RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

5. Pielago vs. People, G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013

G.R. No. 202020 13 March 2013

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE MIKE ALVIN PIELAGO y ROS
ACCUSED-APPELLANT PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PONENTE REYES, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner, (Pielago) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), finding Pielago guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault.

It happened when AAA, the 4-year old victim, and her 2-year old brother, CCC, were
playing with Pielago whom they call Kuya Alvin. After playing, Pielago brought AAA and CCC
to the bedroom. He, then, gave CCC a toy carabao to play with at a corner, while he asked
AAA to lie on the bed. Pielago then took off AAA’s short pants and inserted his right hand’s
forefinger inside her vagina. Unsatisfied, Pielago made AAA lie on her chest on the same bed
then fingered her anus. After a few minutes, AAA and CCC were called for lunch by their
mother, BBB. Pielago immediately replaced AAA’s shorts then sent her and CCC out of the
bedroom. BBB noticed the bloodstains at the back portion of AAA’s shorts. When BBB asked
AAA what happened, AAA did not answer immediately until she said Kuya Alvin inserted
something in her vagina and her anus. Incensed by what AAA told her, on the same day,
AAA and BBB lodged a complaint at the Police Station where AAA was physically examined
by a medico-legal officer which issued a report showing a superficial laceration.

The Information charged against petitioner had, on its face, the crime of acts of
lasciviousness against Pielago. However, the factual allegations contained in the Information
and the provisions of existing laws pertain to the crime of rape by sexual assault. The RTC
gave the testimony of AAA full credit considering that it was clear, candid, and straight-
forward. Hence, Pielago was found guilty. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of rape by
sexual assault despite his being charged in the information for acts of lasciviousness only.

HELD:
No, the CA did not erred in convicting the petitioner.

It has been well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to
know the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the designation of
the crime as specified in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and
allow him to present his defense properly. Further, What controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.
In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.

In the instant case, the designated crime in the Information changed from the crime
of acts of lasciviousness to the crime of rape by sexual assault. It cannot be said, however,
that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
was violated. As correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the
Information determine the crime charged against the accused and not the designation of
the offense as given by the prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts.
Thus, the petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault.
6. People vs. Espera, 706 SCRA 704

G.R. No. 202868 October 02, 2013

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACCUSED-APPELLANT MICHAEL ESPERA Y CUYACOT
PONENTE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The victim and her co-worker were on their way home from work and decided to
share a ride and hailed a tricycle at around 11:30 in the evening. Streetlights illuminated the
area. As they entered in the tricycle, her co-worker beamed a flashlight on the part of the
driver, the victim recognize the driver’s face and notice that he was wearing a red polo shirt
and maong pants. Upon reaching their barangay, her co-worker was first to disembark, later
on the victim tried to stop the driver when they were near her house but he kept on driving
until they finally stopped at the quarry site. The appellant asked the victim to get off. As the
victim was tracing her way home, she realized she was being followed. She saw the
appellant, with his red polo shirt covering his face. The appellant ran after her and
threatened to kill her if she shouted. The victim recognized the appellant’s voice, it was the
voice of the tricycle driver. The appellant dragged the victim to a more secluded place.
Finished with his dastardly deed, he repeated his threat to kill her.

On the next day, the victim told her mother about what happened to her.
Thereafter, the victim had herself examined by a doctor. The medical examination revealed
that she suffered multiple contusions, lacerations and abrasions on different parts of her
body. The victim was assisted by her parents in reporting the matter to the authorities. The
victim saw the appellant at the police station, she recognized the appellant’s voice.
Subsequently, the appellant suddenly left Bohol but was later on apprehended in
Pampanga.

The appellant denied the allegation, he claimed that he lives far away from the crime
scene and he was sleeping in his house at the time of the alleged incident. The appellant
was invited by authorities and he was informed that he is among the suspects in connection
with the crime alleged.

After hearing the parties, RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant appealed his case to the CA. He asserted that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the alleged
perpetrator as it was doubtful. However, CA agreed with the RTC.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused as the
author of the crime.

HELD:
No, the prosecution did not failed to establish the identity of the accused as the
author of the crime.

Under jurisprudence, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence until and

unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The law requires the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt not only each element of the crime but also the identity of
the accused as the criminal. Further, in reviewing criminal cases, the court is required to
carefully determine and establish the following: [F]irst, the identification of the accused as
perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who
made the identification as well as the prosecution's compliance with legal and constitutional
standards; and second, all the elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the
prosecution to be present.

In this case, the prosecution’s evidence on the identity of appellant as the offender is
clear and unmistakable. The victim and her co-worker positively identified the appellant as
the driver of the tricycle in red polo shirt, they saw his face because the place was
illuminated by light from lamp post and the nearby establishments. Moreover, her co-
worker beamed her flashlight, giving the victim an opportunity to recognize the appellant as
the driver and to notice that he was wearing denim pants and a red polo shirt, which was
the same shirt he used to cover his face. The victim also identified him not only by his
appearance but also by the sound of his voice. Ana’s testimony is clear, categorical,
consistent and credible. Thus, it is the appellant who committed the said crimes.
7. People vs. Sy, 590 SCRA 511

G.R. No. L-5848 April 30, 1954

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT SY PIO, alias POLICARPIO DE LA CRUZ
PONENTE LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:
This is an appeal finding the defendant-appellant guilty of frustrated murder. The
prosecution’s evidence shows that the defendant-appellant entered the store and started
firing and first shot one Jose Sy. Another victim, Tan Siong Kap, who was also in the store,
asked the defendant-appellant. However, the defendant-appellant turned around and and
pointed the gun and fired him. Tan Siong Kap immediately ran to a room behind that store
to hide. Afterwards, the defendant ran away.
 At the time of the trial, however, he disowned the confession and explained that he
signed it without having read its contents. He declared that it was not he who shot the three
victims, but it was one by the name of Chua Tone. The defendant-appellant claims that the
trial court erred in not finding that Tan Siong Kiap received the shot accidentally from the
same bullet that had been fired at Jose Sy, and in finding that defendant appellant has
committed a crime distinct and separate from that of murder for the slaying of Jose Sy. It is
also contended that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Lastly, he contended that he should be found guilty only of less serious physical injuries
instead of the crime of frustrated murder as defendant-appellant admitted in his confession
in the open court that he had a grudge against the offended party, and that he connived
with another to kill the latter.

The trial court refused to believed his testimony, and therefore, found him guilty of
the crime charged. The find no merit in his contentions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant-appellant was charged correctly by frustrated
murder.

HELD:
The Court held in negative.

Under jurisprudence, the Court held that of the crime committed was that of
frustrated murder, because the subjective phase of the acts necessary to commit the
offense had already passed; there was full and complete belief on the part of the assailant
that he had committed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of the
intended victim.

Here, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit, but he was
able to escape and hide in another room. The defendant-appellant knew that he had not
actually all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Udner these circumstances, it
can not be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And
as it does not appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit. This doubt
must be resolved in favor of the defendant-appellant. Thus, the judgment should be
modified into attempted murder and not frustrated murder because he did not perform all
the acts of execution.
8. People vs. Cantalejo, 586 SCRA 777
G.R. No. 182790 April 24, 2009
APPELLEE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
APPELLANT CESAR CANTALEJO y MANLANGIT
PONENTE TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
An Information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 was filed
against appellant. The prosecution established that: Past midnight, two male police assets
went to the office of the DPIU, to report on the illegal drug activities of a certain "Cesar". A
police entrapment team was organized. The team proceeded to the scene of the crime. The
asset greeted Cesar and introduced himself as his kumpare. The asset told Cesar, "kukuha
sana kami ng panggamit." Cesar responded and then walked to the side of the house. When
Cesar returned, he handed a plastic sachet to PO2 Acosta who examined it. , PO2 Acosta
scratched his head as the pre-arranged signal. His companions then rushed to the trio and
arrested Cesar.

The defense, however, contended appellant and his wife had been sleeping inside
their house, with their five (5) children, when they were woken by a soft knocking on the
door. Appellant stood up to ask who was knocking but none answered. After a while, a loud
banging was again heard on the door. Appellant had stood up another time to answer the
door and several armed male persons entered shouting "Dapa! Dapa!." Appellant obeyed
the order and was told "Kailangan namin ng shabu." Appellant replied "wala pong shabu
dito." Even so, the men searched the house, poked a gun at appellant’s spouse and the
children. The man declared that there was no shabu in their house. After the armed men’s
search of the house for about an hour and frisking on their bodies proved futile,
nevertheless, appellant was brought to Camp Karingal.

RTC found appellant guilty of the offense charged. Before the Court of Appeals,
appellant maintained that the trial court erred in convicting him as the constitutional
presumption of innocence in his favor had not been overthrown; and that it disregarded his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision5 affirming the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the offense charge.

HELD:
No the appellant is not guilty of the offense charge.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may
logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case the presumption
prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. Furthermore, failure to observe
the proper procedure also negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded
to police officers. While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Here, the testimonies for the prosecution and for the defense are diametrically
opposed to each other. An examination of the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals revealed a heavy reliance on the testimonies of the police officers and a blind
dependence on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty. The prosecution
could have presented the other police officers who were members of the back-up team and
should have offered rebuttal evidence to refute the defense of frame-up. This omission does
G.R. No. 109993 January 21, 1994
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELIAS BARASINA y LAYNEZA
PONENTE MELO, J.

9. People vs. Barasina, 1994

FACTS:
 In the evening of July 17, 1988 when victim was found dead at the VIP parking lot of
the Victory Liner Compound. According to the People, it was herein accused-appellant who
was accountable therefor; the witnesses corroborated that the victim, while walking at the
VIP parking lot, another man was following him. The victim was then shot by the man
following him. The gun man thentucked the gun in his waistline and ran towards the
direction of Rizal Avenue Extension. He shouted at his companions to run after the gun man.
When the gun man was about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted at the police offier
conducting traffic in the area and pointed at the running man. The police officer, shouted at
the gun man who stopped and raised his hands. The police officer then confiscated the
pistol from the gun man. Afterwards, the police officer and others brought the gun man to
the Police Headquarters.

Cpl. Daniel del Rosario investigated the accused but before doing so, he informed the
latter of his Constitutional rights. The accused then stated his desire to have a lawyer. Atty.
Torres conferred with the accused for about 30 minutes. The accused indicated his desire to
give a statement in the presence of Atty. Torres. Before actually taking down the statement
of the accused, Cpl. del Rosario prepared a written appraisal of the Constitutional rights of
the accused It was signed both by the accused and Atty. Torres. Cpl. del Rosario then
proceeded to take a written statement of the accused.

One of the principal defenses set up by the accused was that he was mauled,
maltreated and forced to sign two documents by the Caloocan policemen while he was
inside a small cell. He further claimed that he never read any of those documents and that
he was not assisted by any lawyer during their execution. He claimed further that he did not
know Atty. Abelardo Torres. Accused-appellant submits that two errors, one of which is that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court admitting in evidence the
extrajudicial confession of the herein accused-appellant. accused-appellant makes reference
to the manner the extrajudicial confession and waiver were extracted from him in the
absence of a lawyer of his own choice. Accused-appellant concludes that the extrajudicial
statement can not thus be utilized against him for want of competent, independent counsel
of his own choice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court admitting in
evidence the extrajudicial confession of the herein accused-appellant.

HELD:
No, the CA has not erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court.

Under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution, provides that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel.
Moreover, it does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is
not available to protect his interest.

Here, the claim of herein appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his own
choice, is belied by records. During the custodial investigation, he failed to indicate in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney of his
own preference before speaking or giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that
he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres. Thus, conviction of the
accused-appellant is hereby affirmed.
FACTS:

The petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before
the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was
given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
10. Beltran vs. Samson, 53 SCRA 570

G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929

PETITIONER FRANCISCO BELTRAN
RESPONDENTS FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District
FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela
PONENTE ROMUALDEZ, J.:
 The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied
for which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the
Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in some cases which provides that the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.

The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law which reads as follows: "Nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

ISSUE:
Whether the writing by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.

HELD:

The court held in affirmative.

Under jurisprudence, the following are instances when defendant was not compelled
to testify in his own behalf: (1) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself as witness in
his own behalf, waived his personal privileges; (2) it does not appear that the defendants
and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as
they could certainly do; and (3) no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence
by means of testimonial act; she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a
testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the examination.
Otherwise, when compelled to testify in his own behalf, it is to furnish evidence which may
seriously incriminate him.

Here, the petitioner were sought to compel by the respondent to perform a positive,
testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparison to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence and
which may identify him as the falsifier. Thus, compelling the petitioner to write by the
respondents would constitute an evidence against him.
RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

11. Taglay vs. Daray, 678 SCRA 640

G.R. No. 164258 August 22, 2012

PETITIONER ESTRELLA TAGLAY
RESPONDENTS JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY
LOVERIE PALACAY
PONENTE PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with Qualified Trespass to Dwelling before the MCTC. After
petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, the MCTC issued an order to transfer the
case to the RTC because the complainant was a minor. R.A. 8369 clearly provides that
Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or more of
the victim is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense. Prior to the presentation
of the final witness for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case to the RTC instead of dismissing it.
Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when she
was not arraigned before the RTC. The RTC ruled that it had acquired jurisdiction over the
case when it received the records of the case. The RTC also held that such defect was fully
cured when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting that his client had not
yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has cross-
examined the witnesses for the prosecution. Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should have been arraigned anew before the RTC.

HELD:
Yes, the accused should have been arraigned anew before the RTC.

It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction,

including its decision, are null and void. Under the law, Arraignment is the formal mode and
manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. As an indispensable requirement of due process,
an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise,
absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial court.

It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, hence, all the proceedings
conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Petitioner's counsel
also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her client, herein petitioner, was not
arraigned. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information
filed with the RTC. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC.
12. People vs. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358

G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD
PONENTE CHICONAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
 The herein appellant, thru force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended
party, AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor girl, who is his daughter against the will and
consent of the latter. Before AAA’s mother leave for Singapore again, AAA’s grandmother
told AAA’s mother that the appellant had been molesting their child. AAA tearfully
confessed everything to her mother. BBB brought AAA to the Dinalupihan District Hospital
where she was examined by Dra. Melinda Layug. The examination revealed that the victim
had a nonparous introitus with an old healed hymenal laceration. Thus the instant case was
filed.

The appellant who was arrested and detained, filed a petition for bail. The trial court,
finding that the evidence against the appellant is strong, denied appellant’s petition for bail.
After some time, the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been
arraigned, scheduled his arraignment. The appellant pleaded not guilty.

Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing for the
petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court admitted, the
trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision. In its decision, the trial court convicted
appellant of two counts of rape and imposed on him the capital punishment for each count.

The appellant assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he
was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is
a procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that he
was not properly arraigned.

HELD:
No, the court has not erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that he was
not properly arraigned.

Under the law, Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Moreover, when the accused was arraigned after the case was submitted for
decision, this procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without
raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.

Here, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s
active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the
charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of
this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned.
The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now,
after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his
constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
Thus, the court was correct in convicting the appellant.
13. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, 550 SCRA 233

G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

PETITIONER JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN
RESPONDENT THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
PONENTE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:
Daan and Kuizon were charged for malversation of public funds. In addition, they
were also charged for falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.

In the falsification case, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and
substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor.

As alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to

substitute with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document
by a private individual. Thereafter, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the
accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual.

In the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty
thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts. The prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of Daan.

However, the Sandiganbayan denied Daan’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite

favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason
was presented to justify its approval. Hence, it denied Daan’s Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is proper in this case

HELD:
Yes, the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is proper.

Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that at arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
 In the present case, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes
with which petitioner was originally charged. Therefore, some of the essential elements of
offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, hence petitioner may
plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
14. Sayre vs. Hon Dax Xenos, 2020

G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16 February 18, 2020

PETITIONER NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL"
RESPONDENT HON. DAX GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT;
HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PONENTE CARANDANG, J

FACTS:
Sayre was charged with violation of RA 9165. Sayre filed a proposal for Plea
bargaining and manifested that he wanted to plea bargain to a lesser offense. City
Prosecutor filed a comment and counter-proposal in accordance with DOJ Circular No. 27.
The parties failed to reach consensus. The RTC deferred the pre-trial to afford Sayre another
opportunity to convince the prosecution to accept his proposal. RTC denied Sayre’s offer to
plea bargain. Sayre elevated the case in the Supreme Court. Sayre seeks to declare DOJ
Circular No. 27 unconstitutional for being in contravention with the provisions of OCA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision pertaining to plea-bargaining under Section 5 to
Section 11 of RA 9165, is unconstitutional as it repealed, altered, or modified the more
favorable plea bargaining provision under OCA Circular No. 90-2018, violating the rule-
making power of the Court.

HELD:
No, such provision is not unconstitutional and does not violate the rule-making
power of the Court.

Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that at arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. The word “may”
signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the accused to make a plea of
guilty to a lesser offence. Moreover, the plea bargaining requires the consent of the
accused, offended party and the prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser offense is
ncessarily included in the offense charged.
 Here, DOJ Circular No. 27 provision did not violate the rule-making authority of the
Court. It merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may
give their consent to proposed plea bargains.