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Causes of the Breakup of United Pakistan in

1971: Lessons Learnt
Shahid H. Raja · Follow
16 min read · Jan 17, 2022

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Introduction

‘Wrong political decisions are like tuberculosis, easy to cure but difficult to detect in the
beginning; once belated they become easy to detect but difficult to cure.’- Machiavelli

Most of the present-day developing countries are the ex-colonies of European powers
which, after the dissolution of the colonial empires, got independence. The majority
got new borders with new ethnic, racial, and cultural identities. Some were entirely
new nations accommodated in newly-carved states with arbitrarily drawn borders.
Pakistan is one such country that came into existence as an independent nation-state
on August 14, 1947, after the dissolution of the British Indian Empire.

Pakistan was carved out of the erstwhile Indian subcontinent to provide a homeland to
those Indian Muslims who perceived themselves to be a distinct nation based on
several markers of nationhood. One of these markers and a predominant one was their
Islamic identity. They did not want to live in a post-colonial united India which would
be dominated by the Hindus, fearing economic injustices, political marginalisation,
and social subservience. After a short struggle, mostly nonviolent as compared to the
experience of other countries which got independence post-World War 11, Indian
Muslims were able to get a separate homeland for them in 1947.

However, just after 25 years of its existence as an independent sovereign state, Pakistan
broke into two pieces- the first though not the last, post-colonial state to suffer this
fate. Its bifurcation into two independent states has been the subject of intense debate
since then because it was one of the most significant events in modern history after
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the conclusion of the Second World War.

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In the succeeding paragraphs, we will discuss the major reasons for the breakup of
Pakistan and learn lessons from this momentous event.

Causes of Breakup

Like all momentous events, the separation of East Pakistan from united Pakistan and
gaining independence had deep historical roots and varied social, economic, and
political reasons. As it is difficult, almost impossible to pinpoint a single cause for this
complex issue, we can discuss it under the following five headings whose synergetic
impact resulted in the dismemberment of pre-1971 Pakistan namely
(a) Historical Baggage

(b) Political Governance

© Economic Management

(d) Social Dissonance and

(e) Regional and global geopolitics.

A. Historical Baggage:

Pakistan inherited more than 8,50,000 km of landmass which was divided into two
wings one of which was only 15 %of the total but contained 54 %of the population. In
between these two wings lay 1600 km of the hostile country waiting and hoping for the
collapse of the new state sooner rather than later. Newly carved out the state of
Pakistan contained 5 major and more than 12 minor nationalities which no doubt had
successfully launched a movement for the creation of an independent nation-state of
their own but were a far cry from calling themselves one nation.

However, despite all the above-mentioned diversity, the provinces, states, and regions
comprising West Pakistan had several markers of becoming a nation over some time.
The geographical contiguityof the territories comprising West Pakistan, their racial
stock, the Islamic fervour of the people, and the common script of their languages (i.e.
Arabic) spoken in these regions were fairly sufficient indicators of their becoming a
distinct nation is not so far future.

On the other hand, Bengal, part of which became East Pakistan, was a different ball
game. Although Bengali Muslims took an active part in the creation of Pakistan, their
homeland was destined to be a separate nation-state from the start. Separated from
West Pakistan by 1000 miles of hostile territory, its people were of different racial stock
with distinct cultural identities and spoke a completely different language. British
Indian Government’s decision of 1880 to change the script of the Bengali language
from Arabic, which is the same script in which Urdu is written, and replace it with the
Deva Nagri script can be the starting point for the creation of Bangladesh.
Bengali Muslims, who chose to opt for Pakistan, shared only their religion with the
people of other provinces in West Pakistan, which was too weak a bond to keep them
attached to their compatriots under a single flag. Two Nation Theory which provided
moral and political justification for the division of India was neither relevant for
integrating these two distinct nationalities nor sufficient to create a new nation that
demanded far more than mere religious affinity. A prescient indication of their destiny
as two separate independent nation-states was given in the 1940 Lahore Resolution
which demanded the division of India on a religious basis but proposed two Muslim
states.

Taking a cue from this Resolution, a proposal for an independent United Bengal was
mooted by Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy in 1946 but was opposed by the British
colonial authorities. The East Pakistan Renaissance Society advocated the creation of a
sovereign state in eastern British India. Keeping these two nation-states under one
federation was a Herculean task that needed a long-term vision that incorporated
inappropriate institutional arrangements and was implemented by a capable leader.
With few exceptions, those who ruled Pakistan after her creation as an independent
state woefully lacked qualities of great statesmanship.

Another historical baggage was the vast disparity in terms of the level of economic
development and political representation between the two wings comprising Pakistan.
Bengal remained economically underdeveloped and underrepresented in the political
setup and organs of the state during the colonial period, more by choice and less by
default for many diverse reasons.

Firstly, even if we disregard the hypothesis that Bengal was punished for its role in the
1857 uprising, it was not prudent to develop it industrially as it directly competed with
Britain in textile manufacturing; its development would have adversely affected the
British exports.

Secondly developing infrastructure in the flood-prone region was not as cost-effective,

beneficial, and strategically important as central and northern India.

Thirdly, the commercial importance of Calcutta relegated the need for the
development of East Bengal to a secondary position.
The same was the case in terms of administrative and political representation in
governance structures and organs of the state. Bengalis in general and Bengali
Muslims, in particular, had been systematically kept out of the decision-making
processes in Colonial India after the cataclysmic events of 1857 which had created
serious doubts about the loyalty of the Bengalis towards British rulers.

In contrast, regions and nationalities of northern India, which played a decisive role in
crushing the rebellion, got very preferential treatment in their representation in
institutions responsible for policy formulation and implementation. Resultantly
Bengali Muslims had scant representation in state organs like armed forces, law
enforcement agencies, civilian bureaucracy, etc. during the colonial period. Pakistan
inherited this vast disparity but took too much time to rectify these historical
injustices.

Consequently, when British Indian Empire dissolved, the two wings constituting
Pakistan were far apart, not only geographically but also economically even though the
areas becoming part of Pakistan were themselves far behind in terms of economic
development compared with what India inherited. Its agriculture was still at the
primitive stage where capitalist development had not made any inroads. It was a
subsistence agricultural rural economy, with an extremely poor level of rudimentary
infrastructure, technological penetration, or application of modern techniques of
agricultural farming. The same was the case with its industrial sector, which inherited
34 industrial units of insignificant, almost all of them located in West Pakistan. East
Pakistan producing 70 percent of the world’s jute was without any jute mill.

This historical baggage of disparity between the two wings in terms of economic
development and representation in various state organs was to play the most crucial
role in subsequent inter-provincial relations culminating in their separation and
dismemberment of Pakistan.

B. Political Governance:

Like all post-colonel states, Pakistan inherited a lot of socio-political baggage of

underdevelopment, regional disparities in political representation, and other myriad
economic contradictions, which needed long-term prudent policies to sort them out.
All the social and economic indicators pointed towards the above-mentioned great gap
existing between the two wings.

It necessitated the formulation of comprehensive socioeconomic policies to bridge

these wide differences in the standards of living of the people of both wings. This was
all the more necessary in the backdrop of the Pakistan Movement which no doubt
couched in religious terminology, was based on hard-core economic reasons. Religion
provided the moral justification, symbols, and slogans but it was the broader economic
deprivations that provided the main impetus for separatism.

There was thus an urgent need to develop a long-term vision, duly formulated with
consensus along with a formally approved constitution and democratic institutions to
implement this social contract between the state and the citizens in letter and spirit. It
also needed devising affirmative action policies, rapid but inclusive economic
development, greater social equality, appropriate political representation, and
equitable share in the administrative and security organs of the state to remove the
feelings of deprivation among the Bengali Muslims.

Unfortunately, the relative inexperience coupled with the short-sightedness of those

who ruled the country after independence let the historical forces take their course
which pointed towards separation right from day one. Ayub Khan has been blamed a
lot, and rightly so, for the separation of East Pakistan, for pursuing a flawed economic
development model and inappropriate political reengineering through basic
democracies. However, earlier regimes cannot be absolved of the errors of omissions
and commissions resulting in the fall of Dhaka.

Inordinate delay in the framing of the constitution resulting in their failure to hold
general elections at the national level, thereby failing to create a national democratic
forum for airing and listening to grievances of smaller provinces can be cited as the
most important negligent act of the ruling elite of the 1950s. It also seriously
undermined the intuitional legitimacy of the state which let the market forces play a
full role without the state stepping in to rectify the distortions created by these very
forces resulting in the accentuation of historical disparity already existing between the
two wings.
Secondly, in its efforts to have adequate safeguards in Colonial India, the Muslim
League always stressed the weak center and maximum provincial autonomy, a theme,
which echoed in the provincial assemblies voting for Pakistan. However, after Pakistan
came into existence, the imperatives of the new state forced the ruling elite to change
the equation. It would be a strong center in a federation that could guarantee the
preservation of the new state.

This paradigm shift didn’t go well with smaller provinces in general and with East
Bengal in particular because the Centre was heavily dominated by Punjab, thanks to
the historical developments mentioned above. Heavy emphasis on a strong center
deprived the Bengalis of effective representation in the corridors of power. On the
contrary, despite their numerical superiority, Bengalis could not get the representation
in the national assembly their population warranted and were deprived of their
majority through due process of law i.e. parity. The constitution which was passed in
1956 did not have an upper house to represent the unity of the country and the equality
of the provinces.

If the political power was in the plains of Punjab, commerce was in Karachi, both in
West Pakistan. Thus all the socioeconomic and political policies formulated by the
government had a pro-western wing bias in implementation though not in intention or
rhetoric. When the Bengalis expressed their resentment against the poor treatment
meted out to them by overwhelmingly defeating the Muslim League at the hands of the
Jugtu Front, a coalition of nationalist elements in East Pakistan, its government was
unceremoniously dismissed within two months and a West Pakistani was appointed as
governor. The second time they were treated like this was after the elections of 1970
when the Awami League, which stood for the same principles in Pakistan as was
Muslim league in pre-partition India namely safeguarding the rights of the oppressed
community, was not handed over power despite having a majority in elections.

C. Economic Mismanagement:

There were two biggest grievances of the Bengalis against West Pakistan.

Firstly, not taking appropriate affirmative actions to accelerate the economic

development of the Eastern wing on a priority basis and on a massive scale to reduce
the economic disparity existing between the two wings as historical baggage.
Secondly, instead of spending more on the development of East Pakistan, there was a
massive transfer of resources from East Pakistan to West Pakistan on an official and
private level. Leaving aside the claims and counterclaims about the estimated quantum
of resources transferred annually from East to West Pakistan, the fact remains that
there was a systematic system of resource transfer through several means.

Erroneous pride in a strong currency, more as a counterpoise to Indian hegemony and

less for economic prudence, resulted in the overvalued exchange rate which
undermined the competitiveness of jute, the major earner of foreign exchange in East
Pakistan.

On the other hand overvalued exchange rate heavily favoured the importing classes of
West Pakistan, encouraging healthy growth of an aggressive private commercial sector
in the western wing. East Pakistan failed to develop this vanguard of economic growth
at a time when all the preferences were available for the industrialists

As the receipts from the export of jute were received and recorded in West Pakistan,
less than half of it was spent on the development of the eastern wing due to strong
incentives under the market mechanism in the western wing of the country. The same
was the case with the foreign aid received by the government of Pakistan.

Another source of transfer of resources was the inequitable terms of trade between the
two provinces for the supply of goods and services from one wing to another. The West
wing supplied manufactured goods while the east had few goods to trade and those
also consisted of agricultural raw materials which traditionally fetches lower prices as
compared to manufactured goods.

The West Pakistani businessmen who owned almost the entire industry located in East
Pakistan used to transfer all the profits earned from East Pakistan to the western wing
instead of investing wholly or partially in East Pakistan. Similar was the position in
respect of the banking system, which was owned by them.

Last but not least was public finance. The majority of the taxes imposed were spent on
defense and administration, heavily dominated by the West Pakistanis.

D. Social Dissonance:
While it is very comfortable to put all the blame squarely on the ruling elites of
Pakistan for the separation of East Pakistan from its Western wing, it must be
remembered that the civil society cannot be absolved of the portion of the blame for
this fiasco resting on their shoulders. It was the social and cultural degradation of
Bengali people and their culture in West Pakistan which can be held responsible for
the alienation of Bengalis.

Not only the governing elites, even the public and the civil society considered Bengalis
as an inferior race, and their culture were heavily influenced by Hinduism. Their
contributions to the freedom movement were not properly recognised nor were their
culture appreciated. It is an irony of fate that the Bengalis, who were in majority, had
to pay human sacrifice for the recognition of their language as one of the official
languages of Pakistan.

E. Regional Geopolitical Imperatives:

Lord Palmerstone has rightly said that there are no permanent friends or enemies in
international relations, only permanent interests. India’s permanent interest lay in its
domination of South Asia and beyond according to their well-defined Pannikar
Doctrine (named after K M Panikkar) which emphasized the importance of the Indian
Ocean for the defence of India.

According to Panikkar, the British had kept out other imperialist powers from the
Indian Ocean to protect their interests. India being the successor to the British Raj,
should, therefore, use the same principle to incorporate other states and keep external
forces from the Sub Continent.” Pakistan was a hindrance to the realization of this
dream of the Indian ruling elite.

Cutting it to size became the overriding objective of Indian foreign policy for which the
East Pakistan crises gave them a God-sent opportunity. Arriving with more than a
million refugees as a humanitarian issue and a threat to their national security, India
started preparing for a decisive war with Pakistan and launched a vigorous global
campaign by raising the issue of the creation of Bangladesh at all the international and
bilateral forums.
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s military rulers could not read the writing on the wall, grasp
the rapidly changing scenarios, and remained complacent, to say the least. Even their
military acumen is doubtful. Defending every inch of a vast country with limited
resources and a hostile population was not the right strategy; defending the capital
would have been a better option allowing a negotiated settlement after stalemate.
Consequently, Pakistan lost the war and with it, half of its country opted to become
another nation-state.

Lessons for the Post-Colonial States

What are the lessons one can learn from the dismemberment of Pakistan within 25
years of coming into existence?

1. Vision Needed:

You cannot rewrite history but you must have a clear-cut vision for the future backed
by a definite roadmap. This vision must include a blueprint for redressing the
inequities created as a result of colonial wrongdoings. Centrifugal tendencies are
inherent in any post-colonial state because of boundaries left behind by the retreating
colonial powers and the mix of nationalities clubbed together to live within these
boundaries. It needs a very careful and prudent planning process with a five-pronged
broad spectrum attack-economic inclusion, democratic empowerment, affirmative
action, mainstreaming, and social justice.

2. Provincial Reengineering:

While you cannot change the international borders howsoever arbitrary they may have
been left by the ex-colonial masters, you must re-demarcate the internal boundaries
according to the wishes of the people. If one province is too big in terms of population
or its share in the power structure, there is a need to balance this anomaly by carving
out new regional entities based on language which is one of the most important
markers of a distinct nationality. The predominant position of one province or region,
perceived as exploiting the smaller provinces, is anathema to any federation

3. Democracy Works:
Democracy has been much maligned for its alleged shortcomings such as corruption,
mismanagement, economic disruptions, slow economic growth, etc. However, despite
all these allegations, democracy is still the best form of governance humanity has ever
experimented with. Let it run its course. Frequent, free, and fair elections will
ultimately prop up capable leadership over a while, accountable to the public. Only
genuine leaders elected through popular universal franchises are capable of holding
the federating units together; dictatorship always leaves the countries broken and in a
mess.

4. Cultures Evolve:

You cannot force cultural homogeneity through the barrel of the gun or state edicts.
The evolution of a particular national culture takes time to which each federating unit
contributes. Let a hundred flowers of different varieties and hues bloom rather than
having a garden full of roses only. Unity in diversity is the hallmark of a true
federation. Give respect to every major language spoken and let a national language
evolve over some time.

5. Institutions Matter:

Soon after independence people are very emotional about their newfound nation-
state; however, this sentimental legitimacy must be converted into institutional
legitimacy by strengthening the service delivery institutions by improving their
efficiency and effectiveness and broadening their ownership. Some of the institutions
which matter the most are the armed forces, law and order agencies, judicial
institutions, and nation-building departments like health, education, and general
administration.

Civil society organizations and media are two very powerful institutions that can play a
crucial role in making or breaking a country. Timely and forceful articulation of
grievances of deprived regions by these institutions should be taken seriously and
addressed appropriately. They are also instrumental in creating and fostering common
denominators of cultural and social homogeneity in a country. Stifling them will
deprive the policymakers of a useful channel of two-way communication with the
populace.
6. Growth Matters:

Growth matters because it is only through growth that poverty can be alleviated and
inequalities reduced but the content of growth and equitable distribution of fruits of
growth matter more. Patterns of growth envisaged in the initial stages determine the
prosperity of certain regions and the deprivation of others in the long run. Let the
market forces work but the state must always be correcting the anomalies these forces
always create due to the inherent logic of the capitalistic model of growth which is no
doubt far more efficient than other modes but is also efficient in all its negative fallout.

As every student of economics knows market forces left to themselves not only create
inequalities but accentuate and reinforce them. That is why Adam Smith gave a special
role to the state when he stated-

“The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and
maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which though they may be in
the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the
profit could never repay the expense to any individual, or a small number of individuals; and
which is, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual, or a small number of individuals,
should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of
expense in the different periods of society.”

7. Incremental Changes:

Do not go for revolutionary and drastic changes just for the sake of structural
transformation. The Law of unintended consequences may sabotage all your good
intentions. Incremental changes allow you time for midterm correction and pay
dividends in broader perspectives

8. Devolution Works:

Devolution of powers and decentralization of service delivery institutions, backed by

equitable distribution of resources is one of the key instruments to curb centrifugal
tendencies among the regions feeling marginalization. Devolution can hold any
federation together by helping to prevent or reduce conflict because they reduce actual
or perceived inequities between various regions or between a region and the central
government.
9. Early Warning Indicators:

Federations do not break overnight. Their seeds of destruction take time to germinate.
There is always a time to salvage the situation before it is too late provided the
leadership is responsible and responsive, civil society is aggressive and the media is
vigilant. Keep an eye on early warning signs of centrifugal tendencies and address
them in time and sagaciously. What Machiavelli said five hundred years ago is still
applicable.

‘Wrong political decisions are like tuberculosis, easy to cure but difficult to detect in the
beginning; once belated they become easy to detect but difficult to cure.’

From the book “Milestones of Pakistan History: 1857–1947”, published by Amazon and
available at

Milestones of Pakistan Movement: 1857-1947

The chapters within this volume traverse through a spectrum of
historical junctures, shedding light on the significant…
www.amazon.com

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