d e rs ta n d th a t th e I ria n qu estio n is a m ajo r issue to us.
llav , . l e *r , a n q u e s tio n is n o t a q u e stio n o f eth n o lo g y; n e ith e r is it a q u estio n o f
a j i n S r e a c h e d a sufficien t stag e o f m a tu rity . As a m atter of fact, im p erialists h ave
SOua y s a d v a n c e d th e a rg u m e n t o f m a tu rity , b u t this arg u m en t has n ever been a
Qu ■ ° n e * T ih e I r ia n q u e stio n is a q u estio n o f co lo n ialism or non -co lo n ialism , a
t h ^ r \ ° n ° f co lo n in I‘sm or in d e p e n d en ce. P art o f o ur co u n try is s till colonized by
£ > utch. T h is is a r e a lity a n d w e do not accep t this. . . .
th C o b serv e th e p ro v isio n o f the R .T .C . agreem en ts [H agu e A greem en t]
a t t h e q u e s tio n o f I r ia n sh all be p eace ab ly settled w ith in this year. A fter this
**** n e i t h e r p a r ty w ill b e b o u n d b y the R .T .C . provisions. W e are now in the
^ * le 0 t A u Sust>an d th e re are n.° *ndicatio n s as y e t th a t the D utch w ill ch an ge
■ a t t i t u d e . O n ly fo u r an d a h a lf m onths sep arate us from seein g the sun rise
1 9 5 1 . P e o p le o f In d o n e sia, boys, g irls, lab o re rs an d p e a s a n ts - a li In don esian s!
. e t u s c le a rly understand what this really means. In our present C o n s titu tio n it
^ e x p r e s s ly la id down that the territory of our State c o m p rise s the e n tir e former
e t h e r l a n d s Indies, that is from Sabang to Merauke. Thus, according to o u r
i n s t i t u t i o n , Irian is also In d o n e s ia n territory ,»o territory of the R e p u b lic of
n d o n esia—not tomorrow, not the day after tomorrow, but n o w , at this ver)
f o m e n t . T h e Dutch de facto a u t h o r it y over Irian is recognized fo r this year o n ly .
a se ttle m e n t by negotiation cannot be arrived at within this y e a r , a major con-
*c t w ill arise over the issue of who w ill be in p o w e r in that island from th en
° n w a rd . F or once again I declare: we w ill not stop fighting, we w ill c o n tin u e
figh tin g, w e w ill k e e p on fighting whatever may come, until Irian has been re
tu rn ed to o u r fold. And I have great hope, I k n o w that Irian w ill return to o u r
fold. F or o u r weapon is the unsurpassable weapon of the National R ev iv al which
the D u tch have fought repeatedly and w h ich -at long last they must adm i*-they
co uld n o t crush, even though they used small and large guns. . . . At present we
*re a t p e a c e and on a footing of friendship with the Dutch, but "peace without
30. I ta lic s in dicate em phasis of Soekarno.
166 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W E S T
justice is n ot peace," a wise saying goes. L et us, therefore, p ray th at the eyes o f
the D utch people may be opened and that they may realize the justice o f o u r de
m and, so that friendship between o ur people and the D utch people m ay flourish.
In the face of mounting Indonesian feeling over the New’ G uinea issue,
most Dutch business interests in Indonesia urged upon the Netherlands
government even more strongly than previously the desirability o f ceding
Western New Guinea to Indonesia. T o them it appeared senseless to
prejudice the safety of the tremendous Dutch economic stake in Java,
Sumatra, Billiton, etc. for the sake of maintaining Dutch control over
this relatively poor and underdeveloped disputed territory, an area where
existing Dutch investments were minuscule. The stubborn attitude of
the Netherlands government over the New Guinea issue was accomplish-
ing just this, they felt. T heir views were in harmony w ith those of the
Labor Party in the Netherlands, but the m ajority of the Dutch Parlia
ment remained strongly opposed to cession of W estern New Guinea to
the Republic of Indonesia.
Another effort to settle the dispute was made at a conference of Indo
nesian and Dutch representatives at The Hague from December 4 to
27, 1950. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Roem, on De
cember 11, offered a seven-point Indonesian proposal, which was felt by
the Indonesian government to be the lim it of the concessions it could
make. Roem's proposals for the future of Western New Guinea follow:
field t i l l ' d tê /ramework o f Indonesian-Dutch cooperation in the econom ic

en . f ;.i _ ” ° nesjan Governm ent recognizes the existing rights and concessions.
. . . si eration will be accorded to the Dutch concerning new capital in-
Dutrh !n »i,n concess‘ons> Special consideration w ill also be accorded to the
f f ia/6 tV-G °P mem an^ exploitation o f the w ealth o f the soil an d the
• c ij rian* In fe re n tia l treatm ent w ill be given to the D utch interests
i n ,_. e_ 6 , ° econ°niy, such as trade, shipping and industry.
/s\ p UtC- men be employed in the adm inistrative m achinery.
) ensions o utch officials w ill be guaranteed by the Indonesian G overn-
ul ^ Case ° f the R -T -C - A Sreem cnts [Hague Agreem ent].
" t° ” eSI^n P ° ve^nment ■win allow im m igration o f D utch nationals
^ xj i j ' n to suPP!y t*ie m anpower needed in W est Irian.
( ; le n onesian Governm ent intends to incorporate W est Irian in to the
commumca ions system of Indonesia (sea, air communications, teleph on e, tele-
grap an ra io), w n e paying due attention to die concessions granted ea rlier
to D utch o r m jxed enterprises.
(6) Freedom o f religion will be fu lly guaranteed, and the h u m an itarian w ork
of religious missions w ill be aided and promoted by the Indonesian G overnm en t.
(7) Attem pts w ill be made to run a fully dem ocratic governm ent in W est
167
INDONESIAN P O L IT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM
Irian. T h e population w ill be granted fu ll autonomy and a voice in the govern

ment, w hile the establishm ent of a representative body w ill be carried out a
soon as possible. o-^rial
T he Indonesian G overnm ent is prepared and w illin g to conclude sp
agreements on the basis of these seven points, so that the Dutch interests wo
be preserved after the transfer o f sovereignty over Irian to Indonesia.
T h e N e th e rla n d s D e le g a tio n fo u n d these p ro p o sals u n a c c e p ta b le , a n d
as its fin a l c o u n te r-p ro p o sa l suggested: (1) th a t so ve re ig n ty o v e r W e s te rn
N ew G u in e a b e d e le g a te d to th e N e th e rla n d s-In d o n e sia n U n io n , w i ^
th e D u tc h r e ta in in g de facto a d m in is tra tiv e c o n tro l, an d (2) th a t n e g o ti
a tio n s be c o n tin u e d w ith th e go o d offices o f th e U n ite d N atio n s C o m m is
sio n fo r In d o n e s ia 31 o r a n y o th e r b o d y th a t c o u ld h e lp in re a c h in g a so u-
tio n . T h e p o sitio n s o f th e tw o d e le g a tio n s w e re s till h o p elessly fa r a p a r
an d , in th e w o rd s o f R o e m , th e co n fe re n c e e n d e d in “ a c o m p le te ea -
T h e re a c tio n in In d o n e s ia to th e fa ilu r e w as stro n g a n d w id esp re a d ,

a n d p o p u la r p re ssu re o n th e G o v e rn m e n t to tak e p o s i t i v e a c tio n to
rem e d y th e s itu a tio n w as co n sid e ra b le . In his ad dress to P a rlia m e n t o
J a n u a r y 3, 1 9 5 1 , P rim e M in is te r N a ts ir sta te d th a t th e fa ilu re o t e
C o n fe re n c e h a d “ b ro u g h t a b o u t a serio u s d e te rio ra tio n in I n d o " e?ia£
D u tc h r e la tio n s .” H e w e n t o n to state th a t in c o n n e c tio n w ith th e ta iiu
o f the C o n fe re n c e his G o v e rn m e n t h e ld th e fo llo w in g v ie w :
(1) T he G overnm ent maintains, and w ill continue to fight for, the ^ i o n a l
claim on Irian in a proper way; any negotiations in the future can only be
on the b asis o f th e tran sfer of so vereign ty over W est Iria n to In d o n esia
It is the Governm ent's opinion that a Conference which is n ot b a s e d on tl
transfer of sovereignty w ill miscarry, even when it is attended by a T h u d Par y
(2) T he G overnm ent is o f the opinion that any negotiation which ^does not re
suit in sovereignty over Irian being transferred to Indonesia w ill result in
Indonesian-Dutch relations becoming more strained and tense. j „ np,: an
T h e fa ilu re of th is C o n feren ce has g iven rise to a n ew s itu a tio n . I n d ° “ s‘an
D utch re la tio n s m u st b e th erefo re review ed in th e lig h t o f th is new
T. Ki«m i* a leeacv from the Indonesian-Dutch dispute, the settle
m e n to f w h k h w a s postponed at the R .T .C . T hus Irian attains a
which differs from that of the other Indonesian areas. T his is felt as a burden bj
o u r n atio n , ju s t as are several o th er m atters p e r ta in in g to In d o n esian -D u tch
lationships.
31. T h e U nited Nations Commission for Indonesia, since disb an ded,.aT com e o m
Indonesians to be hardly a neutral body since the A ustralian governn.en‘ ' ion
unequivocally in favor of the Dutch position. T h e B e l g i a n m em ber of the Co ^
had from its inception voted consistently m favor of the Dutch. T hu i at fc
the three representatives on the Commission (A ustralia, B elgium and the Un
being represented) could be expected, they believed, to decide m favor of th
168 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E S T
In connection herewith the Government is of the opinion that the Indonesian-

Dutch Agreements, including the Union Statute, need reconsideration an re
vision on a new basis.
A larg e p art o f the In d o n esian P arliam en t, h o w ever, w a n te d to g o m u ch
fu rth er than N atsir. O n Ja n u a r y 1 1 , o n ly by a vote o f 66 to 6 3 32 w a s the
G overnm ent able to d efeat a m otion c allin g fo r the p r o m p t a n n u lm e n t
o f the N etherlands-Indonesian U n io n 33 an d u ltim a te c a n c e lla tio n o f the
H agu e Conference Agreem ents. T h e G o vern m en t stav ed o ff p r e c ip ita te
action through its proposal that a C om m ission be fo rm e d to s tu d y the
problem o f revision o f the H ag u e A greem en t an d to r e p o r t b a c k its
recom m endations to the G overn m ent at a la ter d ate. H o w e v e r , th e re is
no doubt b ut that its fa ilu re to solve the p ro b lem o f W estern N e w G u in e a
seriously w eakened the N atsir G o vern m en t an d w as o n e o f th e m o s t im
portant reasons fo r its fall.
In his address to P arliam en t on Ju n e 9, 1 9 5 1 , P rim e M in is te r S u k im a n
stated that, after studying the results o f the w o rk o f the C o m m is s io n in
stalled by the N atsir G overn m ent, his G o vern m en t w o u l d ta k e th e steps
it considered necessary to carry out revisions in In d o n e sia n -D u tc h r e la
tions, taking into account the findings and recom m en d atio n s o f th e C o m
mission. H e was reported as sayin g that: “ T h e co n clu sio n w h ic h m u st
be draw n in considering D utch-Indonesian relatio n s . . . is th a t th e N e th
erlands-Indonesian U n ion does not live in the hearts o f th e I n d o n e s ia n
people and that our nation does not ap p reciate it o r n eed i t .” I n co n
clusion, he stated that D utch-Indonesian relatio n s sh o u ld b e r e v is e d on
t e basis of agreements custom ary between tw o fu llv in d e p e n d e n t sover-
eign states. 1
Probably the consensus o f the In d o n esian P a rlia m e n t o n th e N e w
Vic11? 3 qUeStion was sumrned UP tw o days later b y A lb e r t M . T a m b u n a n ,
a n d r hairm an ° f Parliament> C h airm an o f its F o reig n A ffa ir s C o m m itte e ,
an C hairm an of the Indonesian C h ristian P a rty ( P a r h i n d o ) . H e w a s re
ported as having stated34 that it was indeed the d esire o f the e n t ir e In d o -
esian population to have the Statute o f U n io n rep laced b y a n o r d in a r y
rnation al agreement, and as h avin g added that, " E v e n i f th e S ta tu te
m u n i s ^ r o ^ ' 1; T * *“ ^ reS° lution- *n conjunction with the several Com-

and onfe ofPrh a„num ber of non;P ™ y in dividuals. T h e In don esian S o c ia list P arty
na some of the smaller parties backing the Government ab stain ed.
33. In substance, of course, this Union amountpri . ,• > -t ;m nnC^
tion on , ■ e ■u .
0 ,1 on the sovereignty of either p arty.
*,lu °unted to very7 little ; it im p o sed n o h m ita -
34. Aneta report from Jak a rta , Ju n e I I , 1951.
° N E S I A n P O L IT IC S AND N A T IO N A L ISM 169
fiecj e . t o c a n c e lle d b y o n e o£ th e p a rtn e rs, i t w o u ld be c o m p le tely ju sti-

lr i a c c o r d a n c e w ith in te r n a tio n a l la w .” C a n c e lla tio n w o u ld n o t, h e
u g h t , b e a “ w o rld -s h a k in g e v e n t.” “ In donesia," h e stated , “w ill alw ays
ie u
t h ° te C t t*l e i n te re sts °£ N e th e rla n d s , B rita in , F ran ce, B elg iu m , an d
j t C U n i t e d S ta te s in I n d o n e s ia .” W i t h resp ect to th e N ew G u in e a q u estio n
self
£ e l *> h e s ta t e d th a t in his o p in io n th e re w e re o n ly tw o a lte rn a tiv e s : (1)
'Utc
sj ° lû tti o n o f th e d is p u te ; o r (2) fo rce . “I sin ce rely hope," h e ad d ed , “ th at
In.
d ° n e s i a w i l l n o t h a v e to ta k e th e la tte r a lte rn a tiv e ."
Fo re ig n Policy
A r *V a t t e m p t to u n d e rs ta n d In d o n e s ia ’s fo re ig n p o lic y m u st tak e fu ll
a c c ° ^ n t o f its p e o p le 's lo n g c o lo n ia l e x p e rie n c e a n d th e e x tre m e sensi-
tlVlty w h i c h th is h a s e n g e n d e re d to a n y th in g th a t can b e in te rp re te d as
° U ts i d e c o n t r o l. E q u a lly i t m u s t tak e in to c o n sid e ra tio n th e b e lie f o f a l
m o s t a l l p o litic a lly -c o n s c io u s In d o n e sia n s th a t th e U n ite d States d u rin g
^ o s t o f th e c o u rse o f th e ir stru g g le fo r in d e p e n d e n c e, a n d b e g in n in g a t
*e a s t as e a r l y as th e s u m m e r o f 19 4 7 , w as fa r fro m n e u tr a l a n d som etim es
k i c k e d th e D u tc h . T h e y a re c o n vin c e d th a t th is A m e ric a n p o lic y 3
c h a n g e d o n l y a f te r th e successful resistan ce o f In d o n e sia n g u e rrilla s an d
t h e s t e a d f a s t n o n -c o o p e ra tio n o f In d o n e sia n c iv ilia n s m ad e it c le a r th a t
t h e D u t c h c o u ld n o t e n fo rc e a p o litic a l d ecisio n b y m ilita r y m eans. T h e y
a r e s t r o n g a n d p r o u d in th e ir - fe e lin g th a t In d o n e sia n b l o o d , sw eat a n d
t e a r s w o n In d o n e sia 's in d e p e n d e n c e . T h e y rese n t th e im pressions wc
a s m a l l b u t im p o r ta n t m in o r ity o f A m e ric a n officials d e a lin g w ith n
n e s ia h a v e c o n v e y e d , th a t In d o n e s ia ’s in d e p e n d e n c e w as in la rg e m easu re
b y th e m a g n a n im o u s in te rcessio n o f th e U n ite d States o n th e In
n e s i a n s id e . T h e y a re w illin g to ac k n o w led g e th a t a b e la te d A m e ric a
i n t e r v e n t i o n fin a lly sp e ed ed u p th e in e v ita b le d ecisio n a n d s i g n i f i c a n t y
e* p e d ite d th e p ro cess o f D u tc h w ith d r a w a l a n d tra n s fe r o f so vereig n ty,
b u t n o m o r e . M o re o v e r, th e y b e lie v e th a t th e ch an g e in th e A m e r ic a n
35. I t is in terestin g and probably significant that durin g the course of the
s t o g i e fo r independence most politically-conscious Indonesians tended to r „
A m e ric a n p o licy as ' ‘State D e p a rtm e n t policy. T here was a widespread tendenc* :dercd
th em to d ifferen tiate am ong (1) the “Am erican people, who were generally co n ^
to b e sym p ath e tic to the I n d o n e s i a n cause insofar as they knew about it. Ci(L nt\
“A m e ric a n governm ent” (by which was usually m eant Congress and the 11 upied
'v h ic h w as gen erally believed to be ignorant of events in Indonesia and pr aimost
" 'ith E u ro p e , and (3) the "State D e p a rtm e n t, usually conceived as being a m id_
a u to n o m o u s self-contained organ w ith M achiavellian inclinations, which fro
*947 th ro u g h mid-1949 was believed to be strongly pro-Dutch.
170 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W E ST
government s attitude was dictated principally by reasons of American

strategic self-interest vis-a-vis Soviet R u ssia and a w ell-fo un d ed fear that
fru stiatio n of Indonesian hopes fo r n ation al independen ce m ig h t tu rn the
country towards Moscow, rather than by altru istic regard fo r the w elfare
o f the Indonesian people o r dedication to the p rin cip les o f lib e rty and
self-detexmination. T h o u g h recent E .C .A . operations in In d o n esia have
somewhat m itigated the im pression, the feelin g is still very stro n g am ong
Indonesians that the A m erican approach to their co u n try is m uch more
anti-Soviet than it is pro-Indonesian.
On the other hand, d u rin g the course o f their in d ep en d en ce struggle
m any politically-conscious Indonesians became alien ated by an d sharply
distrustful o f the policies o f the Soviet U n ion . In part, this d evelopm ent
was due to their follow ing o f events in E u ro pe, and in p a rt it arose from
the conviction that the Soviet governm ent gave m oral b ack in g an d pos
sibly direction to the abortive revolt o f the P .K .I. (Ind onesian C om m un ist
arty) m Septem ber-O ctober 1948 against the p o p u larly-b acked R e p u b li
can governm ent led by Soekarno and H atta. A m on gst d evo u t M o h am
medans and Christians this outlook had already lo n g existed, because of
heir dislike o f the anti-religious policies o f the Soviet go vern m en t. T h e
increasing belief that the Soviet governm ent, an d later the C h in ese C om
m unist governm ent as w ell, have been giv in g m oral b ack in g to the
■ . s efforts to subvert the R ep u b lican governm ent an d econ om y and
o rep ace them by a pro-Stalinist regim e have been resp o n sib le fo r the
continued growth o f this feeling.
I^ donesians see the Soviet and Am erican-W estern E u ro p e a n blocs
* . m a struS§le f ° r w orld dom ination in w hich each o f the blocs
carrm Mris^T ^ ^ uncomm*tted countries such as In d o n esia in its own
arisJc ' nnt nd° nesians do not wish to enter either cam p. T h is reluctan ce
merely from their disillusionm ent w ith b oth A m e ric a n and
b e l ie f th° tOWards Indonesia and other parts o f the w o rld an d their
n rn , i " Sh° ™ that neither side can claim a n y th in g ap-
desire °^ ^ aIS° derives in la rSe m easure fro m the
standable
j . lf
that a ^” e oPp le ^ h i^ h a 61"® dK1Sged ^ ^ ^
^ ^ as J ust em erged from the rigo rs o f three
years of bitteTand
years of ^ Uta‘ continuous
totter and alraost JapanCSe ° CwCUPatio'> fo ll°" ’ed ^ upon
insist nearlyavoid-
four
in g in v o lv e m e n t in a n o th e r w a r. 1
The international orientation of Indonesia is in fact considerably
closer to the Umted States than to Russia. It is nearer to G reat Britain
INDONESIAN P O LIT IC S AND N A T IO N A L ISM 1/1
than to the United States and even nearer to India, particularly to Nehru.
Yet most Indonesians feel that their country lies much more exposed to
the economic and m ilitary power of the United States and associated
countries than it does to that of Russia and China. Thus the sensitivity
to actual or even potential pressure from outside has been mainly
directed towards the United States. This, and the desire not to give politi
cal ammunition to local Communists, causes the Indonesian government
to appear to stand more aloof from the United States than is actually the
case. For sensitive ex-colonials, who suspect the record of American
policy towards Indonesia since 1947 and believe that Indonesia lies
within the American power sphere, are extremely susceptible to Com
munist propaganda which seeks to interpret alignment with the United
States as subservience to it.
W ithin the polarized world in which it made its debut the new Indo
nesian nation has not sought a sterile neutrality. It has insisted upon
maintaining an “independent foreign policy.” Especially after Prune
Minister Hatta's Government achieved United Nations membership m
the early spring of 1950 was this point made clear. It was particularly
emphasized by the Government of Natsir. This policy is seen as ppsitive,
with Indonesia (to the extent of its capacity) fulfilling the role of sub
ject” and not of “object” in international relationships. Its policy w to
be a positive one in which it takes a stand on important issues, judging
each of them on its own merits as seen by Indonesians. In this way, In
donesians believe, their country can make its maximum contribution
towards the furthering of international justice, while best serving Us own
interests. Moreover, leaders of the Government feel strongly the relation
ship between foreign policy and domestic politics. They believe that a
genuinely independent foreign policy does much to ease internal political
tensions, particularly in combatting persistent Communist propaganda
that the g o v e r n m e n t is a puppet of America.
It is true that the above aims have been more sought than achieved.
The limitations of Indonesia’s economic and m ilitary power have made
this inevitable. Nevertheless, these concepts constitute the principal
ideological dynamic behind Indonesia s foreign policy.
Because of the nature of their foreign policy, Indonesians put strong
emphasis upon the role of the United Nations in international relations
and upon Indonesia's full and active participation in it. Their own
experience with the United Nations has convinced Indonesians that it is
strongly weighted in favor of the United States and Western Europe as
against either Soviet Russia or Asia. But they believe th at its existence
forced the United States and some of the W estern E uropean countries to
take positions in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute more f a v o r a b l e to Indo
nesia than might have been the case. They feel that because In d ia and
Australia could work through the U nited Nations, they w ere a b le to be
more effective in Indonesia's behalf than they w ould oth erw ise have
been. In the same way, they believe that what they term “th ird factor”
countries, such as Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Burm a, can e x e rt much
more influence on the course of world events through the U n ite d Nations,
particularly with respect to m aintaining an independent p osition be
tween the two great power blocs and m itigating the fric tio n between
them, than they could outside that body.
One of the principal differences between Indonesia and th e U nited
States has arisen over their attitudes towards Com m unist C h in a. From
the outset most leaders of the new Indonesian state were convinced that
Mao Tse-tung's government enjoyed the support o f the overw h elm in g
majority of the Chinese people and that most of them w ere m ore content
under it than they had been under Chiang Kai-shek. T h e y s till believe
this. From the beginning they believed that the strength o f C hinese na
tionalism was such that Peking would remain independent o f d ictation
rom Moscow. The conformity which has developed between th e policies
ot Moscow and Peking they ascribe to short-run exigencies. T h is con-
ormity would tend to diminish, they believe, if a peaceful m odus viven d i
were ^ e lo p e d between China and the U nited States.
Anough Hatta’s Government made no great effort to e n ter in to d ip lo
matic relations with Peking/ it quickly showed willingness to recognize
e new Chinese government as soon as the latter had indicated its desire
ô recognize Indonesia. Hatta stated at the end o f M arch 1950: “I t is in-
rnational custom for the older country to recognize the yo u n g er one
rst. Shortly thereafter Peking expressed willingness to recognize Indo-
sia and the latter promptly reciprocated.^ Upon being a d m itted to the
nited Nations, the Indonesian government made clear its b e lie f that
to I n d ^ >e" ia h NmftCrt-tihe ^ ^ a r i C.?™™unist governm ent d isp atch ed a n am b assad o r
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e ^
p i” e a r ly 19^1 d id t h e Indonesian g o v e r n m e n t s e n d a d i p l o m a t i c
B an T o k T fts ^ Mahdi. formerly Charg<5 d ’A ila ire s in
d ip lo m a t ic m f ^ , I* s u m m e r o f 1950 an I n d o n e s i a n
m alize m utual <-r I VCn ■ ° o sc°™ a '_ e m v it a t io n o f th e S o v ie t g o v ern m en t to for-
S b v ie " E V P If r e c o g n itio n . Despite increasing p r e s s u r e on t h e side o f the
th u s L r P e ™ a " e n t m is s io n s , the I n d o n e s ia n g o v e r n m e n t h a s
fo^m ainra 1 .d ec,!nel to act*,°® *ing as an excuse the lack o f staff a n d funds
1 m ain tain in g a mission m Moscow.)
Ne s ia m p o l it ic s a n d n a t io n a l is m 173
Chinee tlta t*Ves the Peking government should replace those of the
lidzed.56) ^Jacionalist government in the United Nations. An unpub-
sion to eat by a Nationalist representative to veto Indonesia’s admis-
to v o t° ^ nited Nations unless its representatives made a prior pledge
ened V ^ ^ t Communist China's admission to the body37 only strength-
ke . e Indonesian government's belief that Communist China should
^ U n i t e d Nations representation.
lr*a s increased strength under the new regime and its aggressive
oreign p o lic y were a cause of some concern to the Indonesian govern
ment. i n p a rt tj^s arose from the facts that Indonesia has an important
m ese m inority, about two millions out of a population of approxi
m ately eig h ty millions, and that a large portion of this Chinese popula-
tion 38 d eclin ed to accept Indonesian citizenship and considered them
selves to b e Chinese citizens. More important, the P.K.I. (Indonesian Com
m unist P arty) had developed close ties with the Chinese Communist
regim e a n d th ere appeared to be increasing liaison between it and some
of the elem ents of the Singkeh co m m u n ity in Indonesia. U n d o u b ted ly
this, as w e ll as purely econom ic factors, influenced the decision of the
Indonesian government, announced on February 28, 1951, to limit
Chinese im m igration to Indonesia to 4,000 per year and to set up a
b ra n c h o f the Indonesian Im m igratio n Office in Hong Kong to screen
applicants.30
A n i n c r e a s i n g t e n d e n c y on the p a r t of Chinese as well as of Russian
p u b l i c a t i o n s and r a d i o b r o a d c a s t s to attack the Indonesian g o v e r n m e n t
(p a rtic u la rly President S o e k a r n o and Vice-President Hatta) also con
trib u ted to making the v i e w of Indonesian leaders toward the S o v i e t and
Chinese Com m unist g o v e r n m e n t s more c i r c u m s p e c t . This was highlighted
° n M a r c h 1, 1951, w h e n I n d o n e s i a n p o l i c e confiscated 9,000 c o p i e s o f the
Chinese Communist n e w s p a p e r To. Kung Pao, ad dressed to s u b s c r i b e r s in
Indonesia and c o n ta in in g a v i o l e n t a tta c k a g a i n s t S o e k a rn o a n d H atta,
■whom i t a c c u s e d o f h a v in g p r o v o k e d mass m u rd e r in M a d iu n in S e p t e m
ber 1948.40
37. T h is th re a t was not carried out. _ . q^q

38. A m a jo r portion of the Singkeh, or China-born, group. (According to t was
census o f th e N etherlands East Indies, 37 per cent of the Chinese p o p u lar0
S in gk eh . T h e present percentage is probably nearer 27.) Emitted.
39. O n e reaso n stated for this was to ensure that no Chinese peasants were a
P rio rity w as to be given to technicians and physicians. , ^
40. T h is referred to the successful suppression by the R epublican g o v e r n m e n
atte m p te d re v o lt l e d by the I n d o n e s ia n Communist Party and associated groups-
174 ASIAN N ATIO N ALISM AND TH E WEST
The most acute difference over foreign policy between Indonesia and
the United States has arisen over the Indochina issue. Most Indonesians
who are aware of Indochina feel strong sympathy for the Vietminh
regime of Ho Chi Minh. They believe it commands the support of the
great majority of the population, and they regard its struggle against the
French as similar to their own struggle against the Dutch. Indonesians of
every political party have been strongly opposed to Am erican and
British backing of the French and Bao Dai. Most Indonesian leaders be
lieve that the pressure of American-supported French arms obliged the
Vietminh to accept Chinese Communist help. They also consider that it
forced a formerly loose coalition of ideologically divergent Vietnamese
nationalists into a close-knit organization that was much easier for the
Communist group to dominate than would otherwise have been the case.
In the context of the Soviet-American world struggle, they believe, Am eri
can support of the French could only result in a pro-Russian Vietnamese
reaction. Their own understanding of colonial nationalism convinces
them that frustrated nationalism begets communism.
Most Indonesian leaders now believe that the continued dominance of
Communist elements within the Vietminh regime is probable. Many of
them are disturbed by the increasingly totalitarian character of that
regime and the growing dogmatism of the communism held by its leaders.
owever, the feeling among Indonesian leaders is strong that if French
military pressure were removed, the Vietminh government— though
pro a y remaining Communist—would back an appreciable distance
away from both Moscow and.Peking.
The differences between the United States and Indonesia over Indo-
ina came to a head in the spring and early summer of 1950. A fter hav-
g 1 se^ recognized Bao Dai, the American government appeared to
naonesians to put pressure on other Southeast Asian countries to do
likewise. Rightly or wrongly, Indonesian leaders received the definite
impression that the State Department was putting strong pressure on
them to recognize Bao Dai’s regime and that American financial as-
sistance, specifically implementation of the recently-approved ? 1 00 ,000,-
000 Export-Import Bank loan, was being held up pending Indonesia's
acquiescence Widespread Indonesian resentment towards the United
States resulted from this, and the impact on Indonesian domestic politics
was tremendous. A heated debate developed in Parliament, and a Com
munist-sponsored motion introduced by Ir. Sakirman, calling for the
immediate recognition of Ho Chi Minh's government, picked up con
siderable support among non-Communist groups as well as among the

several Communist parties. But for the parliamentary skill of Moham
mad Natsir, then leader of the Masjumi faction in Parliament, the mo
tion might have carried. His counter-motion of June 3, urging investiga
tion of the situation within Vietnam prior to recognizing it, in order to
determine for certain the attitude of its people towards the Vietminh
regime, was finally carried against that of Sakirman by a vote of 49 to 38,
with a majority of Parliament abstaining and a considerable number of
P.N.I. members voting with Sakirman.
Prime Minister Hatta made it clear to Parliament that the Government
did not yet intend to recognize either Ho Chi Minh or Bao Dai. How
ever, a great many non-Communist as well as Communist members of
Parliament remained extremely critical of the Governments attitude,
making clear their belief that it had been intimidated by the United
States. In an effort to stem this criticism, Hatta stated to Parliament on
June 19: “Our national policy in international affairs is based on our par
ticipation as a subject and not as an object. . . . W e play our own role
and do not follow in the wake of America or Russia .”41 Thus far the In
donesian government has still not recognized either Ho Chi Minh or Bao
Dai, but there is no doubt that its sympathies lie with the regime of the
former.
Indonesia’s attitude towards the Korean war was from the beginning
strongly prejudiced by President Trum an’s initial pronouncement m
which, in conjunction with his pledge to repel the North Korean ag
gression, he interposed the American navy between Communist China
and Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Formosa arid at the same time promised
an increase of American aid to the French in Indochina. The unilateral
American action with respect to Formosa was generally regarded in Indo
nesia as an unwarranted interference in China’s domestic affairs, but it
was particularly the American undertaking with respect to Indochina
which weakened Indonesian enthusiasm for America’s anti-aggression
policy in Korea.
As the Korean war developed, Indonesia’s appreciation of America’s
role there became somewhat better, but the general feeling remained
close to what Prime Minister Hatta had stated on June 26, 1950, that this
was essentially a matter between the United States and Russia, and that
Indonesia should stay out. Though the fact of North Korean aggression
was generally believed, it was widely felt that the South Korean govern-
41. Aneta report from Jak arta, Ju n e 19, 1950.
176 ASIAN N A T IO N A L ISM AND T H E W EST
ment of Syngman Rhee was non-democratic, corrupt, and u n p o p u la r, and

among Indonesians there was little or no sympathy fo r it.
The principle of repelling aggression was received ra th e r cyn ically y
Indonesians in general. They were quick to point out th at this p rincip e
had been given scant attention by the U nited States a few years before,
when the Dutch had launched their attack against the R ep u b lic o f Indo
nesia in mid-1947. W ith more insistence they recalled the facrt th at the
Dutch had launched a second all-out aggression against the same R e
public in December 1949, in flagrant violation of a U nited N a tio n s-sp o n -
sored truce which the American U.N. representative had b een chiefly
instrumental in negotiating. W hy had this Dutch aggression d ra w n only
verbal admonition, they asked, while North K orea’s aggression was
answered by American arms? The answer to this inconsistency, th ey held,
was simple: the United States was concerned w ith the p rin c ip le of re
pelling aggression in cases where it felt its own nation al in terests were
involved, and not otherwise.
The entry of Communist China into the Korean w ar was view ed with
concern by many Indonesian leaders but was widely regarded as a logical
consequence of a fight being carried so close to China's b ord ers chiefly
by the armed might of the avowedly anti-Communist U n ited States. The
Indonesian government made it clear that it still favored the admission
° f Communist China into the United Nations. T his view was strongly
endorsed even by the bitterly anti-Communist elder statesm an and ad-
Viser to the Indonesian Foreign Office, H adji Agus Salim , w h o was re
ported to have stated on January 8, 1951, that the t r o u b le in K o re a was
ue to the non-admission of Communist China into the U n ite d Na
tions. 2 Q n j a n u a r y 19 5 ^ Indonesia abstained in the U n ite d N a tio n s
so°rte ° n the American resolution branding Communist C h in a an aggres-
A fter the entry of China into the fighting, Indonesia fo llo w ed the lead
° India in trying to bring about negotiations between the p a rtic ip a n t
at would lead to a peaceful settlement and avert a th ird w o rld war.
ere again what seemed to Indonesians to be an inconsistency in the
attitude of the United States made their attempts to prom ote such an out
come difficult. They remembered that in Indonesia the A m erican posi
tion h a d been that the lim it of Dutch m ilitary penetration in to I n d o
nesian Republican territory was the pr0per g e o g r a p h ic line on w h ic h to
gm negotiations between the Indonesian R epublic and the D u tch . Thus
42. Aneta report from Jak arta, Ja n u ary 8, 1951.
^ S I / V N PO LIT IC S AND NATIONALISM 177
they f
in ° u ncl it difficult to accommodate themselves to the American view
stin *?re a t^ at negotiations could not take place while the aggressors were
possession of territory which they had overrun.
the American request for a United Nations embargo on the
sicle strateg*c war materials to China was received with con-
C h *1"*1^ 0 suspicion among Indonesians. They stated that rubber reaching
t ic / ^ ^r ° m Indonesia was well under one per cent of Indonesian produc-
2^ a n d th at all of it had been sent via the British colony of Singapore.
£a ° re ° ver, they held that China possessed no adequate facilities for inanu-
a^ tUr*n g rubber products and would have to rely upon Russia for nearly
Wa SUc*a m aterial. The belief was general in Indonesia that the embargo
s **ot re a lly aimed at China but was an American effort to develop a
d e e'k u y e r system and to keep down prices of raw materials much in
* a n d by it* such as rubber. This attitude was summed up on May 15,
b y the influential Jakarta newspaper Merdeka:
C h ^ rC a l a im 0:E A m e ric a w ith the b an is n o t to b reak the resistan ce of the
* n ese P e o p le 's R e p u b lic an d N o rth K orea, b u t to push dow n p rices of raw
c o r a l s in S o u th e ast A sia in acco rd an ce w itli A m erica’s w ishes th ereb y to be-
a s in g le -b u y e r .
. A m e r ic a w o u ld th en h av e th e p o w er to in c lu d e So uth east A sian co un tries
m « s b lo c a n d co m p el th em to ab an d o n th e ir p o lic y of in d ep en d en ce.
^ a s against this background of national sentiment that F o r e i g n

M in ister Subardjo was reported to have stated on May 7 that In d o n e s ia
w° u ld “sell to the devil if it would serve the people’s interests." This
hasty statem ent was quickly repudiated, however, and on May 24 the
G o vern m en t officially announced that Indonesia would respect t e
U n ited Nations embargo on strategic materials to China and Nor
K-°rea .”43 However, the general tendency of popular opinion was to re
g a in to lera n t of, if not sympathetic with, Subardjo's statement and fully
in accord w ith that of Merdeka. For most Indonesians, conclusive sub-
sta iu ia tio n of M erdeka's views was the fact that adoption of the embargo
^ as soon followed by a very substantial fall in the price of rubber. Thus
they f eit certain that the embargo had led to America’s acquiring a singly
buyer position with respect to rubber, with the consequence that she ha
keen ab le to depress its price.
43. i n a tte m p tin g to stem criticism of this action, Government leaders stated
n o t r e p re se n t aban d on m en t o f an “ independent policy" and that any P ° T!n(j 0 .
c o n te n t i t m ig h t h ave was "d isso lv ed ” by virtu e o f the fact th at it derived from
ncs i a ’s m e m b e r sh ip in the U n ited N ations.
178 ASIAN N A TIO N ALISM AND TH E WEST
W ith the formation of the Sukiman Cabinet on A p ril 26, 1951, there
appeared no discernible change in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Emphasis
remained upon an "independent” policy aligned w ith neither of the
great power blocs. In his address to Parliament on May 28, Prim e Minister
Sukiman stated 44 that his Government would “preserve frien d ly rela
tions with any state and nation which regards Indonesia as a friendly
state and nation, on the basis of mutual appreciation and respect." He
went on to say that “between the Soviet bloc and the Am erican bloc the
Government will not aggravate conditions by taking part in the cold war
which is now raging between them.” Rather, he said, it w ould "exert
itself to diminish that tension by utilizing every appropriate opportunity
given the Government to realize peace."« “On this basis also,” he con
tinued, “Indonesia as a member of the United Nations w ill make use of
that international forum in order to further the objectives o f world
peace. An independent policy,” Sukiman emphasized, “is not one
,ased on the principle of neutrality.” His Government, he said, would
actively strive for the realization of world n ea re” armrrlino- ^ “inrU.
&
12. INDONESIA’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
I us far, in Indonesia, in contrast to several other newly-independent
n states, tie attainment of political independence has not been
INDONESIAN P O LIT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM 179
principally by short-term factors, most of which have been wholly or

largely eliminated. But the internal political cohesion induced by the
struggle for independence has not been seriously weakened by conflicting
social and economic aims of indigenous political groups. Indeed, with
the possible exception of Burma, in no other Southeast Asian state does
there appear to be so widely based an agreement on national aims.
W ith only slight variations the leaders of all significant political groups
in Indonesia, except for the Communists, are dedicated, for the immedi
ate future, to the development of roughly the same kind of social and
economic pattern, namely, a mixed economy—cooperative-socialist-capi
talist—with primary emphasis on the cooperative sphere and secondary
emphasis on the socialist. There is somewhat more difference regarding
long-term aims, especially as to how much emphasis should be put on in
creasing the socialist sector at the expense of the capitalist sector. But the
goals they envisage for the next decade or two are remarkably close. This
results in large measure from the fact that in Indonesia, in contrast to
most other South and Southeast Asian countries, few if any political
leaders have a vested interest in the existing social and economic status
quo. Not only is concentration of landownership relatively slight, but also
few Indonesians with political influence have a vested interest in the
present system of agrarian relationships.1 Likewise, only a handful of
politically influential Indonesians fiave any vested interest in the sphere
of capitalist economy, which has been in the hands of Europeans and
Chinese almost exclusively. This situation goes far to account for the
strong and widespread belief among Indonesian leaders that their
people, possessing virtually no capitalists or private capital of their own,
can be protected against exploitation only by a government which inter
venes widely in economic life on their behalf, a government which is
basically socialistic. In a positive sense this homogeneity of outlook re
sults from the very considerable similarity of ideological or religious con
victions concerning social justice among the leaders of the most important
non-Communist political groups. This similarity of outlook and of
short-term goals is found among the Religious Socialists and other progres
sive elements in the principal Islamic and Christian parties, as well as
among the several variants of Revisionist Socialists in groups such as the
Indonesian Socialist Party and the Partai Nasional Indonesia, and it con
stitutes a major source of political health and strength.
In addition, among the leaders of this large non-Communist majority
1. T h e most acute agrarian problem in Indonesia is that of credit.
there is, with the possible exception of one m oderately stron g p a ity on
the right, a general dedication to democratic ideas and practices w 11
roughly approximate those dominant in the W estern dem ocracies. ow
long this will continue to be true is the crucial question. P ro b ab ly tie
answer depends chiefly upon whether the now dom inant social-economic
phase of the Indonesian revolution can be contained w ith in dem ocratic,
non-totalitarian channels. The w ill to achieve this is strong am ong the
great majority of politically-conscious Indonesians. But, as th ey realize
only too well, there are many conditions which w ill make this extrem ely
difficult and perhaps impossible. The poverty and economic backwardness
of their country are for many Indonesians a compelling a rg u m en t fo r giv
ing priority to their social-economic as against their s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l goals.
They are determined to try, and many of them to try very h a rd , to reach
their social-economic goals via the road of democratic governm ent. But
should this course yield too limited a result, a o-ood m any are likely to
conclude that they have no recourse but to pursue their m ain goal by
means of some form of authoritarian or perhaps even to ta lita ria n political
organization.
The principal long-term problem germane to this q u e s t io n is th at of
capital. The s o c ia l re c o n s tru c tio n to which the I n d o n e s ia n leaders a r e
committed requires an immense amount of capital in re la tio n to I n d o
nesia’s national income. Moreover, priority m u s t be given to expenditures
for reparation of the damage wrought by three and a h a lf years of
Japanese occupation and four years of subsequent in tern ecin e w arfare.
Such expenditure, heavy though it is, can do little more than restore the
economic base of the prewar colonial economy. It cannot fu lfill the wide
spread expectation among the Indonesian people (who now n u m b er ap
proximately 80,000,000, as compared with 70,000,000 before the w ar) that
political independence would mean an automatic rise in th e ir level of
living.
Thus far the Indonesian government has been able to m arshal s u f f i c i e n t
funds both to undertake the reconstruction of damaged areas and to
proceed, some distance at least, with the broad program o f social-economic
engineering to which it is committed. The heavy w orld d em and fo r In
donesia’s chief exports and the credits advanced p rim arily b y the U nited
States and secondarily by the Netherlands have made this possible w ith
out the necessity for placing any substantial burden on the I n d o n e s i a n
people. But either or both of these conditions might quickly en d . In that
event, in order to continue with i t s vital program o f expanding the means
° N E S IA N PO LITIC S a n d n a t i o n a l i s m 181
of
SOcia i° developing a balanced economic structure, and general
re i a n d economic reconstruction ,2 the government would be forced to
u p o n a program oi' domestic capital accumulation under extremely
of conditions. This would mean forcing a population whose level
jsc lr*g is already low and with which many elements are acutely dissat-
r _ . to cut significantly its level of consumption. Such a course would
lre an exceptionally strong government. It is by no means clear that
t . strength could be developed without resorting to highly authori-
an d possibly totalitarian techniques.
. , re are other important factors that will help to determine the speed
'which Indonesia moves towards its social and economic goals, and
w ill, therefore, influence the prospects for democracy or authoritari-
arUsm .
~fhe problem of securing adequate administrative and technical per-
m ay be crucial. Even for the moderate intervention in economic
e n o w undertaken by the government, the number of adequately
a *ned personnel is grossly insulIicienL. It is not even sufficient for the
n°n-econom ic functions of government. This shortage is due primarily
to th e m eager educational facilities provided by the Dutch, and second
l y to th eir reluctance to take many Indonesians into the upper and
^Pper-m iddle ranks of the civil service, thus depriving them of experience
^ h ic h w ould be invaluable today. From the standpoint of cold logic it is
P ^ h a p s unreasonable for the Indonesian government not to retain a large
^ t t i b e r of the undoubtedly competent Dutch and Eurasian administra-
officers and technicians who served the colonial regime. But the emo
tion al content of the still pulsing Indonesian nationalism is too strong
to p e rm it this. W h at chances there were for such a solution were largely
destroyed by the Westerling incident. It should also be noted that Indo
nesia is perhaps unique among the newly-emancipated South and South
east A sian nations in that its Eurasian population—who filled very com
p eten tly most of the upper-middle administrative positions in the colonial
governm ent— unequivocally declared for the colonial master and w'ith
° n ly a f ew exceptions fought the movement for independence. Thus hi
Indonesia today Eurasians are not generally welcome in the many admin
istra tive and technical positions which they are often better trained than
Indonesians to fill.
T h e Hague Agreement provided that for two years after the transfer
2. T h i s a ssu m e s th at T e p a ir o f d am age to the old econom ic stru ctu re w ill soon be
M ostly com pleted-
of sovereignty Dutch and Eurasian civil servants of the Netherlands Indies

regime would be retained and paid by the Indonesian government. For
the most part they have merely drawn their salaries. Some, irked by being
under Indonesian authority, have petulantly refused to do good work.
This, plus the general nationalist-nurtured anti-Dutch feeling, the West
erling incident, and the New Guinea issue, has spoiled the chances of most
of those who have sincerely desired to pitch in and help the new state to
the best of their ability. W ith the ending of the two-year period at the
close of 1951, it is generally expected that most Dutch civil servants, and
many Eurasian as well, will leave for the Netherlands.
A n obvious solution to the problem of personnel shortage would seem
to be the wide recruitment of skilled persons abroad to fill government
positions and to teach their skills in Indonesian schools. However, Indo
nesia s international orientation has thus far made the government re
luctant to go far in this direction. The importance, particularly in respect
to domestic politics, of maintaining a foreign policy independent of the
two great power blocs has made the government extremely cautious. Most
of the available supply of such personnel is in the Am erican-W estern Eu
ropean bloc and the importation of large numbers would give rise to
charges that the government was subservient to that bloc. T he high salaries
and living conditions necessary to attract such personnel are fo r the Indo
nesian rank and file all too reminiscent of the old colonial pattern. It is
e t t.a t their large-scale importation would provide m aterial for Com
munist propaganda to the effect that the government had subm itted to a
new and disguised form of imperialist exploitation. T his difficulty would
e argely obviated if an adequate supply of such personnel could be ob-
tame t rough the United Nations. The government is at present in a
position to pay for such personnel, but it is apparently not available. An
attempt on a limited scale is finally, and certainly belatedly, being made
to remedy this situation by recruiting some skilled personnel in Europe,
in so far as possible from countries not tied in with either pow er bloc.
Long-term projects for solving this problem by training Indonesians
a road are still on a pitifully inadequate scale. So far most such training
is being done in the Netherlands, which has been more cooperative than
other countries in providing the necessary facilities. However, this solution
is difficult because few Indonesians have the educational background for
study above the high-school level. In order to send any substantial num
ber of students abroad, they would first have to be given the necessary
prelim inary training in Indonesia. Moreover, almost all potential candi
INDONESIAN PO LITICS AND NATIONALISM 183
dates for overseas study are already in government employ, doing necessary
work, and no qualified replacements are available .3
It would seem that the most realistic solution for this problem would
be the large-scale importation of qualified foreign teachers. Thereby In
donesians whose present work is needed to keep the government function
ing could go to school during part of the day and at night and thus
increase their capacities without seriously detracting from the perform
ance of their duties. However, very little has yet been done in this
direction.
There is another important factor, largely psychological, which may
seriously damage the health of Indonesian society and make more likely
a drift toward an authoritarian political system. This is the fact that
much of the elan that won success in the struggle for political independ
ence has been lost or dissipated, or, at any rate, has not been harnessed
to the present effort at social reconstruction. A number of Indonesian
leaders, Soekarno in particular, are acutely aware of this and have striven
to arouse the country to the dangers of the situation. However, many
members of the Indonesian elite have not set the examples they should.
Corruption among public officials, though serious, is as yet not nearly so
widespread as in most Southeast Asian countries. But sheer laziness and
irresponsibility have become a serious problem among public seivants.
Among the civilian population, it was the tiny, largely bureaucratic
Indonesian middle class, along with white-collar workers and non-agrarian
labor, which made the greatest sacrifices in the struggle for independence.
It is perhaps not unnatural that after years of great sacrifice and strain
there should now be a tendency among many of them to relax a while
and enjoy the good things of life. Among many of those who formerly
served the old revolutionary Republic and who now serve the present gov
ernment this tendency is undoubtedly accentuated by the example set by
the soon-to-be-retired Dutch and Eurasian civil servants. In addition, their
morale is impaired by seeing some relatively high positions occupied by
fair-weather nationalists who, when the struggle was acute, chose the path
of safety and collaboration with the Dutch. Such persons, because of their
education and experience, must often be given positions outranking those
who have a good revolutionary record but few other qualifications.
3. W hen it is recalled th at only 240 Indonesians grad u ated from high school in 1940
and th at the p itifu lly sm all existin g ed ucation al system was d isru p ted d u rin g the long
period of Ja p a n e se occupation an d w ar for independence, the seriousness o f this p ro b
lem is app aren t.
184 ASIAN N A TIO N ALISM AND T H E WEST
A t present almost anyone with six years of education can get a fairly
good job with no trouble at all. Those possessing a high-school education
can get any one of a dozen good jobs. This lack of competition frequently
breeds a laziness and complacency which the new state can ill afford.
Equally dangerous, it aggravates the lack of enterprise and initiative
among older civil servants which they have inherited from their condition
ing under the old colonial regime. The only remedy for this, of course, is
more educational facilities.
Many Indonesian youths cut short their education to join the Repub
lic’s armed forces, of which they formed the most dynamic and effective
element. Having made this sacrifice for the revolution, they now find
themselves unqualified to assume positions in civil life at all commen
surate with the leading roles which they played in the revolutionary
struggle .4 Hence they become bitter and frustrated, especially when they
note the lack of zeal prevailing among many civil servants and the self-
seeking struggle for power among many politicians. One of the gravest
failures of the new government has been its inability to provide adequate
outlets for the energies of this important group. Only a small proportion
of them can be absorbed as officers into the rationalized and reorganized
army, and the school facilities open to them are w oefully inadequate.
Many of them have not been geared into the socially constructive work
(either attending school or at jobs) to which by nature they are inclined.
If and when these young people can be equipped educationally to fill
the upper- and middle-rank civil service positions, for which on the basis
of sheer intelligence they are admirably suited, they w ill bring to the
civil service an infusion of social responsibility, enterprise and initiative
which by action and example should do much to restore the high level
of probity and devotion to the public welfare which characterized most
of the civil service of the revolutionary Republic.
Another basic problem, which may be crucial in determ ining the po
litical evolution of Indonesia, is that of effectively gearing together the
Western-educated Indonesian elite and the Indonesian masses in a mu
tually responsive relationship. The revolution has done much to develop
contact between the elite and the masses, and to arouse the masses to a
new peak of political consciousness. In wide areas of Java and Sumatra
4. A sim ilar though less considerable disadvantage is experienced by yo un g men
whose education was uncompleted and who went into governm ent service at the be
gin n in g of the revolution. T hey have gained experience which equips them for im
p ortant work, b ut they feel at an unfair disadvantage as again st the o ld er generation
which was fortunate enough to complete its schooling before the revolution.
the ingrained but long suppressed habits of village democracy received

new vigor and were guided by the Western-educated elite into channels
even broader than had existed in previous times. This process is now
being extended throughout the archipelago. On the village level, where
dwells that 70 or 75 per cent of the population which is engaged in agri
culture, the practice of democratic government is already or is fast be
coming a reality. However, between those villages and the national gov
ernment the lines of contact are still all too tenuous.
There is, to be sure, a strong rapport between most villagers and the
President of the Republic. But this is largely the chance result of Soe-
karno’s remarkable personality and his understanding of peasant psy
chology. It could easily die with Soekarno. In the long run, democracy
above the village level must depend upon an effective, mutually-energized
relationship between the village and the national P a rliam en t. Thus far
the development of such a relationship has been only minimal. T o the
extent that the village is aware of a relationship with P a rlia m en t and
with the national political parties, this is largely based upon religion, the
personality of the party leader, or the party's opposition to the govern
ment. Rarely is Lhe actual program of the party known. Efforts are being
made by certain political parties—notably the Masjumi, the Indonesian
Socialist Party, and the Communist parties—to educate the village popu
lation about their programs, but so far only a start has been made. It is
expected that the holding of national elections w ill do much to aid in
this process, but even so it is probable that for some time to come the
political tie between the village and Parliament w ill remain tenuous.
There is danger, moreover, that the Western-educated elite may be
come dangerously isolated from the village and the laboring population.
This can be prevented only by establishing lines of upward social mobility
so that the present tiny elite may be enlarged by drawing from the masses.
Since education is the principal basis of the elite’s position, it must be
the principal ladder of upward mobility. However, it w ill be more than
half a generation before the now expanding educational system can be
expected to educate such persons even through the high-school level.
Furthermore, the disruption of education from 19435 to 1949 means that
it will be another four or five years before the number of high-school and
college graduates can significantly exceed the extremely low level of the
5. T hough most Indonesian secondary students continued th eir schooling durin g the
first year of Japanese occupation, thereafter there began a progressive decrease in their
attendance resultin g from their m ounting hostility to the Jap an ese regim e.
186 ASIAN NATIO NALISM AND TH E W EST
colonial period. Thus for some time to come the Western-educated elite
which governs Indonesia is likely to be deprived of the politically healthy
and stimulating competition of a large-scale influx of able and dynamic
competitors. It will likewise be some time before a large group can be
j educated to the sub-elite level, which should play such a vital role not only
as a bridge between the elite and the masses, but as mass-rooted, enlight
ened critics of the elite’s administration.
One of the greatest dangers inherent in Indonesian society is that of-
authoritarian political methods above the village level. The authoritarian
tradition and the related habit of dependence upon orders from above,
both reinforced by the long period of colonial rule, are still strongly
evident, although somewhat weakened by the impact of revolutionary
experience and opposed by most of the Indonesian elite. For the most
part Indonesians still expect their leaders to solve their problems for
them. Thus not only is there a wide gap between most of the elite and
the masses, but the masses in general feel little disposition to give positive
directives to the elite— the essence of democracy. W ith the introduction
of general elections, this situation w ill probably be partially rectified,
but only partially. Even this w ill depend upon the election procedures
which are adopted. (There is danger that some system of indirect election
may be introduced which will serve to maintain the most rootless of the
existing political parties rather than to give maximum expression to the
popular will.)
Moreover, this authoritarian legacy is at present strongly manifest
e P°^^cal parties as well as within the governmental structure
itse . he tendency has been, and probably w ill be for a num ber of
years, or party leaders to organize mass support among the population
rat er t an for the population itself to take the initiative in organizing
its own political representation. Even with elections, the personality of
the party leader will undoubtedly remain extremely im portant, as w ill
t e ten ei*cy of the rank and file to think of the party in terms of its
leaders rather than of its political and social program. Given the need for
strong go\ernment to solve the country's pressing social and economic
pro ems, t e existence of this authoritarian tradition obviously creates
dangerous possibilities.
One result of the hiatus between the Indonesian elite and the masses
as een to rein orce the tendency towards social irresponsibility among
the leaders of some political parties, and their obsession w ith the struggle
for personal power for its own sake. This w ill no doubt be considerably
INDONESIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM 10'
modified once general elections are held and such leaders are made more
directly accountable to the electorate. (However, this is less likely to occur
if the election laws allow central party organizations to make up their
own lists of candidates.) This tendency to a considerable extent results
from the fact that the competition for leadership is generally not exacting
enough. So long as very few people possess the prestige and capacity
conferred by Western education, this condition is likely to persist.
There is also an ingrained psychological reason for the dangerous social
irresponsibility shown by a number of Indonesian political leaders, and
particularly in the behavior of certain political parties in Parliament. This
arises in part from their long conditioning to the politics of opposition.
They were against colonial rule, against the colonial government’s policy
in the Volksraad, agaiiist negotiations with the Dutch. During most of
their career they have been an opposition without responsibility and with
little or no opportunity to participate in the positive development of
policy. This was undoubtedly a necessary and important function during
the struggle for national independence. However, their continued tend
ency to emphasize negative attacks on those steering the course of gov
ernment is now very much out of place. As members of Parliament, they
as well as the government owe a responsibility to the Indonesian people.
Justified criticism of the government's policy and administration is vitally
necessary, but its emphasis should be constructive.
Thus far this has not been the case. Those in opposition (of whom the
Communists have often been only a minority) have for the most part
sought to discredit the government and to advance their own personal
political fortunes. As a result they have already weakened and diminished
the effectiveness of the government. Insofar as they continue to do so,
they will make more probable the development of authoritarian and
totalitarian political forms. A proper system of elections w ill probably
do much to remedy this situation, and it is vitally important that they be
no longer deferred. However, elections w ill be unlikely to reduce the
abuse below the danger point. It is probable that a multi-party system
w ill continue after they are held and that both Governments and oppo
sitions will be coalitions of two or more parties. The probability is strong
that, as in the case of Republican France, divergently-oriented opposition
parties may unite for overthrowing the existing Government but prove
unable to unite thereafter for the purpose of forming a Government
themselves. Given the presence in Indonesia of some of the factors men
188 ASIAN N ATIO N ALISM AND T H E W EST
tioned above, such a situation might arise much more f r e q u e n t l y and

be more serious in its consequence than has been the case in France.
Hence it would seem wise for the Constituent Assembly, w h ich is
to meet following die general elections, to modify the existing P r o v i s i o n a
Constitution so as to obviate this dangerous prospect. It m ight w ell take
as its point of departure the excellent suggestion of Charles W olf* J r '»
namely, a provision whereby “if a Government were defeated on a Par'
ticular measure (by groups together commanding a p arliam en tary ma
jority), it would not be expected to resign unless the groups th a t had
opposed that measure were able to submit, within a specified tim e, the
names of a substitute cabinet which the said groups would su p p o rt ”0 and
which, of course, could command a parliamentary m ajority.
However, despite these numerous liabilities, post-revolutionary Indo
nesian society appears to possess enough assets to w arrant substantial hope
that it will develop a government of a basically democratic character
shaped to its needs and conditions and possessing only m ild ly au th ori
tarian overtones. Perhaps the strongest of its assets are the sincere and
deep-seated desire among the large majority of its elite to achieve this goal,
their widespread agreement on a social and economic program , the vi
tality of the resurgent and expanding village democracy, and the still only
partially tapped and largely unchanneled, but potentially p o w erfu l, pa
triotic energy possessed by so large a portion of Indonesian youth.
13. SUPPLEMENT: M AJOR DEVELOPMENTS, J U L Y 1 9 5 1 -M A Y 1952

'T h r o u g h o u t t h e LATTER half of 1951 the problem of in tern a l security
JL commanded a major share of the Sukiman Governm ent's attention.
he continued strength of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) w ith
in S.O.B.S.I., the largest labor federation, and an apparent increase o f sup
plies of arms in Communist hands alarmed Prime M inister Su kim an and
several members of his cabinet. On August 5 an armed gang attacked police
Posts m Tandjong Priok, the port of Jakarta, and its members w ere a r r e s t e d
only after all-night fighting in which several policemen were k ille d o r in
jured. The Government stated that this gang was a Com m unist o r g a n i
zation and that the incident was but a pan Gf an over-all pattern o f Com
munist-instigated disturbances which had begun to break out in J a v a and
Set Chu rles W olf' J r- ‘Trobleras of Ind°nesian C onstitutionalism ," P a c i f i c A ffairs,

September 1950, p. 317.
PO LITICS AND NATIONALISM 189
'Week later the Government cracked down hard and during the re
a d e r o f August arrested some 15,000 individuals mostly in Jakarta,
r e GCian’ Pematang Siantar, Semerang and Surabaya. Many of those ar-
sted Were members of the P.K.I., the small political parties associated
So ° r of tIie powerful Communist-dominated labor unions in the
*S-I- A considerable number of Chinese, many of whom had Com-
p ^ n ist affiliations, were also jailed. However, several members of the
Qr2az A iurba and many non-Communist critics of the Government were
a ls o a r r e ste d .
■A-rriong those arrested were 16 members of Parliament most of whom
m em bers of the P.K.I. or the small Stalinist parties associated with it.
hese included Abdullah Aidit, Mudigdo, Tjugito, Djokosudjono, Sakir-
a n d W erdojo. Also arrested were Maruto Nitimihardjo and Pandu
^ g u n a of the Partai Murba and Mustafa of the Front Buruh (W orkers
^r ° n t). However, the latter were released on August 17 along with Aidit.
a p p a r e n t ly A lim in was scheduled for arrest but was secretly given sanc
tu ary W lthin the Chinese Embassy.) In addition three Masjumi leaders,
A n sh ary, A. Hassan, and Abdul Halim were arrested.
° n O ctober 29, following questioning in Parliament, Prime Minister
Su^ im an presented his government’s official justification for its wide
spread security roundup. He stated that it had been carried out in order
to fo re stall a “foreign-supported conspiratorial movement”. This move
m ent, he stated, had as its objective the assassination of President Soekarno,
^ r - H atta and various ministers of the Government of the Republic
an d its replacement by a new form of government. Unofficially it was
Suggested that there was a connection between Communist strategy and
Da ru i Islam in the East Preanger area of West Java and that at least the
Com m unists might be expected to capitalize on the resulting lack of law
and o rd e r there. W hatever the truth in this, Dr. Sukiman did indicate that
there was a definite relation between the security roundup and the situa
tion in East Preanger as well as between it and the Tandjong Priok inci
d en t an d an increase in lawlessness in East Java.
U ndoubtedly the Government’s action was effective in weakening)
p o ra rily at least, the power of the Indonesian Communist Party and its
affiliates— particularly their strength amongst organized labor. Nevertê
!ess, a w ide range of non-Communist public opinion felt that the measures
l aken had in many cases been unjustly severe and in general far more ex
tensive than the situation warranted. Some attributed this to the nervous
ness o f an inexperienced cabinet. Among others there was a feeling that
190 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W E ST
the Governm ent had utilized the opportunity to intimidate some o f its non-
Communist critics as well as the Communists. Many of those who were
critical of the operation tended to blame the Attorney-General, Suprapto,
and his office more than Dr. Sukiman and his Cabinet, feeling that the
former had been overzealous in carrying out the Cabinet’s orders and had
done so with an undue disregard for civil rights.
The fact that within a few months of their arrest most of the 15,000 were
released from jail (including a number of the most im portant Communist
leaders) increased the tendency among many to believe that the Govern
ment’s action had been excessive and motivated by calculations of politics
as well as by a desire to insure security. The growth of this conviction
tended to weaken the Government’s backing in Parliament.
Throughout the remainder of 1951 and the first half of 1952 the Darul
Islam organization, now confined almost exclusively to the East Preanger
area, was the principal security problem confronting the government.
ough by mid-1952 its strength and area of operation had been further
diminished, it still remained a serious problem.
T he second gravest security problem was the recrudescence of guerrilla
activity in south-west Celebes (Sulawesi). Here on August 17, 1951, just as
is pnncipal units were about to be incorporated into the R epublic’s army,
a ar Muzakkar broke this agreement with the government and de-
campe wit 4,000 of his men as well as the equipment which army au-
onties had just turned over to them. By the end of October 1951, after
s arp engagements the government's troops, under their able
mman er Col. Kawilarang, had killed or captured a large portion of
za a rs men. Most of the remnants of his forces fled across the G ulf
one to tie wild and virtually trackless area of south-east Celebes,
n J anuary 5, 1952 the last organized resistance in the South Moluccas
co fpsed with the surrender in western Ceram of some 2000 adherents of
e out o uccas Republic”. Among those surrendering were five per-
IT - Hbed themseIves as “ 5 President, and Ministers of Horae
Affairs, Finance, Education and Information.
The question of West Irian (West New Guinea) remained im portant
uring this period, but little progress was made towards its solution.
n ’ - 952 formal talks were begun at The Hague between
Dutch and Indonesian delegations on the two questions of W est Irian and
the annulment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and its replacement
y an or inary treaty. Though general agreement in principle was reached
with regard to replacement of the Union Statute by an ordinary treaty.
INDONESIAN P O LIT IC S AND N A T IO N A LISM 191
little progress was made in working out the details for such a treaty. V ir
tually no progress was made towards solving the dispute over West Irian.
W ith the approach of the Dutch elections in June 1952 the Dutch Cabi
net, already under heavy pressure from Parliament, was in no position
to explore further conditions of settlement which would undoubtedly
increase this pressure. A t the end of February it was agreed between
the two delegations that continuance of the discussions would be deferred
until after the summer elections. President Soekarno on May 21 made
clear, however, that this suspension of negotiations by no means indicated
any suspension of Indonesia’s claim to West Irian.
In the field of foreign affairs it had begun to appear by the early sum
mer of 1951 that Prime Minister Sukiman and the majority of his cabinet
colleagues placed less emphasis upon Indonesia’s following an independ
ent policy than their initial pronouncements had indicated. However,
their tendency to move openly away from a middle path between the
Soviet and American blocs towards a closer alignment with the latter was
opposed by an important minority of the Cabinet and by a substantial
majority of Parliament. Thus while Sukiman’s Government was moving
towards closer alignment with the United States it was at the same time
drifting progressively away from the support of a majority in Parliament.
It was this more than any other facLor which was to bring about its down
fall late in February 1952.
Following Prime Minister Yoshida’s assurances that Japan was willing
to enter into a bi-lateral treaty with Indonesia providing “adequate
reparation to Indonesia for damages suffered by Indonesia during the
Second W orld W a r” (subject to the limitations stipulated in article 14 of
the Treaty) and regulation of Japanese fishing in Indonesian waters,
Foreign Minister Subardjo at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 signed
the Japanese Peace T reaty on behalf of the Indonesian Government.
However, his instructions to sign the treaty came from a Cabinet which
was badly divided. Of the 16 Cabinet members only 10 had voted in favor
of signing, while 6 were opposed. The majority had included its 5 Mas
jum i members and the single representatives from P.I.R., the Catholic
Party, Democratic Factions, Parindra, as well as the non-party member,
Ir. Djuanda. In opposition were the Cabinet’s 4 representatives from the
P.N.I. (who initially had appeared to favor signing the treaty) and the
single representatives of the Christian and Labor parties.
W ithin the Masjumi the decision to sign the treaty was a very narrow
one. The vote of its Executive Council was arrived at after a two day de
192 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E ST
bate at which only 33 of its 60 members were present. O f those present

17 voted in favor, 2 abstained and 14 (including Natsir and Roem) were
opposed.
On September 30 a party conference of the P.N.I. voted to oppose rati
fication of the Treaty. In addition the Christian and Labor parties as well
as the major parties outside of the Government, including the Indonesian
Socialist Party, made clear their opposition to ratification. It became clear
that even if all Parliamentary representatives of the parties w hich had
agreed to signing of the Treaty were w illing to support it, the Parlia
mentary majority necessary for its ratification could not be mustered.
In addition, it was highly probable that votes against ratification would
come from a considerable number of parliam entary representatives from
the Masjumi as well as some from P.I.R., Parindra, and possibly other
parties, whose Cabinet representatives had favored signing the Treaty.
The consensus was that, given its existing climate of opinion, Indonesia
would not ratify the Japanese Peace Treaty signed at San Francisco. In
general Indonesians opposed the T reaty not so much because of its terms
as because it seemed to symbolize an abandonment of their independent
foreign policy in favor of alignment with the U nited States.
It was widely felt that the continuing existence of the Sukim an Govern
ment was incompatible with the position it had taken on the treaty. How
ever, it was given a tenuous second lease on life follow ing die announce
ment of the P.N.I. that though the party opposed ratification o f the treaty
it would not support any demand for the Governm ent’s resignation. On
the issue of ratification the Government simply lapsed into an awkward
and rather self-conscious silence. Since it refrained from asking for rati
fication of the treaty, the issue was not brought to a head, and the vote
which would have caused its downfall was not taken. Agreem ent was gen
eral, nevertheless, that the Government’s unpopular stand on the treaty
had significantly weakened it.
The development which finally precipitated the fa ll of the Sukiman
Cabinet, and which would undoubtedly have brought about its fa ll even
if it had not already been weakened by its stand on the Japanese Peace
T reaty was the issue which arose over aid from the U nited States M utual
Security Agency.
By the M utual Security Act of 1951 the Economic Cooperation A d
ministration was replaced by the Mutual Security Agency, an organi
zation with a different name but roughly the same functions and staff.
However, Congressional legislation setting up M.S.A. required that
INDONESIAN P O LIT IC S AND N A T IO N A LISM 193
the 1952 agreements with countries receiving such American aid be some
what differently phrased than had been the case under the E.C.A. If the
agreement called for the delivery of military equipment the recipient state
was obliged (Under Section 5 1 1A of the Act) to pledge to “contribute to
the defensive strength of the free world".
Under the E.C.A. Indonesia had been receiving only economic and
technical assistance. She had not been receiving m ilitary aid through
E.C.A. and it was not contemplated in Washington that she would ob
tain it under M.S.A .1 The New York Times reported from Washington
that because of this the State Department had suggested to H. Merle
Cochran, its Ambassador in Indonesia, that under the new M.S.A. set-up
an economic agreement would suffice.2 Thereby Indonesia could con
tinue receiving under M.S.A. the same aid (economic and technical) as
she had under E.C.A., doing so under Section 51 IB of the Act. This sec
tion called for no pledge to contribute to “the defensive strength of the
free world," a pledge which Indonesians would certainly interpret as
meaning alignment with the United States.
However, Ambassador Cochran asked that the State Department re
consider this advice and instead undertook to induce the Indonesian
Government to agree to a somewhat modified version of Section 5 1 IA3,
apparently giving it no indication that the State Department would be
willing to accept the much less objectionable wording of Section 511B.
On February 5, 1952, Ambassador Cochran succeeded in getting his own
somewhat watered-down version of Section 5 1 1A signed by Foreign Minis
ter Subardjo. In drawing up his version of Section 5 1 1A, Ambassador
Cochran not only had not followed the State Department’s suggestion but
had also refused to allow the chief of the M.S.A. mission in Indonesia to
participate in drafting the agreement, declining even to see him for a
three-week period .4 The Ambassador’s re-drafting of Section 511 A, it was
reported5, substituted the phrase “contribute to the strength of inde
pendent and sovereign nations" for the orthodox phrase “contribute to
1. T h e only assistance which Indonesia had received from the U nited States with
respect to m ilitary equipm ent had been a grant m ade in 1950 (under Section 303 of
Public Law 329, 81st Congress) for sm all arm s to help equip its constabulary. Indo
nesia did desire some help in purchasing additional sm all arm s d urin g 1952, but this
was to be done outside the M.S.A. or other U.S. Government agencies and would only
have required some help in obtaining priorities.
2. New York T im es, Feb. 25, 1952.
3. Jbid.
4. Ibid.
5. R e p o r t o n In d on esia , Feb. 28, 1952, p. 2.
the strength of the free w orld”. However, this rewording was to do little
to disabuse Indonesians of their conviction that Section 5 1 1 A implied
some sort of military alignment between their country and the United
States.
Cochran’s negotiations with Subardjo had been carried out w ith the
knowledge of the Prime Minister, Sukiman, but most of the remainder
of the Cabinet and Parliament were kept in the dark. N either the Vice-
Prime Minister nor the Minister of Defense were consulted. O nly a month
after the agreement had been signed did it become public knowledge. A
flood of criticism then descended upon the Cabinet. Subardjo was at
tacked for conducting “secret diplomacy” in a m anner opposed to demo
cratic practice as well as for the content of the agreement. T h e general
opinion was that he had departed from an independent foreign policy
and aligned Indonesia with the United States. It was widely pointed out
that Burma, India and Pakistan had entered into sim ilar agreements with
the United States without having had to sign Section 5 1 1A, and it was
asserted that Subardjo had no business to make commitments to the
United States which these other advocates of an independent foreign
policy had been unwilling to make.
Under mounting public pressure, the Cabinet on February 2 1 accepted
Subardjo s resignation as Foreign Minister, thereby indicating its disap
proval of his conduct of negotiations with Cochran. T he feeling was domi
nant, owever, that Prime Minister Sukiman shared responsibility with
u ar jo for signing of the M.S.A. agreement and that he and the whole
a met should also resign. This feeling was particularly strong within
as1u™f *tse^- Its Executive Committee, under the leadership of
o Natsir, on February 13 condemned the M.S.A. agreement as
signe y Subardjo. On February 22 the Masjumi made clear that it was
as muc opposed to the contents of the agreement as to the procedure in
negotiating it. Since the Cabinet had merely disapproved of the procedure
t e i asjumi felt that it should resign. This feeling was in general con
curred with by the other major parties, and on February 23 the Sukiman
Cabinet handed m its resignation.
On March 1st President Soekarno asked Prawoto Mangkusasmito of the
Masjumi and Sidik Djojosukarto of the P.N.I. jo in tly to form a new
ca met. ac o agreement over the disposition of cabinet seats, particu-
arly between the P.N.I. and the Masjumi} and dissension w ithin the
Masjumi were the two principal reasons which brought them to admit
failure and turn in their mandate on March 18. Dr. Sukim an’s role in the
INDONESIAN PO LIT IC S AND N A TIO N A LISM
195
M.S.A. issue had broadened the breach between his wing and the Natsir
wing within the Masjumi.c It is probable that this had contributed to
the difficulties encountered by Prawoto and Sidik.
Presumably it was because of this lack o£ harmony between the two
wings of Masjumi that President Soekarno next appointed a single cabinet
formateur and selected him from the P.N.I. On March 19 he charged with
forming a cabinet Mr. Wilopo, one of the younger and more progressive
leaders of the P.N.I. and Minister of Economic Affairs in the outgoing
cabinet.7
W ilopo announced on March 30 that he had been successful in his task.
In his cabinet, which took office on April 3rd, 4 seats were held by the
P.N.I., 4 by the Masjumi, 2 by the Indonesian Socialist Party, one each by
the Catholic, Christian, Labor, Sarekat Islam Indonesia, and Parindra
parties and 3 by able non-party individuals. The make-up of the W ilopo
Cabinet was announced as follows:
Prime M inister Mr. W ilopo (PNI)

Vice-Prime M inister Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Masjumi)
Home Affairs M r. Moh. Roem (Masjumi)
Foreign AfEairs M ukarto (PNI)
Defence Sultan Hamengku Buwono (non-party)
Commerce and Industry Mr. Sumanang (PNI)
Finance Dr. Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo (Indonesian Socialist Party)
Education and C ulture Dr. Bahder Djohan (non-party)
M r. Lukman W iriadinata (Indonesian Socialist Party)
Justice
Religious Affairs Fakih Usman (Masjumi)
Communications Ir. Djuanda (non-party)
Public W orks Ir. Suwarto (Catholic Party)
Health Dr. Leimena (Christian Party)
Agriculture Sardjan (Masjumi)
A nw ar T jokroam inoto (Sarekat Islam Indonesia)
Social Affairs
Inform ation A. M ononutu (PNI)
Labour Iskandar Tedjasukm ana (Labor Party)
Personnel Affairs R. P.Suroso (Parindra)
W ilopo’s cabinet was widely hailed as being strong with respect to

parliamentary support and at the same time composed of individuals the
majority of whom were believed to be experienced and competent. It was
6. T h e re were also indications th at the strongest group su p p ortin g Dr- Sukim an
w ithin the M asjum i, the N ah datu l Ulam a, was seriously considering w ithdraw ing rom
the party, alon g with Dr. Sukim an him self.
7. H e h ad succceded Su jon o H ad in o to in th at post.
I®® A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E ST
g e n e ra lly re g a rd e d as b e in g m o re p ro g re s s iv e in its a p p r ° a c h . t o so cia l

p ro b le m s th a n its p red ecesso r. I t w as a lso r e c o g n iz e d as b e i n g m o re
in sis te n t u p o n fo llo w in g a n in d e p e n d e n t fo r e ig n p o lic y a l i g n e d w ith
n e it h e r S o v ie t R u ssia n o r th e U n ite d S ta tes. F o llo w i n g i ts î r s t m e e tin §
o n A p r i l 3 th e W ilo p o C a b in e t o ffic ia lly a n n o u n c e d its p r o g r a m w h ic h
re a d as fo llo w s:
I. S ta te O rg a n iz a tio n .
(a) T o h o ld g e n e ra l e le c tio n s f o r a C o n s t it u e n t A s s e m b ly a n d fo r
re g io n a l co u n cils.
(b) T o c o m p le te g iv in g c o n te n t to r e g io n a l a u t o n o m y .
(c) T o s im p lify th e o rg a n iz a tio n o f th e C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t .
II. N a tio n a l W e lfa re .
(a) T o ra ise th e n a tio n a l liv in g s ta n d a r d b y i n c r e a s in g t h e n a
tio n a l p ro d u c tio n , p a r tic u la r ly o f fo o d f o r th e p e o p le .
(b) T o c o n tin u e a g r a r ia n re fo rm .
I ll* S e c u rity .
T a c t fu lly to ta k e a ll m easu res to ta c k le th e p r o b le m o f s e c u r i t y , as
b eh o o ves a c o n s titu tio n a l state, to im p r o v e th e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f th e
state a p p a ra tu s a n d use so c ia l fo rc e s to e n s u r e la w a n d o r d e r .
IV . L a b o r A ffa irs.
T o co m p le te la b o r le g is la tio n i n o r d e r to b e t t e r th e p o s i t i o n o f
la b o re rs a n d to e n su re th e p ro cess o f n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n .
E d u c atio n .
T o im p ro v e m easu res fo r m o d e rn iz in g th e sy ste m o f e d u c a t i o n .
V I. F o re ig n A ffa irs .
(a) T o p u rsu e a n in d e p e n d e n t fo r e ig n p o lic y d i r e c t e d to w a r d s
w o rld peace th ro u g h a c tiv itie s w h ic h a r e i n lin e w iL h o u r d u tie s
as a m e m b e r o f th e fa m ily o f n a tio n s a n d w it h o u r n a t i o n a l in
terest.
(b) T o c o n tin u e th e n e g o tia tio n s o n th e I n d o n e s ia n - D u t c h r e la
tio n s h ip o n th e basis o f th e U n io n S ta t u t e b e in g r e p l a c e d b y a
n o r m a l d ip lo m a tic re la tio n s h ip w h ic h a n n u ls a l l r e s u lt s o f th e
R o u n d T a b le C o n fe re n c e (H a g u e A g re e m e n t) d e t r i m e n t a l to
th e jêople a n d c o u n try .
(c) T o c o n tin u e th e e ffo rts fo r in c lu s io n o f W e s t I r i a n i n I n d o
n e sia n t e r r it o r y as so o n as p o ssib le.
P A R T TWO
V IE T N AM E SE n a t i o n a l i s m
a n d FRENCH POLICIES
by
P H I L I P PE DE V I L L E R S
Professor, College Libre des Sciences Sociales et

Economiques, Paris; Author o f "Histoire du Viet-Nam”
NOTE
This paper is a translation of the three concluding chapters
of a larger study in French, Le Viet-Nam Contemporain,
which, in addition to a general introduction, also contains
chapters on the French colonization of Vietnam, the form a
tion of parties and the relation between nationalism and
communism, the revolution of 1945, the intervention of
Free France, and the postwar relations between France and
Vietnam. For a concise account of events in Indo-China
prior to the period covered by this paper readers may find it
convenient to consult the chapter on Indo-China in The Left
Wing in Southeast Asia (New York, 1950) by Virginia
Thompson and Richard Adloff and the chapter on Indo-
China by Ellen Hammer in The State of Asia (New York,
1951) by Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates.—Editor.
Vietnamese Nationalism and French Policies
&
1. FROM PACIFICATION TO CIVIL W AR

ith th e aggressive action of the Vietminh on the 19th of December
W 1946 [the resumption of fighting after the breakdown of the French-
Vietnamese Agreement of March 6 of that year] most of the possibilities
and opportunities for cooperation which still existed faded into the realm
of unreality. Everything that had been attempted in that direction now
abruptly had to give way to a sole mode of action, m ilitary action. France
had been attacked; France had to defend itself. Throughout Tongking
and Annam—at Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dingh, PhuLang Thuong, Lang-
son and Hue—encircled French garrisons had to face attacks by Vietmin
forces. And although the available defensive strength at this moment was
small, all the troops gave a good account of themselves. Their release was
taken in hand without delay. Reinforcements from C o c h in -C h in a and
from France were promptly dispatched to the north. The road between
Haiphong and Hanoi was re-opened in the first days of January, and t e
blockade of Hanoi was raised. The Tu Ve [“self-defense” corps of the
Vietminh Resistance], surrounded by French troops in the Sino-Anna-
mite quarter of Hanoi, ceased all resistance on February 19th. Hue, the
imperial capital, was delivered on February 7th after a siege of forty-six
days, by a column that had arrived from Tourane. Nam Dinh, where the
situation had at times been critical, was freed on March 1 1 th by a mass
descent of parachute troops. In mid-March, the m ilitary situation could
be regarded as restored: there was no longer any doubt that the Viet
minh had been halted at every front.
But the problem was not amenable to a solution by m ilitary means
alone. A t that time all but a few observers had come to realize that arms
would not by themselves resolve it. Its essentially political character
nevertheless only accentuated its complexity: to begin with because i t
took shape on two distinct levels—on the one hand, the V ie tn a m e se , whic
unfortunately w ill never be fully understood in France, and on the other,
the French. Both together produce y e t another level, the international.
199
200 ASIAN N A TIO N A LISM AN D 'rH E
F u rth e rm o re , th is p ro b le m w h ic h , fro m first to la s t, c o u ld b e

b y F ra n c e (w h ic h h a d c re a te d i t in th e c o u rse o f s e v e n ty y e a rs ) a s ^
m a tic a lly m o ve d o n to th e le v e l o f id e o lo g ic a l c o n tr o v e r s y a n d ^ eC am et^ e
a rm in th e a rs e n a l o f p o litic a l p a rtie s in F ra n c e ; in d e e d t h e r e ^ ^
ris k th a t i t m ig h t n o lo n g e r b e discussed fr o m th e s t a n d p o i n t °
re a litie s o n th e sp o t o r fro m th e s ta n d p o in t o f th e la r g e r a n d r e a l i n e r
o f F ran ce.
T h e even ts th a t fo llo w e d th e n e w a p p e a l to fo rc e c r e a te d i n F r a n c e
atm o sp h ere v e r y u n fa v o ra b le to th e V ie tm in h . N e ith e r f r o m S a ig o n n o r
fro m H a n o i cam e o th e r acco u n ts th a n th e o ffic ial v e r s io n o f t h e office o
th e H ig h C o m m issio n er, fo r, e x t r a o r d in a r y as i t m a y a p p e a r , n o
o r fo re ig n n e w sp a p e rs a t th a t tim e h a d a c o r r e s p o n d e n t i n I n d o - C in a.
A n d th e official v e rsio n o f ev en ts fe ll in so w e ll w it h th e p r e j u d i c e s o an
im p o rta n t section o f p u b lic o p in io n as to b e a c c e p te d b y i t a l m o s t w it
o u t re s e rv a tio n . O n e n e e d o n ly re a d a g a in th e P a r is ia n p a p e r s o f th ose
days to re a liz e h o w m u c h tro u b le th e a u th o r itie s in S a ig o n t o o k t o in fo r m
them .
A f t e r his r e tu r n to V ie tn a m , A d m ir a l T h i e r r y d ’A r g e n li e u , t h e H ig h
C o m m issio n er, h a d p la c e d w h a t th e n w as s till a lo c a liz e d , s t r i c t l y F ra n c o -
V ietn am ese co n flict o n th e h ig h est in te r n a tio n a l le v e l, t h a t o f t h e c o n flic t
b etw een co m m un ism a n d a n ti-co m m u n ism . L o n g c o n v in c e d o f a n im
p en d in g fa te fu l clash b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e U -S .S .R -* b e a p
p a re n tly h a d n o d o u b t th a t in th e “c o ld w a r ” w h ic h a lr e a d y h a d c a s t its
shadow in ad van ce In d o -C h in a w o u ld b e co m e a n e r v e c e n t e r o f v i t a l im
p o rtan ce. F o r h im , th e V ie tm in h a n d H o C h i M in h w e r e n o m o r e th a n
p aw n s m M oscow's stru g g le fo r g lo b a l su p re m a c y . I n d e a lin g w i t h th em ,
ran ee co u ld n o t a llo w its e lf to b eco m e th e ir to o l in th e s o v i e t iz a t i o n o f
a p e o p le w h ich in e v e ry th in g in its h isto ry , in its t r a d it io n s a n d in its
o u tlo o k seem ed fa r fro m co m m u n ism . T h e A d m i r a l lo o k e d u p o n th e
re m o v a l fro m V ie tn a m o f th is c o m m u n ist m e n a c e as th e p r i m a r y r o l e a n d
m issio n o f F rance.
U n q u e stio n a b ly , th is a ttitu d e to th e c o m m u n ist p r o b le m i n V ie t n a m
w as a lto g e th e r sin cere an d d isin te re ste d ; b u t in V ie tn a m a n ti- c o m m u n is m
b a d fo r tw e n ty years b een used too o fte n as th e a lib i, th e p r e t e x t , a n d
th e ju s tific a tio n fo r F ren c h p o lic y to b e a b le to a w a k e n m u c h re s p o n s e
to d a y. G e n e ra l L e c le rc recog n ized this w h e n , in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 7 , h e said ,
‘‘a n ti-co m m u n ism w ill be a useless to o l as lo n g as th e p r o b le m o f n a t i o n a l
ism re m a in s u n s o lv e d .”
A n d in d e e d , som e o f th e d e c la ra tio n s issu ed a t t h a t tim e m a k e i t p r e t t y
^ N A A ie s e n a t io n a l is m a n d f r e n c h p o l ic ie s 201
a *“ th at anti-communism, in fact, was once again merely a pretext. In

l'Uary 1947 A dm iral d ’Argenlieu expressed the view that the agree-
e*U o f M arch 6, 1946, and the Modus Vivendi [of September 14, 1946]
become void, since they had been ignored by the Vietminh govern-
rit* It w ould be necessary to start again from zero, but now in circum-
, nces w hich could not fail to raise the restlessness of the Vietnamese to
e highest pitch. The agreement of March 6 had been negotiated be-
een. two parties of almost equal strength, since one of them, with Chi
nese help , was capable of efFective self-defense. Now the French army was
GVeryw h e re, and the Vietminh government was in flight.
tjle yiet-minh Was Discredited

^ by insisting that the Vietminh had become part and parcel of inter
a c tio n a l communism the Admiral tried to compromise it in the eyes of
n glo-Saxon opinion and at the same time to discredit it before the
People o f Vietnam, he hardly needed that method. The setback which the
*e tm in h had suffered in December throughout the country had greatly
'W akened the moral authority of a Vietminh already losing momentum
because of that, driven to imprudent acts. The Vietminh had sub-
Jected the people to an extremely painful strain, practically a permanent
^ o b iliza tio n , with its unending meetings, mass demonstrations, and the
w ith its requisitions, with its control of thoughts and acts, with its
atm,osphere of suspicion and its informers, with the arrogance—and often
arbitrariness—of its officials, with its youth corps (the Tu Ve), and
with, the arrests, the abduction or assassination of its opponents and even
those considered lukewarm or suspect. If the Vietminh still seemed to
be the o n ly movement capable of achieving the fulfilment of the people s
asp ira tio n to national independence and to social justice, it nevertheless
r u led w ith the aid of physical terror and moral constraint. As under the
° ld regim e, the political police, now called Trinh Sat or Cong An, was
l be m ain buttress of the regime.
T h e people were tired of this strain. In the north and in the central
a reas signs were not wanting that pointed to a distinct disaffection from
the V ietm in h and its methods. It is true, the Hanoi government had pro*
duced order in many provinces; but the people now wished to work m
Peace, w ithout stress or war, free from the mandarins’ o p p r e s s i o n but
also fro m the dictation of committees. There was no desire for a return o
the F rench but an ardent wish for a government that would rule properly
and n o t throw the country into adventures.
202 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M AN D T H E W EST
Am ong the intellectuals, the policies of the V ietm inh likewise were
judged severely. Some reproached it with having imposed on the country
sacrifices and exertions quite out of proportion either to its strength or
to the results obtained. The Vietminh, it was said, could easily have
brought about national unanimity if, instead of insisting on a revolu
tion in the classical M arxian sense, almost slavishly im itating the methods
and the propaganda of certain foreign countries, it had stuck to the
creation of a national state rather than a party state which gave free rein
to the worst abuses under cover of the National Front and the Patriotic
W ar. In their haste, in their unwillingness to temporize, the Vietminh
leaders, with their fathomless vanity, had driven their country straight
into conflict with France—and this after having assented to the re-instal
lation of the French army in the capital itself and at the most strategic
centers. A t the same time, with the communistic character of its leader-
ship, the Vietminh had isolated Vietnam on the diplom atic level. W hile
Indonesia, with a government predominantly non-communist, was ac
tively supported by the United States and England, Vietnam was left
without any foreign support, even from the Soviet U nion and China,
rom which the Vietminh had so often asked friendship. Not even the
Communist Party in France had done anything to help Vietnam that
might compromise its position in the French government. T he Vietminh's
fourteen months of power had paid off in bloody failure.
is attitude of the Vietnamese masses and Vietnamese intellectuals
seemed to invite some corresponding political action on the part of
nee. mira d Argenlieu acted promptly. From the m iddle of Janu-
*3 ' vf *Jam e ° j conversations with various persons of moderate views
^ ° a T ° * f. ^ etm^nh and some of whom had themselves be-
onge to t e letminh. These contacts, however, failed to produce im
mediate results of any importance. Failure to clarify French policies with
regar to n o ina, the encouragement given to Cochin-Chinese separa
tism, no ess t an the power still possessed by the Vietm inh and the fear
it inspired, all made these nationalists cautious.
• maybe SaM ° f the former emperor Bao Dai who had been
m onS ong since the summer of 1946. A memorandum has recently
come to ig 11* ate January 14, 1947, in which the High Commissioner
expressed himself as in favor of a return to “the traditional monarchical
institution. During that month, the Adm iral had sent an emissary to
learn the intentions of the former ruler. Several of the em peror’s col-
1. Cf. Debats Parlem cntaires, Assemblee de 1’Union Franâise, 1950, p . 49.
V IETN A M ESE N A T IO N A L ISM AND FR E N C H PO LIC IE S 203
laborators thought it “a matter of urgency to constitute a new, strong and

respectable government in Vietnam, which could bring back order
and peace in the country while loyally collaborating with France on the
basis of equitable treaties guaranteeing the legitimate rights of both
parties.” But they suspected that the French advances might be no more
than a means of pressure on the Vietminh to gain new concessions from
it, or that, once such an undertaking on Bao Dai’s part had produced its
desired effect, the French would disavow the whole thing and impose
unacceptable conditions.
From then on, the Admiral seems to have relied altogether on the new
government in Cochin-China which, after the suicide of Dr. Thinh, had
been formed by Dr. Le Van Hoach, who was aiming at autonomy rather
than separation. In order to make of this administration a rallying point,
to get rid of the unfortunate impression which the convention drawn up
by Cedile and Thinh had created [that is, for the separation of Cochin-
China from the rest of Vietnam], and also to do justice to the demands
of the Cochin-Chinese who found themselves without any power, the
Admiral, by a federal ordinance of February 1, 1947, conceded to the
government of Cochin-China more extended powers—powers, neverthe
less, which were still theoretical.
But once again in this matter French policy confronted a fait accompli.
The decision had been made by the Admiral without consulting the
Overseas France Ministry. It was the last drop that made the cup over
flow. A t home, the Adm iral’s policy had provoked sharp reactions within
several of the parties in the governmental coalition. It disquieted some
(who did not want to admit it) and produced open indignation in others
who, from the measures taken by the Admiral in January and from the
reports given out after their return from Indo-China by the co-workers
of M. Moutet, learned too late of the lack of sincerity with which the
negotiations with Ho Chi Minh had taken place. The S.F.I.O. [French
Socialist Party] once again was the party which seemed most fully to
realize that what it confronted was above all a political problem. But
although the Ramadier government, which had just succeeded that of
Leon Blum, declared itself ready to recognize the independence and
unity of Vietnam and to negotiate with the authentic and qualified repre
sentatives of that country, the question of whom to negotiate with divided
government opinion. For the S.F.I.O. and the Communists, no repre
sentatives other than those of the Vietminh or, more particularly, of Ho
Chi Minh, came into consideration. But the M.R.P. [Popular Republican
204 A SIA N N A T .O N A L .S M A N D T H E W E ST
Movement] and certain members of the R .G .R. [R ally o f the Left] called
attention to the "treason” of the 19th of December and w o u l d h ave not
ing to do widi either at any price.
Emile Bollaert’s Mission

It was hardly to be expected that a government u n d er S o cialist leader
ship would retain Adm iral d’Argenlieu in his position o f a u th o rity . Leon
Blum had, at the beginning of January, offered the post o f H igh Com
missioner to General Leclerc. But this officer, not h avin g received from
the government the assurances which he demanded, had declin ed t e
offer. Since each party of the m ajority coalition had its ow n candidate
for the A dm iral’s successor, a compromise became necessary. A Member
of Parliament belonging to the Radical-Socialist G rou p in th e Counci
of the Republic, Emile Bollaert, was named on M arch 5th F rench
Commissioner in Indo-China, to replace A dm iral d ’A rgenlieu. It remained
an open question whether, bound as he was to the R a d ic a l Party, he
would be able to arbitrate successfully between the two attitu d es that
prevailed in the Government itself on the policy to be p u rsu ed in Viet
nam.
M. Bollaert's mission was intended to be temporary. A ccord in g to his
mandate, it was not to exceed six months. M oreover, it was m ore of an
administrative and investigative character than one re q u irin g resolute
action. The new High Commissioner’s instructions could n o t b u t reflect
the tripartite composition of the government. It was his assignm ent to
bring about the integration of the Indo-Chinese states in th e French
Union in accordance with the Constitution of October 27, 1 9 1 6 —a Con
stitution, by the way, about which not one of the states o f Indo-China
had been consulted-and to find the persons who, on the side o f Vietnam ,
would accept the task of entering into new negotiations w ith France. A t
the same time it seemed that the Government o f C ochin-C hina, under
Dr. Hoach, would have a special role to play in the days to come.
Vet, even within these limits the new High C o m m i s s i o n e r d id not en
joy complete freedom of movement. In order to a c h i e v e u n a n im ity , the
Government had not, of course, been able from the s t a r t to sh u t the door
to dealings with the Vietminh; but this apparent open-m indedness had
not sufficed to overcome the d i v i s i o n s within the G overnm ent. A ctually,
M. Bollaert's actions in Vietnam were under the circum stances con
siderably influenced by the picture which at the time p revailed in Saigon
V IE T N a m
E s e n a t io n a l is m a n d f r e n c h p o l ic ie s 205
th e g r Qr e â t ^v e s tr e n g th ° f v a rio u s p a rtie s a t h o m e in F ran ce, w ith

P ° liL ic s tren ci to w a r d c e n te r a n d to w a rd th e rig h t in F ren c h
w i t h v " ^ Ut ^ re n c h o ffic ia ld o m h a d lo st, i f i t h a d e v e r h a d , close co n tact
p ro l e t n a m e s e re a litie s . T h u s , th e so lu tio n s th a t w e re en visag ed a n d
d ra w n anC* tîe te n ta tiv e o u tlin e s o f p o ssib le ag reem e n ts th a t w ere
p o lit' w e r e a ll o f th e m d e n a tu re d by th e o re tic a l co n cern s. F ren ch
a g a - lc s h a d e n te r e d a v ic io u s c irc le o f slogans. Som e w e re fo r a n d som e
^ h i M in h , as la te r th e y w e re l o r o r ag ain st th e " filth y w a r .”
tjl e * ° b je c L iv e a n a ly s is o f th e p ro b le m , n e verth eless, w o u ld h a v e le d to
t i n ieC° n c Ûsi ° n th a t o n ly o n e basic n o tio n c o u ld be re lie d u p o n a t th a t
t£ ^ r a l l y m o re o r less a ll o f th e p e o p le o f V ie tn a m : th e id e a o f na-
an(^ a 1S n i w i t h its s tro n g m y stic a p p e a l to a sense b o th o f in d e p e n d e n c e
u n i t y . i t h a d b e en n a tio n a lis t p ro p a g a n d a ra th e r th a n th a t o f the
t m i n h w h ic h h a d su cceed ed in cry sta lliz in g th e a sp ira tio n s o f the
r p i e a r o u n d th e v is io n o f a n in d e p e n d e n t V ie tn a m , re c o n stitu te d in its
o n e n e s s a n d w it h in its h is to ric a l fro n tie rs , m a ste r o f its d estin y— th a t is,
l t s g o v e r n m e n t , its a d m in is tra tio n , its arm y, its d ip lo m a c y , its finances
d i t s e c o n o m y . F o r a m a jo r ity o f th e n a tio n a lists th is d id n o t p re c lu d e
l e P r e s e n c e o f F re n c h n a tio n a ls . T h e assistance o f F ren c h tech n ician s in
a d e p a r t m e n t s o f th e n a tio n a l life , econom ic, c u ltu ra l, m ilita ry , a n d so
01 th , w a s n o t o n ly to le ra te d , i t w as desired. T h e re w as en visag ed a close
c o o p e r a t i o n a n d fr ie n d s h ip w ith th e F ren ch , o n the basis o f e q u a l rig h ts
a n d e q u a l o b lig a tio n s . B u t th e re w as to be n o m o re o u tsid e c o n tro l o f
Lh e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o r o f th e c iv il service, n o m o re in te rfe re n c e w ith n a
tio n a l a ffa irs .
H e r e w a s th e c o m p e llin g in n e r m o tiv a tio n , th e irre d u c ib le c e n tra l
asp i r a t i o n , th e sig n ific a n c e a n d im p lic a tio n s o f w h ic h h a d to be q u ic k ly
r e c o g n iz e c l if, h a v in g cast th e d ie, F ran ce w as n o t to see th e ch ance o f
p e a c e f i r s t e x h a u s t its e lf a n d th e n v a n ish a lto g e th e r. O n th is basis an
h o n o r a b l e a c c o r d b e tw e e n th e tw o p a rtie s w as s till p o ssib le. W a s it neces
s a ry h e n c e f o r t h to h y p n o tiz e o n e se lf b y s ta rin g a t th e c o m m u n ist co n vic
tio n s o f H o C h i M in h ? W a s th is th e tim e to try to tak e a d v a n ta g e o f them
a n d so t o d e la y th e ta k in g o f a firm p o s itio n o n V ie tn a m ’s n a tio n a l p ro b
le m ? I f H o C h i M in h b e n e fite d fro m th is p o p u la r co n c e rn w ith the cen
t a l is s u e o f n a tio n h o o d , fro m th is r a r e u n a n im ity o f th e p u b lic m in d , it
Was m u c h less in his c a p a c ity as c h ie f o f the V ie tm in h p a rty a n d as P resi
d e n t o f t h e D e m o c ra tic R e p u b lic th a n it w as because h e h a d becom e the
s y m b o l o f th e stru g g le fo r in d e p e n d e n c e. C o m m u n ism ? T h e V ie tm in h
h a d b y th is tim e p u t a c u r ta in o v e r its M a rx ist p ro p a g a n d a . T h e p o o r
206 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W EST
beginnings, the bloody revolution, the excesses, all these it had to live
down under the exigencies of a war for the fatherland.
B ut patriotism was far from being a monopoly of the Vietminh. At
certain times (for example, in regard to the agreement of March 6 th, and
the Modus Vivendi) the Vietminh had shown themselves less demanding,
less intransigeant in matters concerning nationalist aspirations than had
their rivals who, moreover, because of their weakness in m aterial re
sources, had to operate principally by taking a stronger position than the
Vietminh in order to outbid them. Now, at the beginning of 1947, when
new forces, new certainties and irrevocable guarantees were ready to
make themselves felt, Paris should have spoken to Vietnam as London
had just spoken to India: it should with all solemnity have declared its
willingness to give it genuine independence within a specific period of
time—from three to five years at most, to leave it free to accomplish its
unity; it should have clarified also Vietnam’s exact status as an associate
state or dominion in the French Union. It is not too much to say that
everything hung on the taking of some such definite position, on such a
formal “declaration of policy,” because nothing would be clear and the
most dangerous ambiguities would persist until such a statement were
made. On the other hand, from the moment the Vietnamese people would
know just where France wished to go, from the moment the intentions of
France could no longer be doubted, that people would lean either to one
side or to the other, according to whether France had or had not re
sponded favorably to its fundamental Aspirations. Vietnam would no
longer persist in an attitude of waiting. In any case, it was certain that the
longer France waited, the stronger would grow the hold of the commu
nists on the nationalist movement.
In spite of everything that had been said or done to obscure it, the main
problem, once it was posed, would have shown itself simple, at least in
principle. Once the position of France was clearly stated, new forces and
new parties could spring up in Vietnam. W ith independence imminent,
the people, if they no longer wanted to be the prey of the armed and
dictatorial Vietminh party, could be expected to organize themselves in
an efficient and homogeneous bloc. If France were to offer real inde
pendence, perhaps the Vietminh itself might even be led to abandon its
character of National Front” in order to reveal itself more openly as
Vietnam s Communist Party. By making it a condition, as it had done
before March 6 th, that sovereignty would be transferred only to a repre
sentative Vietnamese government drawn from all im portant parties and
V IETN A M ESE N A T IO N A LISM AND FR E N C H PO LICIES 207
population groups, without leaving out any, France could have hastened,
even started, the indispensable regroupings and coalitions. Far from
stirring up a civil war in Vietnam, France could have made a decisive
contribution to agreement between the different forces and to the stabili
zation of the democratic republican regime which the Vietnamese could
have created for themselves—before withdrawing its own administrative
and military apparatus, and all in an atmosphere of reconciliation and
friendship. In that way, not retreating altogether from Vietnam but for
example still holding a number of m ilitary and naval bases in common
with it, we could have founded a true French Union, in full accord with
an allied Vietnam.
This political solution would have conformed not only to reason, to
French traditions and to French ideals—did not the colonial system have
for its aim gradually to lead the people to self-government and, if they
should so desire, to independence? It also would have met a necessity.
Time did not work on the side of France, either from a political or from a
military standpoint. France had relieved its garrisons and was in a good
position to develop its political action in conformity with that step. It
was necessary to put an end to the armed conflict as quickly as possible.
The pursuit of further operations ran the risk of becoming a crushing
burden for French finances, the French economy, and the French armed
forces.
If actually the necessary operation of relief were to become transformed
into war, France clearly would have to face the guerrilla form of hostilities
perfected in modern war. For this the French army was very badly pre
pared, both morally and materially. The best antidote, counter-guerrilla,
could not be brought into play except with the aid and participation of
the people. But that could not come to pass as long as the people were
convinced that the object of France was to reconquer the country and to
re-establish its former domination over it. W ithout the people and its
leading circles, however, France could not look forward to any lasting
political results; and it could bring these groups over to its side only by
promising them independence—or, better still, by actually giving it. We
always come back to the same point.
The military risk was all the more serious as Vo Nguyen Giap and his
general staff had seriously studied and prepared for partisan war. Already
in 1946 there were to be found in Vietnam “partisan manuals," translated
from the Russian and the Chinese, that had served in the Ukraine and in
China. The Chinese experience (1937-45) or the Russian one (1942-44)
therefore provided the model for the m ilitary organization in Vietnam.

The guerrilla, it has been said, is the weapon of the weak. No matter
what the circumstances are, it makes it possible to oppose effectively
much larger and better armed forces.
On the French side, at that time, a beginning was made w ith the
adaptation of army operations to jungle warfare. But as this “Vietnamese
W a r” contained so many political angles, was it wise to take inspiration
from the experience of Wingate? W ould it not have been better to medi
tate on the experiences in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945? They af
ford ample material for reflection on certain analogies. But who at this
time in Saigon knew what had happened during the w ar in Yugoslavia?
Soundings and Approaches

I had intended to lim it myself to a simple account o f the facts which
are still so recent. But facts are of interest only in relation to the sur
rounding circumstances which place them in relief or help to explain
them. I must therefore take the risk of entering upon the field of ex
planation.
In all the period from March 1947 to February 1950, one is liable to
lose oneself in innumerable details and detours of the main actions, if to
begin with the general trends, the motivating forces, and their actions
and reactions are not clearly understood. Not only this, but all the things
that happened must be placed in the frame of world events— events with
which those that took place in Vietnam were often closely related.
A first phase of this period ran from A p ril to September 1947. It was a
phase of soundings, of feeling one’s way, of inquiries. Psychologically
speaking, it began with a retreat. The recall of A dm iral d'Argenlieu and
the appointment of M. Bollaert gave rise to the idea in Vietnam that
France intended to take up once more its negotiations w ith Ho Chi Minh
and with the Vietminh. Nothing more was needed to induce everybody
to be cautious. The forces which, very slowly and very timidly, began to
take form at first assumed all sorts of attitudes. In Annam in the mean
time the monarchist elements had gained the ascendancy. A n Adminis
trative Committee was set up at Hue in A p ril under van Ly. A nother was
formed at Hanoi under the chairmanship of Dr. T ruong dinh T ri. At
Saigon, where the echoes from Paris are more quickly heard, Dr. Hoach
allowed it to be understood that contacts with what was already called
the “Resistance' were not out of question. As for the Caodaists, whose
V IETN A M ESE N A T IO N A L ISM AND FR E N C H PO LICIES 209
pope, Pham cong Tac, had been brought home in September from the
Comores, they preferred to keep a cautious silence.
The Vietminh, on the other hand, sensing a gradual loss of public
favor and occupied at the time with serious material difficulties—organi
zation of its rear, resettlement and relief of evacuated populations, critical
shortage of munitions and medical supplies—multiplied its advances and
offers of negotiation. From the French side, not a sign of official response.
It was stated, however, that any request for an armistice would be con
sidered. A t the Socialist Congress which happened at this moment to
take place in Paris, an announcement to the effect that contact had been
re-established was awaited with impatience.
Actually, two very different elements had to be taken into account.
The cessation of hostilities and negotiation in the full meaning of the
term were, of course, closely linked. No one [in Paris or Saigon] would
have denied that the shedding of blood must be stopped at the earliest
possible moment. A t the same time, it was necessary to see to it diat this
cessation of hostilities would not compromise the solution of the real
problem which for the time being was m ilitary in nature only because
it had lost its original character and outlines. Unless accompanied by
decisive political action, an armistice ran the risk of making it impossible
to set up a democratic regime in Vietnam by giving new sanction, perhaps
for a long time to come, to the power of the Vietminh extremists. If the
French genuinely desired to see emerge all the truly nationalist energies
in Vietnam so that they might deal with all of them, omitting none, it
followed that the cessation of hostilities mus* not be allowed to become
for the Vietminh the occasion of seizing once more the initiative every
where, of imposing once more its control over those who had begun to
extricate themselves from it, as well as to put in jeopardy the security of
the French armed forces.
It was in this light, it seems, that M. Bollaert’s staff saw the problem.
This conception, this “method of approach,” to use an Anglo-Saxon term,
was by no means the only one that might have been conceived. But it had
at least the virtue of permitting a glimpse, after long troubles, of a return
to peace and a solution of the conflict that would be democratic, equitable
and, perhaps, lasting.
But once again there was to be found in Saigon that division of opinion
which gave French policy that characteristic which had so often been
denounced by the Vietnamese: incoherence and duplicity. For these
circles which had inspired the policies of Adm iral d’Argenlieu, it was
A N D T H E W EST
210 ASIAN n a t io n a l is m
n the Vietm inh
n o t a q u e s tio n o f b rin g in g a b o u t a n e q u ilib r iu m b e tw e e n w ith H o
a n d th e o th e r forces, b u t a m a tte r o f b re a k in g o n c e a n d f o r a ^ r e v e r q£
C h i M in h a n d e v e ry th in g h e sto o d fo r, o f e li m in a t i n g h i m ^ th ese
o p p o sin g h im by e v e ry m ean s, a n d a b o v e a ll b y m i li t a r y ° n e s *
circles, th en , th e re w as o f co u rse o n ly o p p o s itio n to a tru c e - _ #
A n arm istice, it m u st be a d m itte d , w as b o u n d to b r i n g w i
serio u s d an g ers: d a n g ers a ris in g in th e m a in fr o m th e h o m e a n s
o f c e rta in ty a n d fro m its h e sita tio n s. F ra n c e h a d e v e n t h e n e me
p o lic y o n ly in v a g u e term s, th us a llo w in g fre e sco p e, w i t h o u t a n e
re to rt, to V i e t m i n h p ro p a g a n d a . F u rth e rm o re , th e g r o u p s a n P 3^ .1^
th a t m ig h t tak e p a r t in th e fo rth c o m in g n e g o tia tio n s s id e b y s id e w itn
th e V ie tm in h , em b arrassed as th e y w e re b y th e c o n t i n u i n g la c k o c a n y
in F re n c h p o lic y , h a d n o t y e t h a d tim e to assu m e o r g a n iz a t i o n a l orm s,
a n d e v e n less to m ak e th em selves fe lt. I f p r e m a tu r e ly e x p o s e d to com
m u n is t attack s, th e y w o u ld r u n th e risk o f b e in g c ru s h e d . B e f o r e ta lk in g
a b o u t a tru ce, th en , it w o u ld h a v e seemed o p p o r tu n e to d e f i n e w ith o u t
a n y a m b ig u ity th e F re n c h a ttitu d e to w a rd th e in d e p e n d e n c e o f V ie tn a m
a n d to re-affirm th e u n w illin g n e s s o f F ra n c e to d e a l w it h o n l y o n e o f t e
p a rties. T h e re c o u ld be n o cessation o f h o s tilitie s u n t i l th e n o n - c o m m u n i s t
n a tio n a lists w ere ab le to c o u n t th e ir fo rc e s a n d to o r g a n iz e th e m se lv e s
effectively. I t w as w e ll k n o w n a t th a t tim e th a t in th e M a q u i s m a n y
g u e rrilla gro u p s w e re a lm o st w h o lly c o m p o se d o f y o u n g p e o p l e w h o se
co n victio n s w ere fre e fro m a n y ta in t o.f c o m m u n ism , a n d w h o fo u g t
u n d e r the V ie tm in h b a n n e r o n ly becau se a t th a t tim e i t w a s th e o n ly
o rg an ized m o ve m e n t th a t d id fig h t fo r n a tio n a l in d e p e n d e n c e . A m o n g
th e V ie tm in h lead ers th em selves th e re d id n o t seem to b e e n t i r e u n a
n im ity . T h is w as a p p a re n t in th e re sh u fflin g o f c a b in e t p o s ts t h a t to o k
p la c e in A p r i l 1947.
S eem in g ly, Saig o n d id n o t h a v e tim e e n o u g h — m a i n ly f o r p o l i t i c a l r e a
sons a t h o m e in F ran ce— to tak e a ll these p r e lim in a r y s te p s . T o fin d th e
w a y to a tru ce h a d becom e th e m o st u r g e n t im m e d ia te ta sk .
N o t p ro p e rly p re p a re d , fo u g h t u n d e rh a n d e d ly b y e n e m ie s , w h a t w e re
th e chances o f M . B o lla e r t’s a tte m p ts to o b ta in a tr u c e i n th e s e c irc u m
stances? I n M ay, to re p ly — o r a p p e a r to r e p ly __ to th e V i e t m i n h ’s o ffers
o f cessation o f h o stilitie s, a n in te rv ie w w as a r r a n g e d b e tw e e n th e H ig h
C o m m issio n e r’s p o litic a l a d viser, P a u l M u s a n d th e V i e t m i n h le a d e rs.
A l l M . M u s h a d to d o w as to le t his q u e stio n e rs k n o w th e c o n d i t io n s w h ic h
th e F re n c h c h ie f o f staff o ffe re d fo r a n e v e n tu a l c e s s a tio n o f h o s tilitie s .
T h e th re e m a in c o n d itio n s w e re th ese: r e t u r n o f p r is o n e r s a n d h o sta g es
■A-MESE N A T IO N A L IS M AND FR E N C H PO LICIE S 211
ert’ delivery of a large part of the arms and ammunition, free entry of
-p/" troops to all territories under Vietminh occupation,
th at *,G regarded these conditions as unacceptable. “If we accept
* said Ho Chi Minh, “we would be cowards. But the French Union
iH0 ^ 0 t he founded by cowards.” An influential section of the Vietminh,
e°v e r, seemed to be opposed to all real negotiation. Certain docu-
ts that fell into French hands revealed that this section looked upon
a Ppeal for a truce as nothing more than simply a maneuver. That
fQ° ^ h i M inh’s reply was not followed by any counter-proposal was there-
interpreted as a refusal to stop hostilities,
j though the communist influence kept on growing in Vietminh circles,
sj^ a direction less and less favorable to negotiations with France— it
°tUd be remembered that at home in France from May 1947 on the
°*nrnunist Party was no longer part of the government coalition—M.
lae rt nevertheless continued his efforts to get the army command and
y . ris to adopt a set of conditions on which it might be possible to secure
tiêtrriin h consent. A t the same time, soon convinced of the force of na-
P sentiment in Vietnam, he for one arrived at the conclusion that
ariCe could not afford to wait any longer without a definition of its
*CY on the national problem of Vietnam.
^ 1 ° take such a definite position seemed all the more necessary and
Sen t because since the beginning of the year important political devel
opm ents had taken place in other parts of Southeast Asia. The Dutch and
e Indonesians had on March 25th signed the Linggadjati Agreement.
^ dia had achieved its independence, and the transfer of sovereignty was
° take place on August 15th, 1947. Might not France on that same day
^ ake a large gesture, too? This idea, proposed by M. Bollaert, appealed
° the Governm ent, but certain divergencies of view came to light at the
ast m om ent, particularly with regard to the implications of a conferment
° r s°vereig n ty upon Vietnam and the expediency of pronouncing the
w ord “independence.” So it was not until September 10th, after having
S °n e hom e to consult the Government, that M. Bollaert was able to de-
lv e r the expected speech announcing the program.
T h e m eaning and implications of that speech can be understood only
1 one keeps in mind the tendencies at work at that moment. On the one
side w e see M. Bollaert, with the support of certain parties in the home-
and, m aking every effort to secure a truce with the Vietminh—as a Prel"
u de to a more general negotiation in which other Vietnamese elements
m ight take part, such as the Hoach government at Saigon and the Ad
m inistrative Committees of Hu£ and Hanoi. On the other side we see the
most influential elements of the administration and of the arm y command
—likewise supported by certain parties at home—fighting against all
rapprochements with the Vietminh; these groups could not or would
not understand the heterogeneous composition of that body and instead
exerted themselves to force the orientation of French action toward the
recognition of a new “partner,” the one Adm iral d ’A rgenlieu had pointed
to in his memorandum of January 14. From that time on there took
shape very clearly, under the influence of these circles, the trend toward
the adoption of Bao Dai as that other partner w ith whom it was supposed
to be possible for France to deal.
W hy Bao Dai? Because in these circles, where some of the high officials
from the period of the protectorate were now the counsellors most listened
to and most influential, it was believed that Bao Dai would prove a part
ner who would make few demands, and that— to judge from experience
still recent— it would be easy to manage him. T o persuade him to return
to the political arena, perhaps even to the throne, did not appear too
difficult; and once this was accomplished it would not be too difficult
either to make him appear at the same time as the symbol of national
tradition, hence in a position to rally the rural masses, and also the sym
bol of Franco-Vietnamese friendship.
The least one can say of these calculations is that they erred through
an excess of optimism. There was no positive ground for thinking that
Bao Dai, whose abdication was recent enough to be remembered by every
body, would lend himself to a maneuver which at first glance would
seem to be designed to break up the Vietnamese Resistance. Bao Dai at
that time still was Vinh Thuy, Supreme Counsellor of the Ho Chi Minh
Government, and had done nothing, uttered not a word, that could be
interpreted as disavowal of that government. T o be sure, fo r a significant
section of the public, especially in Annam, he symbolized the non-Marxian
nationalism of Vietnam;, and to the extent to which the nationalist forces
succeeded in making themselves heard, it might be difficult fo r him not
to return to the scene.
From this moment, the twofold character of what was to be called the
“Bao Dai solution” became evident. T o the great m ajority o f nationalists
Bao Dai as a man meant less than Bao Dai as a symbol. T he task was to
escape the communist constraint by creating a national movement
that would serve as a basis for an independent Vietnam. But fo r the
m ajority of Frenchmen who espoused this “solution" it was on the con
VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES 213
trary the man who mattered the most. They thought they knew the former
ruler and considered it likely that his weak personality would make it
possible for them to continue the protectorate under some other name.
And that is the reason why they started to put Bao Dai on a pinnacle, to
sing his praises, to go overboard for him. And yet, nothing was done to
encourage the formation of nationalist organizations whose support could
make Bao Dai into a real political leader.
It should be noted that at this stage the two French tendencies which
have just been sketched were not entirely in mutual contradiction. If the
aim was to i^roduce conditions under which negotiations could be con
ducted with representatives of all of Vietnam, then the presence of Bao
Dai at the head of the non-Marxian nationalists was certainly to be
desired; but even if this set of circumstances was to be brought about,
working with Bao Dai did not exclude the possibility of also working
with Ho Chi Minh. The two men would have to come to terms and
balance each other if Vietnam was to speak to France with one voice.
Reactions of the Vietminh

But these steps and these notions produced certain serious repercussions
on the side of Vietnam. The fact that France sought—prematurely, it
appears—to make contact with the Vietminh was regarded by the Viet
namese as a sign that France admitted its strength and pre-eminence, that
France had given up all hope of beating it. “If the French have in mind
a deal with the Vietminh, the Vietminh can come back in every part of
the country. So, if we take a position against .-the Vietminh now, we shall
be in trouble when it gets back in the saddle. As things are, it seems better
to keep quiet.” This was a rather general popular attitude. The French
move, therefore, resulted in retarding and greatly curbing the liberation
of the nationalist forces, already all too slow, and in imposing reserve and
caution on them.
In Vietminh circles and those of its sympathizers the confusion was no
less marked. They wanted peace, they ardently looked forward to an end
of hostilities that had let loose on Vietnam tragic miseries and had, as we
know, posed serious problems for the Vietminh government. But the
internal logic of the Vietminh, and the conditions of its survival, were
such as to make it impossible to end without a complete volte-face the
propaganda by which it had allowed itself to become ensnared. It could
therefore accept this offered peace only if i
the acceptance of the minimum terms: the
dependence (even if still within the frame of the F r e n c h

to say, more than had been conceded on March 6, 1946, m ore ia ^
Vietminh’s own minimum demands at Dalat and at F ontain
duced in December 1946 to strike in order to re-establish a prestige^co^
promised by the concessions it had made on those occasions, the letmi ^
now saw itself obliged to go beyond its earlier demands. A n d since i s
adversaries would not stay quiet, France obviously was n o longer m a
position to bargain from a basis as advantageous to itself as th at w n c i l
had rejected in 1946. An opportunity was lost that w ill never return.
The Vietminh also looked upon the French s o u n d i n g s w ith a view to
a truce as more in the nature of a reconnaissance to find ou t its strengt l,
and it knew how to make use of this in its propaganda. Yet there remaine
one great fear: more and more it became afraid of losing its monopo y
in the leadership of the nationalist movement. If negotiations were to
take place, the Vietminh still wanted to be, as it had been in 1946 an
as the universal claims of communist strategy forced it to dem and the
only "partner.” According to its own understanding, the greatest danger,
a crucial and perhaps moral peril, lay in the resurgence, now no longer
of the pro-Chinese cliques of which with French help it h ad got rid in
the summer of 1916, but of the non-communist nation alist movements,
and this despite the fact that they were of many shades, w ho m ight want
to take a hand in the bargaining with the French. From th at m om ent all
the Vietminh's energies were bent to one end: to elim inate, discredit, and
terrorize its possible rivals.
E lim in ate? A n e x a m p le m a y be seen in th e a s s a s s in a tio n i n O c to b e r
19 4 7 , alm o st o n th e sam e day, o f o n e p e rso n a g e a t S a ig o n a n d a n o th e r
a t H a n o i: N gu yen v a n Sam , h e a d o f th e N a tio n a l U n i o n F r o n t , w h ic h
h a d begu n to tak e shape in th e so u th a n d w h o se c o n ta c ts w i t h t h e C o c h m -
C h in ese M aq u is tro u b le d th e V ie tm in h le a d e rs; a n d D r . T r u o n g d in h
T r i, C h a irm a n o f the N o rth e rn A d m in is tr a tiv e C o m m it t e e a n d fo r m e r ly
a m in iste r in the V ie tm in h g o v e rn m e n t, a n a b le a n d h o n e s t m a n w h o
m ig h t h a v e becom e the c e n te r o f a n a tio n a lis t r a l l y i n T o n g k i n g . A n d
in M a rc h o f the sam e y e a r th e V ie tm in h h a d in s tig a te d th e e x e c u tio n o f
H u y n h P h u So, th e yo u n g a n d d y n a m ic h e a d o f th e B u d d h is t se c t o f D ao
X e n (H o a H ao), ye t a n o th e r fig u re lia b le to b e c o m e a d a n g e r o u s a d v e r
sary, in th e so u th .
B y p ro p a g a n d a , b y th re a ts a n d b y acts o f te r r o r , th e V i e t m i n h also
trie d to p a ra ly z e a ll w h o w o u ld lea v e th e “ D e m o c r a t i c ” F r o n t o r p la y an
Â M e se N A T IO N A L IS M AND FR E N C H PO LICIES 215
P e r i d e n t g a m e. A d v e rs a rie s w h o c o u ld n o t b e re a c h e d , g u e r rilla u n its
n o u r e b e l l e d a g a in s t th e C e n tr a l C o m m itte e ’s o rd e rs, w e re ev en de-
aritj Cecl to th e F re n c h p o litic a l p o lic e as d a n g ero u s V ie tm in h m em bers,
y. t ^ e F r e n c h a u th o r itie s to o k o v e r th e task o f e lim in a tin g th em . T h e
£r(^ tr t l^n h a ls o u se d a succession o f ru m o rs o f a co m in g o ffe n sive to k eep
a ri^ Sec e s s io n th o se w h o s till h e sita te d to com e to term s w ith th e F rench,
' v h o a sk e d th em selv es w h e th e r F ran ce w o u ld n o t o n e d a y sen d its
ecl fo r c e s h o m e a n d so le a v e th em in an exp osed iso latio n .
0 j S ô r m e th o d o f d is c re d itin g its o p p o n en ts, th a t is o n e o f th e arm s
P r ° P a g a n d a in w h ic h th e V ie tm in h is p a r tic u la rly a d ep t. T h e fa c t th a t
e a r * ti- M a r x is t o r n o n -C o m m u n is t forces a p p e a r in the m a in — a n d fo r
f h OC* r e a s o n s — i n zones o c c u p ie d b y F ren c h forces is easily e x p lo ite d b y
e V i e t m i n h w h ic h can m a k e i t a p p e a r th a t its riv a ls a re the to o ls o f th e
r e n c h . V e t, in m a n y cases th is s o rt o f p ro p a g a n d a does n o t go d o w n w e ll
e c a u se th e m e n w h o m it a tte m p ts to sm ear a re person s w e ll k n o w n to the
P e o p I e f o r t h e i r in d is p u ta b le p a trio tis m a n d in te g rity . P erh a p s one sh o u ld
r e g a r d th e s e a tte m p ts as n o m o re th a n w a rn in g s to th e persons co n cern ed
^ o t t o p l a y in to F re n c h h a n d s a n d n o t to d iv id e th e fo rces o f th e R e
s is ta n c e b u t to jo in in th e d e fe n se o f th e fa th e rla n d .
T h i s b r i e f s u rv e y m u st suffice to give an in k lin g o f th e c o m p le x ity o f
p o l i t i c a l s itu a tio n in V ie tn a m in the m id d le o f 19 4 7 . O n e th in g c le a rly
e m e r g e s f r o m th ese facts, n a m e ly th a t e v e ry th in g w as sh a p in g u p fo r a
te s t o f s tr e n g t h . T h a t th is test w as also a p re lu d e to n e g o tia tio n s th a t
c o u ld n o lo n g e r b e a v o id e d does n o t ch ange its essen tial ch a ra cter. T h e
V i e t n a m e s e m asses h e s ita te d to choose b e tw een the tw o e x trem es— a t o n e
e *id t h e F re n c h , a t th e o th e r th e V ie tm in h . T h e F ren c h p o le o f th is axis
w as a t t h a t tim e stro n g e r, ric h e r in p o ssib ilities, a n d m o re lik e ly to lead
to p e a c e ; a n d y e t, b y its o w n d e fa u lt, it w as soon to a p p e a r th e less solid
a n d t h e less c o n siste n t. T h e o th e r, a t th a t tim e la c k in g in sureness an d
c o n s c io u s o f its o w n w eakness, by m eans o f its p ro p a g a n d a a n d in tim id a
t i o n w a s to g iv e its e lf th e a p p e a ra n c e o f b ein g stro n g e r th a n i t was. B e
tw e e n th e s e tw o p o les, th e re w as a w h o le ra n g e o f p o sitio n s, v a ry in g i*1
t t ie r i t a n d in practicability. Unfortunately, th e re w as n o sign as yet th at
th e s e d i v e r s e g ro u p s w o u ld n a rro w d o w n th e ir d ifferen ces an d so g|ve
t h e s t r u g g le , as y e t so h e sita n t, a m o re te n acio u s a n d a m o re in clu sive
c h a ra c te r.
H a v i n g d e s c rib e d th e ch ec k e re d p a tte rn , w e can n o w tak e th e m e a
n is rn t o p ie c e s . W e m u st tr y to see h o w i t w orks.
The Hadong Speech

On the tenth of September 1947, at Hadong M. B ollaert made the
speech previously referred to. In it he defined the position of France:
Vietnam would become self-governing without any interference on the
part of France. It would be able without hindrance to realize its unity,
provided the Cochin-Chinese would consent. The only restrictions on its
liberty (Paris had not yet permitted the word "independence" to be pro
nounced) would derive from Vietnam’s membership in the French Union
—that is to say, France would hold itself responsible for the country's de
fense and its foreign relations; it would also be the arbiter between Viet
nam, Cambodia and Laos; and it would, with the three states, administer
the public services. M. Bollaert said nothing about a federation —an omis
sion which constitutes a large step toward the conciliation of the French
and Vietnamese propositions. To promote negotiation with France on
the basis of these declarations, M. Bollaert appealed to all groups of the
intelligentsia in Vietnam.
The reactions were not slow in coming. The Vietm inh declared Bol-
aert s offers to be deceptive. This Saigon and Paris once more interpreted
as a refusal. Once again the Vietminh fulfilled the hopes of its adversaries,
n Hong Kong, where a number of nationalist leaders had come together
around Bao Dai, and where something much beuer had been expected,
there was great disappointment. Nevertheless, urged to action by numer
ous organizations which pictured to him the desperate situation in which
e peop e ound itself, Bao Dai overcame his scruples. In a proclamation
ep em er he declared himself ready to join France in the search
so ution o the conflict which divided the two countries. It was a
A .6 êsPor*se>not by any means an acceptance of the terms laid down
a ong. It was simply the reaction of those who understood that it
onger possible to wait and do nothing. For, it was apparent that
no sincere effort was to be expected on the part of the Vietm inh to find
a way out of the political impasse.
It is also undoubtedly true that, for reasons deriving in part from the
situation in Vietnam and in part from that in France and from that in
Asia, the nationalists thought the time was ripe for a forw ard step, that
ey now eave behind their hedging and try to end a conflict that
3 ^ a ravaSe so many provinces and towns and sown so much
grie . e renc , it seemed, would henceforth assume a more positive
attitude, determined as some of them appeared to be to support the
opponents of the Vietminh, and others at least to give a chance to all.
VIETN A M ESE N A T IO N A LISM AND FRE N CH PO LICIES 217
As time went on, it appeared less and less likely that France would deal
with the Vietminh alone. The Communists had been eliminated from
the coalition government in Paris. The Socialist Party no longer sustained
as energetically as once it had done the cause of Ho Chi Minh. And the
international situation, with the growing antagonism between Russia and
America, also was steadily becoming less favorable for the Vietminh.
Southeast Asia tended to become a sphere of interest for the O ccident as
a whole; and in China just at this time the Kuomintang had once more
assumed the offensive against the communists and had reconquered their
capital, Yenan.
The rapprochement between France and the nationalist camp, which
now seemed to crystallize around Bao Dai, began to take on clearer out
lines. Some of these nationalists openly took a position against the Viet
minh. Others were more cautious and seemed to look forward to a pos
sible deal, under certain conditions, with the Vietminh which would
bring about national unity in spirit as a preliminary step to discussing
matters with France on a footing of equality.
But a new factor intervened at this time: the entrance upon the scene
of General Xuan. This officer—at that time Colonel—had been a member
of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Cochin-China formed
by Dr. Thinh. In the public eye he was therefore tinged with separatism.
In November 1946, after the death of Dr. Thinh, the Council of Cochin-
China had preferred to the colonel’s candidacy for the Presidency that of
Dr. Hoach—which, it seems, had been supported by Admiral dArgenlieu,
and who had been elected. Colonel Xuan, deeply disappointed by this
affair, had retired to Paris where he had many contacts in political circles
and in particular with members of the S.F.I.O. [French Socialist Party]
and the R.G.R. [Rally of the Left]. In an address delivered under private
auspices in February 1947, he developed certain ideas on the solution of
the Vietnamese problem. On that occasion he expressed himself in favor
of a Vietnamese federation, including the three Kys [major political sub
divisions of Vietnam]. He looked to the return of peace, it seems, through
an understanding between those whom he regarded as the natural chiefs
of the three Kys, Ho Chi Minh for Tongking, Bao Dai for Annam, and
himself for Cochin-China. He thought that, with the particular role he
could play because of his past, he was the best qualified of the three lead
ers to obtain from France the assurances which Vietnam was waiting for.
And he also looked upon himself as the conciliator—and if necessary
arbitrator—between Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh.
218 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D th e W EST
I n O c to b e r 19 4 7 , G e n e ra l X u a n s u d d e n ly w e n t b a c k to S a ig o n , Wj ^ rC
h is r e tu r n h a d b een p re p a re d fo r by h is p o litic a l fr ie n d s . I n a
h e m an ag ed to secure a m a jo r ity in th e C o u n c il o f C o c h in - C h in a an
to get h im se lf elected P resid en t o f the G o v e rn m e n t in p la c e o f D r. oac
w h o se a ttitu d e in th e co u rse o f th e la st fe w m o n th s h a d e x c i t e d a goo
d e a l o f o p p o sitio n . A lm o s t a t once th e g e n e ra l p ro c e e d e d to t h e e x e c u tio n
o f his p la n by e n te rin g in to co n tact b o th w k h th e V i e t m i n h a n d w ith
B ao D ai. A s fa r as th e resistan ce fo rces o f th e V ie t m in h i n C o c h in - C h in a
w ere concerned, th e rec e p tio n o f these o v e rtu re s w a s c le a r ly d is c o u ra g in g .
B ao D ai, o n h is p a rt, h a d o b served w ith m isg iv in g s th e c h a n g e th a t h a d
taken place in Saigon. I n as m u c h as h e w as th e h e i r o f t h e N g u yen
dynasty, B ao D a i u n d e rto o k as his first task th e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f V ie tn a m
ese u n ity . W h a te v e r ten d ed to re in fo rc e th e v ig o r o f C o c h in - C h in a s
au to n o m y w as to h im suspect. T h e u n e x p e c te d r e t u r n o f G e n e r a l X u a n
u n d e r the circum stances in te rfe re d w ith th e e x -e m p e ro r's p la n s . In th e
m ean tim e D r. H oach, sen sin g th e rise o f B a o D ai's s t a r a n d w is h in g t o
h itc h his o w n w ago n to th a t star, h a d lit tle b y lit t le a b a n d o n e d h is a u to n o
m ist n o tio n s. H e n o w a rriv e d in H o n g K o n g a n d t h e r e h e lp e d t o
stren g th en ra th e r th a n d isarm the fo rm e r r u l e r ’s m is g iv in g s w i t h reg a rd
to G e n eral X u a n . B eg in n in g in O c to b e r 1 9 4 7 , B a o D a i d e m a n d e d th a t
the French H igh C o m m ission er liq u id a te th e g o v e r n m e n t o f C o ch in -
C h in a and rep lace it w ith an A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o m m itte e s i m i l a r to those
s e t u p i n A n n a m a n d T o n g k in g .
G e n e ra l X u a n at once trie d to re assu re B a o D a i a n d d e c la r e d h im s e lf

read y to side w ith h im in his task a n d h e lp h im r e g r o u p th e n a tio n a l
forces. A t the sam e tim e he d isa v o w ed a ll s e p a r a t i s t a im s . I n fa c t, th e
n am e A u to n o m o u s R e p u b lic o f C o c h in -C h in a h a d i m m e d i a t e ly a f t e r th e
g e n e ra l’s re tu rn been ch ang ed to G o v e rn m e n t o f S o u t h V i e t n a m .
T h ro u g h the com b in ed efforts o f th e n a tio n a lis t g r o u p f o r m a t i o n s a n d
the French a u th o rities, th e propaganda in fa v o r o f B a o D a i assu m ed
large p ro p o rtio n s th ro u g h o u t V ie tn a m . H is b a c k e rs p o i n t e d o u t th a t h e
alo n e h a d responded to th e a p p e a l la u n c h e d b y B o lla e rt a t H a d o n g a n d
th a t th erefo re he em b od ied the o n e g re a t h o p e fo r p e a c e . I n F ra n c e , th e
O verseas F rance M in istry h a d dropped fro m th e h a n d s o f t h e S o c ia lis t
P a rty an d fa lle n in to those o f th e P o p u la r R e p u b lic a n M o v e m e n t — th e
n ew m in is te r w as P a u l C o ste-F lo ret— w h ich w as k n o w n t o b e d e e p ly o p
posed to th e V ie tm in h . T h u s th e s itu a tio n h a d b e c o m e r i p e f o r a n e x
ch ange o f view s b etw een the H ig h C o m m issio n e r a n d t h e e x -e m p e ro r.
^ ^ A M E S E N A T IO N A L IS M AND FRENCH PO LIC IE S 219
T h ev
h a s - y rrie t o n D e c e m b e r 7 , 1 9 4 7 , in th e B a y o f A lo n g a n d d re w u p th e
^ te r m s o f a g e n e r a l F ra n c o -V ie tn a m e s e accord.
s£0 ^ lJC th e F re n c h c o n d itio n s , in th e fo rm in w h ic h th e H ig h C om m is-
ers s u b m it t e d th e m , see m ed w h o lly in su fficien t to th e n a tio n a lis t lead-
W ith w h o m B a o D a i c o n fe r r e d o n h is r e tu r n to H o n g K o n g : N go d in h
s h 6ra> ^ r a n v a n ^y* anc* o th e rs . T h e y th o u g h t these c o n d itio n s fe ll fa r
n a t io n a lis t a s p ira tio n s a n d c o u ld n o t b rin g a b o u t p eace. T h is
i n t e r v i e w s e rv e d to d isp e l c e rta in illu sio n s th a t h a d p r e v a ile d in
° r i g K o n g B e lie v in g th a t h e w o u ld h a v e a b e tte r ch an ce o f m e e tin g
j n U n d e r s ta n d in g in P a ris, B a o D a i le ft H o n g K o n g o n D e c e m b e r 2 6
° T nf Ur° pe'
e tim e h a d a r r iv e d w h e n a s o lu tio n c o u ld h a v e com e a b o u t sp e e d ily
E n ° n l y F r a n c e h a d a d o p te d to w a rd V ie tn a m th e sam e p o sitio n w h ic h
p j ^ ^ n d h a d a d o p te d to w a rd I n d ia o r th e U n ite d S tates to w a rd the
. ^ i p p i n e s : th a t is to say, i f i t h a d co n sen ted to recog n ize V ie tn a m ’s
^ d e p en cj e n c e ancj th e c o u n try 's r ig h t to a n a rm y o f its o w n , to
^ c o n d u c t o f its fo r e ig n re la tio n s , a n d to a n a u to n o m o u s econom y-
l e r e w o u ld h a v e b e en n o d iffic u lty in o b ta in in g as a q u id p ro q u o the
^ ^ r a n t e e s w h ic h F re n c h m e n d e sire d fo r th e ir eco n o m ic, c u ltu ra l, a n d
r r ilU ta r y in te re s ts in V ie tn a m . S atisfied in its m a in d em an d s, V ie tn a m
w ° u lc i h a v e b e e n n e it h e r a d e a d w e ig h t n o r a h o tb e d o f h o stile in trig u e ,
to s a y a p la g u e sp o t, w ith in th e F re n c h U n io n . I t s h o u ld be rem em -
e êd t h a t B a o D a i’s d e m a n d s w,ere n o t e sse n tia lly d iffe re n t— o n e m ig h t
SaV> t h e y w e r e e x a c tly th e sam e— fro m th ose p u t fo rw a rd b y H o C h i M in h
F o n t a i n e b le a u , a fa c t w h ic h goes to sh o w th a t th e y w e re n o t th ose o f
° n l y Qne q £ tjie p a r t ; es b u t th ose o f th e w h o le n a tio n .
B a o D a i’s c o n fe re n c e s, first w ith B o lla e rt a t G e n e v a a n d la te r w ith
o t h e r s i n P a ris , w e re d is a p p o in tin g . T h e F re n c h p o s itio n re m a in e d firm ly
as i t h a d b e e n d e s c rib e d by B o lla e r t in the B ay o f A lo n g . T h e o n ly d iffe r'
e n c e w a s t h a t th is tim e so m e o f th e F re n c h te rm s assu m ed g re a te r p re
d i o n . O n D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 19 4 7 , a t th e su g g estion o f P a u l C o ste-F lo re t, the
G o v e r n m e n t h a d g iv e n B o lla e r t a d ire c tiv e to p u rs u e h is n e g o tia tio n s
“ w i t h o u t H o C h i M in h .” F ra n c e h a d b ro k e n w ith th e V ie tm in h . A n y
f u r t h e r n e g o tia tio n s w ith H o w e re c o n sid ered to b e o u t o f th e q u estio n ;
h a d t o b e fo u g h t “ to fin a l v ic to r y .” A p h ase b egan , th e re fo re , in w h ich
t h e r e w a s n o lo n g e r a d e sire to fin d som e c o m m o n g ro u n d w ith a ll the
s c h o o ls o f th o u g h t— a ll th e “ in te lle c tu a l fa m ilies" — o f V ie tn a m . AH those
R o u p e d a r o u n d H o C h i M in h w e re to be le ft o u t. T h e V ietn am ese co n
v i c t w a s to b e c o m e p a r t o f th e “c o ld w a r .” T o fig h t c o m m u n i s m h a d
220 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E WEST
become a purpose that took precedence over that o f solving the national
problem. From this time on, the French endeavor ceased to follow paths
along which there might have been found the necessary conditions for
the establishment of a national government in Vietnam that would be not
totalitarian but fully representative of the people. It now followed a path
where it would make sure of the victory of some Vietnamese, judged—
without real proof— to be more tractable, over other Vietnamese. The
Franco-Vietnamese talks became moves in a civil war.
&
2. THROUGH CIVIL W AR TO THE B A R G A IN IN G TABLE
a o D a i's j o u r n e y in Europe had permitted him to take the measure
B of French doubts and difficulties. Of the latter he received confirma

tion at Geneva from the lips of M. Bollaert. T he naLure of the conflict
became clearer. The Vietnamese recognized that if France were now
disposed at last to pronounce the word "independence”—which General
Leclerc had already offered in February 1946—that term would be sur
rounded by so many reservations as to lose its accepted meaning. The
establishment of a Vietnamese army was acceded in principle; but Paris
still refused to consent to Vietnam’s right to carry on a really autonomous
foreign policy. Moreover, although the question was not explored at
Geneva, it became more obvious every day that the economic problem
would sooner or later prove the real stumbling block in the negotiations.
The Vietnamese wished to have their economic independence specifically
recognized. In exchange they were w illing not only to accord French
enterprises the same status as Vietnamese ones but also to give French
interests priority in the country’s development. A ll they stipulated was
that such priority should not become exclusiveness. M ore especially, they
wished to have the right to bargain freely over the purchase o f commodi
ties which France could not furnish or purchase at current prices. They
also wished to be masters of their economic, social, and fiscal policy, and
not to be subject to the directives of a French planning bureau.
M. Bollaert wished to arrive as quickly as possible at a political accord.
His thesis was that Bao Dai was still the legitimate heir of the Nguyen
dynasty, and that his abdication, a consequence of the Japanese occupa
V IE TN A M E SE N A T IO N A L ISM AND FRE N CH PO LIC IE S 221
tion, was invalid. For the same reason, the treaties of 1874 and 1884 [the
first opening the greater part of Annam and Tongking to French trade,
the second establishing the French protectorate] could not be considered
as having been abrogated. The present negotiation simply was for the
purpose of adapting the protectorate to new circumstances. Because of
this it was important, he held, that Bao Dai should return as soon as
possible to Vietnam and that he should receive some kind of formal status
as his country’s representative to expedite negotiations. But Bao Dai
refused to entertain these views. And so the two spokesmen remained in
the positions they had occupied from the start: the Geneva talks (January
7 to 13) remained without tangible results. A ll Bao Dai had gained was
the assurance that the unity of Vietnam would never again be placed in
doubt.
On the twentieth of January the High Commissioner returned to Sai
gon. Another meeting between him and Bao Dai had been planned for
mid-February, but the latter evidently preferred to extend his stay in
Europe. In February he went to Paris where he was received by the Gov
ernment and where he received all sorts of people. It was then that he
came to realize the complexity of the French political game, the I'ivalries
and maneuvers which had fastened themselves upon the Indo-Chinese
conflict—rivalries between ministries, between political parties, between
financial groups—not to speak of those between individuals. The Com
munist Party already was engaged in a lively campaign against the new
orientation of French policy. The Socialist Party was very wary. The
Radicals and the Popular Republican Movement were divided. As for
De Gaulle’s R ally of the French People (the R.P.F.), it had assumed a
clearly defined position: it had let it be known that it would not sub
scribe to any agreements entered into by a “T hird Force” government.
But the prophets and the “well informed” people said the R.P.F. itself
would be at the lielm in April. There was talk also in some circles of the
replacement of M. Bollaert, and already the names of possible successors
were bandied about. Confronted with this situation, Bao Dai thought it
preferable to prolong his stay in France and to wait for the turn of events
which was described to him as imminent. And that was the reason why
he failed to turn up at the meeting convened in the Bay of Along for
February 13.
M. Bollaert on his part reacted without delay to the news that reached
him of the conversations which Bao Dai was carrying on in person at
Paris. It was to himself, he recalled, that the Government two months ago
222 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W
h a d e n tru s te d th e m issio n o f c a rry in g o n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . ^ Qn

re c e n tly as F e b ru a ry 2 1 , th e C o u n c il o f M in is te rs h a d c o n fir* 116 1
fid en ce in h im .
A s a m a tte r o f fact, th e p o litic a l s itu a tio n d id n o t ta k e th e c o u rs e p ^
d ie te d b y the crystal gazers. B ao D a i so o n le f t fo r H o n g K o n g , w
la n d e d o n M arch 20. D u rin g his absence th e r e g ro u p in g o f th e n a t i o n
h a d m ad e some progress.
O n J a n u a r y 12, w h ile B o lla e rt a n d B a o D a i c o n fe r r e d in G e n e v a , t i e
C o u n c il o f C o c h in -C h in a h a d a d o p te d a m o tio n o f s e p a r a t is t te n ^ncy»
u n d e rlin in g th e necessity o f seeing to th e d e fe n se o f C o c h i n - C h i n a s i
terests in th e n e g o tia tio n s th en in pro g ress. E v e n th o u g h t h is re s o lu t io n
em an ate d fro m a b o d y th a t w as in n o w a y re p re s e n ta tiv e , h a d n o m a n a
an d lit tle p restig e— i t h a d b een esta b lish e d b y A d m i r a l d ’ A r g e n l i e u in
19 4 6 to s u p p o rt his o w n p o lic y in C o c h in -C h in a — th is i n i t i a t i v e p r o v o e
a v io le n t re a c tio n o n th e p a r t o f a ll th e n a tio n a lis t p a r tie s i n t h e F re n c
zone. O n J a n u a r y 27, th e tw o p rin c ip a l p o litic a l a n d r e lig io u s g r o u p i n p
in C o ch in -C h in a, th e C ao d aists a n d th e H o a H a o (D u o X e n ) , b o th m
fa v o r o£ B ao D ai an d to g eth er c o n tro llin g som e fifte e n o r t w e n t y th o u
san d rifles, co n clu d ed a fo rm a l a llia n c e a n d a ffirm e d t h e i r w i l l to
m ake the n a tio n a lis t asp ira tio n s p re v a il— i f n e ce ssa ry b y r e s o r t to arm s.
A few days la te r, th e C a o d a ist “d ip lo m a tic r e p r e s e n ta tiv e ,” D r . L e v a n
H oach (the fo rm e r h e ad o f the C o c h in -C h in e se G o v e r n m e n t ) , a l l i e d the
F ro n t thus fo rm ed w ith ye t a n o th e r n a tic n a lis t m o v e m e n t, t h e V ie tn a m
ese N atio n al Congress (Q u oc-G ia L ien -H iep ), a g ro u p w i t h m o n a r c h is t
leanings w hose influence, fe eb le th o u g h it w as as y e t, h a d s p r e a d e s p e c ia lly
in the cen ter an d in the n o rth . O n F e b ru a ry 8, r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f a l l these
n a tio n a list groups m et a t H u 6 a n d a d o p te d a re s o lu t io n d e m a n d in g f ° r
V ie tn a m the fu ll status o f a D o m in io n , w ith p o litic a l in d e p e n d e n c e , an
a rm y o f its ow n, c o n tro l o f its fo re ig n re la tio n s , a n d a n a u t o n o m o u s
econom y. T h u s fo rtified , V ie tn a m w o u ld e n te r in to a n a l l i a n c e w ith
F ran ce a n d w o u ld tak e its seat b y its sid e in th e U n it e d N a t io n s . T h e
re s o lu tio n m ad e i t cle ar, o n th e o th e r h a n d , th a t a ll s e p a r a t is m w o u ld
be fo u g h t w ith o u t m ercy a n d th a t, u n ite d , th e g o v e r n m e n t o f V ie t n a m
w o u ld , as it h a d d o n e b e fo re th e F re n c h c o n q u e st, re c o g n iz e o n l y p r o
v in c ia l divisio n s. T h e in itia tiv e tak en o n J a n u a r y 1 2 t h b y t h e C o u n c il
o f C o c h in -C h in a h a d succeeded in b rin g in g a b o u t c o m p le te a g r e e m e n t o f
the v a rio u s n a tio n a lis t gro u p s o n a b o ld ly u n it a r y p ro g ra m .
T h e F re n c h G o v e rn m e n t in th e m e a n tim e see m ed to b e m a i n l y c o n
ce rn ed w ith th e fo rm u la tio n o f a p la n b y w h ic h B a o D a i m i g h t be
'^ A M E S E n a t io n a l is m an d f r e n c h p o l ic ie s 223
|^V est e d -w ith so m e s o r t o f " d e m o c ra tic ” a u th o r ity w h ic h w o u ld e n a b le

n lm t o n e g o tia te “ in th e n a m e o f th e V ie tn a m e se p e o p le ." F ra n c e c o u ld
s V e ry w eU b a r S a in w it h a P r iv a t e in d iv id u a l sp e a k in g o n ly fo r him -
e v e n th o u g h i t w a s in th ese te rm s th a t B a o D a i h im s e lf h a d ch arac-
Iiis m is s io n o f in q u ir y . M . B o lla e r t h a d sp o k en o f c a llin g to g eth er,
^ l U s iv e ly f o r th is p u rp o s e , a s o rt o f P a rlia m e n t, a "C ong ress o f No-
j ? e s »” f r o m th e th r e e K ys. G e n e r a l X u a n h a d ta k e n u p a n d d e v e lo p e d
e i(l e a . B u t i t h a d to b e g iv e n u p u n d e r th e im p a c t o f o p p o s itio n fro m
tw o s id e s : first, t h a t o f th e n a tio n a lis t g ro u p s w h ic h c o n sid e re d i t im
p o s s ib le a t th is tim e to b r in g to g e th e r a t r u ly re p re s e n ta tiv e asse m b ly;
a n d . s e c o n d , th a t o f th e C o u n c il o f C o c h in -C h in a w h ic h fe a re d th a t in a n
f s s e m b l y m a d e u p o f r e p re s e n ta tiv e s o f d ie w h o le c o u n try i t w o u ld fin d
ltse*f in a m inority.
S o m a t t e r s s to o d w h e n B a o D a i a r r iv e d in H o n g K o n g w h e re a n u m b e r
N a tio n a lis t le a d e rs h a d a r r iv e d to m ee t h im . T h e m o n a rc h ists b ro u g h t
th e m a d e fin ite p la n . T h e y re g a rd e d i t as u n n ecessa ry to co n vo k e a
n a t i o n a l co n g ress to in v e s t B ao D ai. A c c o rd in g to th em , h e h ad , le g a lly
sP e a k i n g , n o t ceased to b e th e e m p e ro r, as th e V ie tm in h h a d n o t fu lfilI®“
th e c o n d i t io n s o n w h ic h th e r u l e r ’s a b d ic a tio n h a d b e en p re d ic a te d .2 A ll
B a ° D a i h a d to d o , th e re fo re , w as to resu m e h is p o w ers, as so m a n y
M essa g e s h a d u r g e d h im , a n d to fo rm a c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t.
£ u t w h a t a c tu a l p o w e rs w o u ld such a c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t h a ve ? U n d e r
P r e s e n t c irc u m s ta n c e s, a n d in .k e e p in g w ith w h a te v e r re s tric tio n s th e
F r e n c h w o u ld be s u re to im p o se, such a g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld be in c a p a b le
o f t h r u s t i n g its e lf u p o n th e p e o p le . I t w o u ld h a v e n o p re stig e w h a te v e r.
T ° e s t a b lis h i t th e r e fo r e w o u ld be to tak e a fa lse ste p th a t m ig h t p lace
th e w h o le n a tio n a lis t cau se in je o p a rd y .
N g o d i n h D ie m , w h o p re v io u s ly h a d ex p ressed h is a p p r o v a l o f th e
f o r m a t i o n o f s u c h a g o v e rn m e n t, n o w w as o f th e o p in io n th a t i t w o u
b e im p o s s ib le as lo n g as B o lla e r t stu ck to his term s. B u t p e rh a p s som e
n e w fa c ts h a d co m e u p d u r in g B a o D a i’s absence w h ic h w o u ld a llo w th e
H ig h C o m m is s io n e r to re c o n s id e r th ose term s. T o Find o u t, to see w h e th e r
t h e F r e n c h p o s itio n h a d n o t s h ifte d , B a o D a i o n M a rc h 2 0 sen t N go d in h
^ ie m to Saigon. .
B o l l a e r t r e m in d e d h is v is ito r th a t h e w o u ld h a v e to m e e t w ith B ao
o n c e m o r e to c o m p le te th e n e g o tia tio n s th e y h a d sta rte d . B u t h e h e
f i r m l y to th e c o n d itio n s h e h a d la id d o w n in th e B a y o f A lo n g an
2. T h e s e co n d itio n s w ere th at th e V ietm in h m u st b rin g a b o u t the unity an d inde

p e n d e n c e o f V ietn am a n d estab lish a dem ocratic regim e respecting all parties.
Geneva. Just at that time it was announced in Saigon that under the
auspices of the French authorities in the north a T h ai federation had
been established, composed of provinces detached from Tongking by
reason of the non-Vietnamese character of their populations, and that in
any future Vietnam these provinces would have to be given a special
status analogous to that created in 1946 for the Moi highlands. This was,
to use the words of General Xuan, nothing less than a "torpedo.” In
view of this situation, Ngo dinh Diem could only return to Hong Kong.
As he saw it, there was nothing to be done except wait until the French
would change their mind—which to him seemed inevitable. In the mean
time it might be worthwhile to establish a “Study Committee for the
Formation of a Central Government.” It was virtu ally an open break.
Continuation of the Vietminh’s Guerrilla Operations

A t that time guerrilla fighting was in full swing everywhere. For a year,
the French forces had not noticeably improved their positions. In Tong-
°ccupied the delta towns and a number of places in the Second
1 ltary District (Cao Bang), the Thai provinces and the Nung lands
w ic run a ong the Chinese frontier, between Langson and the sea. In
niJa™ extended their zone of occupation to the north and
west of Hue and to the south of Tourane. In Cochin-China, on the con-
ary, many villages had fallen back under the authority o f the Vietminh.
orîe Provinces, however, Caodaists and Hoa Hao were masters of
roads enCâves' " ^ e French still held all the principal towns and
ally speaking, the security of the communications remained pre-

ous, an a number of large attacks on convoys proved that in a
ary sense the Resistance had not grown weaker. On the contrary,
e equipment of these forces and their tactics evidently had improved,
e numerous clandestine organizations of the Resistance, its propa
gan ists an teiroiist agents, still cowed a population whose inertia and
apathy, indeed, became more and more manifest.
”latters’ however, the Resistance experienced a crisis. In
May 1947, the Vietminh government had absorbed diverse non-commu
nist elements. From the Vietminh zone there filtered through to the
French rumors of differences that divided the leaders. These differences,
or deviations, it was said, had resulted more especially from the eager
ness with which the non-communists were trying to make use of any
opportunities that could bring about peace w ith honor, and likewise
V IETN A M ESE N A T IO N A L ISM AND FR E N C H PO LIC IE S 225
from the care with which they tried to protect whatever remained of
autonomy in the midst of the National Front where the communists had
become more and more audacious; furthermore, they considered it their
business to look out as much as possible for the material interests of the
local populations. On the other hand, mainly for geographical reasons,
the Vietminh government, finding itself strong, it seems, only in the
central part of Tongking, had been obliged to leave considerable military
autonomy to the Nambo (Cochin-China) Committee. But in any case,
the Resistance in the south tended to emancipate itself from the tutelage
of the central government. T o this, the Communist Party, the soul of the
Vietminh, had reacted brutally in reinforcing its control. As a result,
there were now cracks in the solid wall of the Resistance army and
certain nationalist elements were trying to get out from under the grip
of the communist commissars if they could do so without leaving the
ranks of the Maquis.
Less than at any time before were the French confronted by convicts
and agitators. The great majority of the people they confronted were
fighting for a cause and an ideal. To understand the mental state of the
Resistance and of the Maquis in 1948, one did not have to look very far.
One need only remember what happened in the years 1943 to 1944,
though conditions at that time were far from being the same. A compari
son of the two periods makes it clear enough why the people, even though
they denounced its terrorism and its misdeeds, were most of them with
heart and soul for the Resistance. And this was the source of its strength
and ubiquity.
The war in Vietnam had lost all m ilitary splendour. It had become a
monotonous sequence of hand-to-hand encounteis, ambuscades, patiol
engagements, which sometimes succeeded in breaking up an attack on a
convoy and sometimes caught a somewhat larger unit. For the French
it was a war that was hard on the men, in an inhospitable climate, under
a burning sun, where mosquitoes, leeches, marsh fevers, dysentery, and
the so-called “Annam plague” combined their assaults with those of the
“Viets.” In these unsung skirmishes, the Expeditionary Corps already
had paid a heavy tribute— eight thousand dead, according to the figures
given to the Assembly by Overseas France Minister Coste-Floret, and
twice as many wounded and sick. And yet the results obtained did not
even remotely make up for all the courage shown and all the sacrifices
made. Things stood not very differently on the Vietnamese side. The war
already had cost Vietnam tens of thousands of dead. The Resistance, to
be sure, held the countryside, or at least almost all of it. It had enough
arms and munitions. It had almost everywhere the initiative, but it could
do no more than maintain a precarious state of equilibrium . It did not
have the strength to carry a single new position.
A nd this situation, it appeared, might go on indefinitely. But what
target exactly was it that France was aiming at? Ju st to gain a military
victory over the Vietminh? The international situation, the state of
French finances and of the French army, did not allow a really massive
m ilitary effort in the Far East; and, indeed, adherence to the Atlantic
Charter would have made such an undertaking m orally indefensible.
There had to be an end to this struggle. By continuing the w ar against
Vietnamese nationalism France risked arousing against herself all public
opinion in Asia, as in 1943-45, at the time of her Syrian affair, she had
aroused the hostility of all the Arab peoples.
T o make an end of the conflict, it was therefore necessary that France
in one way or another enter into contact with the Resistance. But she
had broken with Ho Chi Minh. Therefore she could no longer hope to
get the Vietnamese communists to listen to any solution she might pro
pose. (Grown more and more intransigent, the communists would at this
time no longer have accepted even the proposed partnership in the
rench Union.) France could deal only with the non-communist national
ists. Moreover, something would have to be done to make sure that these
would lend themselves to this contact, that they had the confidence, the
aut ority, and energy enough to influence the rest of the Resistance.
ove all, it was necessary that France make the required concessions to
convince the Resistance that this time the "national aspirations” were
to be satisfied, and that from here on there would be no sense in continu
ing to fight.
The political machinations in Cochin-China certainly had not been
o a kind to appeal to the non-communist Resistance. Only one person
could bring all those factions together, and that was Bao Dai-assuming,
however that he was surrounded by a team that could gain the con
fidence of the people. Having broken with Ho Chi Minh, France, if it
rea y wanted to make an end of the struggle, was forced to come to terms
with Bao Dai, and that meant it had to make him those concessions
without which he could not succeed. There is no question that this time
more would have to be offered than had been put on the bargaining table
in 1946.
The Provisional Central Government

Today it can be seen that neither M. Bollaert nor those circles which
had been in favor of the “Bao Dai solution” had expected so astute a
play on the part of the former ruler and of his counsellors. T o get over
the impasse to which the previous negotiations had led, some new pres
sure was needed. Thus on March 27, Bollaert summoned the representa
tive of the Socialist Party in Indo-China, Louis Caput, whose opposition
to the "Bao Dai solution” and whose sympathy with the Vietminh were no
secrets. (One need only refer to the important part which Caput had
played in the negotiations that led up to the agreement of March 6, 1946.)
The High Commissioner now commissioned him to go to Hong Kong
and to seek contact with the emissaries of the Vietminh to Bao Dai who
were supposed to be there—news of them had come from South China—
and to find out what he could about the present position of Ho Chi
Minh’s government. If this were the case, he might also take the oppor
tunity to point out to Bao Dai that the Vietminh showed itself less stub
born. In this way, it was thought, Bao Dai might be induced to reconsider
his attitude. But the Caput Mission miscarried. On instructions from
Paris, it seems, contact with Bao Dai was re-established, and Bollaert let
the ex-emperor know that his proposal of a provisional central govern
ment had been accepted.
The numerous consultations which the former ruler had arranged
permitted him to clarify his position. In a declaration of A pril 14 he
made it known that he was ready to act on the many appeals, resolutions
and statements of opinion that had come to him from a section of the
population anxious to see him return to the throne, but that he did not
consider feasible an immediate restoration in the absence of “a sufficiently
representative Assembly." It was, he said, “the right of the people them
selves to decide freely, and with full knowledge of the interests at stake,
what kind of regime they wanted to adopt as soon as peace and order
had been re-established." He himself, “as mediator and negotiator,” was
subordinating all other matters to a single aim, the re-establishment of
peace.
In this way introducing once again the principle of democracy and
setting at rest all rumors of an eventual restoration of the throne, Bao
Dai at once took his stand on solid ground where it would be difficult
to assail him. Ngo dinh Diem still refused to form a government. General
Xuan, however, seemed favorably disposed. On A p ril 24, at Bao D ais
22® ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST
invitation, he flew once more to Hong Kong, to start a new series of

“consultations” in full accord with M. Bollaert.
In Hong Kong a compromise between the divergent view s had been
found possible at the last moment. In order to m aintain the contact with
France, Bao Dai agreed that a provisional central g o v e r n m e n t should be
s e t up.
The purpose of such a government had been laid dow n in a letter
addressed by Bao Dai on March 26 to the delegates of the vario u s political
and religious organizations of Vietnam. Since it was to be provisional,
this government could not determine the country’s future b u t o n ly “enter
with the French into a Modus Vivendi on terms at once restricted and
capable of immediate application which would give the two parties the
opportunity to come to agreement on matters of. a practical natu re and
to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence as an outcom e o f concrete
achievements. This provisional central government could b rin g under
unified command all the national armed forces which at the time were
still operating on their own, and could organize ad m in istrative and
technical services on a national scale.” The main purpose o f this gov
ernment, therefore, was that of giving the unitv of V i e t n a m material
fou ndation s.
As far as the Vietnamese nationalists were concerned, the establishment
® this government would constitute a real test of French intentions,
mce it had not been possible to reach agreement on the m eaning of the
™or independence,” it was best to give concrete expression to that
cancTri131 SovereiSnty” whicIi France had recognized. A l t h o u g h the only
n idate for the delicate post of forming this provisional government,
ouTfraI XUan> had 31 timCS giVen the imPression that what he was really
. ° r was to build around himself a “Third Force,” it was n o t thought
w h‘ h°ng K° ng to be to° TlskY to use him in this im m ediate attempt
i kC ^ aSt WOUld keeP the contact open with France. B ut w ith good
uc Xuan’s government might succeed—as did the Indian in terim gov-
nment in 1946 in securing from France the actual transference of
services and of certain attributes of independent government; and in that
case confidence would grow and a more permanent arrangem ent would
e possible. If on the other hand the Xuan government w ere to come up
against the same obstacles which both the Vietm inh and the Cochin-
Uiinese authorities had encountered in 1946, a new crisis could hardly
be avoided; and in that case the “Third Force” would emerge discredited.
n a t io n a l is m a n d f r e n c h p o l ic ie s 229
ln th a t ca«
still so ° ne wou^ have to see whether any negotiations with France
jn a useful purpose,
the in 'Vay Bao Dai extricated the national question of Vietnam from
group e n ta l and m inor question—who would be the "partner,” the
mjgkt . Pa rty which would do the bargaining and whose composition
or a French opinion, run the risk of giving the solution a rightist
the T Ist tinge. In a way, Bao Dai placed the French with their back to
lon g ed ^ ^ rem inding them that to the people of Vietnam alone be-
q£ y - l *le choice between republic and monarchy, and that the question
T h Gtriarri S *nclependence alone waited for the word of France.
ran . c° nsultations over the formation of the central government soon
livel Int° difficulties. T he rivalries between individuals remained very
anc^ the personality of General Xuan did not exactly have the
o f a p p eal that gathers votes. Bao Dai nevertheless held that under
*ng circumstances the essential thing was to form a government in
1 th e French might have confidence and to which they could with
an ,Sm cerity hand over the administrative authority, the public services,
anc the financial resources. And so, in a letter dated May 15th, Bao Dai
gave his personal approval to the formation of a Provisional Central
G °xe in m e n t under the leadership of General Xuan.
^ he n atio n alist parties gave way. On May 20th their delegates elected
General X u a n President of the Provisional Central Government of Viet
nam. T h e C abinet was at once formed. It included personalities from each
of the th ree Kys, some of them known for their loyalty to Bao Dai. On
May 2 7 ih the High Commissioner “acted upon” the formation of the new
governm ent in the name of France but made it clear that its existence
did not prejud ice either the future form or the future composition of the
State o f V ietnam .
J u n e 1st, an official spokesman for Bao Dai thus defined the former
emp e ro r’s position:
h B a o D a i lo o k s u p o n th e p re sen t G o vern m en t as a step in th e n ego tiatio n s

b e tw e e n V ie t n a m a n d F ran ce.
2- B a o D a i w ill n o t re tu rn to V ie tn a m u n til he has receiv ed from F ran ce form al
a s s u ra n c e s t h a t th e le g itim a te asp ira tio n s of th e p eo p le of V ie tn a m w ill he recog
n iz e d —t h a t is to say, tru e u n ity a n d r e a l in d e p en d en ce in the bosom o i the
F re n c h U n io n , a n d ad m issio n o f V ie tn a m as a state freely associated w ith the
F re n c h U n io n a n d a c ce p te d in it on a basis o f e q u a lity as reg ard s both rig h ts an d
obligations.
3. A lth ou gh the new C en tral G overnm ent does n o t owe its existence to the
E m peror, close contacts w ill be m aintained, and a solid com m unity o f purpose
w ill exist between the G overnm ent and Bao Dai.
The Agreement of the Bay of Along

On June 6th, in the Bay of Along, the High Commissioner, M. Bollaert,
and General Xuan, “in the presence of His Majesty Bao Dai," signed the
protocol which was to serve as the basis for fu tu re Franco-Vietnamese
relations:
1. France solem nly recognizes the independence o f V ietn am to which belongs
the right freely to bring about its unity. On its part, V ietn am proclaim s its ad
herence to the French U nion in the capacity o f a State associated w ith France.
T h e independence o f Vietnam is unlim ited except fo r such restrictions as its
m embership in the French U nion imposes upon it.
2. V ietnam undertakes to respect the rights and interests o f French nationals,
to give constitutional guarantees o f its respect fo r dem ocratic principles, and to
give preference in the tasks of its internal organization and o f its economy to
French political and technical advisers.
3. As soon as the provisional G overnm ent has been established, representatives
o t V ietnam w ill confer w ith representatives o f the French R ep u b lic concerning
suitable methods o f arranging fo r the transfer o f specific activities in the fields
o educational, foreign, m ilitary, economic, financial, and technical services.
^ On the evening this document was signed, Bao Dai wound up his affairs
in Hong Kong and left for France.
The agreement of June 5 marks a turning point in the evolution of
rench-Vietnamese relations. The twenty months that have since passed
permit one to see that in this respect its importance was as great as that
of the 1946 agreement, however prolific that year had been in sudden
turns of all sorts. For this reason it may be w orth while to stop a little
longer at this point.
W hat was the mental climate in which the protocol was signed? To
know this is of the greatest importance, for, as was the case with the
agreement of March 6, 1946, only an analysis of the fram e of mind of
the signatories and of the participants permits us to understand later
developments.
On the French side, several tendencies, some of them in mutual con
tradiction, came to light: there was M. Bollaert w ith his staff; there was
the Arm y Command; there were the so-called “colonials” (a euphemistic
term); and there was, last but not least, the French hom eland: Parlia
ment and French public opinion. Among some of these it was not difficult
to discern eagerness for an end to the long uncertainty, for results, for
VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES 2$1
a '‘political solution” which, it was hoped, would also resolve the military
difficulties. In these circles, the agreement of June 5 was looked upon as
a stage, to be sure, but a stage of decisive import, since the other party
was bound by it. (That Bao Dai had not signed the instrument was over
looked.) In other circles—unfortunately it is not possible to pin down
some particular group as holding this opinion— there was the conviction
that a “partner” had at last been found, one who, though he harbored
many interests, could be relied upon to play on the French side, who
was ready to accept the Frendi terms and who would help the French
army to get rid of the Vietminh. This reasoning was not, however, with
out reservations: “we must not give away too much,” “one can never tell
from what direction die wind w ill blow.”
But the whole idea of making concessions, even though limited, also
awakened, as might have been expected, resistance from more than one
side. There were the “colonials,” a coalition of diverse interests which
had the Messrs Baze and Lachevrotiere for their spokesmen. There were
many elements in the Government, too, which were of the opinion diat
this business of making concessions had gone too far. And so an ex
tremely violent press campaign was let loose against the Bay of Along
accord and against M. Bollaert. This gentleman found himself charged
with having sold the “sacred rights” of France in Indochina for a mere
song, and even of having ‘ betrayed the interests of France. In undis
guised language, this section of the press pleaded for a return to the
situation as it was before the war, for a French colony of Cochin-China
which would be represented in the French Parliament, and an Annam-
Tongking Protectorate under the nominal rule of a monarch without
power— in short, for the re-establishment of the regime against which
the people of Vietnam had risen as one man.
In the metropolis there now came out into the open also those oppo
sition circles which were close to the Saigon colonials and, at the other
extreme, such parties as the French Socialist Party which did not trouble
to hide their ideological sympathy with the Vietminh. The S.F.I.O., al
though it had been unable to prevent the rupture with Ho Chi Minh in
December 1947, intended that the solution then in process of being
worked out would under no circumstances be allowed to become an in
strument of war against the Vietminh. A ll these cross-currents obviously,
and unfortunately, were not favorable to a quick solution, greatly needed
though it was.
On the Vietnamese side there undoubtedly took place at this time, not
so much what has been called a "psychological shock," as a sort of un

believing attitude of suspense, a disposition to w ait w ithout doing any
thing in the expectation that either side might suddenly take some un
foreseen action which might or might not justify the renewed hope. The
weighty word Doc-Lap— independence—had at last been spoken. Viet
nam could now freely realize its w ill to unity. Bao Dai had succeeded
w'here the Vietminh had failed. His prestige at a stroke became solid, and
the people dared to believe once more that peace was perhaps no longer
far off. For the broad masses, indeed, independence signified above all
that the struggle would soon be over, as there was no longer anything to
fight for.
In Vietminh circles this turn of events produced a certain amount of
confusion. T he Declaration of June 5, the establishment of a Central
Government of Vietnam, albeit only provisional, threatened to under
mine its monopoly of leadership in the nationalist movement. Once inde
pendence was achieved, the Vietminh would again be only a party and
would not for long be able to hold together the N ational Front. Yet, the
state of public opinion was such as to make impossible an open campaign
against Bao Dai and those who had wrung this m ajor concession from
France. Indeed, that opinion reached out for peace and clearly had be
come less receptive to slogans and commands calling fo r an all-out
fight; such catchwords were inopportune at a moment when it seemed
that independence would be achieved in the near future and by peaceful
means. The Declaration of June 5, therefore, already had one memorable
effect: it had shaken the Vietminh myths, it had given the lie to the
essence of its propaganda.
One thing all Vietnamese had in common: nobody took the Declara
tion lightly. France had recognized the independence of Vietnam. Now
the people waited for deeds. In nationalist circles it was the general be
lief that a very rapid materialization of independence would be likely
to bring with it very rapidly too, if not complete peace and order, at least
new confidence and assurance. A nd indeed there were good reasons for
the belief in these circles that as soon as a strong and truly independent
national government had been set up, composed of men who enjoyed
the respect of the people, the greater part of the Maquis combatants,
even including some of the staffs and leaders of the Vietm inh, would
abandon their armed struggle so as to take part in the national recon
struction. The Communist Party of Vietnam probably would be reduced
to what it was in reality, an extremely well organized m inority, but one
fighting for quite specific ideological ends. And it was not even certain,
a priori, that the Communist Party—which still disguised itself under
the label of a "Society for the Study of Marxism”— might not want to
take part in public life along with other party formations. But it would
be possible to decide the issue with equal strength on each side and with
out ambiguity.
From this point on, therefore, everything depended on two things: on
the one hand the actions, the nature and the effectiveness of the new
government, on the other the speed—and, frankly, the sincerity—with
which the French authorities would transfer their powers and give the
Central Government the administrative facilities and the financial and
military means that would permit it to assert its authority. A turning
point had been reached, and speed was the foremost factor of success. It
was the task of the French authorities to disarm the distrust of the people
with some spectacular action, for that distrust was liable henceforth to
become an almost unhealthy suspicion of French intentions. There had
to be an end to all the waiting around. Words, I repeat, already had lost
their magic. It is doubtful whether a "psychological shock” was yet pos
sible in Vietnam. It was clearly to be seen that the people would remain
sitting on the fence until the French had given them something more than
a verbal pledge of their willingness to come to terms and of their sincerity.
People waited, and nothing—or almost nothing—happened. A t first it
seemed as if M. Bollaert were not fully supported by his government. In
Paris the friends of the “colonialists” carried on a campaign against the
ratification of the agreement, for reasons already hinted at. The friends
of the Vietminh in France, whether consciously or not, gave substance to
this campaign by advancing the exclusive interests of the Vietminh which
had every reason to fear a prompt execution of the agreement. One only
had to watch the inordinate activity of the Vietminh delegation in France.
On the other hand, the speeches made after the Declaration of June 5
by members of the Cabinet gave substance to the idea that France had no
intention of giving up its special position in Cochin-China. For example,
M. Coste-Floret, the Overseas France Minister, said on June 8 before the
National Assembly that "no change w ill take place in the status of Cochin-
China without a chance for Parliament to vote on it.” And the Council
of Cochin-China, at the instigation of a group of colonials and of some of
their influential allies, refused to recognize the authority of the Central
Government but instead announced its intention not to dissolve until a
permanent status for the colony had been worked out. It only took three
234 ASIAN NATIONALISM AND T H .W B T
weeks for the rising hope in Vietnam to become subm erged again m
suspicion.
Another Cabinet crisis in France tended further to d elay action. M. Bol
laert had left for Paris at the end of June to obtain a speedy ratification of
the agreement. But would the Parliament ratify it? T h e r e was no cer
tainty that a sufficient majority could be brought together fo r th is vote.
W ith the resignation of the Schuman Cabinet on Tu lY l9, the dlscluiet *s
regards the probable outcome of that vote__which alread y was consid
erable—grew even greater, the more so since the f i n a n c i a l situation and
the postponement of the local elections seemed at that tim e to preoccupy
the parties a great deal more than did the F r a n c o - V ie tn a m e s e conflict. A t
Jast, on August 19, the new President of the Council, Andr£ Marie,
managed to secure the adoption by the Assembly, by a vo te o f 347 against
183, of a statement approving in principle the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Ju n e 5. At
the same time the Assembly placed on record its view th at “ the former
status of Cochin-China is no longer in keeping w ith present needs.”
other words, the Declaration of the Bay of A long now was held to be
no more than an agreem ent on general principles. E x tre m e ly im p o rta n t
questions had been left in suspense to be dealt w ith in s p e c ia l co n ven tion s,
t was evident that from the side of Vietnam there w o u l d come no further
L ° a T nC em entS u n t i l so m e o£ th e s e s p e c ia l a g r e e m e n t s w e r e c o n c lu d e d
thp 1 ■desired to condude them with as much speed as possible. Only
Se sPecial agreements or conventions would allow a reasonable judg
ment as regards the reality of the mooted “ i n d e p e n d e n c e w ith in the frame
French Union.” Whether the Resistance w ould be resumed or
em ^ 7eStablif ec1, accordinS to fa d in g Vietnamese authorities, depended
J W Tr°n esults of the negotiations with France.
^ France, it seemed, was in no hurry to come to terms w ith General
h a7 n: - a n ? tb! 5 in Spke ° f the fact that ^ e accord of the B ay o f Along
s ipulated that the specialized arrangements would be agreed upon
s soon as the provisional government has been set u p .” M. Bollaert's
nesis and that of the French Government n e v e r t h e l e s s was as follows:
as L Pr,°u S,l0naI gOVernment d e r i v its powers solely from B ao Dai. And
stin , pS ° Ut of thinSs- the Government of Vietnam is n o t yet con-
e , because it lacks a chief executive and the legitim ate sanction
w h ic h th e V ietn am ese n e g o tia to rs n eed i f th e y a r e to b e r e g a r d e d as
H illy a u th o riz e d to c a rry o n n e g o tia tio n s T h e H ig h C o m m is s io n e r th e re
fo re th o u g h t i t in d isp e n sa b le th a t B a o D a i r e t u r n as s o o n as p o s s ib le to
v >etnam , so th a t the w o rk o f " g iving su b sta n c e to th e Bay o f A l o n g a o
VlETN A M p
^ S E NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES 235
cord” jv .
w ith £ begin.3 On August 25, therefore, in the course of an interview
at orac ° at ®aint Germain, Bollaert asked him to return to Vietnam
dyna a n d to start again where the great traditions of the Nguyen
B a o ^ h a d le£t o£
te n ti * 1 re ûsed- The precedent of 1932, recently recalled to public at-
thinlT'11 ^ a SaiS ° n newsPaPer by Nguyen Phan Long, had set him
to y - in ®*4 T h e monarch reiterated his previous decision not to go back
nat' ietnana as long as he had not received satisfaction on two essential
ancj n a ^ dem ands: liquidation of the colonial regime of Cochin-China,
^ su ffic ie n t guarantees of the independence of Vietnam.
er*ch official policy from that time on was to be dominated by one
sojv e i n : to get Bao Dai to return—as though his return by itself could
a kQC problem . I betray no secret, since the whole press has talked
su^^lt *t, w hen X recall the constant pressure to which the sovereign was
jec te d a ll summer, autumn, and winter of 1948. Bao Dai had de
m anded th at every jJossible assistance be given to General Xuan to enable
th t0 f^ ace government on a firm footing, to have real control over
e ad m in istratio n , to make up his armed forces, and to have some funds
at his disposal. By a higher decision, it seems, such application of the
Pr in cip ies agreed upon on Ju n e 5th, even by the provisional and re
stricted M odus Vivendi, remained suspended until the ex-emperor’s re
turn. W a s the French Government altogether aware of what this decision
w ou ld m ean? Evidently it did not realize that it might in large part
destroy the m oral and psychological implications of the Declaration o f
Ju n e 5 a n d obstruct from the start and forever the “Bao Dai solution.”
Ju st w h a t had happened? T h o u g h the Central Government was able to
take office, it could not govern. The general services were not transferred
t° it. C e rta in regional services and certain revenues were passed on to the
governors o f the Kys, but these remained much more under the tutelage
of the F ren ch Commissioners of the Republic than they came under that
the C e n tra l Governm ent of V ie tn a m . Although this government had
been prom ised the income from the government monopolies, actually it
did n o t e n jo y a single actual source of financial revenue. It lived on ad
vances fro m the Indo-Chinese Treasury. From fear of desertions, practically
n° th in g h a d been done to give the Central Government any armed forces
its ow n . It did not even have control over its police force. T h a t w as
3. Cf. P o litiq u e Internationale, December 2, 1948, p. 50.
4- A p e r io d of terrorism d u rin g w hich the Frcnch police and arm ed forces a tte m p te d
to u p ro o t e v ery rem nant of the n atio nalist movement.—T ranslator.
236 A SIA N N A T IO N A L IS M a N D T H E WECT
the way in which France chose to interpret the “Bao D ai s0Ût^0^-’ze^ j^

was how, from the start, it compromised its chances and jeo p a
practical and concrete basis. Xuan
T h e inevitable consequences soon began to show t h e m s e l v e s . A
government in the eyes of the people looked like a governm ent w * ,

power, like a kind of screen for the French adm inistration- N or i i
lack of initiative and its timidity contribute anything to its prestige. y
two or three of the Cabinet members were able to do good w ork. ie
others gave the impression of avoiding the study of actual problem s an
of shrouding themselves either in silence or in a style of o ra to ry long out
of fashion.
Public opinion did not take long to react. As far as the m a n in the
street could see, the accord of June 5 had been nothing but a trick, a new
machination on the part of France. How could he judge oth erw ise when,
in spite of all assurances, nothing was seen to have changed, w h en every
thing went on as usual (it could not very well have been otherw ise), when
he saw the French officials still at their desks and the French police and
political gendarmerie still at their posts, when he noticed th a t the Viet
namese authorities could do nothing of importance w ith o u t first asking
French permission? How could this be regarded as independence? It
was this, above all, it seems, that discredited the X u an g overn m en t and
all the regional Vietnamese authorities whose financial m anagem ent, by
the way, left a good deal to be desired and gave rise to a ll sorts o f rumors.
More serious was the fact that every French effort, w h ic h n ow b ore on the
anti-communist theme with emphasis on the creation o f a n a tio n a l gov
ernment, was also received with suspicion. In those few weeks, the French
pulled the rug from under the anti-communist nationalists; th e distrust
° f French intentions became still stronger than it had been before.
And from that moment the Vietminh was again in a p o s it io n to take
UP the offensive. The terrain had become favorable. Its prop ag an d a had
°nly to harp on the familiar themes. Once more it un d erlin ed them: the
French have failed to carry out their engagements; the V ietnam ese who
collaborate with them are nothing but puppets; no f u r t h e r p r o o f is
needed to show that the Resistance army alone can produce re s u lts . Every
thing was propaganda. Its only purpose was to make it easier fo r other
forms of political and military action to come into play. B u t the Party's
dupes had had their eyes opened; some thousands of com batants had left
the Maquis. Fences had to be mended with the u t m o s t energy.
W hat followed was an a c c e n t u a t i o n and a g g r a v a t i o n o f th e p r o c e s s
s t a r t e d a long time ago. The c o n t r o l of t h e V i e t m i n h over o th e r parties
N A T IO N A L IS M AND F R E N C H P O LIC IE S 237
an d OT
COl*iTti zatôns grew and became heavier; and in the Vietminh itself
tk e Ul*ist influence came to preponderate absolutely, always through
t|le Use °£ the well-known methods: in the army through the increase in
nUrn b e r and power of the political commissars, as well as the ex-
me^ e a n d amalgam ation of possibly unreliable units, and the appoint-
over m *^tant members to all posts of command while tlie posts of
re r t *eadership often remained in the hands of “neutrals” or even of
su^. e sen ta tives of satellite parties; a closer supervision over all activities,
as the youth groups, women’s groups and labor organizations. Nu-
r ° u s staff schools, entirely in communist hands, furnished the necessary
Was501*1*6 * ^°r t^ S renewet* activity. Political education in the same way
generou sly distributed, and the propaganda, magnificently orches-
• _te<^ a n d directed, took on more and more M arxian characteristics. Such
, ° rrriatio n as came from the Vietminh zone moreover made it appear
at V ietm inh was effectively adm inistering the areas under its con-
. ° a n d th at its regime, now overhauled, was no longer inciting, at least
1T} t*le °p e n , opposition on the part of the people. Even though consider-
e n um bers left the zones of active operations to take refuge in French-
° c5u p ied areas or behind the French front, from other parts of the Viet-
m inh zone o n ly those left who wished to get home.
T o w a rd the end of 1948, the stiffening of the Vietminh—which by the
WaV p ro b a b ly reflected a requirement of international communist strategy
g re a tly reduced the risk that the Resistance might break down. More
and m o re the communists were able to rally the nationalists to their ranks
and to h o ld them. A nd once more one cannot help thinking of Yugoslavia,
w llere the tw elve thousand communists of T ito were able, in 1941, to sur
ro u n d themselves w ith hundreds of thousands of partisans— for the most
p art non-com m unists, urged on solely by their patriotism and their crav-
,ng fo r vengeance. T h at they were in a m ajority did not prevent the
regim e fro m becoming completely communist. In the same way, the
p ro lo n g a tio n of the conflict in Vietnam and the disappointment suf
fered in the summer of 1948 permitted the Vietm inh first to repair and
then to consolidate its positions, to improve its armaments, and once more
to p resen t itself to the people as a genuine national movement— the one
that h a d been right from tlie start.
T he A g reem en t of March 8 ,19 4 9 , and the R eturn of Bao Dai

In Septem ber 1948, the French conversations with Bao Dai had reached
an im passe. T h e French Government did not wish to discuss specific con
ventions as long as Bao Dai had not gone back to Vietnam; and it pressed
238 ASIAN N A TIO N ALISM AND THE WEST
for his return all the more because it felt that the situation in Eastern Asia
was becoming threatening. Bao Dai rested his case and let it be known
that he was in no hurry, but that the solution of the conflict depended
less on himself than on France. Nevertheless, in one way or another it was
felt that this state of things could not go on much longer and that some
thing had to be done to find a compromise.
M. Bollaert returned to France for good on October 4th. On the 21st, at
M. Coste-Floret’s suggestion, the Council of Ministers nominated L£on
Pignon, Deputy Director of Political Affairs in the Overseas France
Ministry, as French High Commissioner in Indo-China. He was a man
whose career had been spent mostly in Indo-China. This change, it was
thought, would make it possible to take up negotiations on a new basis.
T o speed up Bao Dai’s return to Vietnam, the French now seemed
willing to negotiate a general agreement with him, so as to set in motion
the necessary constitutional procedure for settling the question of Cochin-
China. Once such a treaty was signed, Bao Dai surely would return to
Vietnam, and the executive powers would be transferred to the Viet
namese government which from that time on, its own administrative
apparatus put in order, would be responsible, w uh the aid of France, for
the job of making an end of the Vietminh.
On the part of Vietnam, two ways of looking at the situation made
themselves felt in the emperor's entourage.
On the one side, there were those who were less concerned with the
speedy conclusion of an agreement on the external aspects of Vietnamese
sovereignty than with the realization of full internal sovereignty. They
urged that the provisional government should as soon as possible receive
the means of establishing itself and of consolidating its authority. This
might be accomplished gradually by a series of specific agreements, step
by step, as the Hanoi government showed itself capable of taking on new
responsibilities. Bao Dai would return as soon as there was a strong and
efficient apparatus of government for him to take hold of. Controversial
questions concerning foreign relations, economic development, and so
forth, could be left for the last. The chief representative of this school of
thought was Dr. Phan huy Dan, who for some time had been one of the
most respected of Bao Dai’s advisers.
On the other side there were those who thought it only good sense to
profit from the favorable disposition toward the nationalists which now
manifested itself on the French side, and to negotiate an advantageous
deal that would permit Bao Dai and his negotiators to return to Vietnam
with the prestige of “liberators.” W ith that in their favor they could then
administer that "psychological shock” which would rally around them all
“sincere nationalists” still connected with the Resistance. This thesis had
been developed by the Director of the Imperial Cabinet, Me Buu Loc.
And it won out after Bao Dai had for some time hesitated between the
two propositions.
The negotiations lasted all winter. They came to a close on March 8th
1949 with what has come to be known as the Agreements of the Elysde
or the Exchange of Letters between A uriol and Bao Dai. France recog
nized the independence of Vietnam. As regards foreign relations, the self-
government of Vietnam was perceptibly restricted by the fact of its
membership in the French Union: Vietnamese diplomacy would come
into play only in close accord with the diplomatic missions of France and
within the frame of die directives issued by the High Council. Vietnam
would from then on have its national army. The army of the French
Union would be confined to the bases, the garrisons, and the communica
tions facilities. The principle of Vietnam’s internal sovereignty was con
firmed. Certain limitations, however, infringed upon it in the judicial
sphere.
Vietnam, on its part, undertook to give priority to French political and
technical advisers. It also gave formal assurances concerning the status
and properties of French nationals and the freedom of enterprises under
French jurisdiction. Similar guarantees were given with regard to educa
tional institutions. Finally, Vietnam entered into a monetary and cus
toms union w ith the other Indo-Chinese States; and joint institutions
were to be created to harmonize the interests of the three states with each
other and with those of France.
France, therefore, made quite important concessions beyond those of
fered at Fontainebleau in 1946 and in the Bay of Along in 1947 and 1948.
Yet, these agreements were not regarded as altogether satisfactory on the
part of Vietnam; rather they seemed to be acceptable as a first stage that
might for the time being serve as a working basis. If everything went well,
France could not easily refuse Vietnam other advantages. Thus, it was
because they had an evolutionary concept of future possibilities that Bao
Dai’s friends thought he was justified in accepting the proposals offered
at the Elysee. It w ill be important to remember this.
The treaty signed, Bao Dai's return now depended on the solution of
the Cochin-China question. The French Constitution of 1946 stipulates
that before any territory can be ceded, the populations affected must be
AT ts M a n d t h e w e s t
240 ASIAN N A T I O N A L S
•7g a referendum.
consulted. It was therefore necessary quickly to o rg a n s ^ £ourths y ie ^
A mixed Territorial Assembly—one-fourth French, 1 0 th by an
namese—was especially elected for this purpose on Ap^ ^ passed
electoral college of about six thousand persons. On A p ri tQ as
a resolution to the effect that Cochin-China was to be atta ^ t|ia t gtate
sociated State of Vietnam but to be allowed a special status
An act adopted on June 4th made that transfer final.
Bao Dai had delayed his departure until he could learn t i e resu t
the vote in the Territorial Assembly. He left France on A p n
arrived at Dalat on die 28th.
It took several weeks before a government was form ed. or reasons
already alluded to, it did not seem politically possible to rave enera
Xuan continue as President of the Council. Either b ecau se o certain
personal rivalries among those who might be eligible f ° r tlia t ° ce or
because others refused to have any part in a set-up which, circumscribed as
it was by the agreements of March 8th, they d e e m e d unw orkable, Bao
Dai tound himself obliged to assume in person the d irection o f the gov
ernment, with the title of Chief of State.
The first few months which followed the return o f Bao D a* certainly
were very difficult. From a political point of view, h i5 re tu rn had been
poorly prepared for: what little work and propaganda h ad been at
tempted was slight and did not go far. Except for the Caodaists, there was
no organized and armed movement to support the V ietnam ese govern
ment . What there had been of goodwill and talent had been discouraged.
Bao Dai therefore found himself very isolated__though peop le with an
axe to grind were not lacking. He had no staff that could be relied upon
to hold together, that was energetic, and that “ e n j o y e d the confidence of
the people”—to use the language of the Vietnamese press. Nevertheless,
he had the courage, first, to take a definite position, then to assert himself
and to show himself all the way from the south to the n o rth . T here is no
doubt that, at least in the central and northern parts of V ietnam , he re
ceived a favorable reception and that the contacts w hich in this way he
was able to establish gave him new determination. O nly the intellectuals
seemed still to remain cautious, even hostile. A p art from his lack of men
and of money which, it appeared, could perhaps be overcom e, the ruler’s
chief handicap at this time was the distrust in s p ire d by certain personages
placed high in the new regime, a distrust that held back a good many
people.
V IE T N A M E S E N a T toxt
na ^ sm a n d f r e n c h p o l ic ie s 241
A n d it is o f no
affair had by thi • SG tQ close one s eyes t0 the faCt tIlat the Indo-Chinese
area of c o n c e n t £one way beyond the immediate Franco-Vietnamese
new face on th communist victory in China had put an entirely
probably e x c e e d problem - 11 had not been unexpected, but its speed
at the T o n gk i ^ &I1 caIculations. The arrival of Mao Tse-tung’s forces
to the V ie trn M S ^r° ntier not only had the effect of giving new courage
litical aid ' f ^ ^ Wotdd in all likelihood be followed by m ilitary and
T h at is w h & to upset the existing balance of power in Vietnam.
fron tier o f T WatC^Û^ness and preparedness for defense on the northern
ous w in te r nS had assumed so large an importance since the previ-
. . * . 'vas there that the scene was set for what henceforth must
e t le p rin cip al task of the French army in Indo-China; the task of paci-
cation in t e interior must little by little be handed over to the govern
ment of V ietnam .
M eanw hile, the strategic position of Vietnam gave that frontier de-
ense in ongoing a pronounced international importance. Vietnam in
a way is t e key to Southeast Asia. Of this the Japanese had given a mili
tary dem onstration in 1941. It had been from Vietnam and Cambodia that
the great offensive had started which carried the armies of Nippon in
two m onths as fa r as Singapore and in three months as far as Rangoon. If
tom orrow V ietnam were to fall into the Sino-Soviet orbit, the other con
tinental states o f Southeast Asia might not be able to hold out for long.
Thus, from the m om ent the victory of the Chinese communists [in South
China] was certain, Great Britain and the United States no longer could
remain indifferent to the solution of the Franco-Vietnamese conflict.
Yet, one had to reckon also with the traditional enmity to “colonialism”
in the U n ited States and with the sympathetic attitude which British
labor circles had adopted toward Asian nationalist movements. The
Anglo-Saxons could hardly be counted upon to sustain French efforts to
defend the approaches of Southeast Asia as long as France did not trans
late in to deeds the promises it had made in the agreements of March 8th.
It w ould n ot only have to ratify them but also put the power necessary
for self-governm ent into the hands of the new associated state. It was not
likely th at the great powers would think of recognizing Bao Dai until
those two stages had been accomplished.
T he events which followed are still recent, and I will c o n t e n t myself
w ith m erely placing them on record. On December 30th of last year [1949],
after three months of bargaining, the specialized agreements between
France and Vietnam were signed and the powers transfered *‘de jure
to the new State of Vietnam. On February 2nd, 1950, the French Parlia
ment ratified the Declaration of June 5th, 1948, and the Agreements of
March 8th, 1949. But by the end of January the situation had become
abruptly complicated by the fact that the Vietm inh government had
been recognized by the Chinese People’s R epublic and by the U.S.S.R.
(soon to be followed by the other “People’s Democracies”), on the heels
of the ratification of the Vietnam agreements by the French Parliament.
Great Britain, the United States, and many other countries have since
recognized the Bao Dai government. The Asiatic Dominions and other
countries in Asia, on the other hand, have adopted an attitude of reserve.
That is where we stand today. In a few months Vietnam has become the
most sensitive nerve center of the cold war, the place where the two blocs
directly confront each other.
1 shall not try to compute the chances of success on either side. As
far as one can judge, they still appear to be about equal, assuming that
the W estern powers make a rapid and serious effort. If such an effort is
to be made there remains the question as to how and when Anglo-Saxon
assistance can come into play; whether it w ill be given directly to Vietnam
or through the intermediacy of France. W hatever form it may take, it is
to be feared that this foreign intervention w ill have the effect of setting
back many of the things which since the agreements of March 8th seemed
to have been settled—for example, the absolute priority accorded to
ranee in economic matters. Moreover, certain articles that have ap-
peare in the Anglo-American press give ground for supposing that the
evo utionaiy concept,” already discussed, also has its adherents in Eng-
an an America. From now on, therefore, there is the danger that the
quarry wi at the end slip out of French hands, just as the game has been
lost by the Dutch in Indonesia.
In short, we have come to a point at which the attitudes on all sides
ia\e ecome terribly rigid and yet not easy to see. T here are such un-
answere questions as these: W hat exactly have been the effects on Viet-
n pu ic opinion of the arrival of the Chinese communists at the
J^°r Crn ro*u *er ai*d the announcement of aid given to Ho Chi Minh
y im a an e U.S.S.R.? The Chinese occupation in 1945-46 certainly
cannot yet ave been effaced from memory north of the sixteenth paral-
e . n ™ ^ oes the Vietminh think of the rallying to communism of
vt*1 l ] OSG 1f Cê £enerals who four years ago occupied Hanoi: Lu Han,
a mg, an e rest? W h at tendencies prevail today in the bosom of
t e letmm . iat of the New Democracy”—which now also is some
times called “Maoism”—or that of Cominformist Stalinism? There are

many such questions to which there are no ready answers and which
nevertheless are of crucial importance. Besides, there are many others, no
less important, that have to do with the degree of organization that has
been achieved, the w ill to act or, on the contrary, reasons for holding back
on the part of movements and groups favorable to Bao Dai; questions
also that relate to the effect which the recognition of his regime by the
powers of the Western bloc has produced. Even personal factors have be
come extremely important in both camps. The Vietnamese Problem,
then, has lost none of its complexity. T o reduce it to a few simple cate
gorical statements is to shut one's eyes to the reality. Some of the stages
at which the signpost pointed to a number of possible solutions have
been left behind, only perhaps to bring us to a new crossroads. Nothing
has been lost yet, but let us not deceive ourselves that the present equi
librium has much chance of lasting for long. W e have only got to the
“end of the beginning," and in a few months the pendulum will again
swing to one side or the other.
Developments from March 1950 to August 1951

Bao Dai's return in A pril 1949 had been attended by some uncertainty.
It had not been made clear whether he was returning as a “mediator” or
as an “emperor.” In other words, was he now, after having concluded a
basically acceptable agreement with France, intending to seek an under
standing with Ho Chi Minh in order to re-establish the National Union
and restore peace, or was he, on the contrary, going to place himself at
the head of a clearly anti-communist regime and undertake to destroy the
Vietminh “rebellion”?
Both tendencies existed within the imperial cabinet and the Saigon
government. One, supported by the French minister Coste-Floret and
the right wing of the Mouvement Republicain Populaire, favored firm
and energetic action against the Vietminh; the other, supported more
circumspectly by the Socialist Party, inclined toward a policy of national
reconciliation and of reaching an understanding with the Resistance.
The summer and fall of 1949 were marked by the struggle between the
two tendencies, which at that time were of almost equal strength.
This state of equilibrium was disturbed at the beginning of January
1950, to the advantage of those who apparently favored an all-out effort
against Ho Chi Minh, when, on the day after the signing of the Franco-
Vietnamese agreement annexes (December 30, 1949), Bao Dai entrusted
244
ASIAN NATIO
A31AIN N ATIO NALISM AND THE WES1
the direction of his government to Nguyen Phan Long. General Xuan,

eliminated from the government vice-presidency, retired to France, while
t e ocia ist Party, refusing for various reasons to cooperate with the
Bidault government, could no more insist on a m ilitary truce and a call
to
w uie
w e Resistance.
x \ .c M & ia n c e . 1
T a n ^ rv T q T h " ?^ ^ Minh’S re£ime by PekinS and MoSC° W *

of the w l f m eCt ° £ the V ietnam o£ B a° D ai an 0Utp°St
pamfon h t n ^ r0teCting ° £ S° Utheast A ^ a a Sa ^ eventUa‘ **'
L e d by President" ‘T " °l
the Problem - w h ich was d e a r ly recog-
H a n o iI i T ‘d e n t^ ™ m a n * representative, P h ilip Jessu p , on h is visit to
S T n t r e i i„ v" ^ T “ mduCe the United States ^ show increas-
P^d vLTts to V iln ! IrSt “ eCOn°mic and a “ ilitary miSSi°n
Dean Acheson announced * I t t e U ^ H ^ M"y 195°' SeCr6tary ° ^ ance
to I n d o - C h in a ( i,w 0 , ! . e U n u e d States would extend a s s is ta n c e
— more ^than
and ia il 4.v
20>000
yJUU llves>
lives War ^ France 1’800 m ilU ° n
5ionLabcharacyterr Voe£
al^ g the ° f "Wression in Asia and the expan-
speeding C e a ° dt “ n iS m - th e * > « » „ w ar c o n trib u te d t»
th ateco L “ d nrm r nS- ^ 27 PreSideiU Trum an
to enable it to resist ag?r^ aid would be extended to Indo-China in order
supplies were drawn u ^ h ? ? ^ 0 ' Programs ior the provision of arms an
The most delicate matter ^ C0Urse of Franco-American conversation ■
the direct beneficiaries nf ê<ÛinnS a decision had to do with whethe
adm inistration in Indn-Ph- merican should be the F rench army
though Vietnamese nation ^ ^ Stili embryonic Vietnamese army-
- n aid directly, most anxious to receive J^nie5e
adoption of a compromicp co”slf erati°ns of efficiency finally led to t 'i
the Associated States throno-h° ? tlQn' economic aid was given directly
military aid would1 of an E e l mission, ^
General Staff of the French d through the agency of the experience
military mission. rm^ in ^do-China, assisted by an America
deterioration of the mUitarv J ? completely overshadowed by

Minh government had been m V ^ 1011’ Since severaI months the Ho
offensive. The proximity of c l T of an imminent general coun£r
Chi Minh regime to secure nrerin*11111115.1 China was now enabling the
tions, equipment, training farilin'US aSSlstance in the forms of arms,
surprised and captured the post I f n C' In SePtember 1950 the
0ng Khe, on the road skirting
245
VIETNAMESE n a t i o n a l i s m a n d f r e n c h p o l i c i e s
Chinese border. In view of the size of the Vietminh f o r c e s engaged the

French command, which had just established control of the ong i-g
delta after a series o£ patient operations, could no longer hope to hold
border. It decided to evacuate the advance post of Cao Bang.
Vietminh army succeeded in surrounding and destroying the jetreatmg
and it then became necessary to take up defensive positions along
the edge of the delta. M Jt
T h is loss h a d serio u s p o litic a l a n d psychological
jeopardized ev eryth in g th at had been disL sion s,
three years, and this at the very moment when, afte . outstand-
‘he Pau Conference h ad ju st settled the last political qu MiIitary
“US between France an d the Associated States of mdo-Chma. M ih tary
“ nsiderations once again becam e param ount. C° n5T ent‘V a n d Gen-
b- 12, 1950, both Leon Pignon, the civil
*ra l C a rp e n tie r, th e m ilita r y co m m an d er-in < h ie , % £ al
^ n e r c o m m a n d e r-in -c h ie f o f th e F ren ch F u s t ^ ^
e L a ttre d e Tassigny, w h o assum ed a ll civi ™ dence had been at
j ° n to th e th re e In d o -C h in e se States w hose indep
ect. T h e new High C o m m issio n e r was a

- r r ^r sssk
tim e advanc.
e F rench tro o p s. The Vietminh forces, w i w ith heavy losses,
firft h ^ direction of Hanoi’ Wfiiev-nheYen and Mao Khe. In May-June
before Haiphong and then at Vi . ^ south of the
Powerful Vietminh attacks on Ninh Bmh and PhulLy, in
^ were similarly repulsed. The Vietminh thereupon
usual g u errilla tactics. responsible for this change
^ stra tl0SSeS SU ffered w e re d ° Ur i eSSan o ccupied w ith the K o re a n w ar, was
c“v" sr.";
Un kl sy- 11 1S p r o b a b le th a t C h in a , P desired assistance.
theless, within six months Gene China (thanks to fresh

the effi- e n c y of the French arm y in the U nited
° £, arms and “ ^ H e had numerous fortifications
Con &ave it a n e w o ffe n s iv e s p i n . m a t e r ia l A m e ric a n as-
sistStrUCted in the d elta’ and set t0 WOr^’- 1 hv the end of 1952, is l °

in organizing a V ietnam ese arm y which, y 15
e four divisions and to begin relieving French ttoop- J
Dai governm ent in itia te d the first m obilization measu
But this fine m ilitary activity rests on a weak political base. The feeble
and divided Nguyen Phan Long government had to give way (April 1950)
after three months to that of T ran van Huu, form er leader of the Cochin-
Chmese “autonomous” puppet regime. This governm ent relies largely
on the police of Nguyen van Tam, another form er Cochin-Chinese “sepa
ratist, and fails to get the support of the nationalist parties. Its base is
no more popular than were those of the earlier governments of Thinh,
Hoach and Xuan. T he past records, and even the present behavior, of
several of its members, the atmosphere of corruption which reigns every
where, hardly invite public confidence. Although the regime excites little
enthusiasm and rests mostly on the lassitude and resignation of the
people, the latter put up with it, because it represents the last chance to
secure eventually a national regime founded on individual liberty.
o Chi M inh s National Front” (Lien Viet) continues, however, to
possess considerable attraction for youth and for the most dynamic ele
ments of the population. A t present, moreover, it is seeking to infiltrate
its agents into the very core of the Bao Dai adm inistration and army. Al-
t ough it is directed by Communists whose methods often shock the
p ic an weary population, and though it is sometimes suspected of
P aymg more of a Chinese than a Vietnamese game, the Ho Chi Minh
egime still seems more authentically national than does Bao Dai's. The
u personalities of its leaders, only a m inority of whom owe their
p ation to Moscow, their past records as uncompromising patriots,
j . n£t 1 ° the movement that they have built— all suggest that no
ng sett ement of the Vietnamese problem is possible unless it involves
an agreement with them.
estern or Indian diplomacy, shrewdly managed, could facilitate the
° ^ -j ” egotlaUons between the two Vietnams. T he Vietm inh seems
m ed between two tendencies; one (linked to the Peking clique
afr-Hnct V°^,ated intervention in Korea) favoring an all-out offensive
thp ha sic v ^ nC * ° tlier likely to accept, one day, a compromise on
nf w ietnamese total independence of the Sino-Soviet as well as
es ern oc, combined with free elections. Successful negotiations
between Bao Dai and this latter group would strengthen the moral
posi ion o t e ree world in Southeast Asia and re-establish Vietnamese
unity. The likehhood of such negotiations taking place is very slight so
ong us ormer separatists remain dominant in the Saigon government
an so ong as security agreements between the W estern powers have not
VJE'l NAME5E NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES
made Southeast Asia, and particularly northern Vietnam, safe against all
risk of Chinese intervention.
Conclusions
I h a v e on purpose abstained from all comment on the m ilitary opera
tions. But I know well enough what daily life is like for those French
soldiers who today fight at the frontier posts and in the T o n g k i n g high
lands, in the rice fields, and in the delta jungles. I know what this life
demands in courage, presence of mind, patience and resolution; and I
regret that—no doubt for good reasons—the French public is not allowed
to know, through the public announcement of citations, the acts o
heroism which down there mark every day. Taking care not to add fuel
to political quarrels, to say nothing and do nothing that could endanger
those who daily risk their lives, should not go so far that we can no
longer reflect upon, and try to understand, the true nature of the con
flict. . . . . . - i
W e have looked at the action of France since 1945 in its historical
perspective. Seen in their context, are the events of these last four years
really so disconcerting as some say they are? It seems to me, on the con
trary, that these events have unfolded themselves with a logic as lrn
placable as it is unsettling. The actors were new, but the play remaine
the same, though now on a scale ten or a hundred times larger, as in 19U ,
in 1916, and in 1930.
For forty years Vietnamese society has undergone diverse ferments ot
an emotional rather than an ideological character, in which a nostalgic
but often passionate regret for the lost independence and for the ancient
Annam was mixed with a complex of disappointments and humiliations.
In this respect one need think only of the continuity which existed be
tween the movements and men in opposition to France at the time of the
conquest and those who, from the beginning of the present century, have
adopted new ideas to arrive at the same end: independence. Their ap
peals, however, would have remained without echo had not French policy
between the two wars become more farsighted and more liberal, had
not informed opinion in the mother country seen to it that the two or
three thousand persons on whom its Indo-Chinese policy depended would
adopt a more generous conception of their task. T hat in 1945 the Viet
minh was able to bring together the great majority of those in Vietnam
who looked forward to the liberation of their nation was not due to the
Japanese action but rather to the lack of understanding on the part of
248 ASIAN N A TIO N ALISM a N D TH E
the responsible people in France and of the French "colonial society

who for twenty years had behaved in a way to make it inevitable.
Except for a small minority of little influence, the V i e t n a m e s e did not
in 1945-46 have the notion that the independence and the lib eration they
sought involved the eviction of France and rupture with her. L et us reca11
for a moment that crucial year 1945. In the course o f a few months,
through an unusual combination of circumstances, V i e t n a m actually
experienced independence, an almost total independence th at did not
have to fit into any particular external pattern. The dream o f so many
patriots had become real almost without their having to exert themselves.
How could the people of Vietnam have been expected to do anything else
but go to work and defend and guard this independence so miraculously
restored? The fight that took place in the next four years makes no sense
on any other ground: whatever France might do, she could never, psycho
logically speaking, achieve a balance between the right o f a people to
defend its independence and the titles to sovereignty that h ad been con
ferred on France by treaties now three-quarters of a century o ld —treaties,
moreover, that had been imposed rather than n e g o tia t e d .
Was any real agreement possible? First of all, in order to return to
Aongking and to liberate the French forces there,* it was absolutely neces
sary to deal with the Vietminh as a step toward a lasting solution. Those
who knew the Vietminh leaders in 1946 are, for the most part, convinced
at som e agreement satisfactory to both sides could have been arrived
in ! 1 extremists in both camps had riot done everything th ey could
ow distrust, to sabotage all effort at conciliation, and even to provoke
rupture bound to be tragic in its consequences’ A n accord w ith the
p m,lnh’ as yet a fluid mass which still was to congeal, o n ly the “new
cn,,M r en'” the Frenchmen of the Resistance and of the Liberation,
a have brought about, because they alone, or almost alone, fully
F erstood the sPirit of their °PPosites in Vietnam. T o succeed, these
renchmen should have had a thorough knowledge of the “Vietnamese
lec erboard. Perhaps they lacked the “feel” of the p ecu liar relation
etween those forces that were primarily revolutionary and those that
were primarily nationalist—a thing which the understanding colonials
o the French Resistance would have discovered for them. B u t fo r more
or less valid reasons these colonials (officials and businessmen) on the
contrary went in a wide circle around those who so u g h t a new life, and a
badly conceived purge removed valuable men from the adm inistration,
army< trade and finance and left untouched representatives o f a past
V lE T N A M E SE n a t io n a l is m a n d fren ch p o l ic ie s 249
could never be brought back. A ny accord, to be sure, would have

difficult—one might say, extremely difficult—but it was not impos-
Slble. W h a t happened on December 19th did not logically arise from
'vh a t happened on March 6th.
T h e events of the summer and autumn of 1946 have very clearly shown
h°W the conflict developed; but the way in which they were generally
in terp reted in France only contributed, in the main, to the obfuscation
o£ the m atters at issue. In fact, the short period during which a new de
p a rtu re w ould have been possible ended in the autumn of 1946. A fter
w ards there was on all sides a break with the past. On the one hand, the
V ietnamese, w hether of Vietm inh or other persuasions, from that time
° n h ad the conviction or at least the impression that, under whatever
guise and w ith whatever new vocabulary, the same forces would be
° n top as had been before the war. (This is of capital importance; it is too
° fte n forgotten in France how heavily the past, the Indo-Chinese policy
°£ the T h ird Republic, still weighs on the spirits and how much it influ
ences w h at is happening.) On the other hand, the excesses and the mis
takes o f the Vietm inh gave the chance of securing a wider audience to
those in France who refused to see in recent events anything but a rebel
lio n sim ilar to that of Yenbay [the m ilitary mutiny in February 1930
Which touched off peasant uprisings over a wide area] and to those who
Were in favo r of a policy of firmness. And this again reacted on and rein
forced the anti-French convictions which, as we have seen, were stiong
am ong the Vietnamese. There was never a way out of this vicious circle.
T h i s is th e re a s o n w h y w it h th e passage o f tim e a n a c c o rd a n d peace
i t s e l f h a v e b e c o m e m o re a n d m o re d iffic u lt to a c h ie v e . O n b o th sides the
P o s itio n s h a v e h a r d e n e d th ro u g h a p s y c h o lo g ic a l p ro cess w h ic h resem b les
t h a t w h ic h d e v e lo p e d b e tw e e n 19 2 5 a n d 1 9 3 0 a f t e r th e g o v e rn m e n t o t
V a r e n n e . S o m e o f th o se w h o c o n tin u e to m a k e c o m m o n cau se w ith the
V i e t m i n h d o so b e ca u se th e y h a v e com e to th e c o n c lu s io n th a t tlie com
P o s i t i o n o f th e fo rc e s w h ic h d e te rm in e F ie n c h p o lic y a t h o m e a n d in
V i e t n a m is s u c h as to le a v e n o d o o r o p e n fo r a n h o n o ra b le c o m p r o m i s e ,
a n d t h a t s u p e r i o r s tr e n g th a lo n e c a n b re a k th e d e a d lo c k . B y a n o rd e rly
p ro c e s s o f t h in k in g th e y h a v e c o m e m o re a n d m o re to tu r n fo r reco u rse
t o th e U .S .S .R . a n d to C h in a . O th e rs, th o se w h o u n se lfish ly h a v e su p
p o r t e d B a o D a i, h a v e co m e to b e lie v e t h a t p e rh a p s th e o u tc o m e sought,
in d e p e n d e n c e , c a n s till b e fo u n d i n p e a c e fu l w ays, b y n e g o t i a t i o n a n d
d i p lo m a c y — i f n e c e s sa ry b y u s in g th e p o s s ib ilitie s w h ic h th e in te r n a tio n a l
250 ^ N A X IO N A U S M a n d th e w e st
c h ec k e rb o a rd affords. T h e tw o cam ps d o n o t d iffe r i n a i n l b u t ° n l y o n ^

m eans.
S in ce 1 9 4 7 the d o m in a n t o p in io n in F ra n c e h a s b e e n t h a t th e F ren ch
in te re st lies in d e a lin g w ith th e second o f th e g ro u p s n a m e d . O n th a t ba
sis, th e o n ly th in g to d o w as to go th e lim it. B u t th e b a r g a i n i n g w it h Bao
D a i h as tak en th ree years, im p ed ed as i t w as b y Irr e n d i d is s e n s io n s and
h esitatio n s, an d h as been c a rrie d o n in a w a y th a t c o u l d n o t f a i l to re in
fo rce the co n victio n s o f th e first o f th e V ie tn a m e s e p a r tie s , th e ad vo ca tes
o f force, an d so in c id e n ta lly also stim u la te d th e ir m a t e r ia l p re p a re d n e s s .
H a vin g chosen to w o rk w ith the p a rty a m e n a b le to p e a c e fu l b a rg a in in g ,
F rance sh o u ld h a v e p ro v e d the rig h tn ess o f th a t c h o ic e b y g i v in g a cle ar
to k en o f its in te n tio n s a n d by a d o p tin g a v e r y l ib e r a l p r o g r a m . F a ilin g
to do so, F ran ce has, i t seems, co m p ro m ised its c h a n c e o f su ccess a n d has
fu rn ish e d fre sh a m m u n itio n to those w h o h a v e jo in e d th e r a n k s o f its
ad versaries.
Is a compromise still possible between those V ie tn a m e se who, above
all, want to defend the independence actually won in 1945 and those
irenchmen who, above all, want to save the rights earned by the colonial
labors of three-quarters of a century? i f SOj on what grounds? T h a t has
eeu the fundamental question for four years u n til quite recently. A
compromise has been possible, perhaps it still is. One thing, anyhow, is
sure, and that is that the time has passed when F r a n c e could have ob-
r n m h J u S reSUUS by thC US0 ° f force- Its continued presence in Viet-
imerp / c ^ ° me imPosslbIe except to the extent to which it is also in the
In Vletnam’ as the people of Vietnam themselves see that interest,
friend ^ W° rds' to reahze lts ends, France must make itself accepted as a
Drespn* T USeU t0 be re&arded as an outsider w ho inflicts his
L in N° thm» can be done in Vietnam when peace w ill have returned
oreVprf ^ ^ ovc™ helmi"S majority of its nationals refuse to accept the
the! n L F m dlC new relationshiP. W ith ou t such acceptance
ere will be nothing but continuing insecurity, strikes, mass demonstra-
on5 terrorism, and the rest. No Vietnamese government th at appears to
piaytng die French game rather than that of Vietnam w ill ever enjoy
of a !‘“ thonty ° r ever Sain the of the people. M oreover, nothing
thev £ermanent nature can be S i e v e d by the French in V ietnam until
ey have won back the confidence of those active and dynam ic elements
c"nvfn " f I UP ^ ° £ the Pe°P > - F o r m y o w n p a rt, I am
‘need th a t » " o t yet too late and th a t to gether, F re n c h a n d V ietna-
mese» w e can s till d o g re a t things.
'^ T 'N A M E S E n a t io n a l is m a n d f r e n c h p o l ic ie s 251
3. THE TASKS OF RECONSTRUCTION

& to t h i s point we have discussed facts—facts, it must be admitted,
u th at are very complex, often little known—at least in France, and
® connection between which is even less well known. Let us now ex
am in e some of the perspectives for the future of Vietnam.
W h e th e r we like it or not, the fundamental fact certainly is this: Viet
n am is j n the midst of a revolutionary period. Before our eyes there is
tak in g place what no doubt w ill become known as the Vietnamese Revo-
tn io n ; and because of the speed with which the struggle for political
independence moves to its final stage, it is bound to bring with it a pro-
ou n d social revolution and is setting free innumerable energies that have
l l t h erto been more or less severely repressed or have lain dormant.
W h a t w ill be the outcome of the release of all these energies? W hat
Path w ill the R evolution follow? These are questions which many people
ask themselves; and it stands to reason that no satisfactory replies can
even be sketched, so numerous are the unknown factors and the uncer
tain ties that still hover around the movement. Nevertheless, it may be
W orth w hile to go a little beyond the somewhat abstract form which this
discussion usually takes and to try to discern and understand the concrete
and practical problems which Vietnam w ill confront once the transitional
stage through which it is now living has come to its end.
T o d a y the independence of Vietnam has legal sanctions. T h at this
^ d ep en d en ce is still restricted in some respects does not take anything
aw ay from the fact that today Vietnam has its recognized place among the
nations, and that it is in a position to steer and manage its own destiny
to the extent to which the play of the great world forces permit it to do so.
® ut the real problems only begin with independence. U ntil that threshold
has been stepped over, all is seen in a false light, or obscured. As long as
the n ational movement has for its one and only object the recovery of
independence, the differences of opinion and the personal rivalries remain
m ore o r less subordinated to the main end. Tactics and strategy are shaped
h y it. In the countries of Asia the idea of political independence has hyp
notized the minds, absorbed the energies to the point where it often pre
vents the people from reflecting about their real problems. A t least as
im p o rta n t as independence itself is what comes after, and that can some
times be foreseen if one takes account of the actual forces at work and
the ideas held by those who have the opportunity to grasp at this moment
the helm of their country’s destiny. Independence, after all, is no more
than the gate that opens before the real problems.
Economic and Social Problems

T he political problems certainly are im portant. T hey are even at times
the essential problems. Obviously, a young state has no more necessary
or more urgent task than that of setting up a political and administrative
apparatus that is w ell planned and w ill function w ithout friction. One
cannot work without tools. Nevertheless, the fundam ental problems are
of a different nature: they are economic, social, and spiritual. On diis
assumption, one is led at once to recognize a num ber of basic facts of
which any leaders of Vietnamese affairs are obliged to take cognizance,
whether they are communists or not.
Foremost among the problems that arise from m aterial circumstances
in Vietnam is the appallingly low level of living in a peasant class which
at the same time is in full process of population growth. . . . The living
conditions of the various Vietnamese population groups are miserable in
the extreme, and also precarious. This for two reasons: first, the inade
quate return from the soil. The harvests are not large enough. The rice
crops of Vietnam are among the lowest in Asia. Since the size of farms is
inordinately small in the northern and central parts of the country as a
result of excessive parcellation, the amount of rice grown hardly suffices
to eed the family and leaves no surplus for sale. This inadequacy of the
return from the land is the cause of an insufficient money income, a cir
cumstance further aggravated by the fact that when there is a rice surplus,
as in Cochin-China, prices are often very low. It can easily be seen that
no improvement in the rural populations’ levels of living is possible as
ong as they do not get more out of the soil and do not possess sig
nificant surpluses that can be sold and bring in money— the only means
o paying for goods and services that would make their existence more
tolerable.
A second reason, closely related to the first, is the lack o f capital and
o currency in every part of Vietnam but especially in the ru ral areas.
Money has always been scarce in that country, and this explains the high
interest rates and the growth of usury. The cultivator is always short of
money. This follows not only from the scarcity of currency but also
from the fact that the land does not produce enough fo r the market and
VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES * 00
so does not perm it what money there is to circulate freely through the
rural economy—or, where there are surpluses of agricultural products,
as in Cochin-China, for example, makes too large a proportion of it flow
into the pockets of the landowners and the owners of capital.
Connected with this, again, is the excessive preponderance of rice cul
tivation in Vietnam's economy. This is, in the main, a subsistence
economy: the people grow rice because that is the cheapest way of feeding
the poverty-stricken and growing population; but their poverty results
above all from the fact that, apart from rice culture, the sources of em
ployment and livelihood are far too few. There exists therefore a vicious
circle, with the result that the peasants always remain poor and become
ever poorer to the extent to which diey increase in numbers. This process
began a very long time ago. The statistics compiled by the Syndicate, of
French Exporters in Indo-China, reproduced in L ’Oeuvre de la France
en Indochine, show that the disparity between rice consumption and size
of population has grown more pronounced since the beginning of the
century:
(1900 = 100)
1913 1937
Population 120 180
Rice production 109 147
Rice consumption 101 124
A third reason, and perhaps the most important, is the growth of popu
lation just referred to. Before the war, the famines, and the epidemics
of the last few years came to affect the figures, the population’s rate of
growth was such as to double it every thirty-six years. Hence, w ith twenty-
two and a half m illion inhabitants in 1943, Vietnam would be expected
to have forty-five million in 1980— almost equalling the population of
France__and even more if the birth rate should remain the same and the
death rate should continue to decrease at its prewar rate.
This growth of population brings with it frightening prospects. Addi
tions to the cultivated area resulting from irrigation works and the im
provement of cultivation w ill be balanced—one might say, cancelled
out—in a few decades, if not in a few years, by the additions to the
number of mouths that must be fed. Thus, in spite of these improvements,
the food shortage does not diminish, the level of living does not rise.
Even if these endeavors are wholly successful, things after a while w ill
be back where they were before. A nd this growth of population has, of
course, the further effect of adding to the already abundant labor supply,
A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M aN D lH E ^ E ST
keeping down wages, lowering the value of human labor— w hich is so

much cheaper here than mechanical labor__and thus of producing also
partial unemployment, because when there are too many p eo p le on the
land and the holdings are too small, there is not enough w ork fo r all. It
has been estimated that persons statistically of working age on an
average 180 days a year, that is to say, only one day out of every two. *lhis
situation was not quite so bad formerly, partly because the population
was smaller but also because every village had its own artisans, indeed its
own traditional industries. But the decline of the sm all industries has
left tlie villagers with no opportunity for work other than in tiie fields;
There has already been much talk about the necessity of transforming
Vietnam's economy and how this might be brought about; b u t in this
discussion common sense and technical problems have become rather
mixed up with ideological considerations, ranging all the w ay from pa
ternalism to socialist industrialization. It seems to me that these questions
should be coldly examined and that, to begin with, the u n d erlyin g facts
and the permanent essentials should be clarified
The first fact, never to be left out of sight in discussing the economy
of Vietnam, is the peasant himself. Some 80 per cent of the population
hve on the land and from the land. The other 20 per cent also derive
their living in part from agriculture. The outstanding place o f agriculture
in the total economy, therefore, cannot be ignored. The level o f living
can be transformed only to the extent to which agriculture is transformed,
ut how bring about this indispensable transformation? T w o objectives
of r, ,attained: the return from the soil must be increased, the pressure
population must be lessened.
I Sn ral measures wili no doubt have to be used sim ultaneously to raise
oth the return from the land as a whole and the output o f the individual
worker. To begin with, the peasants will have to be' taught m ore modern
met ods of cultivation, the use of fertilizers w ill have to be advanced,
leie will have to be more seed seiecnon with a view to h ig n er yields,
memaSriCUl! tUral imPlements wiU to be overhauled. L a n d improve-
us, such as drainage and irrigation, will have to be taken in hand at
lowest possible cost; there will have to be introduced a g rea ter varia-
° f CT PS eUher Wkhin each Cant° n or within other adm inistrative
reas of about the same extent. And lastly, cooperatives w ill h ave to be
organized
• in the villages.
• , ,Cooperative
J pnt •
e enterprise— j • h by
which, hv the
ti way, isis
entirely m harmony with the tradmons of Vietnamese village life — should
a number of Unctions: production, purchase, and m arketing, also
V i ETm A m e s e NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES 255
St° r a g e a n d c r e d it f a c ilitie s , so as to g iv e each v illa g e a n d e a c h ca n to n an

e c ° n o m ic u n it y a t o n ce w e ll b a la n c e d a n d aliv e .
W o u ld also b e d e s ir a b le to re c re a te in th e v illa g e s , w h e th e r on a
c° ° p e r a t i v e o r a n in d iv id u a lis tic b asis, lig h t in d u strie s fo r th e m an ufac-
tU re o f c o n su m e r go o ds w h ic h th e co un try' can ab so rb a n d do n o t
d e r* ia n d v e r y c o m p lic a te d te c h n iq u e s o r la r g e in v estm en ts. T h e s e in d u s
tr ie s w o u ld m a k e u se o f th e su rp lu s la b o r a n d a d d to lo c a l incom es.
W i t h i n th e e c o n o m ic u n it o f th e co m m u n ity o r of th e ca n to n , th e im
p o r ta n c e o f a g r ic u lt u r a l p rices deserves sp e c ia l a tte n tio n . T h e econom ic
b a la n c e o f a p r e p o n d e r a n tly a g r ic u lt u r a l c o u n try d ep en d s on th e p iic e s
w h ic h th e a g r ic u lt u r is ts o b ta in for th e ir p ro d u c e a n d th e p rices th e y m ust
P a V fo r th e in d u s t r ia l p ro d u cts th e y r e q u ire . T h e in crease of a g r ic u ltu r a l
I n d u c t i o n , b y r e le a s in g s a le a b le su rp lu se s, if ac co m p an ie d b y p rice fix in g
fo r a g r ic u lt u r a l p ro d u c ts a t s u ita b le lev els, w ill a llo w th e p easan ts to
P u r c h a s e m a n u f a c tu r e d goods, th u s g iv in g a n ew im p e tu s to in d u stry .
T h e sa m e process w h ic h , as w e h av e seen, w o u ld h e lp to b rin g a o ut
a b e t t e r b a la n c e w ith in th e fra m ew o rk of th e sm a lle st econom ic u n it
sb o u id a n d w o u ld p ro d u c e s im ila r resu lts in its re la tio n s w ith the o u tsid e
W o rld . T o th e e x te n t to w h ic h th e c o m m u n ity o r th e can to n possesses
M a r k e ta b le p ro d u c ts of in te re st to la r g e r m ark ets a t hom e o r ab ro a ,
W ill b e a b le to o b ta in those in d isp e n sa b le in d u s tr ia l an d a g r ic u ltu re
c ° m m o d it ie s — 1ik e fe r tiliz e r , seeds, im p lem e n ts, etc.— w h ich it can n o t
P ro d u c e fo r its e lf, a n d so m a k e p o ssib le th e ex isten c e of n a tio n a l anci
r e £ io n a l in d u s tr ie s . F o r, ev en if th e n e tw o rk for th e d is trib u tio n of e le c tric
P o w e r w e re a d e q u a te to sp re ad w id e ly th e use of m o d ern in d u s tr ia l tech
n iq u e s , th e g ro w th of v illa g e in d u strie s w o u ld p ro b a b ly n o t suffice to a b
s o r b th e s u r p lu s p o p u la tio n . T h e r e w ill b e n eed also for u r b a n in d u stries,
b o rh lie h t a n d henvv, a n d for trad e .
T h e r e is n o q u e s tio n w h a te v e r th a t c e rta in p a rts of V ie tn a m a re w e ll
s u it e d fo r in d u s tr ia l d ev elo p m e n ts: for e x a m p le , T o n g k in g w ith its
a b u n d a n t co a l reso u rces a n d its d ep o sits of iro n , zinc, tin an d p h o sp h ate ,
as w e ll as th e w a te r p o w e r a v a ila b le in th e h ig h e r ra n g e s; th e c e n tra l an
s o u th e r n p a rts of A n n a m w ith th e ir forests, w a te r fa lls a n d s a lt deposits.
T h e s e re so u rces c o n stitu te a n o te w o rth y p o te n tia l to serve as a b asis o
s iz e a b le in d u s tr ie s . ,
T h e r a te a t w h ic h in d u strie s can b e esta b lish e d a n d e x p a n d e d depends,
h o w e v e r, o n q u ite a n u m b e r o f factors. W h e re a re th e c a p ita l, th e m a
c h in e r y , a n d th e n ec essary te c h n ic a l staffs to com e from ? W h e re are th ere
r e lia b le m a rk e ts fo r th e ir o u tp u t? E x p o rt m ay for them becom e a neces
2*6 ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WIST
sity. Yet, one should not forget that for the most part the products of
these potential industries are urgently needed in Vietnam itself and that
it may not be easy in every case to decide whether it is more advantageous
to produce for the interior or for the foreign market. A t any rate, pay
m ent for the indispensable capital goods must of necessity be the first
charge on these industries. W e should not deceive ourselves about the
desire that w ill predominate in the interested circles to pay off as quickly
as possible the capital invested in the modernized agricultural enterprises
and in the new industries.
The resemblance in this respect between the economic problem of Viet
nam and that of Japan at the outset of the M eiji era has more than once
been pointed out. This is not the place to describe the situation in Japan
as it was in 18/0 or to give an account of that country’s transformation
into a modern nation; but it may be useful to refer in passing to the
lively interest which Jap an ’s economic history for the last ninety years
must have for all who are concerned in V ietnam ’s future economic
development.
T o raise the level of living and to make agriculture more rewarding
are, then, together the first objective, a sine qua non for the economic
reconstruction of Vietnam. But this does not mean that a number of other
o Ject*ves may not be pursued simultaneously, objectives whose realiza
tion likewise w ill require effort, money, technical innovation, materials,
an equipment. Among them I would mention the education and train
ing o youth and the development of public health facilities, for example.
ow are such services as these to be financed when the sources of revenue
are inadequate or when the national revenue is drained off to meet po
litical or other exigencies?
Thus what must be done is pretty clear: to lift Vietnam out of its
material poverty an economic policy is needed which w ill help it to pass
rom its present stage of a country with absolute preponderance of agri-
cu ture in its economy to the agro-industrial stage, or perhaps to the stage
° a m*xed economy, as List has called it. Moreover, it
wou e oth dangerous and ridiculous, particularly since existing pri
vate interests are so few, to think of the problem only in strictly national
terms. 1 7
Vietnam constitutes part of a region or zone, Southeast Asia, the mem-
ers o w ic are states in more or less the same predicament. Their
common problems demand common solutions; and it does not seem
likely that from now on any one of these countries w ill be in a position
VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES £57
to make workable economic plans for itself without at the same time
considering the solutions envisaged or applied by neighboring states
without taking into account the links that bind these economies together
and the exchanges that are called for between these different countries
Should one not also look yet further afield? Southeast Asia is one of the
large regional units on this planet. Its role and its place in the world
economy have not yet been clearly and explicitly defined. It produces
raw materials of which Western Europe, North America and Japan are
in need; and on its part it needs the manufactured commodities, the
capital goods and the technical services which are at the disposal of West
ern Europe, North America and Japan. Obviously, each of the Southeast
Asian countries is obliged to accommodate itself to this general frame
work in accordance with its existing relations and its traditional bonds, its
specific needs, and its buying power. Many factors are as yet too uncertain
to permit us to formulate more than general hypotheses in these respects.
One thing is certain, however: except for its rice, its coal, and its rubber,
Vietnam has not at this time many export commodities to offer; and espe
cially because of a war that plays havoc with its economy, it finds itself
at the moment in a quandary, worse than that of any other country in
Asia.
It would not be honest to encourage false illusions. Let us suppose
that the reconstruction w ill be quite speedy, at least in so far as it depends
on the labor and the initiative of the Vietnamese peasants: nevertheless,
the economic transformation of which we have spoken must of necessity
take a long time. It is not a matter of five years, nor probably of ten;
it will take longer before the standard of living of the ru ral masses can
rise to a point at which it may be considered adequate for a balanced
exchange between agriculture and industry. Five-year plans may be all
right for Japan or the U.S.S.R. In a large and strong country a decade
is the minimum suitable time interval for measuring the stages of its
transformation.
Let it suffice to say that the objective named above—which must be
attained as rapidly as possible since it is a race against the growth of
population—would be very difficult without concentration of means and
energies, without continuity of plan and direction. Such transformations
cannot be brought about by free trade or by laissez-faire, but only by
energetic and enlightened management. Like all backward countries,
Vietnam thus is bound to adopt a managed and even a planned economy.
There remains the choice of means and methods if the managed economy
and die execution of plans are not, under the country’s precarious cir
cumstances, to become restraints radier than stimulants.
The Choice of Means

T he economic and social transformation of Vietnam, of which we have
spoken, constitutes a great national task capable of insjiiring as much
popular enthusiasm as have the five-year plans of the Soviet Union. For,
the main task is none other than that oi building up, or of giving sub
stance to, that national independence toward the realization of which so
many sacrifices have been made for so long.
l o manage this enterprise well, Vietnam, no m atter under what lead-
eiship, cannot afford to dissipate the energies at its command, already so
limited in volume. Individualism and lack of team spirit unfortunately
are traits still too widespread in Vietnam, especially among the intellec
tuals and among those who, on various grounds, have broken with the
rigid traditions of family or communily, and those who cannot subject
themselves to the hard discipline of such bodies as the Communist Party
o Vietnam. Here lies the great danger for Vietnam: in the disintegration
an lence uselessness or ineffectiveness of effort, and in consequence the
clashes and rivalries between individuals; it lies in private ambitions,
the desire to be somebody, the lack of a sense of citizenship; in a false
attitu e to public service, access to which too often is looked upon as a
lam ily possession and as a source of honors and of gain. These attitudes
betray themselves in constant intrigues, disagreements, and so forth. I do
not elieve that they are racial characteristics, for other ethnic groups
K now tiem , too. The history of Vietnam shows that this evil has existed
at a epoc is, but it seems to have become distinctly worse in recent times
per laps under the occidental influence that has weakened and
crumbled the structure and the traditional moral and social restraints of
Vietnamese society.
We are led, then, to ask ourselves whether in such a land democracy
can assume a parliamentary form widiout bringing in its train anarchy
an m m . t^ the least, we must decide whether a parliam entary system
can succeed if it is founded upon rivalry and competition between po
litical parties that actually are little more than factions. The Vietnamese
Constitution makers w ill have to choose between the public good, which
demands above all a just and effective exercise of power, and the mere
forms of democracy which play into the hands of political job hunters
and self-seekers but contribute nothing to the solution of real problems.
VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES
The power structure, therefore, in Vietnam as elsewhere, is of capital

importance. The strains of the revolutionary period, properly so ,
the enthusiasm at the dawn of the new era, never can be maintaine or
very long. Sooner or later it w ill be seen that there is need for introduc
ing an instrument capable of working seriously and realistically under
normal conditions.
W hile the progress of British liberal ideas since the eighteenth century
has in a way made parliamentary democracy the political ideal of the
occidental world, Asia and Africa still remain imbued with the idea o
unity of power. These peoples, whether Vietnamese, Chinese, Indian, or
Arab, do not as yet have any conception of the possibility that there cou
be an organized and legal opposition to the established authority, for t is,
to their minds, springs directly either from divinity or from superior orce.
Where a genuine organized opposition is tolerated they only see proo
that the established authority is weak, that it cannot last, that it no longer
has "the mandate of heaven." In popular opinion, the opposition,^ once
it has passed beyond certain limits, already has the future exercise o
power within its grasp; and it receives public acclaim because there is no
thought that the power can be divided. A struggle for power is a sign o
anarchy. The power of the state is there to govern, for the good o t e
whole people. It does not swing to the right or to the left. It must be just.
W hatever there is of contact and discussion exists directly between t le
people and the power, so that the latter where it goes wrong may correct
its errors and its injustices. Only when it has become evident that the
power has become corrupted and can no longer reform itself, does the
question of overthrowing it arise— it will then be replaced with a power
no less unique. That is a conception which we Europeans, too, have
known for more than a thousand years.
Vietnam has had a life of two thousand years and during all that time
has cherished the idea of the unity of imperial power. The emperor’s rule
was invested with the "mandate of heaven" for the good of the people
and not in the interest of a class. This at least was the general conception
which prevailed among the people. And the emperor was ministered to
by the most worthy of men who, thanks to the system of examinations,
rose from the people. I should like to raise only one question in this
connection: how deep is the difference—ideology apart—between this
imperial regime and a communist regime like that of the Vietminh where
the President also is surrounded by those who have proved themselves,
this time within the party, or those whose special knowledge makes them
260 n a t io n a lis m a n d t h e w e s t
indispensable? No more than in the old imperial V ie t n a m is there an

organized opposition. The power is undivided. The G e n e r a l ta o t e
Vietminh Front or of the “Lien Viet" has replaced the C o u rt ot Hue,
that is all. Thus, there is not yet in Vietnam much of a real understanding
for a regime in which parties can alternate in the exercise o f pow er. Power
is something to be struggled for, to be used for the furtherance of one s
own ends—not to be shared.
A c tu a lly , th erefo re , the situ a tio n in w h ic h V ie tn a m fin d s I ts e lf can be
u n d erstoo d o n ly o n th e basis th a t th e p o w e r o f g o v e r n m e n t m u s t rem ain
u n d ivid e d : th a t is to say, th a t th ere c a n n o t b e a g o v e r n m e n t a n d an
o p p o sitio n . In d ee d , e x p erien c e has sh o w n th a t in th is c o u n t r y th e oppo
sitio n s till looks u p o n its fu n c tio n as th a t o f a p e r p e t u a l o u tb id d in g ; an a
u n d e r th e g iven circum stances this has led a n d can a g a in le a d th e g o vern
m en t in to tra g ic ad ven tu res. T h e re fo re it seem s th a t V i e t n a m ’s in te rn a l
p o litic a l p ro b le m consists ab o ve a ll in o rg a n iz in g th e p u b li c a u th o r ity in
such a w a y th at, th o u g h u n d iv id e d , n e ve rth e le ss i t c a n m u s t e r a l l a v a ila b le
energies, th a t it allo w s fo r w holesom e a n d re a s o n a b le c r itic is m a n d even
fo r p erso n al differences. O n ly so can i t sa feg u a rd , o n th e d iff e r e n t steps
° f the social p yram id , a ll th e lib e rtie s a n d a ll th e i n i t i a t i v e c o m p a tib le
w ith the p u rsu it o f com m on ends. T h e fo r m u la b e st a d a p t e d to b r in g this
ab ou t is one th a t has a lre a d y been used in V ie tn a m u n d e r a p a r t ic u la r set
° f circum stances. I am re fe rrin g to th e “F r o n t,” w h i c h e n c o m p a sse s d i
verse p o litical, relig io u s, tra d e u n io n , a n d o th e r o r g a n iz a tio n s a n d has
the a b ility o f im posin g o n th em a co m m o n h ig h c o m m a n d , y e t leaves
them w ith in th at fram e b o th id eo lo g ica l a n d p ra c tic a l s e lf- d ir e c tio n . T h is
F ro n t is n o t just a single p a rty lik e th e B o lsh e v ik ty p e o f c o m m u n is t p a rty
o r H itle r’s N atio n al So cialist P a rty . I t is a sin g le b u t i n c lu s iv e o rg an iz a
tio n em b racin g m an y m o vem en ts w ith o u t in te r fe r in g w i t h t h e i r distin c
tive ch aracter, a ll o f th em fro m tim e to tim e s u b m ittin g t h e i r la b e ls , th e ir
slogans, an d th e ir p ro g ram s to th e v e rd ic t o f th e u n iv e r s a l s u ffra g e , Ex
pressed in fre e elections. T h ro u g h the e le ctio n s th e p e o p le r e m a in the
fin a l a rb ite r.
T h is is the im age in w h ich the V ie tm in h F ro n t, o r r a t h e r th e L ien
V ie t, ap p ears today, the g re a t A ssem b ly to w h ic h th e V i e t m i n h itself
adheres. B u t the place o f the C o m m u n ist P a rty o f V ie t n a m — w h ic h , it
ap p ears, w ill soon u n d e rg o an official re c o n s tru c tio n — in th is in clu siv e
A ssem b ly, w h ere it occupies the k ey p o sition s a n d h a n d le s a l l th e levers
o f co m m an d , m akes it difficult s till to speak o f th e V ie tm in h as a “ D em o
c ra tic F ro n t.” T h e V ie tm in h system c o n ta in s n o a s s u ra n c e t h a t p o w er
lETNAMESE NATIONALISM AND FRENCH POLICIES 261
pa^ n 0 t exercised in an arbitrary fashion, since in practice only one

T , . the Com m unist Party, controls the means and is armed.
r*s brings me to another problem, one of particular gravity because
not only the m aterial well being of the people but its very
so u °nCernS
* Several references have been made to Vietnamese nationalism. But
a t exactly is its program apart from the often passionately pursued
restoration of the country’s lost independence? This independence is
ay alm ost achieved. W hat w ill then become of nationalism as such?
it a t last acquire that positive and constructive content which so
ar has been lacking? T here can hardly be any such thing as “pure na
tionalism No nation sets out to restore the fatherland without wanting
give it a form and a face. Nationalism implies a doctrine, a political,
econ°rn ic and social theory. It involves of necessity a conception of man
an<* the universe.
*t is interesting to note that in Vietnam, as in so many other countries,
Catholicism and communism face each other as the only comprehensive
°ctrin es capable o f providing solutions or answers to the concrete prob
lems before the nation. A nd therefore we should look a little more closely
at ^vhat communism represents and implies in its bearing on Vietnamese
conditions.
A s it operates in Vietnam, communism represents much less the teach-
*ng o f K a rl M arx than that of Lenin or of Stalin. W hat has for twenty
years attracted so many Vietnamese to communism is the desire for effec
tiveness, fo r action that gets somewhere. They saw the uselessness of all
dem ands fo r reforms, of opposition, as has been said, by way of little
shrines o r little chapels. Leninism offered diem a revolutionary strategy
and revo lu tio n ary tactics. It placed their struggle against the colonial
regim e w ith in a vaster frame, as one campaign in a global war against
im perialism . T his strategy and these tactics, this fighting force which was
a‘ m ilita ry kind of party, appeared to them efficacious as a means of over
th row in g the existing order. In their light the opposition movement made
sense, no longer seemed hopeless. Need for effective action, for toughness
and discipline, the reaction also of those who refused to put up with that
sterile individualism or to take part in the petty quarrels between per
sonal interests, all this contributed to bring outstanding personalities into
the com m unist fold.
L e t m e repeat, for these Vietnamese people communism means Stalin
ism, th at is to say, a system of concrete solutions for the problems that
arise fro m the foundation of a socialist state— that is to say, a state
262 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND THE W E ST
founded on the primacy of labor and the laborer, concrete solutions also
for the problems of the agrarian revolution, of industrialization, of tlie
organization of powers, and so forth. In this sense, Vietnamese commu
nism is not so much an ideology as it is a technique. Marxism, historical
materialism, and dialectic, to be sure, have been assimilated by a few
intellectuals, but they do not as yet seem to have penetrated very deeply.
W hat seems to be of much greater significance is that Marxism here
enters in a scientific guise a country whose people are known for the deep
respect they have for learning and for knowledge. In this connection one
cannot help thinking of certain attitudes which the Vietnamese have
developed in the course of those centuries when they showed themselves
capable of remaining frozen, so to speak, within the confines of one par
ticular kind of civilization. W ill the Vietnamese people, and more espe
cially the people at the top, become wrapped uj:> in Marxism and look
upon it as the final stage in the illum ination of the hum an mind, in the
same way in which for two thousand years they have thought of Confu
cius and of the Chinese classics? Or w ill they rem ain attached to free
thought and accept Marxism at its true value as only a moment, if perhaps
a great moment, in the history of human thought? As a system which, like
the philosophy of Aristotle or that of Descartes, like the ideas which
gained currency in 1789, w ill come to be absorbed, digested, and assimi
lated by each people with such adaptations as dictates its genius? Can
Vietnam today allow itself to forget the tragic consequences which its
intellectual inertia and its mania for Chinese culLure brought with
them in the nineteenth century?
Besides, there is the question whether those practical aspects of Lenin
ism which have attracted the Vietnamese really are integral parts of
M arxian ideology, or whether some of Lenin’s and of Stalin’s teachings
could not also be adapted to a somewhat diflereiit ideological context,
one coming closer to the traditions and the ethics of any particular nation
than does the official Marxism of the U.S.S.R. with its many characteris
tically Russian elements.5 Are we not perhaps justified in thinking that
the peoples of Asia will retain of these teachings not so much the theories
as the practical solutions which they afford to the problems of conquest
of power, of organization of the masses, of industrialization, of the ad
vance of education and of culture? As a Vietnamese friend said to me one
day: When all the peoples of the world have revised their political and
economic ideas and have profited from their new experiences, do you
5. Cf. N. B erdiaev, S ources et Setts d u C o m m u n ism e R u sse, Paris, 1937.
V IE T N A M E S E N A T IO N A L IS M A N D F R E N C H P O L IC IE S 265
believe they w ill still think of Stalin when they talk about their collective
enterprises? Do you think of Rousseau and his theories when you make
use oi universal suffrage?”
Thereiore, whatever form of political organization they may consider
themselves bound to adopt, it is to be hoped that the people of Vietnam
w ill have the sense to beware of conformity and slogans and w ill know
how to guard their liberty of thought and judgment. Teaching them how
to reason and to think is probably the greatest gift the Occident has
brought them. As long as they keep alight this flame they will, no matter
what may come, remain in the progressive camp.
Vietnam and the French Union

W e have touched upon some of the problems which the Vietnam of
tomorrow w ill have to face in a more or less acute form. Once its right
to the fu ll exercise of its internal sovereignty is fully recognized, it will be
Vietnam that w ill have to declare itself, and no longer France. The im
portant thing now is that the powers, and especially France, understand
these urgent needs and assume toward Vietnam a positive and construc
tive attitude.
No Vietnamese of good faith w ill deny that his country still has need
of foreign assistance, not only on the economic, financial and technical
levels, but also on the cultural and the m ilitary ones. For Vietnam it is a
question of knowing how to accept such aid and how to pay for it.
This assistance can assume many different forms. Take for example
the development of existing industries: they already are for the most part
in French ownership. But there is need also for capital investments in
new industries, for credits, for treasury advances or guarantees of loans,
for support of the currency, for long-term contracts in the purchase of
Vietnamese commodities, for priorities in the shipment of machinery, for
making available technical advisers and technical cooperation between
firms, for higher education, involving the services of teachers, the devel
opment of laboratories and research institutions, provision for Vietna
mese students in France, and much more. It would be easy to lengthen
this list.
How is all this to be paid for? In so far as this is a question of private
capital, the answer is simple: if there are well-founded prospects for profit,
capital w ill not be long in coming forth. Soetan Sjahrir, the Indonesian
socialist leader, has well shown that in the struggle of the Asian peoples
for their liberation the so-called international capitalism is at bottom
264 ^ n a t io n a l is m a n d t h e w e st
neutral. It is for or against the independence movements according to

whether it expects to gain or to lose by them. The contribution o oreign
capital therefore depends upon the attitude which the êa ^rs ° tie
liberation movements assume toward it. They must, rnoreover, now how
to divide the risks and see to it that the new enterpriseS really w ill bring
wealth to the country and will fit into its general program o develop
ment. In any case, it is certain that in such attraction of p rivate capital a
country that has no capital of its own has one of the speediest and least
costly means of advancing its industrialization.
Politically likewise it is less dangerous than are loans b y one state to
another. Such loans may, on the lace of them, n o t be onerous from a
financial standpoint. But they nearly always take on a p olitical coloration
and in consequence touch upon th e sphere o f s o v e r e ig n ty - Nevertheless,
it would seem difficult for Vietnam to do entirely w ith ou t such loans,
especially in the field of public finance and support o f the currency.
Technical and financial resources no doubt are today universally avail
able, even though there are striking trends in their diffusion. It will be
possible for Vietnam to exercise some choice in this m atter. W e in France
are convinced that in spite of everything that divides us from Vietnam
that country will not forget what it owes us and w ill see th at its own
interest also obliges it to remain closely allied to us.
In spite of the ignorance of everything pertaining to Vietnam which
still prevails in France, the French nevertheless of all W estern peoples
know Vietnam and the Vietnamese best. I n n u m e r a b le friendships and
bonds of all kinds have been forged which resist time and a ll political
troubles. If many Vietnamese have come to know F r a n c e as it really is,
and love it sincerely, it is no less true that F re n c h m e n on t h e i r p a r t— I
know many of diem—have discovered the authentic V ie t n a m and love it
almost as a second fatherland. At this time, when oO m any people persist
m trying to destroy these disinterested friendships and to sow hatred and
distrust between the two peoples, we should, I th in k , rem ind ourselves
of all this.
Genuine friendship between Vietnam and France can grow up within
the new framework of the French Union. This w ill make demands on
both for constant effort, for much courage and patience. B u t I myself
believe that mutual confidence can be re-established on ly from the day
the Vietnamese are convinced that they have truly become masters of
their own destiny.
The cohesion and power of the French Union w ill have real strength
T r^ A M E S E N A T IO N A L IS M A N D F R E N C H P O L IC IE S 265
he ^ ^ h e n its members play their parts in it volu n tarily and whole-

ar.a,rt.ec^^y- A form al adherence to the French Union, by signing a treaty,
lres VaIue only as the associated state finds every day fresh justifica-
r , n ? ° r this alliance, both in its inner political life and in its external
0 £ l °n s, in other words if daily experience confirms the existence of the
£r Pr °claim ed identity o f interests, if the associated state finds that, far
stiflin g or restricting its national energies, the Union actually gives
th ^ ^re a te r scoPe» ^ ^ sees that, like the British Commonwealth, so also
a e F rench U nion means independence with something added— namely
com m un ity that has real life, a solidarity that is effective, in place of an
ls° la tio n that forces the country to face alone the menacing turm oil of
tim e.
N e ith e r French nor Vietnamese can afford tediously to harp upon
1T1gs th at are past and gone. Today all our strength is needed to measure
yP to the task o f recreating that confidence without which nothing else
Is possible. W h a t is required of us now is that we weave as many threads
as possible between the two peoples, that we break down all the walls
a nd the chains which have for so long f)revented us from knowing one
p o t h e r . T o do that, we must leave behind, no matter what the cost, any
G eo lo g y th at generates hatred, prevents understanding, makes for dis-
tru st, an d kills life and friendship wherever it finds entrance.
■ôth in Vietnam and in France, we know, there still are men and
^ oru en w ho, deep in their hearts, cherish the desire for true friendship
betw een the two peoples and who, through wind and wave, guard that
Srr*all flam e w ithout which life hardly seems w ordi while: the flame of
hope.
PART THREE
to
NATIONALISM
IN MALAYA
by
T. H. SIL C O C K
,
Professor of Economics University of Malaya
and
U N G K U A B D U L A Z IZ
Nationalism in Malaya
&
i . D E M O G R A PH IC AN D H IST O R IC A L BACKG RO U N D *
t IS HARDLY possible to make any generalisation about nationalism m
I A sia that w ill not be falsified in Malaya. W hether we consider the
E la tio n o f nationalism to colonial rule, or its relation to religion, or its
E la tio n to economics, we shall find that the simple truisms w ill not work.
° f course some of the fundam ental forces are there: the disintegrating
effect o f capitalism on traditional economies; the growth of education m
^ sp o n se to economic needs and consequent tension between a local in
t e llig e n t ^ and a predom inantly European ruling class; even perhaps a
tendency fo r the im perialist, subconsciously, to attach undue importance
to th e divisions in local society. But there are special peculiarities in the
dem ographic and economic background of M alaya which make these
factors develop in unusual ways in this peninsula.
Perhaps the most fundam ental fact in Malaya's economic and demo
g rap hic background is the jungle. For it is the jungle, and the conse
q u e n t u n health y clim ate and difficult transport conditions that kept
M alaya underpopulated in spite of its im portant position on the w o rld s
trad e routes. From this u n d e r p o p u l a t i o n many of the characteristics arise
th a t give a special character to nationalism in Malaya. W e may trace to
this source the leisurely way of life of the M alay population, in a land
^ h e re ill health rath er than starvation and scarcity sets the limits to
P o p u latio n growth. T he comparative ease w ith which British power was
extended, the possibility of developing vast tracts of land by immigrant
la b o u r w ithou t either drawing the Malays into the system or arousing any
considerable opposition, the high relative standard of living of the immi
g ra n t w ith consequent political stagnation and inter-racial jealousy
a ll can be traced back to a low density of population and the c o n s e q u e n t
enorm ous effectiveness of W estern medicine, W estern techniques, and
even foreign government.
* T h e au th o rs w ish to acknow ledge the h elp of M r. L im T a y Boh and M*. JW *
P u th u c h e a ry in su p p ly in g m aterial about some aspects of the Chinese and In ia^
m u n itie s resp ectively. T h ey are not to be h eld responsible for the opinions exp
in th is p a p e r, w ith several of w hich th ey w o uld disagree, nor for any errors of fact.
269
T h e simplest way to illustrate this point is to list a few of the special

characteristics of nationalism in Malaya. The following are immediately
apparent: the comparatively recent growth o f any hostility to foreign
rule; the very limited economic content of the various political move
ments in Malaya; the existence of many different groups, each closely
linked to some overseas nationalist or similar movement, but with only
vague local content and significance; the comparatively close link between
M alay nationalism and religion, without religious fanaticism; the great
importance of inter-racial jealousy, and the fact that this depends almost
wholly on progress toward self-government.
Most of these special features depend on the demographic and eco
nomic background, which in turn depends on the fundamental form of
alaya s development in relation to the jungle. It is im portant to realise
that even now Malaya is quite sparsely populated. It is prim arily an
agricultural country, fifty per cent of its total occupied population being
engaged in agriculture; yet only about one-sixth of its total land area is at
present cultivated. However, its population is very dense indeed com
pared with that of onlv a hundred vears nô.
^ The exact population of Malaya in 1850 is of course unknown: but it
■ ^ *1? 1 e ^ have been more than h alf a m illion, mostly of Malay
' ^ n' c with considerable numbers of Chinese and a few Indians
" ?te :>traits Settlements. The tenfold increase in a hundred years has
HlffPT-o ^ c ^ arê^ fr ° m immigration. But the immigration has taken
th ' i _orms ° r the different races, with consequent differences in
their relation to the country.
i t ' e âst ^Ve 7ears tbe Malays had been unw illing to work regu-
/ i J i , states or mines, and their position in the trade of the country
° f ° r re,tai^ had become insignificant. T h eir pattern of life was
, , TTia V1 â£es* largely self-supporting and unspecialized, with a
g ^ a o mutual help and strong communal disapproval of any ex
cessive wealth. Leisure was highly valued, the attitude of the Malay vii-
ge we er approximating that of the impoverished aristocrat who will
ace increasing; ebt and hardship rather than forego the pattern of having
leisure and status. 5
Immigration of Malaysians was therefore not, in the main, immigration
or wor on c“Pita ist estates. Even where, as with the Javanese, labour-
ers i come to Malaya under indenture to work for an employer, many
would neither stay on the estate nor return to Java, bur were absorbed
mio the Malay rural pattern, either in an exis[ing M alay viUage or in a
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M A L A Y A 271
settlement of Javanese. There seems to have been a very considerable

immigration of Malaysian people irom the Archipelago to Malaya during
die nineteenth century as the country was increasingly opened up. Evi
dence ior this can be iound in the customs and traditions oi many Malay
villages, as well as in the obvious increase in the Malay rural population.
These immigrants were easily absorbed, having ties oi both language and
religion wiUi the local Malays. It seems probable that their standard of
living improved less as a result of movement than that oi other races. The
situation was rather one oi a mobile, mainly riverine, population drifting
into an area of lower economic pressure.
The R ole of Immigrants

There were two main streams of Chinese immigrants— traders and
labourers. Traders had come to Singapore irom the year of the city’s foun
dation; they had settled in Penang even earlier. In Malacca there
had been Chinese traders even before the arrival of the Portuguese. But
in the early nineteenth century the number of Chinese traders increased
very greatly. It was probably not until the mid-nineteenth century, how
ever, and the development of Penang and Singapore, that the Chinese
began developing tin mining on a large scale, though tin mining by
Chinese methods apparently started much earlier in a lew places.
It is unlikely that many oi the Chinese traders brought much wealth to
Malaya when they came. Such evidence as diere is shows that most oi the
wealth of the present trading class was made in trade or contracting in
Malaya and its neighbourhood. Most of these first immigrants were free
agents, coming to Malaya to improve their prospects. The labourers in
the early years were not free agents but indentured. W hether they were
lured by extravagant promises or merely kidnapped, they usually came
to Malaya bound to a particular employer, and under contract to repay
a debt for their passage. Sometimes, but not always, their position im
proved after their indenture jaeriod—if they lived that long in the un
healthy conditions then prevailing. Sometimes they remained labour
ers; sometimes an opportunity came for them to become small shop
keepers or contractors; sometimes they returned to China. T hat all three
of these things happened on a considerable scale is certain.
W e know a few things about these labourers: for example, that their
conditions improved steadily after 1877, when the Chinese Protectorate
was established, and that after 1914 indenture for Chinese was abolished
and labourers had to be landed free. Presumably this made it considerably
easier fo r them to acquire money and either rise in the social scale in
M alaya or return to China. But large numbers of Chinese labourers con
tinued to be imported, especially in the decade after the first world war,
by private recruiters sent to China. The 1931 Census of M alaya gives evi
dence, some oi which now, in the light of the succeeding decade, seems a
little unconvincing, that the great m ajority returned to China, The only
things of which we can be reasonably certain are, first, that very few of
the Chinese who came to Malaya intended originally to break their ties
with China and settle abroad; and second, that the num ber who by mar-
riage, by the formation of new social links in M alaya and the breaking
of old ones in China, and by economic circumstances, have become in
fact settled in Malaya has enormously increased during the last fifteen
years. Very large numbers of these are now either employers or workers
on their own account: thousands of small or large merchants, tens of
thousands of contractors and small shopkeepers, possibly hundreds of
thousands of independent peasants or “squatters.”
Indian traders have been numerically less im portant. From the earliest
times they seem to have been a smaller community than the Chinese,
though never negligible. The failure of all the numerous attempts, dur
ing the nineteenth century, to force the rupee on the Straits Settlements,
and the far more frequent references to Chinese trade, in current reports,
t*ie grea[er strength of the Chinese trade; and the importation
of Chinese labour, in spite of much closer official ties w ith India, points
in the same direction.
Indian Immigrants
Much of the labour employed by the Europeans in the early days of
the Straits Settlements was convict labour brought from India. Some of
early Publlc buildings were certainly built by convict labour. But
contemporary records in the first decade after the separation from India
show clearly that Chinese labour even in building had become predomi-
W ith the opening up of the Malay States to European development in

the last quarter of the century, Indian labour was sought for the planta
tions. Later, when rubber drove out the other plantation crops, and
especially with the rapid expansion of rubber at the beginning of the
twentieth century, Indian labour became very scarce and was eagerly
recruited irom ru ral areas of South India. Chinese labour, working under
contractors, has apparently always been used for the more arduous work
of clearing jungle and opening up new ground. For the regular work of
the European estates, however, at least a nucleus of South Indian labour
was usually wanted. Indian labourers were easier to organise as a regular
labour force, partly because it was easier for the planter to learn enough
Tamil, Telugu or Malayalam to communicate with them directly, and
partly because their attitude to the sale of their labour was less commer
cial. By this is meant not only that they normally accepted lower wages
(though this was no doubt an important reason) but also that they were
more prepared to accept a regular daily wage and a regular routine as
members of an organisation, while the Chinese labourer regarded himself
more as a separate economic unit, working through a contractor who was
partly making money out of him but also partly helping him to make
money out of the “red-head.” Naturally the “red-head” preferred to have
a monopoly of commercial principles and to pay for labour on a basis of
providing a certain standard of living sufficient to secure an adequate
supply.
There was a serious danger, in the first decade of the century, that
another commercial principle would disturb the profits of the rubber in
dustry. Planters began to find that it was a good deal cheaper to offer a
slightly higher wage, or better terms of employment, and tempt away
another planter’s labour, than to recruit labour in India themselves. This
practice, which was known as “crimping,” threatened to upset the whole
basis of immigrant labour. A country can be opened up either by volun
tary settlers or by imported labour. In the former case wages tend to be
high enough to attract labour to pay its own passage to the country. In the
latter some means must be found of securing to the employer the advan
tage of importing the labour. This can be done if the labourer is in
dentured to work for a particular employer for a set time to pay off a
debt incurred for his passage. The Chinese labour contractors had their
own way, usually none too scrupulous, of enforcing these obligations.
But European planters, employing labour more or less directly, found
crimping an evil that they could not fight with any weapons ready to
hand.
It was this evil which led to the establishment of the system of immi
gration which was for many years Malaya’s pride: the system of financing
Indian immigration, and providing all the services necessary to maintain
it, by means of a special tax levied on all employers of Indian labour.
This system, combined with a Labour Code enforced by inspection, wages
fixed in key areas, and special camps in India through which labour
could be recruited, made possible a very high degree of economic control

w ithout curtailing the freedom of the individual labourer. If unemploy
ment was developing at any given wage, the wage could nevertheless be
m aintained because unemployed labour would tend to ask for repatria
tion, which in these conditions would be given very freely. If labour was
scarce, wages could be prevented from rising by im porting large numbers
o f additional immigrants.
It would probably be a mistake to accept either the extreme view of
some Indian nationalists that this system was merely a machine for the
maximum possible exploitation of labour, or the apologetics of the early
Labour Department reports, which tend to suggest that it existed mainly
to protect the interests of Indian labour. On the one hand we must ac
cept the view that it was an instrument for preserving, at least in one
respect, the existing economic structure. Malaya had been, and was being,
opened up by European capital and enterprise. Since it was not suitable
country for full European settlement, and was under-populated, this
implied immigration on a large scale by other races. W ith ou t deliberate
importation of labour by employers such immigration would have been
slow, and would also have secured a much larger share in the advantages
of opening up the country for the immigrants themselves. In these con
ditions it was inevitable, even if it was not very creditable, that labour
should be imported at the employer’s expense, and as far as possible for
the employers advantage. But if we enquire why the original system of
importation, which was in fact a form of temporary slavery, broke down
under pressure of crimping, we shall find that it was not because of any
resistance either by organised labour or by nationalism in India or China
but because both Europeans and Chinese in Malaya had earlier objected
to the methods by which this semi-slavery had been enforced. In this
respect the Indian Immigration Fund, the Labour Code and all the work
of the Labour Department may fairly be represented as a continuation of
a more liberal and generous attitude to labour, and as a genuine attempt
to improve labour conditions.
Moreover, the officers who administered the system were all men who
had^ begun their training by a study of language and customs in South
India, and there is little doubt that they regarded themselves, as did their
colleagues in the Chinese Secretariat, as protectors of the interests of one
section of Malaya s working class. On the fundamental economic issue
they may have been on the wrong side, for their ultim ate purpose was to
maintain a labour supply at a more or less stable price by importing or
exporting labour. But it would, be wrong to make too much o£ their

inevitable social contacts with business interests or to suggest that they
were ineffectual or half-hearted protectors of labour s interests. The Ma
layan Labour Code before die war implemented far more recommenda
tions of the International Labour Organisation dian was generally the
case in Asia; and when later a representative of the Indian Government
was regularly given access to estates employing Indian labour, there were
very few instances reported in which the Code was not being adequately
enforced. Moreover, the report issued by Srinavasa Sastri on his visit to
Malaya on behalf of the Government of India in 1937 certainly did not
give the impression that exploitation of labour was the purpose or even
the consequence of the Government organisation in Malaya.
Nevertheless, if we make proper allowance for certain hysterical exag
gerations designed for propaganda rather than as a serious contribution
to truth, there remains a substantial element of truth in the prewar
attacks by Indian nationalists on immigration policy in Malaya. It is natu
ral for an Englishman, reading the statements that Malaya threw back
its labourers like sucked oranges to India when it had no further use for
diem, to point to the undeniably better economic conditions in Malaya
than in India, even during bad times; he draws attention to the large
sums remitted to India in small postal orders, points to the well-built
labourer’s lines, the water supply, the free milk and so on, and dismisses
the accusation as a hysterical lie. Yet the ‘‘sucked orange” propaganda
drew attention to a real evil, the import and export of labour as a com
modity, in response to varying demand, which took the place of genuine
immigration. Similarly, the suggestion that Indians, for all their toil,
rarely rose far above their wretched starting point may have exaggerated
the wretchedness but contained a sound attack on immigration policy
conducted on commercial principles.
The effect of the policy was to accentuate the transient character of
Indian labour in Malaya, so that relatively few Indians were absorbed
into Malayan society. A t the same time it encouraged Indian labourers to
look to the Government for protection rather than to organise themselves
or even to care very much for their individual advancement.
There were few channels of advancement by which Indians could pass
into the local middle class, and few inducements to bring wives to Malaya
and settle there. The average Indian worker’s stay in Malaya was one of a
few years only. True, there has always been an Indian middle class in
Malaya; but, unlike die Chinese middle class, it has not been recruited
276 r AND TH E W E ST
/D A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M •A N U
from the workers in Malaya. Doctors, lawyers, teachers and clerks came
in originally from the middle class in South I n d ia or C e y lo n , and
have since been recruited mainly from the descendants of this class. The
ubiquitous cliettiar has lent money, mainly against r e a l p ro p erty; the
merchants have in the main been little more than agents o f firms in
India, or local firms retaining very close ties with the h o m e la n d .
Immigration set the demographic stage for nationalism in M alaya. But
before giving a brief sketch of the scene at the outbreak o f the Pacific
War, it is perhaps as well to mention a few of the outstanding events that
affected the pattern of immigration during the 'thirties. One o f these was
the suspension by the Indian authorities of all m igration o f unskilled
labour to Malaya in 1938. It is unnecessary to go into details about die
dispute. Enough has been said of the opposing points of view to show
that a break was probably inevitable, and the 1938 recession p ro vid ed the
occasion. The political effects of the quarrel are obscure and difficult to
trace; probably, at least, it heightened in the Indian middle class the sense
°f supporting the cause of the local workers on behalf of In d ia, and so
prepared the way for the Indian Independence L eagues d u rin g the
Japanese Occupation. But demographically the suspension o f the flow of
migrants was one of the causes of the comparative failure o f Indians to
settle, and of the decline in importance, both absolutely a n d relatively, of
e -Indian component in Malaya’s population.
Chinese Immigrants
Immigration of Chinese in the 'thirties was affected chiefly by two
eI e? tST the. &reat depression and the war in China— and by the reaction
~ ,t e Em igration policy of the Government in Malaya to these events.
net outfiow of Chinese as a result of depression from 1931 to
led to a demand for controlling the inflow, and in 1933 an Aliens
rdinance was passed, limiting the monthly number of alien deck pas
sengers admitted, though until 1938 it was in fact used only to lim it the
umber of males by a quota which varied from time to time. Fem ale deck
passengers were allowed to enter without restriction, except fo r precau-
tons to prevent as far as possible the importation of prostitutes. T h is was
oone partiy because the unsatisfactory sex ratio among the C hinese was
regarded as an evil, and partly because a substantial proportion o f female
immigrants had hitherto been wives or prospective wives, and the ordi
nance was intended to regulate only the supply of labourers.
Japan’s invasion of South China following the outbreak o f the Sino-
NAn ONALISM IN M A L A y A 277
J a p a n e s e c o n flic t i n 1 9 3 7 g r e a tly in c re a s e d th e flo w o f fe m a le im m ig ra n ts

° M a l a y a . B u t e v e n b e fo r e th is tim e a n o t h e r fa c t o r h a d b e g u n to in -
c r e a s e th is flo w . T h i s w a s th e ab se n c e o f a n y c r it e r io n f o r lim itin g o r
e l e c t i n g im m ig r a n ts . T h e s h ip p in g c o m p a n ie s w e re s im p ly a llo t t e d th e ir
^ U o ta o f th e t o t a l p e r m itt e d , a n d l e f t to m a k e t h e i r o w n a rra n g e m e n ts .
n c e p a ssa g e s to M a la y a w e r e in k e e n d e m a n d , th e p ric e ro se q u ite
^ h a r p ly . B u t c o m p a n ie s a p p e a r to h a v e ra is e d th e p ric e s a g o o d d e a l
e ss t h a n m a r k e t c o n d itio n s w o u ld h a v e a llo w e d . E u ro p e a n c o m p a n ie s
t e n d t o c h a r g e p ric e s b a s e d b r o a d ly o n a v e ra g e cost, e v e n w h e r e i t is n o t
l n t h e i r im m e d ia te in te r e s t to d o so, a n d th o u g h a v e ra g e co st p e r passage
' v ° u l d b e r a is e d b y th e lim i t a t io n o f n u m b e rs , a n d th e c o m p a n ie s p ro b -
a b l y in c r e a s e d t h e i r c h a rg e s a lit t le b e y o n d th is, a s itu a tio n a ro se in
' v h i c h t h e d e m a n d f o r p assages fr o m th e lo d g in g h o u ses in S o u th C h in a
e x c e e d e d th e s u p p ly , a n d th e c o m p a n ie s w e r e in a p o s itio n to select
th o s e t o w h o m th e y w o u ld s e ll. N a tu r a lly th e y g a v e p re fe re n c e to th o se
'v h o b o u g h t n o n - q u o ta tic k e ts; a n d sin c e th e sa le o f th ese tick ets w as
h i g h l y p r o fit a b le , th e lo d g in g h o u se s w e r e g iv e n a s tro n g in d u c e m e n t
to e n c o u r a g e w o m e n to m ig r a te to M a la y a .
T h i s la rg e -s c a le im m ig r a tio n o f w o m e n , to g e th e r w ith th e v ir t u a l ces
s a t i o n o f th e im p o r t a t i o n o f m a le la b o u r f o r p ro fit, p r o fo u n d ly m o d ifie d
t h e c h a r a c t e r o f th e C h in e s e p o p u la tio n in M a la y a . E n o rm o u s n u m b e rs
C h i n e s e h o m e s w e r e e s ta b lis h e d in M a la y a , as a r e s u lt p a r t ly o f th e im
p r o v e d s ta tu s o f la b o u r a n d p a r t ly o f th e im p r o v e d se x -ra tio . M a n y o f
th e s e h o m e s w e r e m e r e ly o v e rc ro w d e d c u b ic le s o r p e a s a n t h u ts ; a n d th e
P a r e n t s i n m o s t cases w e r e a h u s b a n d w h o h a d c o m e as a la b o u r e r o n a
t e m p o r a r y b a sis a n d a w ife w h o h a d c o m e e it h e r o n s im ila r te rm s o r as a
r e f u g e e . T h e r e w a s p r o b a b ly n o t, in m o st cases, a n y in te n tio n to s e ttle o r
to p l a n t r o o t s i n th e s o il o f M a la y a . B u t th e lo n g c iv il w a r in C h in a a n d
t h e J a p a n e s e o c c u p a tio n o f M a la y a g a ve ch an c es f o r fa m ilie s to g ro w u p
a n d f o r lo c a l s o c ia l a n d e c o n o m ic ties to b e fo rm e d .
T h e effects on social structure among the Chinese w ill need much
fu rth e r study. T here has been, of course, a distinct decline in the im
p ortan ce o f the kongsi-house of male labourers only, having virtually no
contact w ith the country in which they were (as they believed) temporarily
ea rn in g th eir living. In so far as these men have m arried and brought up
ch ild ren , their actual attachment to M alaya has clearly increased. But the
hongsi-house has in some measure been replaced by the C hinese settle
m en t o r Chinese village; and the settlements have clearly had more chance
to influence the Chinese families that had already been a s s i m i l a t e d than
the kongsi-house could ever have done. It is apparent that fewer Chinese
women now wear Malay dress, and other cultural contacts with the
Malays may also have declined. The specifically “Straits born” charac
teristics of M alaya’s Chinese may have become more widespread as a re
sult of a better sex-ratio and improved economic status; but they may
also have become diluted and weakened in the process.
The Prewar Situation

Immediately before the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the demographic
picture was as follows: about three-quarters of a m illion Indians, with a
low sex-ratio especially in the towns, and relatively few children; just over
two m illion Chinese, with a sex-ratio improving and not very far below
normal, and with many young children, but not quite so many at the
adolescent stage as in the early-marriage-age groups; and almost exactly
the same number of Malays (including Malaysian immigrants), with a
population of approximately normal age and sex structure.
The political constitution at the time was rather complex. There were
t ree ifferent political units, the Colony of the Straits Settlements, the
rederated Malay States and the group of Unfederated States. In none was
ere any proper electoral machinery. The Colony was ruled by the Gov
ernor with a Legislative Council of Official and Nominated Unofficial
em ers. e Governor of the Straits Settlements was also High Com
missioner o oth the Federated and the Unfederated States. A t one time
mac mery of legislation and control in the Federation had differed
Vv P V U C CoIon>'- though administration in the country
side depended for effectiveness on the Malay peasant's loyalty to his sultan
n on t e modified traditional machinery of the penghuhi or village
ea man. ut for fifteen years a policy of decentralisation and transfer
o certain epartments to State control under the separate Sultans had
assimilated the Federated to the Unfederated States. This process had
een accompame by a tendency to set up pan-Malayan departments
w ich secured uniform policy by consultation with the State government
machines where any local idiosyncracies necessitated it.
The Unfederated States differed materially among themselves—from
rengganu at one extreme, a traditional Malay monarchy, only slightly
modified in its form by the presence of British control and technical ad
vice, to Jo lore at the other, a State with a constitution and a cabinet and
legislature and pronounced inter-racial elements modifying the original
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M A L A Y A
One vitally im portant thing to emphasize is that at this time none of

the three races owed any allegiance to Malaya as a political unit. A
nal exception might be made of the very small Communist party w ic
was advocating in its underground propaganda a Malayan People s Re
public, but was in fact merely a branch of an international organisation
working throughout Southeast Asia and taking orders from the secretariat
in Shanghai.
The Malays owed allegiance territorially to their own sultans. Cu -
turally their allegiance was to Islam, and more specifically to the maritime
branch of it speaking Malaysian languages and having a common tradi
tion of culture, trade, and intermarriage among the royal families, exten -
ing along the coasts of Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and parts of Java an
other islands. Malaya itself was a political accident of British rule, even
though in fact the Malays of the peninsula had some claim to pre-emi
nence in the cultural rivalry of claiming to be the “true Malays.
About the political sentiments of the Chinese it is difficult to generalise.
A few of those who had settled permanently in Malaya abandoned their
political allegiance to China in favour of allegiance to the British Empire.
Some adopted a form of Malay speech and dress but retained many
Chinese customs. The m ajority probably retained links with China in
gradually more and more attenuated forms, and did not acquire any new
political or cultural ties to replace those that disappeared. It is important
not to exaggerate the degree of settlement of the Chinese in Malaya,
through a superficial reading of the 1947 Census. Only about a quarter of
the Chinese over twenty-one at that date had, been born in Malaya, and
the proportion in 1941 was almost certainly lower. Many of those born
in China had married and had children in Malaya; but from their own
point of view (though not necessarily that of the children) the fact that
this had happened in Malaya may well have seemed merely an accident
of war.
Among the Indians there have probably never been more than a very
tiny fraction who regard Malaya as their country. The sex-ratio is lowest
among the Indians, the class structure least conducive to assimilation,
and the relative smallness of this racial group has militated against com
plete absorption. An exception must, however, be made in the case of the
Indian Muslims who have intermarried with Malays and become Malay
speaking.
Such unity as exists in Malaya is a postwar phenomenon. Nationalism
in Malaya has been, in the main, tlie trace on Malayan soil of nationalisms
of other lands. Malayan nationalism, if it exists at all, is something very

new. It is a result of many complex forces, and its character is still fluid
and unformed.
&
2. COMPONENTS OF PR E W AR N ATIO N ALISM IN MALAYA
Chinese Nationalism in Malaya
world w ar the only nationalism that had any im

B
efo re t h e second
portant influence in Malaya was Chinese nationalism. Some of the
wealthy Chinese merchants of Southeast Asia had helped the Chinese
national revolution of 1911, giving assistance and asylum to its workers
and providing money for the cause. The bulk of the Chinese in Malaya
had been apathetic about politics at that time, but the revolution led to
an upsurge of enthusiasm for education, and the schools rapidly de
veloped into centres of nationalist propaganda, not only because it was
necessary to send to China for teachers, who would thus tend to be
members of the revolutionary intelligentsia of South China, but also be
cause the Kuomintang or nationalist party, w ell aware of the economic
importance of Southeast Asia, took good care to spread nationalist ideas
through the national culture.
Chinese education was not actually discouraged by the authorities but
it was carefully watched ,because of its anti-British character and its
tendency to regard Malaya as a province ripe for annexation to China.
This fact, combined with a reluctance to give an English education ex
cept to those for whom jobs could be found as clerks, led to the rather
restiictive character of Malayan education in the ’thirties. There was
more anxiety to close undesirable schools than to open others to take their
place; a demand for education existed, as did considerable financial re
sources with which to meet it, and yet the demand was not met.
A n im portant feature of Chinese life in M alaya at this time was tlie
influence of secret societies among the immigrant Chinese. These had
been an im portant factor in the maintenance of social discipline among
the early Chinese in the Straits, so much so that before 1850 the Govern
ment impinged very little on Chinese life, which was governed largely
by these societies rules. A fter the establishment of the office o f the Pro
tector o f Chinese and the compulsory registration of societies, the extor
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M A L A Y A AO i
tion and intim idation by these societies gradually waned; but they
remained an influence in the background of Chinese life, making many
of the Chinese rather timid about any form of public activity.
In the decades between the wars both the Kuomintang and the Com
munist party used secret-society techniques to achieve their objectives.
Secret societies ranged from gangs devoted wholly to crime and extortion,
to the disciplinary element in trade, craft, or clan associations which per
formed important economic and social functions and gave genuine as
sistance and protection to their members. It is necessary to recognize that
in Chinese social life the unitary notions of law and force, to which the
West is accustomed, do not prevail. It is easy to condemn societies and
guilds as illegal and to accuse them of extortion and blackmail; and it is
almost equally easy to accept them at their face value as a fair analogy
of societies in the West that exist to perform useful functions.
T o a European there is a very clear dividing line on the use of force.
On one hand is force used on the side of law, which carries a part of the
prestige of natural law and some of the inherited virtue of the Roman
Empire; on the other is all other force. A person collecting funds for any
cause however worthy, who threatened a European even indirectly with
any physical pressure, would forfeit all claim to goodwill, and unless the
force was overwhelming would arouse strong opposition. Therefore a
European who hears of a Chinese giving money to an association under
threats to person or property naturally thinks of the association as an
extortion-gang pure and simple. In fact, however, most of the associations
other than those concerned mainly with Western-educated Chinese proba
bly have some illegal activities and illegal sanctions. A Chinese w ill not
normally regard it as strange to pay money to his guild, or a subscription
to a school, or a contribution to China Relief, partly because he thinks
he should pay and partly because he is afraid of being hurt in some way
if he does not. If the cause is strongly disapproved, he w ill be led to join
with his fellows in resisting or at least be evasive; if the cause is worthy
but lacks any sanction, he will be more apathetic.
These factors make it extremely difficult to assess Chinese public
opinion or to determine the extent of Chinese interest in, for example,
the Kuomintang or the Communist party. The mere fact that Kuomin
tang pressure was exerted through schools, through trade guilds, and
through clan associations cannot be used as evidence that all these were
merely cover for political pressure from China; but equally the fact that
Chinese still voluntarily adhered to these associations in spite of the use
of violence and of pressure through associates or kinsmen in China does

not prove any positive political support for the party. W e can say only
that the Kuomintang made good use, for political ends, of pressure
exerted through all die instruments of Chinese culture; that it was ex
pected to do so, and not specially resented on that account; and that part
of the support given to the policies of successive Chinese consuls re
sulted from a desire to toe the line, and part from a more intellectual or
em otional loyalty. Certainly the attempts of Sir Cecil Clementi and
other Governors to ban the Kuomintang from M alaya appear to have
aroused genuine resentment among the Chinese community. Equally
certainly it would be a grave mistake to assess the extent of Kuomintang
influence in Malaya at the time on the basis of this resentment alone.
Communist influence among the Chinese was much weaker than
Nationalist inEuence before the war. Like the Nationalists, the Commu
nists made use of schools for their propaganda, but in the main instead
of bringing in Communist teachers they tended to organise political ac
tivity among the students in the schools, undermining school discipline,
using boys to disseminate propaganda and study simplified Marxist litera
ture, and organising school strikes and discontent. The chief instrument
of Communism in the schools was the Singapore Student's Federation,
the objectives of which were, characteristically enough: to cultivate
friendly feelings; to increase knowledge and improve art; to unite the
student masses of Singapore; and to struggle for the interests of students.
The other chief agents of Communist propaganda were the Labour
Unions affiliated to the Singapore General Labour Union, and the Anti-
Imperialist League. Both were predominantly Chinese, but about 10 per
cent of the membership of the Labour Unions was Malay and about 10
percent of that of the Anti-Imperialist League was Indian. Though both
these bodies had executives dominated by Communists it is probable
that many of their members were not even aware of this.
It is difficult to assess the amount of intim idation practised by the
Communists at this time. There is some evidence that they were short of
funds, which does not suggest successful extortion; and it seems probable
that their numbers were insufficient to make them a menace to other
workers not m their unions, except of course when a strike had actually
been organised with a large measure of initial support. The power of
the Communists to rule unions by means of W orkers’ Protection Corps
arose only after their successes in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese.
W e cannot, in a paper of this length, trace in any detail the relation
of the Governments of the Straits Settlements and Federated M alay States

to secret societies, or their use of the weapon of banishment as a means of
controlling extortion and intim idation of witnesses. The following
thumbnail sketch must suffice.
In the first few decades after the founding of Singapore the fact that
the Chinese kept order among themselves was more or less accepted. Later
when the activities of the various societies through which order had been
maintained led to violence or extortion that obtruded itself on European
notice, the prevailing attitude was one of shocked surprise at the existence
of such hidden depths of depravity. A fter the establishment of the
Chinese Protectorate a serious effort was made to break the power of such
societies, and the use of banishment as a weapon became a regular feature
of Government political activity. This was, of course, a weapon of un
questionable legitimacy at a time when most Chinese were aliens and
essentially transient.
By the beginning of the first world war the power of the old secret
societies, running virtually a separate state within the state, had been
largely broken. In the first decade between the wars attention was
focussed mainly on anti-British Chinese nationalism fostered through
schools, clan associations, cultural bodies and the like, partly by the
methods of intim idation already well-known among tlie immigrant
Chinese. In the second decade, while attention was more or less equally
divided between Communism and Chinese nationalism, the latter was
becoming less anti-British and merely needed watching, while the former
was regarded as an increasing danger, and banishment warrants were
used more frequently against Communist trade union organisers.
W hile subsequent events have shown that this may have been a neces
sary precaution, we must emphasize that the character of banishment as
a political weapon was slowly and unconsciously changing. As the Chinese
population became more settled and felt itself less alien it came to be
further from the truth to call banishment merely protective removal of a
visitor who had abused hospitality—for which no reason need be given—
and nearer the truth to call it a sentence of exile from the land of his
adoption imposed on a man, w ithout trial, for a political offence.
A t the end of the second world war, when few Chinese had been less
than eight years in the country, and when banishm ent as a Communist
suspect was a sentence not merely of exile but of almost certain death on
arrival in China, there were still m any whose attitude toward this weapon
remained completely unchanged by the course of events. T o such people
the fact that a Labour Government at W estminster questioned the legiti

macy o£ banishing known trade union organisers automatically, was a
sign of unwarrantable interference with the man on the spot. Later when
a m ajority of these trade union organisers proved to be violent Commu
nists they felt they had been proved right. It is possible that nothing less
could have averted the present civil war; but candour compels us to
adm it also that events had converted a relatively fair and harmless policy
into a violently oppressive one, that the men on the spot had a strong
vested interest which might reasonably be supposed to have dulled their
perception of this change, and that the attitude of the Labour Govern
ment (even if it ultim ately proved mistaken) was based on far more
creditable motives than that of its critics.
Malay Nationalist Movements

T he growth of Malay nationalism in Malaya had barely begun when
the second world w ar broke out. But like Chinese nationalism its main
interests were not (at least at first) in Malaya. It was spun from two
strands, the cultural reaction of Islam against the W est and the nationalist
movement of Indonesia. These were the conscious intellectual forces. But
another strand which has since come to light may have been there all
along, a desire, against all reason and probability, to defend against exces
sive outside intrusion the shy, aristocratic, leisurely culture of pre-Islamic
custom which characterises the Malay race in the uncrowded lands of
Malaya and parts of Sumatra and Borneo.
A t the beginning of the twentieth century the combination of British
ru e and prosperity in the plantations had provided for parts of the Malay
anstocracy incomes that enabled their sons to go to Cairo or Beirut or
Mecca for education. These boys, when they returned, became a small and
rather frustrated Malay intelligentsia, circulating (in private) magazines
in Arabic and Malay that dealt with forbidden topics of nationalism and
the politics of the Middle East. They established literary associations and
small debating societies which, though denied overt political influence,
create small circles of friends that were to form nuclei, thirty or more
years later, of political bodies.
On this scattered intelligentsia three new influences impinged in the
third decade of the century. A rising Indonesian nationalism was implant
ing its ideas through personal contacts and M alay journals; Japanese
business men were beginning to spread the pan-Asianism that was later
to produce the collaborators of the Pacific W ar; and the British de
centralisation policy in the Malay States was beginning to restore to

these Malay aristocrats some of the cultural leadership of which the
earlier Federation policy had deprived them.
A part from contacts in sport between Malays in different states there
was nothing to draw the Malays of the peninsula together. Only one pan-
Malay organisation emerged in the fourth decade of the century, and
this was only loosely connected with politics. The Persaudaraan Sahabat
Pena (Brotherhood of Pen Friends) was founded about the middle of
the decade, w ith branches throughout Malaya. Its objects were mainly
cultural; to raise the standard of the Malay language and safeguard Malay
culture from extinction, and to increase the quantity of Malay literature.
This body appears to have drawn its members mainly from die section
of the intelligentsia which was subject to Arab influence. It had some
religious bias, diough it was not a religious organisation. Many of die
contacts made through this organisation, and some of the ideas it helped
to spread, reappeared later in the United Malays National Organisation.
It is a matter of some significance that the first Malay political move
ment in the periinsula began not in the Malay States but in Singapore,
where the Malay Union (Kesatuan Malayu) was founded in 1926. Malay
nationalism began as a defensive reaction against the virtual extinction
of Malay culture, and it began where that culture had been most sup
pressed by alien elements—in Singapore, where large numbers of the
Malays had degenerated to hired servants of other races. The Malay
Union’s objects were, from its beginnings, to struggle against the eco
nomic and educational backwardness of the Malay race and enable it to
hold its own against the immigrants.
The Malay U nion’s first branch was established in Malacca in 1937 and
it was only after this that it began founding brandies in the Federated
Malay States. Its first'pan-Malayan conference was not held until 1939,
and the branches in the Unfederated States and in Penang were not
formed until after this. This first conference, under the chairmanship of
a Malay lawyer, was exploratory only. The second conference in December
1940 was the first and only prewar example of political activity by die
Malays on a pan-Malayan scale. The resolutions passed indicate that in
the main the Malay Union was an aristocratic body tending to identify
the preservation of Malay culture with the fostering of the interests of
the intelligentsia. There were demands for the creation of a post of Malay
Assistant Director of Education, for Malay representation on all external
missions, and for exemption of the Malay States from income tax. There
was much talk of improving the economic position and political power of
the M alay race, but no detailed suggestions which could effectively
fu rther this object.
It is im portant to emphasize that, along w ith the influences of Arab,
Indonesian and Japanese nationalism, which all played their small part,
an im portant component of Malay nationalism was bewilderment. The
Malays were being drawn into a political and economic world which
form erly they had regarded as outside the narrow circle of their village
economy and their small states based on hereditary aristocracy, leisure and
intrigue. They were being drawn in, too, in a subordinate position. It is
not so much that they were materially poorer. Like other primary pro
ducers, the Malays were considerably worse off in the 'thirties than in die
'twenties, but the intelligentsia had little detailed knowledge of this, and
they themselves were probably better off because of die general develop
ment of the country. Rather, they were acutely conscious of increasing
political and economic dependence. They saw Malays everywhere in debt
to Chinese and needing to be protected by a land reservation policy to
prevent them losing their land. They saw Malays as messengers in offices
where Chinese and Indians were clerks. They saw Malays employed as
car drivers by Europeans and even Chinese. They began to realise die
dependence of the Malay fisherman and small holder on die Chinese
dealer and Indian moneylender.
T he decentralisation policy, and the building up of the influence of
the Malay aristocracy in the states encouraged the M alay nationalist in
telligentsia to regard itself as an instrument for preserving an inherited
culture not strong enough to stand unaided. Influenced by Arab pan-
Islamism, by Indonesian attempts to absorb them in Indonesia and by
Japanese pan-Asianism, they nevertheless saw their own political awaken
ing not as any brave new world, but as a tardy recognition of dangers
threatening to convert their race into an "aboriginal stock” and their
culture into a museum piece.
Indian Nationalist Movements

T he impact of Indian nationalism on Malaya was almost negligible
until the last years before the W ar. No doubt many of the workers on
the rubber estates were vaguely familiar with Indian Congress propa
ganda in South India. But it had little or no obvious relevance to Malaya
where they did not for the most part feel that they belonged.
NATIONALISM IN MALAYA 287
Three influences can be traced. One was the direct influence on In*
dian labourers through the Indian Government Agent attached to the
Labour Department. A second was Indian journalism in Malaya itself.
Finally there was the very limited political activity of the Central Indian
Association in Kuala Lumpur.
The Agent of the Government of India was first appointed in 1923 on
the initiative of the Indian Government, but with the full consent of the
Labour Department in Malaya, to supervise the conditions of employ
ment of Indian labourers. He was given a legal right to visit any estate
during working hours and to question labourers directly about their con
ditions. On the whole the arrangement worked smoothly, but the pres
ence of the agent of the Government of another country as a protector
of labourers’ interests naturally aroused some political feelings and
helped to keep the Indian labourer conscious of the influence of Indian
nationalism, even though the Agent was not a political officer.
Indian journalism in Malaya did not play a very active political role.
Before 1932 there were no Indian-language dailies, except for a brief
venture by a Chinese company in 1925. The weekly Indian newspapers
contained political news about India, but were not propaganda organs
and did not concern themselves with Malayan politics. The same may
be said of the Indian dailies started from 1932 onwards—at least until
about 1938. News about India was welcome, and as the journalists were
themselves mostly Indian nationalists the influence of these papers no
doubt helped to preserve, or in some cases even foster, Indian nationalist
feelings. But it would be misleading to represent them as organs for the
dissemination of Indian nationalist propaganda; and with nationalism
in a Malayan setting they did not concern themselves at all.
It was the Central Indian Association in Kuala Lumpur which was the
only real source of Malayan Indian politics before the war. This Associa
tion was founded as a result of Nehru’s first visit to Malaya in 1937. Be
fore this Indian Associations had existed locally throughout Malaya but
they had been wholly non-political. Nehru’s visit did something to stir
up the/‘political backwater,” as he called Malaya, and the Central Indian
Association was set up to represent and to foster Indian political opinion.
It was prevented from affiliating the different Indian Associations in
Malaya under itself and so establishing an Indian political movement
throughout Malaya. But it nevertheless secured representatives nomi
nated from the different Associations, and these no doubt came in useful
later in the organisation of die Indian Independence Leagues.
T he two chief political activities of the Central Indian Association be

fore the w ar were first, the evidence that it gave before the Sastri Commis
sion investigating the conditions of Indian Labour in 1937 and second,
its support of the Klang strikes in 1941. It is noteworthy that, although
the members of the C entral Indian Association were m ainly professional
men, and although they were certainly not adept at mass action, both
these activities brought the Association into contact w ith the Indian
estate worker, as his champion against oppression and exploitation.
W h at the effects of this contact would have been if the Japanese had
never invaded Malaya it is impossible to say. It has already been men
tioned that, unlike the Chinese, the Indian middle class in Malaya is not
in the main recruited from local workers. It is possible that even in the
absence of a Japanese invasion this identification of the Indian profes
sional man with the interests of the Indian worker would have had im
portant results.
Pro-British Chinese Groups

One further form of nationalism that had some influence in prewar
Malaya must also be mentioned, though to most nationalists it would no
doubt appear wholly artificial. This was the strong pro-British feeling of
an important group of Straits Chinese, who took a very considerable
pride in their status as British subjects, or “the King’s Chinese.” This
feeling was undoubtedly quite genuine and intense, though the group
was not numerically a large one. The Association that represented it was
known as the Straits Chinese British Association, founded in 1900 by a
group of Chinese British subjects. It is impossible to understand such
phenomena as the recent Penang secession movement w ithout some ap
preciation of the fact that the political status of British subjects was
highly prized by many Straits Chinese, who joined the V olunteer Forces,
resisted the pressure of the Kuomintang, and asserted their British na
tionality not merely passively but actively.
This was the complex background of undeveloped and inchoate na
tionalism that existed in Malaya at the time of the Japanese invasion in
1941. But it must be emphasized that the great m ajority of people of all
races were untouched by any kind of national feeling. The situation
however was soon to develop very rapidly, even though it has not yet lost
its chaotic inconsistency.
NATIONALISM IN MALAYA
289
&
3. THE IM PACT OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

h e in vasion o fMalaya by the Japanese in December 1941 produced
T many different effects on nationalism in the peninsula. Among the
Malays the important effects were shock and upheaval, and also the learn
ing of the habits of violence and of staged mass demonstrations. Among
the Chinese the Occupation meant guerrilla activity, a sense of insecurity
and a reversion to habits based on personal accommodation to an atmos
phere of violence; the psychological effect on their attitude to the British
was also very important. Among the Indians the organisation of the In
dian Independence League and the Indian National Army was probably
the dominant factor. But on all the peoples of Malaya, brought up in
an atmosphere in which government had been run by an alien people,
on the whole accepted as friendly, and in which politics was definitely
not respectable, the sudden change of masters and the impact of violent
Japanese nationalism and pan-Asianism was a most intensive school for
nationalist feelings and thoughts about political questions.
Japanese Occupation Methods

The principal technique of the Japanese was one of stirring up anti-
European feeling and emphasizing that they were an Asian people. They
were not concerned with efficient or progressive administration. More
over they were dependent on the existing government services for local
knowledge. Therefore at die beginning they could achieve a considerable
effect by promoting to the top people who had previously occupied
comparatively junior positions. The early days of Japanese rule were a
time of opportunity for the young and ambitious, especially among the
Malays.
The civilian administration was in the main a facade. Such activities
as education, medical services and public works were starved of funds,
material and personnel. The actual work involved was improvisation
rather than creative development. But in some cases it was done well; and
it gave a sense of power and consequence until Japanese themselves ar
rived to take over. One of the effects of having local men as directors and
administrators, in services in which formerly they had been assistants,
was to stimulate local professional pride. T he M alayan population ac

quired new self-confidence and the Japanese acquired a reputation for
being in earnest about their pan-Asianism. Sim ilar results developed in
die non-Malay technical services.
It may be questioned how far the responsibility exercised by Malayans
at this time was genuine. In some cases, particularly in the early days,
there can be little doubt that it was. Senior men, whose initiative had to
some extent atrophied under constant European supervision, in condi
tions in which quite ju n ior Europeans had access to confidences that
were denied to them, were able for a few months to exercise genuine con
trol. The return to subordinate positions, first under Japanese and later
under British superiors, inevitably made these men feel bitter and frus
trated.
There were, however, others who were given status and authority in
return for political services during the campaign, but were not in effect
given any real administrative work to do. T he effect on them, if they were
intelligent enough—as many were not— to avoid being shot by the
Japanese, was to give a wholly false idea of the nature of administrative
work. In essence, they merely occupied positions in which they did what
they were told, and others did what they told them to do, because of die
framework of a police state effectively controlled by the kempeitai, the
Japanese military police. The difficulties of controlling clever and ambi
tious men were much simplified in an atmosphere in which any awkward
customer would simply be executed. A nd the problems of drawing lines
that would create the least sense of injustice and frustration were easily
solved in a situation where the general environm ent was saturated with
frustration and fear.
Effects on the Malays

It can hardly be doubted that the experiences of this time have pro
foundly affected current Malay attitudes. Those whose training consisted
largely of indoctrination with patriotic sentiments on behalf of Malaya,
the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and Japan, no doubt feel that they have un
used talents, but their attitude to power is likely to be unconstructive,
and their knowledge of the possibilities of the situation very vague. But
the more senior men whose local knowledge enabled them in the early
days to perform genuine functions may have a better grasp of the situa
tion.
The present situation is one in which the few Malays who are able to
carry real responsibility recognise the complete inability of the Malays

alone to administer an independent state and control the extremely able
immigrant communities without non-Malay assistance, and hence either
try to win the allegiance of Chinese and Indians or rely on British protec
tion; but they are continually menaced by the ideas of younger Malays
who were presumably convinced during the Occupation that the run
ning of a wholly Malay government would be quite a simple affair.
In fostering a patriotism for Malaya within the Co-Prosperity Sphere,
the Japanese fostered something that ultimately turned against them.
The highly emotional cult of the Emperor did not make many converts
among the Malays; but it stirred up feelings that could later be trans
ferred to Malaya, in a way which the more reserved British expressions of
national feeling could never do.
An interesting by-product of guerrilla activity by the Chinese against
the Japanese was the spread of the cult of invulnerability among the
Malays. Every man in the rural areas was liable to have to fight or be
killed. Neutrality and aloofness became impossible. These were conditions
in which the cult of invulnerability naturally became popular. This cult,
a survival of pre-Islamic Malay magic modified in some measure by
Muslim mysticism, was quite strong among the Malays before the days
of British rule, and never wholly died out even in fifty years of personal
security. Under the Japanese the cult was revived among the Malay
peasants, one of the leaders being Kiai Salleh, a man of peasant origins
himself who wielded considerable influence and power and appears to
have assisted Dato Onn in mobilising Malay peasant opinion against the
Malayan Union proposals.
This cult probably strengthened the Malay’s consciousness of race.
Kiai Salleh, for example, not merely encouraged his “invulnerable”
Malays to resist the attacks and demands of Chinese guerrillas, but also
went so far as to attack and loot a Chinese village, presumably with a view
to keeping alive the cult of invulnerability even when the real enemy in
the jungle could not be located. The influence of Islam was also strength
ened, for the invulnerable warrior had to lead a sober and virtuous life
according to the demands of Islam; and the familiar sequence of renewed
faith among those who survived unhurt, remorse among the wounded,
and the attribution of infidelity to the dead, may have contributed some
thing to the present religious revival among the Malays. Moreover there
can be little doubt that the experience of having fought bravely and often
292 ^ n a , io n a u s m a n d t h e w e st
successfully in self-defence has strengthened the political self confidence

of the Malays. .
T h e re w ere M alays o n b o th sides d u r in g th e w a r ; h u t as w i t t e n
d ian s a n d the In donesian s, so w ith th e M a la y s a lso , th e e m o tio n a ex
p e rie n c e o f fig h tin g seem s to h a v e been m o re im p o r t a n t t h a n t e si e on
w h ic h th ey fo u g h t. A f te r the w a r th ey re ta in e d , to a c o n s id e r a le exten ,
th e ir fe e lin g o f b e in g o n e race, a n d re m e m b e re d th e sen se o se ’r ehance
ra th e r th an the co n flict— in som e m easu re a n a lie n q u a r r e l to b o th sides
— w h ich h a d d iv id e d them .
Some Malays had form ed a fifth column to aid the J a p a n e s e against the
British. Before and after the fighting this was known as th e Kesatuan
Muda Melayu (K.M.M.), or Malay Youth M o v em en t.
During the campaign of 1941-2 it came under the con trol of Major
Fujiwara and its members wore an F armband and w ere known as F
men.” Other Malays, including the Sultan of P a h a n g an<^ m any men in
important positions under the Japanese, organised an anti-Japanese
movement on the side of the United Nations In some cases the same men
served in both movements; and though this may denote political in
competence it would be unjust to condemn it as mere treachery and self-
interest. Certainly it is not always regarded as such am ong the M a la y s
themselves.
It is a fact of considerable importance to the subsequent history of
Malaya that no Malay guerrillas were trained by the B ritish to operate
against the Japanese. Both the Malay Regiment and the M alay Volun
teers fought well against the Japanese. In general, how ever, Malay
Volunteer units were disbanded when the territory from w hich they were
drawn was abandoned, and no attempt was made to w ith d raw them and
train them to return and fight from the jungle. It seems probable that a
considerable number of them would have been w illing to do this; but the
British authorities were very skeptical about the possibilities o f guerrilla
warfare, and probably K.M.M. activities had made them distrust the
loyalty of the Malays.
Chinese Communists could be trusted to fight for their ow n lives against
the Japanese; and it would probably be fair to say that the authorities did
not greatly mind whether they succeeded or failed. T h e ir reluctance to
leave behind troops who had fought beside them down the peninsula is
understandable; but the history of Malaya might have been very different
if Malays had been armed and trained in considerable numbers for
guerrilla fighting.
NAT*ONALlSM in M ALAYA 293
$ ects on the Chinese
effects o f the O ccupation on the Chinese were fa r more complex.
° begin w ith, there was a very considerable massacre of Chinese by the
k ill ei'S' â r aS Can ascerta*nec^ îe J aPanese were concerned to
[h ree classes of Chinese: active supporters of Kuom intang, active
^ ftiu n ists, and those who had fought in the V olunteer forces and not
SUrren d ered .
^ h e authorities had, im m ediately before the fall of Singapore, armed
tra in e d a num ber o f stay-behind parties behind the Japanese lines,
lese w ere composed m ainly of Communists, some of whom had been
Seryin g prison sentences. T h ey did some h ard fighting against the Japa-
^ ese a n d today form p art of the nucleus of the present guerrilla forces in
f ju n g le . T h e K uom intang also organised a sm all guerrilla force, but
*ls \vas gen erally adm itted to be less disciplined and far less effective
ari the Com m unist force. Both groups secured a considerable measure of
suP p o rt fro m the Chinese, in spite of the fact that they certainly took
re p risals against some Chinese w ho refused to pay.
^ h e Chinese who had served in the Volunteers, and engaged in other
acts deem ed pro-B ritish by the Japanese, were o f two kinds. Some,
Pr o b ab iy a fa irly sm all proportion, were genuinely attached to British
ru le, B ritish ways and B ritish institutions. The m ajority were probably
actUated p a rtly by am bition, p artly by a desire to stand w ell w ith au
th o rity , p a rtly by various other motives and inducements. M any who
h a d w o rk ed in governm ent service before the w ar returned w ithout
acute discom fort to w ork u n d er the Japanese. M alays who did this
p ro b a b ly believed th at Jap a n now stood in the same protective relation
to th e ir States as B ritain had done; Indians may have thought they were
w ° rk in g fo r the liberation o f India. Chinese, w ith no such pretext, never
theless accepted the situation philosophically. It was m erely a m atter of
econom ics. T h ere was no other governm ent to w ork for. It is unreasonable
^°r a co lo n ial governm ent to expect from its subjects the attitude that a
free g overnm ent expects from its citizens.
T h o se w ho were genuinely pro-British in their attitude and who suc
ceeded, by keeping out of the lim elight, in escaping w ith their lives if not
th e ir p ro p erty, expected to be rew arded for their loyalty when the long-
w a i t e d lib eratio n arrived. W h en the British returned and treated all in
h a b ita n ts in very much the same way they felt b itter and frustrated. It is
p ro b a b ly this as much as anything th at accounts fo r the intensely bitter
feelings generated by any real o r im agined instances o f racial discrimina
tion, such as were inevitable in a situation in which the Japanese had

treated Asians in one way and Europeans in another. A n d it is probably
this that put an end to the propaganda of loyalty to the British Empire,
such as was frequently voiced before the w ar through bodies like the
Straits Chinese British Association.
British loss of prestige as a result of m ilitary defeat is often cited as the
chief cause of this change, but the break in continuity of the colonial tradi
tion and the failure to solve the problems of the return to Malaya are
probably equally important. During the Occupation there was a strong
sense ot comradeship in face of die common enemy between Chinese
(especially of the trading class) and British internees and prisoners of war.
But this attitude was quite different from the prew ar altitude. When,, in
1946, a group of ex-internees, in publicly thanking and rewarding a
Chinese who had signally helped them in Singapore, referred to his
“loyalty” the expression provoked widespread hostility among the
Chinese. They felt (no doubt wrongly) that a deliberate attempt was
being made to make political capital out of an act of friendship and
comradeship against the enemy.
Recently Chinese leaders in turn have been citing as evidence of
loyalty to Britain, or even to Malaya, acts of friendship to individual
British prisoners or of hostility to the Japanese. This is misleading. There
is plenty oi: evidence that the Chinese regarded the British partly as per
sonal friends in misfortune, partly as allies against the Japanese. Loyalty
in the old sense virtually disappeared in 1942, or at best in 19-15. The
effect of the war and the Occupation on the Chinese thus depended very
much on their situation and their initial attitude.
tirs t there were the guerrillas: the efficient and pow erful diree-star
organisation, or Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Arm y, Communist-led
and active against the Japanese supply lines, punishing their collabora
tors, and levying tithes from both willing and unw illing supporters, by
any pressure that they could bring to bear. Beginning with the nucleus
armed by the British just before the fall of Singapore they increased
greatly in numbers as a result of Japanese brutality towards the Chinese.
They were joined however by many terrorists and extortioners who had
no political motives but merely robbed for a living in the chaotic eco
nomic conditions that prevailed at the time. Not all of these were
brought under Communist control even by the end of the war.
T o the great mass of the Chinese who survived the initial massacres,
the Occupation period was one of insecurity and also of opportunity.
Large fortunes were to be made, but not by those who were squeamish
about legality or conventional methods of behaviour. Bribery of indi
vidual Japanese, black market deals, smuggling, and racketeering in vari
ous degrees, became the keys to success and prosperity. People became
accustomed, at least in the countryside, to paying taxes to two or more
authorities, and avoiding the attentions of both as far as possible. Most
probably feared the Japanese more than the guerrillas, and approved of
the guerrillas more than of the Japanese. But the habits of law and order
were largely lost in the business sector.
Those who had served the British Government for security of tenure and
position now served the Japanese for protection from police persecution.
They were paid less than the British had paid; and the inflation progres
sively reduced the purchasing power of their earnings. The Japanese
dollar fell from parity with the old British dollar to virtually nothing, and
was declared worthless when the British returned. Hence civil servants
had to supplement their income by petty corruption, by business deals
on the side or by selling furniture and other assets to intermediaries who
resold either to Japanese or to food producers in the countryside.
A comparatively small number actively collaborated against their own
community, as procurers for the Japanese agents, for the police and the
like. A substantial proportion of the detectives for the kempeitai were
Chinese. But far more acquired a vested interest in the disorder and in
security of Japanese rule which brought them wealth at the expense of
the rest of society.
No one is likely to underrate the importance of the Occupation period
in stimulating guerrilla organisation among the Chinese. But other ef
fects may have been in the aggregate more important; the inculcation of
the habit of paying extortion money; the vast increase in bribery and
irregularity of all kinds; the undermining of the prewar respect for gov
ernment and law; and the stimulation to fantastic extremes of the
tendency among the South Seas Chinese to be steadfastly neutral on all
political issues and concentrate attention on personal advancement.
Effects on the Indians

The group most affected by the w ar and die Japanese Occupation was
the Indian community. From being depressed and uninterested inhabit
ants of a political backwater, the Indians of Malaya became, in their own
estimation at least, the spearhead of a movement to liberate India. For
it was in Singapore that the Azad Hind Government was set up, and it
was in M alaya that most of the personnel fo r the Indian National Army
were recruited.
Very soon after the coming of the Japanese Arm y, Indian Independ
ence League branches were set up in every m ajor centre in Malaya. Their
aim was to spread propaganda, to collect funds, and to recruit and train
workers and troops fo r a fighting movement to liberate India.
T he original organizer of the movement was M ajor Fujiwara, a senior
intelligence officer on the staff of General Yamashita. Though he had to
work through interpreters he was extremely efficient in picking en
thusiastic Indian personnel, and giving them enough freedom of action
to convert the form er Indian Associations into active political bodies.
But the following up of the original enthusiasm was at first less success
ful. Rash Behari Bose, whom the Japanese had designated as the leader
of Indian Independence, proved unpopular and unsuccessful. He was too
obviously a Japanese puppet, and it is said in M alaya that his Japanese
cap did more than any other one thing to alienate Indian support.
T he original efforts to organise an Indian N ational Arm y fared no
better. Mohan Singh, one of the first officers to desert from the British
forces, and join t organiser w ith Akram of the first Indian National Army
of 15,000 men, resigned his command in protest against three grievances,
and was later put in custody. One of the points at issue was his refusal to
fight without a large enough force to take independent m ilitary action.
As a result of this quarrel, and also a split in the command of the Indian
Independence League, the first army was disbanded.
It is important to emphasize that, though the Japanese no doubt in
tended the movement for Indian Independence to be merely another
puppet in their pan-Asianism, this was strongly, and to a limited extent
successfully, resisted by the Indians themselves. T here can be little doubt
that the leaders felt they were using the Japanese almost as much as the
Japanese were using them.
By making some concessions to Indian opinion and giving some
genuine freedom of action the Japanese were able to revive the Indian
National Arm y and use the Indian Independence League for their own
purposes. The A rm y was reorganised under Colonel Bhonsale and a
Council of Indian Colonels. The civilian organisation was given new
energy by the a n iv a l of its Netaji, Subhas Chandra Bose. Finally in Oc
tober 1943 the Azad Hind Government was set up in Singapore.
Opinions w ill no doubt differ, for many years, on the extent to which
the Indian National Arm y was mainly financed by extortion levied with
297
NATIONALISM IN MALAYA
the protection of the Japanese police state, and recruited by press-gang

methods w ith the aid of the kempeitai. It is impossible for anyone with ex
perience in interpreting Japanese propaganda to turn again to the files
of the Syonan Times in Singapore without realising that a good deal of
pressure on the wealthier Indians was prevalent. There appears to have
been no regular system of auxiliary taxation of Indians, but m erely an
irregular levy of whatever funds could be wrung from the wealthy mem
bers of the community. Moreover membership of the Indian Independ
ence League was in some cases sought because it gave some protection
from the kempeitai. And in the Arm y itself the fact was freely recognised
that many of the rank and file had joined mainly for the rations.
It is unwise, however, to make too much of these facts in interpreting
the effects of the Indian Independence League on nationalism in Malaya
today. People may remember their real motives for any action less than
the dramatization which they made for themselves, consciously or un
consciously, to sustain their self-respect. There can be little doubt that
there was a good deal of genuine Indian patriotism stirred up by Bose s
oratory in a community unaccustomed to political speeches, a community
out of the main current of Indian affairs and suddenly led to feel itself
a vital and im portant element in Indian history. The deserters from
the British Indian Arm y accused the civilian recruits of being rice-eaters,
and the civilians accused the deserters of being February 15tli Patriots.
We may make much of these charges if we wish, but the important ele
ment in both is the implied standard of what an Indian patriot ought to
be. The R ani of Jhansi Regiment of Women may have been a propaganda
stunt. But it must have given a sense of importance to many who are
now mothers of Indian children in Malaya.
The Indian National Arm y was defeated. Its Netaji was killed and
thousands of its men also. Their memorial built in Ju ly 1945 on the
Singapore Esplanade was pulled down by other Indian troops who
landed within two months. To most of the people of Malaya the memory
of the Japanese Occupation is a nightmare of the past, and no love is felt
for those who collaborated with the Japanese. Even the flowers that used
to be left regularly at the site of the memorial are left no longer.
Yet echoes of the Indian National Arm y still linger in Malaya. The
Indian community learnt the use of arms, learnt how to organise politi
cally, and learnt some of the techniques of political bargaining. But even
more important for the future was the fact that it learnt a sense of con
sequence. The Congress Party accepted the Indian National Arm y as
heroes and in many parts of India they are honoured today. Whatever
may be the future of the Indians in Malaya, these facts w ill not be easily
forgotten.
V*
4. IM M EDIATE PO ST W A R DEVELOPMENTS
period in Malaya can be understood only in

h e im m e d ia t e p o st w a r
T terms of the way in which the w ar ended. T he all-important fact is

that the w ar ended in Japan, because Japan was h it by the atomic bombs,
delivered by the Americans. Much of the obscurity of the postwar
M alayan scene results from the mist of bewilderment that this unforeseen
event caused. W hat had been planned and expected was a campaign in
Malaya itself, with British troops landing on the coasts, and supported by
guerrillas armed and trained to attack from the jungle. The actual
situation was very different from the plan, and the effects of this dif-
feience can be traced through most of the component parts of Malayan
society.
W e may begin with the guerrillas, since the initiative first fell to them.
In the first two or three weeks after the Japanese surrendered there was
a power-vacuum into which the well-armed and well-organized Malayan
Communist Party rapidly expanded. Throughout the latter part of the
war they had been collecting money from the public and punishing by
eath collaborators” who refused to pay. The fact that they were able,
for a time, to take vengeance, with a good deal of popular support, against
those who had assisted the kempeilai, made it si;em extremely dangerous
to resist their demands. They are believed to have accumulated very con
siderable funds in Japanese currency, though these proved useless when
the British authorities decided to treat the Japanese dollar as without
value. But theii most important activity was organising General Labour
Unions in eveiy centre, setting up affiliated unions in virtually every
trade, using the unions as machines for extorting considerable affiliation
fees to the federal body, and stirring up labour unrest as a means of in
creasing their influence. Threats of violence were freely used, and gen
erally implemented, to terrorise workers who would not strike or sub
scribe when ordered to do so.
The fact that the Communist guerrillas had this period in which to
organise trade union activity proved a great handicap to the Labour
Government’s official policy of encouraging trade unionism in colonial
territories. T o the business interests, European and Chinese, the posi
tion was quite simple. They warned the Government that the trade
union leaders were seditious and should be banished. Later they blamed
the existing emergency 011 the Government’s premature encouragement
of trade unionism in Malaya. But in practice the Government’s problem
was the very difficult one of encouraging constitutional trade unions
(which are now one of the strongest political defences against the Com
munists) at a time when both Communists and the business community
were trying to tar all trade unions with the brush of Communist intimida
tion. This was a most difficult task at a time when it was politically un
desirable to ban the Communist party, and its techniques of intimidation
still enjoyed the prestige of the interregnum after the Japanese surrender.
British M ilitary Activities

The atomic bomb had its effect too on die British A rray and the M ili
tary Administration. The army had fought a hard campaign in Burma.
It was on the point of invading Malaya when the war ended. Indeed so
far had the preparations gone that the actual landing of troops followed a
slightly modified version of what had been planned as a m ilitary opera
tion. It is hardly surprising that the troops were ill-prepared for the task
which they actually had to perform.
The task of the army was to instill quickly into a friendly population,
demoralised by years of inflation, shortages, insecurity and corruption,
a respect for order and integrity and tlie rights of property, which they
were psychologically well prepared to receive. Restoring order was far
more a m atter of restoring standards than of supjDressing the out-and-
out lawbreakers. There has probably never been a time since the days of
Light and Raffles when strict incorruptibility of administration and
meticulous regard for property had been more im portant to British
prestige. But troops straight from a jungle campaign and newly released
from the full rigours of m ilitary discipline were hopelessly ill-prepared to
resist the temptations of the situation.
It is unfair to blame the individual soldiers for the fact that their cor
ruption, illegal commandeering of property, gun-play against unarmed
civilians, and sale of arms to gangsters, undermined in six months a tradi
tion that had taken a century to build. The guilty individuals were few,
the temptations were great, and there had been inadequate preparation.
T h e arm y of 1945 was the victim of circumstances no less than the army
of 1942. But those who understand the roots of British prestige in Malaya
appreciate that it was 1945 at least as much as 1942 that undermined the
confidence of the public.
A n additional source of trouble was the difficulty of knowing who were
the collaborators, or of deciding what acts of treachery to punish and
(more important) what acts of loyalty to reward and honour. Many of the
worst collaborators with the Japanese were able to make themselves useful
to the new administration and escape unharm ed or even secure great ad
vantages. The situation might have been better if there had been active
fighting in Malaya; but in the circumstances that actually prevailed this
state of affairs was almost inevitable, and did little good to British pres
tige.
British Political Aims

The form o£ C ivil Government that was to follow the Military Ad
ministration was almost equally affected by the atomic end of the war.
This aspect of the McMichael treaties and the M alayan Union proposals
is often overlooked, but it is nevertheless most im portant. It is often as
sumed that the Malayan Union proposals represented a new deal for the
immigrant communities planned by a Labour government opposed to
the Malays aristocratic privileges. But this is a complete misreading of
the position. The men who drafted the M alayan U nion proposals were
the same civil servants of the Far Eastern branch of the Colonial Office
that had laid down the broad lines of prewar policy; men well aware of
the history of Malaya and the Malays' special rights, and probably
equally well aware that it was a useful check on the pace of political
change to favour the least politically conscious of M alaya’s three races.
The proposals were drafted for the situation in which they were ex
pected to be implemented. The policy-makers behind the Malaya Plan
ning Union naturally did not foresee the atomic bomb. They expected a
campaign in Malaya, with Chinese communist guerrillas cooperating
w ith Force 136 in the Japanese rear, and with M alay sultans, civil
servants and police in the position of assistants of the enemy if not actual
m ilitary collaborators. They probably expected to set up a civil adminis
tration while the w ar was still in progress, and with Russia as an active
ally. In these conditions the Malayan Union proposals would have been
NATIONALISM IN MALAYA SOI
the best they could do for the Malays against overwhelmingly adverse
conditions.
It may seem incredible that virtually the same proposals were imple
mented in spite of the great change in the position brought about by the
absence of a campaign. This change now seems obvious but at the time it
was, no doubt, too obscure and subtle to distinguish. Indonesia was still
a cloud no bigger than a man’s hand. The confusion over collaborators
was apparent only on the spot. The postwar activities of the guerrillas
were so little known that they were encouraged to send a contingent to
the victory celebrations in London, and nearly caused a crisis in the
ceremonial by their uncooperative attitude.
The details of the changes introduced between the end of the w ar and
Sir Harold McMichael's visit to Malaya are of course still confidential.
But it is believed that the only significant change was the cutting out of
certain prerogatives of the sultans, based not on any new appreciation of
the situation but on the new minister’s ignorance of how the prewar
system had worked.
Those who are inclined to blame the Colonial Office for failure to
appreciate the new situation should recall the circumstances in which
new planning would have had to be done. The senior civil servants were
faced not only with a new government with no recent experience of
Colonial affairs, but also with all the detailed administrative problems,
for which no precedents existed, of territories suddenly and unexpectedly
returned from enemy rule. The juniors who had direct experience of the
Far East were few; and such as there were found themselves beset by the
problems of colleagues newly released from Japanese prison camps. It is
hardly surprising that the Colonial Office was too clogged with work to
do more than implement plans made for a subtly different, but super
ficially similar situation.'
In the event Sir Harold McMichael came to Malaya with a set of essen
tially duplicate treaties for each Malay ruler to sign, in secret and without
consultation, virtually as a condition of remaining ruler. These treaties
conferred new powers on the British Government through which the
setting up of the Malayan Union became possible. They gave away most
of what remained of the independence of the separate states, and even
the rulers’ control over the customs of the Malays.
No doubt Sir H arold had been informed that no fighting had actually
taken place in Malaya and the continuity of state governments had not
really been broken; and that this would have some effect on the courtesies
302 a s ia n n a t io n a l is m and the w e st
, t j • ^ ,*c no evidence tliat the

to be observed in private conferences. But there Ib r
m a tte r o f w h a t he p resen ted , n o r th e e s s e n t i a l m a n n e r o p iesen ta tio n ,
d iffe re d m a te ria lly fro m w h a t h e w o u ld h a v e sh o w n to V ? c° ' verm S an
d e fe a te d p u p p ets o f th e Ja p a n e se w h o w e re n o d o u b t o r ig m a y expec e
to receive the d ocum en ts. . . .
I t m ay seem su rp ris in g th a t the ru le rs a ll a g re e d to sig n . T h e n position,
h o w ever, was n o t stro n g , as u p to th a t p o in t n o s tr o n g p o lit ic a l 01‘gan^ a'
tio n h a d arisen am o n g the M alays, a n d it w as s till d o u b t f u l w h e th e r
m o vem en t fo r In d o n e sia n in d e p e n d e n c e w o u ld re c e iv e in te r n a tio n a l sup
p o rt. T h e y p ro b a b ly fe lt th a t i f th e y resisted th e y w o u ld b e represente
to the w o rld as co lla b o ra to rs an d w o u ld re c e iv e n o s u p p o r t fro m their
o w n p eople.
T h e p o sitio n o f the S u lta n o f J o h o r e is i m p o r t a n t in th is con nection .
I f Jo h o re h a d stayed out, the M a la y a n U n io n w o u ld h a v e b e e n grave y
w eak en ed; an d acco rd in g to the w ritte n c o n s t i t u t i o n o f J o h o r e th e Sultan
ceased a u to m a tic a lly to be S u lta n i f h e sig n e d a w a y h i s a u t h o r i t y w ith o u t
th e consent o f the S tate C o u n c il. W h e n th e first m e n tio n o f n e w consti
tu tio n a l arran gem ents fo r M a la y a appeared in Septem b er 1 9 4 5 a group
o f J o h o re M a la y in te lle ctu a ls b eg an to s tu d y th e p r o b le m o f Jo h o re s
position.
T h is k in d o f discussion am o n g M a la y in te lle c tu a ls h a s a lre a d y been
m en tion ed in d escribing the p re w a r b a c k g r o u n d . I m m e d ia te ly a fte r the
Jap an ese su rre n d e r i t h a d taken th e fo rm o f c o n s id e rin g th e U n ite d N a
tions C h a rte r an d the p o ssib ilities o f p o litic a l a c tio n a n d so c ia l refo rm
am ong the M alays. In Jo h o re , h o w ev er, i t le d to th e f o r m a t io n o f a new
organ isation , the M alay U n io n o f J o h o re , w h ic h b y J a n u a r y w a s p u b licly
criticisin g the S u lta n an d d e c la rin g th a t h e h a d f o r fe it e d h is sovereignty.
I t sent telegram s an d m em o ran d a to th e S u lta n (w h o b y th is tim e was in
L o n d o n ) an d also to the S ec re tary o f S ta te a n d th e S e c r e ta r y o£ the
U n ite d N ations O rg anization , a n d its m em b ers fe e l t h a t th ese h a d an
im p o rta n t influ ence in o v e rth ro w in g th e M a la y a n U n io n p la n .
The United Malays’ National Organisation (U.M- Ar- ° 0

A n o th e r even t w h ich o ccurred i n J o h o r e in J a n u a r y w a s th e fo u n d in g
o f the M a la y P en in su la M o ve m en t b y D a to O n n b in J a a f a r . T h is was
o n ly o n e o f m an y o rgan isation s w h ich w e re s p r in g in g u p a t th is tim e to
o p p ose the M alay an U n io n P rop osals; b u t its le a d e r s h ip m a d e i t o n e o f
th e m ost im p o rta n t. B y M arch 1, ig 46 e n o u g h M a la y o r g a n is a tio n s h a d
b een fo rm ed th ro u g h o u t M a la y a fo r a c o n fe re n c e to b e c a lle d in K u a la
* A - r i o N A L lS M IN M A L A Y A 303
*"UrnpUr to organise the U n ited M alays’ N ational Organisation. Dato

n n y a s elected president of this organization, and secured the com-
^ anciing p osition as lead er o f the M alays w hich he has since retained.
ean\vhile there h ad been a series of angry letters in the Times from
o^mer c iv il servants in M alaya, strongly worded protests in both Houses
° P a rHamentj an d on F ebruary 23 a protest by the M alay Society of
râ t B rita in , w hich was prob ab ly active behind the scenes.
t its in a u g u ra l m eeting the U.M .N.O. asked fo r a R oyal Commission
on M alaya. T h e ru lers also p rivately suggested a num ber of amendments
and s°m e o f these were m ade public by the Secretary of State on M arch
8‘ 1S'Tevertheless the M alayan U nion C onstitution was du ly inaugurated
° n A p ril 1; and a ll the M alays including the rulers boycotted the G ov
e rn o r’s in sta lla tio n and kept aloof from the whole adm inistration, but
avoided stro n ger action because p relim inary negotiations fo r a revision
w ere a lre a d y u n d er way. A Parliam entary mission to Sarawak on the
cession issue visited M alaya in M ay and reported to tlie Secretary of State
on its re tu rn , one m em ber L. D. Gammans, M.P., suggesting a new treaty,
the o th e r D. R ees-W illiam s, M.P., advocating only m inor amendments.
T he success o f the M alays in outplaying the far abler members o f other
races, a n d securing, from a very weak in itial position, substantial gains
at th e ir expense, was a surprise to m any Europeans in M alaya. Rees-
W illia m s indeed w ent so fa r as to suggest that M alay opposition had
been la rg e ly organised by B ritish officials. T his is almost certainly an
exaggeration , b u t the situation is nevertheless one th at needs explanation.
T h e fact th at chiefly requires explaining is' the almost incredible
p o litic a l in ep titu d e o f the non-M alays at this time. T h e Malays gained
th e ir advantages n ot by any specially b rillian t p olitical strategy, b u t by
a Ve*'y m o d erate degree of discipline and by a lim ited capacity to stand
firm o r to negotiate as the situation demanded. T h ey could hardly have
overcom e any effective opposition. W h y, among the thousands of talented
C hinese a n d Indians, were there none able and w illin g to resist this
M alay pressure?
F irst, the m a jo rity of Chinese were w h olly uninterested in politics. The
d iso rd er o f the Japanese occupation had accentuated the almost patho
lo g ically concentrated self-interest th at was already in p rew ar times a
fe a tu re o f Chinese society in M alaya. T h e liberation brought enormous
exp en d itu re s on re lie f and reh ab ilitation and vast possibilities for smug
gling an d black m arket activity. Large fortunes could be made by those
who attended devotedly to their own business, and politics had been
shown to be an unprofitable and dangerous pursuit.
M oreover those Chinese 'who took any interest in political affairs were
divided among tiiemselves. The Nationalist Governm ent of China, not
yet seriously menaced by the Communists, confident from its recent vic
tory, and well aware of the economic importance of remittances from the
South Seas, was using every weapon it had to fu rth er its influence in
Malaya. On every special day of Chinese celebration— the Double Seventh,
Double Tenth, etc.—flags of the Kuom intang flew in almost every house
in the m ain streets of the towns of Malaya. The subsequent behaviour of
the Chinese make it at least unlikely that these exhibitions showed
merely spontaneous and unorganised loyalty either to Chiang Kai-shek
or to China. Probably most of those who flew these flags, while approving
in general of doing so, actually did it because it was safer to have a flag
out than not to have one on such a day.
A nother factor that set limits to what the Chinese could do was the
prevailing lawlessness and extortion. T o become prom inent in any way
was to invite demands for money. M oreover some of the worst extor
tioners were the Communists; and it so happened that the sort of political
activity that alone could have helped the Chinese and Indian com
munities was such that it would have attracted hostile attention from the
Communists. W hat was urgently needed was a leader who could accept
the Malayan Union proposals, make small extra demands as bargaining
counters, be reasonable and amenable to discussion and at the same time
encourage the non-Malays to fight for their advantages. The Malayan
Union proposals represented a great concession to the non-Malays, and
because the Malays were unexpectedly strong it was essential to present
them as something workable and fundam entally acceptable. Above all it
was absolutely vital to secure the position of being the supporters of a
new and liberal policy against a defeated aristocracy. B ut if the Chinese
were afraid of assuming a prominent position they were even more afraid
of appearing to support the Government; and so the only tactics that
could have been of any use, in the conditions that actually prevailed,
were allowed to go by default.
In the absence of any party representing the Chinese, at a time when
M alay opposition was concentrated m ainly on the danger of Chinese
supremacy, it was not unnatural that the M alayan Democratic Union
should be looked on as a Chinese, or at least non-M alay party. In prac
tice, however, the Malayan Democratic U nion was, w ith the exception of
305
the Communist Party, the only political organisation of any influence

which was steadfastly opposed to communal divisions. Its membership
was largely concentrated in Singapore, and this fact also made it suspect
among the Malay politicians of the Federation, diough at the time when
it was acting as the Secretariat of the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action
it acquired quite considerable influence throughout Malaya.
The Malayan Democratic Union (M.D.U.)

The Malayan Democratic Union was formed on December 21, 1945,
when a manifesto was issued demanding self-government within the
British Commonwealth, universal suffrage for all Malayan citizens over
twenty-one, an elected legislature, and an executive responsible to it.
The prevailing view among Europeans and most non-political Chinese
and Malays now appears to be that the Malayan Democratic Union was
merely a Communist splinter group which went underground with the
beginning of the Emergency. It has been stigmatised, for example, as a
Singapore “school in dialectics and grenade-throwing” for the English-
educated middle class. But this view is at least over-simplified if not ac
tually contrary to the facts.
At least some of the members of the M.D.U. were democrats in the ac
cepted Western sense of the term and their demand for an elected legis
lature was envisaged as a defence of genuine democratic principles. It is
of course true that their democratic principles were in general grounded
in hatred of capitalists and of foreign rule. It is probable that they re
garded the Malayan Communist Party as an ally in the struggle against
capitalism and foreign domination, and its willingness to adopt violent
and unconstitutional means as only an incidental difference which would
not become significant until later in the campaign for independence. If
no more than this were'meant by calling it a Communist group there
would be no cause for argument; but this would have damned almost
every socialist party in Europe at one stage or another. The important
question is whether those who controlled its actions and policy were de
liberately running the M.D.U. for the purpose of furthering Communist
interests.
It is apparent now, as was certainly suspected in 1945, that even during
the Japanese Occupation the Communists were planning to use violence
and disorder to drive the British out of Malaya. In this they could count
on little help from the English-educated middle class. They did, however,
need to create the maximum possible opposition in Great Britain and
foreign countries against any action taken to suppress terrorist activities.

T h eir propaganda ever since the Emergency has repeated two lies with
unrem itting monotony through every possible variation: that the British
are depriving the Malayan worker of trade union rights and that they
are suppressing a national movement for independence. It has been
abundantly proved that they immediately set about organising "trade
unions ; and that later these unions tried to prevent settlement of any
disputes and cause chaos up to the point at which they would need to be
suppressed. It seems, therefore, natural to conclude that they also set
about reorganising a “national liberation movement,” and that the func
tion of the M.D.U. was in fact to keep opposition to the Government
active by demanding only what could not be granted.
This is probably, however, a wrong analysis of the position. It is more
realistic to assume that the turm oil of two changes o f administration, the
U nited Nations Charter, and the risings in Indonesia and Indo-China,
stirred up a spontaneous political movement among some of the English-
educated intellectuals, and that the Communists did their best to make
use of this movement for their own ends. Possibly some Communists
uncler party discipline were in certain key positions secretly directing the
mon s policy as far as they could in the interest of the Communist party,
ut this is not a necessary hypothesis, since several members had been
openly working for Communists before joining the M.D.U. and were well
nown to have Communist contacts and sympathies. The influence which
t ese men could have on a party, which in any case was far more interested
m attacking Colonialism and the bureaucracy than in securing immedi-
a fo p te d ^ 3* re^°rms' *s <Iu^te sufficient to explain the policy actually
The M.D.U. s first action was to oppose the M alayan Union proposals
on t e ground that they were undemocratic and excluded Singapore from
I , 6 . m ° n -T here was no attempt, however, to oppose the United Malays
, fI^ la rSan*sat>on by any counter-demonstrations, still less to show
overnment could count on M.D.U. support if it defended the pro-
posals agamst Malay pressure. Indeed the U.M.N.O. was treated as simply
ii t ^ * tS VCry rea* to a plan much more favoura-
e ° • 1 eals than could have been expected, was simply ignored.
vi °/enJment was forced to negotiate directly w ith the Malays to
avoi a ea on c ash in which they had no indication of even Iuke-warm
po itica support rom those who stood to gain from official policy. While
a ay groups were organising protests, sending letters and telegrams to
the Secretary of State, demonstrating for the benefit of visiting Members

of Parliament, and denouncing their Sultans, the Malayan Democratic
Union wasted its time in protesting against trivial interferences with the
liberty of the subject that the disturbed postwar conditions made neces
sary. The usual explanation of this is that these might later have been
used against Communist party cells without the publicity of banning the
party, and that the M.D.U. was therefore used as a catspaw to attack them.
This is rather a far-fetched explanation, even though the Societies
Ordinance (for example) had been used against Communists before the
war. It seems much more likely that these protest activities showed
merely a complete lack of any sense of immediate political priorities.
Communists may have been immediately responsible for raising die is
sues, but there is no doubt that party members in general regarded them
as important.
The evidence that the M.D.U. was not merely a Communist group is
to be found in the fact that almost alone among political organisations in
Malaya it did give a small amount of attention to genuine economic prob
lems. It was the only group to support the imposition of an income tax
—in contrast with the attitude of the Communists who opposed it both
in 1940 and in 1946. It pressed for improved housing, and also for more
diversified agriculture; it pressed for penal reform; and it gave very
strong support to the cooperative movement both in retailing and in
agriculture. Finally it took an active part in influencing public opinion
in favour of a University rather than a University College in Malaya. It
would be possible to dismiss all these as cover for other activities, and a
lure for neutral intellectuals; but it is more probable that this activity
was as genuine a part of the M.D.U.'s functions as any other.
The Malay Nationalist Party (M.N.P.)

Parallel to the M.D.U. and founded at about the same time, was the
Malay Nationalist Party. This was a left-wing Malay party, containing
several who had attended the conference of 1940, some who had sup
ported the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (a Japanese fifth column organisation),
and some who had resisted the Japanese. Indonesian influence was strong,
but the Communists tried to influence this organisation too, for example
through a Malay section in their General Labour Union. Unlike the
U.M.N.O., the M.N.P. wanted immediate elections, though on a rather
less democratic basis than the M.D.U. It supported the continued ex
istence of the Sultans, but with greatly reduced powers. A t this stage,
however, the M.N.P. was simply the extreme left wing of the Malay
movem ent against the M alayan U nion Proposals.
M alay Women's Organisations

No discussion of the immediate postwar period would be complete
w ithout reference to the enormous change that came over the attitude of
M alay women. No doubt it was the result of a num ber of contributory
causes, including increased education of girls in the years immediately
before the war, the breach with traditional ways during the Occupation,
and the prevalence of new political ideas among the men. But there can
be little doubt that the movement began w ith the M alay Ladies’ As
sociation in Johore, sponsored by Dato O nn’s sister, Inche Azizah binte
Ja'afar, in 1940. This body was originally an organisation for adult edu
cation in literacy, cooking and needlework. D uring the w ar it became
widely known through its activities in collecting and distributing cloth
ing for refugees from the East coast; and branches were founded in many
districts. It is probable that the publicity achieved by the Johore Malay
women, both at this time and when activities were revived, with a politi
cal bias, after the war, led to the rapid growth of sim ilar organisations in
the favourable postwar situation. The interest taken in politics by Malay
women was one of the things that profoundly influenced the minds of
the Parliamentary mission, and did as much as anything to convince
them that Malay opposition to tlie Malayan U nion proposals must be
deep and real.
&
5. PO LITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE A P R IL 1946
he M a l a y a n U n i o n constitution was inaugurated w ith the end of
T the British M ilitary Adm inistration in A p ril 1946. But though the
M alayan Union lasted for two years, it is im portant to note that the
citizenship proposals never had any real effect. No steps were taken to
give effect to the acquisition of citizenship, by non-Malays, by process of
law; no register was opened for voluntary acquisition of citizenship. No
elections were held, and virtually no steps were taken to distinguish be
tween citizens and non-citizens in education, social welfare or any other
relation between government and people. The reason is that, even by
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M A L A Y A g g g
June 1946, negotiations with the Sultans and U.M.N.O. for a revision of
the Constitution had begun informally.
The left-wing opponents of the later Federation Agreement usually
allege that U.M.N.O. did not represent the Malays and that there was in
fact no considerable opposition to the Malayan Union citizenship pro
posals, but that the whole Malay protest was effectively organised by
British civil servants, both active and retired.
The Influence of British Civil Servants

The truth appears to be that the opposition was quite genuine and
that even two years of work, directed through the Communities Liaison
Committee and in other ways toward building up in the Malay mind a
greater tolerance to non-Malay citizens, has by no means wholly over
come this opposition. But this is not to deny that it was an opposition
encouraged and assisted by many British individuals whose desire to
perpetuate the status quo in Malaya appears to have outrun their dis
cretion and even their loyalty to their own country’s prestige.
The Malays, at the end of the W ar, were prepared to accept the fact
that they were on the wrong side and must do the best they could for
themselves. They had been used by the Japanese and must have realised
that many of the British would resent this. It is important not to postu
late feelings of either guilt or reproach where they almost certainly did
not exist. If it were reasonable to suppose that the Malays felt reproachful
toward Britain for defaulting in its obligation to protect the Malay States
it would be reasonable to expect them to feel gliilt at having organised
a fifth column (the K.M.M.) against the British during the invasion.
There is no evidence that either of these feelings was of any importance.
The Malays had accepted British protection because they had no alterna
tive; and for seventy years the Malay aristocracy no doubt felt it had
made a very good bargain. No serious effort had been made to inculcate
in the Malay States (as distinct from the Colony) any feeling of loyalty to
the British Empire as such, and it is unlikely that any such loyalty
existed. W hen the Malays had found the British yielding to the Japanese,
their problem had been simply whether it was worthwhile to accept the
Japanese as protectors or whether it was better to resist them in any way
they could, in the hope of a British return. For the most part they had
guessed wrong. The British, with their allies, proved the stronger. And,
though they no doubt expected individually that individual British
friends would help them, they hardly expected things to be exactly as be
fore.
T he propaganda that Britain had defaulted and should return to
M alaya in the role of penitent was spread not by Malays but by English
men, while the noise of the Victory celebrations had scarcely died away
and diseased and half-starved British servicemen were still returning
from Japanese prison-camps to their bomb-scarred homeland. There is
one view of the motives behind this propaganda which came naturally
to the supporters of the M.D.U., namely that it was based on naked
selfishness and class interest. This is grossly u nfair to the men who or
ganised the campaign. Some months later, indeed, company chairmen
in London were to ask for restitution from Britain to the Sultans, peoples
and industries of Malaya, using the feelings of guilt to their own
pecuniary advantage. But this nastiness, if it existed at all, was well down
in the sub-conscious in 1945.
T he general emotional background was one of shame for the debacle
of 1942, accentuated by the fact that many senior civil servants returning
from prison camps had seen nothing of the subsequent course of the war.
This feeling was aggravated by a sense of disappointment that events had
robbed the British Arm y of the chance to wipe out the score by a vic
torious campaign in Malaya. A sense of loss of prestige presented itself in
t em o ie attractive moral guise of an obligation still unfulfilled.
^ ut the direction of this obligation was a result of less creditable mo
tives. Feelings were directed toward the Malays, and the Malay Sultans
in particular, rather than to all the people who had suffered as a result
° ! e /*oss Malaya. And the motives for this direction? Explicitly and
o jectively, the treaties with Malay Sultans, and the decentralisation
po icy, which had been consciously pursued to prevent over-rapid de
velopment and build a more stable political structure; implicitly and
emotionally a preference for the prewar state of affairs: administration
^ a* P0^ * 0^ ^ e loyal hard-working peasant, the contented and
o e lent tapper, rather than the ambitious clerk, the trade union or
ganiser, the clever undergraduate. And these preferences, though they
carry more than a trace of the bad smell of the shareholders’ pocket, are
consistent with disinterested and honest service.
W e have seen that the British propaganda of default was not an ex
ample of deliberate treachery toward allies in the service of naked self-
interest, but rather a reaction of generous desire to atone, unconsciously
misdirected by unworthy traditions. W hat was its effect in Malaya?
The numerous Malay societies that sprang up in the interval between

December 1945 and A p ril 1946 have all the marks of giving lea ers ip,
explicitness and direction to a feeling already widespread among t e
Malays, but kept in check for fear of what might befall. Distrust o t e
immigrant races had been heightened by Japanese propagan a an ^ y
guerrilla tithes in the rural areas. But it might well ha\e remaine
smouldering if it had not been fanned by articles bearing uropean
names well known in Malaya, that appeared in the English language
Press in Malaya at the end of 1945. There was no lack of feeling, an no
lack of Malay leaders to give it form. The leaders were not ritisi
puppets in fostering the agitation, but they would not one so 1
British “default” had not given them a sign that they woul a\e power
ful friends. W ithout these signs the real leaders would have stoo a oo .
They owed their position largely to British support, and wou certain y
have shied aw ay from anything that seemed anti-British.
There is no more need to suppose hidden British hands pu ing t e
strings of U.M.N.O. puppets than to suppose hidden Communist an s
directing the M.D.U. Both are possible, even plausible hypot eses in t
light of history. Much of the success of British administration in a aya
in the past had depended on tactful manipulation of Malay aristocra s,
and many of those who opposed the Malayan Union had amp e expen
ence in this sphere. Organising political demonstrations, however, was
an activity much more consonant with the recent experience o t e i a ay
leaders than with the normal activities of the old Malaya han s, just as
protesting about the liberties of the subject seems a more natural action
for the intellectuals of the M.D.U. than for the professional revolu
tionaries of the Malayan Communist Party. W e need not invent comp ex
subterranean plots, unknown to most of the participants, when norma
activities can explain what occurred. 1
In May 1946, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald arrived as G o v ern o r-G en era
in Malaya and began discussions with Sir Edward Gent, the G o v ern o r o
the Malayan Union. Out of these arose the long series of discussions ^
ginning in June and July, between the G o v e rn m e n t, the Sultans an
U.M.N.O. from which the new Federation Constitution ultimate y
emerged in February 1948.
The Problem, of Malay Support

T h e fo r m o f these d iscu ssio n s is o f som e im p o rta n c e . A f te r in itia l a n d
in fo r m a l d iscu ssion s, a Working C o m m itte e w as o rg an ise d o n a tr ip a r t ite
basis, w ith representatives of the Government, the Sultans and the United
Malays N ational Organisation. No other political body took part in the
actual negotiations. There are two good reasons for this. The most im
portant is that all other bodies remotely comparable in political in
fluence included very large numbers of members who would have been
excluded even from Malayan Union citizenship. T o have included as
negotiating bodies organisations with largely alien membership would not
merely have made agreement impossible but would have been unjust and
unreasonable in itself. The only body that could conceivably have been
called in to represent a non-communal point of view was the Malayan
Democratic Union. The Chinese Chambers of Commerce, Chinese clan
associations and other Chinese bodies all had immigrant aliens in im
portant positions, or at least large numbers of immigrants among their
members. Many of these people might, no doubt, have acquired citizen-
s ip or nationality if the truly domiciled non-Malays had successfully
negotiated for admission to citizenship on a basis even more generous
than the Malayan Union proposals. But to include them among the
negotiators would have been even more offensive to Malay opinion than
the Malayan Union proposals themselves, and would have perpetuated
the boycott by the Sultans and the Malays.
n a situation in which the Government had to choose between the
support of the Malays and that of the non-Malays its choice was bound
Ci ir\jênced by the possibility of organising an effective Government,
e a ay side the traditional machinery of State governments under
u tans with British advisers existed; lower down in the hierarchy came
istrict officers and village headmen, some of the former and all of the
er eing alays. On the non-Malay side were most of the professional,
technical and clerical staff of the Government, and a small proportion of
the population who had had an English education ar;d knew a little—
ow itte , events were to show— of the rudiments of democratic pro-
ce ure. our t s of the population had probably never even taken part
m electing any kind of committee, electoral machinery—other than a
mere open vote being alien both to Malay village organisation and
Chinese associations.
In these conditions any attempt, in face of sharp disagreement on the
conditions for admission to citizenship, to break the M alay Governm ent’s
boycott by setting up a wholly new administration based on elections,
could not have produced anything but chaos. Only the armed and or
ganised Communists could have benefited. Probably there was little
desire on the Government side to institute electoral machinery immedi

ately; but quite obviously the only chance of doing so was through an
intermediate stage in which citizenship would be carefully defined and
the powers of elected bodies limited.
Three dangers had to be avoided: public apathy, communal partisan
ship, and gang rule. T hat the first was a real danger is proved by the fact
that though there is no property or literacy qualification for voting in the
Singapore Municipality, where there is an elected majority, less than ten
per cent registered to vote at the first election; though with the growth
of political parties this number has since greatly increased. The danger
of communal parties is obvious, very few Malays being willing to join in
common political organisations with non-Malays. That gang rule was a
real danger, especially if mass apatiiy reduced the number of electors,
was apparent from the fact that one of the most active supporters of
elections was the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, a Com
munist-dominated body which strenuously opposed democratic methods
of ballot, auditing of accounts, and the like, because its main function
was terrorising workers and extorting money from them. It was quite ap
parent that the intention of this body was to elect members merely to
hamper and disorganise effective Government, in preparation for armed
revolution, such as has since taken place.
Having failed to seize and support the Malayan Union proposals, and
given the initiative in negotiation to the Malay Rulers and their sup
porters, the only chance open to the non-Malay communities was to
emphasise that orderly progress toward self-government was possible
w ith their cooperation and not without it; to give active support to those
who stood for as much of die Malayan Union proposals as could be
achieved; to attempt to allay the suspicions of the more reasonable
Malays by defining carefully those who belonged to Malaya and organis
ing on the basis of their definition. This would have given the Govern
ment considerably more power to resist any extreme and reactionary
demands of die Malays, and also more w ill to do so, since it would know
that an alternative basis of administration existed and that it would
have to negotiate later with an important section of Malayan opinion.
The elements for such organisation existed. The subsequent success of
the M alayan Chinese Association, in spite of Communist opposition,
indicates that an organisation confining itself strictly to those who had
made Malaya their home, could have won considerable support at that
time. Splits and tensions in the Malayan Indian Congress, and the recent
tendency of more Indians fo claim to be Malayans, indicate that Indians

also might have been organised on similar lines. Such organisation would
of course have entailed more work than the tactics actually adopted, but
it would have had far more chance of success.
The actual tactics adopted were very different. Instead of attempting
to organise the opinion of domiciled Malayans in support of the Malayan
U nion proposals, the non-Malay politicians set about mobilising a
“united front” against the prospective Federal Constitution, on as wide
a scale as possible. Chinese nationalists, Indian nationalists, Indonesian
nationalists, and Communists, whose aims had nothing constructive in
common, were brought together on the basis of opposing the constitu
tional proposals negotiated between the Government and the Malays.
Strenuous efforts were made to include some Malays in the opposition
and to present it as a democratic movement of the whole Malayan people
against a feudal intrigue. The Malay Nationalist Party broke away from
the United Malays National Organisation in June 1946, the point at issue
being the use of the Indonesian flag, which the M.N.P. wanted and
U.M.N.O. refused to use. The M.N.P. therefore was the obvious puppet
to use as part of a Pan-Malayan Council, and the Malayan Democratic
mon tried hard to represent it as the true party of the Malays and to
persuade it to join forces with its other organisations.
In the immediate postwar period this party was strongly influenced by
e successes of Indonesian nationalism, and it was strongly anti-im
perialist, combining a Muslim republicanism with a disposition to treat
e Communist party as an ally in its struggle. It had some following in
Pahang and part of Kelantan, and also in Malacca. Elsewhere it was sup
ported only by a few young Malay intellectuals. Its claims to any substan
tial Malay support have been disproved by the almost complete failure
att0I"Pts s‘ir UP anti-British activities among the Malays after the
outbreak of the Emergency.
The All-M alaya Council of Joint Action (A M .C .J.A .)

The first attempt at a Council of Joint Action was made on the basis
of three principle.: (1) a united Malaya inclusive of Singapore; (2) a
fu ly elected central legislature for the whole of Malaya; (S) equal politi
cal rights for all who regard Malaya as their real home and as the object
of their loyalty This was to be known as the Pan-Malayan Council of
Joint Action and to embrace a number of organisations since proved to
have been dominated by the Communists (such as the Pan-Malayan
Federation of Trade Unions, the New Democratic Youth League, and

several women's organisations); and also tlie Chinese Chambers of Com
merce, the Malayan Indian Congress, tlie Malay Nationalist Party and
the Malayan Democratic Union.
W ith in a few weeks the title was changed to All-M alaya Council of
Join t Action, for two reasons. The term Pan-Malayan had been adopted
in the Federation of Trade Unions, in several individual Unions un er
Communist leadership, and in much of the party s literature. A few o
the Chinese merchants, nervous in any case about alliance with the trade
unions, showed signs of being scared off by this term. More important,
however, was the Malay opposition to the term Malayan, which in
general has been used to describe all non-Malay residents in Malaya, and
was also associated with the hated Malayan Union.
Together with the change of name went a change of principles. W hile
the leaders of the proposed Pan-Malayan Council had been touring
Malaya condemning the W orking Committee and all its works, o t e _^
members of the Malayan Democratic Union had been negotiating wit
the leaders of the Malay Nationalist Party, with a view to securing at
least some Malay support for joint action. As a result three new prin
ciples were added before the meeting to establish the Council was called.
These were (1) the Malay Sultans to assume the position of fully sover
eign and constitutional rulers, accepting the advice not of British a Risers
but of the people through democratic institutions, (2) matters of the
Muslim religion and Malay custom to be under the sole control of the
Malays, (3) special attention to be paid to the advancement of the Malays.
The All-M alaya Council of Joint Action was formed on December
22, 1946, two days before the proposals of the W orking Committee of
Government, Sultans and U.M.N.O. were published. It elected Tan Cheng
Lock, a distinguished Chinese politician, as its president, and almost im
mediately such Malay opinion as still supported M.N.P. began to shift
to U.M.N.O., on the ground that M.N.P. had accepted the leadership of
a Chinese. The programme of the Malayan Democratic Union was pro
foundly distrusted among the Malays, and the first two months of 1947
were spent in strenuous efforts to gain some Malay support.
The PUTERA
For this purpose it was necessary to abandon the plan of incorporating
Malays in the Council of Join t Action itself. The Malay Nationalist
Party turned for support to the extremist, and Communist-dominated,
M alay Youth Movement, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf, and between them

they adopted a policy o f registering a large number of nom inally separate
associations, with few members beyond their office bearers, so as to be
able to announce a separate Malay council cooperating w ith A.M.C.J.A.
T he claim that 150,000 people supported the M alay section, Pusat Tenaga
R a’ayat, or PUTERA, is of course as remote from the facts as the claim
that the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (P.M.F.T.U.) repre
sented 800,000 members. It is possible that these figures are mere flights
of fancy, but perhaps more likely that the latter refers to the total num
ber of workers from whom, at any time, the self appointed “officers” of
these trade unions were able to extort subscriptions; while the former
may be a generous estimate of the aggregate of all audiences at all meet
ings staged by the Malay organisations.
PU TE RA came into being on February 22, but the principles under
lying this organisation represented a further concession to M alay opinion;
in addition to the six principles adopted as a basis of A.M .C.J.A. four
more were incorporated: (1) that Malay should be the official language
of the country; (2) that Foreign Affairs and Defence of the country should
be the joint responsibility of the Government of M alaya and o f His
Majesty s Government; (3) that the term “M elayu” should be the title of
any citizenship or national status in Malaya; and (4) that the national
flag of the country should incorporate the Malay national colours, (i.e.
the Indonesian red and white).
These four principles emphasize the nature of M alay opposition to
normal democratic development for Malaya. They are attempts to im
pose psychological tests on immigrant communities and to ensure that
they shall not dominate Malaya in the interest of their own countries of
origin; while at the same time insisting that if any overseas ties are neces
sary they should be either with Indonesia or with the’ British Common
wealth.
Tw o shadows overhang the Malay community in Malaya. One is that
their country, though rich and strategically important, is weak in com
parison to two great countries which both have im portant and potentially
irredentist minorities of fairly recent immigrants in the country. The
other is that the wealth of their country,, in so far as it is not owned by
Western capitalists, is mostly in the hands of non-Malays, who came in
as a part of development on capitalist lines; while M alay residents have
remained, and Malay immigrants have become by preference, peasants
living in poor and relatively unspecialized village communities. These
facts, and also the superior education of the non-Malays, make the
Malays intensely suspicious of all non-Malay politicians.
It is probable that Malay support for U.M.N.O. rather than for
PU TE RA was due mainly to the latter's alliance with obviously alien
non-Malays rather than to opposition to democratic ideas as such. The
Malays had good reason to distrust the Chinese Chamber of Com
merce’s concern for Malay welfare. They were afraid of the pressure
tactics of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and had suffered
from the guerrilla activities of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Ex-
Comrades Association. As for the Malayan Indian Congress, this had been
set up in August 1946, partly to counter Communist influence among tire
Indian community, but its membership differed very little from that of
the Indian Independence Leagues which had recently been proclaiming
their allegiance to India under die Azad Hind Government.
There can be little doubt diat many Malays find die existing Malay
state governments through Sultans rather antiquated, and feel some
shame at being less progressive than the Indonesians. But up to the pres
ent, radical Malay movements have tended to lose Malay support in
proportion to their willingness to use non-Malay support to achieve their
ends.
The Federal Citizenship Proposals

T he actual proposals announced by the W orking Committee on De
cember 24, 1946, were wholly undemocratic in character. An elaborate
Federal constitution was proposed, with most of the important legislative
powers reserved for tlie Federal Legislative Council, though with some
provision for executive action by the States in implementing Federal
legislation. State Legislative and Executive Councils, however, were also
provided for; and a promise was given that elections would be introduced
later.
T he most controversial provision, however, was the definition of
citizenship. The actual details were very complex, but the most important
feature was the exclusion from citizenship even of many who had been
born in Malaya, and some whose ancestors had been there for genera
tions. Malays could acquire citizenship easily by becoming subjects of the
Sultans; in particular this applied to any Malay born in Malaya. Non-
Malays had to fulfil additional requirements of residence in addition to
local birth, unless both parents had also been born in Malaya. The bulk
of the non-Malay population would have to acquire citizenship by appli
cation; and this involved not merely a knowledge of the Malay language
but literacy in Malay. Since over h alf the non-Malay population is illiter
ate in any language, and the scripts used in other languages (Chinese and
Tam il) are in any case different, this effectively rules out most of die non-
M alay population, at least for a generation.
It was the citizenship provisions that aroused the strongest resentment.
B ut this was not only because the citizenship was difficult for non-Malays
to acquire. There was also opposition because the nature of even this
limited citizenship was restricted and ill-defined. It was to be left to the
Government to define any particular rights or duties of citizenship; and
since the terms “M alay” and “subject of the Sultan” were also closely
defined in the Constitution the non-Malays feared that even if they took
up citizenship the most important privileges might be denied them, and
reserved for subjects of the Sultans, or Malays.
A claim was made, in the proposals, that the Federal Council under
the new constitution would have an unofficial majority. This claim was
deceptive on three grounds. First, the unofficial m ajority included the
nine heads of the Malay State Governments, who were Malay govern
ment officials sitting as such, though they were not officials of the Federal
Government. Next, Malay Government officers were allowed to be nomi
nated as unofficials in their personal capacity; they would vote as they
pleased, but would in general not please to vote against the hierarchy
t at controlled their promotion. But in addition to these limitations,
every one of the unofficials was to be nominated by the High Commis
sioner; though most of them represented special interests, there was no
provision for them to be elected even by those interests.
A promise had been given that the proposals of the W orking Com
mittee would not be finally implemented until after consultation with
representatives of the other communities. The precise wording of the
pledge did not lim it consultation to those who regarded Malaya as their
home or the object of their loyalty. The Malays on the W orking Commit
tee, however, accepted it with this limitation, and this was printed with
out comment in the official report. Presumably agreement was reached
inform ally on the precise form that this consultation would take, as no
protest was later made by the Malays.
In practice it was impossible for the Government to lay down a precise
lim it to those whom it would consult. It could not lay down a different
lim it from that specified for citizenship without appearing to go back on
its agreement; it could not lay down the same lim it without being accused
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M A L A Y A J ^
of consulting only one interest. The difficulty was the same as would have
beset the Government in calling a constituent assembly, or instituting
elections. It is a difficulty which appears to have escaped the attention of
all those who have written about Malaya recently, yet it is nevertheless
fundamental. The Government, as the body actually in control, would
have had to take a decision on whom it would consult; it would have had
to exclude some—at least, for example the postwar alien arrivals and
the British troops in Malaya— and the precise point of exclusion was the
main subject of political controversy. Such a conflict can be resolved in
only two ways: overthrow of the Government by one of the parties by
force; or an arbitrary decision of the Government itself.
The Government decided, in effect, to consult anyone who wished to be
heard, but to do it through a committee of unofficial members of the
Malayan Union Advisory Council, and others nominated by them. This
committee was instructed to receive representations from any individual
or group that wished to present them, to take evidence, and itself to
make recommendations to the Government.
The composition of the Committee could have been more fortunate,
even allowing for the difficulties already enumerated. Of nine members
five were Europeans or Eurasians, who could not claim to represent be
tween them more than one percent of Malaya’s population. Only the
Chairman was a Government servant, so that the Committee could not
claim to represent Government in negotiating with the rest of the people
of the country. Nevertheless it is difficult to understand why the setting
up of this Committee should have aroused such intense indignation that
the A.M .C.J.A. and PUTERA decided to boycott it altogether. Very few
can have imagined that the Government would accept their claim to
represent the genuinely domiciled people, let alone to be their only
representatives. Short of that, the only alternative was to appoint a Con
sultative Committee to hear their evidence and any other evidence that
was offered. Yet their protest was not against the composition of the
Committee but in effect against the Government's failure to recognise
them as a negotiating body and thereby throw away in advance of any
discussion the results of their five months’ negotiations with the Malays.
As a result of this decision the Consultative Committee received little
constructive criticism of the W orking Committee’s proposals except
from a communal point of view. Two letters addressed, in very general
terms, to the High Commissioner on behalf of the A.M.C.J.A. by Mr.
T an Cheng Lock were forwarded to the Committee; but they contained

little detailed criticism and the result was that the recommendations of
the Committee were far less progressive than they might have been. The
Governm ent proved, on the whole, receptive of the few constructive sug
gestions advanced in the Consultative Committee’s report, except where
they clashed with direct results of the recent negotiations. The number
of unofficial members was greatly increased so as to give them a real ma
jo rity over officials and State premiers together; representation was made
rath er more liberal; and the transitional arrangements for citizenship
were improved. There can be little doubt that several of the ideas later
advanced in the People's Constitution could have been incorporated in
the Constitution if they had been put before the Consultative Committee
at this time.
The report of the Consultative Committee was presented and referred
back to the original negotiators; and eventually in Ju ly 1947 agreed con
stitutional proposals were published which formed the basis of the new
agreements signed on February 1, 1948, by the Sultans and the High
Commissioner.
Meanwhile the A.M.C.J.A. and PUTERA had called two delegate con-
ences in Ju ly and August 1947 and had published in November a docu
ment entitled ‘‘The People’s Constitution for Malaya." This constitution,
together with the commentary that accompanies it, is an impressive po-
? cunênt' Though it purports to be a result of conference and
P M 10? U S ° WS c*earty m ai'k o f b ein g the w o rk o f one hand.
o a y the author of the greater part of it was Mr. John Eber, a Singa
pore lawyer and former President of the Malayan Democratic Union.
k ° mPare tie contents of this Constitution with the composition of
Tt, I 2! sponsoring it is to gain an insight into the tragedy of postwar
ya. ie e t wing intellectuals who planned this liberal and imagina
ry ocu™ent ad been driven to base their movement more and more on
people who could not possibly implement it. Clearly in face of fierce op-
p , 1 1(?n r °™ Mala?s a Constitution supported by the Chinese
i ^ ° u - ommerce and the Malayan Indian Congress could only
n ,T d f / 1 COmmunal stri£e in which only the Communist-domi-
ated trade unions could have achieved any real power; and quite obvi
ously the Commumst. would have had no truck with any of the Consti-
tutional
T • i . niceties
. of a Council of 7?arP«
U1 OI i •*
-traces, or a Cabinet elected by the 7 .
Legislative Assembly. 7
The Influence of the Communists

There are two theories commonly advanced at the present time, both
of which treat the People’s Constitution as prim arily a Communist-
sponsored scheme. It seems probable that both of these theories attach
too much importance to the fact, since clearly established, that the Com
munists were planning an armed campaign at this time. For though
more than two years of terrorism have since concentrated a good deal of
attention, both in Malaya and outside, on Communist tactics in Malaya,
it is by no means certain that the Communists exerted as much influence
in 1947 as they would now wish us to believe.
One theory is that the whole A.M.C.J.A. and PUTERA agitation was
staged by the Communists with a view to providing cover for their cam
paign of terrorism. It is known that they hoped to occupy at least a few
strong points in Malaya and proclaim an independent Government.
T heir subsequent propaganda that the workers of Malaya were driven to
revolt by a reactionary constitution and suppression of trade union
rights suggests that if they had captured enough territory to set up a Gov
ernment they would have used the agitation of the previous year as evi
dence that they were a suppressed Colonial people rising against im
perialism, and would have sought international help on that ground.
T hat they would have done this is probably true; but it is a long step
from this to the inference that the People’s Constitution was drawn up at
their instigation and for this one purpose only.
The other, and more plausible, theory is that the Communists were
trying to organise a genuine national movement which they could later
infiltrate and dominate; and that they had penetrated such nationalist
bodies as they could find, and led and encouraged them to form a united
movement. Much of the technique of the left-wing groups, such as the
use of boycotts at points where intimidation would be possible, suggests
such Communist influence; and it is, indeed, normal Communist strategy
in the absence of a revolutionary situation. Moreover there is some other
evidence that the first post-war plans of the Communists were based on
extending their influence by nationalistic and trade-union activity; and
that it was only later that they resorted to wrecking tactics directed
toward creating a revolutionary situation. It is even possible that a
change of leadership preceded the campaign of violence and terrorism.
Not only did the Com m unists at first (as in the Kuala Lum pur paper,
Democrat) adopt a nationalist, anti-Colonial line, attacking out-of-date,
or prewar, imperialism, w ith an implication that something better
might be expected from the British people; they also made trade union
demands on employers which were capable of leading to settlements and
successes, occasionally even signing agreements on behalf of the workers.
T his suggests that the A.M .C.J.A. and PU TE R A conferences and
negotiations suited Communist plans very well. It certainly does not
prove that they were mainly the result of Communist planning. There
are clauses here and there in the People’s Constitution that appear to have
been inserted by Communists, but it is impossible to read it closely and
believe it a mainly Communist document. Probably the efTorLs of the
M alayan Communist Party were mainly devoted to preventing any ef
fective negotiation on the basis of this Constitution; and in this task
they fully succeeded.
&
6. THE INTERPLAY OF COM MUNIST AND
NATIONALIST FACTO RS
ince J 1948 a "state of emergency” has prevailed in Malaya, and
une
A v r p 1? a er0Ôre Possibfe that some of those form erly enrolled in the
.. ’ , ' anc* PUTERA may be engaged in underground cooperation
with the Communists in the jungle. Political opinions are unlikely to be
p esse wit candour, especially as many Europeans in Malaya have
been xsolated from politics throughout most of their working life and
can hardly be expected to distinguish between anti-British sentiments
and support for Communist terrorism.
Communist Links With Other Political Groups

The Malayan Democratic Union, for example, after a very ill-timed
f-fi n h Ual GeneraI Meeting in June 1948, against the "un-
j s liable shooting, indiscriminate use of the banishment ordinance and
ension of police power,” dissolved itself at the end of the month when
he character of the emergency became clear. Most of its members have
since aken no oven part m politics. It cannot, of course, be assumed that
even the leaders are underground Communist agents. But it would be
equally unreasonable to suppose that, if they found the Federal Consti
tution unacceptable before, they would now be prepared to accept it to
escape Communist domination. Emergency regulations and terrorism
are probably both unwelcome to most of them, and it may be anticipated

that most of them would ask nothing better than to be able to stay clear
of politics altogether.
Some Europeans who had been inclined to regard the Malayan Demo
cratic U nion as a genuine national and democratic body interpreted its
dissolution as proof that it had in fact been a Communist “cover-organi-
sation.” This, however, is illogical and circular reasoning. For if we as
sume that it was not a Communist-controlled body and was to some extent
deceived as to Communist intentions, it follows that its beliefs about
British divide-and-rule tactics and the like were genuine, even if mis
guided. It is absurd to argue that because the emergency Regulations
were designed and used to resist an attack by Communist terrorists, all
those who were opposed to Colonial rule must necessarily believe this.
Probably the Malayan Democratic Union genuinely believed its freedom
to criticise was threatened; and even those of its members who strongly
opposed Communist aims and methods would not feel as safe in criticis
ing British Colonial methods as European critics would. No doubt Com
munists helped to heighten these fears and suspicions but they would
exist w ithout Communist aid.
T he M alay Nationalist Party on the other hand did not dissolve itself.
Its influence, however, appears to have diminished and its organisation to
have disintegrated. The more moderate nationalists felt that U.M.N.O.
was achieving more success in upholding Malay interests. The extremists
came increasingly under Communist influence, though right up to the
time when they were refused registration by the authorities they retained
a separate and distinct identity.
The later history of the M.N.P. was characterised by frequent sprouting
of youth movements, which appear to have been separate manifestations
of the same underlying organisation. The first youth movement, A.P.I-,
was banned early in 1947 for its advocacy of violent methods. Later
GERAM in Ju ly 1947 and PERAM in the early part of 1948 carried on
the same kind of political activity. In the latter half of 1948 several
leaders of the M.N.P. were arrested as agents of the Communist guerrillas.
T hereafter the affairs of the party are obscure and difficult to follow,
though it rem a in ed a registered society, at least in Singapore, until May
1950. T h at its disintegration was accelerated by police pressure can
hardly be doubted. But it cannot be denied that the Com m unists were
at this time trying desperately to secure Malay supporters, since the
M alay areas were becom ing wholly closed to them. The M.N.P. weie
their n atural allies in this, and there can in the nature of things be no
proof that the police did more than was necessary to eliminate support for
the Communist insurrection. But it would be difficult to convince any
M alayan who was radically inclined that the M.N.P. did not furnish an
example of what would have happened to the M.D.U. if it had not dis
solved itself at the outbreak of the Emergency.
Before leaving the subject of the left-wing organisations it is perhaps
as well to discuss precisely what is meant by a Communist cover-organi-
sation in these conditions. The party dismisses as bourgeois morality any
attempt to respect the truth, keep promises, be loyal to associations or
friends, or indeed observe any moral rules at all. Its members are there
fore free to infiltrate any organisation whatever, and by professing en
thusiasm and using outside contacts to secure influence in it and lead its
members to support some Communist purpose. This support w ill often
be only a very small part of such a body’s activities.
T o some people, of course, any action which threatens private property,
or imperialism, or indeed any other privileged position in the existing
order of society, is automatically Communist. Yet, leaving aside such
1 iocy and confining ourselves to activities furthering the party line of
e world organisation known as the Communist Party, there is still a
WJi*e ran^G Poss*bilities. A t the one extreme are organisations in
w ich all the members are Communists and the only purpose of apparent
in ependence is publicity or avoidance of the attentions of the police; at
e other, organisations in which there is only one unknown Communist
attempting to influence policy so far as possible in accordance with the
party line.
It is difficult to draw precise lines of demarcation. W here there is a
ommittee or controlling body on which all non-Communists know the
ommunists as such and accept their direction, the organisation may be
escri ed as a cover organisation for the Communists; though of course
many members would not regard it as such. W here the non-Communists
°ff 1 -C ^Xecut?ve not know the Communists as such, but the latter
effectively control most of the policy by secret means, it may be described
as a ommunist-dominated body. Many organisations, of course, shift
from one of these classes to another as time passes.
On balance it seems probable that neither the M.D.U. nor the M.N.P.
were even Communist-dominated at their foundation; and that they
never passed w holly into the class of cover organisations. Both these
bodies, however, if they now exist, have gone underground. Presumably
therefore any members who still work for them w ill be either members
of the Communist party, or very reliable sympathisers.
The disappearance of the left wing, which had fn any case never com
manded very wide support, left a virtual monopoly of constitutional
political life to the Malay Right and Centre, as organised in U.M.N.O.
There was an obvious danger that Malay claims would be pressed so hard
that an increasing proportion of Chinese opinion would turn to favour
the Communist guerrillas; and also that even moderate progressive
opinion would find that it had no constitutional means of expression.
It would be idle to pretend that this danger has been wholly averted,
but very considerable success has attended the measures taken against it.
These have taken the form of encouraging closer liaison between the
leaders of the different communities, especially tlie Chinese and the
Malays, and steadfast presentation of the idea that only removal of com
m unal jealousies can solve the citizenship problem in a way that w ill
make greater self-government possible.
The Communities Liaison Committee

T he origins of the Communities Liaison Committee, one of the most
powerful bodies in Malaya today, would need to be traced back to the
personal relations of a few community leaders, most of them members of
the Federal Legislative Council, since it began entirely informally at a
meeting of twenty-one leaders at the house of Dato Onn, the President of
U.M.N.O., at the end of December 1948. TJie initiative, however, was not
w holly Dato Onn’s. It may be conjectured that the Commissioner-Gen-
eral, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, and also Sir Roland Braddell, tlie former
legal adviser to U.M.N.O., were concerned in the founding of this Com
mittee, as they were later in its functioning. Moreover Mr. Tan Cheng
Lock who, though strongly opposed to the Constitution, was no advocate
of violence, was anxious to secure better terms from the Malays by con
stitutional means; and several of the Chinese members of the Federal
Council were alarmed at the position that was developing as a result of
the elimination of all political forces other than U.M.N.O. and the Com
munist guerrillas.
The purpose of this committee is to study sources of inter-racial fric
tion w ith a view to eliminating them, so as to create a united nation in
Malaya.
The M alayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.)

It was out of the C<ommunities Liaison Committee that the proposal
arose to form a Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.). A parallel body
to U.M.N.O. was required, not to foster rivalry, but to secure the same
kind of organised support for the community leaders as U.M.N.O. pos
sessed. It is indicative of the spirit in which this association was formed
that soon after its foundation it amended its constitution to admit
Malays and other non-Chinese as associate members, U.M.N.O. having
already admitted non-Malays some months earlier. In neither organisa
tion however do associate members enjoy voting rights.
T.he M.C.A. was founded on February 27, 1949, after a good deal of
preparation among Chinese guilds. Chambers of Commerce and odier
Chinese bodies, and limited its membership to those who intended to
settle permanently in Malaya, and had either been born there or resided
there for at least five years. Its president, right from its foundation, has
been T an Cheng Lock, and it has maintained consistent opposition to
the present Constitution; but it would be a great mistake to assume from
this that it is merely a metamorphosis of the A.M .C.J.A. It represents,
rather, a steadfast attempt by the Malayan Chinese to win back a stronger
position in the country by working their passage both w ith the Govern
ment and with the Malays. They have tried to regain their position with
e overnment by establishing their influence, through local agents,
1 e ^ ^ nese squatters and persuading them to resist extortion by
the Communists. W ith the Malays they have been conciliatory and co
operative, agreeing for example to the teaching (in principle) of Malay
as we as nglish in all schools, and to discrimination in favour of
Malays in awards for higher education.
♦j âve kuilt up their own position among the Chinese peasants
p y y securing release from arrest of those who have been detained
ent y on charges of aiding the Communists, partly by raising funds
o assist m resettlement of squatters. A considerable part of their mem
bership may, however, be due to the fact that they are permitted to run
lotteries (which are limited to members) for the purpose of raising funds
for welfare services.
The M.C.A. is not quite parallel however with U.M.N.O. Neither of
them is a democratic body with a mass membership, and in both the
committee consists largely of established community leaders. U.M.N.O.,
however, is closely linked with the Sultans and the M alay state Govern
ments, and tends therefore to be more conservative than the M.C.A. The
nominated Chinese on the Federal Legislative Council are automatically

members of the M.C.A. Committee, and this is no doubt sufficient to
prevent any extreme radical tendencies. But the M.C.A. is naturally more
anxious for constitutional reform; and Tan Cheng Lock’s leadership,
and also Chinese confidence that their numerical position w ill improve
w ith the passing of time, both tend to make the M.C.A. more willing than
U.M.N.O. to press for democratic measures.
T he situation in this respect is rather paradoxical, since if genuine
democratic responsibility were introduced, even with a fairly generous
citizenship for Chinese, the situation that would result would be one in
which the Chinese middle class, which leads the M.C.A., would be much
more heavily taxed than at present, to finance welfare services that would
benefit chiefly the Malays, who are both less prosperous and more numer
ous in any probable electorate. In spite of this, however, U.M.N.O. is
much less likely to press for democratic reforms than M.C.A.
T he principal activities of the Communities Liaison Committee in
recent months have been, first, the acceptance of a resolution that all
Governm ent schools should teach both Malay and English (a resolution
not likely to be quickly implemented because of the expense involved);
next, the recognition of the principle that progress in Malaya involves
increased political rights for non-Malays and increased economic aid for
Malays; and finally, a proposal that non-Malays should be able to acquire
the status of subjects of the Sultans, and so become nationals of Malaya
instead of merely acquiring citizenship. These last proposals are ac
companied by a promise of a scheme for improved economic conditions
for Malays; but in spite of this they have not as yet been fully accepted
by U.M.N.O.
Malay-Chinese Rivalries
It must be emphasized that Malay opposition to full national status,
even for fully domiciled Chinese citizens, is not as unreasonable as it
appears. The Malays at present possess considerable power, both by their
m ajority in the Federal Legislative Council and by their monopoly of
responsible posts in the State governments. There is a policy of reserving
most of the best rice lands, actual or potential, for Malay ownership. Yet
in spite of all this the Malays are at most holding their owrn in a most un
favourable economic situation. T o hand over this power by a stroke of the
pen, in exchange for a promise of economic aid, is easy. But any economic
aid that would really enable the Malays to hold their own would cost
very large sums of money, which would have to be voted by legislatures in

which Malays would no longer automatically have a majority, and in
which w ell educated Chinese would only too easily use the argument of
non-discrimination to increase their relative advantage.
T h e possession of most of the productive property of the country,
about nine-tenths of the best educated people, and all the important
economic contacts, is not an advantage that can be offset by a grant of say
ten m illion Straits dollars a year from the Colonial Development and
W elfare Fund and double that sum from general M alayan revenue, to be
spent on ru ral development over a period of ten years. These are arbi
trary figures, but there can be little doubt that most Chinese opinion
would regard them as generous. In actual fact they would make no ma
terial difference to the situation.
Statistics do not at present exist by which this can be demonstrated,
w ithout a good deal of guesswork. Prelim inary estimates of national in
come make it unlikely that more than five hundred m illion Straits dol
lars a year go to Malays, or that less than a thousand m illion go to
Chinese. The Malays are rather more numerous, and this annual dif
ference gives some idea of the enormous m aterial and human capital in
Chinese hands. It is fairly clear that the order of magnitude involved to
set the Malays economically on a par with the Chinese would be a sum
equa to t ie whole present Federal revenue (about three hundred million
Mraits dollars) levied every year from the Chinese and devoted wholly to
a ay we are (education, rural development, housing and the like) for
ten or teen years. Smaller sums, if spent appropriately and w ith maxi
mum e ect, might mitigate the differences to some extent; but at present
the politicians are obviously thinking in wholly unrealistic terms about
t e cost of setting the Malays on a par, economically, with the Chinese.
he change could not be brought about w ithout a m ajor economic
operation, comparable in scale to a long, arduous, all-out war.
The Malays, for all their political power, can do no more than cling
to t leir present inferior position and prevent it from deteriorating. Yet
they are now faced with the urgent necessity of consolidating the popu
lation of the whole country against terrorists, receiving promises of sup
port from outside Malaya’s frontiers. If the bulk of the Chinese popula
tion cannot be induced to become Malayan it may, under pressure, side
w ith the enemy m the jungle. A t present this is unlikely, because Com
munist dom ination would inevitably damage the economic position of
the Chinese even more than complete Malay domination. But racial bonds
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M ALAYA 329
are strong, and if the threat of external pressure were increased they
could be made to outweigh economic advantages.
T he Malays have to make the best bargain they can in the circum
stances, knowing that if they bargain too hard they w ill lose everything.
But there is a widespread feeling among them that Dato Onn and their
other leaders sold their interests too cheaply on the Communities Liaison
Committee. The demand, made by a group of Malay graduates, that
economic aid should be given first, may be taken as a bargaining counter
rather than a reasonable demand in itself. Even too precise a promise
w ould certainly prejudice the chance of reaching any agreement. But it is
difficult to resist the impression that Dato Onn himself believed that
economic assistance to the Malays on a sufficient scale would be a com
paratively simple matter; and that having satisfied himself that the Gov
ernment and the individual Chinese leaders were sincere in their inten
tion, he felt he could safely leave the implementation to the future.
The Importance of Higher Education

A n example of the type of aid that the Communities Liaison Commit
tee might be expected to favour is found in the limited sphere of higher
education. The Committee accepted the principle that State and Federal
funds for scholarships to students in the new University should be allotted
to Malays and non-Malay citizens in the ratio of three to one. The ratio
of academically suitable candidates is about one to twelve.
There are many reasons for this situation. The most important and
remediable one is that the number of Chinese receiving secondary edu
cation of any kind is enormously greater than the number of Malays.
T his in turn is due to the fact that the Malays are economically back
ward, and scattered over the countryside.
The only way to offset the educational backwardness of the Malays is
to subsidise education throughout the whole Malay community suffi
ciently to offset four advantages of the Chinese: first, their prosperity and
consequent ability to pay for school fees and transport; second, their pre
dom inantly urban character and the consequent cheapness of educating
their children; third, their traditional regard for learning and the prestige
of the scholar among them; and finally, the fact that as immigrants they
are a community artificially selected for ambition and aggressiveness. To
offset all these advantages would, of course, be inordinately costly. But
it would involve a radical educational programme which really wou
transform M alayan society. T o pretend that Malay educational back
wardness is being remedied without doing this, is not merely useless

hypocrisy. It is positively harm ful to race relations and to the self-respect
o f the M alay community. It may readily be imagined that a situation in
which M alay holders of scholarships frequently fail in their degrees, and
are then given administrative posts in control of non-Malay technical
officers who are graduates, is conducive neither to good government nor
to racial harmony.
Higher education is only one part of education. The lower rungs of
the educational ladder must develop if the upper ones are to be of any
use. But it is also characteristic of U.M.N.O. that it looks at education
argely in terms of qualification for professional and administrative posts.
Even on a strictly economic plane, the relative backwardness of the Malay
community depends at least as much on its lack of men with secondary
education and training in the various lower technical skills.
Capital invested in human beings tends to yield a much higher per
centage return than other capital. But to build up, in Malay hands, any-
t mg comparable to the mines, the factories, the estates, the houses, the
t ousan s of wholesale and tens of thousands of retail businesses of the
inese, would involve assistance on a truly colossal scale,
t must be emphasised that nothing else w ill really solve the problem,
on a ay monopoly of trade and money-lending would quickly turn
ay peasants and fishermen into serfs, or even reduce them to starva-
1 m* 1 eTf sence any political resistance, and non-Malay predomi-
m a modern techniques and skills would give overwhelming
m ft e a^sence ° f a virtual Malay monopoly of administration and
T CC; at Present under British control. In these conditions the
withdrawal of British power would compel the Malays to fight to hold
eir position, and in such a fight, though the Chinese would probably
ultim ately wm, most of their wealth would be destroyed.
A Malayan nationalism, and a Malayan nation, can be built only on
asis o approximate equality of status among the members of all
races. There can be little doubt that the approach of the Communities
Li ison Committee, suggesting that the political status of the Chinese
and the econoimc status of the Malays should be simultaneously de
veloped towards equality, is the only possible path for a Malayan nation
o travel. But the attamment of equality w ill entail far more radical
econoimc policies than have yet been envisaged. The chief danger is
that the enormous influence of the middle class in politics, strengthened
as it has been by Communist violence from the jungles, w ill prevent suf
ficiently radical economic policies being adopted. For if Malay acceptance

is purchased by promises that are not to be fulfilled the problem of nation
building w ill only be aggravated.
7. PO STSCRIPT: M AJO R DEVELOPMENTS, 1950-1952
the outbreak of the Emergency has witnessed several

h e perio d sin ce
T im portant developments along the lines foreshadowed in the fore

going pages.
In the political field there has been a marked development of sentiment
in favour of allegiances that cut across communal lines. Instances of this
are the amendments to the Federal Agreement and the State Nationality
Bills, the development of the Independence of Malaya Party, the growth
of the Trade Union Council, the increasing influence of Labour Parties,
and the alliance of the Malayan Chinese Association and die United
Malays' National Organisation in the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections.
Three educational schemes have been actively discussed and one of
these has been implemented in Singapore, where the lines of educational
policy are much clearer than in the Federation.
Some attempt has been made to raise the status of the rural Malays,
though the opportunity to take advantage of more than a year s phenome
nal prosperity which resulted from the temporary high price of rubber
has been largely missed. The reason for this can be clearly traced to
middle-class opposition on financial grounds as forecast in earlier chapters.
The Communist terrorist campaign has achieved virtually no success m
arousing popular support, but it has proved impossible up to the present
to do more than hold the terrorist activities in check. There is clear evi
dence that the supply organisation is still adequate to keep a more or less
constant force active in the jungle and even to recruit new terrorists to re
place those who are killed or who surrender.
T he Communists achieved one notable tragic success in the assassination
of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, but have suffered a major
setback in the comparatively successful completion of resettlement over a
large part of the country which has seriously interfered with their food
supply and hence diminished their initiative.
T he period was one in which the Chinese have on the whole secured
more success in improving their jDolitical position than the Malays have
secured in improving their economic position.
Recognition of the need for assistance to ru ral Malays has probably in
creased in all sections of the community, but this recognition has not gone
deep enough to secure any suitable financial help for economic develop
ment.
The Policy of Dato Onn

To consider the task of nation-building in rather greater detail it is
necessary first to follow the astonishing achievements of the Malay leader
Dato Onn. He has been active in three separate fields of activity during
the last four years and can record notable achievements in all three.
He has been one of those responsible for the negotiations that have pro
duced the new approach to the problem of citizenship, which differs
radically from the former plan in which Federal citizenship was not a
nationality and was compatible with dual allegiance. New legislation has
now been introduced which makes first-generation non-Malays eligible for
national status in each of the separate Malay States, and which makes sec
ond-generation non-Malays nationals automatically. This approach
eliminates the special status of Malays as subjects of the Sultan, since all
nationals of the States are subjects, and w ill therefore be entitled to
equality of status. The test of literacy in Malay has also been abandoned,
though a knowledge of the Malay language is still required as a basis for
naturalisation. It would be absurd to suggest that these arrangements
satis y the Chinese community, but they have enormously increased the
number of Chinese who will now have full status as subjects of the Sultans
and citizens of the Federation.
In the more narrowly political sphere, Dato Onn, by threatening to
leave the United Malays’ National Organisation in the middle of 1950,
greatly increased his influence; since he was pressed by the Johore Malays
to remain President of the U.M.N.O. at the meeting on the 27-29
August, 1950. He consented to be re-elected and persuaded the Organisa
tion to accept the State Nationality and Citizenship proposals on which
le had formerly encountered great opposition from other Malays. A t this
time he also attempted to form an unofficial parliam entary group in the
Federal Legislative Council, which could be used against any attempt to
use the official vote as a bloc for carrying through any particular official
policy. It is possible that this move was responsible for the introduction of
the “Member System”, by which unofficial members of the Legislative

Council were given a number of portfolios and made responsible for the
carrying out of policy.
Dato Onn’s tenure of office as President of U.M.N.O. was not however
wholly successful. By the end of 1950 he had clearly recognised that in
dependence was not obtainable without the cooperation of the different
racial groups in Malaya, and he attempted to transform U.M.N.O. into a
non-communal organisation and to persuade it to change its title to United
Malaya National Organisation. It is interesting in view of the previous
controversies over the term “Malayan”, that (owing to a misprint) Dato
Onn was widely reported as having advocated a change from United
Malays National Organisation to United Malayan National Organisation,
the report was however hurriedly denied.
A similar move was made by Dato Tan Cheng Lock who wished to per
suade the Malayan Chinese Association also to cease to be a communal
body, and at one time it seemed possible that the U.M.N.O., the M.C.A.
and the Malayan Indian Congress would all open their doors to memben;
of all other communities with a view to ultimately merging in a sing e
organisation. Because of resistance to this policy in U.M.N.O. Dato Onn
decided, while still President of this body, to break away from it and to
establish a new party to be known as the Independence of Malaya Party.
The Independence of Malaya Party

The establishment of this Party was in effect a translation into an
organised political form of the aims of the Communities Liaison Com
mittee. Most of the present leading supporters of the I.M.P. are former
members of this Committee or their associates. This fact must be borne m
mind in considering die relations of the I.M.P. to other political organisa
tions in Malaya. The Communities Liaison Committee was a committee
designed to draw together leading members of the different communities
who were prepared to cooperate. It was certainly not an attempt to form
a separate non-communal organisation nor was there any expectation that
the members would break away from their communal organisations. This
would indeed have been against the interests of the Communities Liaison
Committee. . ,
For this reason when the I.M.P. was established several of its mem
remained members of their communal organisations. Dato Onn n ™se
resigned his presidency of U.M.N.O. but probably did not inten to rea
w ith the organisation entirely or to take members out of the U.M.N.O.

into the I.M.P.
In the M alayan Chinese Association the I.M.P. section now forms one
political wing of the Association and since the form ation of the I.M.P.
Dato T an Cheng Lock has been attempting simultaneously to build up the
political strength of the M.C.A. (as shown in the recent publication of
some of the papers of the late Sir Henry Gurney) and also to interest
Chinese in the I.M.P.
The formation of the Independence of M alaya Party was first an
nounced by Dato Onn at the beginning of Ju n e 1951 and was received very
favourably in all communities except among one section of the Malays.
Later in the month an 8-point programme was announced which was in
tended to lead to self-government for Malaya within 10 years. The eight
points were the following:
1. Self-government within ten years.
2. Democratic elections to local government by 1953 and the C entral Legislature
b ased o n a d u lt suffrage by 1955.
3' l 2<bya i195? >mpillSOry elem entary education for a ll between the ages of 6 and
4. M alayam sation of the Civil Service and creation of a M alayan Service as op
posed to Colonial Service.
5. Improved social services, in the ru ral areas in particular.
7 S V a n f ? U aram eed P rices to c u ltiv a to rs.
7. Full fruits o f their industry to workers.
orm of the feudal system in the M alay States.
f r n ° cd? bt t^lat tk ‘s was an ambitious programme. The im-

S nf l u educational point which is of course fundamental to
cRndr. ^ i?rS 1S CertainlY now ^ p o ssib le by 1955, in view of the dis-
3Ve s*nce arisen concerning the educational system. Malay
d p m a n d ^ t h iT ? 16 p a it ly ° n c° m m u n it y g r o u n d s a n d p a r tly in th e fo rm o f a
anH YT S ^ t0° long and should be shortened to five years
. G. aim S ou*d ke independence rather than self-government.
I he distinction was nrponv,,ui , ,
presumably intended to refer to the link with the
Commonwealth.
The Independence of Malaya Party is still developing and building up
its organization. It commands the support of several influential Malays
and the personal influence of Onn. It is however still doubtful how far it
w ill command general Malay support among the leaders or in the villages
and there can be little doubt that one section of the M alay aristocracy will
remain bitterly opposed to it.
Other Non-communal Organisations

There has also been an interesting development of Labour Parties in
Malaya during these years. The Singapore Labour Party has won seats
both in the City Council and on the Legislative Council though its rival,
the Progressive Party, still holds the chief power in Singapore. The Pro
gressive Party is prim arily the organ of the English-educated middle
class and its programme favours a strictly non*communal approach to
politics and rapid development towards self-government. It cannot how
ever be regarded as progressive in the social and economic sense of that
term since it has devoted a considerable amount of attention to opposing
taxation and has taken no active interest in social services with the excep
tion of education. The Labour Party in Singapore has suffered seriously
from internal dissensions based mainly on personal rivalries and to a lesser
extent on the rivalry between the well organised English-educated unions
and the unions of uneducated manual workers. The latter have access to a
much larger membership but suffer from lack of capable leadership,
language difficulties, and lack of funds. Nevertheless the success of the
Party in winning seats in elections has stimulated interest in organising
Labour Parties in other centres, particularly in Kuala Lumpur. There is
much talk of forming a pan-Malayan Labour Party and the Labour plat
form always emphasises the need for uniting Singapore with the Federa
tion of Malaya, a point on which the more right-wing parties are less en
thusiastic.
In the municipal elections at Kuala Lumpur at tlie beginning of 1952,
a further phenomenon of cooperation between the communities attracted
much attention. This was the alliance of the Malayan Chinese Association
and the United Malays National Organisation for the purpose of con
testing these elections. A t first sight this alliance might seem puzzling
since the chief rival of the alliance was the Independence of Malaya Party.
Those members of the Malayan Chinese Association who are not also
members of the I.M.P. would not appear to have any obvious interest in
cooperation with the U.M.N.O., the continued separate existence of
which is a protest against the inter-communal policies of the I.M.P. The
basis of the alliance, however, was opposition to the introduction of na
tional political questions into municipal affairs and its explanation is to
be sought in the fact that the municipal franchise gave a considerable pre
dominance of votes to Malays, while the election funds were to be found
mainly among the Chinese. The rivalry should therefore be seen largely
as a personal rivalry between different groups of Chinese, and between
different groups of Malays, in which non-communal feelings were more or

less superficial, though they probably went deeper on the I.M.P. side than
on that of the alliance.
It seems doubtful whether with the extension of the citizenship within
the Federation any advantage w ill remain in an alliance of this kind.
Both the M.C.A. and U.M.N.O. would lose political support among their
more extreme members by acting in unison and an alliance would clearly
weaken their power of opposition to I.M.P. The K uala Lum pur municipal
elections were the first contested elections in the Malay States though other
elections had been held slightly earlier in Penang and Malacca. Other
municipal areas are now introducing registration of electors and a flexible
system of election of village councils for ru ral areas has recently been in
troduced. Some time w ill probably be needed however before these elec
tions can be contested on predominantly party lines. The developments of
the past two years have merely ensured that when this does occur some at
least of the parties w ill be intercommunal, and this must be recognised as
a considerable gain.
Problems of Education: The Barnes Report

In the field of education there is the same aspiration towards a non-
communal approach, but nevertheless educational progress has been held
up y itter livalries which have run largely along communal lines. The
entra ommittee on Education in 1950, which had been considering
owi to implement the resolutions in favour of the teaching of Malay and
‘ ng is in all schools, had been bitterly criticised by the Malay press for
IQÔ16] t0 T-r-Vu enou^ 1 attention to the education of Malays. In August
, t le ig Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, announced that a com-
mi ee was to be established to investigate Malay education. This commit
tee winch was composed exclusively of Malays and'1Europeans under the
lan mans up of Mr. Leonard Barnes, a sociologist from the United
mgaom, met later in the year and heard evidence exclusively from Euro-
pean an alay witnesses since the terms of reference were limited to
a ay e ucation. Neveitheless its report issued in June made recom-
men ations m relation to the entire educational system. The chief recom-
men ation o the Barnes report was the establishment of a national
schools system in which all races should be taught together and in which
the medium of instruction should be Malay in the romanised form, and
English. It was emphasised that the aim should be bilingualism and a
policy was recommended of progressively withdrawing aid from com*
m unal schools and building up a national school system with a view to

discouraging separate communal education.
T here is no doubt that the Barnes report represented a high level
of political enlightenment. It was a major achievement to secure whole
hearted acceptance by the Malays of a system in which the English
language as a basis for secondary and higher education should have an
equal place with Malay and in which the special advantages now en
joyed by the Malay community in the provision of Malay schools would
come to an end. It is also probably true that it would have been impossible
to persuade the Malays to accept any such system if it had not been con
sidered and presented prim arily in terms of the interest of the Malays
themselves.
Nevertheless, two criticisms of the Barnes report must be made. First, it
was certainly unwise to indicate as an aim of policy the cessation of com
m unal education. The intention was to secure this by agreement of the
parents of the child by making the national schools unquestionably
superior to anything that could be achieved on communal lines. But it
showed a deplorable lack of tact to emphasise this aim in the report since
any gain in Malay acceptance was certainly offset by the hostility that this
slight naturally aroused in the Chinese whose school system has been built
up almost w holly by voluntary effort and teaches very nearly as many
children, w ith very small Government aid, as the whole Government sys
tem of M alay education. It was also a mistake to go, in fact if not in form,
beyond the terms of reference without specifically asking for those terms to
be widened and taking evidence from other communities.
The Fenn-Wu Report

Before the publication of the Barnes report an American educationist,
Dr. Fenn, and a Chinese official of the United Nations, Dr. W u, had been
appointed by the High Commissioner to investigate conditions in the
Chinese schools, and make recommendations for adapting them to the
needs o£ Malaya. By this time, January 1951, there was strong suspicion
among the Chinese schools that an attempt was to be made to suppress
Chinese education. Chinese teachers are unquestionably influential in
the form ation of Chinese opinion and have in the past been one of the
chief forces keeping alive the contact of the Chinese with China. There
can be no doubt that they felt threatened both in their livelihood and m
their culture by the trend of educational policy, and they succeeded m
arousing among the Chinese community an exaggerated hostility to any
form of Malayanisation. Rumors were freely circulated that it was in

tended to turn Chinese into Malays.
In M arch Dr. Fenn met three Kuala Lumpur Chinese headmasters who
were protesting strongly against the trend of educational policy and this
meeting received a good deal of publicity in the Chinese press. The
Fenn-W u report, when it was ultimately issued, adopted the view that it
w ould be a mistake to try to force the Chinese to be educated through any
other medium and that Chinese culture should be preserved but modified
to suit Malayan conditions. It was even stated that Chinese education had
emphasised the link with China prim arily because it was not adequately
encouraged in Malaya and that English education had the same faults in
emphasising contact with England. The report emphasised that what was
desired was a direction of education through all the different language
media towards a common sense of belonging to Malaya and that this
should be done in terms of the different cultures in that country.
It is interesting to speculate what would have been the effect on the
political development of the United States if this policy had been adopted
towards immigrants in that country, and it must be emphasised that in the
U nited States a sense of nationality already existed and did not have to be
uilt up as part of a movement towards self-government at the time of
maximum immigration.
The criticisms of the educational system of Malaya made by Drs. Fenn
and Wu were no doubt partly justified but the political policy which they
suggeste could not have created a common Malayan consciousness in less
than two or three generations.
Latex Educational Developments

The acute controversies caused by the divergence between these two re
ports e to urther consideration by the Central Advisory Committee on
ucation w lich included both Malay and Chinese members and which
pro uce an agreed report by leaving open the question whether political
or educational considerations should be given predominant weight. The
report o the Central Advisory Committee recommended a much more
i era policy towaids vernacular education and accepted the principle
that other languages than Malay and English could be taught in the na
tional schools. The principle of a national school system may be said to be
acceptable to all parties.
The whole question of education in the Federation has now been
referred back to a Select Committee of the Legislative Council which is
considering methods of implementing the report of the Advisory Commit

tee. T he phenomenon of Reports on Reports and Committees on the find
ings of Committees may be an inevitable feature of political education.
Ordeal by Committee is however a severe test of Malaya’s frustration-
tolerance.
Nearly 200 teachers from the Federation have been sent to study at a
college in Kirkby in England as one of the preparations for the establish
ment of a national schools system, and plans are also being developed for
the establishment of several teachers’ training colleges in Malaya, includ
ing one for the training of Chinese teachers which has already begun work.
M eanwhile a successful programme of primary education has been
developing in the island of Singapore along lines laid down in the
Frisby five-year plan. The original plan was intended to begin with ver
nacular education in their own language for all children of the many
racial groups. Under pressure from the English-educated Chinese com
m unity this plan was modified and parents were allowed to choose English
education if they wished, whatever their home language might be. As a
result the regional schools built under the Frisby plan have in fact been
schools teaching through the medium of English though the vernacular
languages have also been taught as subjects.
A slightly modified form of this scheme has also been introduced into
the Malay schools which already existed, so that a substantial proportion of
all children receiving education now learn tlirough the medium of Eng
lish. Chinese schools still exist for those who wish to attend them and a
few T am il schools also. These are now receiving more generous Govern
ment support than before, but die Frisby plan of virtually universal educa
tion through the medium of English, with vernacular languages taught in
addition, is now generally accepted by all communities in Singapore.
The Chinese community in Singapore now largely favours a system
similar to the Frisby plan for tlie Federation also. This would no doubt be
an ideal system if adequate funds were available to enable English schools
to be established in all the major villages in the country. English schools
would probably be even more expensive than die national schools pro
posed under the Barnes report, and an additional disadvantage would be
that unlike the proposed national schools, schools on tlie Frisby plan
would be more difficult to adapt to conditions in which Malay was the
predom inant language.
T he Barnes report proposed the establishment of local education au
thorities with powers to finance education, and this is one of the more
doubtful features of the report. Politically, no doubt, the local education

authorities would be an im portant source of political development; eco
nom ically they would still further handicajj the rural and predominantly
M alay areas which are already weakest educationally.
A ll races and all parties in Malaya are agreed that education is a vital
need if a nation is to be built. Nevertheless the agreement, in the absence
of proper democratic institutions, has not reached the purse-strings of
those best able to pay.
The proportion of M alaya’s national income that is spent on education
is baiely one percent. This is perhaps the basic fact, for the type of educa
tion which Malaya needs is undoubtedly expensive and even homogene
ous countries like the United Kingdom with far less need for national
unification or for technical improvement can spend between two and
three times as large a proportion of their national income on education.
Both economically and politically a much larger investment in education
by Malaya would be amply justified, but at present the prospective bene
ficiaries are not politically strong enough to impose their w ill on those
who control the money.
Education has been treated most fully in this summary because of its
outstanding importance in the social services of Malaya. There has also
een during the period a recovery of the trade union movement which
was deserted by those Communist leaders who made off w ith most of the
trade union funds in 1948.
Other Developments Since 1950

A Bill for the establishment of Wages Councils has been passed though
none ave yet been established under this Bill. A rbitration machinery has
een esta lished and functioned smoothly in raising wages during the
rubber boom without strike action. A central provident fund scheme has
been introduced by which workers in all but the smallest undertakings
are ensuied a gratuity at the end of their working life through payments
made compulsorily by themselves and their employers into a central provi
dent fund through the Post Office.
Elections have been introduced for local government in the m ajor cities,
though the franchise m some of the cities has been disappointingly nar
row. Local residents in Kuala Lumpur pressed strongly for a franchise
which would remove all qualifications related to nationality and impose
only strict residential qualifications. This appeal was rejected by the
Sultan of Selangor, but qualifications on a wider basis have been intro

duced in Johore.
There has been one interesting example of the opposition of local in
terests to necessary schemes of social reform. In June 1951 an attempt was
made by the Government to raise a substantial stabilization fund from the
rubber industry with a view to limiting the great inflationary pressure that
the phenomenal price of rubber was causing. The rubber industry op
posed the institution of this fund and attempted to argue, clearly against
all the facts, that rubber prices were not an inflationary factor. A member
of the Emergency broadcasting service, Mr. Alex Josey, who had been
broadcasting propaganda talks designed primarily to influence the artisans
and lower middle class, issued some rather trenchant criticisms of the rub
ber industry and reminded the industry that in some countries industries
had been nationalised. It must be remembered that at this time the United
Kingdom was governed by a Labour Government which had adopted an
avowed policy of nationalising Colonial industries for the benefit of the
local populations. This policy was of course a dead letter as far as Malaya
was concerned but the warning was a mild and wholly legitimate one. A
violent campaign by a local newspaper resulted, to which in the end the
Government yielded, and Mr. Josey was first refused permission to broad
cast and later had his contract with the Government terminated, with no
explanation given.
The Government has derived considerable revenue from taxation of
rubber at the high prices prevailing in 1951, but the duty originally pro
posed by the Government would have given substantial reserves that
could later have been used for education and development while at the
time they would certainly have limited the rise in the cost of living. The
total revenue of the Governments of the Federation and Singapore showed
up very poorly in relation to the National Income, as revealed in a recent
study by Dr. F. C. C. Benham. W ith a national income of approximately
3,000,000,000 Straits dollars, Malaya has the highest per capita income of
any country in Asia.
T he total Government revenue during these years ran to just over 10
percent of national income. In the boom year of 1951 national income
almost certainly reached double this figure while Government revenue
showed a much more moderate increase. A substantial part of this revenue
is being spent on fighting the Communists by m ilitary action and this
makes it only too apparent that the general level of expenditure on social
services and nation building is wholly inadequate by modern standards.
It is difficult to say how this situation could be improved, since without

more widespread education those who are politically articulate will con
tinue to have an interest in limiting Government revenue and expendi
ture and w ill have informed and capable leadership from the European
commercial community. More widespread education may in time lead to
the development of other social services that w ill help to build up a united
nation.
The Development of the Emergency

Throughout this whole period the armed Communists in the jungle
have been attempting to disrupt the life of the community, assassinating
generally their Chinese opponents and the Europeans and trying to
damage transport and productive capacity. In 1949 they issued a party
programme which attempted to appeal to the local shopkeepers and even
large capitalists, as well as to the English-educated intelligentsia. The
tactic was similar to that adopted by the Chinese Communists and is be
lieved to have been modelled largely on their plans. Some of the items in
the 1949 programme are taken over from the Peoples’ Constitution though
with much less liberalism and constitutional nicety.
A t the beginning of 1951 about a score of English-educated intellectuals
were arrested and detained under the Emergency regulations by the Singa
pore police. It was alleged that they had been largely responsible for the
issue of propaganda directed towards the English-speaking classes. Some
of these men have since been released but none of them have been brought
to trial. The propaganda leaflets have ceased to be issued since the arrests.
The Communists appear to have been able to keep their forces at ap
proximately a constant strength in the jungle in spite of frequent actions
in which many have been killed or captured and in spite of increasing sur
renders in recent months. They have a large underground organisation
collecting food and supplies throughout the country. In the nature of
the case it is difficult to say how much of this works by terror and how
much is based on genuine sympathy.
Vigorous action has been taken to deny supplies to the Communists,
c le y y resettling nearly half a million squatters and labourers in areas
in which they can be protected from Communist intimidation. Resettle
ment areas are surrounded by barbed wire though the occupants are free
to leave and return as they wish except during curfew hours. They are
however prevented from removing foodstuffs from the area and strict
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M A L A Y A a ,t J
controls have also been imposed on the transport of foodstuffs by road.

The effect of these regulations appears to have been to prevent very large
concentrations of Communists and to divert rather more of their energies
to fighting for food. In proportion as this campaign is successful, the initia
tive of the Communists w ill be reduced.
M ore recently, with the appointment of a British General, Sir Gerald
Tem pler, as High Commissioner and of Mr. MacGillivray, an adminis
trator from the West Indies, as Deputy High Commissioner and also of
new men from the United Kingdom at the head of the police and the
armed forces, the policy has clearly turned in the direction of treating the
M alayan problem prim arily as a m ilitary problem and keeping the im
portant positions out of the hands of Administrators who are sensitive to
political susceptibilities. The new policy has shown energy and imagina
tion. M erely as a means of ending the Emergency it must be judged by
results which have so far been encouraging. Even should it succeed
rapidly, however, there w ill still remain many important problems to be
overcome.
The Fundamental Problems in Malaya

Some of the difficulties encountered in the defence effort against Com
munism throw into sharp relief the difficulties of building up a sense of
nationalism in Malaya. The introduction of the call-up for national serv
ice in the Police resulted in a substantial exodus both of Indians and of
Chinese. It was reported that the ships carrying migrants to India were
much fuller than usual while approximately 6,000 Chinese within the
call-up groups applied for visas to return to China in the first three months
after the announcement. Press comments on these “dodgers” largely fol
low communal lines. JSotli Indian and Chinese papers and also Indian and
Chinese writers in the English language press were inclined to make ex
cuses for those of their own race who had left the Federation. It was said,
for example, that the Indians were returning for family reasons or to look
after their property in India or the Chinese were objecting chiefly to the
disturbance in their studies. An attempt was also made to secure exemp
tion for the eldest son or the only son of a Chinese family.
M any of those who make these excuses are actively opposed to Com
munism and would not oppose the major steps taken to fight against it m
Malaya. There is some feeling that those who ran away to escape national
service were bringing shame on their own community but in every case
the sense of racial origin appears to have been stronger than the sense of
national opposition to Communist aggression.
In response to pressure from the M.C.A. those who serve under diis
call-up w ill be eligible for citizenship on completion of their service. This
may help to identify some of the potential citizens of Malaya wirii the
country of their adoption.
In the educational sphere a similar indication of the pull of foreign al
legiance may be found in the boycott by a number of Chinese schools of an
attempt to impose a unified examination sysiem. Officially the Chinese
community recognises the necessity of making Chinese education more
Malayan. The Chinese protested at the time of the Barnes Report against
the extinction of their culture, but accepted the need for relating that
culture to a new country. The assimilation of the Chinese schools into a
Malayan system would clearly involve at least a common examination
system, and there can be little doubt that the boycott was intended to
pieserve the separate national character of the Chinese schools. Neverthe
less, in spite of the statements publicly made, the boycott received a con
siderable amount of Chinese support.
The fundamental problem of Malaya remains. It is a prosperous country
and most of the people who come to Malaya to live have no wish to re
turn to their homelands. Psychologically, however, it is difficult for any of
them to transfer allegiance to the country of their adoption. The chief
reason for this is the much greater numerical strength and political im
portance of all the different countries with which these races are linked.
A n Indian may profess loyalty to Malaya and even work for the country
but it is extremely difficult for him to resist the pull of India on any matter
of major psychological importance. The recent growth in the power of
China has had an even stronger effect on the Chinese. There can be little
doubt that if Indonesia acquired greater strength and,influence, large num
bers of Malays with Indonesian connections would look to Indonesia ra
ther than to Malaya. Yet incorporation of Malaya in any of these countries
would involve colonial status with certainly less self-government than
Malaya possesses even now.
A small minority of one of the three races might feel that some degree
of independence had been gained if Malaya were incorporated into the
country from which that race came, but this would certainly not apply to
any member of either of the other two races or even to most of the local-
born members of the new ruling race. Breaking of the psychological ties
with outside countries is essential if there is to be any solution of the
N A T IO N A L IS M IN M ALAYA 345
problems of Malaya. There have been encouraging signs that intellectual

recognition of this fact is spreading, but it would be optimistic to assume
that deep feelings have been materially affected in most of Malaya’s
population.
I
PART FOUR
ft
SUMMARIES OF LUCKNOW
CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS
Opening Address
by
JA W A H A R L A L NEHRU
Prime M inister of India
I, on behalf of the Government o f India, extend to you a cordial
M
ay
welcome and tell you how privileged we feel that you have chosen
this city and this country for this great gathering.
For a number of years—I think it is about twelve— I have been con
nected, at first rather distantly and then a little more intimately, with
the work of the Institiue oi‘ Pacific Relations. I have profited by read
ing many of the publications that you have issued and I have thought
how much good you were doing by pursuing this path of trying to under
stand the problems of the Pacific or the Far East.
For a long time, I have thought that from many points of view the
problems of the world w ill be more entangled in those of the Far East
and that the centre of gravity of trouble w ill be the Far East or large parts
of Asia. It has struck me that while people often talked about this, they
usually passed by the problems of Asia and discussed die other great
problems of the world, notably of Europe. They were, of course, very
im portant, but it seems to me that in the perspective of things to come
they were not paying enough attention to the problems of a developing
Asia. ' . . .
W e all know the tremendous importance of much that is happening in
Europe and other parts of the world and I do not mean for an instant to
say that those changes in Europe and elsewhere are to be passed over, but
I have felt and I have'often said so, that in the perspective of history today
Asia demands attention in many ways. Certainly, of course, from the point
of view of developing undeveloped areas, of providing food where food
is needed, etc., but much more so in understanding. For Asia is an area
which is not only in a process of change but in a process of storm. I am
referring to the inner changes that are taking place all over the world no
doubt but perhaps more so in Asia than elsewhere. It is not because there
is any special virtue in Asia but because we have been kept back and we
are trying to catch up. W e have been entangled in past things and time
has passed by and we have not kept pace with it. And so we have suddenly
a r r i v e d at a stage when we have to run—walking is not enough—and in
running we stumble and fall and we try to get up again. It is no good to
349
tell us to w alk slowly, because we just cannot do it slowly, not even for
outside or other forces. W e realize, especially in an aged continent like
Asia, that running involves risk and dangers but there is no choice, for
there is a torment in our minds and there are all kinds of questions be
fore us which we seek to answer.
In the final analysis, if you seek to understand us, you w ill understand
little by discussing our economic, social, or political problems; you will
have to look a little deeper to understand this torment in the mind and
spirit of Asia. It takes different shapes in different countries, of course,
and it is a problem ultim ately for us to understand and to solve, with the
help of others, I hope, but the burden is ours. Others can help, as others
can hinder, but they cannot solve it for us.
So, if you would permit me to suggest, in your conference sessions I
hope you w ill give thought not only to the externals of the problems
under discussion but to that something inside them which moves vast
masses of people, which puts questions to which they cannot find an easy
answer, and so they go about tormented in m ind and spirit, making mis
takes sometimes, sometimes doing wrong and sometimes doing right
things. T hat is our state today in Asia.
Asia is a huge continent and, when we talk about an Asian feeling, I do
not quite know what it means, because we differ so much amongst our
selves. Great countries like China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Burma or the
countries of the Middle East have ancient traditions and cultures, with a
tremendous background of history and past experience. It is difficult to
jum ble them together and call it Asia because geographically they hap
pen to be in that area. Yet I think it is true that in the present context
T ??6 1S SUCJ? a th*nS as an Asian sentiment, although there may be large
d l“ e™ between these countries. Possibly it is merely a reaction to the
past 200 or 300 years of Europe in Asia.
Personally, I do not set much weight on this belief of an O rient and an
Occident as if there were a basic difference between what is called Oc
cident and what is called Orient. There are differences of background,
history, tradition, geography and climate. There are differences which
have gi own up, especially in the last 400 or 500 years, largely because
certain parts of the world went ahead w ith the consequences of the in
dustrial revolution while others did not. Possibly if the others also
adopt and go ahead on those lines, these differences may be less, although
possibly, even then, the conflict may not be less.
Countries like India or China or those of the M iddle East have a very
long background of history and tradition. It is both good and bad. If it
had not been good we would not have survived. W e have survived and
found there is a great deal of good and we propose to hold on to that. At
the same time there is, no doubt, a great deal of bad in it too. It prevents
S U M M A R IE S O F LUCKN O W CO N FEREN CE D IS C U S S IO N S 351
us from doing tilings which we ought to do. And so, between the good
and the bad and between the past and the present and the future, we do
not quite know what we are going to do and what we should do. Some
individuals may think this way, others another way, but I am speaking
for the moment of national tendencies.
If you ask me— and I am not without experience of my country—it is
very difficult fo r me to answer briefly, because I see so many forces at play.
I am often asked what is Communism doing in this country? How does it
affect us? Certain questions may be important for the moment; I do not
deny that. But we have to deal with deeper problems. W hen I say “we,” I
am not referring only to India, but also to other countries. Deeper prob
lems, more difficult questions and more complicated questions—not just
being Communists and spreading Communism, or being anti-Communists
and fighting Communism and thinking that that is the only question left
in this world. If you ask me about India, the major difficulties will not be
external to us but internal, of the mind and of the spirit; tendencies
pushing us ahead, tendencies pushing us backwards; revivalism on the
one side and progress on the other.
W e are going to advance, I hope, rapidly, with the development and
application of science in this country in every way. This will produce
good results, and yet doubts creep into one's mind because it affords no
real solution. M any of our problems may themselves be the result of the
application of the science which we admire. W here are we going; what
are we aiming at? I feel that unless we give thought to these deeper prob
lems we are apt to go astray and not find a real answer.
You know that many of us in this country have spent a great part of our
lives in trying very imperfectly to follow the lead of a great leader we had.
He gave us some faith and some vision, and because of that we managed
to achieve something. For thirty years or more, we lived under his guid
ance and he spoke in terms strange to the modern world, strange to some
extent even to us who followed him. But we felt the greatness of his per
sonality and followed him in certain things to the best of our ability. He
talked about non-violence and yet we saw a world fu ll of violence.
Here we are today in charge of government, and the Government keeps
armies, navies and air forces and indulges in violence pretty often. None
of us dares, in the present state of the world, to do away with the engine of
organized violence; we cannot, from fear of external aggression or of in
ternal trouble. W e cannot do it and so we keep armies. However we see
that that way does not solve any problem. Of course, such army, navy or
air force as we have is a tiny affair compared to the vast forces of other na
tions. But what of them? Have they solved their problems? There again
the question is not answered in the affirmative.
W e find that sometimes the methods of dealing with the evils of the
w orld themselves contribute to that evil. W hat then are we to do? There
is evil in the world, plenty of it. And the evil supports itself by armed
strength. W e have to meet it by armed strength and as we meet it we
become infected by that evil. W e more and more become infected by
what might be called the m ilitary method of dealing w ith things, or a
m ilitary outlook.
W h ile there have been great soldiers in the world, I do not think that
the m ilitary outlook or the purely m ilitary method has yet solved any
m ajor problem in the world. That is why I believe with the great French
man who once said that war is much too serious a thing to be entrusted
to soldiers. T h at is perfectly true. If it is too serious a thing for soldiers,
to entrust it to a civilian who develops a m ilitary outlook is infinitely
worse. If a nation or a government develops that type of m ilitary men
tality, then there is little hope for that nation.
For the last three months or so we have been facing what was a small
w ar in Korea, but which has in it the seeds of a mighty conflict. Almost
every country desired that that war should be localized and should end
there. The people of the world desired it, I am quite sure. Yet, sometimes
the m ilitary mind wanted to go much further, thinking that by going
further it could solve other basic problems also, but without realizing the
essential lesson of history, that if you go too far you w ill become entangled
in other problems.
It is my misfortune that I have to deal with these problems in a govern
mental capacity. I have to advise my Government and sometimes venture
to express an opinion to other Governments, and often enough I find
that we are not in agreement with any other Government, which is an
unfortunate state of affairs. But, we feel that it does little good for us
merely to make our minds blank and accept others’ impressions and
others views or to follow a particular line of action because others follow
it. I think that would not be a good thing for my country or the world.
I venture to think that perhaps those of us in India, or those of us in
other parts of Asia, may conceivably have a somew'nat better understand
ing, not perhaps of the economic or the political problems, but certainly
of those general problems of the mind and spirit and heart that trouble
Asia and which ultim ately are going to govern the actions of Asia.
The economic factor plays an important and vital part in the lives of
men—-it is playing a tremendous part in Asia. But ultim ately, there are
other forces which may play a more important part. And, as I said, it may
be that we in Asia, whatever country we may belong to, might be in a
somewhat better position to understand our neighbour countries of Asia,
to understand their troubles and their difficulties, to have, if I may say
so, an em otional understanding of them which is more im portant than
any purely intellectual one.
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCKN O W CO N FEREN CE D ISC U SS IO N S 353
I ventured in a spirit of arrogance once to say that many Western

countries lack skill in dealing w ith Asia. Of course, I can say the reverse
w ith equal truth, that is, many Eastern and Asian countries lack skill and
understanding in dealing with the West— because both are true. Now,
how are we to get that understanding, because it is important? I feel that
an institute like the Institute of Pacific Relations is peculiarly situated
so as to help in that real and true understanding. It may be that the work
you do may not carry you very far in influencing governments. It is diffi
cult to know what influences governments and how to influence them at a
critical moment. Nevertheless, in democratic countries certainly, all this
goes towards influencing government.
As you meet here in India to consider problems of Asian nationalism,
I w onder what exactly you mean by Asian nationalism. Is it different
from its European variety, and, if so, how does it differ? W hat exactly is
nationalism ? I do not know; and it is extremely difficult to define. In the
case of a country under foreign domination, it is easy to describe what
nationalism is. It is anti-foreign power. But, in a free country, what is
nationalism ? Certainly it is something positive, though opinions may
vary. Even so, I think a large element of it is negative, and sometimes we
find that nationalism, which is a healthy force in a country, a progressive
force, a liberating force, becomes—maybe after liberation—unhealthy,
retrogressive, reactionary or expansionist and looks with greedy eyes on
other countries, as did those countries against which it fought for its
freedom.
A ll that is “nationalism.” Then, where do you draw the line? W hat
do you call right and what do you call wrong? W e have just been through
our struggle for independence and freedom. Naturally, nationalism was
a war-cry which warmed our hearts. It is still there in our hearts and it
still warms the hearts of almost every Asian wherever you may go, be
cause the memories of past colonialism are very vivid in our mind. Today
a few individuals may escape those memories or get over them, but the
vast masses of the people do not forget them. Any other force, any other
activity that may seek to function, must define itself in terms of this na
tionalism. T h at is to say, if it is anti-nationalism, it comes up against a
great barrier. If it is going parallel and in a line with it, then it may be
helped by it.
T h at is why I said a moment ago that, when the question is put, as it
often is by people coming to us from abroad, “W hat is your reaction to
Communism?” the answer is a somewhat complicated one. When they get
a little angry w ith us and say, “Cannot you see the great danger which is
threatening the world?" we answer, “W e see many things, not one; cer
tainly that danger is there, but there are many others, too—many other
dangers from outside, and many inside—and we try to balance them.”
A n in divid u al may answer this question differently. B ut I am telling you

w hat the national answer w ould be.
W h en Indonesia was struggling for its freedom, it seemed a monstrous
thing to us to ask any country to support Dutch imperialism there. What
ever the reason, Communism or no Communism, it was a monstrous
thing. Fortunately, in the end the right counsels prevailed and Indonesian
nationalism was supported, and it won. No argum ent in any country of
Asia is going to have weight if it goes counter to the nationalist spirit of
the country, Communism or no Communism. T h at has to be understood.
I am not arguing for or against, but am trying to put the position as I
understand it. W hatever country in Asia you may go to, you have to see
w hat is the nationalist urge, how you can support it, and, if you go against
it, whatever your other arguments may be, they w ill not be fully appreci
ated or understood.
I do not consider nationalism by itself an adm irable thing: it may be
good or it may be bad or it may be a m ixture of good and bad. It depends
on how it functions and where it is. So it is not that I wish to lay stress on
nationalism because I consider it a good thing but because I feel that at
the present moment in large parts of Asia it is a factor which must be
recognized. T h at nationalism, inevitably, is based, as I said, on memories
of past colonialism, and if anything occurs which reminds us of past
colonialism or any future form of it, immediately old memories revive
and there is a strong reaction.
I would not venture to put anything concrete before many of you who
are experts in these subjects. Still I venture to say something because my
own life has been a curious one, not that of an expert on anything, but
a dabbler in many things and a person who comes into contact with vast
masses of human beings, ivho tries to understand them, who tries to in
fluence them and is influenced by them. T o some extent I am receptive
to mass influences in other countries. I can understand them a little more
perhaps than if I haci the great advantage of being scholarly as you
are. I can view this problem of Asia in some historical perspective and in
the mass sense, of masses in movement. A nd I think that, unless you see
it also in that way, you w ill not wholly understand it or grasp it, because
this ferm ent in Asia, these masses in movement, are not an external
movement; they are minds in movement and they are changing and shak
ing, and I do not know where it w ill land us.
I have not the faintest notion— I am speaking to you as Prime Minister
of India as to what India w ill be like in ten or twenty years hence. I can
tell you what I want it to be. I have a certain measure of confidence in
myself and can move people in a particular direction. Having said that, I
cannot say what is going to happen in Asia or India. And, frankly speak
ing, I do my job to the best of my ability and w ith as much energy as I
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCK N O W CO N FEREN CE D IS C U S S IO N S 355
possess. If I succeed, w ell and good; if I do not, I cannot help it. Because
I may not succeed, I am not going to w orry today. As of the moment I
have every intention of succeeding. I may tell you that I hope to succeed.
You w ill discuss these problems of nationalism, and I have no doubt
that you r discussions w ill bring understanding to others as well as to
m any o f you, that is to say, understanding of each other’s problems com
ing from different countries. You w ill consider them naturally on the in
tellectual and economic level. I sometimes feel, looking at the world
around us, that a kind of pervading fear is gradually preventing us from
considering any question on its merits. If any country ought to be afraid,
it should be India or any country in Asia, because, judged by any modem
standards, we are weak, with no great resources, although potentially we
have great resources. But I can tell you w ith all honesty that I have not
a shred of fear in me at the present moment, whatever happens in the
w orld; and I think that to some extent my people, or many of diem, share
that feeling. W hy is that so? Because we were trained to a large extent in
this way of functioning by our Master. He started with small groups fac
ing a mighty empire, unarmed people with no apparent means of achiev
ing our end. On the other side there was the might of an armed empire.
G radually we learnt from our great leader not to be afraid. Ultimately
one has to face certain consequences. If you mentally accept those conse
quences, fear goes. But, if you avoid doing so, there is fear. I think it is
true that if we or some of us are not burdened by the fear that is consum
ing large parts of the world, it is not from a lack of understanding of the
dangerous situation that we are in but because we have been conditioned
to this way during the last thirty years.
T h e last w ar perhaps ended long after it should have ended. A t least
some people think that it might have ended in as good a victory and with
fewer problems a year before it actually ended, provided the desire to
take matters to the extreme lim it was not there. Unfortunately, when we
enter into the realm of warfare and the m ilitary mind, there is always that
desire to go to the last limit, and in doing so the objective for which the
w ar was fought is itself often betrayed.
If you had the time and the opportunity, I would advise you in your
leisure moments to read an ancient play w ritten in the fifth century. It
is a political play dealing with the particular problems of peace and war
by an ancient author. He was well versed in the art not only of statecraft
but of w ar too. He said that it must always be remembered that war is
fought to gain a certain objective. W a r is not the objective; victory is not
the objective. W a r is fought to remove the obstruction that comes in the
way of your gaining an objective. If by victory you mean removal of the
obstruction, well and good. If victory is allowed to become the objective,
then you have forgotten your real objective; you have gone astray and,
356 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E ST
therefore, at the end of the victory, the objective has gone somewhere else
and new problems face you.
Now, if unfortunately, in the modern world, wars have to be fought,
sm all or big, they have to be stopped as soon as one can, because by not
doing so they corrupt us; they create new problems and thereby make our
futu re even more terrible. T h at surely is the lesson of the last two great
wars, and now that people talk about a third, it is time that we thought
about it again and do not rush into an adventure which might lead us
into a third w ar which everyone believes would be a catastrophe without
lim it for mankind.
Summaries of Lucknow Conference Discussions
1. SOU TH ASIA
atio n alism is an assertion o f the rig h t o f a grou p o f people in hab it-
ing a given area to decide their destiny for themselves, free of all
outside interference. The group may be united by many different bonds
— religion or language or a common history; what is important is that
the members should feel a bond with each other stronger dian diat they
feel for anyone else. The definite territory, too, is of importance. Suc
cessful nationalism expresses itself through independent government,
and that is not possible unless there is a place where those who share a
particular nationalism are in a majority. So much is this so, and so strong
is human conservatism, that die mere existence over a sufficiently long
period of stable government within a defined boundary will create
loyalties to that unit, though as often as not in reaction to, rather than in
support of, the government in power.
South Asian nationalism as we know it today, therefore, though its
roots go deep into history, is largely a nineteenth- and even twentieth-
century product, not only because the nineteenth century was the first
time that territorial boundaries were stable over a relatively long period,
but also because it was only in the nineteenth century for the first time
that it became vitally important to the ordinary man who controlled his
government. So long as tlie struggle for power was a mere clash of per
sonal ambitions, and no government attempted to interfere with the
regulation of life by village and family and religion, it was possible for
the community as a whole to treat government as somediing which went
on above their heads. But as soon as government began to interfere in
spheres which touched everyone’s private life, the education of his chil
dren, the improvement of his health, the regulation of his customs, the
title to his land, then everyone began to be interested in seeing that the
government was conducted in a way that suited his interests and ideals.
Once nationalism had started, Soudi Asia's colonial regime and intense
poverty acted as forcing-houses for its growth. As people became aware
357
not only that they were poor but that there were other people in other
parts of the world who had discovered techniques by which they could be
less poor, they began to demand increasingly of the government that
it should take action to bring to them, too, the relative wealth of Europe.
For the first time, poverty was attributed to the government instead of to
God; and this attribution was in itself sufficient to raise an anger in
m en’s hearts against which no government could eventually stand.
T he governments of South Asia were in a particularly weak position to
resist the force of this anger, for they were all alien, composed of men
who, however great their services to the country in which they worked,
had no roots in its soil and its traditions. The contrast between the gov
ernors and the governed was ready-made to hand for every nationalist;
indeed, since the governors themselves had an old nationalism which
made them very conscious of themselves as a group, the governed had to
acquire a similar consciousness almost in self-defense. And once they had
begun to acquire that consciousness, everything about a colonial regime
naturally fanned it; for by the nineteenth century a colonial regime
could only be justified on the ground that the mother country was in
some way superior, in some way knew better than the dependency what
%vas good for it. Such a claim was bound to fret the nerves of the ruled
increasingly, to give every grievance historical importance as a disproof
of the theory of superiority; and, above all, the governors inevitably
tended to acquire airs of racial superiority, and ihus to arouse in the
governed that most powerful of all human emotions, resentment against
personal humiliation. Discrimination against “natives” or "colonials”
has in every colonial country been a most successful stimulant of the
growth of the feeling amongst the local people that they were one group,
if only because their ruleis despised them as such.
No stick was too weak to beat a colonial regime with, and there was
nothing it could do which did not offend some of its subjects. A typical
example was education. The British system of education was a stimulant
to nationalism, because it opened the door not' only to Britain’s own
great traditions of freedom and self-government, but also to the whole
ferm ent of nationalism which was shaking nineteenth-century Europe.
Yet at the same time, since it was based on British models and aimed at
turning out men with British ideals, it attracted to itself Mahatma
G andhi’s criticism that it was anti-national.
T w o classes above all acted as the advance guard of the new national
ism: the middle-class intellectual and the businessman. The businessman
felt that he was not getting the support from a foreign government that
the experience of other countries suggested he would have got from his
own. The intellectual was not merely particularly susceptible to the new
ideas that were coming from Europe; he was also both particularly
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCK N O W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 359
sensitive to the hum iliation o£ alien rule and particularly eager to restore
to his country the glories that once were hers. And, of recent years espe
cially, both intellectual and businessman felt that they were not getting
even m aterial advantage from foreign rule—that, in a world where so
m any nations were getting richer, they were getting poorer.
T here has, however, been about the nationalism of South Asia none of
the undying hate to which one is so accustomed in Europe. It has been
unusually mature. Though independence is only three years old, there
has been no brooding over the past. Nationalism in India, Pakistan and
Ceylon is prim arily directed inwards, to service of their people, lather
than outwai'ds, against others. Certainly there is little rancour against
G reat Britain. . .
T his has perhaps been partly because of the immense difficulties,
m ainly economic, with which the new states have been faced from the
beginning; difficulties which, however, their political stability has
enabled them to make a brave beginning in facing.
T his political stability is so far very great. In each country there is one
dom inant political party whose position hitherto, owing to its age—in
Ceylon it has been in office for twenty-five years— and its leadership ot the
national struggle appears absolutely unchallengeable. It is a position
which has its disadvantages. Such a dominant party tends to be a coali
tion covering most of the nation rather than a coherent political group
w ith a definite program of action. It therefore necessarily has a strong
tendency to produce factions and to try to be all things to all men, both
highly disillusioning to die electorate. Indeed, the first need of South
Asian politics is the emergence of a strong opposition based on definite
principles. Since the existing parties in office are all “left,” by profession
at least and since in all three countries the weight of tradition, the power
of vested interests, and the lack of resources continue to make an effective
left policy very difficult, there would be much to be said m favor o f such
an opposition’s coming from the right, and thus bringing openly into
politics the prejudice: and needs of the old-fashioned and the practical,
which are so far as apparently unrepresented as they are in fact powerful.
B ut that is probably impossible. The intellectual atmosphere is so soaked
in socialism and the welfare state, the electorate’s desire for a better life
is so demanding, that the only possible opposition would appear to be
one which would claim that the party in office was socialist only in theory,
whereas they would be socialist in practice, too.
Nevertheless, Communism is nowhere a major menace. It comes per
haps nearest to it in Ceylon, where 23 seats out of a house of 100 are held
by Communists: but they are divided into a Stalinist and two Trotskyite
groups, and so far their only violence has been directed against each other
__although a recent directive has suggested that this may change.
In Pakistan the Communist party is badly organized, though the eco

nom ic condition of East Bengal could make that area a breeding-ground,
and in W est Pakistan there is at least a good deal of fellow-travelling
among writers and students and certain groups in Lahore, and one lead
ing paper leans fairly close to the Communist line.
In all three countries Communism has been seriously weakened by the
feeling that its subservience to Moscow makes it anti-national, and this is
particularly true of India, where the Communists have stood out against
the main flow of national opinion, not only in the last year or two, but
when they cooperated in the war effort and when they opposed the civil
disobedience movement of 1930. D uring the war, when they were free to
organize, they acquired a certain strength, but since then they have de
clined steadily. T he Ranadive policy of terrorism has failed. The purges
and changes of the Communist party line have upset many of their more
honest-minded followers. The lack of an intellectual M arxist tradition,
the fact that the Communist Party is not identified w ith a long history of
workers struggle as it is in Europe, the very small proletariat, the freedom
from m ilitant atheism, all combine to give the Communist Party a much
more difficult intellectual background against which to work than on the
continent of Europe; much of such success as the Communists have had
has been based on admiration of Russian achievements rather than on
the theory of Communism; and Russia is today a somewhat blowzy
heroine.
How profound the Communist Party’s collapse has been was shown
by its failure to obtain any following for its point of view in the present
Bombay textile strike, though the Bombay textile workers were once its
staunchest supporters. It still has some strength in M alabar, and, despite
the recent quiet, conditions in West Bengal, particularly amongst the
ower middle class of Calcutta, are so dreadful, w ith their squalor, over-
®c^n*n§ standards of living and swarming refugees, that the
possibility of an outbreak cannot be discounted. But such an outbreak
might well follow the Bengali terrorist and anarchic tradition rather than
the orthodox pattern of Stalinism.
The only area where Communism offers any real threat is the Andhra
country in Hyderabad and Madras, where a small “M alaya” is going on.
The reasons are special: the extreme freedom allowed the Communists,
sometimes from policy, more often from weakness, in the last days of the
Nizam s regime; the arms they were able to get from the Razakars during
e na co apse, and the chance the police action and the events lead
ing up to it gave them to entrench themselves. But even in Andhra the
position is beginning to improve.
'7nJ^nenrig h tIiS' 35 ^ U° m° Te Powerfu*- ^ India the RSS has perhaps
700,000 members, and may have three million fellow-travellers, including
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCKN O W CO N FEREN CE D IS C U S S IO N S 361
many in the middle ranks of the army and government service. Its tech
nique is fascist, with drills and leaders and a mystique. Nevertheless it is
not as yet a political threat. Its program is not clear enough, and it con
ceives of its puipose as creating an intellectual and emotional atmos
phere rath er than as taking direct political action. In Pakistan the mul
lahs, for all their great hold over the ignorant, particularly in East
Pakistan, do not have the political experience and do not think enough
in practical political terms, to be able to win elections by themselves,
though they can influence policy on such directly religious issues as
prohibition. A more real right-wing threat is the capacity of the zamindars
of the W est Punjab and Sind to use their position of local influence and
authority to delay the land reforms which West Pakistan so desperately
needs— the Sind Government actually succeeded in finding a Committee
to report in favor of the maintenance of the present system. On the other
hand, in East Pakistan, which has seven million people dependent on
rent-receiving, an act has already been passed abolishing zamindars,
though it still leaves untouched the many intermediate holders. In Cey
lon there is nothing at all to the right of the present government.
T he countries of South Asia are fundamentally, therefore, parlia
m entary democracies of the British type, though with a concern in India
and Pakistan, for written and justiciable fundamental rights which is
alien to British practice. Some derogations have had to be made from the
absolute freedom of the individual and the press. There are Preventive
Detention Acts and Press Emergency Acts; one paper was even once sup
pressed in Lahore. But although recent criticism has made clear the need
for some amending, and although they are sometimes misused against
such reasonably constitutional parties as the Socialists, on the whole these
powers are necessary to safeguard the State against revolutionary terror
ism and economic sabotage, especially because the ordinary processes of
the law, though effective in protecting the innocent, are much less so
in convicting the guilty, and because in the crowded cities riot-raising is
so very easy. *
W ith governments as stable, and a public life as free, as those of South
Asia, the prim ary problem is economic, not political. The area suffers
from the same ills as afflict most of the under-developed world.
Populations increase steadily, perhaps by 1 1/4 per cent per year, and
the chances are that the increase w ill speed up before it begins to slow
down. New drugs and better public health are reducing the death rate,
while the birth rate, though no higher than that of, say, Germany in the
1890’s and therefore not in itself excessive, has hardly begun to decline.
As compulsory primary education spreads and more people begin to live
in cities, the increasing discomfort and expense of having children w ill
inevitably reduce philoprogenitiveness. Already the upper classes are us
ing contraceptives, some State hospitals give birth-control information,

and even village women show an increasing eagerness to learn contracep
tive techniques. But against that are religion, the fear of barrenness, the
expense of even the simplest contraceptive methods, and a natural shy
ness about using such novelties in the lack of privacy of the village home.
It must, therefore, be assumed that, for some time to come at least,
population w ill continue to increase in the area by perhaps five million
a year. If the standard of living is not to continue to decline as it has
been doing certainly since 1942, and in most of India and Pakistan for
very much longer than that, then production must be increased at least
at the same rate as population.
The governments are doing their best. Pakistan, for example, is work
ing on new irrigation projects which w ill bring some six m illion acres
under cultivation; and India’s multi-purpose schemes are bigger still. All
three countries are expanding their liydro-electricity and increasing their
industry. For example, Pakistan is building three ju te mills, India is
soon to produce locomotives and telephones, and Ceylon is increasing its
textile capacity.
But what is being done, though not inconsiderable, is not enough. It is
indeed doubtful whether in any of the countries net saving is appreciable.
Certainly the increase in production between 1938 and 1950 has been very
much less than the increase in population.
The reasons for the lack of savings and investment are many. There
as been a transfer of income from the urban middle class, the princes
and the zammdars, who were investors, to the peasant and the speculator,
w o aie not. A long period of inflation has given many moneyed men an
exaggerated idea of the level of profits it is reasonable to expect before
investing, and inflation in fact makes it necessary to earn much higher
profits in order to pay the present high rates of tax and to provide the
money to pay for machinery replacement and the carrying of stocks at
prices which never cease rising. It is possible, too, that inflation and
speculation have so distorted local capitalist attitudes that a proper local
capita ist c ass may never emerge. The governments have chosen un
economic priorities in their social reforms; they have greatly reduced
their revenues by prohibition, the abolition of the salt tax, and the failure
to raise t e an revenue, none of which produce the increase in produc
tion w ic l is generated by, say, technical education or anti-malaria
measures. A nd at least some of the money both India and Pakistan have
been spending on defense could have better gone to development.
Above all, governments have failed to make up their minds what eco
nomic policy they really want. They do not nationalize, except for such
occasional industries as road transport; but they never stop talking of the
state’s right to plan and to control, of the state’s intention to nationalize
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCKN O W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 363
in ten years and to provide the welfare state next week. They thus get
the worst of all worlds. Labor is disappointed because, whether for lack
of staff, of buildings, or of money, the welfare state never actually even
tuates. Capital gets shyer and shyer, because people feel there are better
things to do w ith their money than to put it into industries in which the
government may tell them where their factory should be located, who
should be allowed to take shares in their company, what they should
produce, and whom they can (or rather cannot) sack. Possibly wrongly,
most people w ith money to invest feel that it is more profitable to leave
it under the floor. So foreign investment has been negligible, and the
local capital markets have almost dried up.
So industry advances at a snail’s pace, and agriculture is worse still.
T he abolition of zamindars, in India and Pakistan alike, removes a major
social irritant, a fru itfu l source of revolution, from the countryside; but
it is an economic measure only in the sense that the resultant increase in
the peasant’s income and sense of security gives the governments a cer
tain amount of time in which to act. The extra irrigation affects only
lim ited areas. But the whole farming of the area is conducted at an ap
pallingly unproductive level; wheat yields are less than a half of Eng
land’s; rice yields are a third of Japan’s. The governments are building
fertilizer plants, but so far cowdung is burnt and the whole Indian sub
continent uses only a half-million tons of sulphate of ammonia.
A score of remedies, from improved seed to artificial insemination,
from more fertilizer to chemical weed-killers, are known, possible and
need to be applied immediately. But there is not the money or, very
often, the staff or even the teachers to train the staff, for the necessary
propaganda, demonstration and education. Meanwhile the soil continues,
very slowly, to lose its fertility, or, as in the Punjab, to waterlog, and
each new generation has slightly less land per person from which to eat
than the last.
The position is desperate, worst perhaps in India with its grave shortage
of food, cotton and jtite, but little better in Pakistan and Ceylon, which
compensate for their rather more profitable agriculture by their almost
complete lack of industry. Politically, too, time is beginning to run short.
Populations which have for years been stirred by the thought of the mil
lennium independence would bring, and which are being more and more
impregnated with the idea that the common man, too, is entitled to a
full meal and a shirt on his back w ill not indefinitely tolerate less and
less clothes and less and less food. The result might not be Communism,
but it would certainly be trouble, perhaps chaos.
The only answer, therefore, is aid from outside in order to prime the
pump and reverse the direction in which the economy has been tending.
T he aid does not have to be very large: somediing of the order of 500
m illion dollars a year would probably be enough for the whole area,
firstly because in countries whose economies are so labor-intensive a little
capital goes a long way, especially if spent in, for example, agricultural
extension services or light industry; and secondly because the mere fact
that aid was being given would ease the burden on the local governments,
and restore confidence to the local capitalists, thus enabling them to do
very much more than they are doing at present.
T here are two obstacles in the way of such outside aid. It can come
only from the United States, and the United States has a lot of other
obligations; aid might not be easy through Congress, especially for coun
tries which are so reluctant to accept any sort of strings, any sort of com
mitment in return. On the other hand, South Asian opinion is desperately
afraid of Americans bearing gifts. They feel that there w ill be strings at
tached, that inevitably it w ill be demanded of them in return that they
should sacrifice their sovereignty, and above all their freedom to make
their own judgments in foreign affairs; they would accept even economic
decline rather than sacrifice rights so hard won.
T he fears are real on both sides. The Americans do not want to spend
their money on fellow-travellers. South Asia does not want to follow
Chiang Kai-shek. But they are also exaggerated on both sides. The United
States and the South Asian countries have a common interest in South
ia continuing free and democratic. The U nited States does not need
u i? and Paklstani m ilitary assistance, but it is im portant to it that it
should not be faced with the great strategic and moral disadvantage of
their positive hostility. Equally, India and Pakistan and Ceylon do not
wis to be bound always to take the American side, even over such inci
dents as Formosa; but in the m ajor issues, the issues which really affect
e surviva of the free world, their common tradition ensures that South
la an t e United States will in the end be found on the same side, as
the record of the last three years shows. A nd Canada’s happy relations
w it er arge neighbor show that neither American investment nor
American power need connote American interference. The experience
of Canada and also of the Marshall Plan ought to encourage Asian na
tions to place some faith in the generosity and hum anity of the American
people.
I f that is accepted, then one is justified in hoping that a formula for
aid can be found. Possible ways of doing it would be through the United
Nations, or through the Commonwealth, so that everyone’s projects
wou d be scrutinized by other countries whose eyes were sharpened by
the fact that the money has to come from a common kitty, and yet no
body’s pride would be hurt, because each country would inspect as well
as be inspected.
Once the principle is accepted, how the money is given is a question of
technique. Part could be loans, for many of the schemes should give a
profit even in dollars, e.g., the extension of cotton cultivation in Pakistan.
Much would have to be gifts to the governments, for the really heavy
capital commitments, whether education or irrigation or roads, are all
governmental and, though all of them have their eventual value, many
produce no immediate and tangible return, at least not in dollars. A good
way, for India and Ceylon at least, might be the gift of surplus food,
which would enable the governments at the same time to mop up infla
tion, feed their people properly, and provide themselves with money for
development. Some of the money should certainly be spent on technical
assistance which, in certain special fields—a mineral survey in Pakistan,
for example—is badly needed.
Techniques can be found. Indeed they must be found. For the alterna
tive is a decline, more or less slow, into bankruptcy, and such an ending
for the new states which started with such high hopes in 1947 could
benefit nobody but Russia.
&
2. SOUTHEAST ASIA
n its five meetings , Round Table B discussed a wide range of the
I problems of the new countries of Southeast Asia and their neighbors

in the area, building up to a consideration of the relation of nationalistic
forces to problems of economic development in the area. There was at
least one member of the Round Table from âch of the important coun
tries in the area, except Thailand, and in several cases there were also
members of the Round Table from the colonial powers which had had
or which retained administrative responsibility in Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia is characterized by its diversity. Perhaps the only gen
eralization possible about the area is that no generalization is valid.
Since the war, Southeast Asia has been swept by a nationalistic upheaval
__but Thailand was already independent and, for reasons peculiar to it,
there is no nationalist movement of consequence in Malaya. Many of the
countries are beset by severe racial and minority problems—but in
neither Indonesia nor the Philippines do these difficulties exist in acute
form. Several of the countries have been hampered since the war by con
tinued hostilities between nationalist forces and the forces of the colonial
power, as in Indonesia; by warfare between opposing forces purporting
to represent nationalist sentiment, one of them aided by the colonial
power, as in Indochina; by internal insurrection, as in Indonesia, Malaya,
Burma and the Philippines. But Thailand has been peaceful. It is per
haps true that for all these countries the overwhelming need is to under
take measures of rehabilitation and development which will translate
into real terms the aspirations of the people for a better life, one of
which aspirations found reflection in the nationalist movement. But the
people of Thailand are already relatively well off; and, in Malaya, de
velopment problems must assume second importance behind the more
urgent demands of the constitutional issues flowing from Malaya’s racial
composition, divided between Malays, Indians and Chinese. And, despite
a shortage of skilled personnel throughout the whole area, the particular
development problems differ from country to country. Overpopulation
is now a problem and a threat for the future in some parts of Southeast
Asia, but not in all.
By reason of this diversity, it w ill be impossible for the rapporteur, as
it seems to have been for the Round Table itself, to deal in any integrated
fashion with the problems of Southeast Asia as a region. The report will
instead summarize the salient aspects of present conditions in each of the
Southeast Asian countries and it will then proceed to summarize one
problem which does seem to offer the possibility of common treatment,
namely, attitudes toward external capital investment and the conditions
attached thereto.
Burma
Burma, since its independence, has been beset by internal problems of
Communist and minority insurrection which are only now approaching
their m ilitary conclusion. In open rebellion, more or less simultaneously,
have been, among others, two distinct Communist groups, the W hite
Band P.V.O. s, and a segment of the Karen people, a m inority group of
about one million spread through southern Burma. M ajor efforts of the
Government have had to be devoted to the suppression of these insurrec
tions. The Burmese Government is dominated by the AFPFL (Anti-
Fascist People s Freedom League). The Government is stable and sup
ported by most of the ethnic minority groups, including a segment of
t ie Karenni. The constitution provides for a socialist state, but compensa
tion is provided for in all cases of expropriation. The Government's
intention is to nationalize the land; but this has not yet taken place be
cause of the prior necessity for ensuring a return to law and order.
In balance, and despite some expression of views to the contrary, the
discussion appeared to reveal some danger of a totalitarian swing in
Burma. The problem of demobilizing and fitting into an economy not
yet operating at the prewar level the armed forces which have been re
quired to restore security, and the danger that obligations incurred as a
SUMMARIES OF LUCKNOW CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS 367
consequence of expropriation may surpass the available resources of the

Government, both suggest potential dangers to the existing government
structure. In such development planning as has taken place, die Burmese
Governm ent appears to accord an important place to external assistance.
A large proportion of enterprise is now foreign-owned, and Burma will
need outside assistance for some time to come.
Thailand
T hailand presents a picture of relative social stability, founded in the
absence of a nationalist movement and in the relative prosperity of most
Thais because of T hailand’s fortunate current situation as the world s
principal exporter of rice. The current price for rice is six or seven times
tlie prewar level.
T his internal stability is not reflected in the Government. Thai poli
tics involves the interplay of personalities and cliques. The present
Premier, Marshal Pibul Songgram, rules with the support of the army,
and the main threat to his regime is a clique which favors his predecessor,
Pridi Phanamyong, now in exile. The potentialities for personal dictator
ship seem great, although currently democratic forms are observed. One
of the principal problems in Thailand is the large and influential Chinese
m inority, totalling about three millions, or about one-sixth of the popu
lation.
Indonesia
Indonesia is just now emerging from the colonial struggle against the
Dutch and the formative period during which a unitary state was created
out of the federal structure in existence when independence was at
tained. The remaining resistance to unitarianism, in the South Moluc
cas, is attributable largely to the concern of small Ambonese units of the
Netherlands Indies Arm y lest unification involve loss of their status and
privileges.
Indonesia has no significant racial or religious problems although, as
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there is a Chinese population, in this case
relatively small by comparison with the total Indonesian population.
T he Chinese are entitled to become citizens but under existing laws are
generally barred from holding land. Population density in Java is the
chief social and economic problem, and efforts are contemplated to deal
w ith it by resettling Javanese in other parts of the country where land
is available in considerable quantities. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia,
the shortage of skilled and trained personnel is a principal obstacle to
economic development. Tem porarily Indonesia is in a fortunate foreign-
exchange situation by virtue of its favorable export position—but this
situation may change as synthetic rubber is further developed in the

U nited States.
M alaya
M alaya’s chief problem is to fuse into a common citizenship the three
m ajor racial groups— Malays, Chinese and Indians. In Singapore, Chinese
predominate and constitute 77 per cent of the population; Singapore is
now administered separately from the M alayan Federation, and this
separation was the only condition on which political agreement on the
federation plan was made possible. In the Federation itself, Malays are
outnumbered by the Indians and Chinese together, although the Malays
rank first in total population. It was the general view that the solution to
all M alaya’s problems would depend on finding a successful formula to
resolve this political dilemma. Although relations between the three
groups are on the whole cordial, they nevertheless are highly segmented
and the Malays, in particular, fear the domination of the Chinese and
Indians. One member of the Round Table suggested that an official
government policy aimed at breaking down the separatism was needed,
in place of the existing recognition of it. Only the trade unions were not
organized communally.
T his dilemma has effectively blocked the form ation of a Malayan na
tionalist movement of any magnitude or importance. The creation either
of a Malayan nation or of a Malayan state depends on solution of the
communal problem. Since no immediate solution appears to be in sight,
in spite of the rather more optimistic views of a member of the Round
Table, and especially in view of the likelihood of a Communist China
exerting a strong influence on the Malayan Chinese in the future, a mem-
er suggested the possibility of an interim international arrangement,
perhaps an international trusteeship.
The current Communist uprising in Malaya was described as the work
o a re atively small group, preying on the Chinese squatter population
in particular and employing the technique of terror and squeeze. No
evidence was introduced to suggest that the movement reflected any basic
political or social pressure in the country. On the other hand, it was
agreed that the Malayan Communists were neither dominated nor
financed irom outside the country
Economically Malaya s chief problem, like Indonesia’s, is to prepare for
t e ay w en t e rubber market falls. In any event, there seemed to be
general agreement that dependence on one or two principal export prod
ucts should not be continued. The government is experimenting with
alternative crops, among them cocoa, to take advantage of Malaya's
physical character and of world markets.
Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia)

In one member's view, Indochina was in the least satisfactory state of
all the Southeast Asian countries. Of the three Indochinese countries—
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—Vietnam is by far the most important in
area, population and resources. It includes the southern area of Cochin-
china, the center of the large French rubber plantations and the im
portant Vietnamese rice holdings.
T he country is dominated by the struggle that has been going on inter
m ittently since 1945 between the Communist-dominated Viet Minh, led
by Ho Chi Minh, on the one hand, and the French and subsequently
Emperor Bao Dai and the rulers of Laos and Cambodia on the other.
T he Vietnamese representative at the Round Table emphasized that the
Bao Dai government represented the aspirations of the Vietnamese
people for independence and a better life, and emphasized his govern
m ent’s intention to achieve these purposes in close cooperation with
France, whose m ilitary assistance was needed at least for the time being
u n til a Vietnamese army sufficient to defend Vietnam could be created.
T here appeared to be fairly general agreement that the Ho Govern
ment represented at least a considerable portion of genuine nationalist
opinion in the country. The breakdown of attempts at negotiation in
1946 had been followed by French efforts to find in Bao Dai a substitute
for Ho, and the French had granted to Bao Dai concessions considerably
greater than they had been willing to give Ho. But that these did not
satisfy all nationalists was evident from the continued nationalist sup
port for Ho. Many members were of the view that the Bao Dai experi
ment had not worked well.
U nited States policy in this situation was c'onsidered briefly. It was in
terpreted by American members as being directed at independence for
the Vietnamese people. In the Indochinese context, the United States^had
decided that the prospects for real independence and for protection for
Indochina’s neighbors would be better if the United States supported
the Bao Dai Government. There were, however, serious doubts in the
U nited States as to Bao Dai’s chances of success; but he was generally
regarded as the lesser of two evils. The United States, an American urged,
did not want to restore Indochina to France and had in fact brought
continuing pressure to bear on the French to get them to increase the
extent of Indochinese autonomy. Another member suggested that United
States policy was in part directed to supporting France in the cold war,
and a number of members feared that this involved United States defense
of a reactionary, puppet regime which could not stand on its own merits.
One American admitted that the United States position was probably
influenced by Indochina’s key position in Southeast Asia and by the

Soviet recognition of the Ho Government.
O ther Indochinese problems have to await a solution of the political
difficulties before they can be effectively tackled, although the Vietnamese
representative insisted that the best way to combat Communism was to
ensure the well-being of the people and to raise their standard of living.
The chief economic and social problem is the overpopulation of the
north Vietnam delta. There was some discussion of the difficulties of and
the necessity for creating effective relationships among the three Indo
chinese states.
Philippines
In the Philippine Republic, independence has not been at issue since
the war. T he problem has been to reconstruct and rehabilitate a country
much devastated by the w ar and at the same time to prepare the country
fo r the day when its present advantageous trade ties with the United
States, temporarily protected by the Bell Trade Act of 1946, are ended
and the principal export industries become uneconomic. During the post
w ar period in the Philippines there has been a Communist-led Hukbala-
hap insurrection which feeds on the bad agrarian conditions in Central
Luzon, where there is a high percentage of land tenancy.
The issue of wartime collaboration, which had been critical after the
war, came to an end for all practical purposes following the election of
1946 and the selection as President of an alleged former collaborator,
Manuel Roxas, who had, however, been given a clean b ill of health by
General MacArthur.
Both major political parties in the Philippines represented practically
the same groups in society and were identified by personalities rather
than platforms, which were almost identical. Electoral fraud was quite
common, as were graft and corruption in the government. Fiscal mis
management was one of the major current problems.
On a longer-range basis, the Philippines has to solve the crucial over
population dilemma in Luzon, partly by a resettlement program which is
underway. 1
Foreign A id in Economic Development

It was generally recognized in the Round Table that economic de
velopment was the principal item on the agenda, at least in the cases of
the newly independent countries, for which poverty and inferior eco
nomic status had been prime forces in the nationalist movements which
had succeeded m achieving independence. It was im plicit in the discus
sions that the stability of the new governments might well depend on
their ability to satisfy the aspirations of the people they represented for a
bigger share of greater national incomes. It was understood also that out
side assistance in various forms would be required if these aims were to be
achieved relatively quickly and without the application of the kind o
techniques of capital creation which had apparently worked so effectively,
b u t at such high cost, in the Soviet Union. ^
It was emphasized that capital formation in the receiving countries
w ould have to be accelerated, both because propaganda-wise the aiding
countries would require evidence of a substantial effort by the receiving
peoples in their own behalf, and because there were real limits on the
amounts of aid which could be available from outside sources There
seemed to be agreement that this would be possible only if comprehensive
systems of economic controls should be instituted or if there should be
heavy concentrations of wealth in a few hands. It was recognized that
nationalist aspirations would not tolerate concentration of capital m a
few hands. In large measure resort should be had to die fiscal apparatus
of government as a means of making capital available for development in
order to overcome the widespread reluctance to invest in the lace ot
other forms of capital usage and as a means of combatting the inflation ry
tendencies likely to accompany development. .
T he problem before the Round Table, then, became what cond uons
should properly be applicable to receivers of outside aid to ensure the el-
fective utilization of such assistance without imposing undue burdens on
the receiving countries or restrictions on their freedom. There was a real
dilemma. The need to develop economically caused the leaders ot tfte
newly independent countries to seek economic aid which might require
them to accept conditions or philosophies which were politically unac
ceptable at home. - .
Since agreement was general that private sources of capital are un
likely to fill the needs for external aid, the discussions centered on pub ic
sources. There was no objection to the general proposition that public
aid should be extended through international agencies rather than
through direct, bilateral, inter-governmental operations.
A t least one representative of a Southeast Asian country was strongly
of the view that no conditions whatever need be attached to public loans
on which repayment of principal and interest would be required.
General agreement seemed to be reached that assistance should not in
volve conditions which interfered with the national sovereign rights of
the receiving states. And there likewise seemed to be unanimous agree
ment on four kinds of conditions which might be imposed: (1) specific
definition of the project for which the aid was to be used; (2) technical
supervision or assistance where local know-how was inadequate; (3) pro
gramming of payments so that they are made as progress is apparent; and
(4) local, private or governmental financial participation in projects for

which assistance is to be forthcoming.
These conditions, while they would not infringe on the national
sensitivities of the receiving countries, would provide minimum assurance
that assistance would be used effectively. Implicit was the provision of
guarantees against misuse of funds available. T h at agreement on these
principles was so general gave reason for hoping that real progress might
be made in creating a cordially coojêrative relationship between the
countries which, like the United States, can export capital and those
which can usefully absorb capital for development ])urposes.
The Chinese in Southeast Asia
There was a brief exposition and discussion of the problem caused by
the presence in Southeast Asia of undigested Chinese populations totalling
about ten m illion people. There was general agreement that no satisfac
tory solution of this problem could be achieved if it did not include both
an acceptance of the Chinese into common citizenships and an acceptance
by the Chinese of the responsibilities pertaining to citizenship.1
3. EAST ASIA
n EXAMINING various aspects of nationalism and its international conse
I quences in East Asia, the Round Table adjusted its method of ap
proach according to the experience of members specializing in problems
of the two areas concerned. In discussing Japan, the Round Table de
voted a measure of time to the friendly cross-examination of Japanese
delegates and other members who had had recent experience in Occu-
Pie J^Pan* the case of China, the Round T able was seriously handi
capped by the fact that neither Nationalist nor Communist areas were
represented. Under these circumstances, therefore, the Chairman opened
the Round Table s examination of developments in China by calling for
statements from members who had made specialized studies of important
aspects of the Chinese situation or who had had personal experiences
in the country itself.
Japan
Discussion on Japan mainly concerned rapid changes in Japanese
political, social and economic institutions under the Occupation, the
1. A fu ller treatm ent of the problem is available in Victor P urcell, T h e P osition o f
t h e C h in ese in S ou th ea st Asia, Secretariat Paper No. 3.
problem of m aintaining Japan as the workshop of Asia in the postwar

■world, and the question of the eventual conclusion and probable nature
of a peace treaty between the Japanese and the Allied Powers. Members
of the R ound T able were in nearly unanimous agreement that conditions
in Japan have constituted a peculiar situation in that the government is
not autonomous, but subject to the w ill of Allied Occupation authority.
In a temporary situation of this sort, members of the discussion group
felt that Japan must be regarded as in a transitional stage, that Japanese
problems must necessarily be subjected to rather cautious scrutiny, and
that all conclusions must be regarded as tentative.
It was generally agreed that background factors, such as the main
features of Japanese history, the nature of prewar government, the politi
cal, social and economic phases of life under the Empire, and the Japanese
defeat, were all questions of such general knowledge that detailed discus
sion was unwarranted. A m ajority conceded that the Occupation had
brought about changes as fundamental, perhaps, as those resulting from
the expedition of Perry in the nineteenth century. Most members felt
that changes under the Occupation represented a transformation m
nearly all phases of Japanese life. The Japanese people, having apparently
accepted defeat, appear now to be embarking on a new venture ot
democratization, and there was wide agreement that new developments
may w ell represent fundamental changes in the views of the Japanese
people rather than acquiescence based on force applied from outside.
Most members agreed that the Japanese Empire is gone and felt that
the Japanese people were not likely to re-embark on a course of mili
tarism. Democratization has become a symbol in Japan and although this
m ay not draw the full attention of the general public, there is small likeli
hood that the Emperor w ill regain his former prestige. There remains
much democratic education to be done among the masses of the people,
but the trend seems to exist. A small number expressed doubts concern
ing the sincerity of Japanese democratization. One member noted how
some Japanese had paid lip service to the new law of primogeniture,
only to restore their lands to the member of the family who would have
enjoyed possession under the Empire. It was suggested that this tendency
might develop in many phases of Japanese life once the Occupation
comes to an end.
Some of those with recent experience in Japan tended to minimize
this possibility. The rate of literacy, they pointed out, has long been
high, and even the ru ral areas seem to have accepted a break with the
past. In the spreading of new ideas Occupation teams have exerted an
enormous influence at the village level, and in many areas schools of
local government have been organized under local teachers. Conse
quently, the new spirit of democratization seems to be filtering down

through various levels of Japanese life.
Many members suggested that a new international outlook may have
accompanied these internal developments. The Japanese people, it was
felt, had reached a point where they tended to look toward the United
Nations rather than in the direction of any single power. In the begin
ning, according to one member, the Japanese had been relieved that it
was the Americans, rather than the Russians, who had occupied their
country; but especially since the Korean W ar, there has been strong
sentiment in support of United Nations policies. Hence, there has been
a growing feeling on the part of Japanese citizens that, if the constitu
tional law forbidding war were repealed or modified, it should be for the
purpose of supporting United Nations interests rather than for the con
venience of any one or two powers.
T he consensus was that overpopulation remains a serious problem for
Japan, especially since the nation’s colonies are gone and since there are
few parts of the world to which its citizens can emigrate. Tw o methods of
alleviating this problem were suggested: more intensive industrialization
for the purpose o£ absorbing excess population, and restriction through
methods of birth control. The further development of Japanese in
dustries is a critical problem in itself. Birth-control education has already
begun, but present progress is scarcely sufficient to solve the population
problem.
The question of a Japanese peace treaty is another serious problem.
everal persons pointed out that no treaty can be entirely satisfactory to
a e eated nation, but those with recent experience in Japan agreed that
the people of that country feel that some sort of treaty must and w ill be
concluded within the next year or so. Most Japanese hope that this will
be an over-all instrument including the Soviet Union, but they are quite
w illing to admit that this is a matter for the Allies themselves to decide.
According to those fam iliar with Japanese public opinion, there is a
strong objection to a peace treaty granting bases to any single power or
any small block of powers. If bases are to be granted, the hope of the
Japanese is that the United Nations w ill be the receiving power.
ere was wide agreement among close observers of Japanese condi
tions that the fundamental weakness among the people of Japan is a
tendency to search for an authority under which to act. This stifles
initiative an hampers necessary development and strengthening of
Japanese political, economic and social institutions.
Those with recent experience in Japan agreed that Japanese Com
munism is of the Moscow variety. One member noted the fact that as
recently as January 1950 the Communist apparatus in Moscow had con
demned certain deviations in the Japanese Communist Party and had
strengthened it as an outpost of Party discipline. There was no unanimity

concerning the future of Japanese Communist strength. One member
noted that in the last general elections the Party had attracted two mil
lion votes, but that in recent balloting there had been a notable decline in
Communist strength. Several members thought the membership of the
Japanese Communist Party might total roughly 200,000. It was noted
that the Communists have both a maximum and a minimum plan for
the future, that the maximum program is recognized as a development of
the far future, but that under any circumstances the Party is committed
to violence and the overthrow of the government.
T h e Occupation, according to one observer, has taken steps to curb
Communist activity. Over two thousand civil servants have been purged
for their Communist activities, but Occupation officials have not seen
fit, so far, to disturb Communists or sympathizers who have not been
engaged in active agitation or organizational work. In the first year of the
Occupation Communist strength in Japan increased, but the new mem
bers were generally not well disciplined and hence have not ahvays been
considered dangerous by government and Occupation authorities.
Most of those fam iliar with present conditions felt that the end of the
Occupation would leave a critical situation in which the political tend
ency of the country might shift sharply right or sharply left. It was felt
that if Japan were able to adjust the direction of its trade in some fashion
so that it was no longer dependent upon China, a degree of stability
m ight be maintained. But if Japanese trade deteriorated, a grave situa
tion might well develop to give rise to an increase in political extremism.
One member maintained that at the present moment the best way to
judge Communist strength is to accompany Occupation teams about the
countryside. In rural areas, it was pointed out, the Communists have
won important influence through village headmen and by gaining seats
on local school boards. This situation developed largely because the
Communists were the only party with a ticket in many school-board elec
tions Later, with tli'e growth of teachers’ unions and student movements,
the Communists gained further strength. It was noted that many Com
munists are well educated in a formal sense and that even those without
conventional education of a higher order are familiar with important
economic principles and are highly articulate.
A number of members supported and elaborated upon the general
thesis that the defeat and Occupation of Japan have brought about a
fundamental change in both the spirit and structure of Japanese politics.
It was generally admitted that the new constitution had been dictated by
the Occupation. Occupation authorities, indeed, had rejected two un
official Japanese drafts on the ground that they were not sufficiently demo
cratic. It was also pointed out that the constitution as finally drawn up
is considered by many authorities a poorly w ritten document. But nearly

all members with experience in Japan were in basic agreement that the
spirit of the constitution and the spirit of its accej^tance by the Japanese
people seemed to be fundam entally democratic.
T h e new constitution reduced the Emperor to the position of a political
symbol, established the principle of judicial review, provided for a large
degree of local autonomy, and proclaimed a b ill of rights. The appoint
ment of judges is subject to referendum. The legal system is based on a
combination of Anglo-Saxon law and im portant indigenous principles.
T he Legislature is sovereign. The Prime M inister occupies the apex of
the Executive. Cabinet members must be civilian, one h alf must be mem
bers of the Diet, and a loss of confidence terminates their period of office.
It was pointed out by one member that the National C ivil Service Law is
geared to the general principle of political decentralization. It also pro
vides a training system for all executives. Strikes on the part of govern
m ent workers are forbidden.
Basic in this political structure is the local autonomy law which rests
at the grass-roots level. Originally it was intended that the governmental
m achinery should be powered by a multi-party system, but nearly all
delegates with recent experience in Japan were agreed that this was
rapidly developing into a two-party system.
^ Several members spoke of the relation between the Japanese educa-
tional system and the new government. The consensus was that the nature
of the educational system will be a vital factor in whether democratic
tendencies take root. It was pointed out that there had been a struggle
etween the Ministry of Education and the various institutions and that
e contro o t le ormer had been broken to the point where the present
relationship represents a compromise. Much of this difficulty had risen
rom an attempt on the part of Occupation authorities to adapt the
American federal system to a unitary system.
There was considerable agreement that while the present condition
W°»U i Vndoubtef y ,be f e n d e d after the Occupation had been termi
nated, the spirit behind it would probably be accepted and observed by
ie Japanese people. Most of those with recent experience in Japan
described a tendency toward left and right political polarization The
1 era s ave grown increasingly conservative, according to many ob-
servers, and there is some question whether the Liberal Party can attract
the small man , vote There is likely to be a battle for the votes of small
™e.^c l ®nts( an s °P eePers, of farmers and women and similar groups.
S o d iS tP a rt”? Wmg ° £th£ Libei'al Pany ° r * e ri§ht winS of the
It was felt by many of those most fam iliar w ith Japanese politics that a
strong Social Democratic left is of utmost importance as an antidote to
extremism. Unfortunately, during early phases of the Occupation, many

Japanese expected too much of the Social Democratic Party and were
therefore disappointed when it was not able to meet their expectations.
Now the Social Democratic Party is in need of self-discipline and a pro
gram which w ill attract critical sections of the electorate. A t the same
time, this discipline and this program must be clearly distinguishable
from Communist discipline and planning. The strengdi of the Social
Democrats w ill rest in their ability as gradualists to offer democratic con
trols and a mixed system of private and state ownership. It was noted by
one member that the Occupation tends to favor the party that goes along
w ith it. The Social Democrats favored the war crimes trials, retirement
of the Zaibatsu and the military, and similar measures, but have been
critical of land reforms under the Occupation, feeling that those under
taken have not been pushed far enough.
It was generally agreed that the end of the Occupation would bring
about a large number of political readjustments which are at the moment
extremely difficult to foresee. Several members expressed the view, how
ever, that the personal element was not likely to be as important in
Jap an as in some other countries, but that parties would necessarily base
their appeals on questions of principle if they hoped to win widespread
support.
Population pressure is a central factor in most of Japan’s economic
problems. Several members expressed the view, however, that while the
economic situation is still bad, Japan has been able to achieve a degree
of financial readjustment. America has extended two billion dollars in
economic aid, but Japan was held responsible for Occupation expenses,
which have required 25 to 30 per cent of the Japanese budget. The
reparation questions have been difficult, and inflation has only recently
been curbed, but many new factories have been completed, and within
two or three years Japan may possibly compete with other countries in
a few limited fields.
Japan, as a processing nation, has relied on the importation of raw
materials coupled with wide access to markets for the support of its
population. A t the present time, Japan is largely dependent upon other
nations for its raw materials, and markets are difficult to find. There is no
real solution in sight.
In the past Japan relied upon China, Korea, Formosa and Southeast
Asia for its markets. Now China is mainly closed except for smuggling
and a small amount of trade passing through Hong Kong. Korea and
Formosa, owing to various restrictions, are largely inaccessible to Japan,
and Southeast Asia is suffering serious unrest.
No members saw any easy escape from this basic dilemma. It was
pointed out that Japan, lacking an army and navy, is spared the necessity
of devoting a large share of its budget to those purposes and that in
dustries could be nationalized. Several members admitted, however, that
the first factor was relatively small and that nationalization, which would
probably be carried out on a selective basis, is difficult to achieve and not
always an unmixed blessing.
T he consensus was that despite ideological differences, Japan will
necessarily seek some sort of trade relationship with China, It was felt
that such a relationship would be vital to the welfare not only of Japan
and China, but of the world as well.
One member expressed acute apprehension over the whole program for
rebuilding an industrial Japan. He stated that a number of the factors
behind Japanese aggressions of the last decade were still present—espe
cially the pressure of population. Is there any reason to believe, he asked,
that Japan, with fu ll political freedom and a restored economy, may not
again endanger the security of Australia, New Zealand and various areas
of the Pacific? He admitted, however, that discussions of the last few days
had somewhat relieved his original, more acute apprehensions.
There was considerable discussion of the possibilities of Japanese trade
in Southeast and South Asia. There was wide agreement that such trade
would be desirable, but several members wondered how the undertaking
could be financed. A fter 1952 Japan may no longer be receiving American
dollar aid, and the question therefore arises whether Japan w ill accept
foodstuffs in return for capital goods in trade with South and Southeast
sia. One member felt that Japan would have to im port before it could
export, but it was difficult to see how she could accomplish this without
special financing. Several agreed that two things were needed: American
aid and American investment both for Japan and for areas in need of
Japanese goods. In the pas':, Japanese capital formations resulted from
the investment of British and American capital. Several delegates indi
cated that it might be desirable for European capital to flow into Japan,
but most agreed that the present sterling situation presented grave diffi
culties.
I h e ie was some speculation concerning the results of the Japanese-In-
n trade competition that might develop in Southeast and South Asia,
but no conclusions were formulated.
Japan's postwar position, it was generally admitted, had been seriously
complicated by conflicting policies among the Powers, by the prolonged
Occupation, and by the development of an increasingly Communist Asia.
T he results are visible in economic as well as in political spheres. It was
indicated that Japan is anxious for China to export more and more raw
materials. But wheieas Japan would like to send capital goods in return,
China in the present world situation wants only strategic goods. But
SCAP, under present international circumstances, w ill not allow Japan
SUMMARIES OF LUCICNOW CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS 379
to ship goods of this nature to China. Furthermore, as one member

pointed out, China’s relations with the Soviet Union are likely to be such
that the Russians, rather than the Japanese, w ill be receiving the bulk
of Chinese trade.
A nother member stated that if Japan were to have the necessary access
to raw materials and admission to world trade, there would have to be a
change of public opinion in the United States toward granting Japan a
desirable trade status in the world. Unfortunately, Soviet-American con
flicts are a source of confusion here, too, in that the United States works
tow ard a free world economy, while the Soviet Union favors a power
economy. It is therefore difficult for Japan to operate in both systems.
It was widely agreed that the United States should encourage the de
velopm ent of a viable Japan by allowing and supporting necessary in
dustrialization and by sponsoring Japanese entry into specialized agencies
of the U nited Nations as well as die central organs of that body.
Commenting upon Japan's understandable desire for a peace treaty,
one member suggested that the Japanese people would welcome the fol
lowing terms: protective arrangements; admission to free international
trade; the restoration of shipping lines; a degree of re-industrialization;
an extension of fisheries and other overseas concessions; admission to the
U nited Nations and its specialized agencies; and restoration of some of
h er territorial land, notably certain islands occupied by the Soviet Union.
A member with recent experience in Japan expressed the observation that
the Japanese themselves do not all agree on what should be the content
of the treaty. T heir main desire is that some kind of treaty be concluded.1
T h e question of Jap an ’s security constitutes a particularly difficult
problem. Japan’s security obligations to herself and the United Nations,
and the security of other nations against Japan were all factors which
ought to be considered. One member cautioned that in view of present
international tensions and uncertainties, it would be difficult to find any
assurance in regard to which side Japan might find herself on should a
m ajor conflict break-out.
T he Korean W ar has brought new problems to the Japanese people as
well as to the government and Occupation authorities. The question of
Japanese security has become a critical one, and the query was therefore
raised whether Japan should be allowed to rearm for self-protection and
possibly for participation in any further United Nations actions against
aggression.
T he consensus of those with recent experience in Japan was that the
Japanese people would prefer not to rearm at this time, although they
would w illingly find other methods of supporting the United Nations in
1. A t a la te r m eeting a ll the Pakistan delegates urged the early conclusion of a peace
treaty w ith Jap an .
t h e w e st
380 ASIAN NATIONALISM ANy
case of future aggressions. Several members noted the many d*® num.
connected with the effective rearmament of Japan. It would ta ' ^
ber of years to build up the necessary industrial potential, an
would be difficult to supply Japan with the necessary raw mate
was also pointed out that even in prewar times there had beensgem to
tendencies among many Japanese, and it was noted that those
have reappeared among some Japanese under the Occupation.
Considerable concern was expressed by some members over the p 1
of rearming Japan. It was felt that New Zealand and A ustralia w°u e
especially sensitive to such a development. One member pointed ou a
this fear on the part of New Zealand and Australia is based not only upon
the past record of Japanese aggression, but also upon the desire to ’ n j? 111'
tain white supremacy in their countries. Citizens of Australia an ew
Zealand serving on the Round Table disassociated themselves from sup
port of a white-supremacy policy, but admitted that numbers of peop e
in both countries feel that immigration must be controlled. They agreed,
however, that the basis of this policy is economic and cultural rather
than racial, there being a real fear that large numbers of foreign immi
grants might prove overwhelming.
China
The discussion on China followed the course of primary revolutionary
events since the fall of the Manchu Empire, analyzed the nature of social,
political and economic discontent, tried to assess the relationship be
tween Chinese Communism and Russian Communism, and sought some
just method of bringing China into the family of nations.
Throughout the deliberations on China there was an active exchange
between those who looked upon the Chinese government merely as one
with fresh vigor and new and constructive institutional programs and
those who tried to show that it might well be in part, at least, a puppet of
the Soviet bureaucracy. The first group noted again and again the many
constructive accomplishments of the Peking government in comparison
with the inefficiency and corruption of the Kuomintang. T he second
group granted these constructive features, but felt it was extremely impor
tant (for purposes of cooperation just as much as for opposition) to dis
cover the precise nature of the Chinese government and the direction in
which it is going. Other Round Table members preferred to adopt a wait-
and-see” attitude in regard to the Chinese Communists.
A member with many years of experience in China noted that the
Chinese revolution is an old one and has passed through a number of
stages. The first, or anti-Manchu stage, culminated with the overthrow
of the Empire, but did not succeed in freeing China from foreign con
trols and impositions. For a time Chinese revolutionaries looked to the
S U M M A R IE S O F LUCKNO W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 381
W est for help, but they were disappointed when Western Powers refused
to aid them in their attempts to win complete independence and better
the position of China. In diis connection, Western attitudes at Versailles
■were particularly disappointing to tlie Chinese.
It now became clear that political reforms were not enough, but that
social changes must also be achieved if China were to develop satisfac
torily. In this regard, language differences were an obvious handicap for
which there was no ready solution. There were strikes, angry anti-foreign
demonstrations, in fact, a series of upheavals throughout this second
stage, and gradually during its development the Chinese came to realize
that there remained still another stage through which die revolution must
pass. ]
This third stage contained elements of economic revolt, and in its de-1
velopment the experience of the Soviet Union was a powerful influence.
It then became clear that the diree phases—political, social and eco
nomic—displayed a certain unity which culminated with the victory of
Communist forces in 1949.
T he opinion of this member was that the most important single charac
teristic of the present Peking government is its utter realism. Its au
thorities studied the situation of China, noted where the serious difficul
ties were, and seized upon direct, yet generally moderate, methods of
attacking them.
A nother member expressed die opinion that there are two halves to
the Chinese Communist orange and that neither half could be properly
considered without reference to the other. The indigenous Chinese revo
lution__home-grown unrest resulting from misery and agrarian inequi
ties, a desire for national self-expression, a revulsion against corrupt and
inefficient government—constitutes one half...
T he other half of the orange consists of a system of political strategy,
tactics and discipline based on M arx and especially adapted to areas
such as China by Lenin, Stalin, Roy and Mao Tse-tung. This system is
part of a larger strategical system through which Communist leaders hope
to achieve a Soviet world. In regard to the Far East, the strategy is to use
agrarian discontent and nationalism as a weapon for destroying the
capitalist world and its allies and bringing about a world-wide Soviet
regime in the now not-too-far-distant future. This is a concept which has
been stated many times by Russian Communists and has been restated
w ithin recent months by Chinese Communists.
Many members felt that these doctrinaire phases of Communist back
ground should not be considered too seriously, since the present Chinese
government was seemingly efficient, moderate, and essentially Chinese
rather than Russian.
In seeking solutions for China’s critical problems, according to a mem
382 A SLA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E ST
ber fam iliar w ith developments, the Peking government had taken three
steps of prim ary importance: the passage of laws to absorb excess pur
chasing power and check inflation; the unification of railway and other
transportation systems for more efficient service; the maximum use of
trained personnel.
T he last step required a certain calculated moderation in Communist
principles of class warfare. According to Chinese Communist theory,
there are two main groups within the present state. One, consisting of
proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, is
represented in the government at the present stage of class conflict. The
second group, consisting of imperialists, feudal elements and bureaucratic
capitalists, has duties but no privileges. Bolshevik democracy would
' normally be applied to the first group, Bolshevik dictatorship to the
second. But the Peking government, in line with its policy of realism, has
eased the pressure on capitalist elements, realizing that they are vital to
the development of China at this stage. In general there has been com
pensation for enterprises seized. The New Democracy of the present is a
mixed economy with elements of state control, cooperatives and private
enterprise.
T he same member pointed out the vital part which land reform must
necessarily play in the new Chinese economy. The Peking government is
feeding an army of five million and four m illion civilian workers. Be
cause of this and because of China’s enormous general population, it is
vitally necessary to achieve the greatest possible efficiency on the land.
The government is therefore giving every possible encouragement to the
poor and middle peasants and to the agricultural laborers and is at the
same time pursuing a moderate policy toward wealthier landed elements.
There is a strong desire to cooperate with all agrarian elements until they
come over to the new system of their own accord. The Peasant Associa
tions have been the basis for land reforms. In areas of North China the
program has been complicated because of the large number of small
peasant proprietors.
Another member pointed out that the present political system and eco
nomic arrangement in China can rightfully be viewed only as one stage
in what, from the Communist viewpoint, is an inevitable advance toward
Bolshevik socialism and communism in which all middle-class elements
and eventually much of the peasantry are likely to become victims of
class warfare.
There was general agreement that the New Democracy is, in a doc
trinaire sense, only one stage, but there was considerable disagreement
again in regaid to the importance of ideological factors. Many felt that
the present government, if it is good, should be examined on the basis of
its deeds without too much reference to what Communist leaders have
S U M M A R IE S O F L U C K N O W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 383
■written in books and stated in speeches. A third view was that later
stages rem ain in the distant future, as Communist leaders at the present
time admit, and that any number of qualifying developments may take
place in the meantime.
Many members who were in disagreement on other points agreed that a
prim ary question is whether the Communists can succeed in unifying
China and in carrying through a program of political, social, and eco
nomic betterment. Most felt that if they succeed in doing this, they are
likely to retain the confidence and support of the Chinese people. One
member with experience in China pointed out that the Communists have
already displayed great ingenuity in teaching untrained personnel to do
specialized jobs in a minimum of time. There was general agreement
among members of the Round Table that the new government, regard
less of its ideological nature, is probably a vast improvement over the
Kuom intang regime.
Throughout discussions of China the greatest divergence of views arose
from estimates of the nature and direction of development of the Peking
government. One view was that the Chinese Communist movement had
been started by Moscow and that for more than a decade it had followed
every twist and turn of the Moscow line. During these years, Moscow
made many serious mistakes which resulted in the needless sacrifice of
thousands of Chinese Communist lives. In nearly every case, blame for
these mistakes was placed on Chinese leaders by Moscow, and yet there was
no evidence that the Chinese Communist leadership ever revolted against
Russian domination.
It was generally admitted that Mao had differed with Stalin in his esti
mate of the peasantry and its importance as the dynamic force in the
Chinese revolution. In the long run, Mao’s estimate had proved more
nearly correct, and Stalin was perhaps forced by circumstance to recog
nize Mao's leadership. Some members felt, however, that despite these
differences Mao and his followers had never deviated in any substantial
fashion from the fundamental tenets of Bolshevism and that they had
never violated Moscow's discipline in any noteworthy fashion.
Others felt that the Chinese tradition of moderation would prove
much stronger than ties of doctrine and ideological discipline. One mem
ber held that there was nothing in the present program more radical than
what the British Labour Government has espoused. A second member
noted that the present government included many non-Communist
leaders. A third stated his opinion that this represents a tactic of the
present and that such leaders not only have no real power, but are likely
to be purged whenever circumstances warrant.
It was almost unanimously agreed that there are no effective non-Com
munist forces left in China. Most felt that a majority of die Chinese
people are offering at least passive support to the government and that,
even if resistance develops in the future, it w ill be entirely impotent
unless arms are somehow placed in the hands of the discontented. One
member stated that the Chinese w ill be quite capable of their own variety
of passive resistance once they feel that the regime is not serving their
interests or has given itself over to a foreign power, but the consensus
was that this sort of opposition is not likely to be a considerable factor.
Discussion of U nited States policy toward China and other parts of
Asia developed into a spirited debate. A British member said that all na
tions should express their gratitude to the United States for sreps taken
to oppose aggression in Korea and to obtain a lasting peace. He charac
terized President Trum an as an honest representative of the American
people “without an imperialist idea in his head.” An Indian member
supported this statement, as did individual members of other delega
tions, but several delegates offered critical qualifications. A number of
Asians felt that the United States had compromised its good intentions by
allowing troops to cross the 38th parallel in Korea and that other phases
of American policy, as in Indochina, were open to criticism. Five Indian
members asked to be placed on record as committed to the proposition
that the United Nations is nothing without the participation of China,
but one Indian delegate asked to be disassociated from this view.2
Several members of other national groups also expressed their strong
support for immediate Chinese Communist representation in the United
Nations. An American, in expressing his personal support for an Ameri
can recognition policy toward Communist China, pointed out that there
were reasons why it would not be easy for the United States government
to recognize Communist China, emphasizing the effect which the Angus
W ard case had exerted on American public opinion. Another American,
in explaining and defending American policy, noted evidence to suggest
that Communist China does not want recognition, and a British mem
ber cited the delay in Communist Chinese responses.to British recognition.
A n American suggested that if India wishes to win American confidence
in the integrity of its middle-of-the-road policy, Indians must make clear
that they are fam iliar with the facts of Soviet expansionism as well as
with those of Western imperialism.
T he relation of the Formosa problem to China and Asia was discussed
in considerable detail. A n American cited the course of American policy
toward the island, indicating that the United States has no intention of
2. T h e Pakistan members in a later m eeting expressed th eir belief that the present
regim e in C hina should be given “its righ tful place" in the U nited Nations and that the
‘ discredited regim e of C hiang Kai-shek” was not en titled to represent the people of
C hina.—Editor.
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCKNOW C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 385
occupying Formosa, but sent the Seventh Fleet for the sole purpose of
isolating it from the Korean outbreak.
(For lack of time, the Round Table did not devote much attention to
the rapidly-changing problem of Korea.)
4. PO LITICAL PROBLEMS
h e R o u n d T a b l e began by discussing the relations of Asia with the
T W estern nations. It was suggested by a British member that there is

no international society today and that resort to “illicit abstracts” serves
only to confuse; the political positions of national states are determined
by their own self-interest shaped largely by considerations of trade and
power, and sound relations between Asia and the West rest on recogni
tion of these basic and realistic assumptions. Other members, eager to
see closer ties between Asia and the West, replied that these classical
factors in the relations between states have been upset in die twentieth
century by new forces, such as the influence of public opinion in the for
m ation of foreign policy, the growth of interdependence among peoples,
the emergence of new loyalties to movements of universal membership
and doctrines of universal application, and the involvement of entire
peoples (in place of small armies) in war.
It was argued that freedom has been challenged on a world scale by
Communism, and that only by responding in a positive way to this chal
lenge can freedom survive. Nationalism is no final answer to Communism
on a w orld scale. Force alone is not a positive response. Political liberty
is a means to human development rather than an end in itself. The U.N.
C harter is beginning to emerge as a new ethical standard. Yet, for all its
falsity, Communism as a world ideology stands practically unanswered.
Is a corresponding world ideology necessary to unite the free nations of
Asia and tlie West? There are present today feelings of indefinable senti
ment that transcend tests of trade and power. Yet the barriers to a com
mon ideology are plain. Despite the growth of world consciousness, na
tionalism is the predominant mood of Asia, and w ill remain so until the
heritage of W estern imperialism is forgotten, its last vestiges are abolished,
and the new threats and fears of continued Western domination are
overcome.
For these reasons it was suggested that the objectives set for common
action by the nations of the W est may be totally different from those of
the W est and Asia together. M ilitary and economic necessities make inte
gration the task of the Western nations. Integration in turn compels a

recognition of a common ideology. In the relations of the West and Asia,
however, the objective is cooperation rather than integration. The need
for a common ideology is consequently less. It may be that, far from
searching for a single doctrine of universal application, our task is to
stress the diversity of these nations, and to attack Communist ideology
precisely for its insistence that there can be one doctrine, one state, one
party, one method of organizing society, which is right for all peoples.
R ather than compelling agreement on ultimate aims which no one can
see today, the need may be for a common program in which we gain
understanding by working together. This program, die Group agreed,
would be based on economic development, social reform, national inde
pendence and civil rights. A precondition of its success would be the
recognition of racial equality by the West.
These general conclusions were confirmed by a detailed discussion that
followed on the points of friction in the relations of Asia and the West.
Some members from Asia pointed out that relationships with the West
revolved around friendship with a particular Power with which long
and close bonds were established. Others argued that stress should be
placed on a world order rather than on East-West ties.
In the view of a Vietnamese speaker, there are differences of climate,
culture and tradition that necessarily divide Asia and the West, but the
W ests assumption of racial superiority is by far the greatest source of
tension. The West must come for the purpose of understanding, not
civilizing, Asia. It must shed phrases such as “native,” “colonial,” “back
ward. If the West can do this, then the two civilizations can complement
each other economically, politically and spiritually.
The majority of Asian members emphasized the frictions between Asia
and the West. These frictions were noted as arising from such attitudes
of the Western nations as: continued attitudes of racial sujêriority, par
ticularly in Africa; the desire to subordinate Asia to Western aims; the
maintenance of imperial power in Southeast Asia and Africa; the threat
of m ilitary and economic domination amounting to a new form of im
perialism; the alignment of Western nations with conservative groups.
Further sources of friction were noted in attitudes of Asian nations,
such as. the conviction that democracy cannot solve Asia’s economic prob
lems, the lack of understanding of democracy or Communism resulting
from high rates of illiteracy, lack of information and concentration on
internal problems; reaction to the immense economic contrasts of East
and West.
Several members made it clear that today hostility to the West in Asia
is often directed against the United States rather than against Great
Britain. These beliefs among the peoples of Asia were noted: the United
States is extending its bases too far into Asia; the United States intends
to fight Russia on Asian soil— Korea being an example; the United States
is w illing to use the atom bomb on Asia but not in Europe; the United
States regards the peoples of Asia as expendable and is indifferent to loss
of Asian life in war; the United States led the United Nations to act
quickly in Korea because of its own strategic self-interest. It took no ac
tion in Kashmir, where its strategic interests were not involved; the
U nited States acted in Korea because the South Koreans accepted United
States domination. It took no such action in Kashmir because neither
side is controlled by a Western Power; United States aid was given to
Europe on condition that Europe cut off its trade with the U.S.S.R.;
U nited States aid served to damage the European economy.
These arguments were analysed on their merits by members from
several nations who made these points: the West has in fact made West
ern Europe the prim ary battleground and has been criticized by Asians
for neglecting Asia; the atom bomb was completed after the German
surrender, and was offered for world control; United States economic aid
was given to Russia with no conditions in U N RRA and was rejected by
the Russians in the Marshall Plan; the quick action in Korea resulted
from a long record of U nited Nations intervention, a direct interest in a
form er enemy-held territory and an undisputed case of aggression; West
ern nations are often governed by their regard for minority rights.
In addition it was pointed out that the United States had tried to reach
a settlement with Russia and had moved slowly and reluctantly toward
rearmament. The insistence of Asians that the United States has stressed
political freedom and ignored economic security was said to be wrong.
Both political parties in the United States have concentrated very largely
on social and economic legislation for the last twenty years. Both have
desired continued development in America and overseas and have op
posed Russia partly for her insistence on making progress impossible by
destroying freedom of scientific inquiry.
Nonetheless, it was ’agreed that, rightly or wrongly, Asians held deep-
seated fears concerning the motives of the West. These “stubborn socio
logical facts,” as they were called, led one American delegate to empha
size the difficulties of the Western position as follows: if the West gives
aid, it w ill be feared for its imperialism; if it withholds aid, it will be
denounced for its indifference; if it establishes garrisons, it will be at
tacked as expansionist; if it keeps its troops at home, it ensures the suc
cess of aggression in Asia; if it expresses no political preferences, it will be
accused of siding with reaction and the status quo; if it supports pro
gressive forces, it w ill be condemned for intervention. “In other words,”
the delegate concluded, “we are damned if we do and damned if we
don't.”
388 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND TH E W E ST
A n Asian member, carrying this argument one stage further, main

tained that the danger to Asia was not that the United States would
intervene in Asia but that it would withdraw. Already, he pointed out,
the conviction is widespread in America and Europe that United States
economic and m ilitary resources are overextended and should be con
centrated where they can be of most use. Unless Asia liberates itself of
outworn and unfounded prejudices, the United States w ill concentrate
on strengthening nations that understand and act on the real issues of
the present time.
Underscoring this warning, a British member added that if the
United States leaves Asia to itself, one country after another will be
picked off and subjected to a Communist dictatorship which will make
the worst W estern imperialism pleasant in comparison.
The Asians were urged by European delegates to stop talking of power
blocs and imperialist wars and to talk instead of building the power of
the U nited Nations to resist aggression. Asian members replied that their
governments respected their commitments to the United Nations but
tended towards neutrality because they needed time to develop their
resources. They wanted economic aid, and hoped it might be given by
the West. Because of the fear of United States intervention, aid from the
U nited States should be given indirectly, and to a regional association of
Asian nations. One Asian member suggested that United States aid
should be given only on condition that the nations of South Asia form a
confederation.
From the first part of the discussion these conclusions seemed to
emerge: cooperation between Asia and the W est is desirable and neces
sary, it is restricted by tensions and misunderstandings; cooperation for
t is reason should be based on recognition of m utual self-interest rather
t an on reasons of charity or ideology; it should center in a program that
stresses present needs rather than ultimate ends.
This program should start on the assumption that resistance to Com
munism is not an end in itself but part of a larger program to achieve
uman welfare. It should be administered wherever possible through the
mte Nations or a regional organization. The W est should not hope
or too much and should be content to look forward to ultimate partner
ship with Asia. Asia should not assume that Western aid would be forth
coming because of fear of Communism in the W est or internal economic
pressures. It should respect public opinion in the W est and trust it to
help Asia in overcoming the imperialist aims of special interests and
m inority groups.
T he R ° und Table went on to consider the relations of Asian nations
with the U.S.S.R. It heard first an analysis of Soviet attitudes towards
Asia.
T o Soviet leaders, the existence of tlie colonies explains why capitalism

in the W est did not collapse in the way that had been prophesied by
M arxist leaders. T herefore it is im portant for the success of the world
revolution to underm ine capitalist control in the colonies. In stimulating
revolution in the colonies, Communists hope to win the colonial peoples
and accelerate tlie dow nfall of the capitalist states.
C olonial peoples are mostly peasants. They want relief from die bur
dens of usury and tenancy. So it is necessary for the Communists to sup
p o rt peasant proprietorship. Yet peasant proprietorship leads in turn
to the rise of a small-landowner mentality that is hostile to Communist
aims. Consequently Communists emphasize nationalism and work to
create Communist-led national fronts.
T h e Communist-lecl movements are dedicated to armed revolt. Nor
m ally armed revolt is condemned as adventurism in Communist theory.
I t is justified fo r the colonies on the ground that the imperialists and
their lackeys are armed. Therefore, arms can be used against them. In
China, this doctrine was boldly and successfully applied. The Communist-
led movements are further dedicated to legal work in urban centers. For
strategic reasons their work in the past was often concentrated on mari
time labor groups.
In seeking leadership, the Communists perm it no compromise. A ll
independent groups are called lackeys of imperialism. Everyone who is
not fo r them is against them. W hen a colonial nation achieves inde
pendence, however, a lightning reversal may follow in Soviet attitudes,
as in Israel, Burm a and Indonesia. Because of rigidities and inner con
tradictions, sim ilar tensions may well break out in tlie relations between
the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.
As fu rth er examples of Soviet activity, members cited the Moscow
training and support of Ho Chi Minh, and tlie supplies of manuals,
propaganda leaflets and, possibly, arms and ammunition to the Com
m unist rebels in Malaya. In most areas in Southeast Asia, however, it
was stated, Soviet pressures were indirect and not yet fully applied. An
Indian delegate reported that there were distributed among peasants in
H yderabad large quantities of pamphlets and magazines, probably not
p rinted in India, w ith lavish photographs of textile factories, bakeries
and plants of the U.S.S.R. It was reported that in most Asian countries
the Soviet-directed Peace Pledge Campaign had had a wide effect and
led m any outstanding scientists, men of letters and political leaders to
lend their weight to Communist propaganda.
A fu ll discussion followed on the attitudes of India toward Russia,
Communism and the Indian Communist Party. A n Indian member main
tained that India’s attitude toward Russia, like its attitude toward the
W est, was am bivalent. Indians feel that Russia achieved rapid economic
progress in an undeveloped nation. A t the same time they fear Soviet

pressure. They feel diat India has been helped by Russia because the
Soviet challenge to the West has accelerated the tempo of progress toward
social and economic welfare and toward the liberation of the colonies.
The threat of Communist revolution seems the best means of arousing
the W estern nations and democrats everywhere from lethargy and in
action. Indians believe, therefore, that if a Communist menace did not
already exist, it would have to be created. They are tempted to exploit
the conflict of Russia and the West to speed their own development.
A second Indian member contrasted the sympathy for the Communist
ideal that is widespread in India widi the equally widespread opposition
to the Indian Communist Party. The Communist Party was popular as
long as it participated in the anti-imperialist front. But when it cast
itself against national sentiment by opposing the 1942 anti-war move
ment (of the Indian Congress Party), its subordination to Moscow was
clearly revealed. The Communist sabotage of the Indian nationalist
movement led to a fear of Soviet imperialism and a far deeper distrust
of Moscow than of the West. One evidence was seen in the refusal of
Indian publishers to seek newsprint from the U.S.S.R. despite the short
age of newsprint in India. Yet, although India sympathizes with the
West in the cold war, she cannot for internal reasons afford to be drawn
into any alliances against Russia. India wants above all to be left inde
pendent.
Throughout the discussion it seemed to many that Asians did not suffi
ciently distinguish between theoretical Communism and Soviet im
perialism. Communist theory attracts Asians through its doctrines of
racial equality and social and economic equality. One Indian member
who asserted diat there was more economic inequality in Russia than in
most Western nations also added that the myth of Soviet equalitarianism
was widespread. Asians did, however, distinguish between stopping ag
gression and stopping Communism. Halting aggression requires emphasis
on national independence. Halting Communism requires stress on eco
nomic and social progress. Westerners may identify Communism as
aggression against democracy. To Asians, concerned above all with social
justice, democracy is a much larger concept than the particular forms of
society established in the West.
Western members, in replying, insisted that they had no quarrel with
the Soviet people and were opposed chiefly to the foreign policy of the
Soviet regime. This policy was clearly expansionist and opposed to the
United Nations. They challenged India’s failure to support the United
Nations in Korea and her refusal to join the United Nations Commission
created by an overwhelming vote of United Nations members.
A n Indian member answered that his government had supported the
U nited Nations. India’s failure to send troops to Korea was due to in
ternal conditions. Indians held that tlie crossing of the 38th parallel was
an act of provocation and they believed that at least one major nation
should rem ain neutral in order to serve as an intermediary in eventual
peace negotiations.
A n American member replied that in this case the conflict in which
India sought to be neutral was not between two power blocs but between
tlie U.N. Charter and defiance of the Charter. The United States, he
added, had once tried to legislate itself into neutrality and had learned
its error at great cost. Another American member added that neutrality
itself served to increase the danger of war since die hopes for peace
turned on amassing enough strengdi behind the Charter to make aggres
sion unprofitable. He noted the reference of an Indian delegate to sug
gest that India was tempted to play a balance-of-power game in the
conflict of Russia and the West. This meant backing the weaker side, that
is the Communist side, which is engaged in aggression and defiance of
the United Nations. He suggested tiiat India’s safety in the Korean crisis
lay in the fact that her position was a minority position. She was saved
by the action of the majority. A t the same time, she could turn to the
m inority and say, we did our best to help you. This effort to have the best
of both worlds might end in disaster.
One Indian member agreed with these views and suggested that an at
titude of m oral neutrality in today’s conflict was indefensible. India’s
reluctance to join the majority of U.N. members was the result of an
inadequate understanding of the Soviet regime and its ambitions in
Asia. For example, at the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi (in 1947)
Socialist delegates from certain countries in Southeast Asia had insisted
that Communists in their own countries were good patriots who would
never oppose their national interests. Soon after, in February 1948, a
Cominform conference was held in Calcutta. In accordance with its
directives, civil war was launched in Burma and Malaya; and the Indo
nesian government yvas undermined by a Communist uprising at the
height of its struggle against Dutch rule. Today, this member added, the
leaders of Pakistan and Indonesia are reviled on the Moscow radio;
Ceylon is barred from U.N. membership by a Soviet veto; Indian leaders
are called lackeys and stooges; Moscow spreads tlie line that the Mount-
battens have gone but that they still rule through Nehru and Patel. The
record is clear enough. It is not understood because too many Indians
find it necessary to cling to the illusion that diere is a genuine contrast
between Muscovite imperialism and theoretical Communism.
Another Indian member noted that, had aggression succeeded in
Korea, it would have been followed by further aggression in Germany
and elsewhere. Yet, he said, in the struggle for the guardianship of the
political orphans of Southeast Asia, the democracies must always be at a

disadvantage. Communism is much less pow erful in nations that are
free and achieving higher living standards. The only real answer to Com
m unist propaganda is not counter-propaganda, but reform.
A Pakistan member offered a similar analysis of the relations of Asia
and the U.S.S.R. The common man in Asia sees only his own misery. He
believes that nothing can be worse than his own condition. He thinks
that in Russia the lot of people like himself has been made much better.
He hears that there is no freedom of speech in Russia. But freedom of
speech means very little to him. His needs are for food and shelter. Free
dom of speech is a luxury which lie will forego until his prim ary require
ments are satisfied.
He understands that there is no religion in the U.S.S.R. This does not
w orry him. He is bound to his own society, with its base in religious
values and superstitions, but he is not too concerned w ith organized
religion. In addition, the Russians have been careful not to offend his
religious beliefs. They have promoted Moslem culture in Central Asia,
allowed pilgrims to go to Mecca, and sanctioned the Council of Theo
logians.
More im portant to the common man of Asia is his belief that Russia
has brought about rapid advances in industrialization, irrigation,
mechanization of agriculture and abolition of illiteracy.
A further factor is the proximity of the U.S.S.R. The northern borders
of W est Pakistan, for example, are only a few miles from the borders of
the U.S.S.R.
Asia for these reasons w ill maintain relations w ith the U.S.S.R. In
developing its own ideology, it w ill not reject Communism out of hand,
but w ill draw from it the precedents it feels may be helpful. Asia will
draw closer to the U.S.S.R. if its relations with the West prove unfruitful.
A member suggested that the power of attraction of the U.S.S.R. in
Asia might derive from three m ajor factors: the belief that the U.S.S.R.
CffUld Provide caPlt;al to industrialize Asia; the belief that Communism
offered a sound economic and social pattern for Asia; the belief that
dictatorship could accomplish more quickly than democracy the objec
tives of Asian nations.
How far, he asked, was the third factor responsible for Asia's sympathy
?°^. U.S.S.R.? A Pakistan member replied that, while there is no
belief in dictatoiship in his country, the speed with which democracy
can achieve its objectives is a critical question. A n Indian delegate added
that equalitarianism and planning are sources of attraction when con
trasted with private enterprise. The issue of freedom and dictatorship is
obscured fo r Indians by Western support of reactionary regimes in Asia.
Another Indian maintained that Indians have lived too long under
police rule to be attracted to a police state. Yet they are greatly confused.
He quoted the rem ark of the Congress Party leader Acharya Kripalani,
that the police state must precede the welfare state, to indicate that many
who are im patient w ith the slow ways of democracy think of dictatorship
as a short-cut to the welfare state. The same people argue that if Russia
could industrialize her economy without foreign capital, so can India.
T his belief strengthens illusions of self-sufficiency and isolationism.
If illusions persist in Asia about Soviet Communism, Westerners must
realize that they are partly to blame. The attitudes of Asian intellectuals
towards Soviet Russia have been shaped substantially by the writings of
W estern scholars, such as the Webbs. It is only recently that Western
experts have changed their minds. In war time, Asia was given great
amounts of A llied propaganda about the victories of the Soviet Union.
Just five years ago, Allied leaders were unanimous in insisting that noth
ing could undermine the unity of Russia and the Allies.
In the postwar years few anti-Communist books have had wide^ circula
tion in Asia. Authoritative books on Russia published in America have
been almost impossible to buy due to tlie dollar shortage. A French mem
ber asserted that it was highly desirable to maintain contacts with Mos
cow in order to gain understanding of conditions in the U.S.S.R.
T he R ound Table next considered intra-Asian relations. It was recog
nized that because of the swift changes taking place in Asia, the relations
of Asian countries with each other had not yet become fully stabilized.
A n Indian member suggested that any analysis of intra-Asian relation
ships should include the following factors: (1) the impact of historical
problems— for example, the present problems arising from the partition
of India and the defeat of Japan; (2) the impact of economic forces—
fo r example, the conflicts between the desire for self-sufficiency and the
need for foreign capital; (3) the impact of internal politics—for example,
the strength of the Communist parties within each nation; (4) the impact
of Commonwealth relations— for example, the aid given by Common
wealth organizations to Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth na
tions; (5) the impact of external agreements— for example the military
treaties between the United States and the Philippines, Britain and
Ceylon, the U.S.S.R. and China, France and Indochina.
In the light of these factors, the Round Table discussed first the chang
ing nature of the British Commonwealth. Before the war, when Britain
signed the Statute of the International Court, she entered a reservation
on Commonwealth disputes. It was generally believed then that the
Commonwealth constituted an organic whole and that disputes among
its member nations should be settled within the Commonwealth.
T oday the Commonwealth has developed into an association of inde
pendent democratic states. Its member nations are wholly sovereign in
3 9 4 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND TH E W E ST
a sense that they were not when they signed the treaty at Versailles.
T he Commonwealth is not and cannot be an exclusive bloc precluding
alliances w ith other nations. It is, in the view of Canadian and British
delegates, a vital and growing association which, while it gives the greatest
freedom to its members, carries out important functions and provides a
valuable common meeting ground.
A Pakistan member accepted this interpretation. Because the members
of the Commonwealth are sovereign, he said, they settle their disputes in
the same way as other nations. That is why the Kashmir dispute was
taken to the U nited Nations.
An Indian member agreed that India had benefited from her continued
association with the Commonwealth, although public opinion questioned
the wisdom of continued membership at the time that independence was
achieved. Nevertheless, he added, India’s ties to the Commonwealth are
slender today. India’s concern centers on the actions of South Africa in
applying against Indians laws of discrimination that violate fundamental
human rights. India recognizes that the Commonwealth has no legal
power to coerce South Africa but she feels that moral power should be
brought to bear. The Indian Socialist Party platform, it was noted, calls
on India to leave the Commonwealth. A Pakistan member expressed
similar concern with the failure of the Commonwealth to exert moral
pressure on behalf of human rights in Africa.
The Round Table went on to consider points of friction within Asia.
Except in the cases of Kashmir and Western New Guinea, the discussion
was restricted to a consideration of the international implications of the
conflicts in question, and the merits of the disputes were excluded. Sev-
erfc ■members asked to be recorded as stating that, were it not for this
self-imposed restriction, they would have contributed at much greater
length to the discussions held on Indochina, Formosa and Korea.
In discussing Korea, it was asserted that the partition of Korea was a
tragic accident which could be set right only by the unification of the
na ion. t was agreed, however, that unification would tend to create
new problems as well as to solve old problems. The Korea peninsula, an
American member suggested, has been the classical corridor both for the
extension of Soviet and Chinese power into the Sea of Japan, and for
the extension of Japanese power into Manchuria and China. The ad
vance o nite ations forces into North Korea, coming at a time when
Japanese power is emg revived and Japanese rearmament is under con
sideration, w ill tend to arouse China's fears and so increase her reliance
on Soviet Russia Western policy has looked forward to the restoration of
C hinas independence and has assumed that Soviet "detachment” of the
northern provinces of China was the most significant development taking
place m the relat.ons of Asian and non-Asian powers. The Korean dispute
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCKNO W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 395
has served to postpone China’s reaction against Soviet expansion. It will

be furth er postponed if Western forces remain in North Korea, and if
Japanese industry is used extensively in Korean reconstruction. The use
o f Japanese industry, he held, was desirable from both Korea s and
Ja p a n ’s points of view. Some forces must remain in Korea to supervise
government. T o minimize the fears of China and all Asia, the strongest
emphasis should be placed on United Nations administration in super
vising free elections, maintaining order and distributing relief supplies.
In reconstruction, even though much of the material may come fiom the
U nited States, the administration of it should be in the hands of a United
Nations reconstruction agency for Korea. Chinas fears can be fuither
reduced if she participates in tlie work of Korean reconstruction follow
ing the replacement of the Nationalists by the Peking government in the
U nited Nations.
A Japanese member expressed the great interest of his country in
Korean affairs and its fear of Soviet domination of Korea. Discussion of
Korea was concluded on the understanding that it would be considered
fu rther in an analysis of Asia’s role in the United Nations.
Formosa, an Indian member asserted, can be removed as a point of
friction only if the dispute is brought into open debate. The United
States undertook to neutralize Formosa only for the duration of the
Korean war, but since Communist China remains unrecognized by the
U nited SLates, and Nationalist China remains in the United Nations with
U nited States support, it is hard to see how the commitment to prevent
Communist occupation of Formosa w ill be terminated. Until the United
States alters its attitude or loses support, China cannot be assured that
the Nationalists are not being encouraged in their plans to attack the
m ainland from Formosa. The member added, that Communist occupation
of Formosa w ill intensify militarism in Japan and Korea.
A Japanese member reported that his people now regarded Formosa
as a part of China. American delegates added Lliat their government was
committed to tlie view that Formosa belonged to China but that its
future status should certainly be held open until die conclusion of a
Japanese peace treaty. According to a Philippine member, the extension
of Communist control to Formosa would lead tlie Philippines to ac
celerate its rearmament program and reorient itself in an effort to
diminish the impact of a Communist government so close to its shores.
T he Communist victory in China has already strengdiened the left-wing
m inority in the Philippines and made people aware of tlie existence of
conflicting ideologies. To the extent permitted by ruling groups, the
Philippine government w ill move toward a middle-of-die-road position
in the cold war.
A n Indian member expressed a personal, dissenting view on Formosa.
396 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W E ST
T he disposition of the island should be in the hands of the United Na

tions, which has the right to determine its future in the light of present
considerations. The United Nations decision should be based on the
wishes of the people of Formosa and on the necessity for maintaining
peace in the Pacific. Not only China but the Philippines, Korea, Japan
and other Pacific nations are concerned in the future of Formosa. The
best solution may be a United Nations trusteeship. This view was
disputed by another Indian member who doubted the validity of security
considerations in determining the government of a country.
Indochina, a French member declared, was spared for the time being
from Chinese invasion. Nevertheless, the exjDerience of 1942 proved that
there are two routes for m ilitary expansion from China to Singapore, one
by land via Tonking, and one by sea. The conquest of Indochina would
re-create the strategic situation which followed Jap an ’s advance to Singa
pore in the second W orld W ar. Citizens of Laos and Cambodia are well
aware of this danger, and France, with her concern for Indochina and
her protection of minority rights, is determined to protect Laos and
Cambodia at all costs.
A Vietnamese speaker asserted that the Vietnamese were the recognized
leaders and spokesmen of all Indochina. He stated that his country wel
comed United States aid against Soviet imperialism. An Indian member
questioned whether a leader might arise in Vietnam who could unify the
country and whether United Slates aid would be given to Laos and
Cambodia if Vietnam should fall. A French member replied that the
future of Indochina, like that of Korea, should not be judged in terms of
specific individuals. An American member doubted that unilateral aid
would be given by the United States.
Another Indian member noted that Bao Dai had offered a plebiscite
on the subject of union with France following the restoration of law
and order in Indochina. He suggested that this plebiscite should be
guaranteed and supervised by the United Nations. Given this assurance,
India should join the 32 nations that have recognized Bao Dai.
W estern New Guinea, an Indonesian member noted, is the subject of
continuing negotiation with the Netherlands government. The Indo
nesian claim to New Guinea, he added, is based on legal rather than
ethnic grounds. The Indonesian government entered the Round Table
Conference at the Hague on the assumption that the Netherlands would
transfer sovereignty to all its possessions in the area. However, the
Australians have made it clear that they do not want Indonesians in
New Guinea. Indonesians regard this as an unwarranted intervention. If
Australia's action is dictated by fear, they ask: fear of whom and of what?
They believe that Indonesia can defend New Guinea as well as the
Netherlands can. They are afraid that the exceptionally friendly rela
SU M M A R IE S OF LUCKN O W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 397
tions of A ustralia and Indonesia w ill be poisoned by this intervention.

A n other speaker stated Australia's attitude, as follows: Australia feels
that New Guinea is vital to the defense of Australia and New Zealand. It
is not convinced that Indonesia can protect the island. It notes that In
donesia is today having difficulty in maintaining stable rule in areas
under its jurisdiction. The people of New Guinea are Melanesians and
have no ethnic ties to Indonesia. The legal claims of Indonesia are
challenged on the ground that New Guinea was a separate administrative
u n it unrelated to the main areas of Indonesia. Australia has no expansion
ist aims in New Guinea. In trade agreements and other matters, Aus
tralia continues to cooperate with Indonesia, and powerful sections of
public opinion, including the trade unions, will not let relations between
the two nations deteriorate.
A n Am erican member suggested that the status of New Guinea should
be determined by the interests of its peoples, and by the necessity of
m aintaining peace in the region. It might best be amalgamated with the
rest of New Guinea and made a United Nations trust territory. The ex
perience of North Africa, where the United Nations took over the
form er Italian colonies after the failure of the great powers to reach
agreement on individual trusteeship, indicates the United Nations ca
pacity to act in New Guinea. _
Kashm ir was discussed by the Round Table in a special one-hour
debate. Equal time, in opening and closing discussion, was allotted to
members from India and Pakistan. The Indian Chairman of the Round
T able turned over his functions to a Canadian delegate during the dis
cussion, although the Pakistan group assured him that they wished him
to rem ain in the chair. The discussion covered the following major issues.
The historical background. An Indian member opened the discussion.
For some time after Partition it had seemed that Kashmir would not ac
cede either to India or to Pakistan. W hile the question was under review,
tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir. India’s assistance was re
quested. India answered that she could send troops only if Kashmir were
a part of India. A t the request of the Maharaja Hari Singh and of Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah, India accepted the accession of Kashmir. Despite
their assurances, she voluntarily announced that a plebiscite would be
held after law and order had been restored. Later, India found out that
the invaders were supplied by the Pakistan government and supported
by regular Pakistan troops.
A Pakistan member replied that the revolt in Kashmir was internal and
was caused by resentment against the Dogra dynasty which had flared up
in rebellion as long ago as 1931. In Ju ly 1947, before Partition, RSS and
Sikh forces entered the Dogra area. He quoted a London Times despatch
asserting that “237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated by the
forces of the Dogra state headed by the M aharaja in person and aided by
Hindus and Sikhs.”
Subsequent uprisings among the peoples of Poonch were caused, ac
cording to Sheikh Abdullah, by resentment against the Kashmir Durbar.
A t the time of Kashmir's accession to India, the M aharaja in fact lost
control of Kashmir.
Self-determination. It was agreed that the desires of the people should
prevail in a Kashmir settlement. An Indian member maintained that
Sheikh Abdullah had been the accepted leader of the Kashmir Moslems,
whose political activities he had first organized in 1931. Mr. Jinnah had
tried to win the support of Kashmir Moslems for the Moslem League but
had failed. W hile in jail, Sheikh Abdullah had continued to be the true
spokesman of Kashmir.
Pakistan members replied that the opposition to Sheikh Abdullah had
polled 16 out of 21 Assembly seats in 1933, 20 out of 21 in 1941, and 15
out of 21 seats in 1946. Moslems constituted 93 per cent of the population
of Kashmir Province, 61 per cent of Jammu Province, and 77 per cent of
the entire area despite the heavy exodus of Moslem refugees to Pakistan.
The United Nations action. A Pakistan member stated that India had
o i t0 naccePt United Nations Security Council resolution of
pn , 1948, calling for a plebiscite. Later India blocked the attempt
to create a coalition government for Kashmir. Pakistan had supported
•1 6 Uni t ed Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
in 1948 and 1949. India had not cooperated. The report of Sir Owen
ixon ma e it p am that India had refused to withdraw its troops from
as mir in accordance with United Nations requests. India’s objections
K W tf eTJ SC1c werf invalid since none had been raised in the case of the
n'm*. * *uStu rontl^r Provinces. Pakistan felt that India was playing for
j.* G, 1 at E*me w°uld change the composition of the popula-
faSlm irA/ i exocûs of Moslems and the influx of Hindus and
Sikhs to former Moslem centers of population.
” “ mem3ers replied that their objections to1 making both sides
j ,raW Was. t ia t ^ 1S amounted to equal treatment of the aggressor
16 a^®rf eê. ' any government could commit aggression, then
thp n raW an r , g *e Nations to judge im partially between
T h p r? ’reSSOr 311 1 Vc1Ct*m’ aggression might become highly profitable.
i._, ^ aS n ° recor .any case where a civil government was replaced
y ano ie r government in order to hold a plebiscite. The case of Greece
was just the reverse.
h meJn êrs cited India’s own actions in Junagadli and Hydera
bad to discount charges of aggression. Indian delegates replied that India's
position was consistent throughout in acting in accordance with the will
ot the m ajority of the people.
Strategic importance. Pakistan members quoted Sheikh Abdullah as

stating that if Kashmir joined India, Pakistan would be "completely en
circled." Kashmir is bound to Pakistan geographically. Its logs are floated
down rivers that flow tlirough Pakistan. Its natural port is Karachi. Paki
stan’s vital railway communication that runs from Lahore through
R aw alpindi to Peshawar, and the road that runs beside the railway, can
be outflanked and left defenseless if Kashmir is lost. Rivers that rise in
Kashmir irrigate 19 m illion acres of Pakistan’s land. If their flow should
be restricted, this land would turn to desert and millions of Pakistan
citizens would starve.
In reply, an Indian member pointed out that all European geographers
had declared that Partition itself was a geographical error. That had been
foreseen at the time. #,
Communal question. A Pakistan member stated diat the Partition of
India was based on two communities and should be followed dirough. An
Indian member replied that while Pakistan is an Islamic state, Hinduism
is not an organized religion with a church, and therefore there has always
been a tradition in India of divorce between religion and state. The
government gives full rights to Moslems and cannot countenance that
tlie Moslems of Kashmir shall be turned over to Pakistan on communal
grounds, regardless of their own desires. Numbers of Moslems are re
turning to Kashmir, while Hindus are not returning to Moslem-con-
trolled areas.
Other members made the following points: Both sides agree m private
that the dispute must be settled by compromise. Pakistan feels that she has
compromised most so far. A plebiscite for the vale of Kashmir may be as
difficult as a plebiscite for the entire area. Kashmir should be a United
Nations trust territory.
A member who stated that he was an old friend of the subcontinent
expressed these views: the Kashmir dispute is the root of all troubles on
the subcontinent. It forces intolerable military expenditures on both
sides, prohibiting qjcpenditures on nation-building services. India, al
though her m ilitary budget is higher than that of the undivided nation
before the war, cannot make m ilitary contributions to the United Na
tions. Pakistan is even more strained by die burden of excessive arma
ments. Unless a compromise can be worked out fairly soon, die two
nations w ill drag each other down to ruin.
One dissenting Indian member supported this view. He stated that
most Indians w ill sustain their government in any reasonable solution.
T here is no ungovernable feeling on this score in Bombay and Madras.
If a plebiscite by regions in Kashmir should lead to partition, that would
be preferable to the poisoning of relations between India and Pakistan at
a time when both nations face far greater menaces. Many would have no
objection to dem ilitarization under a civil adm inistration w ith United

Nations support. He cited the views of an Indian Socialist member who
believes that the only solution is a confederation of India, Pakistan and
an independent Kashmir, which would provide for common defense, and
w hich Burma and Ceylon might later join.
A Pakistan member stated that he looked forw ard to the time when
India would be Pakistan's best friend and Pakistan would be India’s best
friend. He added that the Prime M inister of Pakistan had accepted
Prime M inister N ehru’s proposal of a no-war pledge and had proposed
that all disputes between the two nations should be handled at two
months' intervals, lirst by negotiation, then by mediation, and finally by
arbitration.
Opposition to Pacific Pact

T he R ound Table concluded its analysis of intra-Asian relations with
a discussion of a Pacific Pact. It was understood that a Pacific Pact might
be a regional Pact within the United Nations, or one similar to the
North A tlantic Pact in its relation to A rticle 51 of the U nited Nations
Charter. T he R io Pact was cited as a third type o f regional association.
It has amounted to a “m ultilateralization” of the M onroe Doctrine and
it has worked successfully in the settlement of disputes w ithin the region.
However, it has matured over a period of years.
One Indian member maintained that a Pacific Pact would be generally
favored in economic and cultural fields. In m ilitary cooperation, he as-
serte , its effectiveness would depend on the willingness of Asian nations
that are free to guarantee the integrity of those that are not yet inde
pendent, and on the ability of Asian nations to extend m ilitary aid to
each other. He felt that when there is a lack of force, disunity is worse
than unity.
Asian nations should take the initiative in banding together, and then
turn to the United States for aid. M ilitary agreements on the parts of the
U nited States, the Netherlands, France and Great"Britain with the na
tions that would make up a Pacific Pact would give the Pact force.
A second Indian member doubted if a Pacific Pact would be of suffi
cient value to the nations of Southeast Asia to make it worth while. The
A tlantic Pact, he said, has force only because the U nited States provides
large amounts of weapons. A n economic pact would have to do more than
direct trade since trade is assumed. No nation in Asia can provide capital
for industrial development.
It was pointed out that the Pacific Pact proposed by President Quirino
was aimed at aggression and was anti-Communist. It was rejected by some
Asian nations on the ground that it implied hostility to Communist
China. An Indian member pointed out that an inclusive Pacific Pact

would have to include China and therefore would lose homogeneity. A
Pact without China would become a political association.
Asia and the United Nations

T he final discussion on Asia and the United Nations was opened by an
Indian member. The United Nations, he declared, for all its promise,
has not yet secured deep roots in Asia. It is regarded as a great-power
organization dominated by the United States and Great Britain. It is
questioned whether it can maintain peace in the absence of accord be
tween the great powers. It is felt in addition that the United Nations has
neglected Asia and concentrated on Europe. It should give two seats on
the Security Council to Asian nations.
The member added that Asians looked on the United Nations essen
tially as a forum. They believed that in Korea the United Nations was
functioning well but mainly as a front for the United States. An Ameri
can member replied that the United States was stressing the United
Nations more than ever in all its actions.
The United Nations, one member asserted, was founded in the belief
that there would be unanimity of purpose among the great powers.
Given unanimity, the main purpose of the United Nations was to serve
as a forum. However, events had proved that there was no unanimity. Ag
gression had developed, and the main function of the United Nations had
become to check aggression.
A forum imposed no commitments and obligations on its members.
But an organization that sets out to check aggression may make heavy
demands of its members in men and material.
Membership in a forum is quite consistent* with the desire of a nation
to remain neutral in political conflicts. But neutrality and membership
in an anti-aggression organization may not be compatible. A nation such
as Switzerland, which is truly neutral, cannot join a world organization
like the United Nations for fear that at some time it may be aligne
against another nation. How far w ill India carry her neutrality if it con
flicts w ith the growing responsibilities of the United Nations?
A n Indian member replied: India is neutral as between alliances out
side the U nited Nations and not neutral as between aggression and
resistance to aggression by the United Nations.
In the effort to make the United Nations an effective instrument in
preventing aggression, it was pointed out, measures have been proposed
to change the rules of the Assembly and to organize United Nations units
and contingents to counter aggressive threats and actions. A member
asked: what is the response of Asian nations to these proposals?
T he United Nations, one Indian member replied, will either make itself
effective or it will die. The reason that the United States dominates the
U nited Nations is that other nations have given it only moral support.
India was mistaken in not serving on the Korean Commission. She should
support proposals to strengthen the United Nations.
There is only one bloc in the world, the member continued. The
satellite nations voted with the Russian on 411 out of 429 United Nations
roll-call votes and never voted against the U.S.S.R. In contrast, Common
wealth nations differed among themselves on 328 of the same 429 votes.
The Arab states and the United States and Latin America were similarly
divided.
A second Indian member maintained that the United Nations was
built on the unanimity of the Great Powers. If agreement between them
is impossible, he stated, the United Nations is dead and war is inevitable.
No new power is given to the Western nations by going around the veto.
If they wish to by-pass the veto, they should admit that the United Na
tions has broken down. The Assembly cannot direct the United Nations
to take action to avert aggression. The most it can do is to lend moral
authority to action taken by United Nations members. If the United
States and Great Britain, which once suggested the veto, have changed
their opinions, the small nations may not oppose them. But turning to
the Assembly does not avoid the necessity for reaching great-power ac
cord in the Security Council.
There ^will no objection, another Tndian member added, if the
nited Nations reform proposals are to give moral authority to action to
resist aggression. If the Assembly finds that aggression has taken place, its
moral support of members who take action is desirable provided those
who do not act are not regarded as traitors.
A discussion of the rights of dissenting minorities in the United Na
tions followed. Strong criticism was voiced of India’s refusal to join the
reconstituted United Nations Commission for Korea. Critics of India
maintained that as a United Nations member she was morally bound to
accept and help to implement the m ajority decision as determined by 47
r atlons members. A member emphasized the significance of
India s action at the present time. Korea, he said, may prove to be the
Abyssinia of the United Nations.
Indian members strongly objected to these views. The United Nations,
they said, is a flexible and democratic organization. Had the founders
made clear that the majority could impose its will on the minority at all
times, the United Nations would never have been created. Any attempt
today to make the United Nations an instrument for coercing inde
pendent nations would lead to its breakup.
In a democracy, some members added, the m inority is not coerced into
accepting the m ajority will. This was disputed by Canadian members

T hey were asked whether minorities were compelled to serve on Koyal
Commissions, Select Committees and other committees of whose purposes
and terms of reference they did not approve. The Canadian members
replied that a distinction should be made between committees intended to
d raft legislation and committees of investigation such as they understood
the U nited Nations Commission to be. They agreed that the minority
w ould not be compelled to serve on committees to draft legislation, the
purpose of which they disapproved. They added that His Majesty s
Loyal Opposition has the right to criticize the decision of the majonty
but must not carry its opposition to a point of disrupting ■
T h a t is in accordance with the parliamentary tradition that the King
Governm ent must be carried on. , w ; c;,-»n
T he Indian members emphasized that conformity with every decision
taken by the m ajority of United Nations members cannot be made a test
of loyal membership in the United Nations. ; TW wi
A Pakistan member declared that on the issue of reforming the Unite
Nations he favored measures that would diminish the preponderant in-
L e n c e of the great powers and increase the influence of the smaller
nowprs in the U nited Nations. , _j
A Philippine member closed the discussion. Small nations, he ,
knew what it meant to be attacked and sympathized with the victim of
aggression. The Philippines, although a small nation, sent troops to serv
under the U nited Nations flag in Korea because it believed in the
U nited Nations and looked to it to help the Philippines in its hour of
need.
5. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

NA N A R E A which is beset with a variety of socio-economic problems,
I the search for a suitable starting point for their discussion must nseit
present serious difficulties. The countries of South, Southeast and East
Asia all passed through a convulsion during the last war. T h e difference
in their individual experience is in some cases one of degree and in oners
of kind; and in some, as in Southeast Asia, the convulsion h a s survive
the w ar itself. How far the governments of the region—most of them new
— can come to grips w ith their economic problems is still a question
which time alone can answer. The triumph of nationalism m these
A S IA N NA'IIONALISM A N D rHE WES1
countries has little altered the fact that their economies le*n keaviIy
upon their relations with states outside of the region; rather it âS. ^x*
posed the need for more cooperation within the region and for W1 er
recognition of interdependence within it.
The picture of Asia's commercial and financial situation today was
viewed from at least three standpoints: first, as an aftermath of tie
war and its ravages in the area; secondly, as an aggregate of certain tren s
in production and prices, and in the value, volume, composite011' « uec'
tion and terms of trade; and thirdly, as a sequence in the process ot
economic history. To take the last one first, the share of the erstwhile me
tropolitan countries in not only the trade of Asia but in the area’s produc
tion and services like banking has declined as a result of political changes.
Formerly empires were trading regions, not Asia as a c o n tin e n t, nor
sub-regions of it. Coming to the immediate past, the exigencies of V\ orld
W ar II stopped the exchange of all but essential commodities between
the countries of this region and the West. The military governments that
replaced civil ones in Southeast and East Asia had no p a r t i c u l a r solici
tude for the pattern of trade obtaining till then, and imposed their own
in order to get in whatever they wanted and from wherever they could.
I he transition from this state of affairs to the postwar pattern oi trade
was rather violent because the ideas of the successor governments in this
area after 1946 ran on different lines. They saw in the fact of their coming
to power die opportunity consciously to vary the composition of trade
which traditionally was made up of exports of raw materials and food-
s u i t s in return for manufactured articles. Fresh political divisions, like
ie Partition of undivided India, subtracted from both East-West trade
ana intra-Asian trade; what was domestic trade had become foreign trade,
-disinvestment by foreign interests in the region meant in some countries
a breakdown of the machinery of foreign trade, for in them the export-
lmport business was in foreign hands.
A broad quantitative measurement of production and trade illustrates
ne change, besides giving an indication of why the above factors pro
duced different degrees of breakdown of the prewar pattern in different
countries. The importance of foreign trade in the total trade (domestic
and ioreign) varies as between different countries of the region from about
ive per cent m India and China to anywhere between 50 and 80 per cent
in the countries of Southeast Asia. The rise in the total value of foreign
/ % PrTeT
Woar and Postwar is apparent, not real. The value rose
fiom 6.5 billion U.S. dollars in 1938 to 12.2 billion U.S. dollars in 1949,
but United States prices have doubled in the course of this period. Popu-
ation and production have been moving in opposite directions more or
ess to the same extent. Population increased and production decreased
y a out 10 per cent over the period. This is an alarming situation, par
t i c u la r ly w h e n fo o d p ro d u c tio n is s till v e r y f a r fro m satisfa cto ry. T h e re

is u r g e n t n e e d fo r a p o p u la tio n p o lic y i f th is p a r t o f th e w o r ld is n o t to
p r o v id e p r o o f o f th e M a lth u s ia n d o c trin e .
T h e r e is o f co u rse th e k e y fa c to r o f th e re v e rs a l o f th e p re w a r fa v o ra b le
b a la n c e o f tra d e fo r th e a re a . T h e re sp e c tiv e v o lu m e s o f im p o rts a n d ex-
ports have almost exchanged places. Imports have shot up from about
three billion U.S. dollars in 1938 to 6.5 billion m 1949. Even allowing
for price changes, the real increase is substantial in this case. Exports
have increased in absolute value but lagged behind relative to the in
crease in imports. In 1938 they were for the area (in c lu d m S J a P an b u t
excluding China) 3.4 billion U.S. dollars; in 1949 the corresponding
figure was 4.7 billion U.S. dollars. W ith a trade like this, the balance of
payments position must inevitably be regarded as far from satisfactory.
However, there seems to be a tendency for the bulk of the deficits to
concentrate in a few countries. Thus India, Pakistan, Korea and the
Philippines together absorbed most of them. Changes m the directio
and composition of trade have further intensified the ™ bala"“ - ™
the shares of the United Kingdom, as also of the other European me
politan countries, in Asia's trade have no doubt 1"?reasedTSOI”ne' ^ ] ’s* es
U nited States has emerged in a dominant role, eclipsing Japan in Asia
trade. T he terms of trade have also become unfavorable to Asia.
W h i l e th is sta te o f a ffa irs is a r e s u lt o f th e even ts o f the past decade,
h a s n o w b e co m e a lso a c o n d itio n in g fa c to r fo r th e fu tu re o f ‘ n tra-A sia
c o m m e rc ia l r e la tio n s a n d th e re la tio n s o f th e a re a w ith W e s te rn co
trie s T h e p r e w a r p a tte r n h a s u n d e rg o n e fu n d a m e n ta l change. W e a o
y e t k n o w , e x c e p t in p atch es, w h a t th e p o s tw a r p a tte rn is, o r is going to be.
T h e b a sic q u e s tio n t h a t m u s t a rise in a c o n sid e ra tio n o f th e prospect o r
th e d e s ir a b ility o f r e g io n a l self-sufficiency is w h e th e r A sia as a
o r S o u th , S o u th e a s t a n d E ast A sia , can be c a lle d reg io n s a t a ll except m
th e p u r e ly g e o g ra p h ic a l sense. P e rh a p s n o t, th o u g h in p ractice w e hnd
t h a t m a n y c o u n trie s co n tig u o u s o r p ro x im a te to o n e a n o th e r are b eh av
in g as i f th e y c o n s titu te d a re g io n . In d eed , an I n d ia n m em b er o b s e n e a
t h a t t h e i r re g io n a lis m is lit t le m o re th a n a fig m e n t o f statistical im agina
tio n . P o litic a l e n titie s can b e reg io n s— c u ttin g across co n tin en ts. B ut,
e v e n a ssu m in g th a t som e re g io n a lis m is e v id e n t, i t is n o t k n o w n if S o u th
e a s t A s ia o r I n d ia a n d P a k is ta n can p la n in te g ra te d ly . T h e y m ay con
c e iv a b ly seek to b e e c o n o m ic a lly in d e p e n d e n t in fu tu re .
H o w e v e r, w h e th e r o r n o t re g io n a lis m is a m y th , th e m ore concrete
a sp ect o f th e p o s tw a r A s ia n ec o n o m ic s itu a tio n to d a y is th a t o f self-sup
p o r t a n d self-sufficiency. T h e p o s sib ility , th e d e s ira b ility a n d the fact o
self-su ffic ie n c y a re th re e d iffe re n t, th o u g h n o t u n re la te d , questions. K e a
self-su fficien cy c a n p e rh a p s b e r u le d o u t as u n a tta in a b le . T h e id ea ltse lt
is re tro g re s s iv e , e v e n i f circu m stan c es le a v e n o o th e r choice. T o give o n ly
one example of its logical inconsistency, self-sufficiency cannot come

about without an initial flow of capital, and such a flow rules out self-
sufficiency by definition. A t the other extreme, though the concept is
currently discredited in certain quarters, multilateralism still remains a
worthwhile objective to strive for. In between comes the desirability of
some degree of intra-regional and national self-sufficiency in Asia and the
fact that the trend is there whether or not we like it. It is too much to
expect that the under-developed economies of Asia should wait in
definitely, handicapped by shortage of exchange and private foreign
investment, instead of making a beginning with self-support. Self-suffi
ciency in Asia is a stage in the process of transition from the old “colonial”
or semi-colonial economy to the new national economy. The trend is not
strictly postwar; it was there for some years preceding the war. Also, what
actually is diversification for achieving stability may outwardly seem to
be self-sufficiency. Asian countries realize, however, that diversification
implies more trade both within and outside the region. As a matter of fact,
many under-developed countries do not hesitate to depend upon con-
WT?ai aC*VerSe tr?ê balances in order to build up diversified economies.
ether they wish to run this adverse balance with Western countries
or with Asian neighbors is sometimes a matter of political preference.
*rom such considerations the consensus in the Round Table seemed to
e t at the trend towards self-sufficiency and diversification is continuing,
an m certain circumstances may even be desirable. Economic develop-
ment may proceed consistently with limited diversification and trade,
e basic feature of the commercial relations between Asia and the
es e ore the war was the more or less stable trading among India and
ou least sia, Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The deficits, in
payment or goods and services, of one area were met, under a system of
J;!!L COnV \ty ° f currencies, with the surpluses of the next, and the
hniKP Wf , ComP ^ te‘ ^ le United Kingdom was the center and clearing
° f 1S tra c- Reduced production and export capacity as a conse-
P • • ° 1 e war’ ancl heavy foreign indebtedness, have compelled
°i °ease to suck a center. The United States is obviously the
rnm*> ' nCW ce.n ter t*le postwar trading pattern, but is yet to be-
tn h t/16 m Practlc^' however, it is not as if the U nited Kingdom chose
o be the center of the old pattern and the United States refuses to be so.
reason or t e■ ifference in their roles partly is historical and partly
K?naHnU ° Kre Cllfferences in their respective economies. The United
. I rn is o ige to import raw materials for her industries and food-
is thprJfr*r*»mUC1 ®Tea^ r ^xtent than the United States. Its export need
■ , . correspon ingly greater. Moreover, Britain became the center
of fh G nm<rte 1 century when the relative development of other areas
Of the world was l.m.ted, On the other hand, the United States economy
is broader, is highly developed both industrially and agriculturally and is

therefore more self-sufficient. T hat country has not the same economic
need to buy as much as it sells.
T here is another economic fact which prevents the United States from
buying as much as it sells. In fact, the United States is insisting that the
M arshall Plan countries of Europe should try to export more to it; but
owing to their high cost of production, European products find it ex
trem ely difficult to compete with American products in the American
market. This handicap is even heavier for Asian products. Further, the
developm ent of synthetics in the United States is an especial handicap
to Asian exporters. For a number of reasons paper substitutes are reduc
ing sales of jute goods; synthetic rubber competes with natural rubber,
and nylon w ith silk. It was suggested that there are two fields in which
Asian countries may earn more dollars as some contribution to a freer
flow of trade between the Western Hemisphere and Asian countries.
These are tourism and handicrafts. Yet it cannot be ignored, an American
member pointed out, that large consumption of dollars in Asia, and conse
quently Asia's adverse trade with the dollar area, arose from the fact that
A sia’s production for internal consumption is very low, rather than from
the fact that Asian products cannot readily be sold in the American
market. The United States taxpayer cannot indefinitely pay to meet the
difference between production and consumption in the rest of the world.
In any case, it seems obvious that trade both within and outside the
countries of Asia must be subject to some degree of planning. No new
varian t of the prewar trading pattern can be expected under present con
ditions to emerge spontaneously. Of course, a flow of dollar capital into
the area would help restore multilateralism, but at the moment such a
flow is only a hope. Nor are the prospects of the new pattern encouraged
by the competitive rather than the complementary character of intra-
Asian trade, the vast distances that separate the countries of this region,
and the paucity of Reliable statistics. The area needs imports of pro
ducers’ goods, and the manufacture of these within the region will have
to be encouraged, not forever but for the transitional stage of industriali
zation. Secondly, for similar reasons, the new nations of Asia may have to
evolve their individual patterns of trade with European countries, pend
ing an adequate flow of dollar capital. The planning of the new pattern
of trade may also imply the planning of productive structures or the en
suring of more coordination in economic development. There is need
to rationalize and eliminate useless competition between units within the
same country and between countries of an area. Last but not least, an
Indian member emphasized that the means of achieving self-sufficiency
are no less im portant than die end. He suggested that the Gandhian ap
proach may make economic conflict unnecessary for organizing self-sup

port.
Tw o particular problems of trade within Asia that came up for discus
sion were the role of the Japanese economy and Indo-Pakistan trade
relations. A Japanese member assured the Round Table that Japan has
no intention of dominating the Asian market. Japan is also opposed to
self-sufficiency lest that degenerate into isolation. But from the viewpoint
of other countries in the region vis-a-vis their future trade in the area,
not all of them would like to see a full-scale resumption of Japanese
industrial activity. Some Asian countries, like India, are apprehensive of
the effect of Japanese recovery on their export industries. But Japanese
trade, if well directed and controlled, may bring benefits to the region.
In any case, Japan must recover in due course, and possibly regional plan
ning and the judicious use of controls may to an extent neutralize the
potential threats of Japanese economic recovery.
In the m atter of Pakistan’s trade relations w ith the West, a Pakistan
member said that the prevailing sentiment in his country was against
granting Commonwealth preferences, for the extent of Pakistan’s exports
that w ill benefit by such concessions is, according to the member, barely
four per cent of its total exports, while the volume of imports affected by
the concessions which Pakistan grants in return is as much as 50 per cent
of the total. Other members proceeded to say that to this disadvantage
was at present added the virtual stoppage of normal Indo-Pakistan trade,
a stoppage which hinges on the controversial deadlock over the non
devaluation of its rupee by Pakistan. The stalemate is not helped by the
line taken by the International Monetary Fund, which so far has failed
to resolve the question of the exchange parity of Pakistan’s currency. It
is also true that Pakistan did not expect that the consequences of non
devaluation would be the virtual stoppage of trade with India. But both
countries seem to be playing a waiting game. W h ile the stalemate was
not perhaps foreseen before its development, the unimaginativeness and
lack of foresight of both governments are responsible’for its persistence.
Notwithstanding the vagueness of the regional idea, the Far East and
the U.S.S.R. in Asia seem to be a region in the political sense, from which
certain commercial consequences may reasonably be expected to flow.
Russian interest in the Far East is not new, nor superimposed on the old,
but a continuation, with variations according to circumstances, of a
contact that has been there since Tsarist days. Currently it is the building
up of an economic sphere of influence without territorial acquisition. It
is conceivable that in the long run Russia may become an exporter to
Asia in two ways. First, by virtue of the low-quality light products which
she produces and which are suited to Asian markets, and secondly by
encouraging certain countries of Eastern Europe like Czechoslovakia to
export to countries like India and Pakistan the sort of heavy equipment
w hich they produce and which the latter need. A trade directly comple
m entary in character between Russia and die Far East and Southeast Asia
is not likely because Russian production still does not have enough ma
chinery or tools for export. But Russia is interested in the strategic raw
m aterials that Southeast Asia can offer. In China it is uncertain to what
extent Russia would be able to undertake industrialization under the
terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. The nature of joint enterprise
between them is also unclear. In any case comparisons based on Western
jo in t enterprises in the Middle East, for example, are wide of the mark.
It is possible that Russia w ill pass on to China the dismantled equipment
which it has received from ex-enemy countries, in which case both its
investments and its good intentions in China become dubious. On the
other hand, it is also possible that the dividends which Russia expects on
its Chinese investments may prove less economic than political. Similarly,
the Russian view of future Japanese trade in the region may be political
rath er than economic.
Probable trends of future trade apart, trade barriers are imposing their
special burdens on Asian trade. These come under both exchange and
trade controls, and tariffs. The scarce resources of foreign exchange and
the necessity to ration them between competing requirements in the
deficit countries of Asia is the main justification for the continuance of
exchange and trade controls and tariffs. This may have some deterrent
effect on the flow of international capital. But the effect of lifting ex
change controls would almost certainly be chaos rather than the availa
b ility of more capital for Asia. In regard to the tariff problem, Asian
countries are in some respects differently placed than Western indus
trialized nations. The revenue tariff plays a far larger part in the budget-
making of Asian countries, where low capital formation imposes absolute
limits to levels of direct taxation. Protective duties similarly occupy a
more im portant place, as indigenous industry needs to be developed.
T raditionally, such considerations have meant special arrangements be
tween many Asian countries and their erstwhile metropolitan powers.
T he same special characteristic prompts them to seek bilateral tariff ar
rangements rather than to subscribe to such stipulations as the uncon
ditional most-favored-nation treatment. Moreover, in die immediate
period ahead, the main need for some of them, like India and Pakistan, is
to operate their tariff policies with a view to promoting the flow of an
accumulated sterling balance. However, these considerations need not in
themselves prevent Asian countries from ratifying the Charter of the
International Trade Organization, or hinder participation in such ar
rangements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The former
especially has enough provisions to safeguard the legitimate interests of

under-developed countries.
Increase in industrial efficiency and improvement of social conditions
are two important aspects of the economy of Asian countries for the step
ping up of their production. Production depends not merely on skilled
and properly trained workers: efficiency and the capacity to produce de
pend on nutrition, housing and amenities which the worker enjoys. It
seemed from the brief discussion of this subject that labor efficiency was
often looked upon, in India at any rate, as mainly resting on industrial
peace, and not so much as being impaired by such factors as the wage-price
spiral, absenteeism and malingering. The maintenance of industrial
peace, however, is not helped by the unfortunate tendency ot the Gov
ernment of India to choose from among several labor federations in the
country in bestowing its patronage. Conditions of employment, rights of
combination and welfare provisions are indisjênsable factors in building
up contented workers and furthering efficiency and production. As to
social conditions, one of the most deplorable lapses in Asian countries
in general is housing. Housing has received attention from some govern
ments and employers, but generally it enters the calculations of either
government or industry too little.
There are limitations to the possible progress in social improvement.
As in the case of purely economic development, much of the effort in the
development of social services and in such fields as prim ary education
must come from governments; but voluntary effort is of much im
portance in many fields, particularly where governments have only limited
resouices. A British member observed that the individual and the small
community must learn to do more for themselves. A n Indian member
pointed out that voluntary effort in his country is genuine though, more
o ten than not, either ineffective or too little. Such effort, on the basis
o experiments conducted so far, has had the salutary effect of spurring
ocal communities to action. It has blazed a trail for governments to fol-
ow. Much is being done in the field of rural development. The training
o village leaders and headmen in Ceylon for organizing villagers to cut
roa s by voluntary effort, the youth movement of Korea which put in
wor on five different kinds of projects, the voluntary village work going
on in Saurashtra, as in other places in India, are but examples. Yet, im
portant as all these may be, they are inadequate and only governments
can make good the leeway. Their social programs should be interlinked
and priorities determined in preventive medicine, housing, medical serv
ice, education, and labor training.
V oluntary effort for expanding agricultural production in Asia is
sim ilarly indispensable. R ural savings schemes in India are capable of
extension, but are unrelated to the needs and spending habits of the
agricultural classes. There is room for much extension of cooperation in

ru ra l areas.
In industry assimilation of science and new processes is poor. Obso
lescence of facilities for industrial research has caused leakage of scientific
man power.
T h e theme emerging from the discussion of the possibilities of economic
and social development in Asia with the assistance of the United Nations
and the specialized agencies was that, though they had all done good
w ork in their own way, their practical utility was circumscribed. Be
cause of the expensive nature of their work, governments may probably
show too little disposition to make the agencies more effective. The
lim itations and inadequacies of these bodies were confirmed as the Round
T ab le proceeded to examine the divergences of the regional as well as
the functional commissions of the United Nations. The Economic Com
mission for Asia and the Far East cannot by its terms of reference perform
operating functions, but advises and assists governments in a variety of
ways, including studies of local natural and financial resources and
facilities for training technicians. The work of the International Labour
Organization is important. But it was remarked by an Indian member
that both the ECAFE and the International Labour Organization tend
to rely too much on information supplied by governments, which may
sometimes be too optimistic or one-sided. UNESCO is making plans in
the field of fundamental education. There has already been some suc
cessful work in adult and community education.
As more and more people become concerned about the future utility
of the U nited Nations and the specialized agencies, the question that is
im m ediately pressing upon them is how far these are equipped to dis
burse funds that may become available to them in future. It is particu
larly im portant for the U nited States to know the answer to a question
like this, for the United States is being told that aid to Asia is urgent and
at the same time that it is not desirable to give it direct lest that prove a
form of “imperialism-.” This raised a whole series of questions, such as
w hether or not the U nited States intended to export capital at all under
either private or governmental auspices; whether an inter-governmental
body in Asia itself would not be better suited to disburse funds; and
w hether some sort of a supra-national authority to plan the industries
concerned for their productive and distributive activities in the aid-
receiving countries is not the real need. On the first of these it was pointed
out, particularly by Indian members, that to ask for the aims, the
methods and the existing resources of prospective recipients of funds is
to put the cart before the horse. A fter all, Asian countries are not a closed
book. It is well known that much of the economic development of this
area is development of natural resources and basic industries. A good
412 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AN D T H E W E ST
part of it would have to be carried through under State enterprise, as

private enterprise is hardly equal to the task. It is no doubt true that
over big regions there must be agreement between neighboring coun
tries on the investment-output ratio, as otherwise aid to an industry in
one country may depress a similar industry in a neighboring country,
even though the demand for the products of a region like Southeast Asia
are potentially enormous. It is therefore for the lending countries to make
up their minds if they w ill give and how much. Once that were known,
the receiving countries would make up theirs.
A ll the same, the dangers of loose thinking in the prospective aid-re
ceiving countries cannot be minimized. But by an insistence on the details
of a project, by making funds available only as the project goes along and
by strict supervision, these can be counteracted (as has also been eluci
dated in the report of Round Table B).
A different set of problems is presented by the ability of receiving
countries to assimilate the capital if and when it is given. No less serious
is the problem of assimilating foreign technical assistance. Previous ex
perience and knowledge are sometimes lacking in handling technical
assistance in receiving countries. Technical training for such work as
quick and correct erection of plants is urgent if machinery is not to lie
rusting at quaysides. Huge sums in the form of loans or direct private
investment would either intensify existing inflationary situations or
create new ones in the receiving countries. There is real danger that the
economies of receiving countries w ill be disrupted unless the whole proc
ess of foreign capital investment is controlled. That, incidentally, pro
vides ample justification for a proper system of intelligent controls in
under-developed economies.
&
6. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
Pattern of Trade
h e f ir s t question considered by the Round Table was that of
T changes in the pattern of trade of the countries in the Southeast

Asian and the Far Eastern regions during and since the war. It was
observed that the prewar pattern of m ultilateral trade had given place to
bilateral arrangements and that there were large import surpluses giv
ing rise to large deficits in the balance of payments of these countries.
These deficits were being met by extraordinary payments and receipts.
T h e fa ll in exports and increase in imports as well as the diversion in

die direction of trade were attributed to a variety of factors, which were
present, in varying degrees, in the countries of the region. The factors
m entioned were the following: (a) w ar devastation, leading to a fall in
production and in exports; (b) imports of capital equipment through
extraordinary payments; (c) internal disturbances, as in Burma and In
donesia; (d) increase in the population and so in demand for food, etc.;
(e) growth of synthetic products like nylon and rubber which adversely
affected exports of silk and natural rubber; (f) difficulty of securing goods
from European countries, leading to greater dependence on the United
States.
Self-Sufficiency
D uring the course of this discussion it was pointed out that preoccupa
tion w ith the problem of balance of payments often led people to think
in terms of self-sufficiency, which was contrary to the expansion of
prosperity all round. Some members expressed the view that it was in the
interests of all concerned tiiat there should be international division of
labor along natural lines and that the policy of self-sufficiency was
fraught w ith the danger that an uneconomic diversion of resources would
be brought about. Against this view, an Indian member contended that,
ap art from m ilitary and strategic considerations which led even the
highly-developed countries like the United States to achieve self-suffi
ciency in certain lines by a program of stock-piling, Eastern countries
w orked upon the principle of self-sufficiency as a means of bringing
about the development of resources which had long been neglected. But
there was no reason to believe that such a policy on the part of these
countries would necessarily reduce the total volume of international
trade. Perhaps it was not proper to use the word self-sufficiency in that
context. T his view was elaborated by a member who drew the attention
of the Round T able to the abnormal instability of the economies of these
countries on account'of their dependence on the export of a few primary
products to the markets of tlie world. The need for a diversification of
their economy was urgent, and national aspirations would not be satis
fied unless it was met by industrial development. It would be possible for
these countries to continue to follow the old pattern only if their stand
ard of living were made independent of their resources and a higher
living standard were guaranteed them.
W h ile not suggesting that the standard of life of the people of these
Eastern countries should remain what it is, a Japanese member thought
th at self-sufficiency could be a feasible proposition only in the case of
large areas like those of the United States, the U.S.S.R. or the Common
A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M A N D T H E W E ST
414
wealth. The attempt of Japan, which had tried to achieve self-sufficiency

through an aggressive expansion of its territories, had ended in complete
failure and showed that self-sufficiency was bad for an industrially-ad
vanced country as well. It would be to the advantage of both the under
developed and the advanced countries if they cooperated on the basis of
division of labor. In answer to this remark, an Indian member pointed
out how the present economy in the underdeveloped countries was not
based on the economic principle of division of labor but on the policies
of metropolitan territories which were politically dominant in the colo
nial areas, and how a perpetuation of the present pattern was impossible
in the face of the political independence attained by many of these coun
tries. The only way of increasing world prosperity was therefore to assist
these territories in their task of reconstruction.
Future Pattern of Trade

It was emphasized during the course of the discussion that the develop
ment of the underdeveloped economies of the East would not result in
loss of trade with them. But the pattern of trade would certainly change.
How exactly the pattern altered was dependent on the nature of the de
velopment plans and the order of priorities adopted by the various
countries. But it appeared certain that an increase of food, textiles and
other consumers’ goods would be aimed at in the first instance.
The composition of imports would naturally change and there would
be a greater emphasis on machinery and goods of a higher quality. To
that extent the Western countries would have to readjust their economies,
which would involve a certain amount of hardship in the transitional
period. But this burden was inescapable in the nature of things.
The Round Table was apprised of the fact that there was no definite
ness about the plans of development drawn up by some of the countries
in the region, but Indian experience during the last twenty years or so
pointed to certain conclusions which might as well''serve as an indication
of what was to come. Those conclusions could be briefly summarized as
follows: (1) industrialization was to be gradual; (2) there was to be a
preference, in the initial stages, for light consumers’ goods industries; (3)
the scope of development would be limited by local resources, labor
power and markets; (4) there would be no tendency towards autarky, and
hence foreign trade would not be jeopardized.
It was also brought out in the course of the discussion that the South
east Asian and Far Eastern region occupied a comparatively unimportant
place in total world trade, its share being only eight per cent in 1949,
though the percentage was as high as 15 per cent before the war.
S U M M A R IE S O F LUCKN O W CO N FEREN CE D IS C U S S IO N S 4 15
Economic Relations with U.S.S.R.

T h e Round T able then considered the question of economic relations
w ith the Soviet Union. It was pointed out that the Soviet Union had a
state m onopoly of foreign trade and that its trade policy, and indeed its
policy in all economic matters, was linked up with its political policies.
In the case of underdeveloped areas within its territories such as Central
Asia and Siberia—which had really been colonies in Tsarist times—the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union appeared to be to bring about the
developm ent of the resources of those areas. Russia had had her own
problems of capital accumulation. A t first an attempt was made to in
duce foreign capital by a policy of concessions, but high taxation and
labor regulations frustrated it. The policy of forced savings was then
tried. Later the system of technical aid contracts was introduced, and big
firms from the West set up plants and trained personnel. In Eastern
Europe, Russia was using economic means to control the policies of the
Communist countries. As an example, it was mentioned that Polish coal
was shipped to Russia under an agreement, only to be reshipped to
Sweden at a higher price, the difference going to Russia and not to Po
land.
As regards the Sino-Soviet agreement, a member who had studied the
question expressed the view that, while he would not call it an example
of imperialism in the old sense, it was a highly developed system for the
extension of power. U nder the agreement, China was to provide the land
and buildings, while Russia was to provide the capital equipment and
technical assistance. The loan which was to be received by China over a
period of five years was to be repaid in 10 years in terms of raw materials,
tea, etc. It was pointed out that underdeveloped areas were considered by
Russia to be very im portant in the strategy of the Communist revolution.
T h e im perialist countries had to be separated from these sources of their
raw materials. T he nationalist movements in Asia were, it was suggested,
being exploited by Russia for this purpose. The Sino-Soviet front was
the first step in tying the economy of China to that of Russia.
A t this stage the question of the ability of the Soviet Union to pro
vide capital aid was raised by a member. In the discussion that followed it
was pointed out that the U.S.S.R. had expressed its willingness to export
capital equipm ent for the development of the petroleum industry in
Iran. In the case of Eastern European countries, Soviet practice appeared
to be to bring into existence a development corporation jointly with the
country concerned, the Soviet contribution to die capital being the Ger
man assets she had received as her share of reparations. Another member
suggested that the capacity of Russia to provide capital aid was not to be
considered on the same level as, say, tlie capacity of the United States,
416 A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND THE
because if the Soviet Union regarded an investment in a n ° ^ er ?

to be more useful to it politically than the same investment at ^ ^
would make the investment in another country even at the sacrilC
higher return at home. Russia probably could provide some capita ' . ^
the amount required by China would not be very large. The expe^ a
of the Chinese, who have just come out of civil war, were proba y
very difficult to satisfy. _ vould
T h e g en eral vie w , h o w ever, a p p ea red to be th a t the S o v ie t U n io n ^
n o t be in a p o s itio n to p ro v id e m u ch c a p ita l assistance. B u t th e om
m u n ist te ch n iq u e m ig h t re su lt in a fa n a tic a l d e te rm in a tio n o n th e p<
o f co u n tries u n d e r C o m m u n ist d o m in a tio n to create c a p ita l a t a great
sacrifice o f p re se n t co n su m p tio n .
A Japanese member laid special emphasis on the effects of the ino
Soviet agreement on the Japanese economy. In the first place, ■^'US.^!a , 1f
agreed to send to China machinery which could have been provide y
Japan, and secondly, Chinese industrialization was likely to result in the
production of war materials, thus endangering the security of Japan.
Japan was passing through difficult times, her industries were not hemg
allowed to function as before, her population had increased, and the
Chinese situation was an additional burden. Earlier, a Japanese member
had pleaded for the resumption by Japan of the production of manufac
tured goods and machinery for export to the other countries of the region.
International Agencies
The role of international agencies in bringing about the development
of the countries of the region was next considered. Descriptive accounts
were given of the working of the regional and functional agencies of the
United Nations like ECAFE, WHO, UNESCO and UNICEF, by members
who were closely associated with their work. In the course of these state
ments, it became clear that (1) Southeast Asia did.jiot mean exactly the
same region to each of these agencies, (2) there was considerable room for
improvement in the way of coordinating the activities of these agencies,
( ) tIle impression that, relative to the size, population and needs of the
area, the United Nations had not paid as much attention to it as it might
have, was not incorrect. Doubts were expressed as to the extent of effec
tive aid from these agencies, though the work that they were doing was
acknowledged to be quite valuable in its own way. The fact that agencies
like ECAFE had neither the power nor the finance to solve the problems
ot the area or even to ensure cooperation between its governments was
mentioned as a reason for refraining from excessive expectations of effec
tive assistance from such organizations.
A s regards the International Monetary Fund, it was pointed out that

this agency was designed to operate under “normal” conditions. So long
as conditions are abnormal, as they still were, this agency necessarily falls
in the background. Though the International Bank had given loans for
capital development to die tune of some $700 million, its activities, based
as diey were on the principle of earning and production return, would
necessarily remain restricted in the prevailing situation of uncertainty
and instability. In the immediate future, therefore, assistance could in the
m ain come either on a government-to-government basis or by way of
private investment.
T here was a sharp division of opinion as to the extent to which these
two sources of capital assistance would be available to die underdeveloped
countries of the East. One view was that since even the International
Bank had to withdraw to the background because of die prevailing in
security, it was too much to expect that private capital would come for
w ard to fill the breach. On the other hand, there was the view that
government-to-government aid was even more difficult than private in
vestment because of the difficulty of convincing the taxpayers that it was
to their interest to support the government in giving such assistance. The
question was discussed particularly with reference to aid from the United
States, as there was general agreement that it was die only country
w hich could furnish capital assistance on any large scale.
U nited States A id
Explaining the position of the United States, an American member
pointed out that large-scale aid similar to the Marshall Aid in Europe
was possible only on the basis of a conviction in the American mind that
th at was the only way of dealing with an emergency situation created by
the wartim e devastation of their economies. Such aid had, in addition,
political implications which had to be clearly understood. Unless it
could be shown to the American peoj^le that aid to Asia was a part of a
plan fo r meeting an emergency involving the safety of American interests,
the only way of granting aid was through private channels of investment.
In the long run, capital must be thought of in terms of “investment” and
not of “grants.” Business investment would carry with it the technical
know-how which was indispensable to the success of development projects
in the East. It was also emphasized that economic action, to be efFective,
was very closely bound up with political conditions. The private investor
must be convinced that his investment would be safe and secure.
E xplaining the point of view of the underdeveloped countries, an
Indian member pointed out diat there was a general resistance to the
acceptance of aid w ith political conditions attached to it. The newly freed
countries of Southeast Asia desired to m aintain freedom of action in any

situation and, therefore, freedom from entanglement with any power
bloc. Secondly, it was emphasized that there was no general hostility to
accepting foreign aid as such. Thirdly, it was agreed that the United
States should not insist on the governments of the receiving countries
maintaining the framework of private enterprise in their economies. In
dian experience of private enterprise in recent years had not been such
as to inspire confidence. Fourthly, it was suggested that the responsibility
of the U nited States in supplying capital aid to these countries flowed
from the fact of the indivisibility of prosperity rather than from con
siderations of strategy or emergency.
There was an interesting discussion on the two viewpoints, in the
course of which (a) the relative merits of free enterprise and govern
mental activity, (b) the nature of the development plans and the scope
they offered for private enterprise, and (c) the need for producing goods
within the buying capacity of the peoples of this region, were considered.
It was clear that the problem of the institutional mechanism of economic
development could not be posed simply as one of free enterprise versus
governmental activity. Even in the United Slates, government participa
tion had considerably increased and showed no signs of decline. Secondly,
if development projects included the spread of education, health services,
irrigation, communications, etc., they had to be undertaken by govern
ments and not by private enterprise. Besides, the rate of profit necessary
to attract private foreign capital to these countries would be anywhere
between 15 and 30 per cent and would severely lim it the field of private
enterprise. T hiidly, the question was not merely that of producing goods
within the buying capacity of die underdeveloped countries but one
prim arily of laising their income levels. It was also made clear that
merican opinion on these questions was undergoing a steady but sure
ciange. File adoption of Lend-Lease during the second world war had
represente a basic change in America’s attitude to foreign aid from the
W ar I P yGd in connection with the war-debt payments of W orld
Ih e question was raised as to how far India’s policy of neutrality was

compati e wit i her desire to secure American aid. In the discussion that
0 owe t e o owing points were made by an Indian member: (1) I n d ia
1 not w isi t e abrogation of its responsibilities under the United Na
tions cia ite r, ( ) India desired to keep clear of power blocs and inter-
nationa commitments which came in the way of tackling urgent economic
pro ems, ( ) nc ia desired world peace and would like to use its moral
strength m its support; (4) neutrality was an expression of these desires
and aspirations and did not mean any hostility to the United States; and
S U M M A R IE S O F L U C K N O W C O N F E R E N C E D IS C U S S IO N S 419
(5) the economic development of the country could not be made a matter
of bargaining over her foreign policy.
Broadly speaking, the same arguments were put forward for other coun
tries in Asia. The Pakistan member pointed out that, in view of the
geographical position of Pakistan, neutrality was the best possible policy
fo r his country.
A n American member expressed the view that the emphasis of United
States opinion was mainly on collective security and cooperation in the
attainm ent of a common objective and not so much on tying the Asian
countries to American foreign policy. Perhaps the concept of power blocs
was not quite appropriate in the context of collective security.
A U nited Kingdom member argued that the threat of Communism in
Asia was of even more importance to Asians than to Americans. To the
U nited States, a Communist success in India or Burma or Pakistan would
be a strategic inconvenience; to the peoples of these countries it would
be a disaster. United States strategic interests did not require tlie coun
tries of Asia actually to fight on the American side. Most of them were so
weak that in a m ajor war they might well be liabilities rather than assets.
Asia and the United States were both interested in the preservation of the
free democratic system in the countries of Asia.
Specific Problems of the Countries of the Region

T he Round Table then went on to consider the problem of economic
development in certain countries. The following views were expressed:
Indo China. Industries were to be developed with reference to local
resources and needs. Hydro-electric schemes were to be undertaken for
providing cheap power to the countryside. The evil consequences of in
dustrialization could be avoided if progress was achieved by stages over a
period of time so that the population had time to adjust to the new
conditions.
M a la y a . Small holders were to be settled on a secure tenure and assured
of a fair deal against the present dominance of the estate owners. Some
diversification might be possible within the economy.
Burma. Foreign capital without political strings attached to it was
welcome. The policy of nationalization of land and transport was de
signed to increase production. British oil companies were trying to drive
a hard bargain over concessions, but a compromise settlement was soon
expected.
Philippines. American aid by way of loans was expected. Short-term
plans for producing consumer goods and long-term plans for such projects
as hydro-electric power plants were contemplated with the use of capital,
partly local and partly American.
A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E W E ST
420
Pakistan. Foreign aid w ithout political conditions was welcome. Indus

tries like sugar, paper, glass, cotton textiles and jute were to be developed.
Hydro-electric power projects could also be pushed ahead.
Indonesia. The country had not yet made up its m ind on these ques
tions and was in no h u rry to do so. It had been freed only a few months
ago and would take some time to form ulate its plans.
Point Four
T he question of the capacity of the countries in the region to absorb
foreign capital was next considered. The provision of technical aid under
Point Four was considered to be a step in the direction of increasing this
capacity. It was emphasized that experience in China had shown the
importance of such aid, and it would be incorrect to underestimate the
provision that could be made under this head on the ground that, unless
it was accompanied by the necessary capital equipment, it was of no use.
In the course of the discussion it was observed by an Indian member
that the problem was often considered in the context of too narrow a
definition of capital. Capital need not always mean capital equipment.
It might also mean the consumer goods w ith which to sustain a popula
tion which was itself producing the capital equipment. In th e construction
o£ dams in India, lor instance, capital assistance w ould largely take the
form of consumer goods and simple tools and perhaps raw materials. T he
use of complicated equipment was not needed in such a case. T he capacity
to absorb capital in this sense, for projects of the above type, was quite
large in India and it would be to the advantage of India if such assistance
were forthcoming. If this were not realized and if foreign aid was adjusted
only to the capacity to absorb capital equipment in the narrow sense, the
situation would not improve appreciably. T he statement of an American
member that the U nited States had accepted the responsibility for provid
ing technical assistance to the underdeveloped countries of the East was
warm ly welcomed by the Indian member. °
Arising out of the same question of capacity, it was suggested by some
members that the plans of development had better be kept to simple
things at first. A reference was made to the projects of Commonwealth
aid as contemplated at the Colombo Conference. Some of the proposals
under this head were at the time still vague and nothing definite
coulcl be said about their influence on the countries included in their
scope. T he amount of £8 m illion announced already, and of £15 m il
lion likely to be forthcoming in the near future, would hardly suffice
to provide any real measure of assistance to these countries. It was men
tioned that the scheme of Commonwealth aid was the result of pressure
exerted m ainly by Britain and Australia, though the latter country’s
421
S U M M A R IE S OF LUCK N O W C O N F E R E N C E D .S C U S S I O N S
interesLs in the scheme and its g ^ t h ot population

A n oth er question raised was as «^ “ J es as took place as a
w ould not outdistance such imp q£ the quesu011 was recog-
r e s u lt o f th e d e v e lo p m e n t p la n s . r % f d a re a d y so lu tio n to the
nized, but the R ound T able was meraber, the situation was
problem . In the view o£ a U m “ d J made out to be, because the rate
not quite as hopeless as it was som m ected to be higher than the
o£ grow th o£ national income could be ^ investment was
r a t e o£ g r o w t h o f p o p u la tio n , p
m ade.
Cooperation a m o n g Eastern C ountnes n g th e E a s te r n c o u n tr ie s
T h e question o£ d « ° £ were e * I « « e d . fact ‘that all

^ o n was ^ ^ f £
the countries in the ^ “" ^ d i n e d to take a " ^ ithin the

countries o u tsid e .O t iei mjes 0 f the several c , ^ on tlie solu-
basis o f the specialize^that sUCji coopera“ 0“ ^ iiUict between the
re g io n . I t w a s a ls o su g g sUCji as, fo r e x a m p le CT(TPStion w as n o t gen‘
tion ot political dilhcu LlGb' i ndochina. But the ^ lg° eration was con-
V ie t M inh and V iet ^ am problem oi economic P obsiac\e, tt
erally acceptable because the p w ^ seUmg. The rta ^
sidered to be prim arily on ^ ^ goOCis to be oug ^ c h q£ ^
was pointed out, was t i e < Japan■co*\ mer goods as well
O n e J a p a n e s e m e m b e r in c h c a t^ a n d fo r c o n su m e ^ g q ^ such
needs of the area both fo u was obsene , ^ assistaXlCe
as fo r technical assis^ Reference was made to th
assistance as she could. Burma. _ Borneo for settlemen
given by India to In on lated territories i ' 00peration, but
T h e opening of ^ de^ . ° X U y of intra-reponal co P ^ people
was also considered * P °“ £ ^ d by the neo^ in any
scope £or such m e a s u r e s was 1 ® ^ chinese laboi
to adm it outside laboi production s
gi'eat num bers. j <j a plan for r aj“ million tons to
T h e Pakistan g°vernm " We surplus of halt a ^ q£ rfiU ng he
present e x P £ W ^ t five years as a m eans^ menlber that
to increase its }
and a h a lf m illion tons in ^ ^ asserted by devalue her cur Y
food shortage o£ the reg , decision n , j ; a’s dollar ea
India's refusal to accep h countries I n d « jute
was causing great hardship m w buy ^ pakistan. It
have gone lo fv n because o fjr e r ^ ^ m alket
stocks are creating a 1
was strange fo r In d ia to get h e r food supplies from die U nited States and
A u stralia, w hen food is availab le from h er next-door neighbor. It was
eq u a lly uneconom ic fo r Pakistan to im p o rt h er coal requirem ents from
P oland and France instead o f from India.
A n In d ian m em ber indicated th at the m atter was one fo r agreem ent
between the two governm ents and hoped th at an agreem ent w ould soon
be reached.
T h e difference betw een regional cooperation u n d er a C om m unist
system and th at u n d er a capitalist system was brou gh t ou t by a m em ber
w ho pointed ou t th at the Communists claim ed th at they p ro vid ed a
socially effective p arty fo r carrying out policies; and between such parties
there w ou ld exist cooperation as a m atter of course. T h o u gh the condi
tions m ight n ot always be fulfilled, still by and large the p rob lem w ould
be easier. A m em ber suggested th at the on ly answer to Com m unism was
an im provem ent o f conditions on a continuing basis, and th at m eant
continuous cooperation between the non-Com m unist countries. It was
also observed, how ever, th at an im provem ent in livin g conditions m ight
not o f itself necessarily result in b arrin g the fu rth e r spread of Com
munism.
Finally, the problem s o f social and educational developm ent w ith in a
country were touched upon w ith reference to w h at one m em ber called
the resistance to education. T h e general consensus was that, given the
rig h t leadership and a convincing dem onstration o f the benefit o f re
form , educating a trad itio n ally conservative peasant in m odern tech
niques should be possible. It was recognized that the w ill to educate m ust
necessarily come from w ith in the com m unity.
APPENDIX
Conference M em bership
HRIDAY NATH KUNZRU
Chairman of the Conference
CAN AD A H istory, U niversity of

n q4 c 1947^ C hairm an. Professor Canadian Institute o f
“ ' s s . s r s - <— -
P aul B ridle. First Secic 7 Hitrh Commissioner,
\V . F. C h ipm an ( l 042) ^ ; M o n tre a l D a ily Star, ,5ince Chairm an, Ottawa
G eorge V . F ercsuson. L c - Magazine, since 19
B la ir F ra ser . O t t a w a e d i t o i , MncUa ^ ^
B ran ch , C .IX A . p resid en t an d M an ager, b er. House of Com-
H eN R Y R . JACKMAN 0 ^ l % ogressive C o n s e r v a t iv e M e n *
tie s C o r p o ra tio n o f C a . p -m a d ia n In stitu te o f In ter-
mons, since 1940. ^ National Secretary,
D ouglas M ac L ennan ( -c, : on K arachi, Pakistan.
national Affairs, since 1942. dian H ig h Commission,
G. S. M u rra y . T hird Secreta^ 'Utori Ottawa /ourrco^ since ^ Directorof In-
I. N orm an S m it h . A ssociate ^ Professor o f ^ Vancouver
Frederic H. S oward (193-5. q£ Briush Columb
te rn a tio n al S tu d ® ^ ^ v e ^ „ * C. ^ m em ber, Ottawa
B ran ch , an d M em ber, Thc O t t a w a C iU z e ii.
C harles J . W oodsworth. Ed .
C'IX A ' F iM N C B re (Paris) and the

1947’) Professor at tlie P ro b lta e s du
P ierre G ourou (1945,‘ 19 President, ConutL
S - °f " " I 193Q 1947). P ro fessor at
m in istratio n M u su lm an e. ^ (ParIS).
P acifiq u e (P an s)- fcssor 0 £ G eography
C h a r l e s R o b e q u a in (1945). ^ C ou n cil o f W orld
„ (,9 4 5 ), C h a irm a n . "parliament.

H ridav se rv an ts o f In d ia Society. con£cre„ces.
A ffa irs . P r e s id e n t , ^ attendance a t previou. IP *
* Years in parentheses m ic ^
D in k e r D e s a i. Secretary, Bombay Branch, Servants o f In d ia Society; M em ber,

M unicipal Corporation of G reater Bombay.
N a re n d ra D eva. Vice Chancellor, U niversity of Lucknow, Lucknow , India.
D. R . G a d g il. Director, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, since
1930. Chairman, International Programme Com m ittee, IP R , 1950-
B. N. G a n c u li. Professor of International T rade, D elhi School of Economics,
University of D elhi. M ember, Executive Committee, In d ian C ouncil of W orld
Affairs.
A. D. G o r w a la . I.C.S. 1924—47. C hairm an, H yderabad Economy and R eorganiza
tion Committee, Ju ly-S ep tem b er 1950.
K a m ala d e v i C h a tt o p a d h y a y . M ember, Executive Comm ittee, Indian C ouncil of
W orld Affairs. A leader of Socialist Party.
S* V. K o g e k ar. U niversity R eader and H ead of the D epartm ent of Politics, Uni*
versity of Poona.
G. B. K o ta k . Finance M inister, Saurashtra Government, R ajko t, India.
B. K. M a d an . Economic Adviser to the Reserve B ank of India, Bombay.
A. D. M an i. M anaging Editor, The Hitavada, since 1936.
M . R . M a sa n i. M em ber of P arliam ent. C hairm an, UN Sub-Committee on Dis
crim ination and M inorities. A dviser on Industrial & P ublic R elatio ns to T a ta
Industries, Ltd.
A so k a M e h t a . G eneral Secretary, Socialist Party, India.
C. A. M e h t a . Director, K am ani Brothers Ltd., Bombay. M em ber, C entral Em
ploym ent Advisory Comm ittee, Government of India, since 1947.
M . M u je e b . Offg. Vice Chancellor, Ja m ia M illia Islam ia, D elhi.
V. K. R . V. R a o . Director, D elhi School of Economics, D elhi U niversity, D elhi
N ih a r -R a n ja n R a y . B agisvari Professor of Indian A rt and C ulture, C alcutta U n i
versity.
K r is h n a la l S h r id h r a n i (1939). A uthor and journalist. A uthor:
America. My India J My
S ir S h ri R am . Industrialist. Director of several business concerns and banks in

cluding Reserve B ank of India. ’
H . V e n k a ta su b b ia h . D elhi Editor, Indian Finance (C alcutta).
IndianSecretariat
tZtDr AI‘
A 'hHouse, C onnaught SeT , ta^7 GerNew
Place, a1' Delhi.
Indian CoUncil o£ W ° rld A ffair* Kashi
ARJUN A r o r a , Secretary, Kanpur Branch, LC.W .A.
D e v e n d ra N a th , Assistant Secretary, I.C.W .A., New D elhi
V id y a P ra k a s h D u rr, Research Associate, I.C.W .A., New Delhi
G i r j a K um ar, L ibrarian, I.C.W .A., New D elhi.
P. N. M a s a ld a n , Secretary, Lucknow Branch, I.C .W A
D. S. M e h t a , Research Associate, I.C.W .A., New D elhi.
G i r i ja K. M o o k e r je e , Baroda House, Curzon R oad, New D elhi
N. N. P ic h a i, I.C.W .A ., New D elhi.
S. P o p la i, Survey 8; Documents Officer, I.C .W A ., New D elhi.
427
a p p e n d ix
ShM r a m S hakma. secretary, G walior Branch, I.C .W A .. Victoria College,
N ^ l o v ^ , Asst. Director, Gokhale Inst. o£ Economics 8=Politics, Poona.

N. C. Zamindar, Indore Branch, I.C.W-A.
JA P A N
Komakiciii M atsuoka, C hairm an. M ember, Nippon House of Representatives.
President, Japanese Federation. of T rad e Umons Steamship Co.)
S iiinsuke A sao. President, N ippon Yusen k aish a U P
Yos^ a" b u r^ M — ?(1 9 2 9 . 1933). Executive Director, Kyodo News
- d chie£ o£ Research Division’ An Japan cotton

S ^ r l A i r m a n , Board of Directors, T h e Nissho Company, Ltd.
M em ber of the Board, Jap an IPK.
Secretary, Jap ar
S - r Sho3i Kaisha U d„ T okyo, Japan.
N EW ZEALAND
» . ,„n. Editor New Z ea la n d N a tio n al R e v ie w ,
P hilip M atthews. Journalist, ssis
1949-50. . . r h ristia n High & Normal School, Ivharar, Di
W. M. R yburn. Vice P rincipal, C hr.stian t t g
A m b ala, P unjab, India.
PAKISTAN ' . ,r_
A. B. A. H aleem , C hairm an AfEairs,

m an of C ouncil, P " I " p ° a U stan Institute of International Affair
M ushtaq A hmad . R esearch Officer, ^ o£
K arachi. o . r , p n l c o u rt of Pakistan and the
M ahmud A u . Advocate at the F edeial Cou
H0
L ah o re‘ ■ D irector Pakistan Industries, Ltd., varal . achi>
A mirali F ancy . M an agin g Directo Qf InternatlonaI Affai ,
K. S a r w a r H asan . Secretary, Pakistan ^ Dacca University, Dacca,
A twar H usain . H ead, D epartm ent o£ Comm
stan.
PH ILIPPIN E S
i ■ ■ C ouncil, Insti-
E xecutive Secretary, P h il ip p i
Q u irin o G. G re g o rio , Cairm ‘ ndi M a n ila . r n n eee of E ducation,
tute of Pacific R e la “ onS' S "Education and Secretary of College
A n to n io Is id ro . Professor Q uezon C ity.
U n iversity of the P hilippines, Quezon
R ic a rd o R . P a s c u a l. Associate Professor of Philosophy, Head, Department of

Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Quezon City.
U N IT E D K IN G D O M
S ir G eo rge Sansom (1942, 1945), C hairm an. Professor of Japanese Studies and
Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, since 1947, Chairman, In
ternational Research Committee, IPR.
E ric B r it t e r . In dia correspondent o£ T he Times, London, since 194G
C h w sto p h e r J o h n C h a n c e llo r . G en eral M anager o f R euters, L o n d o n , since
A r t h u r C re e c h Jo n e s (1942, 1945). L abour M.P., 19 3 6 -5 0 . Secretary o f State to r

Colonies, 1946-50. 3
G pore° 1948-50NS' M alay“" C ivil Service (R et’d)- Secretary fo r D efence, Singa-
K s t a c e 1 94L6OUD° N (1947)' WkK BlitiSh AmeriCan T° baCCO C°mp™y. London,

Ivison S M a cad am (1933 1936, 1942, 1947). D irector G eneral, T h e R o y a l Insti-
tute of International Affairs, London.
H ChinaORFORD DCpUty Chie£ ManaSer- Chartered Bank of India, Australia and
A n t i t a t lf f a i ^ L L d aorn EaStCrn R° yal InStkutt o£

V lS ^ L UcRe°E1949UniVerSity LeCtUrer ^ F ar EaStem HiSt° ry ’ C am bridge U niver-
Ia n Step h en s. Editor, The Statesm an , Calcutta and Delhi, since 1943
G « Y W. T y so n . Author and Journalist. Editor of ba pi ta l, CaTcutta, since
R ^ e w X r r ' s i n c e P ' l £ a8bOUr)' ^ ^ A d ™ er “ U nion o f

M a u ric e Z inkin. C om m ercial M anager, L ever B rothers (India) Ltd., C alcutta.
U N ITED S T A T E S
H a r o ld H. F ish er, C hairm an. C hairm an, H oover In stitute and T ih ,,,
Professor o f H istory, Stan ford U niversity, C alifo rn ia. ^ e p re se n ta We o f "the
C arnegie E ndow m ent fo r In tern ation al Peace, New York
E E^lyBH ahnFree‘lanCe j0,™ aliSt “ d aUth“ ’ * ““ “ * * - d e r the name of
WBoLmbBay“ ELEY' M3nager' Cky Bank ° £ New Y° * , Hornby Road,

L awrence C. B urr. Member, Internafmmi r « ,__ •- ,• ,
way, New Y ork City, on B r° ad-
Ceylon, stationed in Madras. ’ kistan, Burma and
V“ o rk “ S DEAN' ReSearCh DireCt° r and E dit0r- F° re iSn Association,

L a w re n c e S. F in k e ls t e in . Research Associate, Institute o f Pacific R elations, New
429
APPENDIX
Sidney D. G am b le. President, Princeton-Yenching Foundation. T reasurer, C hur
H erbert T ™ 0 « 4 7 ) - Senior partner, Littfe, LeSourd, Palm er * Scott,
Seattle, W ashington. Protessor 0 £ In tern atio n al Law and Political

C h a rle s E. M a rtin (192J, 193 )• , s ience University o£ Washington,
Science, and Head, Department of Political Scienc
Seattle, W ashington. Hoover Institute and Library, Stan-
RoiM-RT c . N orth. Member, Research staff, Hooker
Economics, U niversity of Michigan, A n n A rbor,
Mfcn1AELnSTRA,GHT (1942). E ditor, T h e jt t c v RepubUc, W ash., D.C. N

Chairm an, American Veterans C o m m ^ Los Angeles, California.
M rs. G. j . WATUMULL. Da-ector, V\ aumui, ^ 1945.
W . H. W iser . D irector, India V illage bervxe ,
g u e st m em bers
A u stra lia co m m issio n er's Office, New Delhi.

C y n tiiia N E L so ^ A -tra h a n office, New Delhi.
F. S t u a r t . A u s tr a lia n m y
B u rm a R angoon. Form erly w ith Rangoon Cor-

II B v T h a w . C h artered A ccountant, R an 0oo
U = - 1, secretary and Consu, for the Union of Burma, New De ,
Ct M D. D e S ilv a . C hairm an, Board of Directors, Associated Newspapers of
C eylon , Ltd., C olom bo.
In d o n esia . A dviser, M inistry o f Foreign Affaiis, Dja

H a d ji A coes S a l im , A ffairs. President U niversity of
March. 1950.
Malaya V Z G rad u ate A ssistant, D epartm ent of Economics, University

U ngku A bdul A ziz- G *■
- u i d ,„ » «
A S IA N N A T IO N A L IS M AND TH E W E ST
Vietnam
N c u y e n -T h i C h a u . Secretary, V ietn am In fo rm a tio n M ission, N ew D elh i.
T r a n V a n T u n c . V ietnam ese M ission, P aris.
Other
R" s ^ r e tI,rNAi'IUFTI; A ffairS ° ffiCer’ D ivisio n °£ E conom ic Studies,

B angkok E conom ic Com m ission fo r A sia a n d the F ar East,
G a r d n e r M u r p h y . D irector, U N E SC O "T ensions P ro je ct” in In d ia. P rofessor

o f Psychology, C ollege o f the C ity o f N ew Y ork, N ew Y ork.
OBSERVERS
Rockefeller Foundation
R Ti hhe
e RR„oEW Nnlle(1£f
c k e fe ’ n',9d4atio
r F ou 5 ' 19
n , 4N
7 )'ewASSi5tant
Y ork. D irecto r * e Social ociences.
Sciences
United Nations Secretariat
J 'Iffa Birs';SBaAn g k o k EaStern R ePrCSentative’ N ations D ivisio n o f Social
E.C.A .F.E.
H Un;teFd0 NGa ti1o9ns2E co n ie fic

E conom ' C om m ission fo r A sia D
a nivisi°
d then' F ar East, B anofgkok
the
I.L.O. '
P ' N ew D d h ? ePreSem atiVe ° £ the In tem a tio n a I L a b ° ” O rg anization in In d ia,

s. K. J a in (altern ate). Secretary, In te rn a tio n a l L a b o u r Office, N ew D elhi.
U.N.E.S.C.O.
U nkC d N ati“ S S cien tific an d C u ltu ra l
U.N.I.C.E.F.
T ' r f Lt r! i D^ VIES' C h ie f ° f C o m b in ed M ission to In d ia, A fg h a n istan an d C evlon
U n ite d N ations C h ild ren 's E m ergency F und, N ew D elh i. *
INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS
H s L i ? r u \ e (,I9B l!i arDdeC a t f aB :Smew SC c ? ia C o. Ltd.,

C om m ittee, IP R , 19 4 7 -5 0 . * C h airm an , In te rn a tio n a l F inance
W i l l i a m L . H o l la n d (192 9, 19 3 1, 1933, 1936, 19 3 9 19 4 2 10 4* i<U7 \ c
G e n e ra l, In stitu te o f Pacific R elatio n s, N ew Y o rk .’ * ' S ec fetary
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
M r „ s f N^ AYoYr ^ 9 4 2 ’ ’ 9 4 7 )- PU bIkati0nS ^ c i f i c R ela-

A P P E N D IX 431
R uth D. C arter (1936, 1939, 1942, 1945, 1947). Administrative Assistant, Insti
tute of Pacific Relations, New York.
J ean A. C urran, J r. Research Associate, Institute of Pacific Relations.
LUCKNOW ROUND TABLE CHAIRMEN AND

RAPPORTEURS
1. S outh A sia 4. P olitical P roblems
Chairman: F. H. Soward Chairman: M. R. Masani
Rapporteur: Maurice Zinkin Rapporteur: Michael Straight
2. S outheast A sia 5. Economic and Social Problems
Chairman: A. D. Gorwalla Chairman: Arthur Creech Jones
Rapporteur: Lawrence S. Finkelstein Rapporteur: H. Venkatasubbiah
3. E ast A sia 6. Economic and F inancial P roblems
Chairman: A. B. A . Haleem Chairman: Harold H. Fisher
Rapporteur: Robert North Rapporteur: S. V. Kogekar
CONFERENCE STAFF
Mrs. J. A. Curran, Jr. Shanker Dutt Upraiti
Miss Louise Gamble Miss Mohini Advam
Miss Barbara Levison E. Bittenbender
Mrs. W. F. Rivers Dr. Miss B. Roy
Miss Lila Ann Watumull Miss Eva Shipstone
Mrs. Maurice Zinkin Miss Rena S. Singh
Capt. A. L. Loomba Miss Vinita Wanchoo
Bhagwan Dayal Awasthi S. N. Saxena
Raj Krishna Kapoor IJday Singh Negi
List of Data Papers Presented to the Eleventh Conference
Institute of Pacific Relations
Lucknow, India
October 3-14, 1950
Australia
1-4. A ustralian P apers : “Australian Population Policy and Its Relation to
Demographic Problems in Asia” by W. D. Borrie. “Australian Foreign
Policy and the Indonesian Dispute” by H. A. Wolfsohn. “Australia and
the Peace Settlement with Japan” by N. D. Harper. “Australia’s Economic
Interests in the Far East” by E. E. Ward. 47 pp.
Canada
1. C anadian I nterests and Policies in the Far East S ince W orld W ar II.
By D. H. Gardner. 15 pp.
France
1. V iet Nam and France. By Philippe Devillers. 51 pp.
India
1. I ndia’s F oreign P olicy . With Special Reference to Asia and the Pacific. By
Vidya Prakash Dutt. 45 pp.
2. I ndia’s R ecent Economic and S ocial D evelopment. By N. V. Sovani. 63 pp.
Japan
1. J apan ’s E conomy—P resent and Future. By Shigeto Tsuru. 18 pp.
2. J apan ’s R ole in A siatic THade. By K enji Katayama. 54 pp.
3. Nationalism in P ost-W ar J apan . By Masao Maruyama. 25 pp.
New Zealand
1. New Zealand's I nterests and P olicies in the Far East , By Samuel Leathern
24 pp.
Pakistan
I. P roblems of E conomic R eform and D evelopment in P akistan , By A F A
Husain, M. N. Huda, Mrs. Manzur Ahmad and Mushtaq Ahmad. 23 pp.
Philippines
1. C hances for S urvival of D emocracy in the P hilippines. By Enrique Fer
nando and Jose L. Africa. 27 pp.
2. P hilippine N ationalism and the Schools. By Antonio Isidro. 21 pp
3. Social and C ultural D evelopment o r the Philippines. By Ricardo Pascual
37 pp.
432
433
A PPEND IX
■1. Economic A spect of the B aguio C onference of 1950. By Amando M.
5 -6. P i S i u c D evelopment. By Members o£ the Philippine Coun-
A crL - l^ L l D evelopment Program. By Amando M. Dalisay. 99 pp.
UT o ^ : » Poucv n, East and Sou th east Asia, 1945 -M ay ,950.
s and T h e ir E ffe c ts on th e U nited Kingdom, l i y a . ™ » * T K 3 £

50 p p .
United States , , , , Tr* ks r»n

1. T he U ntied States and the Far East . By Harold M. " e ^ 5 3 pp
2. A merican Policy in Southeast A sia. By La''T™“ ’ w lter Lippmann.
3. C ommentaries on A merican Far Eastern Policy. By \\ alter L. pp
65 p p .
In te rn a tio n a l Secretariat Q j-iiith ern a n d E a s t e r n A s ia .

1. PROBLEMS OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL O ffice 27 PP
By Members of the In te rn a tio n a l LabourÔffice^:2 7 ^ ^ ^
2 . S o v ie t F a r E a stern P o l ic y SlNCEs J oATHF.;sT ^ srA B y v ic t o r P u r c e ll. 78 p p .
4 S v / p° o L™ ECON° MrC DEVELOPMENT‘ ^ E*
s , w
32 PP" T I'd am P o l i t i c s a n d N a t i o n a l i s m . By G eo rge M c T .

6 S o m e A sp e c t s of I ndonesian 1 o lit ic
K a h in . 4 7 p p . C o m MUNISm in t h e F a r E a st . B y W . M a o n a h o n
7 . N o tes on N a t io n a l is m and o o m m u w
B a ll. 41 p p . — tt S ilc o c k a n d U n g k u A b d u l A ziz. 4 8 p p .

8 . N a t io n a l is m in M a l a y s B y ^ £VELOpMENTS IN 6 h in a . B y S. B . T h o m a s.
9 R e c e n t P o l it ic a l and E co n o *
’ 30 p p - ■' Politic VL D evelopment in C eylon. By Sir Ivor Jennings.
10. N a t i o n a l i s m a n d P o l i t i c a l u
cm m m m « — ««■ »• '
t h e im . 8 3 p p -
Su p p lem e n tary P apers AND H anD i Ca p s w i t h P a r -

E c o n o m ic I m p l i c a t i o n s o f ?hvs^
t ic u l a r R e f e r e n c e t o t h e P r o b l e m s
t h e F a r E a s t e r n R e g io n . B y J-
B u ls a r a . 3 6 p p . d e v e l o p m e n t in S o u th A sia and th e ar
U N E S C O and t h e P r o b l e m s of De
Prepared by UNESCO, Paris. 11 PP- By charles Robequain. 7 pp.
N a t io n a l is m e et E d u c a tio n e
Index
(For majorgeographical andsubject divisionssee Tableof Contents)
Abduh, Mohammed, 73, 74, 75 Anwar Tjokroaminoto, 195
Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, 62-3, 397, Arabs: in Indonesia, 112; influence on
398 Malays, 284-5
Abdulmadjid, 95, 97, 98, 100 Arudji Kartiwinata, 82
Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi,
Abidin, S. M., 134
Abikusno, 82-3, 137 1947, 37, 38, 391
Acheson, Dean, 244 Assaat, 118, 135, 142-3
Acoma (Communist Youth Organization), Atlantic Charter, 226
Atom bomb, 387
Indonesia, 102
Agrarian legislation (see also Land):
Aung San, 34, 38
Auriol, President Vincent, 239
China, 382; Indonesia, 149, 179, 196; Australia: relations with Indonesia, 164,
Vietnam, 252, 254 167, 172, 396-7; security, 380, 396-7
Agricultural labor: Burma, 37; China, A zad H in d Government, 295, 29G, 317
382; Indonesia, 68, 70, 139, 140, 159; Aziz, Capt. Andi, 124
Malaya, 269 f].;Vietnam, 255
Agriculture: Burma, 37, 38; Ceylon, 363, Bahder, Djohan, 135, 195
China, 45, 382; India, 363; Indonesia, Bali, 116, 119, 126, 133
155 (seealso Plantation regime); Malaya, Ball, W. MacMahon, 7
Bambang Sugeng, Col., 140, 153
270, 307, 368; Pakistan, 363, 365; Viet
nam, 252, 253, 254,256 Banditry: Burma, 38; Indonesia, 108, 139,
Agung Gde Agung, Anak, 113 140; Malaya, 291
Banishment as political weapon: Malaya,
Aidit, Abdullah, 39, 141, 189
Aligarh University, 55 283-4; see also
Prisoners, political
Alimin Prawirodirdjo, 93, 94, 95, 100, 139, Bantam coup, 1949, 152
140, 189 Bao Dai, 174, 175, 202-3, 212, 213, 216 tf.,
249, 250, 369, 396
All-Malaya Council of Joint Action, 305,
314fj., 319, 320, 321, 322, 326 Barisan Banteng (Buffalo Legion), Indo
AlManar, 74
Along Bay Conferences: 1947, 219, 221,
nesia, 101
BarisanTani Indonesia ( I n d o n e s ia n Peas
223; 1948, 230//., 239 ant Corps), 134, 142

Amboina, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127, 152, 153, Barnes, Leonard, 336-7, 339
Batavia Petroleum Co. (B-P.M-). 1(>1
367
Amboinese, 31, 58 Bell Act, 1946, 10, 370
Ang Bagong Katipunan, Philippines, 11, Benham, F.C.C., 341
Berdiaev, Nicolas, 262
A12ngkatan Pemuda Insaf (Malay Youth Bernardino, V., 16
Bhonsale, Col., 296
Movement), 316, 323
Anti-Imperialist League, Malaya, 282 Bidault, Georges, 244
Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League Birth Control, 361-2
(AFPFL), Burma, 366 Black Market: India, 61; Malaya, 303-4
435
436
IN D E X
Blum, Leon, 203 Chairul Saleh, 152

Bocobo, Jorge C., 12, 18 Chang Hsueh-liang, 47
Bollaert, Emile, 204-5, 208, 209, 210 211
216//., 219, 220 ff. Cheuyars, see
Indians, Moneylenders
Chiang Kai-shek, 44, 47, 172, 175, 304, 364
Bombay, textile strike, 360 384
Bonifacio, Andres, 12, 13 Chin, Burma, 35
Borneo: British, immigration, 42; Indo
nesian (Kalimantan), 123, 133, 137, 153
C hina-C ivil War, 41 ff.,
50, 217, 241, 304,
Bose, Rash Behari, 296 380//.—industrialization, 415-6—“New
Bose, Subhas Chandra, 4, 296, 297 Democracy,” 382-relations with: Indo
Braddcll, Sir Roland, 325 nesia, 140-1, 170, 172//.; Japan, 375,
3/7//.; Malaya, 279, 280//., 304, 337,
Buddhism, influence of: Burma, 8, 33-4, 344, 368; U.S.S.R., 379, 380//., 394-5,
38; Cambodia, 8; Ceylon, 8, 32-3; China!
53; Indonesia, 67; Thailand, 8; Vietnam 409, 415-6; Vietminh, 201, 202, 214,
214 241, 242, 244, 246, 249, 396—revolution,
Budiardjo, All, 121, 152 stages of, 380 //.—Westernization, 21-2,
40//., 48, 262
Bukharin, Nikolai I., 93
Building labor, Malaya, 272 Chinese overseas, 41, 372-in: Borneo,
421; Burma, 35, 36; Indonesia, 70, 78,
Cadoaism, Vietnam, 208, 222, 224 89, 104 ff.,
112, 119, 141, 156, 172//., 179,
189, 367; Malaya, 270//., 276//., 279!
Calcutta—Conferences, 1948, 96, 97, 391;
social conditions, 360 280 ff.,
286, 288, 289, 291, 292, 293//
299, 303//., 308, 312, 317//., 325, 328’
Cambodia, 8, 216, 241, 369, 396
Capital, foreign: 393, 406, 411-12, 415-6, 329, 331, 332//., 337//., 843-4, 368;
Thailand, 367
417, 420-1; Burma, 367, 419; Ceylon!
363, 364-5; India, 63, 363, 364-5; Indo Chinese Protectorate, Malaya 271 274
280, 283 ’
nesia, 81, 97, 101, 102, 149, 155-6, 158,
Christianity, influence of, 8, 21, 30, 32-3,
160, 166, 179, 180; Japan, 378; Malaya,
274, 316, 330; New Guinea, 164, 166; 67, see also Partai Kalolik Partai
Indonesia, see
Missionaries: in Ceylon, 32;
,
Pakistan, 363, 364-5, 420; Philippines,
11; South Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon),
Kristen.
363, 364, 370//., 392; U.S.S.R., 415; Viet Clementi, Sir Cecil, 282
nam, 253, 263-4 Citizenship—definition of, M alaya, 317 ff.,
Capital, formation of, 371: Ceylon, 362, 327-teaching of, see also Education!
363, 364; China, 382; India, 60, 362, 363, political: Indonesia, 92; Japan, 23, 373;
364, 410; Indonesia, 69, 92, 115, 140, 149, Malaya, 338-9, 343; Philippines, *12 f'.,
155, 158, 179, 180; Japan, 378; Malaya, 16//. 1
330; Pakistan, 362
Vietnam, 252-3, 255
ff.;U.S.S.R., 415; Civil—rights, 386: Africa, 394; Indonesia,
116-7, 129; Japan, 23, 376; Malaya, 300
Caput, Louis, 227 //., 327, 334; Philippines, 10; South Asia,
Carpentier, General, 245 361, 372, 392; U.S.S.R., 392-service:
Caste system: Ceylon, 29-30; India, 54 China, 45, 382; India, 36; Indonesia, 69,
Celebes, 133, 136, 137, 153, 190: North, 84, 85, 87, 88, 114, 115, 119, 136, 153, 160,
126, 127; South, 115, 116, 121, 123
136, 152, 190
ff 181-2, 183-4; Japan, 376; Malaya, 289
290, 293, 299, 300, 303, 306, 309, 310, 312,
Censorship: South Asia, 361 330, 334, 340; Philippines, 370; Vietnam!
Central Advisory Committee on Educa 205, 240—war: Burma, 37-8, 366-7, 391,
tion, M alaya, 336, 338
Central Asia, 415
413; China, 41
ff.; ff.,
50, 217, 241, 304, 380
India, 60; Indonesia, 107 ff., ff.
121
Central Indian Association, Kuala Lum 151 //., 180, 391, 413; Korea, 39; Malaya
pur, 287, 288
Ceram, 153, 190, see also Moluccas
391; Philippines, 8, 370; Southeast Asia!
365-6; Vietnam, 199//., 220 ff.,
369
IN D E X 437
Cochin-China, 202, 203, 204, 211, 214, 216, Coste-FIoret, Paul, 218, 220, 225, 233, 238,
217, 218, 222
369
ff., ff.,
234 239-10, 232, 253, 243
Credit, cooperative: Indonesia, 78, 81, 156,
179; Vietnam, 255
Cocoa, proposed cultivation of, 3G8
Cochran, H. Merle, 193-4 Crime, sec also Gangsterism: Indonesia,
151. 152, 153, 154; Malaya, 281, 2S3, 299-
Colonial Development Fund, U.K., 328
Colonials, see see also
Commonwealth,
Europeans
by name of Do
300, 30-1, 307; South Asia, 361
Czechoslovakia, exports to Asia of, 408-9
minions—cohesion of, 205, 393-4, 402-
composition of, 393-*!—mutual aid (Co Dao Xen {Buddhist sect), Vietnam, 214, 222
lombo Plan), 5, 328, 420-1—preferential D'Argcnlieu, Admiral Thierry, 200, 201,
202-3, 204, 208, 212, 222
trade, 408—relations with: U.S.A., 3GJ;
Vietnam, 242—self-sufTiciency, 413 Dctml Islam, Indonesia, 7, 8, 104
152. 153, 189, 190
ff.,
150,
Communalism: India, Gl-2, 399; Indo
nesia: 74, 77; Malaya, 270, 280 0., 309, Darusman, Maruto, 95, 99
311 ff., 322/7., 331 ff., 336 ff., 343, 3G3 Decentralization, administrative: Indone
Communications, 9, 418: Indonesia, 157, sia, 119, 133, 185, 196; Malaya, 278, 310
159, IGG; Philippines, 17 Defense, problems of: India, 61, 147; Indo
Communities Liaison Committee, Malaya, nesia, 159, 192ff.
De Gaulle. General Charles, 221
309, 325, 327, 329, 330, 333
Communism, 39, 385, 388, 392, 419, 422- De Lattre de Tassigny, General, 245
in: Burma, 8, 34, 35, 36G, 389, 391; Cey Demobilization: Burma, 366; Indonesia,
lon, 350; China, 5. 38. 39. 43/7- 172 ff.. 98, 106, 120. 121, 125, 139, 147, 151-2;
241 ff., 342, 380/7., 389, 395: France, 202, Kashmir, -100; Malaya. 292; Vietnam.
207
211, 217; India, 58-9, G3, 350, 353-4,
360 fj., 389-90; Indonesia, 8, 69, 70, 75, Democracy, 14, 23, 41, 48, 63, 79, 80-1,
87, 88. 92, 102, 166-7, 180. 181, 185, 188,
84,
76, 79-80, 82, 83, 89, 91, 92, 93/7-, 101,
117, 139-40, 153, 164, 179, 188//., 191, 209, 223, 242-3, 258, 259-60, 305, 312 ff.,
389, 391, see also Partai Komunis;
374-5, 376; Malaya, 8, 279, 281, 282,
Japan, 31G—
also
7, 334, 372, 386, 390, 392, 402-3, see
Citizenship
283-4, 293, 298-9," 304, 305/7., 312, 320, Desai, A. R., 52
321 /7., 328, 331, 340, 342 /7-, 389, 391; Devillers, Philippe, 197/7-
Pakistan, 360 ff.,392; Philippines, 8, 370,
395; U.S.S.R., influence on Asia of, 26-
Dewanis, Sutan, 101, 102
“Dimitrov Doctrine,” 95
8. 42, 43. 46-7; Vietnam, 8, 38, 39, 174, Dixon, Sir Owen, 398
200/7., 224 /7., 232-3, 236-7, 241 fj., 260 Djokosudjono, 189
ff., 369-70
Confucianism, in: China, 39, 40, 42, 54,
Djuanda, 113, 135, 146, 191, 195
East Indonesia. 115/7-, 120 ff., 123 ff-, 128/7-

304; Vietnam, 262
Constitution: Burma, 366; Indonesia, 111 (see also
Celebes, Moluccas, etc.)
Eber, John, 320
ff., I28/7-, 147. 165. 187-8; ]apan, 375-6;
Economic Aid, 387, 388, seealso
Common
M alaya, 301 //., 309 ff., 317 /7., 322/7-,
332, see also Malay Union; Philippine wealth, Marshall Plan, etc.:
China, 49
50; Indonesia, 72, 158, 170, 180, 193;
Republic, 10, 13; Vietnam, 204, 258
Constitutional Reforms, Netheiiands-In- South Asia, 363-4; Southeast Asia, 370
dian Committee for Study of, 119 ff.;Vietnam, 244
Economic—Depression, effects of: Burma,
Convict labor, Malaya, 272
Co-operatives, 411—in: China, 382; Indo 37-8, Malaya, 276, 286-development,
nesia, 78, 81, 156; Malaya, 307; Vietnam, 386, 393, 404/7-, 411: Asia, 349, 361;
254-5 Burma, 367; Ceylon, 362/7-; India, 60-1,
“Co-Prosperity Sphere,” see Pan-Asianism 362/7-, 419; Indonesia, 148-9, 154/7.,
438 IN D E X
180 ff., 196, 367; Malaya, 270

316, 327, 329, 332; Philippines, 419;
ff.,
310, Flag, cult of: Malaya, 316; Philippine R e
public, 17
Southeast Asia, 370
251 ff., ff.;
Vietnam, 220, 242,
263, 419—diversification, 406,
Food shortages, 410, 413, 421-2: Ceylon,
365; China, 382; India, 61, 63, 363, 365;
413: Malaya, 419-self-sufficiency, 405-6, Indonesia, 196; Japan, 378
413-4: Commonwealth, 413: India, 414; Foreign exchange, 406, 409: India, 421;
Japan, 414; U.S.A., 413; U.S.S.R., 413 Indonesia, 159, 367; Japan, 378
Education, 410, 411, 418, 422: Burma, 33-
4; Ceylon, 32; Indonesia, 68, 77, 147,
Foreign investment, 404ff., 411-12, 415-
16, 420-21: Burma, 367, 419; Ceylon,
154, 181/7., 196; Japan, 19, 373, 376; 363, 364—5; India, 63, 363, 364—5; Indo
Malaya, 280, 281, 289, 308, 327, 330, 331, nesia, 81, 97, 101, 102, 149, 155-6, 158,
334, 336
ippines,
ff.,10ff.;
344; New Guinea, 162; Phil
South Asia, 361-h igh er:
160, 166, 179, 180; Japan, 378; Malaya,
274, 316, 330; New Guinea, 164, 166;
Burma, 34, 37; Ceylon, 30, 31, 33; China, Pakistan, 363, 364-5, 420; Philippines,
41, 42; Indonesia, 68, 73, 99, 119, 159, 11
157, 181-3, 185-6; Malaya, 284, 305, 306,
307, 310, 326. 329-30, 339, 343; Philip
Foreign relations, 385 ff.:China, 49 ff.,
63;
India, 58, 63, 91; Indonesia, 81, 83, 86,
pines, 15-16; Vietnam, 263—political, 9, 89, 91, 102, 103, 138, 144, 147, 150, 164,
see also Citizenship, teaching of: India,
358, Indonesia, 92, 109, 185-6, 187;
169 ff.,180/7., 192/7., 196. 202; Japan,
377-8; South Asia, 364-5; Vietnam, 199,
Japan, 373, 376; Malaya, 280, 281 282 202, 220, 241, 242, 244
284, 305, 308, 313, 342; Vietnam, 261
-vocational, 412, 422: China, 383; In
ff. Foreign study: Indonesian, 182-3, 184-5,
187; Vietnamese, 264
donesia, 182-3; M alaya, 280, 308; South
Asia, 362, 363
Foreign trade, 404 ff., 412 ff.:
China, 375,
377-8, 379; Indonesia, 139, 154-5, 156,
Elsbree, W illard H., 4 157, 177, 180. 367; Japan, 257, 375, 377-
Embargo on shipment of war materials to 8; M alaya, 271; Philippines, 11, 370;
China, 177 Southeast Asia, 257; U.S.S.R., 387; Viet
Employment, see also
Unemployment: In
donesia, 129, 156, 184; Vietnam, 253 ff.
nam, 220, 221, 242, 252, 255,
Formosa, 175, 364, 384—5, 395, 396
256ff.,
263
Engles, Major General, 121
Ethical problems: China, 42; India, 60,
Fraksi Demokrat (Democratic Party), In
donesia, 134, 136, 146
355, 391; international, 385; Islamic, 74* France: Communist Party, 202, 211, 217,
76-7, 79, 183, 186-7; Japan, 22 ff.;
Ma
laya, 281, 291, 324; Philippines, 12, 13-4,
221; Popular Republican Movement
(MRP), 203, 218, 221, 243; R ally of the
16/?., 370; Vietnam, 257 French Republic (RPF), 221; R ally of
Eurasians: Indonesia, 120, 156, 181-2, 183 the Left (RGR), 204, 217, 221; Socialist
Europeans, in: Indonesia, 112, 119, 153, Party (SFIO), 203, 209, 217, 218, 221,
155, 156, 166, 181-2, 183; Malaya', 2 7 l’, 227, 231, 243, 244'
272, 274, 290, 299, 305, 309, S10, 311, 322*, French Union, Vietnam’s status in, 206
342; Vietnam, 205, 230, 231, 233, 248 211, 216, 219, 226, 229, 230/7., 239-4o’
Exports, see
Foreign trade
Extraterritoriality: China, 42, 44, 49
263-5
Frisby educational plan, Singapore, 339
Familism: China, 39, 42; Japan, 24
F
Front
ront BDuruh
emok(Labor Front), Indonesia, 189
rasi Rakjat (People’s Demo
Federalism: Indonesia, 113
laya, 317 ff.,
322, 325, 326, 331
ff., ff.,
130-1; Ma
368
cratic Front), Indonesia, 97
Furnivall, J. S., 34, 37
Fenn, U.S. educator, 337-8 Fujiwara, Major, 292, 296
"Feudalism”: China, 382: Indonesia, 92;
Japan, 20, 22ff.,
25; M alaya, 334 Gabungan S(United
arekat BAssociation
uruh Revolusionari
Fishing industry: Indonesia, 191; Japan,
379; M alaya, 286
Indonesia of Revo
lutionary Indonesian Labor), 138
439
IN D E X
Gammans, Capt. L. D., M.P., 303 154; Malaya, 269, 289; South Asia, 361;
Gandhi, Mahatma, 9, 29, 38, 53, 54, 60, 351, Vietnam, 256
355, 358, 407 Hero worship: Japan, 25; Philippines, 12-
Gangsterism: Burma, 38; Indonesia, 139, 3, 15, 17, 18
140, 151. 152, 188; Japan, 25; Malaya, Hindu Code, 61
313, 323, 328, 331, 342; South Asia, 361 HinduMahasabha, India, 55, 61
Gcnjosha (Japanese Nationalist socicty), 22 Hinduism; Ceylon, 32, 33; India, 53/7-, 61;
Indonesia, 67
Gent, Sir Eduard, 311
George, Henry, influence of, 41 Hizbullah troops, Indonesia, 106
Gerakan Rcvolusi Rakjat (People’s Revo Ho Chi Minh, 174, 175, 200, 203, 205, 208,
lutionary Union), Indonesia, 89, 90, 101 210, 211, 213, 217, 219, 226, 243, 244,
GERAM (People's Revolutionary Union 369, 389
Hoa Hao (Dao Xen cult), 214, 222, 224
of Malaya). 323
Gibb, II- A. R.. 73, 74 Hoach, Le Van, 203, 204, 211, 217, 218.
Gottwald, President Klemcnt, 98 222, 246
Great Britain—Colonial Development Hollandia, naval base, 164
Fund, 328—relations with: Asia, 386,
401; Ceylon, 28, 30; India, 59; Indonesia,
Home industries, 407, seealso
Handicrafts,
Industries, light: China, 40; Indonesia,
71, 170, 174; Japan, 25; Vietnam, 174, 81, 157; Philippines, 11, 19; South Asia,
241, 242 364: Vietnam, 254
Guerrilla organization: China. 48; Indone Housing. 410: India.
sia, 98, 107-8, 117, 124-5, 151, 152, 153,
360,
Indonesia, 147,
169, 190; Malaya, 252, 289, 291, 292, 154; Malaya, 277, 307
H u e , 199, 208, 212, 224
293, 298, 299, 301, 311, 323, 325, 342//.; H ukbalahap movement, Philippines, 8, 37U
Philippines, 8, 370; Vietnam, 207—8, 210,
215, 224/7., 232, 236, 245 Huynh Phu So, 214
Gurney, Sir Henry, 331, 334, 336 Hyderabad, uprising in, 360
Hadjis (returned pilgrims), Indonesia, 75 Immigration, 421, see also

Chinese, Java
nese, Indian: Borneo, 421; Common
Hadong, declaration of French terms at,
1947, 216-7 wealth countries, 380; Indonesia, 173
Hague Conferences: 1949, 72, 103, 109, 111, Income, national: Malaya, 341
113-4, 117, 118, 125, 143-4, 149, 161 /7., Indebtedness, 389, see also
Moneylenders:
181-2, 196, 397; 1950, 165, 166; 1952, Burma’, 36, 38; Indonesia, 78,104-5; Ma
190-91 laya, 271, 286, 330
Halim, Abdul, 118, 135, 143, 189 Independence of Malaya Party, 331, 333-4,
Hamengku Buwono IX, Sultan of Jogja 336
karta, 112, 113, 115, 121. 135, 152, 195 India: relations with Indonesia, 171, 172,
H am id II, Sultan of Wesi Borneo, 113, 122 176, with Malaya, 286-7, 295 ff.,
344;
Handicrafts, 407, see also Home indus trade with Pakistan,
Indian Congress Tarty, 297
408
tries: China, 40; India, 51
Hanifah, Abu, 76, 80, 113, 137 Indian Independence Leagues, 27b,
289, 296-7, 317
H arjadi, F. S., 136
Harjono, 99 Indian National Army, Malaya, 4, tw,
Hashimoto, Sanai, 21, 23 296,297 .
Hassan, A., 189 Indian National Congress, 52, 53, 54, t>o,
Hatta. Mohammad, 69, 71, 82, 84, 86. 90, 97, 59, 60, 61-2 ^ , on
98, 99. 101, 112, 113, 118, 119, 127, 128, Indians, in: Burma, 35-6, 37- 8; Ceylon, 29,
135, 137, 140, 141, 142, 147/7-, 157, 158, 30, 31; Malaya, 4, 270, 272
162, 170, 171. 172, 173, 189 282, 286/7-, 293, 295#., 303, 308, 313-4,
Health conditions, 418: Indonesia, 147, 317/7., 343, 344, 368
IN D E X
440
. _ 7. 94-5, 104, 170, 180,
Indirect rule: Indonesia, 68, 114 ff., 162-3; Indonesia, 7°“ '* ’ 976 277, 282, 288,
Malaya, 278-9, 309, 312,
tution, Sultans
see also Consti 183; Malaya,
289 ff., 298 309, 1ff-,
i/m’ pines, 12; Viet-
Fr
Indonesia, relations with M alaya, 344 n a m 220,241, 247 H2l 152, 153; E ast,
Indonesian People’s Congress, 86 J a v a -C e n tr a l, 123, ^ ^ ^
Indonesians in M alaya, 270-1, 344
Industrialization, 404, 407, 411-12, 413.
119,
i- i 12a— ro lUo 9J, 11
i 4,iso133,189' *West, if)8— i l j*5 ff., n
420—in: Ceylon, 362, 363, 364; China, 40, ’ : 2 a f i , 152, 153, 1 8 9 - r c b c llio ti.
42, 45, 60, 415-6; India, 51, 61, 362, 363, 1926 93, 163-representauo,;, >n Indone-
364, 393, 414; Indonesia, 155, 157; Japan, sian Governm ent, U 9- '
19, 21, 379; Pakistan, 362, 363, 364, 420; Java, Bank of. 149 ..
Philippines, 11, 419; U.S.S.R., 392, 393; Javanese in M alaya, 270- >
Vietnam, 254, 419 Jayatilaka, Sir Baron, 29
Industries—heavy, 407, 414, 420: Japan. Jennings, Sir Ivor, 28
377, 421; Vietnam, 255, 256—light, 407, Jessup, Philip, 2-14
414, 420, see also Home industries: In
dia, 414; Vietnam, 255, 263
Jhansi, Rani of, 297
J i n n a h , M
^
Ah, 5
o h a m m e d
Inflation: China, 48, 382; India, 410; In Jogjakarta, Sultan of, 112, U3, u&, 121,
donesia, 105, 159, 160; M alaya, 299, 3-11, 135, 152, 195
South Asia, 362, 365, 371, 408 Johannes, 135
International Bank, 417 Johore-franchise, 341; Sultan of, 302
International Labour Organisation (II Josey, Alex, 341
275,411 ' Jute production and market, 421
International Monetary I'und, 408, 417
International Trade Organization, 409 Kachin, Burma, 35
International Youth Conference, Pracue Kahar Musakar, 125, 190
1948, 96 ’
Kahin, George McT., 10, 65 ff.
Internationalism, 385-<5: Asia, 21; Europe,
20-1—cultural: Philippines, 16
Kalimantan, Borneo see
Kaliwarang, Colonel, 153, 190
Iran, petroleum industry, 415
Irian, see New Guinea
Irrigation: Ceylon, 363, India, 363 Pa
Kang Yu-wei, 121
Karen, Burma, 8, 35, 366
Kartosuwirjo, S. M., 106 ff.
kistan, 362, 363
Isa Anshary, 189
Kashmir, 9, 62-3, 387, 394, 397
Kasnian Singodimedjo, 137
ff.
Isaak Mahdi, 172
Isidro, Antonio, 10
Kesatuan Muda Melayu (KMM, M alay
Youth Movement), 292, 307, 309
Iskak Tjokrohadisurjo, 143 Khan, Sir Syed Ahmed, 55
Islam, see also Moslem: and communism,
75, 79; and social justice, 56, 77; mod
Ki Bagus Hadikusuina, 137
Kiai Salleh, 291 f
ernization of, 73, 76; mysticism, 291 Konigl. Nederlands Indie Legcr (KNIL,
Royal Netherlands Indies Army), 116,
Jakin Permata, 137
Japan—Allied occupation of, 372 //.—at
117, 118, 120, 121-2, 123-4, 125
147, 152, 153
135, ff.,
tempts at self-suflicicncy, 414-comm u
nism, 374 ff.—democratization, 373—eco
Komite Nasional IndonesiaPoesat (KNIP,
Provisional Parliam ent, Indonesian R e
nomic recovery, 408-foreign trade, 377- public), 130,150
8, 408, 409. 421—National Civil Service Korea, 176, 385, 387, 394, 395
Law, 376—relations with: China, 375, Korean W ar, 394-5—as concern of: India,
377-9, 416; Indonesia, 191; Korea, 3 9 5 - 352, 390-1, 402; Indonesia, 175//.; J a
security, 379, 394-5, 416 pan, 374, 379; Philippines, 403; U.S.A.,
Japanese occupation, effects of, 4—in:
Burma, 35, 38, 241; China, 45, 46 ff.,
277;
175 ff., 244, 384, 387, 402; Vietnam, 246
369
IN D E X 441
Kosasih, 113 Laos, 216, 369, 39(5

Kripalani, Acharya, 62, 393
K risu b a n o , 100
LaArmy
skar ofRakjat Djawa Barat
West Java), 107
(People’s
Kuala Lumpur—Conference, 1946, 302-3; Laurel, President Jose P., 15
elections, 331, 333, 336, 310; Labor Leclcrc, General Jean, 200, 204, 220
Party, 333 Lcimena, Johannes, 113, 126, 135, 146, 195
Kuomintang 38. 39, 43/7., 31, 217, 380, 383. Lesser Sundas, 133, 136, 153
384, 393; influence in Malaya, 281-2. Li Hung-chang, 21
283, 293,304 Li Li-san, 46
Lincoln, Abraham, influence of, 41
Labor—conditions, 410: India, 273; Indo
nesia, 147, 149, 133, 134 ff., ff.;
138 Japan,
Lien Viet
260
(National Front), Vietnam, 246,
22; M alaya, 273//., 287, 288; Vietnam, I.im Tay Boh, 269
233—disputes: India, 360, 410; Indone Linggadjati Agreement, 1947, 211
sia. 139—10. 147. 153. 154, 138//., 18S-9; List, Georg F., 256
Japan, 37G; Malaya. 283, 298, 30G, 340- Literacy, 9, 26, 386, 411: Burma, 33; Indo
efliciency, 410—forced and compulsory': nesia, 147; Japan, 373; Malaya, 308, 318,
Indonesia, 71. 108, 150—indentured: Ma 332; U.S.S.R., 392
laya, 270, 271 //.—migration, 421: Ma Literature: Ceylon, 30-1, 32; China, 42;
laya, 269 ff-,
343, 344—legislation: China,
43; Indonesia, 76, 196; Malaya, 273//.,
India, 56; Malaya, 284, 285; Philippines,
334, 340, 368; U.S.S.R., 413—organiza Living, levels and standards of, 413, 414,
tion, 389: Burma, 37; China, 42, 44; In 422: China, 383; India, 360, 363, 410;
dia, 39. 410; Indonesia, 68. 70. 71. 83, 85. Indonesia, 129, 149, 157, 138, 180. 181.
86, 138, 139, 153, 138/7., 183, 188, 189; 196; Malaya. 269, 273. 299; Vietnam, 252.
Japan, 24; Malaya, 273, 282. 283-4. 298- 253, 256, 370
9, 306, 307, 310, 313, 316, 317. 335. 340; Longshoremen, Indonesia, 139, 140, 153-4
Singapore, 333; Vietnam, 262—parties: Lu Han, 242
Indonesia, see
331, 335; Netherlands, 117
Partai Buruh;
Malaya, Luat Siregar, 100, 134
Lucknow Conference, I.P.R., 1951, 3 7 ff-
Land—ownership: Burma, 38; China. 40- Lukman Wiriadinata, 195
1, 48. 382; India, 51, 3G1; Indonesia, 68, Luna, Juan, 17
76, 77, 104 ff.,
129, 149-50, 179, 367; Ma Lyon, Jean, 5
laya, 327, 328, 419; Pakistan, 361; Phil
ippines, 10-11, 370; Vietnam, 233; Is Ma Hing, 242
lamic assessment of 77—refonns, 389: Mabini, Apolinario, 12, 13-4, 17
Burma, 36, 366, 419; Ceylon, 363; China, MacArthur, General Douglas, 370
40, 43, 45, 46, 48, 382; India, 61, 361. 363;
Indonesia, 76, 77, 149-50; Japan, 373,
Macassar, 116, 117, 123-4, see also
Celebes,
South
377; Pakistan, 363; Philippines, 10-11; MacDonald, Gov. Malcolm, 311, 325
Vietnam, 252, 253-4, 419—shortage: In
MacGillivray, A. R. McG. of, 343
donesia, 78, 367; Pakistan, 362; Vietnam,
253—utilization: Malaya, 270; South McMichael, Sir Harold, 300, 301
Asia, 363 MacNair, Harley F., 43 ..
I.andon, Kenneth P., 8 Madiun rebellion, 1948, 90, 98/7-> 1 *
151, 173
Langen, General van, 126
Language problems: Burma, 33; Ceylon,
cil
MadjelisSjuroMuslimin
of Indonesian
I n d o n e s ia ( o
Moslem A ss o c ia tio n s ),
28, 30, 31-2; China, 42, 37. 381; India,
55, 56-7. 63; Malaya, 273, 285, 316, 318, see Masjumi
327, 332, 336/?.; Philippines, 12. Madura, 123, 133
326,
13, 14-5, 18 Mahavamsa
(Singhalese chronicle of Cey
Laoh, H., 113 lon), 30
442 IN D E X
Malacca: Chinese in, 271; M alay Union, Malaya, 270, 275, 276, 284, 286, 288, 305,
285 310, 327, 330, 331, 341; Pakistan, 362;
M alay Ladies Association, Johore, 308 Singapore, 335
M alay Nationalist Party, 307-8, 314, 315, Middle East, influence on Southeast Asia
323, 324 of, 284
Malay Society of Great Britain, 303 M ilitarism, 8, 355-6: China, 9, 43, 44, 52,
Malay Union
300 #., 308 ff.,(KesatuanMalayu),
315, 368
Malay Volunteers, 292
285, 291, 382; India, 52, 351-2, 361, 399; Japan,
21 #., 39, 373, 378, 379, 395; Korea, 395;
Pakistan, 399; Vietnam, 250
Malayan Chinese Association, 313, 326-7, M ilitary—equipment, 5, 413: Burma, 35;
331, 333, 334, 336, 344 China, 49, 177, 416; India, 360, 362; In
M alayan Communist Party, 311, 322#., donesia, 71, 98, 171, 188, 190, 193; Japan,
342 ff., see also Communism, Malaya
Malayan Democratic Union, 304#., 310,
379-80, 394; Malaya, 292, 293; Pakistan,
362; South Asia, 364; Vietnam, 207, 244,
311, 312, 314, 315, 320, 322-3, 324 245—training: Burma, 38; Indonesia,
Malayan Federal Legislative Council 326 70-1, 88, 120, 147, 151, 184; Japan, 24;
327, 332 Malaya, 292, 293, 297, 343; Philippines,
Malayan Indian Congress, 313, 315 317 18-19; Vietnam, 220, 244
333 Minahassa, 117, 120, 121, 127
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Ex-Com Mine labor, M alaya, 270
rades’ Association, 317 Minorities, 387: Burma, 8, 35, 37, 366; Cey
Malayan People's Republic, 279 lon, 29; China, 39 56; India, 56, 61; In
Malayan Trade Union Council, 331 dochina, 396; Indonesia, 112, 120, 367;
Malayan University, 307, 329 Kashmir, 398; M alaya, 270, 316, 338,
Malik, Adam, 101 344; Pakistan, 61; Southeast Asia, 365;
Manchuria, 49, 394 T hailand, 367; U.S.A., 338; U.S.S.R., 390
Manchus in China, 39-40
Mangunsarkoro, 85
see also
Missionaries, Christianity: Burma,
33, 35; Ceylon, 30, 32; New Guinea, 162,
Mansur, 127 166
Mao Tse-tung, 22, 46, 100, 141 172 241
381, 383
Mohammadijah
Borneo, 75, 137
(Moslem party faction),
Maquis, see Guerrilla Moluccas, 125, 126-7, 133, 136, 153, 162,
Marie, Andrd, 234
Marshall, General George C., 49.
see also
190, 367, Amboina, etc.
Moneylenders: Burma, 34, 35, 36, 37-8;
Marshall Plan, U.S.A., 76, 103, 364, 387, Indonesia, 78, 104#.; M alaya, 276, 286,
330
M artin, D., 16 Mononutu, Arnold, 113, 146, 195
Maruto Nitimihardjo, 101, 102, 189 Monroe Doctrine, 400
Maruyama, Masao, 20
Masjum i Council
(MadjelisofSjuro Muslimin Indo }.
Mook, Hubertus van, 95, 110, 114
Moslem national movements: Ceylon, 32;
nesia, Indonesian Moslem
Associations), 74#., 87, 89, 91, 106 109
China, 39, 54; India, 54 #., 62; Indone
sia, 7, 8, 67, 73#., 104#,. 170, 284, see
134, 135, 136, 137#., 141, 142, 144’ 185*
189, 191, 194, 195 '
also Masjumi; Kashmir, 397#.; M alaya,
279, 284, 314, 315; Pakistan, 7, 8, 38-9,
Maskoer, 137 361
M aulana Abul Kalam Azad, 55 Mudigdo, 189
Me Buu Loc, 239 Mukarto, 195
Medan, 141, 189 M unicipal elections, M alaya, 313 331 335
Middle class, 26, 358-9: Burma, 34, 35, 36, 336, 340
37: Ceylon, 31, 362; China, 40, 42, 43, Mus, Paul, 210
48, 382; India, 55, 59, 63, 362; Indonesia' Muîc, teaching of national, Philippines,
68, 69-70, 74, 75. 84-5, 91-2, 115, 183;
IN D E X 443
Musso, 93, 97. 98, 99, 100, 139 Nguyen van Tam, 246
Mustafa, 189 Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O. van, 108
Non-cooperation as nationalist method:
Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem
Indonesia, 75
organization), India, 53; Indonesia, 115
North Atlantic Pact, 400
National Economic Protection Association Northern Administration Committee,
(NEPA), Philippines, 11 Vietnam, 214, 218
National Union Front, Vietnam, 214
Nationalism—definition and phases, 6, 353, Onn bin Jaafar, Dato, 291, 302-3, 325, 329,
357—cultural, 386: Burma, 33-4, Cey 332-3, 334
lon,
53
300.;
ff., China, 21, 40, 41, 53; India,
61, 352; Indonesia, 67, 75-6; Japan,
Opium War, 1880, 40
Overseas France Ministry, 218
20 0.; 100., 0.,405ff.,
Malaya, 279, 281-2, 284
344, 365; Philippines,
315,
16//.—eco Pacific pact, proposal for, 400-1
nomic, 39, 357-8, 370-1, 386, Pahang, Sultan of, 292
413: Burma, 34, 37; China, 42, 381; In Pan-Asianism, 284, 286, 289, 290, 296
dia, 55, 56, 62, 352, 363; Indonesia, 79,
180; Japan, 220.; Malaya, 269, 307;
Philippines, 11, 19, 21—historic factors
Pandu Karta Wiguna, 102, 189
Pan-Islam movement, 73 0;
284
Pan-Malay movement, 285-6
in, 350, 353-4, 393: Ceylon, 30-31; China, Pan-Malayan Council, 314, 315
380-1; Indonesia, 162, 353; Malaya,
2690., 300; Vietnam, 205, 247
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions,
313, 314-5, SI6, 317
Nationalization of economic enterprise, 3,
41, 412, 418: Burma, 366; China, 382;
PantjaSila (Five Principles of I n d o n e s ia n
India, 418; Indonesia, 81, 82, 91, 101, Policy), 178 .
P arin d ra, see Partai Indonesia R a ja (G reat
102, 129, 149, 179; Japan, 378; Philip
Indonesia Party)
pines, 11; South Asia, 362-3; U.S.A.,
418; Vietnam, 254
Park indo, see Partai Kristen (C hristian
Party, Indonesia)
Natsir, Mohammad, 76, 80, 109, 134#.,
Partai Buruh(Labor Party), Ind°nesia,. 83,
Negara0.,Darul Islam
147 154, 163, 167, 168, 171, 175
(Islamic State of West 90, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 134, 138, 146,
Java), 107, 108
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 171, Partai
195
Buruh Indonesia Merdeka (Inde
287, 3490., 391, 400
Netherlands—Communist Party, 94; Labor
pendent Indonesian Labor Party),
-,
Party, 166
Netherlands-Indonesian Union, 167-8
Partai Comunis Indonesia
102
(C o m m u n is t
splinter party, Indonesia), 102
Neutrality and international obligations,
401: India, 418-9; Pa’-istan, 419
Partai Indonesia Raja (Parindra, *
Indonesia Party), 86#., 134, 1 >
New Democratic Youth League, Malaya, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 191, l92- 195 4
315, 316
New Guinea, Western (Irian), 72, 114, 133,
Partai Katolik, Indonesia, 134, 130,
144, 147, 148, 161 0., 182, 190-1, 196, 394, Partai Kedualtan Rakjat (Peope3 .
146,179,191,195
396-7 ereignty Party), Indonesia, 134
New Zealand, security, 380
Newspapers, 9, see also Communications:
Partai KomIndonesia,
donesia, unis and P83,artai90,K*nu««
f>‘
> £
’
128, 134, 138 ff., 146, 151 0
.,
Burma, 37; Ceylon, 28-9; Indonesia, 82;
159,160, 170,
Vietnam, 200 172/7., 185, 187, 188, 189, see also Com
Ngo dinh Diem. 219, 223, 224
munism: Indonesia
Nguyen Dynasty, 218, 220
Nguyen Phan Long, 235, 244, 246
Partai Komunis Merah_ (Red
In d o n esia
,
Indonesian Communist Party),
Nguyen van Sam, 214
444 INDEX
Partai KristenIndonesia (Parkindo, Indo Pedoman(Socialist newspaper, Indonesia),

nesian Christian Party), 91, 134, 135, 160
136, 142. 146, 164, 168, 170, 179, 191, 195 Peiris, Sir James, 29
Partai Murba (Proletarian Party), Indo Pellaupessy, M. A., 134, 136, 146
nesia, 86, 89, 90, 93, 100 ff., 134, 138, 139, P
141, 189
em uda Rakjat (People's Youth), Indone
sia, 139
Partai Nasional Indonesia, 83#., 89, 134, Penang Malay Union, 285
138, 141 ff., 179, 191, 192, 194#. People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO).
Partai N asion al Indonesia M erdek a (In Burma, 38, 366
dependent National Indonesian Party),
134, 136
PE RAM (Malay Revolutionary Youth
Movement), 323
Partai Rakjat (People’s Party), Indonesia, Persatuan Indonesia Raja (Greater Indo
101 , 102 nesia Union), 87 ff., 134
Partai R ak jat D jelata (Poor People's P ersatuan Rak jat Marhaen Indonesia
Party), Indonesia, 101, 102 (P E RM AI,
Partai Rakjat Nasional (National People’s tariat), 102 Union of Indonesian Prole
Party), Indonesia, 136
Partai R ak jat S osialis (Socialist People’s
Persaudaraan Sahabat Pena (Brotherhood
of Pen Friends), Malaya, 285
Party), Indonesia, 89, 90
Partai S arek at Islam Indonesia (PSSI, Is
lamic Indonesian Union Party), 74 ff.,
Personnel, shortage of trained: China, 382.
383; India, 60; Indonesia, 92, 119, 149,
155, 181-2, 367; Malaya, 289, 330; South
86, 106, 134, 136, 137, 142, 143
Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party), Indonesia, PESINDO(Socialist Youth Organization).
83, 88 ff., 91 93, 95, 97, 98, 99, 134, 135,
east Asia, 366
Indonesia, 99, 139

138, 142, 144, 146, 160, 168, 179, 185, Pham cong Tac, 209
195, see also Socialism: Indonesia Phan huy Dan, 238
Party systems: Burma, 33, 34, 37, 38; Cey Pibul Songgram. Marshall, 367
lon, 28, 359, 361; China, 43, 45, 48 ff.; Pignon, L<5on, 238, 245
France, 202 ff.; India, 52, 62, 359, 360 ff., Pilar, Gregorio del, 17, 18
390; Indonesia, 68 ff., 1 4ff., 134 ff., 187;
Japan, 375, 376; Malaya, 304/?., 331 ff.; Plantation—labor: Malaya, 269, 287, 288,
Pakistan, 360#.; Philippines, 370; Singa 310—regimes: Ceylon, 30; Indonesia, 81,
pore, 335; Vietnam, 205#., 215 139, 140, 155, 158, 159; Malaya, 269, 368
Pasundan, 108-9, 115#., 121-2, see also Police, political use of: Malaya, 343; Viet
Java, West minh, 201
Patel, Sardar Val’labha’i J., 60, 62, 391 Ponnambalam, Sir Arunachalam, 29
Paternalism as political principle: Indo Ponnambalam, Sir Ramanathan, 29
nesia, 87-8, 92, 114, 186; Vietnam, 254 Pontianak, general strike at, 123
Patriotism, 357-teaching of, see also Citi
zenship, Ethics: Indonesia, 67, 187, 188;
Population—exchanges, 61—growth
404-5, 413, 4*1: Ceylon, 361-2; India,
of,
Japan, 23#.; Malaya, 290, 291, 297, 304, 63, 361-2; Indonesia, 156, 180; Japan,
344; Philippines, 13; Vietnam, 202, 206* 377; Malaya, 269, 270, 271; Pakistan,
246, 248 361-2; Philippines, 370; Southeast Asia.
Payments, balance of, 405 366; Vietnam, 252, 253, 370-resettlc-
Peace Pledge campaign, Communist, 389 ment: Borneo, 421; Indonesia, 151 367*
Peasantry—organization of: Burma, 38; Malaya, 271, 326, 331, 342; Philippines’,
China, 43, 44, 46, 382; India, 59; Indo 370; Vietnam, 209
nesia, 70, 77, 139, 142—political affilia Prawoto Mangkusasmito, 137, 144, 194 195
tion: Indonesia, 84, 87-8, 142, 185- Preanger area, Java, 153, 189, 190; confer
status of, 389: China, 382, 383; Indone ences, 1948, 106-7, 108
sia, 76, 110, 129, 156, 185; Malaya, 270,
310, 331. 334
Prices, 404, see alsoInflation: Burma 37-
8; Indonesia, 157, 177; Malaya, 331,’ 334,
445
INDEX
Reinsch, Paul S., 26
340, 341, 368; T h ailan d , 367; Vietnam , R eligious factors in nationalism , 7: Burm a,
252, 255 8 33 #•>' Cam bodia, 8; Ceylon, 8, 32-3;
P rid i Phanam yong, 367
Prisoners, political: Indonesia, 116, 118,
China, 54, 259; India, 53 .6 0 .6 1 # ., ff.,
259; Indonesia, 8, 67, 73#., 129, 160, 179,
124 146 151, 162, 189-90; M alaya, 326, Japan, 20-1; Malaya, 270, 279, 284#.,
342’; South A sia, 361; Vietnam , 201, 210 291, 315; Pakistan, 8, 392; Philippines,
Production, 4 0 4 # . 8, 13-14; T h ailand, 8; Vietnam, 8, -,14,
P roletarian Party, Indonesia, see P a rta i 259, 261, 262
R enan, Joseph E., 24
P ro pagan d a, 7, 9, 371, 391-2, 393: Ceylon, Renville Agreement, 1948, 89, 90, a>, »/.
29; C hin a, 43, 48. 342, Anti-American, 106
50- In d ia, 389, 391; Indonesia, 99, 1/3, R e p a ra tio n s , damages ^
182, 391; M alaya, 275, 280, 290, 296, 297, R e q u is it io n s : Malava,
°n4 n 310 311 341, 342, 389; Pakistan, Vietminh, 201; West J a v a , I ^ ^
P ublic utilities: Indonesia, la9. M alaya, R" 363naindoncsia: 129; Malaya, 316;
289; Philippines, 10-11 • SfiV philippines'
Section of A ll-M alaya Council of Joi

Action), 316, 317,319, 320, 321,322 V s ; Thailand, 367; Vietnam, 2=2 p ^
Puthucheary, J. J-> 269 d u ctio n : Vietnam, *>2, 7
Puluhena, 124 So uth Asia, 363
Rizal, Jos6, 12, 13> 15* Jl3 u7 135,
Quezon, President M an ual L . 12 Roem , Mohammad, 76, 80,
° 37, 144, 166, 167, 195
R oiiiulo, General Carlos .,
N*‘ionaI Rousseau, Je an J ., 3?0
Congress), 222
R osas, President M anual A.,
R acialism , 358, 386, 390, ^ lo'g0 2 i’n(to- Roy, M. N., 6
Roy, Rammohun, 54
Royen, J. H. van, 117 anUfactUre:
Rubber—embargo » ^ —prices,
China, 177; I"donef‘a' ^ Nation fund,
12, 365; Southeast A sia, 3b5 331, 334, 368, proposed tfatah
R am ad ier, P au l, 203
R am akrish n a, Sri, 54
R an go on , lab o r supply, 35
413—taxation, 341 . 26-8,
R an ad iv e, B h alch an d ra T o m b a k , 360-
Ru4s1 effect o<: revolution on As.a,
R ash id R id a , 74 /P c c \ 7,
42,43, 46, 57-8, 360, 381
Rashlriya SwayamsevakSang (
Sakirm an, 134,1^ ’ 189
61, 360-1 Agus, 75,17
S a l i m , 2
R azakars, 360
Rees-Williams, £>•>M.P.. gl Samsu Harja Udaja.
R efu gees: In d ia , 61, 36 ; ^ ^ m Samsuddin 7 5 , 146
R e g io n a lism -c u ltu ra l. jn ter- Samsuridjal, 137
Sarawak, cession of, 3us Union)> In.
—econom ic, 400, 404#-, m ilitary,
national technical services, 411-mlUtary s arbupri (P lantation W orU
d o n e s ia , 139,
400 . ,- g iso , 191;
Sardjan, 195
R eh ab ilitatio n : Indonesia.
K orea, 395; M alaya, 303, *
^ p p j nes
1^ S a r d jo n o , 94, 9d
370; V ietnam , 209
446 INDEX
Sarek at Buruh Islam Indonesia (Indo Sino-Soviet

nesian Islamic Labor Union), 139
Treaty, 1950, 409, 415-6
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 74, 76, 79, 80,
Sarek at Buruh Revolusionari Indonesia Sjahrir,
(Union of Revolutionary Indonesian
113, 134, 135, 137, 156
Soetan, 69, 71, 81, 89, 90, 91-2, 97,
Labor), 138 101, 131, 138, 146, 162. 263
SaMerchant
rekat Dagang IslamIndonesia (Islamic Sjarifuddin,
Association of Indonesia), 78 107
Amir, 71, 82, 89, 90, 97, 98, 99,
SSaaPeasant
rekaatt Islam
rek ani, Indonesia,
TAssociation 74 ff., 106, 195
IslamofIndonesia (Islamic
Indonesia), 77
Sjaruzah, Djohan, 90
Slamet R ijadi, 153
SOBSI, see Sentral Organisasi
Sartono, 85, 144, 147 Social legislation and services, 386, 410,
Sastri, Srinavasa, 275, 288 422: China, 383; Indonesia, 76-7, 196;
Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 85 Malaya, 308, 334, 340 ff.; Singapore, 335;
SSchuman,
ayaSanrebellion, Burma, 34, 35
Robert, 234
South Asia, 362, 363; U.S.A., 387; Viet
nam, 252 ff.
Secret societies: China, 41; Malaya, 280-1, Socialism, 7, 2 6ff., 418, see also Com
283 munism and names of parties: Burma,
Security—economic, 387—internal, see also 34, 37, 366-7; Ceylon, 359, 361; China,
Banditry, Civil war: Indonesia: 150 ff., 41, 48, 382, 383; India, 56, 59, 359, 361;
189-90, 196 Indonesia, 69-70, 75 ff., 85, 86, 88 ff., 103,
Selangor, Sultan of, 341 179; Japan, 23, 376-7; Pakistan, 361;
Self-determination, 29, 357, 371, 386: Vietnam, 254
Burma, 36, 68; China, 41-2; India, 53, Societies Ordinance, Malaya, 307
68; Indonesia, 68, 87, 114, 116; Malaya, Soekarno, President, 9, 69, 70, 71, 84, 90, 99,
270, 305, 307, 334; Philippines, 68; Viet 101, 112, 118, 119, 124, 130, 132, 134, 140,
nam, 227ff., 232, 239, 248, 251, 369
Senanayake, Don Stephen, 29
141, 144, 145, 165, 170, 173, 178, 183, 185.
189, 191, 194, 195
Sentral
nesia Organisasi
(SO B SI Buruh Seluruh Indo
, All-Indonesian Central
Soepomo, 113, 129, 130
Soulbury, Lord, 29
Labor Organization), 99, 138, 139, 188-9 Soumokil, 124, 125, 153
Setiadjit, 95, 97, 98, 100 South Africa, Indians in, 394
Sewaka, R.U.S.I., 122, 145
Shankarrao Deo, 62
Soviet bloc, 402, see also
Socialist Republics
Union of Soviet
Sian incident, 47 Squatters: Malaya, 272, 326, 342, 368
Sidik Djojosukarto, 85, 145, 194 195
Silcock, T . H., 267ff. Straits Chinese British Association, 288
Strikes, see Labor disputes—outlawry of:
Siliwangi Division of Indonesian National Indonesia, 159, 160
Army, 109 Stuart, J. L., 49, 50
seesee
Silk, substitutes for, 407, 413 Students, .Education, higher move
Simatupang, Colonel, 121, 153 ments, Youth: China, 42, 43, 44, 47
Simbolen, 153 Subadio Sastrosatomo, 90
Simon, Sir John A., 36 Subardjo, Achmad, 145, 177, 191, 193, 194
Singapore—and Malay Union, 285, 306, 314 Subroto, Gatot, Colonel, 151, 153
—Chinese in, 271, 366—communist activi Sujono Hadinoto, 85, 86, 146, 157, 195
ties, 342-elections, 313, 335-General Sukarni, 97, 100, 101, 102
Labour Union, 282—Labour Party, 335_ Sukawati, 127
Indian Army Memorial, 297—Progressive Sukiman Wiriosandjojo, 75, 80, 137, 138,
Party, 335—revolutionary organizations,
323—schools, 331, 339—Students' Federa
145, 146, 147/7., 155, 160, 168, 178. 188
194
ff.,
tion, 282 Sultans, position in Malayan Constitution
Singh, M aharaja Hari, 397, 398
Singh, Mohan, 296
of, 301-2, 307, 309, 310
332
ff.,
315, 317, 326,
INDEX
447
Sumanang, 195
Sumatra, 153—rebellion, 1926, 93, 163-
Tentara IslamIndonesia (Indonesian Is
lamic Army), 107
East, 123, 127-8, 128 #.; Middle, 133;
North, 133, 141; South, 122, 133, 137,
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indo
nesian National Army), 106
152; West, 121
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 135, 154, 157,
Tentara Peladjar(Student array, West and
Central Java), 88, 152
195
Sumitro Kolopaking, 145
Tentara RcpnblikIndonesiaPeladjar(Stu
dent Army, Indonesia), 152
Sun Yat-sen, 22, 40, 41, 42-3, 44, 50
Sunario Mangunpuspito, 137 Textbooks: Ceylon, 32; Philippines, 12#.,
16. 17
Suparmo, 113
Suprapto, 190 Textile industry, 407, 413, 414; Ceylon, 362;
Surubaya, labor disturbances, 139, 153, 160, India, 360; Indonesia, 157; Pakistan, 362
189 Thai Federation, Indochina, 224
Surakarta rebellion, 1948, 98#., 151 Thailand, 365, 366, 367
Suripno, 99 Thakin Nu. 34
Suroso, R. Pandji, 136, 146, 195 Theocracy: West Java, 107
Susanto Tirtoprndje, 8:*, Thinh, 203, 217, 246
Suwarto, 146, 195 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 54
Suwirjo, 85, 145 Timor, 120, 121, 133
Synthetics, in competition with raw materi Tjokroaminoto, Harsono, 75, 136, 143
als, 407, 413 Tjokrosujoso, Abikusno, 75, 81
Tjugito, 189
Tadjuddin Noor. 87 Tongking, 214, 218, 224, 231, 241, 245, 248,
TaKungPao, 173
Tambunan, Albert M., 164, 168
255
Totalitarianism: Indonesia, 92, 158, 180,
Tam ils: in Ceylon, 29, 30, 31; in Malaya, 181, 183, 187; Japan, 20 #.. 374; Thailand.
see Indians
T an Cheng Lock, Dato, 320, 325, 326, 327,
366; Vietminh, 174, 201, 260
Tourism, 407
333, 334
T an Ling Djie, 97, 100. 139
Trade unions, see Labor organization
Traditionalism, cultural, 386: Japan, 24-5;
T an M aiaka, 89, 93, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, Malaya, 269; Philippines, 12-3, 15-6,
107, 146 17, 21
Tandionu Manu, 135 Tran van Him, 246
Tandjong Perak, 153 Transportation: China, 382; Indonesia,
Tandjong Priok, 153, 188, 189 147, 157, 159; Malaya, 269; South Asia,
Tandon Purushottamdas, 62 363
Tariff, role in Asian economics of, 11, 409 Trotskyism: Indonesia, 93
Taxation: Indonesia, 77, 108, 133, 150; Truman, President H. S., 244, 384
Singapore, 335; South Asia, 362; U.S.S.R., Truong dinh Tri, 208, 214
415 Trusteeship, international, suggested for:
Technical aid, 5, 371, 412: Indonesia, 193; Formosa, 396; Kashmir, 399; Malaya,
Vietnam, 263 368; Western New Guinea, 397
Technical moderation, 21, 358, 410, 411,
417, 420, seealso Industrialization, West
TuVe (“Self-defense” corps of Vietminh),
199, 201
ernization: Ceylon, 362, 365; China, 45,
383; India, 351, 362, 365; Indonesia, 157, Ukar Bratakusumah, 146
181; M alaya, 269, 330; Pakistan, 362, 365; U Kyan Myint, 37
U.S.S.R., 392 Unemployment and underemployment:
Tedjasukmana, Iskandar, 146, 195 Malaya, 274; Vietnam, 254
Templer, Sir Gerald, 343 Ungku Abdul Aziz, 267 #.
INDEX
448
Union of Soviet Republics, 26-8, 58, 384, 418—and Korean War, 175#., 244, 384,
388 ff., see also Communism, R u ssia-
economic development, 257, 258—eco
387, 389-90-Marshall Plan, 76, 103, 364,
387, 407, 417—military treaties, 393, 4 0 0-
nomic foreign relations, 415-6, with Mutual Security Agency, 192 #.—relations
Southeast Asia, 408-9—relations with: with: Asia, 386 ff.,401; Burma, 194; Cey
China, 43, 49 ff., ff.,
58, 172 383, 384, 389,
409, 415-6; India, 389-90, 391; Indonesia,
lon, 364; China, 172, 175, 384; Common
wealth, 364; Formosa, 175; India, 194,
70, 83, 95-6, 97-8, 100, 102, 103, 138, 364; Indonesia, 71, 83, 95, 103, 117, 140,
170 ff., 196, 391; Korea, 395; Pakistan,
391; U.S.A., 388; Vietnam, 200, 202, 242,
158, 160, 164, 167, 169#., 174, 180, 192-3,
196; Japan, 25, 377 #.; Pakistan, 194, 364;
244, 246, 249—self-sufficiency, 413—tech U.S.S.R., 169#., 200, 390; Vietnam, 174,
nical aid from, 415 175, 241, 242, 244, 369, 384, 396-self-suffi
United Malaya National Organization, 285, ciency, 413—strategic interest, 418, 4 1 9-
333, 336 trade with Asia, volume of, 405, 4 0 6-
United Malays National Organization, 285, White Paper, 1949, 49
302
325
ff.,
ff., 306, 307, 309, 311, 314, 317, 323,
331,332ff.
United States of Indonesia, Constitution of,
128#.
United Nations, 385, 388—action on Indo Usman, Fakih, 137, 195
nesia. 89, 90, 95, 107,see also Renville
Agreement—admission of Indonesia, 7 2 - Vandenbosch, Amry, 150
Assembly, 401, 402—Charter, 302, 400- Van Ly Tran, 208, 219
relations with: Asia, 401ff.; Burma, 172;
China, 384, 395; Formosa, 395-6; India,
Varenne, Governor General, 249
Versailles, Treaty of. 1919, 42
172, 391, 394. 398-9, 402; Indochina, 396;
Indonesia, 117, 147, 161. 167, 171ff., 182,
Vietminh, 39—transformation of, 205
Vietnam—Indonesian attitudes toward,
ff.
191; Japan, 374, 379; Korea, 395, 401-2,
see also Korean W ar; Malaya, 302, 306,
173 ff.
Village improvement: Ceylon, 410; India,
368; Pakistan, 172, 394, 398-9; South 61, 410
Asia, 364, 371; U.S.A., 401, 402-Security Vinh Thuy, 212
Council, 401, 402—technical services, Visman, F. H., 119
411, 416-7 Vivekananda, Swami. 54
United Nations Economic Commission for Vo Nguyen Giap, 207
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 411, 416 Vreeden, General Ruurman van, 126
United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 411, Wachid Hasjim, 113, 136, 137, 146
416 Wacre—policies: Inrlonesia, 76, 81, 153-4,
United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICF.F), 416
158 ff.;
Malaya, 273 ff.,
334, 340; Vietnam,
254—remittances, from Malaya, 275, 304
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation War damage: Indonesia, 158, 180, 191-
Administration (UNRRA), 387 reparations, 377,413
United Nations World Health Organisa Ward, Angus, 384
tion (WHO), 416 Watnick, Morris, 5
United States of America—aid, 5, 372, 388, Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 393
400, 411-2, 417-9, 420-1: to China, 49- Wcrdoio, 189
50; France, 174, 175, 242, 369; Indonesia, Westerling, Capt. Paul, 109, 121-2, 181, 182
158; Japan, 377-8; South Asia, 364; Viet
nam, 242, 244, 245, 396—Economic Co
Westernization. 9, 27-8: Ceylon, 28
China, 21-2, 40 ff., ff.,
33;
48, 262; India, 52, 54;
operation Administration: and Indo Indonesia, 6S, 73, 87, 99, 180; Japan,
nesia, 72, 158, 170, 180, 193, 417#.; and
Vietnam, 244—educational policy, 338—
21 ff.;
nam, 262
Malaya, 269; Philippines, 11; Viet
F.xport Import Bank, 158, 174, 180, 372— Wibisono, Jusuf, 76, 137, 146
and Kashmir dispute, 387—lend-lease, Wikana, 100
449
INDEX
Yamashiia, Gen. Toinoyuki, 296
Wilopo, 85, 113, 195
Yamin, Mohammad. 146
Wilson, President Woodrow, 29 Yenbay mutiny, 1930, 249
W iranata Koesoema. 108, 122 Yoshida, Shigeru, 191
Wolf, Charles, Jr., 188 Youth organizations: Burma, 33; Ceylon,
Women—immigration of: Malaya, 276-7, 33; Indonesia, 75-6, 81', 88, S9, 96, 102,
308—status of, India, 61; Malaya, 297, 139 1)2, 189; Japan, 373; Korea, 410;
315 Malaya, 2S2, 292, 315, 316, 323; Philip
Wondoamiscno. 82, 137 pines, 12; Vietminh, 199, 201, 237, 246
Wongsoncgoro, 87, 13:), 146 Yuan Shih-kai, 42
World Federation of Trade Unions, 96 Yugoslavia, 208, 237
Wjnthanu (General Council of Buddhist
Zakat (tithes), 77
Associations), Burma, 33, 34, 37 Zamindars, India and Pakistan, 361, 362.
Xuftn, G e n e ral, 217. 218, 223, 224,228, 229, 363
Zhdanov, 96
235, 236, 244, 246
3 2 0 .1 5 8
lio l
pNGARANG : H o lla n d , W illia m L .
ju d u l : A c ic -n n a t io n a lis m an d th e W est*
TAN GGA L
N a m Q
P l n j a m K e m b a l i
------ --
------------- ----------------
----
----------------------------------------- 1
3 2 0 ,1 5 0 — :
llo l H olland , W illiam L*
a Asian nationalsm and tlie tfesV

File

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

File

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

>.

The Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial and non-partisan organization,

THE M A C M I L L A N COM PANY

1 East 54th St., New York 22

h e o m i n o u s m a r c h o f events in A sia since the ou tb reak of the Korean

T w ar has served to heighten the p u b lic interest in the o ld er and more

For assistance in preparing the introductory chapter and in editing the

International Secretariat W IL L IA M L. H OLLAN D , E ditor

Part One INDONESIAN PO L IT IC S AN D N A T IO N A L ISM by

I. M ajor Indonesian P olitical O rganizations and Programs

II. Political D evelopm ents Since the T ran sfer of Sovereignty

7. T he M ovem ent fo r a U nitary State HI

9. The Structure of the New State 128

Part Three N ATION ALISM IN M A L A Y A by T . H. Silcock and

Part Four SUMM ARIES OF LU C K N O W CONFERENCE DIS­

N E W TRENDS IN A SIA N N A T IO N A L ISM

a force o f such m agnitude and persistence in

W h at is the new phase of Asian nationalism ? Few serious attem pts

even r r : T are, hard t0 describe in people!

th e ’ l n d S Z n tt;Pr 0 M klNg R oy w h o ^ r d ' A " “ i * * h“ IeC“ t,y b ee" o !t m d *

considerable potential risk. On the one hand extrem ist or chauvinist

natfon?^adi°Wr g’ am l. sometimes menacing, the stability of the new

Chicago 1949ler aCC° Um Kenneth P’ Landon- Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religion,

happened in T hailan d . M oreover, it adds enorm ously to the financial

fo rt to expound the so-called Five V irtues (Pantja Silo)* represents a

P h ilip p in e nationalism has n o t been confined to the p o litica l phase It

poT teritVldCr e m‘CtraSPeCtS' ? “ Pre” rV“ ion ° f the ^

generations, the C o m t k u t T o n ^ im ^ n a tio n a l resources fo r la te r

on the BelfA^t^hereb^Uie^Conslitution0^ ^ 1946 dUrinS the discuss;° ns

secure advantages fro m the A m erican g o vern m en t w hich w o u ld have been im ­

Kartilla by Bonifacio; Sa Mga Tagabangon ng Bayang Filipino by Mabini, and

ism w as le d by G e n e ra l C arlos P. R o m u lo , S ecretary o f F oreign A ffairs. H e

o n ly p a trim o n y o f th y race, th e o n ly in h e ritan c e o f th y an cestors an d the

W h e n A m erica came and proclaim ed the separation o f the C h u rch an d State

lum o f the different coll* acc°niplishm ent o f this -C artS’ llte ra tu re

ric u la r activities. A m o n g th em are the fo llo w in g : a lo yalty pledg e d u rin g the

T h e objective o f the new p la n o f observing these even ts in an im pressive

a L L r t h e ncteTnsmoU£Stan« CeS5arily ^ inten* and mOTe resolute than

strucdone in a^9M af hor,iz"d £° be “ ed as an a u x ilia ry m ed iu m o f in-

o p e ra tio n w ith p erso n n e l o f the B u re a u o f P u b lic Schools. A cco rding to the

One m a jo r difference was that Jap an in the second h a lf o f the 19th

flip ro n n frv n r u S„ Lr0lve

G e n e ra lly speaking, m odern nation-states in E urope w ere b o rn o u t o f the

ness in E u ro p e, as i t grew u p w ith in each n a tio n , recog nized fro m the ve ry

coOTdLidtion°wi,hnl mOVem5nt ° f J aP anese nationalism have grow n u p in close

W ith few exceptions, the nationalist m ovem ent am ong the p eo p le in Ja p a n

fa m ily o f th e e n tire n a tio n an d th a t the E m p ero r was the su p rem e h e ad o f a ll

an d this in te rn a l dissension co n tin u ed to the end. T h e m ovem ent in all its

Outside Japan, Asian nationalism , operating not through b u t against

th a / th V ^ t . W PthS ° f n a tive life h a ve n o t b een stirred , b u t signs are p le n tifu l

New YoUr l ’^ w f 1 pp- 1Cb"06’ 108. Remsch was later

carried o u t an extensive p lanned developm ent beginning in the late

h a lesre'fK an d y^ n ^ an c^ L m v^ b 61^ C e>'lonC5e: th ere w ere B u rg h ers, Sin-

invemed in the prese^^century.11. * ^ aS * ^

tran slatio n s o f th E nglish ^ P -p o se s

vo ted to in te rn a tio n a l new s h ad to be sm all because cables w ere exp en sive—

o th e r caste w ith w h ite faces th a t those w ith b ro w n faces w e re in fe rio r. I t m ust,

w a n te d to fo rce p a re n ts to sp eak S in h a le se o r T a m il to th e ir c h ild re n . T h e ru le

mass o f th e p e o p le h a ve re m a in e d B ud dh ists, H in d u s a n d M uslim s. B ritish to l­

Some Characteristics of Burm ese N ationalism

rated in to the governm ent-regulated system o f education, received no gov­

blam ed by B u rm a’s nation alist leaders fo r allow ing unrestricted Indian

3 m - T !! OX1CaUy' thOUgh Burmese nationalism has had an im p ortan t

feet in 1937, u n d er the terms of the G overnm ent of B urm a A ct of 1935.)

Part Four SUMM ARIES OF LU C K N O W CONFERENCE DIS

secure advantages fro m the A m erican g o vern m en t w hich w o u ld have been im

mass o f th e p e o p le h a ve re m a in e d B ud dh ists, H in d u s a n d M uslim s. B ritish to l

rated in to the governm ent-regulated system o f education, received no gov

T h e M asjum i (M adjelis Sjuro M uslim in Indonesia— Council of In

an d ap p ro ved by S jarifu d d in as Prim e M inister, his C abinet, and a ma

nesian Socialist Party. Knowledge of his ideas provides a general under

of the N etherlands governm ent. In this they m et no success; b u t in at

w hich supported the rebellion) had to be cleared by judicial hearing be