Prolegomena to a semiotic approach to dancing

Nicoleta Popa Blanariu

Vasile Alecsandri University (Romania)

Abstract: Semiotics is able to open the way for re-thinking dance. Particularly,
it is able to bring to light key aspects of choreographic process: semantic
deployment, syntagmatic combinations, pragmatic effects. In this chapter, the
author takes into consideration some aspects relating to the choreographic
system, especially the signification of dance: the relationship between
“linguistic” and “symbolic”, “semiotic” and “semantic”, “recognition code”
and “perceptual code”, “abstraction” and “(de)motivation”.

Keywords: basic dance, (post)modern dance, ballet, ritual dance, (body)

language, (de)motivation, abstraction, recognition code, perceptual code

1. Introduction
Choreographic speech (“parole”) actualizes a language (“langue”) that –
according to the followers of basic dance – everybody carries within him or
herself, as an ancestral ability. We can all “speak” it, even without knowing its
grammar1. This basic dance is a “universal”, “primordial” language, a “return
to the point where movement is expression and communication” (Robinson,
1996: 22). The concept of basic dance has dominated choreographic practice
and theory since the first decades of the 20th century when the alternative to
the academic ballet was born. The “elaborate and secret code” of Sapir also
includes (basic) dance: “(W)e respond to gestures with an extreme alertness
and, one might almost say, following an elaborate and secret code that is
written nowhere, known by none, and understood by all” (Sapir, 1927: 556).
The “return to the body” – on which (post)modern choreographers insist – is
an attempt to (re)discover the “grammar” of the nonverbal.
(Post)modern choreographers are concerned with the refinement of body
consciousness, with the connections between movement, sensation, and
emotion, between external manifestation and subtle signals transmitted by the
kinesthetic sense (the latter is responsible for sensations related to the
movement and balance of one’s body). In classical ballet, the dancer’s

1 Understood as a set of rules according to which the kinesic discourse is structured.

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movement takes on a predetermined figure, associated with a certain emotion.
The movement thus recovers a motor symptom of emotion, which the
academic convention has reified. But the (post)modern choreographer
reconsiders the relationship between movement and affect. (S)he no longer
tries to fill an empty figure (a conventional movement, chosen from a
standardized inventory) with his/her own emotion, as in classical ballet. The
(post)modern choreographer seeks bodily expression in the motor echo of
inner states, as long as every perception “causes motor discharges”, even
before the awareness of a sensation or emotion (Suquet, 2009: 454-483). The
classical composition is a set of movements and postures strictly codified and
variably managed by the associative ability of the choreographer. But
contemporary dance is a much larger laboratory of kinetic experiments. Often,
the silence and stillness of the body lying on the dance mat respond to the need
for internalizing the movement, for descending to its pre-intentional and “pre-
expressive” source (cf. Barba and Savarese, 2008), which is a psycho-sensory
one. The outer movement of the dancer is born from an imperceptible inner
“rumor” (Suquet, 2009). Involuntary, “unconscious”, the former is a
projection and amplification of the latter, as Isadora wanted. The (post)modern
performance thus offers – to both the dancer and his/her audience – the
opportunity of an “experience” that leads to the organic, subliminal roots of
the movement. This topic deserves further consideration.
In recent decades, arts professionals have questioned the relationship
between art and non-art, dance and non-dance, “institutionalized” art forms
and performance, finished work and work in progress, stage and
unconventional space, actor (dancer) and role, the fragility of the boundaries
between arts, etc. Against this background, the approximation of a definition
may seem risky. It does, however, have the advantage of reducing the diversity
of the empirical phenomenon to an intelligible scheme. Without moving away
from the common perception, we can say that human dance manifests itself as
intentional behavior, performed with nonverbal means – with or without sound
accompaniment (musical or otherwise) – meant to express ideas and emotions
or to satisfy the playful pleasure of movement. Dance differs from other
behaviors – human or nonhuman – in intentionality and function (Benveniste,
2000 [1963]: 55-61). The typology of human dances, as stated by Greimas
(1987 [1970]) – “sacred”, “playful” and “aesthetic” – corresponds to their
multiple functionalities. To Jakobson’s classic question (1963: 210) – “What
makes a verbal message a work of art?” – Genette (1991: 40) proposes an
amendment: “What makes a text an aesthetic object?” Giving the concept of
text a trans-verbal meaning, consecrated by structuralism, we can extend to
dance the answer that Genette gives: “The state of being a work of art” is only
“an answer among others” (Genette, 1991: 40).
Our research could be enriched by the analysis of animal dances, such
as pair dances and “stylized group dances” of chimpanzees: the “rain dance”
and a type of warrior dance (Sachs, 1937: 10; van Lawick-Goodall, 1971: 54;

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Sebeok, 2002 [1981]: 202). Curt Sachs talks about the prehistoric, even
prehuman, origins of some basic motifs of human dance: the circle, the ellipse,
the steps back and forth, the jumping, the rhythmic kicking, the spinning and
embellishment for dance (Sachs, 1937: 11; Sebeok, 2002 [1981]: 202). The
“dances” of different animal species (nuptial dances or “dances” of bees, with
the function of specifying the coordinates of the food source) have their origin
in reflex, hereditary behaviors, with the function of survival of the species.
Based on the observations of K. von Frisch, Benveniste (2000 [1963]: 55-61)
concludes that bee dancing is not a “language”, but only a “signal code”. This
code mobilizes an “authentic symbolism”, but “rudimentary”, with the help of
which “objective data are translated into formalized gestures”. Even if it is
used and understood by an entire community, the code does not meet the
conditions of a language, because – according to Benveniste – the message
cannot be reduced to morphemes and “phonemes, systematically organized”.
In Benveniste’s opinion, the latter constitute “the basis of any language”, and
the double articulation ensures the absolute specificity of verbal language.
However, in this chapter, we focus only on human dance.
Our approach aims at the choreographic “language” in terms of its mode
of semiotic production. It remains indebted to Saussurean and Greimassian
semiology, Peircean semiotics, and communication theory. Of the three types
of relations that a sign maintains and Morris (1971) identifies – syntactic (the
relation of the sign with another sign), semantic (the relation of the sign with
its referent/designatum), pragmatic (the relation of the sign with the users) –
we are especially interested in the first two. We dealt with the third, to a certain
extent, elsewhere.

2. Choreographic “language”, between “linguistic” and

“symbolic”
It must be said that we do not follow a thorough inventory of kinemes1 and
morphokines (Birdwhistell, 1970) based on which choreographic utterances
are constituted, in different genres and styles. The criterion we have in mind
is the semiotic approach to the constitution of the sign and meaning. We rely
on a lato sensu definition of language, borrowed from Saussure. Although

1 The terms were proposed by Birdwhistell (1970) who tried to formalize the kinesic “language”
using the method of structural linguistics. Within an anthropological approach to dance,
Kaeppler (2001: 49-63) adds two other levels of analysis (motifs and choremes) to
Birdwhistell’s kinemes and morphokines. “Kinemes are minimal units of movement”, “having
no meaning in themselves”. “Morphokines are the smallest units that have meaning as
movement in the structure of a movement system”, and they “are organised in a small number
of motifs”. “Motifs choreographed in association with meaningful imagery form a choreme”
(2001: 51-52). However, it is difficult to isolate such elements which are generally valid for
dance “language”. They are only relevant for a certain “dance tradition or genre” and “they are
not interchangeable from one dance tradition to another, although they may occur in more than
one genre or dance tradition” (2001: 51-52).

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debatable, it proves useful: language is a structured set of elements that “mean
something” (Saussure, 1998 [1916]: 358). For Greimas (1975 [1970]: 99),
gestuality is a “symbolic”, “not linguistic” system. His conclusion requires
minimal comment. As Greimas understands it, the linguistic/symbolic
opposition is reducible to a Hjelmslevian one, biplane/monoplane semiotics
(Hjelmslev, 1968-1971 [1953]). According to Hjelmslev, the fundamental
difference between sign and symbol is that the former is decomposable into
hierarchically inferior units, called figures, while the latter does not admit such
segmentation. Greimas adheres to Hjelmslev’s view and sees gestuality as a
“symbolic” monoplane system that cannot be broken down into a limited
number of discrete units (figures). The observation can be extended to the
gestural component of dance.
At the same time, Birdwhistell (1970) proposes a formal model of
kinesics, organized according to rigorous linguistic criteria, but he later gave
up on it. For the time being, “it is impossible to establish a plan of autonomous
expression for gestures” and, at the same time, “to constitute a visual
phonology”, states Greimas (1975 [1970]: 99). In his opinion, we have to “be
content with the gestural units cut out as phonemes and as sememes at the
same time”. Therefore, sign language has only one level of articulation, the
(kine)morphematic (endowed with meaning), which is also valid for dance.
However, Marco de Marinis (2012 [2008]: 182-185) discovers a “double
articulation” in the use of the body on stage. It is inseparable from a “double
disarticulation”, as long as the “goal” is to cancel, “to disarticulate” the
“physical and mental automatisms” that limit the actor in the use of the body
on stage. Specifically, “the first articulation (disarticulation) concerns the
body”, and the second concerns “movement and stage action”. In the 20th
century, the renewal of the bodily expression of the actor and performer –
along with Dalcroze, Isadora Duncan, Laban, Stanislavski, Meyerhold,
Decroux, Grotowski, Barba, Pina Bausch, among others – stems from the
insistence on the first (dis)articulation (see Marinis, 2012 [2008]: 182). It must
be said, however, that the latter does not allow the isolation of minimal units
of bodily expression, similar to phonemes in verbal language.
We come across the same opposition, linguistic/symbolic, but based on
another criterion, in Dan Sperber. Language has “particular signals”, i.e. signs
established based on the “mutual presupposition” between signifier and
signified (Sperber, 1974: 17). But symbolic systems use as “signals”, some
“elements, acts, statements that can be equally interpreted independently of
the symbolic systems that integrate them” (Sperber, 1974: 17). We believe that
also from this point of view, choreographic codes are symbolic systems. In
addition to their means of expression, choreographic codes assimilate some
“signals” (“elements, acts, statements”) from other social practices: those of
work and other practical activities, gestural communication, rituals, etc. Hence,
choreographic discourse is all a palimpsest carrying out a variety of
connotations, even in an unconscious manner.

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 Concerning the linguistic/symbolic opposition, the digital/analog
dichotomy can be approached. In the metalanguage of communication theory1,
a digital language is based on a discrete and finite inventory of minimum units,
of which higher-ranking units are constituted. An analog language manifests
itself as an infinite set of values, irreducible to a fundamental nucleus of units,
from which all the others can be deduced. For Greimas, gestuality is a
“symbolic” system. Otherwise said, it is an “analog” one: a language of
indecomposable elements in the minimal, discretized units of a code. In
modern ballet and contemporary dance, innovation is continuous and
uncensored by canonical codes. Therefore, we may regard (post)modern
dance as analog language which still awaits its segmentation into discrete and
numerically finite units. Meanwhile, in classical ballet, the analog means of
expression are combined with the digital ones: the kinesic continuum
complements a code strictly defined. The latter is a discrete system – a finite
set – of kinesic expressions. The vocabulary of classical ballet consists of the
five canonical positions of the feet, each accompanied by a port de bras
(position of the arms and hands). To these are added the arabesque and
attitude. There are also several types of movements: steps (pas de bourrée,
glissade), jumps (battu, entrechat, pas de chat, grand jeté), rotations
(pirouette, fouetté en tournant, piqué) (see Linval, 1986). These fundamental
elements are linked in various combinations relevant to a choreographic
“syntax”.

3. “Semiotic” and “semantic” in dance

The choreographic sign can be codified by norms with practical, extra fictional
efficiency, which regulate the magic-ritual dance, or by the aesthetic codes
“institutionalized” from various epochs and societies. Although there are some
positions invested with conventional meaning, the meaning is specified, in the
“aesthetic” dance especially, by the whole choreographic construction. The
use of only those elements that have a (pre)determined meaning cannot
produce a work of art (Laban, 1994 [1960]: 128).
A differentiation of choreographic discourses can be made taking into
account the predominance of one or another of the modes of producing
meaning: the semiotic and, respectively, the semantic mode (Benveniste, 2000
[1963]). The domain of the semiotic is that of the autonomous sign, as a unit
belonging to a system (code), within which the sign specifies its significance.
Thus considered, the sign is “pure difference from any other”. As a semiotic


1One of the “axioms” of the Palo Alto School is that “communication involves digital and
analogic modalities” (see Watzlawick et al., 1972). The terms were borrowed from cybernetics,
where a digital system operates with a binary logic (0 and 1), and an analog system uses a logic
conveying a continuous infinity of values. The two types of communication can coexist in the
same statement. According to Watzlawick, nonverbal communication is analog (generally
valid, this principle has however some exceptions).

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unit, it acquires its status as a sign only if it is “recognized” by a certain
community. This means that the sign provokes “in general, the same
associations and the same oppositions”, to each of the members of the
respective community (Benveniste, 2000 [1963]: 55). The semantic domain is,
however, that of significance that derives from discourse. If the semiotic (sign)
is to be “recognized”, the semantic (discourse) must be “understood”. Only
language can have both dimensions of meaning (Benveniste, 2000 [1963]).
Other systems have a “one-dimensional significance”: either “semiotic
without semantic” (such as gestures of politeness), or “semantic without
semiotic” (nonverbal artistic expression, musical or visual) (Benveniste, 2000
[1963]: 50-55).
Benveniste also illustrates the category of the semiotic “without
semantics” by the specific positions of Indian dance, mudras. Benveniste’s
example, however, requires a nuance. Even if each hasta-mudra (gesture of
the hands) has a certain meaning, yet its particular meaning is specified only
in the choreographic discourse. For example, the Arala means, depending on
the co(n)text, “drinking poison”, “drinking nectar” or “storm”. Tripataka
means “Indra’s lightning”, “trees”, “star”, “flame”, “dove”, “arrow”, “to twist
oneself”, etc. The relationship between semiotic and semantic is not, therefore,
one of exclusion, but of complementarity. Classical ballet has a pre-
established, canonical inventory of signs. However, a pirouette, a fouetté, a
pas de deux or a porté “symbolizes” only the general values of academic
dance: grace, elegance, the sublimation of impulses. The referential and
emotional meanings of these choreographic figures are specified only in the
discourse. Although conventional, the signs of ballet are not arbitrary, but
(relatively) motivated. They retain an expressive “kinship” (Laban, 1994
[1960]: 124) with the practical attitudes and actions from which they are
derived. A work of art never refers to a convention that everyone receives in
the same way (Benveniste, 2000 [1963]: 50-51). Each time, the original,
“unpredictable” elements of the work must be discovered (Benveniste, 2000
[1963]: 50-51). The meanings of “artistic languages” can be specified “only
within a composition”, a “closed” semiotics which the artist himself elaborates
(Benveniste, 2000 [1963]: 50).
Benveniste distinguishes two types of semiotic systems: 1. those in
which semiosis is instituted by an individual author; 2. those in which semiosis
– being conventional – pre-exists the use of signs in a speech. In our opinion,
in ritual (magical-religious) choreographies, the predominant meaning is of
the second type. It has a semio-pragmatic value that can be specified by a
paraphrase of the title of Austin’s work, how to do things with dances. More
precisely, the ritual dance aims to determine certain effects on the real: to enter
into communication with the spirits, with the other world, with the game, to
appease and worship the gods, etc. (Arnheim, 1979 [1954]; Bourcier, 1994;
Popa Blanariu, 2015, 2019a). But in “aesthetic” dance, the meaning is
specified within the discourse. The difference between the two types of dance

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goes back to the relationship of the “semiotic” and the “semantic” modes of
signification (Benveniste, 2000 [1963]).

4. “Abstraction” procedures in creating the choreographic

sign
Dance allows us to identify a “gestural form behind the gestural substance”,
a semiotic scheme beyond empirical phenomena. Through the process of
“variations of possible gestural contexts”, “substance” is reduced to a
“minimal visual figure” (Greimas, 1975 [1970]: 99). Such “visual figures” are
the “elementary actions” of classical dance, as Laban calls them (1994 [1960]:
103). A type/token relationship is established between “elementary” and
“derived” actions. The transition from token to type, from usage to semiotic
scheme, from “derived actions” to “elementary” ones implies a process of
“abstraction” (Peirce, 1978 [1931-1958]; Arnheim, 1979 [1954]; Marcus,
1977; Graur, 1960; Robinson, 1981: 79). Peirce (1978 [1931-1958]) sees in
abstractive observation the manifestation of every intelligence capable of
learning by experience. Arnheim (1979 [1954]: 152) understands “abstraction”
as a general process of artistic representation, between the extreme of mimicry
and that of nonmimetic. Graur (1960: 219-226) distinguishes two aspects of
abstraction: i) “elimination of individual features” of a series of phenomena
and – explains Marcus (1977: 73) – the introduction of “equivalence relations”;
ii) “loss of the motivated character of words”. Based on the observations of
Graur (1960), Marcus (1977) analyzes abstraction in relation to the
(de)motivation of iconic and index signs. His comments are also relevant to
the choreographic expression.
Robinson (1981) is interested in the choreographic potential of
“abstraction” procedures. She sees it as a “reduction of experience to the
essential” (1981: 79), achieved from the point of view of an “interpretive
consciousness” (Peirce, 1978 [1931-1958]: 120). The choreographer modifies
“an experience or an image”, “depending on the applied subjective optics”
(Robinson, 1981: 79) which is that of an “interpretive consciousness” (Peirce,
1978 [1931-1958]: 120). (For Saussure, semiosis is given by the system and
offered as such to the user. But in Peirce, the role of interpretive consciousness
is crucial for generating meanings). The object of the choreographic sign
integrates what Laban (1994 [1960]) calls pensée motrice (see also Merleau-
Ponty, 1945). The “image or inner sensation” perceived by the artist
crystallizes “a lived or imagined experience” (Robinson, 1981: 79). The
choreographic sign manifests its object through “transformation” which
means “selection, simplification, interpretation” (see Wallis, 1973: 492-494).
“Transformation” is possible due to the play of Peircean interpretants and is
related to a process of abstraction, inherent in the constitution of every formal
structure (Robinson, 1981: 79).

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 The “degree of abstraction” of a sign can be assessed “by the length of
the chain of successive motivations that binds it to its initial motivation”
(Marcus, 1977: 73). “Abstraction” and “demotivation” are relevant to a
semiotic process in which “iconic and index signs (hence all motivated signs)”
are “transformed into symbolic signs” (Marcus, 1977: 73). Here, icon, index
and symbol keep the meaning they have within the context of Peirce’s theory.
In particular, the figures of classical ballet retain an expressive “kinship” with
the actions from which they come; they “symbolize” the same profound
impulses, but without “signifying” them (Laban, 1994 [1960]: 124). Within
the process of abstraction, a meaning, at a given moment, is a diffuse
(“symbolic”) echo of another previous meaning. The choreographic sign is
constituted by “emphatic exploitation” of the appearance of things, which
means not reproducing the model, but signifying a function or aspect of it
(Lévi-Strauss, 1995 [1964]: 413; Popa Blanariu, 2008). Each style has its
ways of “distortion”, each technique “prescribes how the features of an object
are best rendered” (Arnheim, 1979 [1954]: 147): for example, the styles of
Mary Wigman, Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey in the modern Western
dance, the styles of Indian classical dance, etc.

5. Evocative rhythm: “perceptual code” and “recognition

code”
Rhythm is a “significant form” (Greimas and Courtés, 1979: 319), a “percep-
tual configuration” that draws attention to a “meaning that remains to be
discovered” (Fontanille, 1998: 228, also 214-221). “Where there is rhythm,
there is, at least virtually, meaning” (Fontanille, 1998: 216). Greimas and
Courtès define rhythm as “waiting” (1979: 319). The rhythm is manifested
both in the sound substance of the choreographic discourse and in the visual
one. Sometimes, the whole bodily discourse is metonymically replaced by its
rhythmic component. This is how the “telegraphic” effect of the tam-tam was
explained: the approach of a caravan is announced in great detail and with
incredible speed, by the rhythmic beating of drums. Choreographer Rudolf
Laban (1994 [1960]: 120) rejects the analogy between this communication
system and the Morse code. He argues that the tribes speak languages so
different that neither knows the combinations of sounds or the rhythm of the
words of the others (Laban, 1994 [1960]: 120). In this case, rhythm allows
communication without words, by transposing perceptions in another sensory
order. It is, indeed, “une communication par l’effort” (Laban, 1994 [1960]:
120). The reception of the rhythmic vibrations of the tam-tam is accompanied
by the visualization of the drummer’s movements, which form a kind of dance
(Laban, 1994 [1960]: 119).
In our opinion, such a kinesic discourse can be described using the
concepts of perceptual code and recognition code (Eco, 1972 [1968]). The
first is associated with perceptual function and the second with semiotic

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function. If the sign has properties in common with something, it has not with
the object, but with its perceptual model (Eco, 1972 [1968]: 185). Therefore,
Eco rejects the simplistic definitions of iconicity, based on the “resemblance”
of the sign to its object: the sign can be recognized by the same mental
operations that we perform to construct what we perceive, regardless of the
matter in which these relationships are realized (1972 [1968]: 185). Such a
perspective on iconicity can serve to understand the motivation of gestural
signs and also to nuance the relationship between “abstract” and “figurative”
in dance. There is an “iconic” code that establishes the equivalence between a
certain sign and a relevant element of the recognition code (1972 [1968]: 179).
Hence the “translucency” of the kinesic sign (see Bouvet, 1997), particularly
the choreographic and rhythmical one.
There are three categories of rhythms in dance: spatial, temporal, and
ponderal (Laban, 1994 [1960]: 178). In the performance, they may intertwine,
but one of them prevails. Spatial rhythms create spatial and bodily
configurations (Laban, 1994 [1960]: 178). Temporal rhythms arise from two
attitudes towards time: resistance (sudden and quick movements) or
abandonment (slow, lengthy movements). The emotional connotations of
temporal rhythms have been observed since the ancient Greeks. Laban (1994
[1960]) reminds us of Greek rhythmical schemes which are among the oldest
we know.

6. “Syntagmatic solidarities” and “associative series”

The meaning of discourse is a “double system”, where “syntagmatic” and
“associative” “contiguities” converge (Saussure, 1998 [1916]: 139-140). Due
to the “syntagmatic solidarities”, the units of language depend on what
surrounds them in the spoken chain, and also on the successive parts they are
made of. The associative “series” exist in the subconscious and are built from
units which share an element with the syntagm. Thus, other forms from the
associative series are “floating around” the syntagm, and the associative halo
determines special connotative meanings (Saussure, 1998 [1916]: 139-140).
In my opinion, such a semantism particularly arises from the choreographic
discourse (Popa Blanariu, 2014). The choreographer Jacqueline Robinson
(1981) gives us an argument for this. As she observed, the signification of
dance movement depends upon “what has happened before” and also “what is
about to happen” in the kinesic flow. There are “selections” and “associations”
based on memory (Robinson, 1981: 59), and thus, the “idea calls not for a
form, but an entire latent system” (Saussure, 1998 [1916]: 141). As I have said
elsewhere, each of the figures of the descending vertical, for instance, brings
“associatively”, in the meaning of dance, the entire paradigm of the
descending vertical (Popa Blanariu, 2013). Between the bending of the head,
the fall of the arms, the bending of the knees, the sagging of the shoulders, the
stooping of the back and finally the collapse of the whole body, there is an

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“associative” (paradigmatic) relationship which could be consolidated by the
“syntagmatic” one (there is more about this and some examples in Popa
Blanariu, 2008, 2013).

7. To finish
Speaking of choreographic “language” involves considering a warning from
Jakobson: “Language is never monolithic; the total code includes a set of sub-
codes” (1963: 92, my translation). The choreographic expression is
conditioned by the articulatory possibilities of the body and by the cultural
conventions. Being codified, it remains however dependent on a certain
co(n)text.1 Particularly, the choreographic sign can be codified by norms with
practical relevance, as in the magic-ritual dance, or by aesthetic codes,
variable from one society to another. More exactly, the “semiotic” and the
“semantic” modes (Benveniste, 2000 [1963]) are intertwined in the choreo-
graphic meaning. That said, it is worth noting that no matter how codified they
may be – as in academic ballet or classical Indian dance –, choreographic
figures still retain an “expressive kinship” (Laban, 1994 [1960]: 124) with the
current actions from which they come. In this respect, it should be recalled
that the specificity of the symbolizing relationship, in the Saussurean sense, is
the “presence of the referent in the sign” or the “proximity” between “the sign
and what it designates” (Todorov, 1982 [1977]: 236), which is particularly
confirmed in terms of dance. In any case, connotative “ambiguity” is,
generally speaking, a specific trait of aesthetic phenomena (Jakobson, 1963).
Finally, in dance we cannot delimit “an autonomous plan” of gestural and
corporal expression and no systematic “visual phonology”. Therefore, we will
consider “gestural units cut as phonemes and as sememes at the same time”
(Greimas, 1975 [1970]: 99). Furthermore, another important element of
choreographic performance, the rhythm, is manifested as a “significant form”
(Greimas and Courtés, 1979: 319), both in the sound substance of dance and
in the visual one.
There are remarkable achievements in dance semiotics. However, much
remains to be done in this field. In sum, semiotic approach is able to bring to
light key-aspects of choreographic process, particularly its semantic deploy-
ment, its syntagmatic combinations and discourse strategies, as well as its
pragmatic use and effects.

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1 In general, since 1965, researchers have given up the idea of “universally valid” gestural signs

(Birkenbihl, 1999: 203; see also Birdwhistell, 1970). A conclusion invalidated, nevertheless,
by Cosnier (2002: 32).

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