Reichenbach, 1938: The

pragmatic justification of
induction
Reichenbach, Hans (1938). The pragmatic justification of induction. In Hans
Reichenbach, Experience and prediction, University of Chicago Press. Reprinted
in
Bernecker and Dretske.

Summary
The text aims to provide a justification for inductive reasoning, a task Hume
considered impossible due to his belief that such justification requires
demonstrating the truth of the conclusion. Hume's critique focuses on the
impossibility of proving the truth of inductive conclusions, assuming that without
such proof, inductive reasoning is unjustified. However, the text argues that
proving the truth of the conclusion is not necessary for justifying induction; it is
sufficient but not mandatory. Inductive reasoning aims to make the best
assumption about the future based on available information, suggesting that even
without certainty, a well-founded assumption can be justified.

The text uses a medical example to illustrate that in situations of uncertainty,

choosing the best available option based on past experience or evidence can be
justified, even without guaranteeing success. The medical example in the text
illustrates a situation where a patient has a serious disease and the physician
believes that an operation is the best available treatment option, even though it's
not guaranteed to save the patient. This logic applies to inductive reasoning; if it is
recognized as a necessary condition for success (achieving the best assumption
about the future), then its application is justified.
Further, the text explores the concept of predictability and the role of induction in
identifying patterns or series of events that converge toward a limit, defining a
predictable world as one where such series can be constructed. This approach

Reichenbach, 1938: The pragmatic justification of induction 1

 broadens the aim of induction beyond merely forecasting specific future events to
identifying limits of frequency, encompassing both statistical and causal laws as
general forms of nature's laws.
The justification for inductive inference, then, hinges on the method of
anticipation, which involves making assumptions (blind posits) about the limits of
frequency based on current evidence and adjusting these assumptions as more
data becomes available. This method, although it cannot guarantee the accuracy
of each individual assumption, is justified because, in a predictable world, it will
eventually lead to the true value of the limit if one exists.

The objection raised in the text questions whether the principle of induction is the
only method capable of leading to the true value of a limit in a series of events.
The text acknowledges that other methods, including clairvoyance, could
potentially offer predictions about the limit of a series earlier or more accurately
than the inductive principle. However, two key points are made regarding
alternative methods: (1) their predictions must eventually converge with those of
the inductive principle as defined by the limit, and (2) there's a risk that such
methods could be unreliable or false.
To address these points, the text argues that while there could be various
methods to predict the limit, the inductive principle is preferred because its
reliability is known to us, making it a safer choice. Other methods might introduce
corrections (denoted by "cn") that could either improve or delay convergence to
the true limit, but without knowledge of these corrections' properties, their
reliability is uncertain. The inductive principle, where cn equals zero for all values
of n, is seen as carrying the smallest risk of failing to converge to the true limit.

In this context, "cn" represents a correction factor that other methods might use to
adjust their predictions. These corrections aim to either speed up the process of
accurately identifying the limit or to refine the predictions made at earlier stages in
the series. However, the key issue with these corrections (and, by extension, the
methods that use them) is that their reliability and impact on predictions are
uncertain without further information. Specifically, it's unclear whether these
corrections help consistently achieve closer approximations of the true limit or if
they might introduce errors that lead to less accurate predictions.
The inductive principle, by not relying on such corrections (effectively setting "cn"
to zero for all values of "n"), avoids the potential pitfalls associated with them. This

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 approach ensures that the method does not artificially skew the data or
predictions based on unverified adjustments. As a result, the inductive principle is
considered to carry the smallest risk of failing to accurately converge to the true
limit of the series. This makes it a safer, more reliable choice for predicting
outcomes based on observed patterns, especially when compared to other
methods that might use uncertain corrections to enhance their predictions.

The text further clarifies the logical structure of inductive inference, stating that if
a limit exists for a frequency, the inductive principle is sufficient to find it.
However, the existence of a limit does not make the inductive principle the only
necessary method, as other equivalent conditions or methods could also lead to
the limit. The inductive principle's applicability is thus a necessary condition for
the existence of a limit.
The decision to use the inductive principle over other methods, such as
clairvoyance, is justified not only by its minimal risk but also because other
methods' efficacy in converging to the true limit is unverified without the inductive
principle. This analysis addresses Hume's problem by arguing that the goal of
inductive inference is not to guarantee the truth of its conclusion but to provide
the best wager or assumption based on the available information. The inductive
principle allows us to fulfill the necessary conditions for making predictions, even
if it cannot ensure the attainment of absolute truth, thus resolving the issue raised
by Hume's critique.

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