Administrative and Regulatory Law

Topic 9
Contempt of Court
Every dispute resolving mechanism must provide at least two things, in some form and under some
name. They are:
1) its own power to preserve the orderliness of the decision-making process and
2) its own power to enforce decisions once made.1
In Bangladesh, a mechanism to enforce a court’s decisions is provided through empowering the
court to hold someone in contempt of itself. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh’s power to punish
any contempt of itself has been provided by the Constitution of Bangladesh. Article 108 of the
Constitution states,
The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such
a court including the power subject to law to make an order for the investigation of
or punishment for any contempt of itself.
Article 108 of the Constitution of Bangladesh gives both divisions of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh the power to act as a court of record. Article 108 notes that, like other courts of record,
the Supreme Court also enjoys the power to investigate and punish any contempt of itself. Through
this Article, the Constitution of Bangladesh affirms that a court of record inherently possesses the
power to punish contempt of itself.
In Moazzem Hossain v The State,2 a former Deputy Attorney General was punished for contempt
of court. The HCD held him in contempt after he was deliberately absent from court proceedings
on multiple occasions. The HCD treated his action as an effort to undermine the authority and
dignity of the Court and cause obstruction of the course of justice. While hearing an appeal against
the decision of the HCD, the AD held,
To commit someone for contempt of court and punish him for it: if found guilty, is
the inherent power of a Court of record. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh is such
a Court. The power is no doubt extra-ordinary. The Judge who commits any one
for contempt of court is both prosecutor and arbiter of the alleged offence...
In the same case, Justice Chowdhury held, “[t]he essence of contempt is an action or inaction
amounting to an interference with or obstruction to or having a tendency to interfere with or to
obstruct due administration of justice.”
Justice Ahmed in the Same case held

1
Dan B. Dobbs, 'Contempt of Court a Survey' (1970-1971) 56 Cornell Law Review 183.
2
(1983) 3 BLD (AD) 251
 'Contempt of Court' has nowhere been defined in statutes. It has been conveniently
described by referring to its ingredients and citing examples. "Contempt" may be
constituted by any conduct that brings authority of the Court into disrespect or
disregard or undermines it dignity and prestige. Scandalizing the Court is a worst
kind of contempt. Making imputations touching the impartiality and integrity of a
Judge or making sarcastic remarks about his judicial competence is also a contempt.
Conduct or action causing obstruction or interfering with the course of justice is a
contempt. To prejudice the general public against a party to an action before it is
heard is another form of contempt.
It is important to remember that contempt of court was defined in the Contempt of Court Act 2013.
However, the Contempt of Court Act 2013 was declared unconstitutional by the HCD in Writ
Petition No. 2964 of 2013.
Contempt of court is generally distinguished at two levels. Firstly, courts catagorise contempt of
court into civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is when someone refrains from
obeying an order, decree, or judgement of the court. Criminal contempt can be of many kinds. For
instance,
1. Disruption in Court
2. Obstruction of the Court's Processes
3. Perjury, Forgery, and Alteration of Records
4. Symbolic Acts
5. Insult and Insolence
6. Out-of-Court Publication
7. Disobedience of Court Orders, etc.3
Secondly, contempt of court is catagorised as direct and indirect. Dobbs wrote, “roughly speaking,
a contempt is direct if it is in the presence of the judge and indirect otherwise, though it must be
understood that such a simple distinction cannot stand without qualification, and it must also be
understood that terminology may differ in various jurisdictions.”
It is now unclear which law governs the contempt of court proceedings in Bangladesh. Proceedings
regarding contempt of court are generally decided with the help of common law. The Courts enjoy
next to unlimited authority while dealing with cases of contempt of court. For instance, in Shahudul
Haque, IG Police and others v State,4 a contempt of court proceeding was initiated after a police
officer refused to salute the car of a Judge of the HCD. The Inspector General (IG) of the Police
was instructed to show cause by the HCD. The HCD issued a rule nisi asking the IG to answer the
following questions:
(i) Does the derogatory expression of Sergeant Shoaib [the police officer who
refuesed to salute the car], echo what the members of the Police Forces are given
to understand during their training?

3
Dan B. Dobbs, 'Contempt of Court a Survey' (1970-1971) 56 Cornell Law Review 183, 185-219.
4
(2006) 58 DLR (AD) 150.
 (ii) Are the Police officials of all ranks trained to understand that every person in
uniform is under indispensable legal obligation to show utmost respect to the
Supreme Court saluting the august body's flag?
(iii) Are the Police officials briefed on the warrant of precedence and trained to
follow them at all events?
(iv) Are they trained to learn that it is internecinely contumacious to the solemn
grandeur of the Apex Court to hold back a car with its flag in order to allow the
passage of a vehicle, which carries a person of lesser importance in the warrant of
precedence?
The IG contested this rule. Such contestation was held as contemptuous by the HCD, and the IG
police was punished for contempt of the HCD. The IG police then issued an unconditional apology.
However, the Court held that the IG’s apology was ingenuine. The AD held while hearing the
appeal,
From the record of the Rule we also find that initially the appellant Inspector
General of Police contested the Rule with certain uncalled for and objectionable
remarks regarding the Supreme Court flag designed for undermining the authority
and the dignity of the Supreme Court and also certain remark personally directed
towards the Judge in question and even suggesting for taking criminal action
against the Judge concerned which, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
manifest the contemner's despicable attitude. Finding difficulties subsequently, the
appellant sought to withdraw the same which constitute gross contempt of Court
and manifest adamant and defiant attitude of the appellant in order to lower down
the image, authority, dignity and prestige of the Supreme Court making certain
contemptuous statements which is not desired or expected of a chief executive of
the police force...
The AD also remarked,
Though the contempt of Court is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with
reference to the interests of administration of justice but in a serious situation, as in
the instant case, the Court of law should not be happy with the 'apology' without
resorting to the very weapon to uphold the dignity, prestige, authority and solemnity
of the institution and its Judges.
It is to be noted that the IG was punished for contempt for a statement he made in his defence.
Even though the HCD did not accept the apology of the IG, in other cases, it is often satisfied with
an unconditional apology. For instance, in Abhimunnyo Singha v Shauli Shumon,5 the HCD held,
Unless the contempt is of a very gross nature, the court is inclined to accept apology
from the contemnor. An apology usually mitigates the offence of contempt of court
and when it is unqualified the court may accept it. An apology is not a weapon of

5
(2014) 34 BLD 183
 defence forged to purge the guilt of the offender, nor it is intended to operate as
panacea. It is intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the mainly consciousness
of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such
reparation as lies in the wrongdoer's power. Such an apology to be acceptable must
be sincere, unqualified and should be tendered at the earliest opportunity. However,
on some occasions the court accepted the apology even though tendered at the
belated stage.
The “Unconstitutional” Contempt of Court Act 2013
In 2013, the Parliament enacted the Contempt of Court Act 2013 that gave subordinate courts
along with both divisions of the Supreme Court the power to punish a person for contempt of court.
As mentioned, the Act of 2013 was declared unconstitutional by the HCD. The HCD held that the
Contempt of Court Act 2013 contradicted the Constitution. The Appellate Division is yet to give
a decision regarding the constitutionality of the Contempt of Court Act 2013. As the HCD declared
it unconstitutional, it is no longer in force. However, if the Appellate Division reverses the
judgement of the HCD, it may get back its legal status. So, it may be beneficial to know what the
Contempt of Court Act 2013 provided.
The Contempt of Court Act 2013 specified some circumstances where action could not be
considered a contempt of court. For instance, Section 4 of the Act noted that a publication that
interferes with a judicial proceeding would not be an act of contempt if, at the time of publication,
the publisher had no reason to believe that a judicial proceeding was pending before a court
regarding the matter. Section 5 of the Act noted that an impartial and objective publication about
the proceedings of a court would not amount to contempt of court. Section 5 of the Act also stated
that an objective and impartial discussion about the merits and demerits of a final judgement of a
court would not be contempt of court. Section 6 of the Act noted that any bonafide critical opinion
or comment regarding a judge of the subordinate court presented before another subordinate court
or the Supreme Court would not be contempt of court. Section 8 of the Act declared that nothing
in this Act would prevent any person alleged of an act of contempt from defending herself. Section
9 of the Act limited the scope of courts’ power to punish a person for contempt of court.