THE STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY PLANNING STAFF PAPERS 1948 VowuMe I INTRODUCTION BY ANNA KASTEN NeLson GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC. New York & LONDON 1983SECRET PPS/38 NIZED STATES OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT 20 RUSSIA August 18, 1948 Mr. Lovett: There is attached » paper prepared by the Policy Plenning Staff on United States Objectives with resvect to Russia, “This study has been prepared in connection with NSC-20, "Appreisal of the Degree and Character of ‘Military Préparedness Required by the World Situation". I recommend that you forward a copy of this paper to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council under cover of the attached letter, GSORGE F. KENNAY SMOURY OF CONCLUSIONS I. GENERAL OBJECTIVES In generel, it should be our objective in time of peace a3 well as in tine of war, {a)_ to reduce the power and influence of Moscow to Limits where they will no longer Gonstitute s threat to the peace ond stebiiicy Gf international society; and (®) to bring about a baste change in the theory and practice of international relations observed by the government in poner in Russia. IT, PEACETIME ATUS Accordingly, 1t should be our ain in time of peace: (a) To encourage and provote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue =312- ‘SECRETSECRET Pps, August 18 2938 further questions to be ansrered for the event that Sortet aut te 50 ‘and, 30 padiceily es co ieave the country in chaos, sxking 3 encumbent upon us as the victors to make politics shoices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality ther ‘three main questions which mus fe caso, that the présent territories of the Soviet Union emoln united under o single regine or that ti titioned? And if they are t toa large extent, then be observed ina future Ru: the major minority groups, in particuler the Ukraine? Wo have slresdy taken note of the problem of the Baltte states. The Baltic states should not be com Pelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another: Should the territory adja- cent to the Baltic states be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should Be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which thet Russian authority 42 in clined to exhibit with respect to then, In the case of the Ukraino, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are th most a: jeoples who have been under Russian rule in modern eed of the ‘and voeal abroad. clusion that they should be fr Fale and permitted to set ther stat We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Its very simplicity condems it in terms of eastern European Fealities. It 4s true that the Ukrainians have been unhappy, under Russien rule and that something should be dene to Protect, thes position in tuture.. Bit there are certsin sie facts which must not be lost sight of, While the ho5- ‘eeoanrsecRer pps/3t August 18, 1: ‘Viraintans have been an important end specific elenent in the Russian enpire, they have shown no siens of being 4 thation" capable of bearing successfully the responsi= ‘bilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition. “The Ukraine is not a clearly defined eth- nical or geographic concept. In genera}, the Okrainian population made up of originally in larg’ measure out of Fefugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off fmperceptitly into the Russian or Polish nationalities, There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the and it would be impossible to establish ono. in Uirsinian territory have been predominante ly Russian and Jewish. The real basis of "Ukrainianisu” As the feeding of "difference" produced by a specific Beasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts, The politi- gal agitation on the surface 1% largely the work ct a fem ronantic intellectuals, who have 2ittle concept of ‘the responsibilities of government. ‘The econony of the Ukraine 1s inextricably inter— fwined with that of Russia as a whole. There has never deen any economic separation since the territory mes conquered fron the nomadic Tatars and developed for pur- poses of » sedentary population. To attempt to carve 1t font of the Russian economy and to set it up as something , including the Great. 8 industrial area, from the edonony of the United States, ores, the people, tho speak the Uirainten ta~ en Split, Like those who speak the White Gialect, by & division mhich in eastern Europe hag always been’ the real mark of nationality: nanely, religion. If any real border can be drawn in the Ukraine, "it should Logically be the border between the Breas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give 1t to the church Finally, we cannot be indifferent to the feelings of the Great ‘Russians thenselves. They were the strong- est national element in the Russian Empire, as they now fare in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in’ that general area, ander any status. Any long-term U.S, policy mst be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. ‘The Ukrainian 05 - seoREY SECRET PrsyaB August 18, 1948 terrttory 1 Ee" the’Wladie' test de of ourss_ shi’ they that facts A poiution mnieh attenpte Zo gapeeeee toe Uuratge entirely fron the seat of Russie 1s°seasd fedn= Cat, thete Feseutasct and oppositions apd canto, aais~ Gained dn'the Last anslyeloe only ty forces Phere ia S'ressinabte chance thatthe’ orost Russians’ east be inaveed to tolerate the renewed andapendence of tae Baltic states, ‘They tolerated the freedom of those ter. ritories from'Russian rule for Zong periods in the past- and they recognize, subsconsciously if not otherwise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence. ict to the Ukrainians, things are different. mith They are too close to the Russians to be able to set ‘up successfully as something wholly different. For better or for worse, they will have to wark out thelr destiny in sone sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people. It scoms clear that this relationship con be best 8 federal one, under which the Diraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and culture) autono- my but would not be economically or militarily indi Pendent, Such a relationship would be entirely just to the regiirenents of the Great Russians themselves. It would sven, therefore, to be along these lines that T.S, objectives with respect to the Ukroine should be framed, It should be noted that this question has far more than Just a distant future significance, Ukrainian and Grent Russian elenents gnong the Russian enigres roUpe are alrosdy competing vigorously for.0. support, The ronner in Wich we receive ehelt corpeting Gloins fay have en inportont intluence on she develop: Bent ond saccess of the rovement for political freeden among the Russians, It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision how and adhere to tt consistently, And that decision should be neither a pro-Ruszian ene place in the family of the traditional Russian Expire, of which they form an inextricable part, It should be added that while, ax stated above, wo would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separntisn, nevertheless if an independent regine were to cone into Yeing on the territary of the Ukraine through no doing‘SECREE Pps, august 18° 288 of ours, we should not oppose it outright, To do so would b to undertake an undesirable responsibility for Anternal Russian developments, Such a regime would be Bonpt to be challenged eventudlly. from the Russian eide, If it were to maintain itself successfully, that would be proof that the above analysis was wong and that. the Ukraine does have the capacity for, ani the moral right to, independent status. Our policy in the first dn stance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as Jong as our own interests--nilitery or otherwise--were Rot immediately affected. And only if St becane clear that an undesirable deadiock was developing, we would encourage a composing of the differences aléng the Lines of a reasonable federalism, The sane would apply to any other efforts at the achiévemen: of an ind lent status on the part of other Russian minorities. it ds not likely that any of the other Binorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of tine. However, should they attempt 1t (end 1t is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case oF ‘the Ukraine, We should be careful not to place our- selves in a position of open onposition to such attempts which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question, On the other hand, we should ot commit ourselves to their support to a line of ac- tion which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance 4%. The Choice of # New Ruling Group In the event of s disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for support on the part of the various competing political elewents ‘among the present Russian opposition groups, It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals, But a great deal will de~ end on ourselves, and on our contept cf what we are ees eis je have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there 1s none which we will Wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish ¢o take 408- od