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ABSXXX10.1177/0002764218764251American Behavioral ScientistSkoric et al.

Article
American Behavioral Scientist
2018, Vol. 62(8) 1097­–1115
What Predicts Selective © 2018 SAGE Publications
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DOI: 10.1177/0002764218764251
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218764251
Media? A Study of journals.sagepub.com/home/abs

Political Unfriending in
Hong Kong and Taiwan

Marko M. Skoric1 , Qinfeng Zhu1,

and Jih-Hsuan Tammy Lin2

Abstract
One of the democratic promises of social media relies on the expectation that citizens
will be exposed to more diverse sources of information and will consequently be
more likely to encounter views that challenge their beliefs and opinions. Still, recent
evidence suggests that although social media may increase exposure to difference,
citizen also take active steps to reduce the dissonance they encounter by engaging in
selective avoidance tactics such as political unfriending and unfollowing. We report
the findings from the first comparative study of political unfriending conducted in Asia,
which analyzes survey data from two Chinese societies, Hong Kong and Taiwan. We
find that political interest, political discussion network size, and political discussion
with distant others all predict the likelihood of engaging in selective avoidance on
social media. The results also suggest that political interest is a stronger predictor
of unfriending in Hong Kong, while social and psychological factors play a more
important role in Taiwan.

Keywords
social media, selective avoidance, unfriending, Hong Kong, Taiwan

1City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, SAR, China

2National ChengChi University, Taipei, Taiwan

Corresponding Author:
Marko M. Skoric, Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong,
18 Tat Hong Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong, SAR, China.
Email: mskoric@cityu.edu.hk
1098 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

Introduction
Social media platforms potentially provide access to highly diverse range of views and
perspectives, but they also offer powerful filtering and curation affordances that could
promote the creation of homophilic information environments. In addition to being
able to create homogenous online networks through selective affiliation, people can
also engage in post hoc user filtration (Yang, Barnidge, & Rojas, 2017). With a click
of a button, one can hide postings he or she disagrees with and mute or unfriend/unfol-
low sources that challenge his or her beliefs. Conceptually, these behaviors fall under
the term of selective avoidance, denoting efforts to avoid information one disagrees
with. These actions also train social media algorithms to automatically filter out
unwanted dissonance in the future and create tightly controlled information ecologies
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; John & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015).
The aim of this study is to closely examine the predictors of politically motivated
selective avoidance on social media, specifically political unfriending/unfollowing on
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Unfriending/unfollowing denotes a deliberate
dissolution of social ties, and represents a form of nonalgorithmic, manual reconfigu-
ration of egocentric online networks. We seek to understand both political and social
psychological, as well as media use related factors that predict political unfriending by
analyzing two unique survey data sets from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Noting the role
of culture in the relationship between new technology use and political change in Asia
(Skoric, 2007), we also focus on the role of cultural differences in the dynamics of
selective avoidance on social media.
Both Taiwan and Hong Kong are renowned for their traditions of free press and civic
life, and noninstitutional political activities such as protests are common in both regions.
Social media platforms have played an important mobilizational and organizational
role in activities such as the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan (B. Chen, Liao, Wu, &
Hwan, 2014) and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (F. L. Lee, Chen, & Chan,
2017; P. S. N. Lee, So, & Leung, 2015). However, Taiwan enjoys full democracy in
which citizens are free to express their political preferences in periodic democratic elec-
tions. In contrast, Hong Kong is only partly free since no universal suffrage exists and
the Chief Executive is elected indirectly via an election committee, while the legislative
branch is elected more democratically. A recent meta-analysis showed that use of social
media platforms is linked with political action in both regions, and yet the effect size is
larger in Taiwan than in Hong Kong, arguably because of the difference in the political
systems (Skoric, Zhu, & Pang, 2016). In Taiwan, engagement with politics through
social media seems to be a byproduct of socialization, given that Taiwanese citizens
who use online media to discuss politics and socialize with friends are more likely to
publicly express their political opinions and contact elected officials (Hsieh & Li,
2014). In contrast, social media performs a more political role in Hong Kong (H. T.
Chen, Chan, & Lee, 2016), arguably as a result of the surging political polarization and
appalling inequality (Nobel, 2014; Steinbock, 2017), which are not present in the cur-
rent Taiwanese political scene. P. S. N. Lee et al. (2015) suggests that social media has
become an insurgent public sphere in Hong Kong, based on the finding that social
Skoric et al. 1099

media use contributes to dissatisfaction and distrust of the established political authori-
ties. While Hong Kong and Taiwan are both Chinese societies sharing many cultural,
linguistic, and historical traits, Hong Kong was also a British colony for more than a
century. Research suggests that there are significant cultural differences between the
two regions, such as those related to uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and trust
tendencies (Y. H. Chen, Wu, & Chung, 2008).

Literature Review
Even before the arrival of social media, scholars have voiced concerns about the power
of digital technologies to deliver highly personalized version of reality to citizens based
on their preexisting political preferences and opinions (Sunstein, 2001). The social
media ecologies that have emerged since offer even more powerful personalization and
filtering affordances, aided by proprietary algorithms optimized to increase advertising
efficiency instead of creating a marketplace of ideas. The algorithms are created to rec-
ommend content that citizens will like and/or agree with and can therefore inadvertently
widen ideological fissures that exist within a society (Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016).
Indeed, the supply of public affairs news has become deeply entangled with social net-
working, which, while enabling marginally more cross-cutting exposure through social
endorsement (Messing & Westwood, 2014), may have amplified selectivity thanks to the
principle of network homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
The exponential growth of political information on the Internet has further deci-
mated people’s cognitive ability to assess nonpreferred alternatives (Metzger, Flanagin,
& Medders, 2010), making information filtering a necessity. The rise of more homoph-
ilous networks, paired with algorithmic filtering and advertising incentives has also
accelerated the process of decoupling of “news production” from professional stan-
dards and practices, as evident by the rise of “fake news” during the recent U.S. presi-
dential election. Recent evidence suggests that ideological divide between citizens is
greater among those who get their news via social media, particularly when it comes
to opinion, rather than factual pieces (Flaxman et al., 2016). The increasing power of
filtering paired with an ongoing migration to more intimate and closed social media
platforms such as Snapchat, WhatsApp, and WeChat potentially signals that the era of
context collapse (Marwick & boyd, 2011) and intensive and open weak tie communi-
cation over social media may be coming to an end.
The concept of selective avoidance is related to selective exposure, an observed
pattern of information seeking and processing in which individuals gravitate toward
content sympathetic to their established opinions and partisan biases (Stroud, 2008).
And yet selective avoidance is different from the common practice of selective expo-
sure in that, while the latter does not necessarily sacrifice opportunities for cross-cut-
ting exposure (Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013), the former purposefully eliminates
both present and future encounters with unwanted disagreements by cutting off the
connections with the source. In addition to their direct impact, selective avoidance
behaviors provide input to social media algorithms which can then automatically filter
out dissonant views in the future.
1100 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

Selection Avoidance on Social Media: Political Unfriending and

Unfollowing
Research shows that cross-cutting exposure is linked with increased tolerance, greater
openness to political difference, and better understanding of political arguments
(Dilliplane, 2011; Mutz, 2002). However, its relationship with political participation is
more contested, since exposure to political disagreement may lead to ambivalence,
which may depress political participation (Lu & Gall Myrick, 2016; Mutz, 2002;
Pattie & Johnston, 2009). In contrast, exposure to likeminded views boosts participa-
tion via activation and reinforcement of citizens’ existing attitudes, but it can also lead
to more extreme political attitudes and greater polarization and fragmentation
(Dilliplane, 2011, 2014; Sunstein, 2001). Selective avoidance of political content may
therefore reflect tribalism inherent to politics as citizens holding more extreme politi-
cal views are more likely to engage in it (John & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015), which further
promotes their participation in contentious political activities such as street protests
(Zhu, Skoric, & Shen, 2017). Consequently, moderate and tolerant citizens are likely
to disengage from politics, allowing those holding more extreme and radical attitudes
to play a more significant role.
Research shows that politics is the second most common reason for unfriending on
social network sites, most frequently as a reaction to polarizing posts or exposure to
political disagreement (Rainie & Smith, 2012; Sibona, 2014). Citizens who are more
politically engaged or extreme in their ideologies are most likely to unfriend or unfol-
low others (John & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015), with weak ties being the most common
casualty (Rainie & Smith, 2012; Sibona, 2014). Even simply engaging in political talk
with friends and family has been linked with greater frequency of unfriending (Bode,
2016). We therefore expect that a broader pattern of interest in politics should also be
predictive of unfriending since it is likely reflective of stronger political preferences
and greater likelihood of political engagement. This should particularly matter in the
case of Hong Kong, which has experienced a more polarized political climate follow-
ing the Umbrella Movement protests in 2014.

Hypothesis 1: The level of political interest is positively related to the likelihood

of engaging in political unfriending/unfollowing on social media.

Research on selective exposure suggests that the social aspect of information pre-
sented on social media can trump selectivity bias. Social endorsement can increase
perceived information utility and thus help reduce partisan selectivity (Messing &
Westwood, 2014). Such a positive effect is particularly pronounced among people
driven by impression goals of appearing likable and developing relationships (Winter,
Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016). However, considering that these studies were experi-
ments, it is unclear whether this is easily generalizable to the real world. In everyday
life, people may be willing to compromise on issue stance in order to protect personal
relationships and associated social resources (Mutz, 2002). In contrast, in times of
heightened political conflict, opinion extremity and commitment to protect personal
Skoric et al. 1101

and in-group beliefs may overshadow other relationship qualities. Exposure to dis-
agreement is thus likely to trigger a defense motivation. As consistently demonstrated
by research on cognitive dissonance, a defense motivation such as to justify one’s
opinion makes individuals more prone to selectivity bias (Fischer & Greitemeyer,
2010; Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; Winter et al., 2016). At the affective level, anger
dominates; it triggers risk-taking behaviors, willingness to spend scarce resources, and
a quick reaction that involves little contemplation (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lu & Gall
Myrick, 2016). Selective avoidance aimed at shielding oneself from dissenting views
via a click of a button thus becomes a reality.
Exposure to dissonant and politically polarizing information on social media is
likely to increase the chance of unfriending and unfollowing, and it is more likely to
be done by those who are more engaged in politics. However, a recent study by Yang
et al. (2017) paints a more complex picture, suggesting that although the strength of
political ideology, the number of social media contacts, and the time spent using
social media all predicted frequency of unfriending, such relationship was surpris-
ingly absent when it came to exposure to disagreement. This absence could be poten-
tially explained by the sociocultural context in which the study was conducted (i.e.,
Columbia), and also by the nature of measurement deployed, namely a single-item
measure assessing the frequency of encountering disagreement with friends’ posts on
social media without actively engaging in a conversation or interaction. Although
social media users do often monitor others’ opinions through “lurking,” it is also
common that they engage with others’ views through commenting, liking, or sharing,
particularly during political events. Political disagreement experienced through
expression may differ from disagreement experienced through mere exposure.
Expression has a self-reinforcing effect that, thanks to humans’ innate confirmation
bias, transforms cross-cutting exposure into a source of “postdecisional dissonance,”
which evokes a defense position and a stubborn psychological commitment to and
“automatic consistency” with the expressed opinions (Cialdini, 1984). In other words,
the act of expression tends to move people toward more fortified versions of their
views. Such a self-reinforcing effect has been empirically demonstrated in social
media studies. Cho, Ahmed, Keum, Choi, and Lee (2016) find that political expres-
sion on social media strengthens expressers’ preexisting political preferences. J. K.
Lee, Choi, Kim, and Kim (2014) report that, exposure to incongruent views is condu-
cive to more polarized opinion about party and ideology only among those who have
engaged in public affairs discussion.
In this study, we therefore aim to examine the role of political discussion in selec-
tive avoidance on social media, focusing on two different attributes, namely the dis-
cussion network size and the nature of discussions. Although previous research has not
directly assessed the impact of the political discussion network size, there is evidence
suggesting that the number of contacts on social media is predictive of unfriending
(John & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015; Yang et al., 2017). In addition, the number of people
one engages in political discussions with is also an indicator of one’s political activity
and ideological commitment, which are expected to increase the likelihood of selec-
tive avoidance. In terms of the nature of discussions, we categorize them into those
1102 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

involving known others (e.g., families, friends, and coworkers; Metzger et al., 2010)
and those with distant others (e.g., strangers, people different from us in terms of eth-
nicity and social economic status; Park & Lee, 2012). The difference between the two
types of discussions is that the former tends to be more oriented toward agreement
seeking than the latter, as the former is bounded by social relationship norms, whereas
the latter is not. First of all, social contacts tend to be localized in sociodemographic
space. People are biased in the selection of affiliation in favor of those who are similar
to them, and grow more alike over time (McPherson et al., 2001). Besides, when inter-
acting with known others, people are subjected to the pressures of social conformity
and compliance (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). In order to maintain a sense of coher-
ence, people usually stay away from controversial topics and are ready to overlook
minor disagreements emerging in their daily interactions (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995;
Jussim & Osgood, 1989; McPherson et al., 2001). Studies on political talk suggest that
people often make political conversations in a social rather than in a civic manner—
similar to small talk and gossiping, talking about politics often serves the primary
function of social grooming and signaling (Eveland, Morey, & Hutchens, 2011). In
other words, we tend to expect agreement when interacting with our existing ties and
when disagreement happens, we are more likely to overlook it in the interest of pre-
serving a social connection. In contrast, when interacting with strangers and people of
different backgrounds, disagreement is to be expected and it is less likely to be avoided
or mitigated for the sake of preserving a tie. Moreover, although people indeed experi-
ence disagreement in close relationships (Morey, Eveland, & Hutchens, 2012), studies
have also shown that in such contexts disagreement is a means of expressing sociabil-
ity and intimacy rather than confrontation (Sifianou, 2012). Based on the extant
research, we formulate the following research hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: The size of political discussion network on social media is positively

related to the likelihood of engaging in political unfriending/unfollowing.
Hypothesis 3: The frequency of political discussion with distant others is posi-
tively related to the likelihood of engaging in political unfriending/unfollowing.
Research Question 1: Is the frequency of political discussion with known others
related to the likelihood of engaging in political unfriending/unfollowing?

Political Unfriending and Unfollowing in the Cultural Context: Hong

Kong and Taiwan
Research on selective avoidance on social media in the context of Asia is very scarce.
A recent study from Hong Kong found a positive association between political use of
social media and the likelihood of selective avoidance, with perceptions of out-group
threat intensifying this relationship (Zhu et al., 2017). It can therefore be expected that
social psychological variables play a role in the decision to unfriend/unfollow users
and that of particular importance are those factors related to the maintenance of social
relationships. As unfriending and unfollowing on social media resembles and signals
the dissolution of social ties, it may be governed by cultural norms. In this study, we
Skoric et al. 1103

therefore examine the roles of cultural orientation—collectivism, and a social psycho-

logical trait—fear of missing out (FoMO).
In a collectivist culture, the concept of “self” is defined by “we” rather than “I.”
Therefore, it emphasizes the interdependence of relationships between group mem-
bers. Members take responsibilities to take care of each other and form strong connec-
tions. Efforts are spent in achieving group harmony (Kim, Park, & Suzuki, 1990).
Therefore, in the context of political discussions on social media, users who endorse
collectivistic values may be less likely to unfriend others in order to maintain harmony
in the network.
Taiwan has been categorized as a highly collectivistic society (Hofstede, 1983) in
which people tend to avoid uncertainty and have an affinity for hierarchy in their
organizations and communities. Most Taiwanese receive political information from
social media, but they mostly just read or share information rather than engage in
commenting or discussing political issues (Taiwan Communication Survey, 2015).
This is due to citizens’ ambivalent and negative attitudes toward using Facebook for
political discussion and engagement (Lin, 2016). In comparison, while Hong Kong
is also categorized as a collectivistic culture and a highly hierarchical society, it
significantly differs from Taiwan when it comes to uncertainty avoidance, indicating
that its people are more flexible in their interpretation of rules and easier to adapt to
ambiguity.
In addition to collectivism, FoMo is another trait variable that is closely tied to
social relationships (Przybylski, Murayama, Dehaan, & Gladwell, 2013). It refers to
“the fears, worries, and anxieties people may have in relation to being in (or out of)
touch with the events, experiences, and conversations happening across their
extended social circles” (p. 1842). Individuals, who are high in FoMo, spend more
time on social media to monitor potential social activities or trends (Przybylski
et al., 2013; Taiwan Communication Survey, 2014). Among teen and adult social
media users in Taiwan, around 12% of respondents indicate that the main reasons for
using social media is FoMo. Therefore, it is likely that those who are high in FoMo
are more likely to engage in various discussions during their social media surveil-
lance activities, including those with dissimilar others. Such behaviors are likely to
be predictive of unfriending/unfollowing, which would act as a necessary informa-
tion management tactic. Furthermore, FoMo may interact with a cultural context, as
those who are high in FoMo in Taiwan may demonstrate greater likelihood of engag-
ing in avoidance behavior than Hong Kongers. This is because Taiwanese are higher
in uncertainty avoidance and would engage in unfriending/unfollowing with low
tolerance of ambiguity or different opinions. Given the above, we aim to examine
whether collectivism and FoMo are linked with selective avoidance behaviors in
Hong Kong and Taiwan, while focusing on the potential differences between the two
societies.

Research Question 2: Are social psychological factors such as (a) collectivism and
(b) FoMO related to the likelihood of engaging in political unfriending/unfollow-
ing? What are the difference in their role between Hong Kong and Taiwan?
1104 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

Method
Data
The data were collected by a reputable market research agency, YouGov, which is one
of the pioneers of online polling (Twyman, 2008). It adopts what is known as “active
sampling”—a panel-based approach—where a sample is drawn from a pool of respon-
dents, matched in terms of desired population quota such as age, gender, and race. This
approach ensures that the eventual sample is equivalent and selected with the right
proportions.
For the Hong Kong survey (March 7-16, 2016), the participants were recruited
from the YouGov proprietary consumer panel using gender and age quotas. For the
Taiwan survey (January 6-16, 2016), the participants were recruited via a YouGov
trusted panel partner. The sizes of the online panels from which the respondents were
recruited were 15,000 and 21,000 for Hong Kong and Taiwan, respectively, with a
response rate of 30% to 40%. The final data set is weighted for analysis purposes using
the Random Iterative Method which uses an algorithm that checks the target variables
of sample distribution against the same variables from known distribution, and then
assigns a weighting coefficient that tries to distort each variable as little as possible.
The target variables used were based on gender, race, and age proportions according
to the population census.

Measures
Selective Avoidance. Selective avoidance was operationalized in this study as politically
motivated unfriending or unfollowing. We measured it with the question, “Have you
unfriended or unfollowed anyone because of comments or posts related to politics in
the past 6 months” (0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = do not know). Indeed, 12.16% (n = 298) of the
2,450 self-reported social media users in our sample reported to have engaged in such
selective avoidance behavior, while 77.27% (n = 1,893) did not. Whereas 10.57%
(n = 259) chose “do not know,” which was treated as a missing value in the analysis.

Political Interest. Political interest was estimated with a single-item measure. Respon-
dents answered the question, “How interested are you in what’s going on in govern-
ment and politics” on a 5-point scale (1 = not interested at all, 5 = extremely interested).
Responses yielded a mean of 3.17 with a standard deviation of 1.03.

Collectivism. The collectivism variable measures the degree to which an individual sees
him or herself as a part of a collective. The items used tapped into both vertical col-
lectivism where people accept the hierarchy and submit to the authority of their in-
group (i.e., obedience, self-sacrifice), and horizontal collectivism where people see the
members of a collective as equals and still merge their selves with the in-groups (i.e.,
conformity, cooperativeness; Triandis, 2001; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Respondents
were asked to answer the following questions on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). (1) “I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my
Skoric et al. 1105

family did not approve of it.” (2) “It is important to me that I respect the decisions my
friends make.” (3) “If my friend gets a prize, I would feel proud.” (4) “It is important
to maintain harmony within my family.” Responses were subjected to a principal com-
ponent analysis, which found the items to load on a single component. The reliability
test yielded a Cronbach’s α of .72. Collectivism scores were estimated by taking the
mean of the four items (M = 4.84, SD = 1.00).

Fear of Missing Out (FoMO). We used the 10-item FoMO scale developed by Przyb-
ylski et al. (2013) to measure the psychological trait FoMO. Respondents were
asked to answer the questions using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all true of me, 7 =
extremely true of me). FoMO scores were estimated by averaging across the items
(M = 3.62, SD = 1.14, Cronbach’s α = .92).

Social Media Political Discussion Network Attributes. We measured both the size and
nature of political discussion networks on social media. To estimate the network size,
we asked the respondents how many people they had discussed political affairs with
via social media during the past month, using a 6-point scale (1 = 0-20 people,
2 = 21-50 people, 3 = 51-100 people, 4 = 101-200 people, 5 = 201-500 people, and
6 = more than 500 people; M = 1.48, SD = 1.03).
As to the nature of political discussion, we asked respondents how frequently they
had conversed about politics with (1) close friends and families, (2) coworkers and
friends, (3) strangers, and (4) people outside their family who are not of the same eth-
nicity or socioeconomic status, respectively, on a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7 = all the
time). Responses were subjected to a principal component analysis with a varimax
(orthogonal) rotation. The analysis yielded two factors explaining a total of 84.02% of
the variance for the entire set of variables. With high loadings by the Items 1 and 2, the
first factor explained 50.66% of the variance. It reflected discussion within one’s
social circle, and was thus labeled political discussion with known others. The second
factor consisted of Items 3 and 4, which counted for 33.36% of the variance. It reflected
political discussion occurring beyond one’s social circle, hence labeled political dis-
cussion with distant others. We created the variable political discussion with known
others by computing the mean of the first two items (M = 4.78, SD = 1.56, Pearson’s
r = .73), and the variable political discussion with distant others by computing the
mean of the other two items (M = 2.62, SD = 1.42, Pearson’s r = .61).

Control Variables. We controlled for demographics (age, gender, and education), and
media consumption (traditional vs. online). Demographic information is summarized
in Table 1. To estimate media consumption, respondents were asked to report how
frequently they used traditional and online media to get information about public
issues and politics on a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7 = all the time). Traditional media
included local free-to-air TV, cable TV, radio news, traditional newspapers, and tradi-
tional magazines (M = 3.89, SD = 1.20, Cronbach’s α = .73). Online media included
online text news, online magazines, online video news, and online discussion forums
(M = 4.34, SD = 1.27, Cronbach’s α = .79).
1106 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

Table 1. Summaries of Demographics.

TW (n = 1,028) HK (n = 1,500)

M (SD) Median % M (SD) Median %

Age 2.66 (1.07) 3 2.49 (1.12) 2
Gender (male) 44.55 49.20
Education 3.41 (0.02) 4 2.90 (1.06) 3

Note. TW = Taiwan; HK = Hong Kong. Age 5-point scale (1 = 18-24 years old, 2 = 25-34 years old,
3 = 35-44 years old, 4 = 45-54 years old, 5 = 55 years old and above); Education 6-point scale (1 = less than
high school, 2 = high school degree or equivalent, 3 = some college but no degree, 4 = associate degree,
5 = bachelor degree, 6 = graduate degree).

Table 2. Summaries of Between-Country Comparisons.

M (SD) or % (N)

TW HK t(df) or χ2
Selective avoidance 10.84% (108) 13.07% (190) 7.92*
Political interest 3.25 (0.89) 3.12 (1.11) 3.23 (2460.08)**
Collectivism 5.04 (0.99) 4.70 (0.98) 8.36 (2193.58)***
FoMO 3.56 (1.23) 3.66 (1.08) −2.11 (2016.50)*
Political discussion network size 1.35 (0.93) 1.57 (1.09) −5.35 (2340.21)***
Discussion with known others 4.70 (1.59) 4.49 (1.53) 3.45 (2075.27)**
Discussion with distant others 2.41 (1.39) 2.77 (1.42) −6.11 (2448)***

Note. df = degrees of freedom; FoMO = fear of missing out; TW = Taiwan; HK = Hong Kong.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Results
The percentage of respondents who engaged in politically motivated selective avoid-
ance on social media differed significantly between countries, χ2(2, 2450) = 7.92,
p < .05; 10.84% (n = 108) of the respondents in Taiwan reported to have unfriended or
unfollowed someone, compared with 13.07% (n = 190) of the respondents in Hong
Kong. We also note that a lower percentage of Taiwanese respondents (9.04%) reported
“do not know” than their Hong Kong counterparts (11.62%).
In our analyses, t tests showed significant between-country differences related to
the political and social factors, as well as the three attributes of political discussion
network on social media (see Table 2). In general, Taiwainese respondents exhibited a
higher level of political interest, t(2460.08) = 3.23, p < .01, stronger collectivist orien-
tation, t(2193.58) = 8.36, p < .001, and a greater tendency to discuss politics with
known others on social media, t(2075.27) = 3.45, p < .01, than their Hong Kong coun-
terparts. Hong Kong respondents on average scored higher on the FoMO scale,
t(2016.50) = −2.11, p < .05, had larger political discussion networks on social media,
Skoric et al. 1107

Table 3. Zero-Order Correlations.

1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Collectivism
2. FoMO .14***
3. Network size −.02 .27***
4. Discussion with known others .37*** .20*** .09***
5. Discussion with distant others −.01 .43*** .43*** .21***
6. Political interest .11*** .25*** .28*** .13*** .39***

Note. FoMO = fear of missing out.

***p < .001.

t(2340.21) = −5.35, p < .001, and discussed politics with distant others more,
t(2448) = −6.11, p < .001, compared with the Taiwanese respondents.
A logistic regression was performed to examine predictors of politically moti-
vated selective avoidance with the two regional data sets combined, followed by a
logistic regression with two-way interaction effects using region as the moderator
(Taiwan = 1, Hong Kong = 0) to estimate between-region differences. Odds ratios,
Exp(Β), were calculated and the results summarized in Table 4. In terms of the main
effects of the focal independent variables (Model 1), political interest, Β (SE) = 0.40
(0.08), Exp(Β) = 1.49, p < .001, political discussion network size on social media, Β
(SE) = 0.15 (0.06), Exp(Β) = 1.16, p < .05, and discussion with distant others on
social media, Β (SE) = 0.43 (0.06), Exp(Β) = 1.54, p < .001, are positively and sig-
nificantly associated with the log odds of selective avoidance. Hypotheses 1, 2, and
3 are thus supported. Regarding Research Question 1, political discussion with
known others is not significantly associated with selective avoidance, Β (SE) = −0.05
(0.06), Exp(Β) = 0.95, p = .36. As to Research Question 2, both FoMO and collectiv-
ism are significantly associated with selective avoidance, although in opposite direc-
tions. Specifically, one-unit increase in FoMO is associated with an estimated .19
increase in the log odds of selective avoidance, Β (SE) = 0.19 (0.08), Exp(Β) = 1.21,
p < .05, whereas one-unit increase in collectivism is associated with an estimated .21
decrease in the log odds of selective avoidance, Β (SE) = −0.21 (0.08), Exp(Β) = 0.81,
p < .05.
When it comes to the interaction effects (Model 2), the relationship between
political interest and selective avoidance is moderated by region with statistical
significance, Β (SE) = −0.40 (0.17), Exp(Β) = 0.67, p < .05. Specifically, the
effect size is larger in Hong Kong (Β = 0.52) than in Taiwan (Β = 0.12; Figure 1).
Besides, the predictive power of FoMO also differs significantly across the two
regions, Β (SE) = 0.32 (0.16), Exp(Β) = 1.38, p < .05; its effect size in Hong Kong
(Β = 0.06) is significantly smaller than that in Taiwan (Β = 0.38; Figure 2). The
relationships that political discussion network size, discussion with distant others,
and collectivism have with selective avoidance are not significantly moderated
by region.
1108 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

Table 4. Summary of Logistic Regressions With Two-Way Interaction Effects.

Selective avoidance Selective avoidance

(Model 1) (Model 2)

Β (SE) Exp(Β) Β (SE) Exp(Β)

Constant −4.03 (0.48)*** 0.02*** −2.31 (0.13)*** 0.10***
Age −0.05 (0.07) 0.95 −0.04 (0.07) 0.96
Gender (male) 0.12 (0.14) 1.12 0.09 (0.14) 1.10
Education −0.06 (0.07) 0.95 −0.05 (0.07) 0.95
Traditional media −0.12 (0.07) 0.89 −0.12 (0.07) 0.89
Online media 0.09 (0.07) 1.09 0.09 (0.07) 1.10
Political factor
Political interest 0.40 (0.08)*** 1.49*** 0.52 (0.10)*** 1.69***
Social factors
Collectivism −0.21 (0.08)* 0.81* −0.10 (0.11) 0.90
FoMO 0.19 (0.08)* 1.21* 0.06 (0.10) 1.06
Social media political discussion attributes
Political discussion 0.15 (0.06)** 1.16* 0.21 (0.07)** 1.23**
network size
Political discussion with −0.05 (0.06) 0.95 −0.03 (0.07) 0.97
known others
Political discussion with 0.43 (0.06)*** 1.54*** 0.39 (0.08)*** 1.48***
distant others
Moderator
Region (Taiwan) 0.08 (0.15) 1.09 0.08 (0.18) 1.08
Interactions
Political interest × Region −0.40 (0.17)* 0.67*
(Taiwan)
Collectivism × Region −0.25 (0.17) 0.78
(Taiwan)
FoMO × Region (Taiwan) 0.32 (0.16)* 1.38*
Political discussion −0.11 (0.13) 0.90
network size × Region
(Taiwan)
Political discussion with −0.04 (0.12) 0.96
known others × Region
(Taiwan)
Political discussion with 0.11 (0.12) 1.12
distant others × Region
(Taiwan)
N 2,191 2,191
LR χ2 262.23*** 275.57***
Nagelkerke R2 .206 .215

Note. FoMO = fear of missing out; SE = standard error; LR = logistic regressions. Taiwan = 1,
Hong Kong = 0. Model 2: Continuous variables mean centered.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Skoric et al. 1109

Figure 1. Two-way interaction effect for logistic regression (political interest × region).

Figure 2. Two-way interaction effect for logistic regression (FoMO × region).

Note. FoMO = fear of missing out.

Discussion
The findings demonstrate significant differences in both the frequency as well as the
predictors of selective avoidance between the two Asian societies, Hong Kong and
Taiwan. While the difference in the rate of political unfriending and unfollowing is not
large (around 2%), it is likely an indication of the greater need for post hoc filtration,
given the larger discussion network size and more discussions with distant others in
1110 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

the case of Hong Kong citizens. Not surprisingly, the frequency of discussion with
known others, while being higher in Taiwan than in Hong Kong, did not predict selec-
tive avoidance in either society. This is in line with previous research that shows that
the “unfriended” tend to be weak ties (Rainie & Smith, 2012; Sibona, 2014), which in
our case were likely coming from the ranks of strangers and people from different
socioeconomic or racial groups.
Our study provides further evidence demonstrating that the sheer size of political
discussion network size and discussion with distant others on social media are robust
predictors of the likelihood of unfriending and unfollowing, irrespective of the cultural
context, which is in line with Yang et al. (2017) who reported a similar finding regard-
ing the number of social media contacts. The moderation analysis shows that the posi-
tive relationship between political interest and selective avoidance is substantially
more pronounced in Hong Kong, whereas the psychological factor FoMO has signifi-
cantly larger effect in Taiwan. This corresponds to the previous findings showing that
political engagement through social media in Taiwan has a strong social element,
while in Hong Kong it is more instrumentally political (M. Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin,
2012; H. T. Chen et al., 2016). Therefore, psychological factors such as FoMo could
further predict avoidance behavior because unfollowing/unfriending is the informa-
tion management tactic that Taiwanese use to eliminate potential discomfort arising
from online social interactions. In contrast, citizens in societies that are low in uncer-
tainty avoidance, such as Hong Kong, are more flexible and open to ambiguity.
Therefore, political variables become the salient factor predicting selective avoidance
behaviors.
We argue that political unfriending and unfollowing in Hong Kong are indicative of
political tribalism and a symptom of heightened affective polarization present in the
current Hong Kong society. Affective polarization is followed by increasing hostility
and declining trust toward political opponents, as well as greater social distance
(Iyengar, Jackman, & Hahn, 2016; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). As shown in the study
of the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, perceived out-group threat intensifies the
positive relationship between political use of social media and politically motivated
selective avoidance (Zhu et al., 2017). Moreover, selective avoidance creates an insu-
lar socioinformational environment and contributes to cyberbalkanization which may
further reinforce polarization (C. H. Chan & Fu, 2015).
The results show that higher levels of collectivism are associated with lower rates
of unfriending in both cultures. This is in line with the literature on collectivism, which
argues that individuals strive to achieve group harmony rather than satisfy their own
needs. Therefore, despite witnessing polarizing discussions and perceiving others as
violating the norms of social interactions on social media (McLaughlin & Vitak,
2012), individuals endorsing collectivism may perceive these behaviors as tolerable
inconveniences. Simply ignoring this information may be a strategy to keep peace
with the members of the in-group. After all, unfriending signals the termination of
relationships, which can be seen as undermining social harmony (McLaughlin &
Vitak, 2012). In addition, such behavior may alert other members in the common net-
work and cause awkward situations in subsequent interpersonal interactions. Therefore,
Skoric et al. 1111

individuals high in collectivism may adopt less drastic measures for dealing with dis-
sonance on social media.
In contrast to collectivism, FoMO positively predicted selective avoidance on
social media, particularly in Taiwan. This can be explained by the innate motivation of
those who exhibit high FoMO to monitor all activities and discussed topics in their
networks in order not to miss any potential social activities. However, these users also
perceive greater social pressure and experience lower levels of psychological well-
being resulting from their social interactions. This could explain the negative associa-
tion between FoMO and unfriending behavior. It is likely that FoMO leads to greater
exposure to difference on social media (as evidenced by a moderately high correlation
in this study), which becomes a constant source of pressure for these users. Therefore,
unlike collectivism, users high in FoMO may decide to pursue selective avoidance
tactics to filter unfavorable content during the process of constantly searching for
social information on others, particularly dissimilar others.

Limitations and Conclusion

The current study brings further evidence for the claim that “engagement with differ-
ence” on social media platforms may lead to post hoc filtration and dissolution of
social ties. We also highlight rather different patterns of findings coming from two
seemingly similar societies, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Interestingly, although political
interest is a stronger predictor of unfriending in Hong Kong, social and psychological
factors play a more important role in Taiwan. Since, Yang et al.’ (2017) study demon-
strates that exposure to political disagreement may not be the reason behind unfriend-
ing, it is possible that unfriending mainly comes as a consequence of political
engagement with distant others. Selective avoidance on social media may thus be less
about filtering out dissonant political information, and more about avoiding strangers
and distant others. Given that political polarization is increasingly taking an affective
turn in which citizens openly dislike and even loathe their political opponents (Iyengar
et al., 2016; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), avoiding people rather than information on
social media seems logical. This study, however, cannot resolve this issue fully, as our
data does not contain identifying information on the “unfriended.” We therefore urge
further research on this topic, focusing on the difference between mere exposure to
disagreement versus engagement with difference, preferably utilizing both survey-
based and behavioral trace data.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Strategic Research Grant from
1112 American Behavioral Scientist 62(8)

City University of Hong Kong and the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan, Grant
#103-2628-H-009-002-SS4.

ORCID iD
Marko M. Skoric https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6578-9872

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Author Biographies
Marko M. Skoric is an associate professor at the Department of Media and Communication,
City University of Hong Kong. His teaching and research interests are focused on new media
and social change, with particular emphasis on civic and political implications of new commu-
nication technologies.
Qinfeng Zhu is a PhD candidate at the Department of Media and Communication, City
University of Hong Kong. Her research interest lies in the field of political development in
greater China region, focusing on social media, political participation, and government
capacity.
Jih-Hsuan Tammy Lin is an associate professor in the Department of Advertising at the
National ChengChi University. Her research interests focus on examining psychological mech-
anisms in virtual reality, digital games, and social media and the role of interactivity in media
effect studies. She is also interested in using virtual reality for health promotion.