‫مؤمن البيومي البيومي عبيد‬/ ‫األسم‬

)‫بحث المقاصد (الفرقة الرابعة‬/ ‫الموضوع‬

‫سمير الشيخ‬/‫إشراف البروفيسور‬
‫أحمد حمزة‬/‫البروفيسور‬

Introduction
Nobody would contest that the provisions and ordinances of any divine law
(Shari’ah) instituted for humankind aim at certain objectives intended by God
(SWT), the Wise Lawgiver. It is proven beyond any dispute that God does not act
in vain, as is plainly shown in His fashioning of the creation. Thus, we are informed
in the Qur’an: “For [thus it is:] We have not created the heavens and the earth
and all that is between them in mere idle play. None of this have We created
without [an inner] truth: but most of them do not understand it” (44:38–39), and,
“Did you, then, think that We created you in mere idle play, and that you would
not have to return to Us...?” (23:115). Moreover, one of the most important
qualities of human beings is their God-given disposition for, and acceptability of
civilization, whose greatest manifestation is the making of laws to regulate their
lives.

God sent messengers and revealed laws (Shari’ah) only for the purpose of
establishing human order. As He says: Indeed, [even afore-time] did We send
forth Our apostles with all evidence of [this] truth; and through them We
bestowed revelation from on high, and [thus gave you] a balance [wherewith to
weigh right and wrong], so that men might behave with equity.]
The Islamic Shari’ah is the greatest and most upright of all laws, as indicated by
the Qur’an: “Behold, the only [true] religion in the sight of God is Islam” (3:19).
This is expressed by the use of the grammatical form denoting both exclusivity
and intensity. Hence, when we find that God has described the revealed Books
preceding the Qur’an as books of guidance and called them “religion” (dÏn), as in
this verse: “O followers of the Gospel! Do not overstep the bounds [of truth] in
your religion” (4:171), referring to Moses’ law, and when He says: “In matters of
religion, he has ordained for you that which He had enjoined upon Noah – and
into which we gave thee [O Muhammad] insight through revelation, as well as
that which We had enjoined upon Abraham, and Moses, and Jesus: Steadfastly
uphold the religion, and do not break up your unity therein” (42:13), and when
we find that He calls what is mentioned here shari’ah, as in the following verse:
“Unto every one of you is appointed a [different] law and way of life. And if God
had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community”(5:48);
when we find, on the other hand, that God describes the Qur’an as the best of all
of them, then we know for certain that the Qur’an is the best and most exalted of
all guidance.
In this connection, God says [about the Torah]: “Verily, it is We who have
bestowed from on high the Torah, wherein there was guidance and light” (5:44),
after which He says [about the Gospel]: “And We caused Jesus, son of Mary, to
follow in the footsteps of those [earlier prophets], confirming the truth of
whatever there still remained of the Torah, and as a guidance and admonition
unto the God-conscious” (5:47). Thus, God attributes two properties to the
Qur’an: its confirmation of the truth of earlier revelations, that is, the laws
brought by the Torah and the Gospel that have not been abrogated by the
Qur’anic Revelation; and its guidance over previous revelations concerning those
laws in the Torah and the Gospel that it has abrogated as well as the
fundamentals of the Shari¢ah that it has Introduced.
Accordingly, the Qur’an is superior in the sense that it bears witness to the truth
and reveals alterations of previous revelations. All divine laws, and particularly the
Islamic Shari’ah, have come down for the benefit of humankind both now and in
the future. By “the future” we are not referring to matters of the Hereafter, for
divine laws do not determine how people should behave in the afterlife. Instead,
God has made people’s status in the Hereafter the result of their conduct in this
world. What we rather mean is that some provisions (ahkam) of the Shari’ah, such
as the prohibitions of drinking or selling wine, may seem to entail hardship and
harm to those under obligation and that the latter are thus made to forsake some
benefits. However, when we reflect on these provisions, we discover their real
benefits in relation to the ultimate consequences of things. From an inductive
examination (istiqr’) of numerous indicants in the Qur’an and the authentic
Prophetic traditions, we can with certainty draw the compelling conclusion that
the rules of the Islamic Shari’ah are based on inner reasons (ikam) and causes
(asbab) that devolve upon the universal goodness and benefit of both society and
individuals, The maqasid of the Shari’ah naturally reflect on the Shari’ah itself in
that the goals of the Shari’ah arise from the Shari’ah and are in many ways
affected by developments in the Shari’ah itself, the history of ijtihad, and major
developments in the applied law and custom of society. Developments relating to
the ahkam (legalrules), ijtihad and fatwas have largely been influenced by the
minutiae of fiqh writings that focused on particular cases and incidents at the
expense sometimes of the broader goals and purposes of the Shari’ah.
Similarly, the textualist orientations of fiqh are manifested in the legal theory of
usul al-fiqh and both remained focused on analysing the text at the expense often
of the overall goal and objective of the Shari’ah. Theoretical expatiation into the
higher purposes of the Law and the quest to explore the intent of the Lawgiver
were generally not encouraged. The maqasid or purpose of the text was only
recognised when the text declared it as such, a position which to all Intents and
purposes extended the textualist approach of usul al-fiqh also to the maqasid. The
onset of taqlÏd (indiscriminate imitation), which advised unquestioning adherence
to the authority of the past jurists and imams, added to the problem. The maqasid
based approach was consequently marginalised so much so that many a
reputable text of usul al-fiqh did not even assign a section or chapter to the study
of the maqasid, and it was not until al-Shtibi (d. 1388) that the maqasid were
treated as a credible theme in its own right, and an instrument also of flexibility
within the corpus juris of the Shari’ah. However, the maqasid still remained
marginal to the mainstream usul al-fiqh, but made a comeback only in the latter
part of the twentieth century.
It is due to their focus on real life issues of vital concern to people’s welfare that
the maqasid became the focus of renewed attention in recent decades, attested
by numerous doctoral dissertations, books, and conferences that sought to
further develop this important chapter of the Shari’ah. A mere glance at the five
essential maqasid, namely life, intellect, religion, property and family, shows that
the maqasid are concerned with protection of basic values of interest to all
human beings.This is a different approach to that of the usul al-fiqh that proposes
certain methodologies for ijtihad of relevance only indirectly to the protection of
basic values. In its long history of development, the usul methodology has also
become burdened with technicality and literalism.
Meaning and Definition of Maqasid:
Maqasid (singular: maqasid) refers to the goals and purposes of the Shari’ah
either generally (i.e. al-maqasid al-‘mmah), or in reference to its particular themes
and subjects (al-maqasid al-khssah). Three other Arabic words that occur in the
relevant literature of usul al-fiqh and convey similar meanings to maqasid are
hikmah (wisdom), ‘illah (effective cause/ratio legis), and maslahah (interest,
benefit) respectively. A briefreview is followed by the definition of maqasid.
Hikmah in the sense of wisdom looks toward the positive end or purpose of
conduct, and in the works of Muslim jurists it refers to the wisdom and end-result
of legislation, accomplishment of a desired benefit or its perfection. hikmah (pl.
hikam) may signify a beneficial consequence of the Shari¢ah asa whole, or ofa
particular ruling thereof. It also signifies the objective of legislation, in which case,
hikmah would be synonym to maqasid . It is unusual, however, to use maqasid or
maqsid in reference to God the Most High, such as Maqasid Allah, although
maqasid al-Shari’ah – objectives of the Lawgiver – is commonplace, which is why
Muslim jurists normally use hikmah in reference to Allah. One can, of course, use
both hikmah and maqsid almost interchangeably in reference to the Shari’ah
'Illah signifies two meanings, namely cause, as in cause and effect, but also more
technically in the context of legislation it refers to the effective cause and
attribute of a ruling (hukm) of the Shari’ah for which it was legislated. For al-midÏ
(d. 1233), ‘illah refers to the effective cause, or the hikmah and benefit the
Lawgiver has considered in introducing a law. This evidently brings ‘illah very close
to maqsid, as per Mustafaal-Zarqa who wrote: “’illah could signify the hikmah of
legislation in reference to the attraction of benefit or prevention of harm that
may be sought through a legal command or prohibition.”This would equate ‘illah
to maqasid and make it synonymous with the goal and objective, or ghayah of the
Shari’ah.
Some scholars may add, however, that ‘illah is normally tied to the existing text
and status quo of the law, whereas hikmah in the sense of end-result and purpose
looks equally to the presentand future and is also not so closely tied to the
specificities of the text. In their discussions of the ‘illah of analogy (qiyas) the usul
scholars have stated that ‘illah must be constant and unchangeable (mundabit)
whereas hikmah need not meet this qualification.
The usul writers have used maslahah almost interchangeably with maqsid and
many have considered them as convergentand coterminous. There is a distinction
between maslaha and maqsid, the tendency of equating these two concepts is
partially accountable for the marginalisation of maqasid in mainstream usul al-
fiqh. From an essentialist viewPoint, there is no objection, of course, as masalih
and maqasid are parallel concepts and look at basically the same values. Yet we
also Know that maslaha, especially the unrestricted maslaha (maslaha mursalah)
became controversial in usulÏ thought as it represented a certain departure from
the textualist proclivities usul al-fiqh. Only The MalikÏ School recognised maslaha
as a source of law in its own right, but all the other schools gave it partial
recognition and stipulated it with many conditions. The substance of the
scholastic critique of maslaha is based on the specious argument, as many have
advanced, that the nusus of Qur’an and Sunnah encapsulate most, if not all, the
benefits and that a maslaha outside this sphere can only be recognised if it can be
connected to a recognised principle of Shari’ah. Maslahah mursalah would in this
way be likely to be reduced to a form of analogical reasoning (qiyas). This is the
substance basically of the Shafi’Ï critique of maslahah mursalah. To equate the
maqasid with masalih, as is the case with mainstream usul al-fiqh, one would be
indirectly inviting the polemics of maslahah also to the maqasid and the tendency
thereby to subsume the latter under the rubric of the usulÏ thought and
methodology, which would clearly undermine the place and prominence of
maqasid as a distinctive source and chapter of Shari¢ah in its own right.
Early pioneers of the maqasid, such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazaly, Izz al-DÏn Abd al-
Salam (d. 1262), and al-ShatibÏ who wrote on the maqasid did not attempt a
definition for it on the assumption Perhaps of the linguistic clarity of the word
itself. This can no longer be an adequate explanation due mainly to the sheer
scope and diversity of writings on the subject that has developed ever since, both
in the Arabic and other languages. Hence the need for a definition, which was,
however belatedly, attempted by twentieth-century scholars such as Ibn Ashur,
Allal al-Fasi, al-Qaradawi, Al-Zuhayliand others, who defined the maq¥|id and also
stipulated a number of conditions a valid maqasid must meet.
Al-Raysuni who wrote a book on al-ShatibÏ’s theory of the maqasid concurred that
it was due most likely to the linguistic clarity of maqasid that such a prominent
contributor to the subject did not attempt a definition. The renowned hadith-
cum-legal maxim, al-umuru bi-maqsidiha (human affairs are judged by reference
to their purposes) was commonplace and frequently cited from early times.
Ibn Ashur (d. 1973) defined the general objectives (maqasid ‘ammah) of the
Shari’ah as “the deeper meanings (ma’anÏ) and inner wisdom (hikam) that the
Lawgiver has contemplated in respect of all or most of the Shari’ah ordinances
[…].” Allal al-Fasi (d. 1964) also defined the maqsid as “the hidden meanings (al-
asrar) and wisdom that the Lawgiver has considered in the enactment of all of the
Shari’ah ordinances.” The two definitions differ only slightly in that according to
al-Fasi none of the laws of the Shari’ah is without a purpose, whereas Ibn Ashur
put it that “all or most of the Shari’ah ordinances” have their purposes. Al-Fasi’s
usage of “hidden meanings – al-asrar” invites criticism as it would fail to meet Ibn
Ashur’s four conditions that the general goals of the Shari¢ah must qualify.
These are: firm, evident, general, and exclusive (thabit, zahir, ‘amm,tard). Other
jurists have generally concurred with the analysis that virtually all of the laws of
the Shari¢ah have their purposes; the doubt emerges, however, whether they are
all known to us, since they are not always declared in the clear text.
Al-Qaradawi noted that “maqasid al-shari’ah consist of the attraction of benefits
(al-masalih) to the people and repelling of harm and corruption (al-madar wa al-
mafasid) from them.” Muhammad al-Zuhayli has given a more detailed definition
of maqasid as “the ultimate goals, aims, consequences and meanings which the
Shari’ah has upheld and established through its law and consistently seeks to
realise, materialise and achieve them at all times and places.” Maqasid,according
to al-Raysuni, signify “the end-goals for which the Shari’ah has been promulgated,
namely to realise benefit (masllahah) for God’s servants.
Technicalities apart, almost all the definitions of maqasid are focused on
realisation of benefits for human beings, that is, for the individual and society,
indeed for all people, regardless of any distinction of status, colour and creed,
both in this life and the Hereafter. The benefits/interests include temporal and
utilitarian interests of concern to the material, moral and spiritual aspects of
human life in this world and the next. Protection of religion is one of the essential
maqasid, yet our general reading of the source evidence informs us that the lives
and properties (also among the essential maqasid) of non-Muslims are sacrosanct
and that justice and fair dealing under the Shari’ah are inclusive of both Muslim
and non-Muslims alike.
Maqasid IN THE Qur’an:
The Qur’an is expressive in numerous places of the benefits, Goals and purposes
of its messages. The Qur’an characterises itself as “guidance and mercy” (hudan
wa rahmatan) (10:57) and the prophethood of Muhammad as “a mercy to the
worlds” (21:107).Mercy and rahmah also characterise the most favourite of all the
99 excellent Names of God: these are al-Rahman and al-RahÏm(Most Merciful,
Most Compassionate), both of which signify that compassion (rahmah) is a
cardinal goal and purpose of Islam. More specifically, the purpose of the law of
retaliation (qisas) in the Qur’an is to protect life (2:179); the purpose of jihad is to
fight injustice (22:39); the purpose of prayer is to repel immorality and evil
(29:45), and of the alms tax is to prevent circulation of wealth in the hands only of
the rich (59:7). The same can be said of the prohibitive injunctions of the text that
seek to protect people against harm, prejudice and injustice.
The frequent invocations in the Qur’an for people to think and exercise their
reason especially for those who possess knowledge(4:83), prompted the Prophet
to speak in condemnation of those who “utter the Qur’an without ever letting it
(its meaning) go down their throat.” The purpose is to provide guidance, as one
observer put it: “the cardinal objective of Qur’an that runs through the entire text
is to provide guidance to individuals and societies, to educate, improve and
reform the people, to enable them to build the earth.” The development of the
genre in Qur’an interpretation known as tafsÏr mawdu’Ï (thematic interpretation),
which seeks to consolidate isolated verses into thematic clusters, signified a step
towards the development of a goal-oriented tafsÏr. The thematic tafsÏr proceeds
on the assumption of an essential unity of a number of verses throughout the text
on the one and the same subject.
The ayat al-ahkam, numbered at about 350 (out of the total of 6,235) verses had
to be confined to a limited number due to the somewhat restrictive criteria of
their selection. The rule-based verses were thus identified as ones with a practical
import that sought to regulate the manifest and practical aspects of human
conduct. This is because legal ordinances are typically concerned with commands
and prohibitions that relate to the externalities of conduct and their provable
consequences.
The ayat al-ahkam were thus confined to practical rulings(ahkam’amalÏ)whose
violation could also be proved by admissible evidence. But since the Qur’an was
not meant to be a law book but a source of moral and spiritual guidance, one
could conceive its rule-based verses somewhat differently to incorporate, for
instance, not only practical rulings, but also verses and sections of the Qur’an on
the essence of faith, prophethood, moral themes, encouragement and warning
(targhÏb wa tarhÏb), stories and parables and matters of concern to the hereafter
and so forth that share a common purpose. All of these could become part of the
data that could justify extraction of the ayat al-ahkam from a much wider
selection of verses.

Maqasid and Sunnah:

There are also ahadith which lay down practical rulings, commands, and
prohibitions that demand performance and constitute the actionable laws (ahkam
‘amaliyyah) of the Sunnah. A great deal of the legal hadith support and
supplement the legal verses of the Qur’an by way either of elaboration,
specification, or qualification of the qur’anic injunctions of concern to human
conduct. These may include worship matters (‘ibadat) and civil transactions
(mu’amalat), but they also introduce, albeit on a limited scale, new rulings of the
Shari¢ah on which the Qur’an may be silent.
AhadÏth al-ahkam are larger in number compared to the ayat al-ahkam.
According to an estimate attributed to Abu Hamid Al-Ghazaly the legal hadith
number at about 1,200 according to the traditional usull methodology of
selection. Determining the precise number, whether of the rule-based verses or
ahadÏth, would much depend on the methodology and purpose of the selection.
Unlike the Qur’an which does not pose any question over the authenticity of its
text, the hadith does, and so does the selection of ahadÏth al-ahkam from the
large bulk of hadith: if one proposes a maqasidÏ approach to the selection of
ahadith al-ahkam, one would need to verify the authenticity of the hadith in the
first place. Yet the issue over authenticity of the ahadÏth al-ahkam may not be as
challenging as that of the bulk of the hadith itself. This is because the ahadÏth al-
ahkam are generally verified and adopted into the body of fiqh and the applied
laws of the Shari’ah, often endorsed by general consensus and continuous
practice.

Since the thematic tafsÏr(tafsÏrmawdu’Ï) has already gained general acceptance

in the genres of Qur’an hermeneutics, one may propose the same
approach to ayat al-ahkam: Thematic unity in the larger body of hadith
and chapterisation of its existing collections has to some extent been
attempted, just as the so-called Sunan category of hadith purports on
the whole to compile only the legal hadith. The effort to ascertain
thematic unity in hadith is, moreover, likely to strike a note with that of
the ayat al-ahkam – since much of the legal hadith reiterate or
supplement the ayat al-ahkam. Thus it is likely that only a smaller
number of hadith, in the ahkam category at least,would be left for an
independent attempt at classification on the basis of theme and
purpose. If one were to assimilate the general purpose, spirit and
rationale of the hadith consistently with the Qur’an, the criteria of
selection of hadith into the ahkam category should roughly be the same
as one would propose with regard to the ayat al-ahkam.
Furthermore, the circumstantial element in hadith is larger compared
to the Qur’an as a great deal of hadith are known to have addressed
particular situations that may or may not amount to laying down a
general law or hukm of the Shari’ah. It is therefore important that in
reading the hadith, one is aware of its original occasion and context,
and avoid, as Ibn Ashur has warned, the temptation of engaging in
literalism. “For holding on to the literalist understanding of Sunnah may
miss out on implementing the spirit and purpose thereof, and worse
still, if one unwittingly moves in the opposite direction, even through
apparent adherence to its text.” Ibn Ashur concurred that a great deal
of the Sunnah is concerned with particular cases and situations and
cannot be readily considered as a basis for universal legislation.
This may well entail frequent recourse to qualification (taqyÏd),
generalisation (ta’mÏm) and particularisation (tkhasis) of the rulings of
the Sunnah. This was partly the reason why the Prophet discouraged
his Companions from writing down his hadith. It is advisable therefore
to read the detailed rulings of hadith in light of the general purposes
and objectives of the Shari’ah. The Companions understood the Sunnah
in this way and the insight they had gained through direct involvement
in its teachings even by allowing themselves the liberality occasionally
to move away from the text of a hadith in favour of its purpose.
This is Illustrated as follows
a)The prophet distributed, in line with a qur’anic injunction (8:41), the
conquered lands of Khaybar among the Muslim soldiers, but later the
caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab resisted the pressing demands of his fellow
Companions when he refused to do the same with the fertile lands of
Iraq. ¢Umar ordered instead that the conquered lands should remain
with their owners who should pay the kharaj tax. This he did on the
analysis that if he distributed the fertile land, the Companions would
become settled landowners away from Madinah, and may well neglect
jihad. Thus he went against the apparent ruling of the Sunnah and
moved in the opposite direction, knowing that this would be in line
with the purpose the Prophet himself would have embraced due to the
change of circumstances.
b)The same tendency could be seen in the ruling of hadith on price
control (tas’Ïr).The Prophet himself turned down a request from his
companions for price control at a time of price hikes in the market of
Madinah and said that fixing commodity prices may prove unfair to
commodity suppliers. But the opposite of this was ruled by the
Successors (tabi’een), including the so-called ‘Seven Jurists of Madinah,’
who held that the objective of ensuring fair market prices in their time
actually favoured price control of essential foodstuffs. Ibn Taymiyyah
(d. 1328), who spoke in support of this latter ruling, commented that
the purpose was to ensure fair prices; the original ruling addressed that
purpose during the Prophet’s time, but that the same purpose could
best be achieved by introduction of carefully measured controls on the
price of essentials, due to the change of market conditions.
c)According to a renowned hadith, “a Muslim does not inherit from an
infidel (kafir), nor an infidel from a Muslim.” By General consensus
(ijma'), it is held that a non-Muslim does not inherit from a Muslim, and
the majority have also held that a muslim does not inherit from a non-
Muslim either. However, many prominent figures among the
companions and Successors, including Mu’adh ibn Jabal, Mu’awiyah ibn
Abi Sufyan, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah and Sa’Ïd ibn al-Musayyib
have held, as Ibn Taymiyyah recounts, that a Muslim may inherit from
his non-Muslim relative, as the Prophet himself had allowed this in
some cases. To this it is added that kafir in the above hadith refers to
kafir harbi, one who is engaged in active hostility with Muslims. It is also
established on the authority of leading Companions, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib
and ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas’ud, that an apostate is inherited from by his
Muslim relatives and that their case is not subsumed by the text of the
above hadith.
It is further added that kafir harbÏ in this case also precludes protected
non-Muslims (i.e. the dhimmÏs) as well as apostates and hypocrites
(munafiqun). Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim understood
this hadith in the light of a Maqasid-based analysis that allowing
Muslims to inherit from their non-Muslim relatives would encourage
non-Muslims to embrace Islam and would not be deterred by the
prospect of their preclusion from the estate of their non-Muslim
relatives. when it is known that conversion to Islam does not mean loss
of inheritance from one’s non-Muslim family, it works as an incentive,
which is a suitable ground for specification (takhsis) of the general
terms of the above hadith.
d)A woman who experiences menstruation during the hajj is allowed to
continue, according to the instructions of a hadith, with the rest of the
hajj rituals except for circumambulation (tawaf) around the Ka’bah.
Ibn Taymiyyah’s analysis of this ruling of hadith led him to the
conclusion that if the impediment of menstruation were to disqualify
the woman from completing her hajj and required her to return from
along distance the same year or the next, it would mean hardship,
which is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Shari¢ah. He added
that in the Prophet’s lifetime it was not too difficult for the women of
Madinah to tolerate the inconvenience, but that with the expansion of
the territorial domains of Islam, and issues over the physical safety of
women travelling alone, plus the additional expense, it would be in line
with the goal and purpose of the Shari’ah for her to complete the hajj
and the tawaf. Ibn Taymiyyah added on a general note that ritual
purity is tawaf prerequisite of tawaf, and also that a Shari’ah obligation
may be suspended on grounds of intolerable hardship, which is the
issue here. However, if the woman concerned can stay in Makkah until
the end of her menstruation without much hardship, she must do that,
otherwise she is advised to take a bath and do the tawaf.
These examples serve to show that a specific requirement of the
Sunnah is either relaxed or given an alternative interpretation, or even
reversed to its opposite, in order to realise a higher purpose and goal of
the Shari’ah. One can add to these many more examples from the
Qur’an and the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyyah who looked into such issues
concluded that the textual commands and prohibitions of the Shari¢ah
do not overrule their maslahah and maqasid-based understanding and
import. For God the Most High revealed the Qur’an and sent the
Messenger in order to realise ease and repel hardship, corruption and
prejudice. One should in principle adhere to the clear injunctions of the
Shari’ah at all times, and as far as possible, even if one does not
perceive the benefit or harm in them. However, in the event where the
harm of a command or prohibition overwhelms its benefit, effort must
be made to minimise the harm even if a command of a lower order is
abandoned or a less harmful prohibition is committed.
Significance of Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah:
Writing on Maqāṣid has stopped after the ninth century for about four
centuries. With its revival in the fourteenth century after Hijrah,
especially at the hands of Ibn ‘Āshūr and ‘Allāl al-Fāsī, many
researchers started focusing on this branch either devoting specific
works for Maqāṣid or trying to use Maqāṣid to benefit from Sharī‘ah in
different sciences and to understand the texts of Sharī‘ah. Hence,
although Maqāṣid started as a topic discussed in the literature of Uṣūl
al-Fiqh, now it has become an independent branch of Sharī‘ah studies.
The abundance of studies and researches that have been carried out on
Maqāṣid is very significant. We can see this in al-Dalīl al-Irshādī li
Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah by Muḥammad Kamāl imām.
Distinctive features of Maqāṣid that attracted such great attention.
-Studying of the objectives of Sharī‘ah shows that the Islamic Sharī‘ah is
one of the most perfect systems of legislations as it pursues to achieve
benefits for humans in a way that humans cannot comprehend alone,
and this is very necessary in our time as the humanistic trends attack
religions on the pretext that religions do not care for human
aspirations.
-Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah represents a philosophy of Islamic law.
the comprehensive understanding of any system or law requires
realizing Its philosophy. If we accept –as it is agreed upon by the
majority of Muslim Scholars– that the Islamic Sharī‘ah is teleological in
its nature, then there must be a philosophy that helps us to understand
its comprehensiveness. Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah can meet this purpose.
This view is underpinned through realizing two further points:
1- objectives are stable and do not change from time to time. For
example if we said that justice is one of the purposes of Sharī‘ah, so this
purpose can never be changed from time to another, even though the
texts proving this justice may not workable at certain conditions or
times.
2-They are comprehensive and cover all dimensions of Sharī‘ah.
This feature of Maqāṣid can easily be realized through Maqāṣid’s
various categories and divisions according to different considerations.
Basing the philosophy of Sharī‘ah on its purposes and objectives
ensures the Sharī‘ah’s suitability for every time and place, because the
Lawgiver’s objectives can never change. In this way we can avoid the
negative formalism of the Fiqh. This is why scholars agreed that (effect
is given to intention and meaning and not to words and phrases). Bashīr
Shammām summarizes the benefits of adopting Maqāṣid as a
philosophy of Islamic law in three points:
1- Through the philosophy of Islamic law in light of Maqāṣid al-
Sharī‘ah we realize the perfection, wisdom and precision of the
Islamic law, as one understands that Allah is the Most-Wise and
 that He (Glory be to Him) does nothing without wisdom or
purpose.

2- [It] helps in identifying the ranks of benefits and evils and the
ranks of actions when applied to real life.

3- [It is] helpful to a legislator, Jurists and judges in order to

differentiate between major and minor issues, between general
rules and branches and between maxims and deduced questions.
They have to realize this in order not to protect minor issues on
the account of major ones.

Basing the philosophy of Sharī‘ah on its Maqāṣid can allow the Sharī‘ah
itself to address different fields of knowledge in a way that can make
Sharī‘ah suitable for application in different areas of life as economy,
policy, development, sciences, etc. This is because the texts of Sharī‘ah
do not provide a detailed approach of every single filed in life. Jurists
still can deduce from these texts the purposes that Sharī‘ah pursues to
achieve in every field. This gives scholars the freedom to search and
study but under an umbrella of Divine guidance. Thus, if Muslims are
calling to act in all fields of this life in accordance with the Sharī‘ah,
Maqāṣid can help much in this regard.
The Jurists’ Need to Know Maqasid al-Shari’ah:
The disposition of the mujtahid to comprehend the Shari’ah takes Five
modes:

1. The first mode is to understand its expressions (aqwal) and grasp

the meanings (madlulat) of those expressions in accordance with
 the language use and legal polysemy (naql shar’Ï), by applying the
linguistic rules governing juristic argumentation. Most of this has
been taken care of in the discipline of u|‰l al-fiqh.

2. The second mode is to search for anything that clashes with the
indicants (’adillah) advanced by the mujtahid and in respect of
which he has exhausted all possible effort to discover their
meanings. The purpose of this search is to make sure that those
indicants are free from anything nullifying their connotations or
requiring their invalidation (ilgha’) or emendation and refinement
(tanqih). When he is certain that an indicant (dalÏl) is free from
any contradiction, he applies it. If, on the contrary, he finds a
counter-indicant (mu’arid), then his task is to see how to reconcile
the two and apply them together or to decide the superiority of
one to the other.

3. The third mode is to give, by means of analogy, that whose rule

(hukm) has not been given in the texts of the Lawgiver the same
rule of that which has been mentioned there in, once the effective
causes of the Shari’ah legislative rules have been known by any of
the methods of identification and confirmation of the ratio legis
laid down in usul al-fiqh.
4. The fourth mode is to give a specific rule to a certain act or
event whose rule has not been provided by the textual indicants
of the Shari’ah as known to the mujtahids, nor is there an
equivalent to which it can be connected by analogical deduction.
5. The fifth mode is to accept some textually established rules of
the Shari’ah simply as someone who does not know their causes
or the inner wisdom of the Shari¢ah in enacting them. Here, the
 mujtahid acknowledges his incapacity to comprehend the
Lawgiver’swisdom in prescribing such rules, and belittles his
knowledge in relation to the vastness of the Shari’ah. He then
considers this kind of provisions as merely devotional.
Development of Maqāṣid:
From the early time of Islamic history, Muslim scholars have exerted
great efforts serving Sharī‘ah. These efforts took various stages, the
most prominent ones thereof were probably the development of
schools of law and then the documentation of Fiqh. Later on, various
branches of knowledge appeared to further serve the Sharī‘ah. The
basic science that was developed by scholars is Uṣūl al-Fiqh, which
started technically speaking with al-Shāfī‘ī in his “Al-Risālah”. Within the
literature of Uṣūl al-Fiqh, the knowledge of Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah arose.
The idea of the objectives of Sharī‘ah was present in the understanding
of the Ṣaḥābah (Companions of the Prophet). A usually quoted example
here is the ḥadīth of Banū Qurayẓah, when a group of the companions
insisted to follow the literal command of the Prophet (PBUH) while the
other group, tried to understand a further purpose of the command
beyond its literal wordings.The Prophet did not reprimand either of the
groups, which was the basis for the idea that both approaches of
understanding are correct. Ibn Ḥajar commented on the ḥadīth, “He
[the prophet (PBUH)] condemned no body due to their justified
reasoning and the accepted purpose they reached.” It is, however,
interesting to find Ibn Al-Qayyim reports a group of scholars who
considered those who prayed during their journey before arriving at
Banū Qurayẓah were better and more knowledgeable of the Prophet’s
command than the other group, and it seems that Ibn al-Qayyim was
supporting this view as he later refuted objections to that view.
Era of Prophet Muhammad’s Companions:
After the death of Prophet Muhammad (.‫) صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬observe the
purposes of Sharīʿah . Ibn al-Qayyim says, “The companions were the
most knowledgeable people in the [Muslim] ummah about intents of
the Prophet and the best to follow him. They used to investigate this
intent and purpose. Having reached it, they never abandoned it to
another matter.”86 Scholars state, “Whoever gathers, follows up and
investigates the accounts narrated about the jurists from among the
Prophet’s companions (may Allah be pleased with them) –such as the
rightly guided caliphs87, Ibn Masʿūd, Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn ʿUmar, ʿAishah,
Muʿādh and Zayd ibn Thābit, will surely find that they used to consider
the wise wisdoms and interests to be achieved through the legal rulings
as well as the wise wisdoms and purposes of the commands and
prohibitions. Therefore, when they issue a legal verdict or a ruling
concerning a certain issue, they always consider the purposes and
universal objectives of Sharia and never depart from them to abide by
the partial texts. However, they used to establish close relationships
between the partial rules and the universal maxims; the practical
rulings and general principles and the universal objectives without
strictly abiding only by the literal and explicit meanings of the texts.”
Studying the era of the Companions of the prophet ( ‫)صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬
countless examples of this practice can be found. Following are only
some instances which best prove this point.
Collection of the Qur’ān:The Glorious Qur’ān was revealed piecemeal
throughout twenty three Years. When a certain portion of it was
revealed, the Prophet (‫ )صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬used to summon one of his
scribes and order him to write it down. They used to write it down on
palm leaves, flat bones, parchments, etc. It was not collected in one
volume or in one place nor did the Prophet order them to do so. It is
narrated that Zayd bin Thābit said, “The Prophet was taken [from this
life] whilst the Qur'an had not yet been gathered into a book.” After the
death of Prophet Muhammad ((‫ صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬and Abū Bakr’s
ascension to power, there were many battles wherein many huffāẓ 89
were martyred. This is why Muslims were compelled to pursue the
collection of the Qur’ān. They were motivated to do so by fear that
others who committed the Qur’ān to their memories would die and
thus portion of the Qur’ān would disappear. Therefore, ʿUmar ibn al-
Khaṭṭab proposed that the Qur’ān should be collected in one volume
for the purpose of its preservation. At first, Abū Bakr hesitated to take
up that suggestion, but ultimately he accepted it and the mission was
completed through Zayd ibn Thābit.
b. War Against the people who refused to pay Zakah
After the death of the Prophet ((‫ صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬Arab tribes decided
not to pay Zakah. Abū Bakr decided to wage war against them in spite
of the objection from other companions. The companions argued that
those who refused to pay Zakah were still Muslims as Prophet
Muhammad (‫( صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬said, “I have been commanded to fight
against people, till they testify to the fact that there is no god but Allah,
and believe in me (that) I am the messenger (from the Lord) and in all
that I have brought. And when they do it, their blood and riches are
guaranteed protection on my behalf except where it is justified by law,
and their affairs rest with Allah.”This was a clear example for the
consideration of maṣlaḥah or public interest of the Muslim ummah at
that time.
Development of the Theory of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah:
The previous section shows that maqāṣid is a very important theme of
Sharīʿah which has been governing the activities of ijtihād since the
time of the great companions of the Prophet( ‫) صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬After the
Companions’ era, the theory and classifications of maqāṣid started to
evolve. However, maqāṣid as we know them today, were not clearly
developed until the time of the later uṣūlīs of the fifth to eighth Islamic
century. It was not until the fourth century when the interest in
maqāṣid began to be noticed. This started with al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d.
Ca 320 AH/932 CE)95 who was among the first jurists who mentioned
the word maqāṣid in their juristic writings. He wrote many books
including al-Ṣalāh wa Maqāṣiduha (or ritual prayer and its objectives).
The book is a survey of the wisdoms and spiritual ‘secrets’ behind each
of the prayer acts, with an obvious Sufi inclination. He wrote another
book, following the same approach, entitled al-Ḥajj wa ’Asrāruhu
(Pilgrimage and its Secrets). However, according to Aḥmad al-Raysūnī,
“perhaps the most important of Al-Tirmidhī’s writings relating to our
topic (i.e. maqāṣid) is the book referred to variously as al-ʿllal, ʿllal al-
Shariʿah, and ʿllal al-ʿUbūdiyyah.
Muhammad Uthmān al-Khasht describes this book as an attempt by al
Tirmidhī “to identify the bases of Islamic religious obligations through a
Process of reasoning.” Al-Tirmidhī was followed by a host of graet
scholars who immensely contributed to this field such as Abū Bakr al-
Qaffāl al-Shāshī known as al-Qaffāl al Kabīr (d. 365 A.H.). He is an
eminent ’uṣūlī scholar (legal Jurisprudent). He was also the pioneer
imam of the Shāfiʿi school of Jurisprudence of his time. He wrote many
books including “Uṣūl al-Fiqh” And “Maḥāsin al-Sharīʿah”. The latter
book is closely related to maqāṣid al-ṣharīʿah as he could not highlight
the bounties of Islamic Sharīʿah without disclosing its wisdoms,
purposes and objectives. Abū al-Ḥasan al-‘Ᾱmirī (d. 381 A.H.) who is
known also as al-‘Āmirī Al-Faylasūf is considered a great link in the
chain of the development of Maqāṣid. He wrote a great book in this
field entitled al-I‘lām bi-Manāqib al-Islām. Commenting on this book,
Aḥmad al-Raysūnī states that al-ʿAmirī made the earliest mention of the
five essentials (al-ḍarūriyyāt) which became the core of research in field
of maqāṣid throughout ages. From al-‘Āmirī’s point of view, the
punishments, according to the six Religions, revolve around only five
items:
1. Punishment of killing an innocent person such as retaliation and
blood ,money.
2. Punishment of unrightfully seizing property such as chopping off
[hands and legs] and crucifixion;
3. Punishment of violating one’s honor such as lashing and stoning
to death.
4. Punishment of falsely accusing innocent people of committing
zinā(fornication) such as lashing and labeling one fāsiq;
5. Punishment of jeopardizing Muslim community such as killing for
apostasy.
These are the universals of the Sharīʿah that were edited and
elaborated on later on by al-Jūwaynī and, his student, al-Ghazālī and
were known afterward as the five essentials or necessities (al-
Ḍarūriyyāt al-Khamsah). Al-ʿĀmirī wrote another book entitled
al-’Ibānah ʿan Ilal al-Diyānah which seems –as its title indicates, to be
more relevant to the study of maqāṣid. However, this book is still
missing.
In his Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Muḥammad Fawzy states that fathoming the
underlying reasons was a distinctive feature of the fourth century
literature as independent works appeared to discuss this issue. For
example, al-Abharī, A Maliki jurist, (d. 375 AH/985 CE) wrote Mas’alat
al-Jawāb wa al-Dalā’il wa al-‘Ilal i.e. a treatise on reply, indications and
underlying causes.
Similarly, Ibn Babawayh, a Shiite jurist, (d. 381 AH/991 CE) wrote ‘Ilal al-
Sharā’ī‘ i.e. underlying causes of Sharī‘ah norms. Abū al-Qāsim al-
Ṣaymerī, A Shafi‘ī jurist, (386 AH/996 CE) also wrote al-Qiyās wa al-‘Ilal
i.e. Analogical deduction and effective causes.In the fifth century after
Hijrah, Imam Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478 A.H.) developed the
writing in this field from partial justifications to the establishment of
general foundations and theories in his two books al-Burhān fī Usūl al-
Fiqh and Ghiyāth al-Umam fī Iltiyāth al-Ẓulam. Although he did not
write an independent book on maqāṣid, all his writings discussed the
related issues in detail. Al-Raysūnī states that al-Juwaynī played a
pioneering role which has been unrivaled to this day104. He further
adds, indeed, al-Burhān became the starting point for all writing on uṣūl
al-Fiqh by those who succeeded al-Juwaynī such as al Shafiʿī’s al-
Risālahhad been the starting point for writings in this field during the 3 rd
and 4th Centuries AH and continued in this capacity until the days of al-
Juwaynī.
Al-Juwaynī presented for the first time ever the basis of the three
interrelated categories’ classification of the purposes of Sharīʿah of al-
ḍarūriyyāt, al-ḥajiyyāt and al-taḥsiniyyat. Auda argues that “Al-
Juwaynī’s al-Burhan fi Uṣul al-Fiqh (The Proof in the Fundamentals of
Law) was the first uṣul treatise to introduce a theory of 'levels of
necessity,' in a way that is similar to today's familiar theory.”In the third
section of Kitāb al-Qiyas in al-Burān, al-Juwaynī states, after reviewing
the views of the scholars pertaining to the Sharʿī rulings which have
ratios legis/effective causes and that which have not and stating
examples for their justifications, “What have been mentioned by those
[scholars] are the principles or universals of Sharīʿah and we divide
them into five categories…”
The five categories mentioned by al-Juwaynī are as follows:
First, items of reasonable meaning which are deemed necessary such as
the Qiṣāṣ which was legislated for the protection of the sacred lives of
people and deterring people from violating them108. This category,
‘Abd al-Qādir ibn Ḥirz Allah explains, has two features: first is that the
items included therein are of reasonable meaning as the relationship
between the legislation of Qiṣāṣ (retaliation) and the protection of
peoples’ lives is highly suitable and clearly evident; and second is that it
is related to the matters necessary for the preservation of the life of
humankind.
Second, the items related to the public need which, in the same time,
are not considered necessities, such as lease110
Third, the items which are not considered necessary or needed. They
are, rather, improvements such as purities. Al-Juwaynī says, “If we wish,
we can say that this category includes all what the Sharīʿah explicitly
recommends us to do.”
Fourth, the items which are not considered necessary or needed, but
they are less important than the third category, such as encouraging
people to do Good deeds, and fifth, the items which have no clear
ratios legis or specific purposes, they neither fall under the category of
necessities, needs, nor recommended things. Al-Juwaynī contends,
“And this category is very rare”. This means that we cannot find many
examples for it in the Sharīʿah.
Al-Juwaynī was also one of the foremost scholars who referred to what
came to be known afterwards as al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khamsah (the five
Necessities). In his al-Burhān, he states, the rulings of sharīʿah are
divided into obligations, prohibitions and permissible matters. As for
obligations, most of which pertain to acts of worship… Regarding
prohibitions, the sharīʿah established deterrents for grave sins… On the
whole, people’s lives are protected by Qiṣāṣ…people’s honor is
preserved by fixed sharʿī corporal punishments (ḥudūd)... and property
is protected from being stolen by [the legislation of ḥadd] chopping off
[hands of thieves]. On the other hand, al-Juwaynī did not suffice himself
with these theoretical knowledge, but, rather, he put this knowledge
into practice, commenting on the methodology of al-Juwaynī, ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīm al-Dīb -who edited and verified al-Juwaynī’s two books of al-
Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh and Nihāyat al-Maṭlab fI Dirāyat al-Madhhab-
states, “He had a great insight and profound knowledge about the spirit
and purposes of Sharī‘ah.”115 Al-Dīb provides many examples to
support his opinion. For instance, when he [al-Juwaynī] discussed the
legal ruling pertaining to the water mixed with mud to the extent that it
cannot be called water no more, he stated that the majority of scholars
(al-jumhūr) see that it is a purifier because dust is pure per se exactly as
water, then it does not change the state of water. However, he rejected
their justification stating that dust in itself is not a purifier, but people
are allowed to use it [in Tayamum] due to necessity (of losing water).
He accounts for his opinion stating that dust does not purify one’s
minor or major impurities (al-janābah al-ṣughra aw al-kubra) as one is
obliged to make ablution or take a bath in case one finds water. He,
afterwards, states the wisdom behind the permissibility of making
tayamum (dry ablution with Dust) saying, “The Lawgiver allowed
person, in case s/he does not find water, to make tayamum in order to
keep one accustomed to seek purity because when one loses water for
so many days and abstains from purifying oneself, then one’s self will
get accustomed to abandon it. Accordingly, Tayamum was legislated for
keeping one accustomed to this practice”.
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH), student of al-Juwaynī, is also one of
the early pioneers in the field of maqāṣid. He developed the five
category classification presented by his teacher, al-Juwaynī, into the
well-known three categories of al-ḍarūriyyat, al-ḥājiyyāt and al-
taḥsiniyyāt. He also developed the theme of the preservation of the five
necessities that was initially proposed by Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī and
then al-Juwaynī. Al-Ghazālī, according to Kamālī, “wrote categorically
that the Shari’ah pursued five basic objectives — life, intellect, faith,
lineage and property, and that these were to be protected as absolute
priorities.” It is at that point that al-Ghazālī may be quoted:
The very objective of the Shariʿah is to promote the well-being of the
people represented clearly in safeguarding their faith (dīn), their life
(nafs), their intellect (ʿaql), their posterity (nasl), and their wealth (māl).
whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves public interest and
is desirable, and whatever hurts them is against public interest and its
removal is desirable, in his Qawā‘id al-Aḥkām fī Maṣālih al-Anām, ‘Abd
al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Al-Salām (d. 660 AH/1261 CE) elaborated on the
standards, ranks, classifications and conflict of al-maṣālih al-
mu‘tabarah (considered interests) and mafāsid (causes of corruption).
In his extensive investigation of the concepts of maṣālih and mafāsid,
he linked the validity of rulings to their purposes, e.g., “Every action
that misses its purpose is void’, he Stated. Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790
A.H.), the second great Imam of maqāṣid, was the first to devote a book
chapter on the theme of maqāṣid. He devoted part of his book al-
Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Sharī‘ah for maqāṣid and entitled it kitāb al-
maqāṣid in which he included subjects that were not discussed before
such as maqāṣid al mukallafīn (or the purposes relating to the loci of
Obligation) and how to identify the higher objectives of sharī‘ah”.
“After the death of al-Shāṭibī, his book went missing and Muslims kept
declining for the following six centuries”.Al-Shāṭibī’s al-Muwāfaqāt,
according to Ebrahim Moosa, “was brought to the attention of the
larger reading public by the Egyptian reformer Muḥammad ʿAbduh122
…[who] was intrigued to discover scholars at the most important of
which were the writings of Shaykh ʿAbdul ʿAzīz al-Tha‘ālibī, ʿAbdul ʿAzīz
Gaʿīt, Salīm Buḥājib and Ibn Abū al-Ḍayyāf. Those scholars, among
others, began to discuss the maqāṣid and called for the reconsideration
of the legacy of Islamic Jurisprudence, notably the late literature, in
order for its correction and revision, for being able to respond to the
new incidents and for coming up with solutions for the issues and
challenges facing the Muslim nation. It was at that point that Ibn ‘Āshūr
appeared.Ibn ‘Ashūr126 (d. 1393 AH/ 1973 CE) wrote his book Maqāṣid
al-Sharī‘ah al-Islamiyyah as the first independent book on this
discipline. In fact, the subjects of maqāṣid were spread across the
classical books, though there was not an independent book in that field
before the book of Ibn ‘Āshūr. In his book, Ibn ‘Āshūr called for
considering maqāṣid as an independent science. He said, “and if we are
to write down conclusive principles for understanding religion, we
should reconsider and criticize the well-established principles of
jurisprudence, in order to drive out the points which spoiled them and
add to them the best pieces of legal thought. In addition, we should
reformulate that knowledge and call it the science of Maqāṣid al-
sharī‘ah. We furthermore should leave the science of the priinciples of
jurisprudence intact.127. Ibn ‘Āshūr’s biography, books and Maqāṣidī
approach will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Three. After Ibn ‘Āshūr,
some scholars began to write on the theme of renewal of maqāṣid.
Muḥammad al-Ghāzalī called for widening the scope of the five
essentials and not to confine ourselves to them. He said that there are
higher values in the Glorious Qur’ān such as justice and mercy which
should be underlined in order to ensure that Islam does not call for
these values only, but considers them from among its higher objectives.
Calls for renewing maqāṣid are evident in the writings of many
cotemporary scholars such as Ṭaha Jābir al-‘Alwānī. Al-‘Alwānī adopted
a deductive approach in terms of the Qur’ān and concluded that the
Qur’ān underlines three basic objectives which are: al-Tawḥīd
(monotheism), al-tazkiyyah (purification) and al-‘umrān (civilization and
modernization), which he called the Higher Governing Shar‘i objectives.
He says, “The Higher governing objectives can help also in developing
“a general knowledge theory” in terms of the Islamic sciences as well as
the social sciences or “the sciences of civilization”. Such a theory can
undertake the operations of “description, classification and
interpretation” and can, at the same time, be subjective in this
regard.”Many projects of renewal regarding Maqāṣid al Sharī‘āh were
developed. Among which is the project of ‘Abdul Majīd al-Najjār
included In his book entitled Maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah bi Ab‘ād Jadīdah129
(The Higher objectives of Sharī‘ah: New Perspectives). In this book, the
author stresses on the objectives of Sharī‘ah that were not discussed in
the early scholars’ literature. In his book Naḥwa Taf‘īl Maqāṣid al-
Sharī‘ah130 (Toward Realization of the Higher Objectives of sharī‘ah),
Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Atiyya presented a renewal vision which aims at the
realization of these objectives in the day-to-day life instead of confining
ourselves to the theoretical aspects only. Al-Ḥassān Shahīd developed a
renewal vision in his al Khitāb al-Maqāṣidī al-Mu‘āṣer: Murāja‘ah wa-
Taqwīm131 (Contemporary Maqāṣidī Discourse: Review and Criticism).
In this book, he reviewed and criticized the renewal visions developed
by the other scholars and then he presented his own vision of
renewal.The second half of the twentieth century onwards witnessed a
special focus on the study of maqāsid as some universities in Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia included it as a separate course
in their curricula. Likewise, many Muslim scholars began to write
independent books on this topic alone.
Some References in Maqāṣid:
1- Nour al-Din bin Mukhtar al-Khademy alm elmaqasid al-Shari’ah.
2- Yousef Hamid: al Maqasid Al ‘amah llsharia’ah El Islamiya.
3- Mohamed Taher bin ‘ashour :Maqāṣid al- Shari’ah el Islamiya.
4- Ibn Rabi’ah Abdel Aziz bin Abdurhaman bin : elm Maqāṣid al-
Shari’h.
5- Ibrahim bin Moussa al- Shatebi :Al Muwafaqat.
6- Abu Hamid al Ghzali : Al Mustasfa Fi ‘Lm asual Al Fiqha.
7- Kilani Abdel Rahman zid :Qwa’id El Maqasid of Shatebi
8- Hosni Ismaël Nazarite (the theory) of Ibn ‘Ashour .
9- Ibrahim bin Moussa al-Shatibi :El ‘iitisam.
10- Shahab el-Din el-Kurafi :Al Forouq.
11- Ibn al-Akthami :Irshad El Kasid Ila Athna Al Maqasid.
12- ‘Awad bin Muhammad el ‘Arni :Al Mukhtathar Al Wagiz Fi
Maqasid El Tashri’h.
13- Ahmed Abdel Salam bin Raisuni : Muhadrat Fi Maqasid El
Shari’ah, El Tagded Al Osouli, Al Fikr AL Maqasidi Qwa’id
Wafawaida.
14- Mohamed Hashim Kamali : Maqasid, Ijtihad and civilizational
renewal.
15- Yousef El Karadawi Maqasid El Shari’ah el-Muta’liqah bil Mal.
16- Mohamed El Taher El Mesawi : Treatise on Maqasid Al -
Shari’ah.
17- Dr.Mohamed Bakr Ismaël Khabib: Maqasidi Al Shari’ah Ta’sila
wa Taf’ilan .
My references:
Mohamed Hashim Kamali : Maqasid, Ijtihad and civilizational
renewal.
Mohamed El Taher El Mesawi : Treatise on Maqasid Al Shari’ah.
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