The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis

Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2023, 153－164

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2023.35.1.008

The Taiwan Strait and the ROK–U.S. Alliance*

Alex Soohoon Lee** and Choong-Koo Lee***

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, Republic of Korea

The ROK–U.S. alliance is an Indo–Pacific alliance. The first sentence of the ROK
Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo–Pacific Region states “The
Republic of Korea is an Indo–Pacific Nation.” The U.S. Indo–Pacific Strategy
begins by stating, “The United States is an Indo–Pacific power.” In their first
summit meeting, President Yoon and President Biden agreed to develop ROK–
U.S. into a global comprehensive strategic alliance. Moreover, the two leaders
emphasized that preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is a significant
component of security and prosperity for the Indo–Pacific region. If China attacks
Taiwan, the United States would probably send forces to protect Taiwan. This
research discusses ROK’s possible policy options and the issues that should be
considered under the circumstances. Put simply, ROK’s policy options will be
limited due to its security situation on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, it would
be critical for the allies to discuss and prepare for the contingencies that may appear
in the Taiwan Strait.

Keywords: U.S.–China competition, the Taiwan Strait, high-intensity conflict

scenario, ROK–U.S. alliance, Indo–Pacific region

Introduction

The Biden administration’s Indo–Pacific Strategy, released in February 2022, begins by

stating, “The United States is an Indo–Pacific power.”1 Since the Obama administration
announced its “pivot to Asia,”2 the United States has dramatically shifted its strategic
*
This is a paper prepared for a joint KIDA–INSS research project on “The Conflict Scenarios
of the U.S.–China Strategic Competition and the impact on the ROK and the United States.”
(November 2022). The views are those of the authors and do not represent the views of
the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, the Ministry of National Defense, or the ROK
government.
**
First Author. E-mail: alex.hoon.lee@gmail.com
***
Corresponding Author. E-mail: ck.choongkoo.lee@gmail.com

ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online

© 2023 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda
154 Alex Soohoon Lee and Choong-Koo Lee

focus from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific. While a lingering war on terror resulted
in a U.S. leadership vacuum in Asia, China became the sole power that could not be
contested by any other states in the region. When the United States reappeared in
the region, China had to face an uncomfortable competition with the United States.
This competition has created the current power structure of the Indo–Pacific region.
In this setting, the Biden administration announced that it would “prevail in strategic
competition with China or any other nations.”3 The Biden administration’s direction
for such a strategic competition is known to be composed of competition, cooperation,
and confrontation, the so-called 3Cs.4 The United States could compete, confront, or
cooperate with China depending on the environment.
In a situation of armed conflict in the Taiwan strait, however, such a strategic
competition will be unavailing. It would rather be a war in which Pandora’s box that
has been sealed for the last couple of decades would be opened. This armed conflict
would be the sea change that would significantly alter the security landscape of the
Indo–Pacific region. In such turmoil, the Republic of Korea (hereafter “ROK”) may be
exposed to the dual threats posed by North Korea and China. In this respect, the ROK
will try to seek ways to maintain the status quo in the region but, at the same time, will
have to strike a balance between the United States and China.
One of the greatest concerns for the ROK, regarding the United States and China
armed conflict over the Taiwan Strait is, whether or not United States Forces in Korea
(hereafter “USFK”) would be affected by the situation. USFK is one of the Subordinate
Unified Commands in the organization of the Indo–Pacific Command (hereafter
“INDOPACOM”). Thus, USFK is technically a part of INDOPACOM though its
area of responsibility (hereafter “AOR”) is primarily limited to the Korean Theater of
Operations (hereafter “KTO”). However, USFK former commander, retired General
Robert Abrams, mentioned possible use of USFK forces in Taiwan Strait crisis by
saying that “all options,” “including those assigned to the USFK,” are open.5 In other
words, there could be a change in the role or AOR of USFK when such contingencies
occur.
After the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the United States emphasized strategic flexibility
in its forces abroad. Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, announced, “The
United States will move people where it needs them.” To deal with worldwide
challenges, the United States will have to create “a smaller, more mobile force that is
based closer to the likely sites of future conflicts.”6 On the other hand, it may not be the
case for USFK. According to the ROK–U.S. Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1953,
USFK’s role has been to defend ROK from outside forces. Article 3 of the Mutual
Defense Treaty Between the United States and the ROK states as follows.

“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the
Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter
recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative
 The Taiwan Strait and the ROK–U.S. Alliance 155

control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes.”7

It means USFK’s role and mission will focus on South Korea’s defense. In this regard,
in 2006, the ROK and the United States held ministerial talks over strategic flexibility
and its influence on USFK.8 Such a traditional logic or discussion of strategic flexibility
may be revisited if contingencies occur in the Taiwan Strait. Thus, it is important to
understand how and why such tension in the Strait may escalate into a full-scale war.
In this respect, this paper offers respective measures and responses of the ROK to the
three scenarios, China’s joint fire strike campaign, joint blockade, and joint island
landing campaign9 in the Taiwan Strait.

The Impact on the Korean Peninsula

To discuss the ROK’s strategy in the Taiwan Strait, it is critical to assess how the crisis
in the Taiwan Strait may affect the security environment in the region, especially the
Korean Peninsula. U.S.–China armed conflict over Taiwan will bring a tremendous
impact on the Northeast Asian regional order. In other words, if the United States
decides to militarily deter, or confront, China in the Taiwan Strait, the ROK’s regional
strategy may also be affected. In addition, considering the potential humanitarian crisis
in Northeast Asia, ROK policy toward the possible Taiwan Strait crisis could emerge
as a central issue in South Korean domestic politics. Nevertheless, since the security
landscape of the Korean Peninsula would largely be influenced by the situation in
Taiwan, the extent Seoul could cooperate with Washington may well be uncertain.
As an ally of the United States, the ROK is well aware of the security and political
commitment of the United States to maintain peace and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait.
The ROK has also committed its role to rebuilding liberal international order. In this
regard, the ROK has shown its support for the United States in multiple ways. Since
the joint declaration of the ROK–U.S. summit in 2021, the political commitment
of the United States to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait has become one
of the allies’ main agendas. In May 2021, President Biden and President Moon Jae-
In announced that they would “emphasize the importance of preserving peace and
stability”10 in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait
has become one of the highlights of the 53rd Security Consultative Meeting (hereafter
“SCM”) which the ROK Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense attend.11
The Yoon Suk Yeol government has emphasized upholding international norms as
one of its foreign policy pillars. The ROK and U.S. leaders highlighted the importance
of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait during their first bilateral summit meeting. In
May 2022, the leaders emphasized “the importance of preserving peace and stability in
156 Alex Soohoon Lee and Choong-Koo Lee

the Taiwan Strait as an essential element in security and prosperity.”12 Understanding

the importance of maintaining a stable Taiwan Strait in achieving peace and prosperity
in the region, the ROK has a role to fill. The ROK’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and
Prosperous Indo–Pacific Region reaffirmed “the importance of peace and stability
in the Taiwan Strait for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and for the
security and prosperity of the Indo–Pacific.”13
Deterring Chinese invasion or occupation of Taiwan is the number one priority for
the United States in the era of U.S.–China strategic competition. Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine signified the importance of preventing its competitor’s expansion. According
to the survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, since the outbreak
of the Ukrainian war, the United States has “committed more than $9 billion of military
assistance” and it is the largest amount compared to “other U.S. military aid campaigns
in the last 30 years.” According to this survey, 80 percent of Americans “support U.S.
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia,” 72 percent support “providing
additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government,” while 38 percent
support “sending U.S. troops to defend Ukraine.”14 This explains that more Americans
prefer indirect military engagement over direct engagement. Over the twenty–plus
years of war in the Middle East, Americans come to understand how the war could
bring devastating outcomes to their economy.
In the case of the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, however, U.S. response could be
different. The National Defense Authorization Act (hereafter, “NDAA”) for Fiscal
Year 2023 included the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which would allow the
U.S. to modernize “Taiwan’s security capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat
aggression by the the People’s Republic of China,” to promote “international military
education and training cooperation with Taiwan,” to assist Taiwan to “fufill defensive
requirements of military forces,” and to fast-track “sales to Taiwan under Foreign
Military Sales program.”15 In addition, the U.S. Congress’ decision to authorize a total
of 11.5 billion dollars of the NDAA to the Pacific Deterrrence Initiative (hereafter,
“PDI”)16 reflects the U.S. prospective postion of deterring China and protecting Taiwan
in the Indo–Pacific region.
In this respect, whether or not the United States would protect Taiwan is not a
question to be addressed anymore. Although the Biden administration will try to
maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, China and Taiwan could discount such
efforts. Once a contingency in the Taiwan Strait occurs, the Biden administration
would respond to the attack initiated by China. If the time comes, the ROK’s policy
options could be very limited. Therefore, the ROK must prepare well for various
options in multiple situations.
The situation in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on the security of the
Korean Peninsula. However, the level of impact may vary. What could happen in the
Korean Peninsula in the event of a U.S.–China military conflict in the Taiwan Strait
could be threefold. First, the security environment of the Korean Peninsula would
 The Taiwan Strait and the ROK–U.S. Alliance 157

be extremely tense due to a possible provocation by North Korea. Armed conflict

between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait could work as a window of
opportunity for North Korea. North Korea’s strategic calculus may lead to a military
provocation on the Peninsula while U.S. strategic focus remains in the Taiwan Strait.
Under these circumstances, the ROK may be exposed to different types of danger,
including a nuclear attack. This is the situation that the ROK must avoid.
Second, South Koreans may be seized by fear knowing that North Korea would
provoke. At this point, there can be two concerns faced by the South Korean public.
One would be a concern that the conflict in the Taiwan Strait may provoke conflict
on the Korean Peninsula. Another concern among the South Korean public would be
about the USFK and the ROK military being involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict. If
the United States faces difficulties in deterring China or if China conducts a landing
operation in Taiwan, more U.S. forces in the region may be asked to participate. In
this respect, the USFK, composed of a large land force, could be asked to participate.
These concerns may ignite intrastate conflict between the two blocs, one supporting
the ROK’s active role in the Taiwan Strait and another wanting to keep both the ROK
forces and the USFK in the Peninsula.
Lastly, if the United States decides to relocate the USFK to the Taiwan Strait, there
will be a security vacuum on the Peninsula. If there is a possibility of the USFK being
relocated to the contingent area, the ROK and the United States will have to discuss
issues regarding the USFK’s strategic flexibility beforehand. Overall, a U.S.–China
military conflict in the Taiwan Strait will enormously affect the security of the Korean
Peninsula. Therefore, close communication between the ROK and U.S. governments
will be critical.

The Policy Direction of the Republic of Korea

Overall, the ROK intervening in a Taiwan Strait military crisis would be unlikely.
Seoul has worried that the current situation in the Taiwan Strait may turn into a military
conflict. However, facing nuclear Pyongyang, Seoul’s main security concern has
always been North Korea’s provocation. If the ROK supports U.S. military operations
in the Taiwan Strait, there is a chance that the military front between the United States
and China may be extended beyond the Taiwan Strait, eventually including the Korean
Peninsula. Consequently, the instability of the U.S.–China strategic competition
will deteriorate the stability of the region. Even though an extended frontline would
increase the burden on China, which has to respond to multiple theaters, North Korea
and Russia supporting China can cause even more complicated tasks for the United
States, to manage the stability of the Indo–Pacific region.
Above all, if Seoul decides to send operational forces, China would designate
the ROK as an enemy. Then, the tension in the Yellow Sea/West Sea could intensify.
158 Alex Soohoon Lee and Choong-Koo Lee

Beijing has openly threatened neighboring countries that those providing operational
air force bases for military operations against China would be considered enemies.
This has various implications but it may include air force bases in the ROK. Both
the ROK and USFK air force bases in the ROK could be exposed to China’s missile
attacks. In this regard, for Seoul, the situation in the Taiwan Strait must stay under
control, so that it does not spill over to the Korean Peninsula. If not, Seoul will face a
dilemma where its involvement in the conflict, whether active or passive, may affect
the security landscape of the Korean peninsula. The ROK will have to assess its own
risks before making any decisions regarding involvement.
The ROK’s responses to China’s three possible provocations in the Taiwan Strait
would differ. As introduced in Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War
with Taiwan, there are three scenarios of China projecting power over Taiwan. They
are 1. Joint Fire Strike campaign, 2. Joint blockade, 3. Joint island landing campaign.
From the joint fire to the landing operation, the level of military provocation on Taiwan
would increase. If the United States decides to defend Taiwan and successfully deters
or defeats China in the first scenario, the ROK would not have to bother considering
the policy options for scenarios 2 and 3. But considering any of these provocations in
these scenarios could be conducted at any time, not incrementally, it is important to
consider the three scenarios and prepare respective options.
As presented in the U.S. Unified Command Plan (hereafter “UCP”), Taiwan
is located in the INDOPACOM AOR.17 Therefore, China’s military provocation
surrounding Taiwan is managed by the INDOPACOM Commander. In a Taiwan Strait
Crisis, INDOPACOM’s subordinate unified commands and subordinate component
commands would be mandated to take action. After the INDOPACOM Commander
makes a theater–wide decision, a commander of each component will plan operations
accordingly. Then the forces in the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the U.S. Pacific
Fleet (PACFLEET), the U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF), and the U.S. Pacific Marines
(MARFOPAC) will be put into missions and operations over the situated area. For
instance, the 7th fleet located in Japan would follow the orders from PACFLEET. In
a full-scale invasion by China, all of these U.S. forces will be ordered to move to the
conflicted area. This may not be the case, however, for the USFK.
In these circumstances, strategic flexibility of the USFK may have to be revisited.
In other words, the two allies will have to discuss whether the USFK will have to be
redeployed. In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Ban
Ki-moon agreed to respect the U.S. strategic flexibility of the USFK.18 After the Iraq
War, on January 19, 2006, Minister Ban and Secretary Rice reached an understanding
between the two allies that the ROK fully understood the necessity for strategic
flexibility of the USFK under the U.S. global military strategy. Also, in this agreement,
the two parties had confirmed that the United States would not relocate the USFK
outside of the Peninsula without the consent of ROK citizens.
This could be revisited under a Taiwan Strait crisis. Since the last strategic talks
 The Taiwan Strait and the ROK–U.S. Alliance 159

between Minister Ban and Secretary Rice, there have been no official talks between the
United States and the ROK regarding the strategic flexibility of the USFK. Strategic
flexibility of the U.S. forces abroad had been a significant agenda for the United States
during the war on terror. Under the circumstances of a Taiwan Strait Crisis, such
strategic talks between the ROK and the United States concerning the USFK could be
resumed.
The ROK’s response to a U.S.–China military conflict over Taiwan should consider
other variables as well, such as China’s decision or Taiwan’s response. However, the
following analysis would be completely based on the assumption that China would
invade Taiwan, highly hypothetical. It is unlikely that the ROK would allow the U.S.
forces including the USFK to fight from the Peninsula. The ROK–U.S. Combined
Forces can respond to the attacks initiated by China or North Korea, however, the
United States provoking China from the Peninsula may create another contingency
surrounding the Peninsula. This would mean the 7th Air Force would use the base
located in South Korea to attack China in response to the attacks on Taiwan. It may
turn the Peninsula into a battlefield. This is a situation that both the ROK and the
United States will avoid.

A ROK Perspective to U.S. Expectations in a Taiwan Strait Conflict

There are high–end conflict scenarios across the Taiwan Strait which can mean worst-
case scenarios for the ROK–U.S. alliance. The allies should be prepared to understand
each other’s expectations and potential demands. Under the People’s Liberation Army
(hereafter “PLA”) military campaign scenarios beyond the scope of low-intensity
Chinese traditional provocations, U.S. scholars, including Phillip C. Saunders, took
U.S. expectations about the ROK’s assistance into account.19 Then, vis-à-vis U.S.
expectations, how would the ROK respond as an essential ally of the United States
as well as a country with unique national interests? Suggesting a Korean perspective
on potential U.S. demands will help contribute to a deepening mutual understanding
within the ROK–U.S. alliance.
In addition, though U.S. experts have not highlighted the ROK’s diplomatic
cooperation in the probable crises, the ROK will likely join international diplomatic
efforts to condemn Chinese military attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan
Strait by force.20 The lesson of the Ukraine War is that the international community will
enforce international norms by inflicting coordinated sanctions upon an unprovoked
aggressor. Announcing the ROK’s own Indo–Pacific Strategy, President Yoon stated:
“Any unilateral change in the status quo by force should never be tolerated.”21
160 Alex Soohoon Lee and Choong-Koo Lee

Under a Chinese Joint Firepower Strike Campaign

Should China launch missiles aimed at Taiwan, according to the Chinese Joint
Firepower Strike scenario, the ROK will have to cooperate with the United States to
cope with the Chinese aggression under visible and tangible clashes between China and
Taiwan. Intelligence-sharing will be the most probable bilateral cooperation between
the United States and the ROK. One of the ways Seoul can support the United States
in its conflict with China would be the missions regarding information, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR). Seoul can support the implementation of the U.S. regional
strategy by monitoring and deterring aggressive Chinese activities around the Korean
Peninsula, especially on the western front.
The ROK denying the Chinese military’s transit across ROK territorial airspace and
territorial seas within 12 nautical miles of the ROK mainland could be another option for
supporting the United States. Cooperation on this matter from the Korean side would
not be difficult since the PLA’s intrusion into the ROK territory is rare. Therefore, those
measures can fall within symbolic cooperation among the allies. Bilateral cooperation
between the United States and the ROK will meet no overwhelming challenges with
significant risk in the first phase of a high-end Taiwan Strait conflict scenario.
Moreover, the ROK can cooperate with the United States in the space and cyber
domains. These domains would be conflictual but necessary for conducting responses
against Chinese missile attacks across the Taiwan Strait. By conducting cyber defense
operations to protect critical domestic infrastructures, the ROK can indirectly protect
the capabilities of the USFK during an intense conflict around the Taiwan Strait by
supporting its space and cyber domains. Moreover, the ROK military must strengthen
its cyber security posture against the possibility of Chinese cyber-attack attempts on
the USFK or the ROK–U.S. alliance.

Under a Chinese Naval Blockade Campaign

If the PLA conducts a naval blockade on Taiwan, the United States will request ROK
assistance. In this Chinese blockade campaign scenario, the ROK might be able to
designate maintenance facilities and bases for the maintenance of U.S. civilian aircraft
or ships engaged in non-military missions. In these facilities, U.S. ships can be repaired
and be ready to sail in conflicted waters. However, enhanced logistics cooperation in
this phase can be one of the most delicate issues for Seoul trying to avoid a military
clash with China.
The enhanced logistics support for the U.S. military vessels and aircraft mobilized
for non-strike operations might be the target of the Chinese criticism that the ROK
would start to support the United States militarily, even if the ROK does not provide
weapons to a party of the conflict.22 This kind of enhanced logistics support can be a
delicate topic of bilateral cooperation. An intergovernmental review process might be
 The Taiwan Strait and the ROK–U.S. Alliance 161

necessary for the ROK to determine its cooperation in this period under the threshold
of a full–fledged invasion of the Chinese military against Taiwan. The most dangerous
moment for the ROK in the Taiwan Strait conflict can be this moment of status change
in the naval blockade scenario since China can suddenly begin to regard the ROK as a
belligerent country.
Nonetheless, even though the ROK would be extremely cautious if there is a
Chinese naval blockade, there could be a case that Seoul may positively consider its
cooperation with Washington and Tokyo. Chinese naval blockading the Taiwan Strait
will disrupt maritime trade and will have an enormous impact on ROK and Japanese
economies. In this respect, securing maritime trade even under such a contingency
would be vital for both ROK and Japanese governments. Therefore, the ROK may
cooperate with the United States and allied countries to protect the SLOC (Sea Lines
of Communication) east of Taiwan.
Additionally, the ROK will have to defend the USFK from a Chinese naval
offensive. If the Chinese military intends to prevent the USFK from dispatching
to Taiwan, China can implement a maritime blockade in the Yellow Sea/West Sea
through its North Sea Fleet or East Sea Fleet. In this case, there is a possibility the
ROK would automatically be involved in a crisis. In this regard, the ROK should
prepare for a Chinese naval blockade in the Yellow Sea. The consequential situation
after the Chinese naval blockade in the Yellow Sea will constitute an increased security
burden on the ROK as well as an unstable environment for the USFK which can limit
the scope and extent of strategic flexibility of the USFK.

Under a Chinese Joint Island Landing

The ROK can also meet precarious moments in the final campaign of a Chinese joint
landing operation on Taiwan. This is because of the potential strategic cooperation
between China and North Korea, which can encourage North Korea’s provocation vis-
à-vis South Korea. Under this condition, while there will be a great need for munitions and
spare parts for the United States, Seoul will not be able to provide the United States with the
requested logistics support due to its own security demand. Therefore, logistics cooperation
diversion of the United States, rather than depending on the ROK logistics stock, might be
necessary for this full-scale conflict scenario in the Taiwan Strait.
At the same time, deterring North Korea will also be the main mission of the ROK
military, considering the likelihood of North Korea’s provocation.23 However, since
a North Korean provocation amidst the Taiwan clash will likely target Tokyo as well
as Seoul, ignoring the North Korean aggression might significantly undermine the
allied capabilities of the U.S. side. In this sense, although the ROK might be expected
to deal with North Korean low-level provocations on its own, a strengthened alliance
coordination mechanism might be a must to manage simultaneous provocation in two
theaters.
162 Alex Soohoon Lee and Choong-Koo Lee

Lastly, if the conflicts in the Taiwan Strait escalate beyond its border, direct
offensive to the ROK territory cannot be excluded. Considering this worst-case
scenario, the ROK might also take possible threats from China into account.

Considerations for the Cooperation between the United States and the
Republic of Korea

As discussed above, if the United States and China clash over the Taiwan Strait, the
ROK’s policy options will be extremely limited. The ROK has its own security agenda,
primarily deterring the aggression of North Korea on the Peninsula. If the situation
in the Taiwan Strait develops into a war, then it will hardly be controlled. Thus, it
is important for the allies to work closely together to maintain the status quo in the
Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. It is also essential to keep track of the bilateral
relations between China and the DPRK. If Kim Jong-un decides to start a war on the
Peninsula in the midst of a contingency, it will be an all-out war that could possibly
develop into a nuclear war.
The bottom line is that both the United States and China do not want simultaneous
wars in two different theaters that would greatly change the security landscape of the
Indo–Pacific region. Paradoxically, this may lead to a claim that neither the United
States nor China wants a war over Taiwan. However, to firmly maintain its values
of peace and prosperity in the region followed by its global reputation, the Biden
administration has no other options than deterring Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait
under a contingency.
This article explained the ROK’s role during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in accordance
with three scenarios introduced in the volumn, Crossing the Strait: China’s Military
Prepares for War with Taiwan. While the ROK’s policy options seem limited due to
its own security agenda on the Peninsula, there may be ways the allies can cooperate
under such contingencies. The problem, however, is that such decisions will have to be
made promptly in a dynamic situation. While making an effort to maintain the status
quo of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula to maintain peace and prosperity of
the Indo–Pacific region, the allies will also have to prepare for contingencies that may
occur.
 The Taiwan Strait and the ROK–U.S. Alliance 163

Notes
1. The White House, Indo–Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf (accessed
November 1, 2022).
2. Mark E. Manyin, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” toward
Asia,” Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2012, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42448.
pdf (accessed November 1, 2022).
3. The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, 19, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed November 1, 2022).
4. Cheng Li, “Biden’s China Strategy: Coalition–Driven Competition or Cold War–Style
Confrontation?” Brookings, May 2021.
5. Michael Lee, “Hints Dropped That USFK Might Have to Help Defend Taiwan,” Korea
JoongAng Daily, September 27, 2022.
6. Kun Yong Park, “A New U.S.–ROK Alliance: A Nine–Point Policy Recommendation for
a Reflective and Mature Partnership,” The Brookings Institution, June 2005, https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/park20050907.pdf (accessed November 1, 2022).
7. U.S. Department of State, “American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 Basic Documents Volumes
I and II Publication 6446,” General Foreign Policy Series 117 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1957).
8. David Straub, “U.S. and ROK Strategic Doctrines and the U.S.–ROK Alliance,” Dynamic
Forces on the Korean Peninsula: Strategic & Economic Implications (Washington D.C.: Korea
Economic Institute, 2007), 180–81.
9. Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Philip C. Saunders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang,
eds., Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan (Washington D.C.:
NDU Press, 2022), 113–38.
10. The White House, “U.S.–ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2021, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/
(accessed November 1, 2022).
11. The 53rd SCM Joint Communique stated “Additionally, the Minister and the Secretary
acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as
reflected in the May 2021 Joint Statement between President Biden and President Moon.” U.S.
Department of Defense, “53rd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique,” December
2, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2858814/53rd-security-
consultative-meeting-joint-communique/ (accessed November 1, 2022).
12. The White House, “United States–Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-
republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/ (accessed November 1, 2022).
13. The Government of the Republic of Korea, “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperious
Indo–Pacific Region,” December 2022.
14. Dina Smeltz and Emily Sullivan, “Americas Support Ukraine ‘as Long as It Takes,’” The
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 18, 2022.
15. U.S. House of Representatives, “James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023,” 2095–2096, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7776/
text (accessed Feburuary 15, 2023).
16. Hibbah Kaileh and Luke A. Nicastro, “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary
Overview,” Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2023.
17. Kathleen J. McInnis, “Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations,” Congressional
Research Service, February 18, 2020.
18. Regarding the issue of strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the ROK, Secretary Rice and
Foreign Minister Ban confirmed the understanding of both governments as follows: The ROK,
as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military
strategy, and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK. In the
164 Alex Soohoon Lee and Choong-Koo Lee

implementation of strategic flexibility, the United States respects the ROK position that it shall
not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.
David Straub, “U.S. and ROK Strategic Doctrines and the U.S.–ROK Alliance.”
19. See Phillip C. Saunders, “Stressing the Alliance: The United States and ROK in a Conflict with
China over Taiwan,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analyses 35, no. 1 (March 2023).
20. David Lawler, “South Korea Would Expect U.S. to Intervene If China Invades Taiwan, Official
Says,” Axios, June 28, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/06/27/south-korea-expect-us-
respond-china-invade-taiwan (accessed November 1, 2022).
21. Hyonhee Shin, “South Koreas Yoon Says Forced Change in Indo–Pacific Is Unacceptable,”
Reuters, November 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-
says-forced-change-indo-pacific-status-quo-cannot-be-accepted-2022-11-11/ (accessed January
16, 2023).
22. “Neutral Swiss Rule out Arms Deliveries to Poland,” Reuters, March 22, 2022, https://www.
reuters.com/world/europe/neutral-swiss-rule-out-arms-deliveries-poland-2022-03-21/ (accessed
January 16, 2023).
23. Whether by its own strategic motivation or encouraged by China, North Korea could use this
moment as an opportunity to achieve higher status in nuclear negotiations.

Notes on Contributors
Alex Soohoon Lee is an Associate Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
(KIDA). His research interests have been focused primarily on the issues of international security,
the ROK–U.S. alliance, the U.S. foreign and security policy, and recently ROK– U.S.–Japan
trilateral security cooperation. Dr. Lee received a Ph.D. from Korea University. He recently authored
and co-authored Biden Administration’s Indo–Pacific Security and Defense Policy (KIDA Press,
2022), “Security and Defence Policy” in The Oxford Handbook of South Korean Politics (Oxford
University Press, 2022), and “South Korea and the 2016 US Presidential Elections: A Security–Trade
Nexus Redefined?” in American Presidential Elections in a Comparative Perspective: The World is
Watching (Lexington Books, 2019).

Choong-Koo Lee is an Associate Research Fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He
was previously a Visiting Fellow of the National Defense University in Washington D.C. in 2022 for
one year and a Visiting Fellow of the Renmin University of China in Beijing in 2013. His Ph.D. is
from Seoul National University. His research areas include North Korean nuclear discourses, Sino–
North Korea relations, and the U.S.–China strategic competition in the Indo–Pacific region. Dr. Lee
has published in academic journals such as The Pacific Review, The Korean Journal of Defense
Analyses, The Korean Journal of International Studies, Korean Political Science Review, and in
edited volumes.