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(1971) 55 Cr.App.R. 258

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COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)

before
LORD JUSTICE FENTON ATKINSON, Mr. JUSTICE LYELL and Mr. JUSTICE MARS-JONES

MAUREEN McKENNA BRINDLEY FRANK JONES LONG

1971 Feb. 23

Assisting Offenders
-
Doing Act to Impede Apprehension
- Elements of Offence-No Necessity to Prove that Defendant Knew Identity of Principal
Offender-Criminal Law Act 1967 (c. 58), s. 4 (1).

To establish the offence of doing an act to impede the apprehension of an offender, contrary to
section 4 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, the prosecution are required to prove only (i) that the
principal offender committed an arrestable offence; (ii) that the defendant knew or believed that the
principal offender had committed that or some other arrestable offence; (iii) that the defendant did an
act with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of the principal offender; (iv) that the act
was done without lawful authority or excuse. They are not required to prove that the defendant knew
the identity of the principal offender and did an act relating to that person.

Applications for leave to appeal against conviction and (in the case of the applicant Long) also
against sentence. The applicants were convicted at the Central Criminal Court on October 22, 1970,
of doing an act with intent to impede the apprehension of an offender, contrary to section 4 (1) of the
Criminal Law Act 1967, and were sentenced by Judge Edward Clarke, Brindley to be placed on
probation for two years and Long to twelve months' imprisonment. On the night of November 21,
1969, two lorries containing loads of brass ingots were stolen from a yard behind the Silver-line
Garage, the forecourt of which abutted on the A13 road. In the forecourt were petrol pumps and a
kiosk where the attendant could shelter when not serving petrol. The evidence showed that the lorries
must have been taken from the yard
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(1971) 55 Cr.App.R. 259
shortly before 10 p.m. and must have been driven away across the forecourt of the garage. It was not
in dispute that the applicant, Miss Brindley, was on duty until 10.30 p.m. as the petrol pump attendant
and that the occupier of the premises next door to the garage had come and told her that strangers
had got into his garden and escaped over the wall towards the yard. He offered to investigate the yard
to see that everything was all right. She said she would go, and came back and reported that nothing
was amiss. Two days after the theft she was interviewed by the police and stated that no lorries had
left the yard at the material time. She repeated this in evidence, but admitted that, if two lorries had
crossed the forecourt, she must have seen them. The prosecution's case was that the statement was
untrue, that she saw the lorries, knew they were stolen, and made the statement untruthfully without
lawful authority or reasonable excuse, with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of the
thief or thieves. She admitted that she knew one Morphew, who was jointly charged with her with the
theft of the lorries and was convicted. She was, however, acquitted of the charge of theft. Long also
was interviewed by the police and made two statements. In the first he said that, while he was at the
garage with Miss Brindley, he had seen no lorries cross the forecourt. Later he made a further
statement in which he admitted that he had in fact seen two lorries driven from the yard across the
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forecourt of the garage at the material time.
Piers Herbert for the applicants. The second statement of the applicant Long should have been
treated as non-voluntary as having been extracted from the applicant by threats on the part of the
police and should not have been admitted in evidence. With regard to both applicants, the judge
misdirected the jury on the ingredients of the offence with which they were charged. The jury should
have been told that the prosecution had to prove that the applicants knew the identity of the principal
offender and did an act relating to that specific person. Further, the jury should have been directed to
consider whether the applicants, in
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(1971) 55 Cr.App.R. 260
acting as they did, might have had some other intent than that of assisting the principal offender. E.
M. Hill for the Crown.
Lyell J.: On October 22, 1970, the applicants, Brindley and Long, were convicted of doing an act
contrary to section 4 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. The subsection reads as follows: "Where a
person has committed an arrestable offence, any other person who, knowing or believing him to be
guilty of the offence or of some other arrestable offence, does, without lawful authority or reasonable
excuse, any act to impede his apprehension or prosecution shall be guilty of an offence." [After
stating the facts, His Lordship continued:] Both now apply for leave to appeal against their
convictions. Long puts forward two grounds. First, he says that his second statement admitting that
the earlier one was untrue was not a voluntary statement, but was extracted by the police by threats
and that the learned trial judge erred in law in admitting the statement. [After dealing with the
evidence on this point, the learned judge continued:] There was ample evidence to support the
conclusion that the statement was voluntary. Long's second ground of appeal, and the only ground
put forward on behalf of Miss Brindley, was that the learned judge misdirected the jury as to what was
required to be proved under section 4 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. First, it was argued that the
prosecution had to prove that the accused person knew who had committed the principal offence and
that he did an act relating to that person. In the view of the Court, there is no foundation for that
contention. What has to be proved is as follows: first, that a person has committed an arrestable
offence; secondly, that another person knew or believed that the first person had committed it; thirdly,
that the second person did an act with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of the first
person; fourthly, that the act was done without lawful authority or reasonable excuse.
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(1971) 55 Cr.App.R. 261
The unsoundness of the applicant's contention is perhaps best demonstrated by simple example. A
smash-and-grab raid is carried out in a quiet street and the person or persons committing it run off.
Another person sees it. A police car comes by shortly after, the driver sees the broken window, asks
the man who has seen the offence committed which way the offenders went and he replies that they
went up the street when in fact they went down. That evidence is clearly enough for a jury to convict
the bystander of an offence under the section. Anyone who sees a smash-and-grab raid being
committed must know that a theft has been committed, and he has seen the person or persons who
did it. He sends the police in the wrong direction, so giving the offenders more time to escape. It
would then be for the jury to consider whether they are sure that he sent the police the wrong way to
make it more difficult for them to catch the thieves and whether there could be any lawful authority or
reasonable excuse for his act. It is frivolous to suggest that in such circumstances the bystander must
know the identity of the thieves before he could be convicted. Finally, it is said that the learned judge
should have directed the jury to consider whether the applicants may have had some other intent than
that of impeding arrest or prosecution. In the judgment of this Court, the judge was under no duty to
do so. His duty was to direct the jury as to the intent which had to be proved and that they had to be
sure it had been proved, unless some other intent was suggested by the defendant. None was
suggested here and there was a proper direction as to what the prosecution had to prove. For these
reasons the applications are refused.
Applications refused.
Solicitor: The Solicitor, Metropolitan Police, for the Crown.
On the previous day the Court had reduced the sentence of the applicant Long to such term as would
enable him to be released forthwith.

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