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    Globalization Cap 5

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    Ana Sandoval

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    ae 82 (Cos, and Stokes, (2012), US Foreign oli, 2nd edn (Osford: Oxford Univers Pres). The fullest guide to US foreign policy Cox, Ml, Booth, K, and Dunne, T (1999), The tnterregnum: Controversies Wold Pltcs 1989-1999 (Neu Yor: Cambridge University Pres). A comprehensive guide ta the lst deca of the ‘wentieth centr Fen, (2014), Will China Dominate the 215 Century? (Cambridge: Polity Press). Challenges the ve that China will one day rue the wor. Fem D, and Lobel. (ed) (2015), Regional Contesation to Rising Powers, Intemational Pots, 522}: 139-268. Looks at rising powers in a regional context, Geges.F.(2016).A History of 5 (Princeton, N:Princeton University Press). Sober account af a rest threat Kant, 6 (¢d) (2012), Rusia inthe New international Order: Theories, Arguments, Debates Intemational Pls, (4) 393-544, Wide-raging lack at the rie of Rusia and its impicaion International security Zakaria, F (2008). The Pst-American Word (New York: W. W. Norton. Influential study of US fore policy options fr President Obama. Zielonka,) (2014) she EU Doomed? (Cambridge: Polity Press) Argues thatthe EU will emerge significantly weakened from the cument eri Online Resources, Rss mere ering sauces rth capt goto wnnonordentooks coke bayisre/ ANDREW HURRELL ming Questions ‘Are rising powers actually powerful? ‘new global international society? fra period of US dominance of the intestinal alia and economic systems, the weld order began > undesgo what many came to see 3 a fundamental al change om thernid-20005 This was intly ciate with the se ofthe BRICS counties (raz, Inga, and Chin, and. fom 2010, South fica, das then accelerated by the financial cri that hit the core Western countries afer 2007. This chap begins by examining the US-led global order that athe end of the cold war and the arguments 1h wasikely to remain table and to endure The cond section considers the challenges tothe dea of 2 US-dominated plbal order. paying particular aten- onto the role of large, emerging developing coun Hi, othe ide ofthe BRICS tothe regional ole of ising powers and the merging global order Have rising powers effectively challenged the US-led global order? What does the debate about rising powers tell us about the longer-term evolution of a oa ‘these countle, and tothe new Southern coalitions that werecomingto play an increasingly infertile In negotiations and institutions affecting ade, climate change, and foreign id tals looks atthe more recent ‘economic stow-down nthe emerging worldandatthe Political and socal challenges facing many emerging Societies. The thi section distinguishes between cif ferent arguments aboutthedfusion of power andds- cusses what's ivoled theoretically when one talks of sing powers The fourth section looks at some ofthe major theoretical arguments about how sng powers affect theintemaional political system. Te concluding section consides the argument that todays emerging powers mater not simply because oftheir current and lity future power but rather because ofthe challenge ‘hat they may pose to the Euracetriam and Westen dominance ofthe international order, ecerenESEseesisttsetsnatierenisttsttenatis? 84 Introduction At the end ofthe cold war the structure of global order appeared clear and straightforward, The West had wo. “The United States was the sole superpower and the word was living through a peried of unipolarity that many believed would contnve well nto the twenty-first cent, The US-led order had thee pills: firs, the unrivalled extent end! many dimensions of US power, second, the Westera- dominated institutions and mol tilateral organizations originally created in the wake of the Second World War-the United Nations the GATT Ithe World Trade Organization from 1995), and the ‘World Bank Group and international Menetary Fund: and third, the dense set of transatlantic and transp ‘fic elations and alliance systems Fr many commen: tators, this liberal Greater West had tiumphed and vas bound to Increase its global reach—parily through the intensification of economic and socal globaliza tion, partly through the power and attractiveness of ‘Wester ideas of democracy ima eights, and liberal The post-cold war order In the 1990s global order was widely understood through the lens of liberal internationalism or Mera solidarism (Hurrell 2007), Globalization was render Ing obsolete the old system of traditional international reltions—the so-called. Westphalian world of great ‘power rivalries, balance-of power pois, and anol: fashioned international law built around slate sover ‘igny and strict rules of non Intervention. Bumpy as it might be, the road seemed to he lading away from Westphalia—with an expanded role for formal and infor moliateral instittions; a huge increase in the scope, density and intrusiveness of rules and norms rade at thelaternatlona level butaffecting how domes ticsocieties reorganized the ever greater volvement ‘of new ators in global governance: moves towards the ‘coercive enforcement of global rues; and fundamental ‘changes in political, legal, and moral understandings ‘ofstate sovereignty and ofthe relationship between the state the citizen and the international comenusity. ‘In addition to an expansion of inter-state modes of ‘governance, increased atention was being pad to the ‘world of complex governance beyond the state. Global towder and global governance would no longer be the capitalism, and partly through deliberate US pol and the efective deployment of American power, ‘The central question, howeves, was whether petiod of US predominance would last. On one analysts consilved the stability of US power. To extent would the US fall prey to “imperial overste ‘le tothe los of domestic support fr is global ‘monicroet On the other side, attention quickly ca facus on the large, fast-growing counties in what previously been called the Third World or the gl South, Even ifone leaves China in a category of ‘wn, in the next ier down a range of eter states becoming more influential globally a5 well as cme ing sgniticant degre of gional influence: Braz South America, Indian South Asia, Nigeria and Sq [Alia in Africa. These developments came tobe ta power challenge tothe US and Europe as well representing a challenge tothe historic furocenti ofthe international one. preserve of sates There was already a much m Prominent role for NGOs and social movements transnational companies, and forthe direct inv ment of groups and individuals, often empowered new technologies and new forms of soci mobil tion, Such governance was characterized by thee plexity of plobal rule-making; the role of peivate actors and civil society groups in promoting valves the environment or human rights, for example) would then be incorporated within inter-state i tions and the increased range of informal gover mechanisms often built around complex net ‘both transnational and trans-goveramental. From petspctive, the state was losing its place asthe pt leged sovereign institution and Instead becoming ‘of many actors in a broader and more complex st political, and economic process. ‘Academies, especially In Europe and the Ua States, told theee kinds of liberal stories about postcold war world, Some stressed institutions i the cooperative loge of institutions. They argued institutions are needed (0 deal with the ever m complex dilemmas of collective action that em red world The complexity of governance meant that International law and international 4 would necessarily increase in number, scope, Marty, It also meant that as large states, incl Iarge developing states, expanded thee range of fs and integrated more ally into the global yy and word society-as they Joined the word’, he popu language of the 1990s—they would be iy drawn by the functional benefits provided by tons and pressed towards more cooperativeand bk’ pattens of behaviour. They would gradu become socialized into a Western global oder process would not necessarily be easy. It would n and offen unsettling, Bt, on this view the rection of travel was eae Others stressed the Kantian ide of the gradual but sion of iberal values, partly a result conomice and increased economic interde- ndence, partly as result of the groving influence evil soclety, and partly a a result ofthe suc- Gilexample sctby the multifaceted liberal capitalist of states. A tied group tld a more US-centred ey The US wasindced the centre ofa unipolar world fre both to own vales ato rational sl Washington would have a continued incentive itself within the ineitations that t had created cold war era inorder to reassure smaller states fo prevent balancing against US power (Ikenberry i). A rational hegemon in an age of globalization understand the Importance and wtilty of soft and el restrain. In return for thie sel binding be procedural oytimacy it would create, and in for US-supplied global public goods and the pt lgimacy that they would confer, other states acquiesce and acept the roleof the United States fe owner and operator ofthe international system. thallenge posed by the Soviet Union and is (the so-called Second World) had been seen off Victorious end tothe cold war. Through a mix three liberal loges those developing sates of fold Third Worl that had previously challenged the order (cspecaly i their demands ofthe 19705 New international Economic Order) would now increasingly enmeshed, socialized, and inte- ‘The natureand dynamics of power were chang Power would outstrip hard coercive power in and concentration of liberal power would tt rater than repel or threaten Just as the exam 8 Uber and successful European Union had Powerful incentives onthe pat of weaker and Chapters neighbouring states towards emulation and a desire for membership, so, ona large scale and over a longer period, similar pattern would be observed in the case ‘ofthe liberal, developed world a6 whole. The 1990s, then, were marked by a clear sense ofthe liberal ascen ancy.a clear assumption that the US hd the rightand power to decide what the liberal global order’ was all about; and a clear ball thatthe Western onder worked and that ithad the answers. Yes ofcourse there would be solated rogues and radial rejectionists. But they were on the wrong side ofhistory as President Clinton confidently proclaimed. ‘he idea that this US-led order was stable was not ‘confined to liverals, One group of neoealistthink- ‘ees argued thatthe extent of US power was simply so great that the normal logic af balance of power no Tonger applied and that no state was ikely to emerge inthe foreseeable future with the capacity to disturb US power and primacy (Wolhforth 1999; Brooks and ‘Walhorth 2015) This was especially the case since, for ncorealits, military power isthe most important form of power In terms of military power the United States ‘ 5 of is own: it accounts for 45 per cet ofthe worl totl mulitary spending tha an enoemous ead in new military technologies thas a vast global net ‘work of over 750 overseas bases in ove 100 countries; And it has # unique capacity to project power to any corner ofthe world. Since active oppesition was ruled ‘out the expectation was that weaker states would have no option but to seek accommodation with the US and ‘with the US-led global onde, Many critical political economists also saw cont ‘auity a the level ofthe system. Across the developing ‘word neoiberalism wae spreading, parly imposed by the US ad its associated international institutions and parily rolecting the choices of elites within what had previously been called the Third World and was now inereasingly refered to asthe global South Prom ‘4 noo-Marust perspective it is wrong to focus on the ‘merging nation-states ofthe global South. What we are seoing is in realty, the transformation of global Capitalism from an old core centred on the advanced Industrialized states into far more global and fr more thoroughly transnationalized capitalist det. The sys temic change has to do with the unfolding of a de territraized global aptalism made upofflows axes, networked connections, and transnational production networks, but marked by Inequality, nsabilty,and new patterns of stratification, Instead of counting up and ‘ategorizing the ‘power of emerging power, analysts 85 should focus on the social forces and state society rl ‘ions within emerging powers (Starrs 2014) ‘Mer the end ofthe cold war, the global South came toberedefined in transnational soci terms ratherthan a8 a grouping or category of nation-states. Attention vas focused mote and more om the social movernents that were emerging in response to neoiberlis: the World Social Forum, ant-globalizaton groups, andthe Key Points + During te 19505 threas erie agement ht the pba stemware bythe power of te Une Sater ais allerand bythe rts htt omit. From te pospecve a he emargng pots the US nde ingles powell move to charge many oth ensing ‘ules nors and pace f gob pltie Seon othe {ol South, th United States has hy bren ast gue ower buts often ugh to mou esta in sown Image After he nf the col war was in may a Sony reson power: n the 190s in tach retin for new nos an itenton forthe pening of math and forthe embedng of part whi stor ais wn intetional ntations nthe ay years of Be wert tet cent nem fe ‘Mtmpt orcas norms on eine change onthe eof The US order under challenge By the late 19905, this picture of stable, US-dominated slobal onter was coming under increasing challenge ‘he terrorist atacks of 11 September 2001 under- scored the darker side of globalization, ‘The experience ‘of trying to ight war’ on global erorism and of using Darel coercive power to dominate weaker cites (as in Iraq or Afghanistan) brought 10 the fre the limits of nilitary power for achieving political goals, The mis- ‘match between Washington's rhetoric of umm rights and democracy and its systematic willingness o violate human rights in defence of ts national security swith Guantanamo, Aba Ghraib, and the poliey of so-called rendition of terrorist suspects) undercut Western lms ‘to moral superioity. And the unilateralism ofthe Bush ‘administration was, for many people, undercutting the legitimacy and acceptability of US leadership. (One of the most visible sigs that something vas changing was increased diplomatic activism by lrg, developing countries. The activist coalitional polices of Baril and India within the World Trade Organization rote movements that had came to prominence a WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 199, The lenge, then, tothe US-led order would not come fn large developing countries (such as India, Chin, Braz), Rather it would come from radial rejection states (auch as Venezuela o Iron; fom grastoots slobalization movements and rom transoationa an ‘Western Islamic groupings and tevoest organiza fore an on the condtinsty of vereigty more coca Theses fh glob seh dd pot ce the ned Ses within astute nation of "explana nthe ver the dominant Westen stats iere ing tht man he Irestimporant rane ofthe stm ough a ange above nays a vented get itereon a ‘ought tomo the maysin which sce eabo red doesn Bit athe sme ne seer to nay stare te ernest There wasteprendcorenctht lrg the Sted oder woud vest rom lon tach gant USand Wester poer a woul be ord around ‘ts hepeonic sail movements ada ates (WTO) provide a good example, most notably in terms ‘ot the Group of 20 (G24) coalition created at Cancun a 2008. Atte fifth Ministerial Conference ofthe WTO at ‘Cancun in September 2003, developing countries came ‘ogether in several overapping coalitions and decided a block the ngotatonsfthe Doha Development Agenda until gir demands were met. The conference ended in deadlock, Cancun represented a symbol ofthe dss: faction ofthe developing world with globalization aad Indicated its greater willingness to act in pursuit of collective interests and against the developed world. ‘A farther example was the creation of BSA: a cop. ction project between the thee democratic counties of India, Bral, and South Alice. The organization was formalized by the Braila Declaration in June 2003; since then, several iniiatives have emerged to fue cooperation in abroad range of res. A third example is provided by the BASICS (Braz, South Africa, Indi and China). This group sidelined Europe i climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2008 Study 5.1. The BRICS ID: et Ae Ay Pea We BI! begin wan acorn hat fered for emeing Jmremics Sak Chin, nd, and Rss The tr ws fat Cored ne reach paper Bung Bate Goal Canoe BBS by econo en OMe of oldman Sasi 201 ‘il gaa tess eu counter the ky emesis a Fat scram and projets tha he reuve saa ana she of Ihe BICs inthe worl economy wad xpanatialy i Iepor, ON ako desobed th inpicatos ths hes He Gop of Seren} aearangement of there Sesion sich poupingsas the om sar thee eet ny ttngabt BCs The fa, ad moet comer, hae been Sowden the Bis yh conte ofthe tre of he obs! economy. 2003, olan sacs repr conoid Corse Wison and Fos rattan Dang with BRC Te Path o 200 ‘panded on ONS ageret Thi report preted hat lod, by 205 the Bs woud accu for over ako the ae fh nts of GOP Ad nes ta 1 yeas he economies together col be age tan the GT Seve Ieper have fllwed upon th fengmore dete rales ‘ed rexjsed prjctonso he BRC canoes: Te lay undering gure Bend thse pects [OP that China anna would thea he world pp Chapters and South Alica from 2010) comprise the five largest ‘economies outside the OECD. By the early years ofthe twenty-first century they held around 50 per centoftotal slobal foreign exchange reserves. They had reduced ot liminated any residual dependence on foreign ad and, inthe cases of China, India, and Braal themselves bad become major ad donors. In 2009 these new donors provided around USS! billion of foreign aid, And ‘hey had expanded their relations with each aber, with China ecipsing the US as Brazil's major trading part ner and Sino-Inian trade approaching US860 billion 4 yeu. South-South trade rose from being marginal suppliers of manufactured gods and servis, whe Sa ane ass would Became miiy dominant a upp fr tae They al hve an ners pel ene a. tet complemented acces torpor mrt ad an bu dnc woitorce "Marerecet;atnton hehe othe pity ad vines ty ofthe emerging conor The gruth fra ‘lowe very cone cmmocy pices have ale co ‘ae and sovereign det has Sp the ight of frp ap ‘She trance mera won as gees eth ll South has bam tard byte doe (Ciraandy the tlacng ofthe Chines onan toned (peter oes on dome ruth ac consumption a lt Inst ad the prospect fa fre anda rs remain Fight seem an ne ait otro tone tocomuchta hep ncudngaeacosaqunceof ele oe Irteratons stators inte Ears) The ther way of ting about the BIS as bes a es cf diac pring The reg minster the ou BUC Sees, Rissa nda and Cnt at op in New Yor at hans mesg ofthe UN Gora Asem a 2005 Theft RCo ae ed Run 20% nde ‘ta nd the groping in 210 See then ana saris av bon hl Understandings ofthe ratte of e grouping, ‘ance designed wo Blanc the power ofthe United Staten Others 3 cues or dni comon pions on ‘hepa of group of age Slates hat hae Been argralind ty the poner he Wt Sil ote som a the yo Fr pls to ld anata st of ltl oer ition ‘not ele ited inthe cent fhe BRS ceeopent nk (The 203 Gotan Sch report Dang wth BRC can be found at: apne oldman ing che bc dreamt) ‘Qustion 1: hat are th ieee een the which vests and Rana vw the emerge? ‘Question 2:5 the 8865 roupingan liane? 87 late asthe cay 1990s to accounting for 175 per cent of lobo merchandise exports by 2010 (Zoellick 2010 “The language of BRICS and of rising and emerging powers took off from around 2003. Both popular com ‘mentary and a great deal af politcal rhetoric focused on the dfusion of power and the emergence of we powers. ‘The cena pont of these debates was not where word onde ie nave, but where i was gong Log i the in the fare, The BRICS were important not just because of their recent and current rapid development but because ofthe predicted changes that were going a transfor the Case Study 5.2 Brazil In Novrber 2009 Te Kenai magne an ston fn cover of he anor ate of Cnet te Rader ang ti om the Corcoran Thies tht eel a oy {alan of ptred mach hear frag power Sr dewoped very rap inte pred rom 1930 16 10, ut ke most the developing wera vy by ty the det cr of th 1905 In the 1950 uncer Peer Feraro Henigue Cadoo~one of te architects of te te oy depanercy mitators!Reltonsthe eas was Frac! ation athome an para degree feconome Noerzton ard + caou fag pay of esl slobal economy and change the balance of global es ‘omic power (See Case Studies 5.1 and 5.2. The fay cialis thathitthe advanced capitalist coven 207 Into these changes, For many influential fgues, historically extremely significant thatthe financial Ike out in the core Western countries. Ita only ‘ously damaged these economies but also undermine the teclcal and moral authority atthe entre of _lobl capitalist system. Finally, dhe criss enforod ‘iw that international economic institutions had to feformed to ceflect shifting economic power. Bri a the countys eit hough ning uch agreements th Nicer Hon rear eay Tet under Cardow sucenr Preset Ls enc Lol cal now a al hatte atin of Sal a 2 sing ower ely ged pound Ls speeches repeat reed {he en ta rl nts or ngiicantcouty de {Pata ots n 3 wer! where dept al he along Uinplaty erere apart than es Bal shold est atonal aionany rm coaltone wth ter deen al Socrates Lu spencer ie many qtr abou he re of ‘Mog ral poses enorme tral ene des ae any igre eps of altar or karl owes wal ‘traf have to depen ns St poner prea Sib ray ard he gery dog bth mle alae te deloping weld and forthe gs sce: lhe [ennentathomein edungeonemi ny and Mgt at nm ce bth a dep ean ronan ne ong pba ss cntes on ges compton sand ts moraine ofthe pret Mohd ae {et ue dean pl far spel be nes ori ‘ale ding th Eon yeas te ey 200 Coes hh ‘each dealer naked nb ome ie hy art errand rata hereto sin eb ‘sory Isnt coreon ta acorns cnn for dln cermin an ra wen ty th inchs got Tepes oped ihe dope we tee bl nae cae eae il gt td une i apy Cag franca mx ‘tie rom fr maranae What a ek! he rb the ing poe care cad gue ape 23 Nelo ‘Wuradanianvas appear Decor Goal WTO Ht {ny tine ne he rnin Ievacenng apt ts Question: an sot power vse for arspower) ‘question To wha et can colons poles among et {pirgand ener power fet neon ono Be ein oc en “the emerging powers. These include the cntinsation of 9) BRIC summits the creation ofthe BRICS deve nna the 6th smmit in Braz in 2014; the nd by fs Brazil and then China fora new noe Presponsility Wie Protecting’ n response to what sen asthe Wests abuse ofthe idea of Responsibility nd the implica forthe emerging word of Chine’ ‘One Road, One native to crateanew SilkRoad and is creation of Asin Infastractre[nvestment Bank (ATE) in 2015. fe questions about the power of about the difasion of power and the emer et ofnew powers have become ubiqultous, But there any more questions than cer answers. he rise an fll of great powers. This isthe whole tof stores about ‘superpower China, “India rie BRICS or the BASICs. We can debate exactly who fe ew aciors are, how they have behaved inthe nd what they might want inthe future, But the have fundamentally todo with what ‘they’ will th thet” power—a limited number of impor. Bnew actors acquiring substantial amounts of new Chapters Jobal order ‘The woies ofthe sceptics, however, have grown far louder. Emerging economies have witnessed slower {growth or even outright recession; an ntensifaton of ‘pital fight; and an erosion ofthe exported growth fn which their emergence was seen to depend. Social and political instability has spread, often driven by cor ruption and by protests at corruption. The faites have rmuplied to the point where many economists point toa fandamental reversal of fortune for emerging mae st economies. Key Points sia, na, Chita, South Ain he SCAN ate ad Mico emperened ipa enor dept. lenin th gee oa aeration inte ance ‘ance inarour of hedyrariemerig mate itt renter econamc shar of th word mse, ‘margng cones that they deserved gtr easy in internat cnt aswel The Frances at began in 200 seemed unencre {testinal eonomie weigh ad ade a for ‘tough Soithem Splomatcand titans aim hs come, des have pown abot he economic 2nd evar oundatons on whic essa rising powers An alternative view, however, is that we are wit essing «much more general diffusion of power, Which Is often linked to technological changes, to changes inthe global economy, and to new forms of social and political mobiliatio, Thus if rising China is one centeal part of contemporary global politics, the Arab Spring is another. Both illustrate how power may be difusing, but in very diferent ways. The gen= «al power diffusion’ view holds thatthe sory is really about the ‘rise of the est (Khanna 2009). This wi Include other fast-developing societies, such as the so-called MINTs—Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey. Buti is also going to involve a multiplicity fnew actors. According to this account, the interna ional system is increasingly characterized by a di fusion of power, including to emerging and regional 90 powers but also to many private actors and transna- tional groups: by diffusion of preferences, with many mare voices demanding to be heard both globally and ‘within states asa result of technology, globalization, and democratization; and by a diffusion of ideas and ‘alues, with a reopening ofthe big questions of social ‘economic, and political orguniation that were sup- posedly ended with the conclusion ofthe cold war and the liberal ascendancy, The combination of techno logical innovation with sci and political mobili tion hasbeen extremely powerful. In some cases it has underpinned mass social protests—as with the Arab Spring and the street protests in Brazil and Turkey in 2014 In others the challenge to the capacity and legitimacy of existing states and regional orders has provide space for new forms of challenge, 38 with the so-called Islamic Stats IF ths vew of a general difusion of power is true, then effective power and inflence willbe harder for everyone to achiev, Including both the currently stiong and the new emerging powers. It will be harder for the emerging powers to contol their own regions and to secure sustained support from weaker states, “This suggests that we need! to pay at much attention to the relations between emerging powers and weaker actors as we do to relations between emerging powers fand the currently dominant. Another Likely conse quence is thai willbe harder for the governments of large fast-devloping states to maintain coherent and consistent foreign policies as more groups domestically ave mobilized and empowered. The overall expectation ‘would be ols effective power, bath within states and {internationally ‘Second, what i power? Power is one of the most complex and contested ideas in the socal sciences. It ‘san essentially contested concept in that i i subject. to the kindof debate that snot rationally resolvable. ‘Tere sno overarching theory of social power and no single analytical approach that can provide a magic key, Political scletists differentiate between difer- ent levels of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). These inclde «+ relational power and the capacity of a politic ‘unit to impose its wil on another and to resist the attempts of others to impose thee wil: «+ institutional powerpower here becomes the abil ity to contol the agenda, to determine what gets Aecided, and to exclude those issues that th the interests ofthe most powerful, 1 iferent forms of structural power that have to ‘ith the constitution of action and the material discursive condition for action, (Others distinguish betwoen hard, coercive power the one hand and soft power on the other—the ‘of attraction, of getting others to emulate your o society and its values, Almost all the arguments reject the decline ofthe US and ofthe West high the importance of combining these diffrent lee ‘lobal military dominance, the economic reslens land attractiveness of US society and ls continu pivotal role across global governance institu “They ako emphasize its unrivalled structural p inclading the capacity to generate and to promote ‘most powerful conceptions of international and order ‘When told that a country is an emerging po ‘the frst question that one needs to ask is inlet ‘over what actor, in what period, with respect 0 matters? Thus one might want to trace the gr role of South Afric, Indi, or Brazil n terms of intlvence within a particular region and the way ‘which being recognized asa regional power ma an important pact of thelr growing global inl (Or one might want to understand Brazil’ infu ‘ot in terms of ts very limited military capabili ‘but rather in tems ofits diplomatic skill and ‘one analyst called its ‘diplomatic GNP" (Hurl 2007) ‘A farther lesson from the Ierature on power is atill more important. Discussion of pa and influence cannot be separated from the ana ‘of motives and values, It may be tre that allt incluging emerging powers, seek power and sec ‘but the rea question is the one pressed by con ‘vat: what sorts of power do they seek and for ‘purposes? Historically revisionism has been far Frequently the result of particular sets of foreign ideas within rising sates that explain why the e ing status quo Is Unacceptable, even intolerable= ‘example, thatthe existing order embodies hist humiliations (as in the case of China); or that it ‘ot grant the social recognition to which the esl state fels entitled as «result ofits power, it a is culture (asin the case of India or Brazil; of chang a worl polite i cremantal and prada seer = long-term eon of he West dominance Peer sce rtrd ty ys ee gy psnl-oc jt ints econo baton but Dstt he cpscy of mic ier ange tesa este otis to press ther aes ard ree, ahd tne ple of te ad powers fhe Wester, US he cps eftbe United Sates to uae reser 8 go and wlreman, bie pow diplomatic achievements have ben consid: dave peated despite a more adverse interne ernment conte ote Tid Wei movement os oss emerging powers ae ar more canal 2 "fhe gal sonany sad nately dete echo suo South South economic changes at ep otd tan wath cae nth 1570, jo today vlog pours ot jt i com aI cis or ele tha hy are pea win al isons cried to dea with vr mre presing ofchalleng ch athe manager ofthe lb econ ms cima change ané noc proleratn), Ae dares her sul necesery rol the etn flea fon wpe str fob oversee txstng order works against legitimate claims to sta within ite’ region dh power for what? This isthe most important isimpossbleto make any senseofthe ides ofa shi unlessonehasin one'shesd some idea of why Powers important and what It might be aft Opposing Opinions 5.1) The BRICs mattered man Sachs because they were emerging markets iver therefore important fr profits and longcun decisions, But this says absolutely nothing why these same countries might matter politically Asopolically. Thisiewhy the analysis of sing powers st involve lists of power resources ad eval of how dteent kinds of power have shifted from ator society to another, thas connect wth our teal understanding of word pls. Chapter 5 Rising powers andthe om 1g Opinions 5.1 Are todays rising powers powerful enough to affect international order? atts are ight that itary power remains the most Important sure of poten international lations. Thee eo tary ecologies mans ts premay eto ‘The United states continues to have unparalled nflence ‘over nteratina ition nd glaba overanc. "30 ‘Sets agenda sein power o sage new nems ance doce tps ceded Face wi the dendock of eign ‘ions or tes fs ples thas uniue capt oe alert optons For example thas troup tpt groups ike ingest negate so-caleé meg elon ade bec arom the Ata ahd Pate The mari le of oe emerpngworidn these ageatns clears ofa wea rss ingbal onder The WRICS-and similar groupingsface deep divisions that have prevented thom fram achieving cohesion and Intuece, Fr athe tal of new colina pli, Chinn, Ind ard Rusia are competes for power and te eo: toms pefrences ued neds ae ten Sebel. Tey eve ery ite commen. what ont dosh secs of conc depen inden plat inifuenes? Cn you ses the infer sing powers without aang dex view Yb oe? Key Points + Rent ee that per isthe common caren Ineo aon for many ana areca be rope aceted ention or unsetanding ot owen ntetonal lione. + Power dfisioncanbe dete ato den ay, Sometime teen ea shiin he tlc or erbon power beeen and among sas Sometimes ‘ew ea boader amare comple procs which Imo inporant and polly mre mobi. + Forth bers and const power isaiays ‘connected with actor ales purpose nd oie. + Powers vey understoodinemsof the resoutes ‘totaal str poses a ralaonal concen sual best undertod na gen sol cron 71 Pe 92 anonew sure Debating the impact of rising power Forse the history and theory of eerpng poets sip and sraightoevrd.netnatons Regen, ahs ben astro there nd illo get ean For alts hs fms the vey are the sae therenavel-sablied tafe numer, ‘hats gang andor ging poly ayes ae ame ofthe conti my change bat i ag ot Fom this eset one sul ot coy

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