(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–660. Argued October 10, 2023—Decided February 8, 2024

Congress enacted the whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 to prohibit publicly traded companies from retaliating
against employees who report what they reasonably believe to be in-
stances of criminal fraud or securities law violations. Title 18 U. S. C.
§1514A(a) specifically provides that employers may not “discharge, de-
mote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment be-
cause of ” protected whistleblowing activity. In this case, Trevor Mur-
ray filed a whistleblower action in District Court alleging that UBS
terminated his employment in violation of §1514A. Murray had
worked for UBS as a research strategist in a role that required him to
certify—in accordance with applicable Securities and Exchange Com-
mission regulations—that his reports to UBS customers on the firm’s
securities business were independently produced and reflected his own
views. UBS terminated Murray shortly after he informed his supervi-
sor that two leaders of the UBS trading desk were engaging in what
he believed to be unethical and illegal efforts to skew his independent
reporting.
In the District Court, UBS argued it was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Murray’s whistleblower claim because Murray “failed
to produce any evidence that [his supervisor] possessed any sort of re-
taliatory animus toward him.” The District Court denied the motion.
As relevant here, it instructed the jury that, to prove his §1514A claim,
Murray must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his
“protected activity was a contributing factor in the termination of his
employment.” App. 126–127. If Murray did so, the burden would shift
to UBS to “demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have terminated [Murray’s] employment even if he had not engaged in
2 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Syllabus

protected activity.” Id., at 130. The jury found that Murray had es-
tablished his §1514A claim and UBS had failed to prove that it would
have fired Murray even if he had not engaged in protected activity. On
appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded for
a new trial. The Second Circuit held that “[r]etaliatory intent is an
element of a section 1514A claim,” and the trial court erred by not in-
structing the jury on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s retaliatory in-
tent. 43 F. 4th 254, 258, 262–263.
Held: A whistleblower who invokes §1514A must prove that his pro-
tected activity was a contributing factor in the employer’s unfavorable
personnel action, but need not prove that his employer acted with “re-
taliatory intent.” Pp. 7–15.
(a) Section 1514A(a)’s text does not reference or include a “retalia-
tory intent” requirement, and the provision’s mandatory burden-
shifting framework cannot be squared with one. In explaining why,
and consistent with the Second Circuit’s opinion, the Court treats “re-
taliatory intent” as meaning something akin to animus.
Although the Second Circuit and UBS both rely on the word “dis-
criminate” in §1514A(a) to impose a “retaliatory intent” requirement
on whistleblower plaintiffs, the word “discriminate” cannot bear that
weight. First, placement of the word “discriminate” in the section’s
catchall provision suggests that it is meant to capture other adverse
employment actions that are not specifically listed, drawing meaning
from the terms “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, [and] harass”
rather than imbuing those terms with a new or different meaning. But
even accepting UBS’s argument that “discriminate” relates back to
and characterizes “discharge,” the word “discriminate” simply does not
require retaliatory intent. The “normal definition” of “discrimination”
is “differential treatment.” Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. 399, 405. When
an employer treats a whistleblower differently, and worse, “because
of ” his protected whistleblowing activity, that is actionable discrimi-
nation, and the employer’s lack of “animosity” is “irrelevant.” Bostock
v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644, 658, 663. Pp. 7–10.
(b) In addition to having no basis in the statutory text, requiring a
whistleblower to prove his employer’s retaliatory intent would ignore
the statute’s mandatory burden-shifting framework. Burden-shifting
frameworks have long provided a key mechanism for getting at “the
elusive factual question” of intent in employment discrimination cases.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 986 (quoting Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 255, n. 8). Bur-
den shifting “forc[es] the defendant to come forward with some re-
sponse” to the employee’s circumstantial evidence. St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 510–511. Congress decided in Sar-
banes-Oxley that the plaintiff ’s burden on intent is only to show that
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Syllabus

the protected activity was a “contributing factor in the unfavorable

personnel action.” 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B)(i). If the plaintiff makes
that showing, the burden shifts to the employer to “demonstrat[e], by
clear and convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the
same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior.”
§42121(b)(2)(B)(ii). The contributing-factor burden-shifting frame-
work is meant to be plaintiff-friendly. Here, the Second Circuit erred
by making proof of “retaliatory intent” a requirement for satisfaction
of the “contributing factor” element. 43 F. 4th, at 259–260. Showing
that an employer acted with retaliatory animus is one way of proving
that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse em-
ployment action, but it is not the only way. Pp. 10–13.
(c) UBS and its amici argue that, without a retaliatory intent re-
quirement, innocent employers will face liability for legitimate, nonre-
taliatory personnel decisions. But the statute’s burden-shifting frame-
work does not lead to that result. Section 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s same-
action causation inquiry asks whether the employer would have taken
the same action against an otherwise identical employee who had not
engaged in protected activity. While the contributing-factor frame-
work that Congress chose in Sarbanes-Oxley is not as protective of em-
ployers as a motivating-factor framework, that is by design. This
Court cannot override Congress’ policy choice by giving employers
more protection than the statute provides. Pp. 13–14.
43 F. 4th 254, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which BARRETT, J., joined.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–660
_________________

TREVOR MURRAY, PETITIONER v. UBS SECURITIES,

LLC, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[February 8, 2024]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the whistleblower-protection provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, no covered employer may “dis-
charge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other
manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of ” protected whistle-
blowing activity. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a). When a whistle-
blower invokes this provision, he bears the initial burden of
showing that his protected activity “was a contributing fac-
tor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the com-
plaint.” 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). The burden then
shifts to the employer to show that it “would have taken the
same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of ” the
protected activity. §42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).
The question before this Court is whether the phrase “dis-
criminate against an employee . . . because of ” in §1514A(a)
requires a whistleblower additionally to prove that his em-
ployer acted with “retaliatory intent.” Below, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit endorsed such a require-
ment. This Court disagrees.
2 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Opinion of the Court

I
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of
the Enron scandal to “ ‘prevent and punish corporate and
criminal fraud, protect the victims of such fraud, preserve
evidence of such fraud, and hold wrongdoers accountable
for their actions.’ ” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U. S. 429, 434
(2014) (quoting S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 2 (2002) (hereinaf-
ter S. Rep.)). “Of particular concern to Congress was abun-
dant evidence that Enron had succeeded in perpetuating its
massive shareholder fraud in large part due to a ‘corporate
code of silence’ ” that “ ‘discourage[d] employees from report-
ing fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities,
such as the FBI and the SEC, but even internally.’ ” 571
U. S., at 435 (quoting S. Rep., at 4–5; alteration in original).
Indeed, employees of Enron who had attempted to report
corporate misconduct internally were often fired.
Congress’ response was 18 U. S. C. §1514A, which pro-
hibits publicly traded companies from retaliating against
employees who report what they reasonably believe to be
instances of criminal fraud or securities law violations. The
provision establishes that no employer may “discharge, de-
mote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner
discriminate against an employee in the terms and condi-
tions of employment because of ” the employee’s protected
whistleblowing activity. §1514A(a). If an employer violates
this provision, the employee can file a complaint with the
Department of Labor seeking reinstatement, back pay,
compensation, and other relief. §§1514A(b)(1)(A), (c). If
there is no final decision from the Secretary of Labor within
180 days, the employee can file suit in federal court seeking
the same relief. §§1514A(b)(1)(B), (c).
If the whistleblower does bring an action in federal court,
Sarbanes-Oxley directs the court to apply the “legal bur-
dens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United
States Code”—a provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21).
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Opinion of the Court

§1514A(b)(2)(C). This incorporated burden-shifting frame-

work provides that the whistleblower bears the burden to
prove that his protected activity “was a contributing factor
in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the com-
plaint.” 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B)(i). If the whistleblower
makes that showing, the burden shifts to the employer to
show “by clear and convincing evidence” that it “would have
taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence
of ” the protected activity. §42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).
This framework is not unique to Sarbanes-Oxley and AIR
21. It originated in the Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989 (WPA), 5 U. S. C. §1221(e), which provides legal pro-
tection for whistleblowers within the civil service. The
framework was meant to relieve whistleblowing employees
of the “excessively heavy burden” under then-existing law
of showing that their protected activity was a “ ‘significant’,
‘motivating’, ‘substantial’, or ‘predominant’ ” factor in the
adverse personnel action, and it reflected a determination
that “[w]histleblowing should never be a factor that contrib-
utes in any way to an adverse personnel action.” 135 Cong.
Rec. 5032, 5033 (1989) (Explanatory Statement on S. 20,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)). Congress then incorporated
the easier-to-satisfy “contributing factor” framework into a
series of similar whistleblower statutes that protect non-
civil-service employees in industries where whistleblowing
plays an especially important role in protecting the public
welfare—including, as noted above, the airline industry
(AIR 21) and the securities industry (Sarbanes-Oxley).1
——————
1 See also, e.g., Motor Vehicle and Highway Safety Improvement Act of

2012, §31307(b), 126 Stat. 766–769 (enacting 49 U. S. C. §30171(b)); FDA

Food Safety Modernization Act, §402, 124 Stat. 3968–3971 (amending
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U. S. C. §301 et seq., by
adding 21 U. S. C. §399d(b)); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
of 2008, §219(a), 122 Stat. 3063–3065 (enacting 15 U. S. C. §2087(b)); En-
ergy Policy Act of 1992, §2902(d), 106 Stat. 3123–3124 (amending Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. §5801 et seq., by adding
§5851(b)(3)).
4 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Opinion of the Court

II
In 2011, petitioner Trevor Murray was employed as a re-
search strategist at securities firm UBS, within the firm’s
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) business.
In that role, Murray was responsible for reporting on CMBS
markets to current and future UBS customers. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations required him
to certify that his reports were produced independently and
accurately reflected his own views. See 17 CFR §242.501(a)
(2022). Murray contends that, despite this requirement of
independence, two leaders of the CMBS trading desk im-
properly pressured him to skew his reports to be more sup-
portive of their business strategies, even instructing Mur-
ray to “clear [his] research articles with the desk” before
publishing them. 1 App. in No. 20–4202 (CA2), p. 254.
Murray reported that conduct to his direct supervisor,
Michael Schumacher, in December 2011 and again in Jan-
uary 2012, asserting that it was “unethical” and “illegal.”
App. 28. Schumacher expressed sympathy for Murray’s sit-
uation but emphasized that it was “very important” that
Murray not “alienate [his] internal client” (i.e., the trading
desk). Ibid. When Murray later informed Schumacher that
the situation with the trading desk “was bad and getting
worse,” as he was being left out of meetings and subjected
to “constant efforts to skew [his] research,” Schumacher
told him that he should just “write what the business line
wanted.” Id., at 29–30. Shortly after that exchange (and
despite having given Murray a very strong performance re-
view just a couple months earlier) Schumacher emailed his
own supervisor and recommended that Murray “be re-
moved from [UBS’s] head count.” Id., at 39. Schumacher
recommended in the alternative that, if the CMBS trading
desk wanted him, Murray could be transferred to a desk
analyst position, where he would not have SEC certification
responsibilities. The trading desk declined to accept Mur-
ray as a transfer, and UBS fired him in February 2012.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

Opinion of the Court

Murray then filed a complaint with the Department of

Labor alleging that his termination violated §1514A of
Sarbanes-Oxley because he was fired in response to his in-
ternal reporting about fraud on shareholders. When the
agency did not issue a final decision on his complaint within
180 days, Murray filed an action in federal court.
Murray’s claim went to trial. UBS moved for judgment
as a matter of law, arguing, among other things, that Mur-
ray had “failed to produce any evidence that Schumacher
possessed any sort of retaliatory animus toward him.” No.
1:14–cv–00927 (SDNY, Dec. 14, 2017), ECF Doc. 244, p. 6.
The District Court denied the motion.
The District Court instructed the jury that, in order to
prove his §1514A claim, Murray needed to establish four
elements: (1) that he engaged in whistleblowing activity
protected by Sarbanes-Oxley, (2) that UBS knew that he
engaged in the protected activity, (3) that he suffered an
adverse employment action (i.e., was fired), and (4) that his
“protected activity was a contributing factor in the termina-
tion of his employment.” App. 126–127. On the last ele-
ment, the District Court further instructed the jury: “For a
protected activity to be a contributing factor, it must have
either alone or in combination with other factors tended to
affect in any way UBS’s decision to terminate [his] employ-
ment.” Id., at 130. The court explained that Murray was
“not required to prove that his protected activity was the
primary motivating factor in his termination, or that . . .
UBS’s articulated reason for his termination was a pretext.”
Ibid. If Murray proved each of the four elements by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the District Court instructed,
the burden would shift to UBS to “demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have terminated [Mur-
ray’s] employment even if he had not engaged in protected
activity.” Ibid.
During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of
the contributing-factor instruction. The court responded
6 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Opinion of the Court

that the jury “should consider” whether “anyone with th[e]

knowledge of [Murray’s] protected activity, because of the
protected activity, affect[ed] in any way the decision to ter-
minate [Murray’s] employment.” Id., at 180. When the
court previewed this response to the parties, UBS indicated
that it “would be comfortable” with that formulation. Id.,
at 140.
The jury found that Murray had established his §1514A
claim and that UBS had failed to prove, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that it would have fired Murray even if he
had not engaged in protected activity. (In that regard, UBS
had argued to the jury that market-wide difficulties and a
$2-billion loss on a UBS trading desk in London had re-
quired the elimination of certain positions, including Mur-
ray’s.) The jury also issued an advisory verdict on damages,
recommending that Murray receive nearly $1 million.
After the trial, UBS again moved for judgment as a mat-
ter of law, which the court denied. The court then adopted
the jury’s advisory verdict on damages and awarded an ad-
ditional $1.769 million in attorney’s fees and costs. UBS
appealed the decision, and Murray cross-appealed on the
issues of back pay, reinstatement, and attorney’s fees.
The Second Circuit panel vacated the jury’s verdict and
remanded for a new trial. The court identified the central
question as “whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s antiretalia-
tion provision requires a whistleblower-employee to prove
retaliatory intent,” and, contrary to the trial court, it con-
cluded that the answer was yes. 43 F. 4th 254, 258 (2022).
The court acknowledged that the jury instructions correctly
identified the four elements of a §1514A claim, consistent
with Circuit precedent. The court concluded, however, that
the further instruction on the contributing-factor element
was wrong as a matter of law.
Looking to the text of §1514A and focusing in on the
phrase “discriminate . . . because of,” the court nevertheless
held that “to prevail on the ‘contributing factor’ element of
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Opinion of the Court

a [§1514A] antiretaliation claim, a whistleblower-employee

must prove that the employer took the adverse employment
action against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory
intent.” Id., at 259–260. The court noted that this holding
was consistent with its recent “interpretation of nearly
identical language in the Federal Railroad Safety Act.” Id.,
at 260 (discussing Tompkins v. Metro-North Commuter R.
Co., 983 F. 3d 74 (CA2 2020)). The court further deter-
mined that “the district court’s failure to instruct the jury
on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s retaliatory intent” was
not harmless—despite “circumstantial evidence at trial
that UBS terminated Murray in retaliation for whistleblow-
ing,” such as the close temporal proximity between Mur-
ray’s whistleblowing and termination and the fact that
Schumacher had given Murray a good performance evalua-
tion prior to his whistleblowing. 43 F. 4th, at 262. The
court concluded that “[r]etaliatory intent is an element of a
section 1514A claim,” and “[t]he district court erred by fail-
ing to instruct the jury on Murray’s burden to prove UBS’s
retaliatory intent.” Id., at 262–263.
The Second Circuit’s opinion requiring whistleblowers to
prove retaliatory intent placed that Circuit in direct conflict
with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which had rejected any
such requirement for §1514A claims. Compare id., at 262,
with Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Bd., 771
F. 3d 254, 263 (CA5 2014) (per curiam) (holding that retal-
iatory intent is not an element of a §1514A claim);
Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F. 3d 745, 750 (CA9 2010)
(same). This Court granted certiorari to resolve this disa-
greement. 598 U. S. ___ (2023).
III
Section 1514A’s text does not reference or include a “re-
taliatory intent” requirement, and the provision’s manda-
tory burden-shifting framework cannot be squared with
such a requirement. While a whistleblower bringing a
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Opinion of the Court

§1514A claim must prove that his protected activity was a

contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action, he
need not also prove that his employer acted with “retalia-
tory intent.”
Before explaining why a §1514A claim does not require
proof of “retaliatory intent,” it is necessary to understand
what that term means. The Second Circuit seemed to con-
ceive of “retaliatory intent” as “prejudice” or “animus.” 43
F. 4th, at 259, 261. UBS insists that it means something
else, arguing that “[t]he Second Circuit mentioned ‘animus’
only twice” and that the Circuit explicitly required “a show-
ing of ‘retaliatory intent,’ not hostile feelings toward the
employee.” Brief for Respondents 27, n. 3. UBS’s circular
definition does not reveal anything about what “retaliatory
intent” means, however, and UBS itself equated retaliatory
intent with “animus” in its briefing below. See supra, at 5.
Thus, consistent with the Second Circuit’s opinion, this
Court treats “retaliatory intent” as something akin to ani-
mus. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16
(suggesting that an employer acts with “retaliatory intent”
“where the employer act[s] out of prejudice, animus, or com-
parable hostile or culpable intent”).
A
The Second Circuit and UBS both rely heavily on the
word “discriminate” in §1514A to impose a “retaliatory in-
tent” requirement on whistleblower plaintiffs. As UBS
acknowledges, the Second Circuit’s holding was “expressly
predicated” on the word “discriminate.” Brief in Opposition
11. That word, however, cannot bear the weight that both
the Second Circuit and UBS place on it.
Consider the statutory text: No employer subject to
Sarbanes-Oxley “may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment because of ” the employee’s protected whistleblowing
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

Opinion of the Court

activity. §1514A(a). To start, the placement of the word

“discriminate” in the section’s catchall provision suggests
that it is meant to capture other adverse employment ac-
tions that are not specifically listed, drawing meaning from
the terms “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, [and] har-
ass” rather than imbuing those terms with a new or differ-
ent meaning. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S.
398, 403, n. 2 (1998) (“[W]hen a general term follows a spe-
cific one, the general term should be understood as a refer-
ence to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration”).
Here, there is no dispute that Murray was “discharge[d],”
and so it is not obvious that the “or in any other manner
discriminate” clause has any relevance to his claim. Ac-
cording to UBS, though, “discriminate” in the catchall pro-
vision relates back to and characterizes “discharge,” such
that “to be actionable, discharge must be a ‘manner’ of dis-
criminating.” Brief for Respondents 11. Accepting this
statutory construction argument “for argument’s sake,” as
this Court did in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644,
657 (2020), the question is whether the word “discriminate”
inherently requires retaliatory intent. It does not.
In Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. 399 (2020), this Court ex-
plained that the “normal definition” of “discrimination” is
“differential treatment.” Id., at 405 (quoting Jackson v. Bir-
mingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 174 (2005); internal
quotation marks omitted). In Bostock, the Court likewise
observed that “discriminate” typically means simply “ ‘[t]o
make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as compared
with others).’ ” 590 U. S., at 657 (quoting Webster’s New
International Dictionary 745 (2d ed. 1954)). Prohibited dis-
crimination occurs when an employer “intentionally treats
a person worse because of ” a protected characteristic. 590
U. S., at 658. In elaborating on the meaning of “discrimi-
nate,” Bostock made clear that a lack of “animosity” is “ir-
relevant” to a claim of discrimination under Title VII. Id.,
at 663; see also Automotive Workers v. Johnson Controls,
10 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Opinion of the Court

Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 199 (1991) (explaining that a prohibition

on discrimination “does not depend on why the employer
discriminates” or the presence of “malevolent motive”).
An animus-like “retaliatory intent” requirement is
simply absent from the definition of the word “discrimi-
nate.” When an employer treats someone worse—whether
by firing them, demoting them, or imposing some other un-
favorable change in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment—“because of ” the employee’s protected whistleblow-
ing activity, the employer violates §1514A. It does not
matter whether the employer was motivated by retaliatory
animus or was motivated, for example, by the belief that
the employee might be happier in a position that did not
have SEC reporting requirements.
The Second Circuit was wrong when it held that the word
“discriminate” in the statute’s catchall provision imposes an
additional requirement that the whistleblower plaintiff
prove the employer’s “retaliatory intent” or animus. Ac-
cepting that the word “discriminate” is relevant to the in-
tent inquiry, the only intent that §1514A requires is the in-
tent to take some adverse employment action against the
whistleblowing employee “because of ” his protected whis-
tleblowing activity. The statute is clear that whether an
employer “discriminated” in that sense has to be resolved
through the contributing-factor burden-shifting framework
that applies to Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims.
B
Statutory context confirms that the word “discriminate”
does not import a “retaliatory intent” requirement: Requir-
ing a whistleblower to prove his employer’s retaliatory ani-
mus would ignore the statute’s mandatory burden-shifting
framework. The burden-shifting framework was conspicu-
ously absent from the Second Circuit’s opinion, and UBS
now insists that the statute’s burden shifting addresses
only “causation, not intent.” Brief for Respondents 11. Not
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Opinion of the Court

so. Burden-shifting frameworks have long provided a

mechanism for getting at intent in employment discrimina-
tion cases, and the contributing-factor burden-shifting
framework is meant to be more lenient than most.
Consider the burden-shifting framework this Court has
devised for certain Title VII claims. In Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977 (1988), the Court ex-
plained that “[i]n order to facilitate the orderly considera-
tion of relevant evidence,” courts rely upon “a series of shift-
ing evidentiary burdens that are ‘intended progressively to
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of in-
tentional discrimination.’ ” Id., at 986 (quoting Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 255, n. 8
(1981)). This idea applies with equal force to the statutory
framework here: Because discriminatory intent is difficult
to prove, and because employers “contro[l] most of the
cards,” 135 Cong. Rec., at 5033, burden shifting plays the
necessary role of “forcing the defendant to come forward
with some response” to the employee’s circumstantial evi-
dence, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 510–
511 (1993). The result is that the trier of fact has the full
picture before it and can make the ultimate determination
as to whether the employer intentionally treated the em-
ployee differently, and worse, because of the employee’s pro-
tected trait or activity.
The burden-shifting framework provides a means of get-
ting at intent, and Congress here has decided that the
plaintiff ’s burden on intent is simply to show that the pro-
tected activity was a “contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel action.” 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B)(i); see 18
U. S. C. §1514A(b)(2)(C) (explaining that an action brought
in federal court “shall be governed by the legal burdens of
proof set forth in section 42121(b)”). Once the employee
makes that showing, the burden shifts to the employer to
“demonstrat[e], by clear and convincing evidence, that the
12 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Opinion of the Court

employer would have taken the same unfavorable person-

nel action in the absence of that behavior.” 49 U. S. C.
§42121(b)(2)(B)(ii). While many statutes dealing with em-
ployment discrimination apply a higher bar, requiring the
plaintiff to show that his protected activity was a motivat-
ing or substantial factor in the adverse action, see, e.g.,
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U. S. 768,
772–773 (2015) (discussing burden in Title VII context), the
incorporation of the contributing-factor standard in
Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a judgment that “ ‘personnel ac-
tions against employees should quite simply not be based
on protected [whistleblowing] activities’ ”—not even a little
bit. Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F. 3d 1137, 1141
(CA Fed. 1993) (quoting S. Rep. No. 100–413, p. 16 (1988)
(discussing WPA); brackets omitted).
While the Second Circuit attempted to make “retaliatory
intent” a requirement for satisfaction of the “contributing
factor” element, 43 F. 4th, at 259–260, UBS does not ask
this Court to follow suit, and for good reason. The ordinary
meanings of the words “contribute” and “factor” suggest
that the phrase “contributing factor” is broad indeed. See
Webster’s New World College Dictionary 317 (4th ed. 1999)
(defining “contribute,” in the relevant sense, to mean “to
have a share in bringing about (a result); be partly respon-
sible for”); id., at 508 (defining “factor” as “any of the cir-
cumstances, conditions, etc. that bring about a result”).
Showing that an employer acted with retaliatory animus is
one way of proving that the protected activity was a con-
tributing factor in the adverse employment action, but it is
not the only way.
Here, the burden-shifting framework worked as it should
to “ ‘sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination.’ ” Watson, 487 U. S., at 986
(quoting Burdine, 450 U. S., at 255, n. 8). The jury heard
both sides of the story. It then determined that Murray had
shown that his protected activity was a contributing factor
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13

Opinion of the Court

in his firing while UBS had not shown that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of his protected activ-
ity. That burden shifting—and not some separate, heavier
burden on the plaintiff to show “retaliatory intent”—is what
the statute requires.2
C
UBS and its amici argue that, without a retaliatory in-
tent requirement, innocent employers will face liability for
legitimate, nonretaliatory personnel decisions. See Brief
for Respondents 33–34; Brief for Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 22–24. UBS
posits a hypothetical where an employee’s whistleblowing
causes a client to end their relationship with the company,
leaving the whistleblower without any work and ultimately
leading to the elimination of the whistleblower’s position.
UBS asserts that “[u]nder petitioner’s view, the employer
would be liable for retaliation, despite the absence of any
intent to retaliate.” Brief for Respondents 34. The statute,
properly understood, does not lead to that result.
The statute’s burden-shifting framework provides that
an employer will not be held liable where it “demonstrates,
by clear and convincing evidence, that [it] would have taken
the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of ”
the protected behavior. 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B)(ii). The
right way to think about that kind of same-action causation
——————
2 UBS also asks this Court to affirm on an alternative basis. UBS

claims that the Second Circuit held that the initial jury instruction on
the contributing-factor element, which allowed the jury to find that Mur-
ray’s protected activity was a contributing factor if it “ ‘tended to affect in
any way UBS’s decision to terminate [his] employment,’ ” independently
required the court to set aside the jury’s verdict. Brief for Respondents
47. UBS is wrong to characterize the Second Circuit’s footnoted discus-
sion of this instruction as an alternative holding. See 43 F. 4th 254, 259,
n. 4 (2022). On remand, the Second Circuit remains free to consider
UBS’s separate argument regarding this initial instruction, but this
Court did not grant certiorari to address that issue.
14 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

Opinion of the Court

analysis is to “change one thing at a time and see if the out-

come changes.” Bostock, 590 U. S., at 656. The question is
whether the employer would have “retain[ed] an otherwise
identical employee” who had not engaged in the protected
activity. Id., at 660. As the Federal Circuit has explained
in the WPA context, the same-action analysis “does not re-
quire . . . that the adverse personnel action be based on
facts ‘completely separate and distinct from protected whis-
tleblowing disclosures.’ ” Watson v. Department of Justice,
64 F. 3d 1524, 1528 (1995). In that case, the correct inquiry
was whether the employer would have taken the same ac-
tion if it had learned of the contents of the employee’s pro-
tected disclosure through other means. Ibid. In UBS’s hy-
pothetical, the relevant inquiry would be whether the
employer still would have fired the employee if the client
had left for some other reason. If so, it will have no trouble
prevailing under the statute.
To be sure, the contributing-factor framework that Con-
gress chose here is not as protective of employers as a
motivating-factor framework. That is by design. Congress
has employed the contributing-factor framework in con-
texts where the health, safety, or well-being of the public
may well depend on whistleblowers feeling empowered to
come forward. This Court cannot override that policy choice
by giving employers more protection than the statute itself
provides.
* * *
A whistleblower who invokes 18 U. S. C. §1514A bears
the burden to prove that his protected activity “was a con-
tributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged
in the complaint,” 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B)(i), but he is
not required to make some further showing that his em-
ployer acted with “retaliatory intent.” The judgment of the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed for
the reasons explained above, and the case is remanded for
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 15

Opinion of the Court

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–660
_________________

TREVOR MURRAY, PETITIONER v. UBS SECURITIES,

LLC, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[February 8, 2024]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE BARRETT joins, con-

curring.
I agree with the Court that a plaintiff suing under the
whistleblower-protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act need not prove that his or her employer acted with “an-
imus,” a term that denotes “prejudic[e]” or “ill will.”* Mer-
riam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 46 (10th ed. 1996);
American Heritage Dictionary 73 (3d ed. 1992). The statute
makes no mention of “animus” or any of its synonyms, and
we have no ground for adding it in as an additional, non-
statutory requirement. I write separately to explain in sim-
ple terms how the statute works and to reiterate that our
rejection of an “animus” requirement does not read intent
out of the statute. Rather, as the Court confirms, a plaintiff
must still show intent to discriminate. Ante, at 9.
A Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff must ultimately prove that
his or her employer “discharge[d], demote[d], suspend[ed],
threaten[ed], harass[ed], or in any other manner discrimi-
nate[d] against” him or her “because of ” protected whistle-
blowing. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a). The phrase “in any other
manner discriminate” suggests that the adverse action—

——————
* The Court uses the term “retaliatory intent” as a synonym for “ani-
mus.” See ante, at 8. All references in the opinion to “retaliatory intent”
must be understood to carry that meaning.
2 MURRAY v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC

ALITO, J., concurring

here, petitioner’s discharge—must be a form of discrimina-

tion. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 557 (2007)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when a catchall phrase
is “limited,” the other items in the list “must be viewed . . .
in light of that category”). And a discriminatory discharge
that is made “because of ” a particular factor necessarily in-
volves an intentional choice in which that factor plays some
role in the employer’s thinking. As the Court puts it, the
plaintiff must prove that the employer “ ‘intentionally
treat[ed the plaintiff] worse because of ’ ” the protected con-
duct. Ante, at 9 (quoting Bostock v. Clayton County, 590
U. S. 644, 658 (2020)).
To structure the presentation of proof in a case brought
under the whistleblower-protection provision, Sarbanes-
Oxley adopts a burden-shifting framework. See 18 U. S. C.
§1514A(b)(2)(C); 49 U. S. C. §42121(b)(2)(B). This frame-
work provides the “mechanism for getting at” discrimina-
tory intent. Ante, at 11. Under this framework, the plain-
tiff must show that differential treatment was at least in
part “because of” his or her protected conduct, §1514A(a),
and was thus a “contributing factor” in the employer’s deci-
sion-making process. §42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). This requires
proof of intent; that is, the plaintiff must show that a reason
for the adverse decision was the employee’s protected con-
duct. The plaintiff need not prove that the protected con-
duct was the only reason or even that it was a principal rea-
son for the adverse decision. Showing that it “help[ed] to
cause or bring about” that decision is enough. Concise Ox-
ford Dictionary 310 (10th ed. 1999); Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 496 (1993) (defining “contrib-
uting” as “ha[ving] a part in producing an effect”).
If the plaintiff makes that showing, the statute’s intent
requirement is met, and the only open question is causa-
tion. On that element, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove “by clear and convincing evidence that [it] would have
taken the same unfavorable personnel action” alleged in the
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

ALITO, J., concurring

complaint. §42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). In other words, it must

show that the plaintiff ’s protected conduct did not cause the
challenged employment decision. And if the employer sat-
isfies that burden, the element of causation has not been
proved.
On the understanding that this is the interpretation
adopted today, I join the opinion of the Court.