Chapter 3 a ee ee ee AN EXPECTANCY-VALUE APPROACH TO MEDIA GRATIFICATIONS Philip Palmgreen J. D. Rayburn II RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES has demonstrated rather convincingly that much human behavior is shaped by our perceptions of behavioral outcomes—by expectations that have been acquired through experience, through communication with others, and via processes of inference and deduction. Those concerned with the uses audience mem- bers make of the media of mass communication have been cognizant of the important role played by such expectations concerning the character- istics of various media and nonmedia sources, and the gratifications potentially obtainable from such sources. Indeed, it is difficult to find a publication within the framework of the uses and gratifications tradi- tion that does not employ the term “expectation” or some synonym. It is a key element in Katz et al.’s (1974) now classic seven-part précis of the uses and gratifications approach. It is also a central concept in all three approaches to uses and gratifications phenomena (functional, structur- al/cultural, and action/ motivation) outlined by McQuail and Gure- vitch (1974). A fundamental assumption of uses and gratifications mod- els, that of an active audience, is in fact founded upon the even more basic precept that audience members do have perceptions of the gratifi- cations available from various alternatives, and that they act upon these perceptions. Unfortunately, consensus regarding the importance of the expecta- tion concept has not inspired equal accord on the concept’s meaning. A number of authors have treated expectancies as equivalent to gratifica- tions sought (for example, Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch, 1973). Peled and Katz (1974) adopt a normative approach in defining expectations as 6162. MEDIA GRATIFICATIONS RESEARCH audience demands concerning what the media should provide. In Men- delsohn’s (1974: 307) scheme, expectations “refer to affective anticipa- tions regarding the prospects of particular events occurring in conjunc- tion with certain associated consequences.” McLeod and Becker (1981: 74) have defined expectations as “rough probabilities of satisfaction assigned . . . to various behaviors.” As these various approaches illustrate, we do not know quite what to expect when an author uses the term “expectancy.” A way out of the beckoning conceptual morass may be found if, in the spirit of eclecticism proposed by Blumler (1979), we reach out to a research tradition that has focused upon a similar concept, and that has arrived at some resolution of the thorny issues involved. In this particular case, a major and well-tested theory of social psychology—expectancy-value theo- ry—holds the promise of substantial clarification, and is a fertile source of hypotheses about the relationship among beliefs, values, gratifica- tions, and media behavior. While there are various theories under the expectancy-value label and they differ somewhat in their emphases (Atkinson, 1957; Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Rotter, 1954; Tolman, 1932; Vroom, 1964), all view behavior, behavioral inten- tion, or attitudes (or all three) as a function of (1) expectancy (or belief—that is, the perceived probability that an object possesses a particular attribute or that a behavior will have a particular conse- quence; and (2) evaluation—that is, the degree of affect, positive or negative, toward an attribute or behavioral outcome. Expectancy-value theory thus not only provides an explicit conceptualization of expectan- cy in terms of perceived probabilities that certain media behaviors will have certain outcomes, but also states that we must take into account the value that an audience member attaches to those outcomes. Given the historical importance of the expectancy concept in the uses and gratifications tradition, we should not be surprised to find elements of expectancy-value thinking appearing occasionally in the uses and gratifications literature, though not explicitly recognized as such. In- deed, Katz, Gurevitch, and Haas (1973), in their classic study of Israeli media use, measured not only need importance (similar to “value”) but also respondent perceptions of gratifications to be obtained from differ- ent media sources (“expectancy”). These were not combined in any fashion, however, in the examination of consumption. Lundberg and Hultén (1968) provide an even earlier example of the use of a conceptual- ization similar to expectancy-value theory, though the authors again do not draw a connection. Respondents in their study rated the perceivedPhilip Palmgreen and J. D. Rayburn II 63 importance of certain goals and the perceived instrumentality of the media in helping them achieve these goals. A multiplicative index of the two measures successfully predicted reported media use. An explicit merger of uses and gratifications and expectancy-value conceptualizations did not occur until the early 1980s, with the work of Galloway and his colleagues (Blood and Galloway, 1983; Galloway and Meek, 1981), Van Leuven (1981), and ourselves (Palmgreen and Ray- burn, 1982, 1984; Rayburn and Palmgreen, 1983, 1984). Van Leuven’s (1981) model of media and message selection is based on Vroom’s (1964) expectancy-value theory of worker motivation. Galloway and his col- leagues have also drawn upon Vroom and a worker motivation study by Hackman and Porter (1968). Our own work is based upon Fishbein’s expectancy-value theory (Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Fishbein’s theory is the most prominent and well-specified of the various expectancy-value theories, and its information-processing assumptions are compatible with those of the uses and gratifications perspective. Drawing upon Fishbein’s models of attitude and behavioral intention, we have postulat- ed that gratifications sought from media experience are a function of both the beliefs (expectations) that audience members hold about media sources and the affective evaluations they attach to media attributes. Expressed formally: GS; = bie: ( where GS; = the i™ gratification sought from some media object, X (some medium, program, content type, etc.); b;= the belief (subjective probability) that X possesses some attri- bute or that a behavior related to X will have a particular out- come; and e; = the affective evaluation of the particular attribute or outcome. This model implies that a particular gratification will not be sought from X if X is perceived not to possess the related attribute or if the attribute is very negatively evaluated. If the attribute is both strongly believed to be a component of X and is evaluated very positively, then relatively strong seeking of the appropriate gratification is predicted, with more moderate levels of seeking associated with more moderate levels of bj or €;64 MEDIA GRATIFICATIONS RESEARCH BELIEFS «joa berpnns obeeeeap a ea PERCEIVED GRATIFICATIONS MEDIA GRATIFICATIONS & SOUGHT > CONSUMPTION OBTAINED EVALUATIONS Figure 3.1 Expectancy-Value Model of GS and GO A parallel formulation that predicts a generalized orientation to seek various gratifications from a particular source is as follows: & Gsi=% be: [2] Both models received support in a study of television news (Palm- green and Rayburn, 1982). Correlations between each of fourteen gratifi- cations sought and their respective belief-evaluation products ranged from .26 to .74. These correlations remained substantial and significant after the introduction of a control for gratifications obtained, indicating that expectations about the characteristics of television news and evalua- tions of these characteristics are important antecedents of motives to seek associated gratifications. ' This finding has been replicated recently by Babrow and Swanson (1984). A MODEL OF GRATIFICATION PROCESSES Further analysis of the data in the 1982 study that included measures of media consumption and gratifications obtained supports the model in Figure 3.1. The model is a process one that posits that the products of beliefs (expectations) and evaluations influence the seeking of gratifica- tions, which in turn influence media consumption. Such consumption results in the perception of certain gratifications obtained, which then feed back to reinforce or alter an individual’s perceptions of the gratifica- tion-related attributes of a particular newspaper, program, program genre, or other media consumed. For example, if a person values “information about current issues and events” positively and believes (expects) that television news possesses such information, he or she will be motivated to seek such information from television news. AssumingPhilip Palmgreen and J. D. Rayburn II 65 that, television news is available to the audience member (and that no better alternatives are perceived), exposure to television news should result. If the individual obtains the expected information, then this outcome (GO) will feed back to reinforce the initial belief about this program attribute. If he or she obtains information at a lower or higher level than expected, then his or her associated belief should be altered, with consequent change in motivation to seek information about current issues from television news. The model postulates that evaluations, on the other hand, are not affected by perceptions of gratifications obtained; that is, we should not find that the more a gratification is perceived to be obtained, the more positively evaluated is the associated media attribute. Evaluations are viewed instead as relatively stable elements that are the product of an individual’s needs and value system. Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) model for predicting behavioral inten- tions also includes a subjective norm component. This component takes into account a person’s beliefs that significant others feel he or she should not perform a certain behavior, as well as the person’s motiva- tion to comply with the wishes of these other persons. Although the model in Figure 3.1 does not incorporate such a component, its inclu- sion might take into account certain important social aspects of con- sumption decisions. Such an expanded model would, in effect, contrast motivations for media use (GS) with social motivations to conform to the wishes of others. The influence of such social factors was illustrated in a study of public television viewing (Palmgreen and Rayburn, 1979), in which, among those respondents who usually deferred viewing decisions to other household members, public television viewing was predicted best by the viewing behavior of the decision maker, while the influence of gratifica- tions sought and obtained was minimized. For decision makers them- selves, gratifications played a significant role in predicting exposure. This distinction may help explain why Babrow and Swanson (1984), in the only gratification study to date that included a measure of subjective norm, found no relationship between this variable and intention to view television news. It may be that the influence of a motive to comply with the wishes of others would emerge only among those viewers who ordinarily leave many of their TV viewing decisions to others. GRATIFICATIONS OBTAINED VERSUS BELIEF We should note an important distinction between the concepts of “belief” (expectancy) and “gratification obtained,” as we have employed66 MEDIA GRATIFICATIONS RESEARCH them in our research. Earlier we defined belief as the subjective probabili- ty that a media object possesses some attribute, or that a behavior related to that object will have a certain outcome. In our research we have chosen to operationalize belief in the former-sense; that is, as the subjective probability that a media object possesses a particular attri- bute in the general sense (as a defining characteristic of the object). By comparison, a gratification obtained in the abstract sense is not a belief at all, but is some outcome (cognitive, affective, or behavioral) of media behavior. Nonetheless, a perceived gratification obtained is con- ceptualized and operationalized by most researchers as a belief that a media behavior has a given outcome (conforming to the second interpre- tation of belief described above). This belief, however, is personal in nature in that it represents the subjective probability that the media behavior provides the respondent with a particular gratification. Thus, in our model, “beliefs” and perceived gratifications obtained are both operationalized as expectancies, but with quite different referents. While our research has shown the two concepts to be related empirical- ly, responses to items measuring belief and perceived GO may be quite different. For example, a nonviewer of television news may believe that much of the content of TV news is concerned with information about political affairs; that is, that political information is an attribute of television news. He or she therefore should endorse measures that tap this belief. On the other hand, since the person is not a regular TV news viewer, he or she is unlikely to endorse a perceived GO measure such as “TV news gives me information about political affairs.” Galloway and Meek (1981), Blood and Galloway (1983), and Babrow and Swanson (1984) do not make a similar distinction, but operational- ize expectancy only in terms of perceived gratifications obtained (as the subjective probability that media behavior will have a particular out- come for the respondent). While either approach is consistent with the way in which Fishbein and other expectancy-value theorists have opera- tionalized the expectancy concept, the distinction may help account for one apparent inconsistency between our findings (Palmgreen and Ray- burn, 1982) and those of Galloway et al. (Blood and Galloway, 1983; Galloway and Meek, 1981). Our model predicts an indirect effect of the expectancy-value index on media exposure through GS. This prediction was supported, and no direct effect of the bie; index on television news exposure emerged with GS controlled. Galloway and his colleagues, however, have found direct effects of bie: indices (EV indices in their model) on subsequent exposure to television programs. Because the Galloway et al. measure taps perceived personal outcomes (GO) from media use, it may be a stronger direct predictor of exposure. Other differences, however, may also account for the discrepancy, includingPhilip Palmgreen and J. D. Rayburn I] 67 the fact that we have defined evaluation in terms of affect, whereas Galloway et al., define it as importance. In addition, our study employed acontrol for GS, while the Galloway studies did not. Further research is needed that examines the theoretical and measurement issues raised by the two approaches. A TYPOLOGY OF MEDIA MOTIVATIONS A few uses and gratifications studies (such as Becker, 1979; Blumler and McQuail, 1969; McLeod and Becker, 1974) have distinguished between “positive” gratifications (reasons for seeking media consump- tion) and “negative” gratifications or avoidances (reasons for avoiding media consumption). Becker (1979) found that avoidance motivations are empirically distinct from gratifications, and called for more concep- tual attention to avoidance measures. Taking an expectancy-value approach to uses and gratifications of- fers a fruitful way of conceptualizing both gratifications and avoid- ances, and gives insight into different kinds of motivation for media use. Anexamination of avoidance items employed in uses and gratifications studies reveals that the majority involve a negatively evaluated attribute (presumed to be gratification related) that the media object in question (for example, political content) is believed to possess. An example of such an item tapping avoidance of political content on television is the following: “Because I’m not interested in watching candidates I don’t like” (Becker, 1979). Endorsement of such an item would indicate a negative evaluation of information about “candidates I don’t like” along with the belief that political content on TV possesses such information. Such a situation would involve a case of true and classic avoidance of a disliked entity. The remainder of avoidance items commonly employed usually in- volve a positively valued attribute that the media object is believed not to possess. Such an item for political TV is “Because I prefer to relax when watching television” (Becker, 1979). Endorsement of this type of item indicates a positive evaluation of “relaxing when watching tele- vision” in conjunction with the belief that political TV content is not relaxing. This would reflect not so much true avoidance of political TV as exposure to alternative TV content perceived to be more relaxing. We shall term this type of motive, then, “seeking of alternatives.” As Palmgreen (1984b) has shown, cross-tabulating evaluation of media attributes with belief in their possession yields a fourfold typolo-