Philos Phenomenol Research - 2022 - Gupta

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.
12866
SYMPOSIUM
Overthrow the Orthodoxy! Replies to Hill, Titus,

and Sosa
Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Correspondence I respond to three sets of questions and objections to
Anil Gupta, University of Pittsburgh.
Email: agupta@pitt.edu
the account of empirical reason I offer in my book Con-
scious Experience: A Logical Inquiry. (i) In response to
doubts expressed by Christopher Hill, I outline the case
against Simple Representationalism, the view that expe-
rience confers an epistemic status on certain perceptual
judgments and that it does so in virtue of its content.
(ii) In response to objections of Lisa Titus (née Mirac-
chi) and Hill, I show that the account is not too lib-
eral in its attributions of rationality to transitions, beliefs,
and views. (iii) In response to questions raised by David
Sosa, I explain why qualities do not constitute appear-
ances and why the account offered of hallucinations is
not overly restrictive.
I am grateful to Christopher Hill, Lisa Titus (née Miracchi), and David Sosa for their generous
words about my book and for the rich set of questions they raise—a set so rich that it is impossible
to do it justice in the space allotted to me. I have chosen, therefore, to address questions relating
only to some of their principal concerns, leaving a full treatment of others to a later occasion.
I argue in my book for a departure from orthodox treatments of experience in two principal
areas. First, I argue for an abandonment of simple conceptions of the given, and Hill has doubts
about my arguments here. I respond to these doubts in §1. My preferred conception of the rational
role of experience is the hypothetical given, and Titus finds this conception too liberal. She objects
that it fails to capture the substantive contributions of experience. I address Titus’ objections in §2;
I address here also related objections offered by Hill. The second major departure from orthodoxy
I recommend concerns appearances. Sosa raises questions about the account of appearances I
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offer and, in particular, the sharp separation in it of appearances from qualities. I address Sosa’s
questions in §3.
1 SIMPLE REPRESENTATIONALISM
Hill’s doubts concern my arguments against a position I labeled “Simple Representationalism.”

This position accepts a representationalist account of experience: it sees experience as a state with
representational content. And it subscribes to the simple given: it takes experience to confer an
epistemic status on certain ordinary perceptual judgments, a status that leads to a simple account
of their rationality.1 Versions of Simple Representationalism can differ from one another on the
epistemic status conferred on the perceptual judgments, on the contents attributed to experiences,
and on the constraints imposed on the relationships between these contents and the contents of
the perceptual judgments. Simple Representationalism is a popular position in the philosophy of
perception, and in my book I offered a critique of it—a critique that has left Hill unmoved.2
Hill’s main concern is that I do not adequately address a version of Simple Representational-
ism that he traces to the work of John Pollock and James Pryor. This version respects, he suggests,
the motivations underlying the hypothetical given and, more specifically, the dependence of per-
ceptual judgments on views. This version, as Hill presents it, takes an experience to confer on the
experiencing subject a defeasible right to accept certain contents, contents that are suitably related
to the content of the experience. To illustrate, consider a situation in which you see a red ball. You
undergo a visual experience which, let us take it, possesses a content that is suitably related to the
content “there is a red ball.” Then, according to this theory, your visual experience confers on you
the defeasible right to issue the perceptual judgment “there is a red ball.” As Hill puts it, it makes
it prima facie rational for you to accept “there is a red ball.” Hill adds,
(1) [the] prima facie right can be neutralized by beliefs that contradict the proposition or indicate
that perception is unreliable in the relevant context (Hill, this symposium, §2).
I will call this view Simple Representationalism* (SR*, in brief).3

I consider in CE at least ten different versions of Simple Representationalism, but it is true
that I do not explicitly consider SR*. Now, the case I build against Simple Representationalism is
scattered across several chapters in CE. So, it may be useful to provide an outline of its argument
and to point out the bits that are applicable to SR*. The argument consists of five main parts.
(A) It is plain that experience contributes not only to the rationality of perceptual judgments
but also to the contents of these judgments. Furthermore, experience enables the introduction of
essentially novel concepts through ostensive definition. I show in CE, ch. 8, that Dual-Component
Presentationalism (“Presentationalism,” in brief) provides a natural account of these facts. I point
out in CE, §223, that representationalism does not do so. It leaves it a mystery how experience
1Isharpen the characterization of the simple given below. See also §51 of Conscious Experience (Gupta, 2019; henceforth
CE).
2I offered also a critique of Simple Relationalism, a position that combines the simple given with a relationalist account
of experience. Hill does not question this critique; he himself rejects relationalist accounts. So, in my response below, I
focus on the critique of Simple Representationalism.
3 I do not name this position after Pollock or Pryor because their positions differ from SR* in important respects. I do not
name it after Hill because Hill does not endorse the position; he only sketches it.
258 GUPTA
contributes to the content of perceptual judgments and how it serves as a basis for the introduction
of novel empirical concepts. This mystery persists with SR*.
(B) It is also a mystery how under Simple Representationalism experience comes to possess
the epistemic power attributed to it. Representationalists have offered two types of accounts of
experience, and the mystery remains on either type of account. Some representationalists take
the content of an experience to result from a play of concepts within that experience. Here it is a
mystery how such a play can generate a state with the required epistemic power. In thoughts, too,
there is a play of concepts, but thoughts lack the epistemic power attributed to experience. What is
it about the play of concepts in an experience that endows it with this wonderful power? The other
type of representationalist account takes experience to receive its content through systematic
causal relations that the subject bears to the world; on one version, experience is an information-
carrying state, analogous to those of thermometers and central processing units of computers.
Here, too, it is a mystery how experience comes to possess the epistemic power attributed to it.
Many information-carrying states of the brain possess no epistemic power. What sets experience
apart? How is it that it is endowed with epistemic power? I develop this general argument in CE,
§§55-65. The argument applies to SR*.4
In contrast, the account of experience and thought developed in CE, chs. 4–8, explains how it is
that experience possesses the epistemic power attributed to it by Presentationalism—that is, how
it is that experience yields the hypothetical given.
(C) The next argument is by cases. Either the epistemic status conferred by experience is com-
pulsive or it is merely permissive (CE, §51). In the former case, experience puts the subject under
an obligation (e.g.) to accept a content; in the latter, experience merely confers a right (e.g.) to
accept the content.
(C1) The compulsive case. I argue, on the basis of the Equivalence Principle, that any concep-
tion that puts the subject under an epistemic obligation to accept propositional contents
must be Cartesian in character. This argument is presented in CE, §§175–183. If sound,
it reduces to absurdity all simple conceptions of the given that confer compulsive epis-
temic statuses. Also, if sound, the argument explains why it is that simple conceptions
of the given are rare in the history of epistemology and why Cartesian conceptions have
dominated the subject. The Equivalence Principle is a non-negotiable desideratum on any
account of empirical rationality. Thus, if one takes experience to confer compulsive epis-
temic statuses involving propositional contents, a Cartesian conception is forced.
(C2) The permissive case. I argue (CE, §66) that such conceptions are unable to account for
simple epistemic phenomena. In the red ball example above, the subject would possess a
right to accept “there is a red ball” but would not be required to accept it. This is too weak.
If, for example, one is shown a red ball in the course of a debate and asked to give one’s
assent to “there is a red ball,” one has no option but to give his assent.
4 Hill calls “unfair” a related objection I offer against Pryor. Pryor takes experience to confer prima facie justification
that is defeated by (e.g.) physical arguments but not by a priori skeptical arguments (Pryor, 2000, p. 534). I objected that
it is puzzling how experience can confer this specific epistemic status, one involving a priori skeptical arguments. The
objection seems to me fair, for representationalists bear the burden of explaining not only how experience comes to possess
the general epistemic power they attribute to it but also the specific power. It is a burden on Pryor to explain how it is that
an experience can entitle a subject to ignore certain skeptical arguments and not (e.g.) certain physical arguments. We can
grant that the subject is entitled to do so. The puzzle is how a particular experience can be the source of this entitlement,
how the experience can confer a status that distinguishes between skeptical and physical arguments.
GUPTA 259
SR* is open to the objection in (C2) but not the one in (C1). The hypothetical given escapes the
dilemma, for it denies that the given is propositional.
(D) Simple representational theories lack satisfactory formulation (CE, §66). They do not
spell out in a clear, acceptable, and detailed way what content experiences possess, what pre-
cise epistemic status experiences confer on judgments, and what relationship the contents of the
judgments must bear to the contents of the experiences. Indeed, on all these points there are
internecine battles among the proponents of these theories. A satisfactory formulation should at
the very least provide a plausible explanation of simple facts about perceptual judgments, but I
do not know of a single formulation that does so. Take a variant of the red ball example. Suppose
you are looking not at a red ball but at a red cardinal, and you issue the perceptual judgment “the
red bird is a cardinal.” Let us take it that the perceptual situation is ordinary. Now, your judgment
is plainly rational, but do simple representational theories provide a plausible explanation of this
status? We cannot answer the question with a clear and definite “yes.” For there is a prior ques-
tion: what is the content of your visual experience according to these theories? And this question
has no clear and definite answer. There is a large debate about the content of experience, with
some theorists arguing that “bird” and “cardinal” can be constituents of the content while others
denying this. No plausible systematic principles emerge from this debate, however, that enable
us to answer the question with any confidence. Suppose we waive the question of the content of
the experience. Whatever this content, does it bear the right relation for the experience to confer
an epistemic status on your judgment?—Again, no clear and definite answer. Some theorists say
that the content of the judgment must be a part of the content of the experience; others deny this.
Suppose we allow that your experience possesses a content that bears the right relation to the con-
tent of your judgment. Does the epistemic status conferred yield the result that your judgment is
rational?—Yet again, no clear and definite answer. For the epistemic status is never spelled out
with the required precision. We can go part way to the answer: we can say that your judgment is
prima facie rational (or justified or right). But we are unable to say that it is rational (or justified
or right) tout court. The defeating conditions are never set out in a sufficiently clear and detailed
way. This can be illustrated using SR*. Recall the defeating condition specified in (1):
(1) [the] prima facie right can be neutralized by beliefs that contradict the proposition or indicate
that perception is unreliable in the relevant context.
Suppose that before seeing the bird, you believed that the red bird was not a cardinal—because,
say, your cousin had told you that it was a parrot. Is your prima facie right neutralized or not?
We cannot tell because all we are told is that the right can be neutralized. We are not told when
it is neutralized. Suppose, to give another example, that in your far-flung view of the world there
is a subtle inconsistency that has escaped your notice. Again, we have a potential defeater: your
beliefs contradict the content “the red bird is cardinal.” But we cannot say whether your prima
facie right is neutralized, for the conditions of defeat are not specified in the required detail. In
this case, at least, the theory should yield a clear verdict that your perceptual judgment is perfectly
rational, but SR* does not do so.5
I do not think it is an accident that no clear and precise account of defeating conditions is to
be found in the literature. “Prima facie rightness” and “defeating conditions” are not the right
5I wish to stress that the above complaints are not directed at Hill. Hill does not endorse SR*; his own positive views are
quite different. See his Consciousness and the essays in Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge (Hill 2009, 2014). See especially
essays 12 and 13 in the latter.
260 GUPTA
rubric under which to think of the rationality of perceptual judgments. The rationality of a per-
ceptual judgment depends on features of the antecedent view, with different perceptual judgments
depending on different features. This dependence is complex,6 and it is not captured by the pair
“prima facie rightness” and “defeating conditions”—or so I argue in CE, §68. The hypothetical
given provides a better framework for capturing the dependence, and it brings with it an addi-
tional bonus: it enables us to understand perceptual judgments while bypassing intractable issues
about the content of experience.
(E) Simple conceptions of the given are motivated, in part, by a desire to sustain a moderate
foundationalism about empirical belief. This foundationalism sees our empirical beliefs as falling
in a foundationalist structure, with beliefs in the upper strata deriving their rationality from those
lower down, and the latter beliefs in turn deriving their rationality from those yet further down,
and so on. This regress ends in basic beliefs, which receive their rationality immediately from
experience. On this picture, as in the Cartesian one, experience is the original source of empirical
rationality. Where moderate foundationalism differs from its Cartesian counterpart is on basic
beliefs. Cartesian conceptions take these beliefs to be about appearances, sense-data, and such.
Moderate foundationalism, on the other hand, takes basic beliefs to be ordinary perceptual beliefs
(or some large subset of these), which can be about all sorts of things, including external objects.7
Now, if a simple conception is to deliver perceptual beliefs suitable for a foundational role, then the
defeasibility conditions it postulates must meet an important constraint: they should not make the
rationality of ordinary perceptual beliefs dependent (in general) on the rationality of other beliefs.
Violation of this constraint would thin out the foundationalist base and make the view untenable.
My final objection to simple representationalism is that satisfaction of the constraint generates
a fatal problem. It results in “improper flows of rationality.” Let us go back to the red ball example.
If we take the visual experience to render rational the perceptual judgment “there is a red ball”
then the following can happen. The subject can begin with an irrational antecedent belief that
the lighting conditions are normal, and can then issue the judgment “there is a red ball that looks
red” (which counts as rational in light of the simple given), and then derive the antecedent belief
about lighting conditions (and thereby render it rational). This is unacceptable. Rationality and
irrationality flow from the antecedent belief to the perceptual judgment, not the other way around.
It is because the antecedent belief is irrational that the perceptual judgment is irrational; not that
the antecedent belief becomes rational because the perceptual judgment is rational. I sketch this
argument in CE, §67, and I provide a fuller version in my 2019 Rutgers Epistemology Conference
lecture “Foundationalism and Empirical Reason,” which I hope to publish soon.
Whether SR* falls prey to this objection depends on the precise spelling out of the defeasibil-
ity condition in (1). The hypothetical given, on the other hand, plainly blocks improper flows of
rationality.
Let me close with a general observation. Hill points out, correctly, that under a simple given,
the rationality of perceptual beliefs can depend on antecedent views; the simple given is, in this
respect, similar to the hypothetical given. The differences that separate the two conceptions lie
farther afield, however, and they are two: (i) Under the hypothetical given, the rationality of ordi-
nary perceptual beliefs typically depend on the rationality of other beliefs. In the terminology
introduced in CE, the rational basis for an ordinary perceptual belief is nonempty; the belief is
not autonomous (CE, §§67, 105–6). (ii) The hypothetical given places no bounds on the depth and
6 See my “Marushak on the Hypothetical Given” (Gupta 2020), which is a response to Marushak (2021). Marushak’s paper
was published online in 2019.

7 See Audi (1999) for a version of moderate foundationalism.
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breadth of beliefs in the rational basis of a perceptual belief. It places no bounds on how deeply
theoretical these beliefs may be and on how far-flung the regions may be from which these beliefs
are drawn. Since good fences make good neighbors, I suggest that these two features be taken
as defining the separation between the simple and the hypothetical given.8 Because it lacks these
features, the simple given can serve the needs of a moderate foundationalism; because it possesses
them, the hypothetical given cannot. The proposed separation leaves neutral ground between the
two positions. Whether this ground is habitable, let us leave for another occasion.
2 RATIONAL TRANSITIONS
According to the hypothetical given, the rational role of experience in cognition is to confer ratio-
nality not on perceptual judgments but on transitions from views to (e.g.) these judgments. Titus
objects that the resulting theory is too liberal and that it fails to account for the substantive con-
tributions of experience. She writes:
Whereas traditional logic makes all substantive inference illegitimate, Gupta’s

account makes them all legitimate, at least with the right background view.. . . The
radical permissiveness of his account of proper transitions means that experiences do
not provide the kind of check on our reasoning that they are supposed to—that is, a
check on our reasoning that keeps it grounded in how the empirical world is (Titus,
this symposium).
Two concerns are driving this charge, one about views and the other about transitions. Let me
begin with the concern about transitions, and then I will turn to the concern about views.
The notion of rational transition I work with is, in one respect, highly liberal. It allows that
transitions to insane beliefs, for example, can be rational so long as the antecedent view is of the
right sort. Hill, who raises a worry similar to Titus’s, expresses the point thus:
Whether a transition is rational is determined entirely by the antecedent beliefs and

inferential commitments of an agent, no matter how wild those beliefs and commit-
ments may be, and it is therefore an entirely subjective and relative affair (§3).
Titus gives the example of a woman, Jordan, whose view links the proposition “it is sunny out-
side” to “there’s a pink elephant down the hall.” Jordan’s transition from her acceptance of “it is
sunny outside” to the acceptance of “there’s a pink elephant down the hall” counts as rational, as
I understand the notion “rational transition.” Hill gives the example of a view that takes affirming
the consequent to be valid. If a person X with such a view transitions from his acceptance of
(2) If Kennedy took cyanide, he is dead
and
(3) Kennedy is dead
8 Pace Hill, the hypothetical given does not make the rationality of a perceptual belief dependent on the subject’s total view
(CE, §§105–6; Gupta 2020); hence, a defining difference between the two conceptions cannot be located here.
262 GUPTA
to the acceptance of
(4) Kennedy took cyanide,
the transition counts as rational, according to the conception I favor. Why, asks Hill, should we
care about such a subjective and view-relative notion of rationality? Why should we value and
praise agents who conform to it? Hill’s own position is that appraisals of transition should not be
so subject relative. “When we appraise transitions as rational or irrational,” Hill writes, “it must
be that we have at least one eye on objective factors such as deductive validity, inductive strength,
and appropriate principles of defeasibility” (Hill, this symposium, §3). I’d like to make several
observations in response to this objection.
First, even though X and Titus’s Jordan are, by stipulation, irrational in their antecedent views,
the transitions they go through are in a clear sense rational. One can certainly define senses of
rational on which one or more of these transitions fail to count as rational, and I will presently
consider such senses. For the moment, I wish to highlight the sense in which the transitions are
rational. Consider the situation with X, whose move from (2) and (3) to (4) appears to be especially
illogical. Let us notice, though, that even here logic is in play. Antecedent to the move, X accepts
the conditional,
If (2) and (3) then (4),
and, of course, X accepts both (2) and (3). X’s move is thus no more than an application of modus
ponens. A normal person’s move from (2) and (3) to (4) would be utterly illogical and irrational;
not so for X’s move. So, while it is true that little logic is discernible in X’s mad view, we can see
logic at work in X’s move to the acceptance of (4).
Second, rationality in this sense—the sense in which Jordan’s and X’s moves are rational—is
something we should value. Compare Jordan with a counterpart Jordan* who has the same view as
Jordan—she accepts that “it is sunny outside” entails “there’s a pink elephant down the hall”—but
refuses to recognize a commitment to “there’s a pink elephant down the hall” after we convince
her “it is sunny outside.” We know how to reason with Jordan; we do not know how to reason with
Jordan*. We have some idea how we might talk Jordan out of her crazy view; we have no idea how
to do so for Jordan*. Let me add that to recognize Jordan’s move as rational and praiseworthy is not
to deem her consequent belief rational and praiseworthy, much less to recognize her as rational
and praiseworthy. It is only to recognize a glimmer of light in the darkness that is her cognition
of the world.
Third, as I indicated, recognition of a sense of “rational” in which Jordan’s and X’s transitions
are rational is perfectly compatible with a recognition of other senses of “rational,” on some of
which these transitions may well not be rational. For example, following Hill, we can recognize
senses that are less subject-dependent and more externalist. Let me reserve ‘rational’ without sub-
script for the sense in which Jordan’s and X’s transitions are rational. Then, we can recognize a
transition as, say, rational1 iff it is rational and the relevant part of the antecedent view is cor-
rect. (Rational1 is to rational as soundness is to validity.) Jordan’s and X’s transitions fail to be
rational1 by the standard set by this definition. For another example, we can recognize a transi-
tion as rational2 iff it is rational and the relevant part of the antecedent view is logically coherent.
Jordan’s transition is rational2 by this standard, but not X’s transition. For a final example, we can
recognize a transition from beliefs of the form “a is F” to those of the form “a is G” to be rational3
iff F is a reliable sign of G (as, e.g., high body temperature is a sign of illness). This last notion is
GUPTA 263
entirely independent of the subject and is highly externalist. Other notions may also be defined,
and they may be useful for various purposes.
Fourth, the notion I need for my purposes is the bare, unsubscripted notion of rational transi-
tion. This is the notion that is useful for spelling out the rational role of experience. Experience
does not, I have argued, confer rational statuses on beliefs, etc.; its role is to confer rationality on
certain transitions. Now, the rationality conferred is not any of the subscripted ones defined above.
Your visual experience of the cardinal, to reuse the earlier example, does not pronounce on the
correctness of the fragment of the antecedent view you bring to bear on the experience. You may
believe that the lighting conditions are normal and that your visual system is functioning properly,
and you may be right about all that. Nevertheless, your visual experience does not pronounce on
these matters. Hence, it cannot confer rationality1 on your transition to the belief “the red bird is a
cardinal.” Similarly, the experience does not pronounce on the coherence of this fragment of your
view. Hence, it cannot confer rationality2 on the transition. The notion “rationality3 ” is inapplica-
ble here, but examples are easily constructed to show that experiences do not confer rationality3
on transitions. Externalist notions of rationality have their usefulness, no doubt. But they are not
useful for spelling out the rational role of experience. The rationality conferred by experiences on
transitions is the plain unsubscripted rationality isolated above.
In summary, then, Titus and Hill are correct to observe that the notion of rational transition
I bring into play is subjective and highly permissive. The notion is, however, genuinely a notion
of rationality; it is normative; and it is the one needed for spelling out the role of experience in
cognition.
Let me now turn to the concern about views. Titus writes:
With no constraints on which views are reasonable, there are no constraints on which
“links” are reasonable, and so no constraints on which transitions are proper. This
means that there are no constraints on empirical rationality. . . . Because there are
no constraints on the ways in which views can affect what transitions an experience
licenses, it is not clear in what sense experience provides a substantive contribution
at all.
This concern arises from a misunderstanding. The account of empirical rationality I offer brings
into play strong constraints on views: coherence, non-rigidity, and receptiveness (CE, §95). The
hypothetical given helps us understand empirical rationality not on its own but only in the con-
text of these and other constraints.9 Thus, if a view is manifestly incoherent, it is not reasonable,
according to the account I offer. If the subject arrives at a belief through fallacious reasoning, nei-
ther the belief nor the subject’s view counts as reasonable. The same holds if the subject arrives at
the belief through an insufficient consideration of relevant alternatives. So, although the account
I offer is liberal in its attributions of rationality to transitions, it is not liberal in its attributions
of rationality to views and beliefs. Views and beliefs must satisfy strong constraints if they are to
qualify as reasonable.10
9 Hillrecognizes the importance of these constraints. Let me note that these constraints are not derivable from the hypo-
thetical given. Rationality of transitions is thus not the only form of rationality I recognize, and I do not attempt a reduction
of categorical rationality to the hypothetical given. (These remarks are prompted by some comments of Hill’s in §§3–4 of
his essay.)
10 Titus’s misunderstanding arises, I think, from a misinterpretation of the last paragraph of CE, §97. I am responding here
to the objection that there is a rationalist element in the theory I am offering, for I am ruling out, on the basis of a priori
264 GUPTA
A further point deserves emphasis. On the hypothetical given, the enrichments experience
brings about in views are highly substantive. When you saw the red bird and came to believe that
it is a cardinal, your view was enriched in a substantive way, and according to the hypothetical
given, your experience was a crucial factor in this enrichment. You might have introduced a name
for the red bird through an ostensive definition. You would then have enriched your conceptual
system, and again, your visual experience would have been a crucial factor in this enrichment.
On the hypothetical given, the same experience can bring about different conceptual and dox-
astic enrichments in different antecedent views, but in each case the enrichments are typically
highly substantial. Furthermore, since the hypothetical given makes available a liberal notion of
perceptual judgment and ostensive definition, it allows us to see experience as playing a vital role
in the enrichment of our view through perceptual judgments such as “the strength of the cur-
rent flowing through that wire is 3 amps” (made, let us imagine, after reading an ammeter) and
ostensive definitions such as “let c be the strength of the current flowing through that wire.” The
hypothetical given allows us to see experience as bringing about enrichments that are broader and
deeper than on any other account of perception.
Let me close with two observations about empirical rationality and the constraints on views.
First, a constraint on views is that they respect perceptual judgments issued on the basis of expe-
riences. Now, on Presentationalism, portions of the real world are presented to the subject in
experience. Hence, the real world itself, through its presentation, shapes perceptual judgments;
it affects both the content and the rationality of these judgments. It follows, therefore, that the
constraints of rationality on beliefs and views are not purely subjective and internalist; on the
contrary, they are world-involving and thus externalist. So, while the notion of rational tran-
sition isolated above is highly subjective, this is not true of the notion of rational belief and
view.11
Second, the rational constraints on views together with the strength of the hypothetical given
endow empirical reason with great power. Unlike popular conceptions, the resulting account sees
scientific argumentation as yielding conclusions that are forced, not optional. It thus rejects the
epistemic voluntarism of Willard Quine and Bas van Fraassen (CE, §§341–351). Titus claims that,
on the account I offer, all substantive inferences are legitimate. Actually, the very opposite is true:
substantive inferences need to meet strong constraints—constraints very few meet—to qualify as
legitimate. On the account I offer, the contribution of experience to rationality and content is so
substantial that we can sustain an attractive and reformed empiricism (CE, ch. 8 & §384; Gupta
2006, ch. 6).
reasons, inadmissible views from the starting points of revision. I point out in response that I am not assigning reason a
power of discerning matters of fact. Furthermore, the ruling out of inadmissible views actually aids experience. I wrote:
The role of reason, as I see it, is to remove obstacles (e.g., solipsism) that would hinder experience from shaping
our view of the world. The role of reason is to serve experience.
I mean to be characterizing here the role of reason in ruling out inadmissible views. Titus reads it as suggesting that “expe-
rience would provide us with knowledgeable (or at least epistemically appropriate) views of the world, if only reason could
get out of its way” and that the role I am assigning empirical reason is that of mere “remover of obstacles to knowledge.”
Both these ideas are misinterpretations. On my view, experience can provide epistemically appropriate views only in con-
junction with reason. Furthermore, reason plays vital roles beyond the ruling out of inadmissible views. It is, for example,
essential in the rational revision of views in light of experiences.
11 I aim to offer an account of empirical rationality that fully respects the subject’s viewpoint even in its application to belief
and view (CE, §§184–185). Whether I succeed in this, I’ll leave to the reader’s judgment.
GUPTA 265
3 APPEARANCES
Sosa raises two questions about the account of appearance I offer, one concerning hallucinations
and the other concerning phenomenology. Let me begin with the latter question, which Sosa puts
as follows:
Why can’t the very “universal” property to which an experience is directed (the prop-
erty the experience is in part “of,” the property that is presented in that experience)
also be part of the phenomenology (in Gupta’s sense)—be itself manifested in the
experience? Manifestation need not be an anti-reflexive relation, even if it is not
reflexive. If so, some appearances could be universals, manifestations of themselves,
and instantiated by external particulars that are presented, that way, in that experi-
ence (Sosa, this symposium).
Before I explain why a property (e.g., a color quality) cannot be a part of phenomenology, let me
review how I understand “phenomenology” and the related notions “appearance” and “manifes-
tation.” The following six points are essential.
First, the phenomenology of an experience, as I understand it, captures the subjective dimen-
sion of the experience. Two visual experiences (e and e*) may present a subject with two objects
(o and o*, respectively) that differ in color, shape, and size and yet the objects may look exactly
the same to the subject—the two experiences may be subjectively identical.12 In such a case, the
phenomenology of e is identical to that of e*. It is a defining principle of “phenomenology” that
subjectively identical experiences possess the same phenomenology.
Second, the phenomenology of an experience—for example, e—is to be located “on” its object
o; it is not to be located “in” the mental state of the subject. Here I accept a weak version of the
transparency thesis (CE, ch. 5). It is a defining principle of “appearance” and “manifestation”
that items presented manifest appearances in experiences. It is these appearances that determine
whether experiences are subjectively identical or not, and hence whether they possess the same
phenomenology or not. So, experiences e and e* possess the same phenomenology because o and
o* manifest identical appearances in them.13
Observe that the position that identifies manifestation with exemplification and appearances
with qualities is untenable. Objects o and o* exemplify different qualities but they manifest the
same appearance.14 It will not help to alter the position and identify appearances with relational
properties. For objects can exemplify different relational properties (e.g., being red and illumi-
nated by white light and being white and illuminated by red light) but manifest the very same
appearance. A similar argument shows that appearances cannot be identified with concepts or
with wholes whose constituents include concepts (CE, §170).
Third, though the phenomenology of an experience such as e is located “on” its object o, it is
not determined by the features of o. Numerous other factors affect the appearance o manifests
12 Subjective identity concerns the purely visual dimension of the two experiences. Experiences may be subjectively iden-
tical even though the subject issues different perceptual judgments on their bases, even perceptual judgments that bring
into play different concepts. For an explanation of subjective identity, see CE, §§144-151.
13 I am assuming that e and e* are directed to nothing other than, respectively, o and o*. If experiences are directed at mul-
tiple items then they possess the same phenomenology iff their presentational complexes manifest the same appearance.
14 Thesense-datum theory effects the identification by moving to a radical account of the objects of experience. It takes
experience to be directed only to objects peculiar to it and not to public, external objects.
266 GUPTA
in a visual experience, including the state of the environment, the location and orientation of o
relative to the subject, and the working of the subject’s visual system. The same object with the
same features may manifest to the same subject radically different appearances in different envi-
ronments. Also, in the same environment, the object may manifest radically different appearances
to different kinds of experiencing subjects. The appearance a flea manifests to a human may be
radically different from that it manifests to a lizard. This variation may be called the relativity
of appearances. Similarly, radically different objects with radically different features may mani-
fest the same appearance to differently constituted subjects living in different environments. The
visual appearance manifested in the human experience e by the object o in virtue of its color, shape,
and size may be manifested by o in a differently constituted animal in virtue of its temperature,
shape, and size. This kind of constancy may be called the multiple-factorizability of appearances.
Fourth, appearances manifested may bear similarity and identity relations in various dimen-
sions. Two appearances manifested by o under different lights may be identical in the shape and
size dimensions but differ in the color dimension. On the other hand, when o is viewed under the
same light but is located at a different distance and in a different orientation relative to the subject,
the appearance it manifests may be identical in the color dimension but different in the shape and
size dimensions. We can think of the total visual appearance manifested by o in e as constituted of
color, shape, and size appearances. A difference in any of these appearances entails a difference
in the total appearance manifested by o and thereby a difference in the phenomenology of the
experience of o.
Fifth, appearances are general items, and in this respect they are like qualities. The same qual-
ity can be instantiated in several objects, objects located in different regions of space across very
different time periods. Similarly, the same appearance may be manifested in several experiences,
experiences of different subjects belonging to very different species. The same color appearance
may be manifested in the experience of a present-day bonobo as in that of a Cro-Magnon child.
Sixth, and this is the final as well as the most crucial point, the principles of identity governing
appearances are different from those governing qualities. For example, the principle of identity
governing color qualities is tied to exemplification:
The color quality Q = the color quality Q* iff the actual and possible objects exempli-
fying Q are identical in the color dimension to those exemplifying Q*.
The principle of identity governing color appearances, on the other hand, is tied to manifesta-
tion:
The color appearance A = the color appearance A* iff the actual and possible expe-
riences in which A is manifested are subjectively identical in the color dimension to
those in which A* is manifested.15
Color qualities and color appearances capture, therefore, identities along very different dimen-
sions. The former capture identities in how things are while the latter capture subjective identities
in experiences of things. There is a greater gulf here than in the identities captured by, say, length
and weight. At least these latter identities concern how things are; they do not straddle the divide
between being and seeming. Not so for the identities captured by qualities and appearances. An
identification of a color quality with a color appearance is even less plausible than an identifica-
tion of a length with a weight. Their radically different principles of identity entail, in light of the
15 In these principles of identity, I am assuming, for simplicity, that only one color is instantiated in the objects and that
only one color appearance is manifested in the experiences.

GUPTA 267
features noted above, that qualities are not appearances. It follows that a quality is not a part of
the phenomenology of an experience.
Let me make this abstract response to Sosa more concrete and vivid. Consider a version of the
causal model Sosa sketches. According to this model, experiences are the results of causal inter-
actions between subjects and their environment; these interactions help fix the characteristics of
an experience. For instance, items are presented in an experience in virtue of certain causal rela-
tions between these items and the experiencing subject. So, a bird and its yellow color may be
presented in a human experience, for example, and their presence would be due to certain causal
relations of the subject to the bird and the color quality yellow. Now, certain things scattered across
space and time are yellow. They are identical to one another in a certain respect: they all possess
a certain power. The color yellow is the feature in virtue of which yellow things possess their dis-
tinctive power.16 Similarly, in certain experiences scattered across individuals yellow appearance
is manifested; these experiences are subjectively identical to one another in a certain respect. The
appearance yellow is whatever it is that accounts for this subjective identity of the experiences.
Now, the feature in virtue of which yellow things possess their distinctive power is something
that is open to empirical investigation and discovery. Suppose this feature turns out to be a certain
electro-magnetic property E that enables the reflection of certain kinds of photons. Then the color
yellow is this electro-magnetic property E. The principle of identity for colors determines E to be
the color yellow; it is the relevant identity across yellow things. Given the multiple-factorizability
of appearances, however, E cannot be the appearance yellow. For this appearance can be mani-
fested in creatures that bear no causal relationship to E. It may be manifested in their experiences
by, for example, the presence of heat qualities. So, while E captures the relevant identity across
yellow things, it is not suitable for capturing the relevant identity across experiences in which
the appearance yellow is manifested.17 E is the color quality yellow; it is not, however, the color
appearance yellow.18
It is a strong reading of the transparency thesis—a reading I argue against in CE, ch. 5—that
generates the illusion that a presented quality is also manifested in experience. One thinks that
when a quality, say, yellow is presented in experience, its very presence fixes a part of the sub-
jective character of the experience. One is thus led to think that the quality itself constitutes the
phenomenology of the experience. One neglects the relativity of appearances: one overlooks the
fact that the identity of the subjective character is shaped not by the quality alone but by the qual-
ity in conjunction with a host of other factors. The quality is not transparently transmitted to the
soul to constitute there the subjective character of the experience. The presence of the quality does
not fix the appearance it manifests. To put the point in terms of the causal model: the nature of
the quality sustains the causal relations that bring about its presence in experience; this nature
does not render it fit, however, to capture the subjective character of the experience. Presence of
the quality does not entail that the quality constitutes phenomenology.
16 I am assuming, here and above, realism about color qualities. If there are no color qualities, then the distinction between
color appearances and color qualities is wide indeed. One belongs in the realm of being while the other in the realm of
non-being.
Also, the causal model if true is an empirical truth; it is not a conceptual truth about (e.g.) presentation. I am using the
causal model only for illustrative purposes, without committing myself to its truth.
17 Even “represents E” is unsuitable for this purpose, for some of the creatures in whose experiences the appearance yellow
is manifested may be so independent of E they may not even represent E.

18 These two are, in turn, different from the concept “yellow.” For an account of concepts, see CE, §§ 234–251.
268 GUPTA
Let me now turn to the question about hallucinations. On the account I offer, it is an essential
feature of experiences as well as appearances that they are tied to presentation and, thereby, to
the duality of the experiencing subject and the presented items. There are no experiences, and
hence no appearances, if there are no experiencing subjects. And the same holds if there are no
presented items. In Presentationalism, appearances must satisfy the following requirement:
The Relatum Requirement. Appearances can figure in an experience only if there

is a relatum, that is, something presented that manifests them.
Sosa’s question is prompted by this requirement. He asks, in effect, whether the scheme is not
overly restrictive. For does it not altogether rule out total hallucinations? Sosa writes:
It is characteristic of hallucinations that there need be nothing to which they’re

directed. . . It seems plausible that sometimes, even though nothing is presented, the
way that nothing is presented to consciousness on that occasion is the same as a way
that things sometimes are.
The Relatum Requirement is definitely too restrictive if it is conjoined with certain orthodox ideas.
Suppose, for example, we accept the orthodox identification of presentation with acquaintance.
Now, we are unable to make sense even of ordinary cases of illusion. When the light is low, a bush
may manifest a bear appearance to a subject, but we are precluded from taking the bush to be the
object presented in the experience, for the subject (we can imagine) is not acquainted with the
bush. The identification of presentation with acquaintance imposes strong constraints on items
that may be presented in an experience, constraints that make it impossible to sustain the Rela-
tum Requirement. This is one of the reasons why contemporary acquaintance theories face great
problems in giving a plausible account of illusions and hallucinations. I argue in CE, ch. 5, for a
rejection of the identification of presentation with acquaintance, a rejection that enables a highly
liberal conception of presentation. On the conception I favor, all sorts of items may be presented in
an experience—objects and universals, facts and events, states internal to the subject and states
external. I even allow that what is presented may be no more than a highly indeterminate and
unarticulated portion of the world. This liberal conception is possible because it is not a require-
ment on presentation that the experiencing subject know the items presented. This conception in
turn renders it possible to sustain the Relatum Requirement.
To give a second example, the Relatum Requirement is overly restrictive if we accept strong
readings of the transparency idea, readings that imply that appearances are universals (e.g., color
appearances are color qualities). For the strong readings reduce manifestation to presentation,
rendering it impossible to give a satisfactory account of illusions and hallucinations. A halluci-
nation of a green lizard now requires the presence of a green item, yet nothing may be available
to serve this role. This is a second reason why contemporary acquaintance theories are unable to
offer plausible accounts of these ordinary phenomena. As I have indicated, I argue in CE for a
sharp distinction between appearances and universals and for a rejection of the strong readings
of transparency. These moves, together with the liberal conception of presentation, make pos-
sible a satisfactory treatment of illusions and hallucinations within the bounds of the Relatum
Requirement.
Let me illustrate this point with the causal model. Imagine that a subject—a patient with a
sick brain—hallucinates crawling green lizards on what to a healthy eye is a blank white wall.
The visual system of this patient magnifies and distorts, let us imagine, signals from otherwise
GUPTA 269
invisible squiggles on the wall and then synthesizes them in a way that result in the hallucinatory
experience of crawling green lizards. What is presented to the subject in his experience are
the wall and the squiggles on it, though the subject is entirely unacquainted with the latter.
Furthermore, these presented items manifest appearances of crawling green lizards—that is,
appearances that render the patient’s experience subjectively identical to a normal experience
of green lizards crawling on the wall. We can countenance this possibility because we have
rejected strong readings of transparency. We are not forced to see the phenomenology of the
patient’s experience as fixed by the features of the wall and the squiggles on it. We do not need
to posit something green and moving on the wall to account for the hallucination; the wall and
the squiggles can manifest the required sort of appearance. As we vary the circumstances of
perception and the subject’s constitution, the same wall and squiggles can manifest radically
different sorts of appearances, appearances that are normally manifested by very different kinds
of things. Because of this relativity, the character and structure of the appearances manifested
may be different and much richer than that of the items manifesting them.
The flexibility provided by the rejection of transparency enables Presentationalism to accom-
modate two noteworthy kinds of cases. First, Presentationalism recognizes the possibility of hal-
lucinations without any “object.” For it allows that some constituent appearances manifested in
an experience may possess no relatum specific to them. So, in the previous example, it may be
that the wall and the squiggles manifest the complex phenomenology of a crawling-green-lizards
experience, but nothing manifests the appearance of any of the hallucinated lizards. The whole
hallucinated scene may possess a relatum, but its constituent parts may well fail to possess any.
The Relatum Requirement must be understood liberally: all appearances figuring in an experience
are parts of a whole that possesses a relatum; it is not required that each constituent appearance
must possess its own distinctive relatum. Second, Presentationalism allows that the relatum of a
hallucination may be an indeterminate unarticulated portion of the world. In the causal model,
this corresponds to the case in which the causal effects are coherent deep in the visual system to
produce, say, the hallucination of crawling lizards, but the causal origins, though they lie within
a vaguely determinable portion of the world, are too messy to be pinned on specific objects and
properties.
I conclude, then, that Presentationalism is not overly restrictive. It provides resources to
naturally accommodate all sorts of illusory phenomena, including hallucinations without any
“objects.” What about Sosa’s case of a total hallucination that is directed to nothing? Shall we say
that not only being, but nonbeing—nothing—can manifest appearances to a subject’s conscious-
ness? If we say this, we would be giving nonbeing, nothing, too much substance and power, and
furthermore, we would be letting the tail wag the dog. We would be gutting the core account of
appearance for the sake of a case whose credentials are dubious. It is better to say, I think, that the
proper description of the case Sosa has in mind is that nothing is presented in the sense that noth-
ing specific is presented in the experience. Nevertheless, an indeterminate, unarticulated portion
of reality is indeed present, and it is this that manifests the appearances that make up the hallu-
cinatory experience.19
REFERENCES
Audi, R. (1999). “Contemporary foundationalism.” In L. Pojman (Ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and
Contemporary Readings, second edition (pp. 204–211). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
19 Thanks to Sofia Berinstein, Will Conner, and David Sosa for their feedback. Special thanks to Chris Hill for his extensive
comments on these replies.

270 GUPTA
Gupta, A. (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gupta, A. (2019). Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Gupta, A. (2020). “Adam Marushak on the hypothetical given.” Philosophical Issues 30, 167–174.
Hill, C. S. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, C. S. (2014). Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marushak, A. (2021). “On the hypothetical given.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 102, 497–514.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12658
Pryor, J. (2000). “The skeptic and the dogmatist.” Noûs 34, 517–549.
How to cite this article: Gupta, A. (2022). Overthrow the Orthodoxy! Replies to Hill,
Titus, and Sosa. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 104, 256–270.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12866

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Overthrow the Orthodoxy! Replies to Hill, Titus,

© 2022 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC

256 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phpr Philos Phenomenol Res. 2022;104:256–270.

Hill’s doubts concern my arguments against a position I labeled “Simple Representationalism.”

I will call this view Simple Representationalism* (SR*, in brief).3

was published online in 2019.

Whereas traditional logic makes all substantive inference illegitimate, Gupta’s

Whether a transition is rational is determined entirely by the antecedent beliefs and

(2) If Kennedy took cyanide, he is dead

(3) Kennedy is dead

(4) Kennedy took cyanide,

Let me now turn to the concern about views. Titus writes:

only one color appearance is manifested in the experiences.

is manifested may be so independent of E they may not even represent E.

The Relatum Requirement. Appearances can figure in an experience only if there

It is characteristic of hallucinations that there need be nothing to which they’re

comments on these replies.

Gupta, A. (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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