Review

Author(s): James Winchester

Review by: James Winchester
Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 1996), pp.
389-391
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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Book Reviews
guage and its method of reduction to basics seems im-
possibly alien to actual linguistic practice."
The last chapter addresses Margolis's theory of
cultural embodiment in Art in Philosophy, with par-
ticular attention to the thesis that artworks and cul-
tural entities generally are "tokens-of-a-type." Mar-
golis there defines types as "abstract particulars of a
kind that can be instantiated" so that, for example,
prints from Diirer's engraving Melancholia I are in-
stantiations of that type. For Margolis, artists make
tokens of the types they create, and no type can be
created without at the same time being instantiated in
a physical token, which itself is not created by the
artist in the sense that the type is. In this sense, works
of art are embodied in physical objects without being
identical to them, much as a person is embodied with-
out being reducible to his or her body. But Hagberg
finds problematic Margolis's assertions that types
and tokens are both individual particulars and that
they "are not separable and cannot exist separately
from one another." For the members of type-token
pairs, normally understood as categorically distinct,
are not so understood by Margolis. And in addition,
whereas they are conventionally understood as stand-
ing to each other as general-to-particular, in Margo-
lis's account their relation is one of particular-to-par-
ticular. It thus appears that for all Margolis does not
say, his account entails that the one particular, for all
intents and purposes, is the other particular. Hence,
suggests Hagberg, Margolis's theory of embodiment
runs afoul of a dilemma: If Margolis's use of the type-
token distinction is coherent, then it is reductively
physicalistic, and the concepts of "embodiment" and
of "token-of-a-type" would appear to be empty. But if
they are not empty, they seem to imply a kind of de
facto dualism, insofar as-for all Margolis does not
say-they seem to refer to "the presence of an intan-
gible entity within a physical object that transcends
unaided sensory perception."
In these chapters, as elsewhere in the book, the ar-
guments are persuasive and deftly executed, and the
examples are well chosen. Initiates into the main de-
bates of analytic aesthetics who share the author's
sense that the latter tradition is in need of internal cri-
tique-and it is to such readers that the book is
mainly addressed-will not be disappointed. At the
same time, noninitiates seeking a larger stock-taking
of the situation of philosophical aesthetics on the
landscape of twentieth-century art theory may be less
sure what it all adds up to. That would be a shame,
since running beneath the surface of these studies is
an observation which, though not developed in its
own right, has deep implications for the understand-
ing of the sources of the tension between modern aes-
thetics and the rapidly proliferating forms of "anti-
aesthetic" theory that present themselves as opposed
to the legacy of Descartes and Kant. This is Hagberg's
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389
point; again, that aesthetics is burdened by a reliance
on dualism-a point which mirrors a broader per-
plexity within modern philosophy about how to un-
derstand, and how to reconstruct, an array of distinc-
tions central to its self-image such as those of inner
versus outer evidence, subjects versus objects, and
mind versus nature.
The problematic nature of these distinctions, not
coincidentally, was a source of deep perplexity to the
later Wittgenstein, a thinker whose ambiguous rela-
tionship to aesthetics has yet to be fully appreciated
in print by the latter's defenders. Consider that while
remaining a methodological hero for most analytic
aestheticians today, Wittgenstein never advanced a
theory of art himself. Consider also how Wittgen-
steinian authority is now being invoked by those in
cultural studies and elsewhere who would view mod-
ern aesthetic discourse as but another historically
contingent language game which may well, in the
proverbial postmodern sense, have reached its "end"
as the twentieth century draws to a close. It would be
interesting to hear more from Hagberg on these mat-
ters. To that extent, this short and specialized book
wants a sequel, and the quality of its analyses and ex-
amples gives the reader reason to want it, too.
CASEY HASKINS
Philosophy Board of Studies
College at Purchase
State University of New York
HOOKS, BELL. Art on My Mind: Visual Politics.
New York: New Press, 1995, 224 pp., 17 b&w + 8
color illus., $15.00 paper.
As hooks notes in her introduction, the choices we
make with respect to whom we write about or think
about (and many of us could add, whom we teach
about in our courses) are all a part of "visual politics."
The attention that she pays to the art of African-
American women is intended to begin to redress the
lack of critical writings on the art of women of color.
The book consists of an introduction, seventeen es-
says, and five interviews (with Alison Saar, Carrie
Mae Weems, LaVerne Wells-Bowie, Emma Amos,
and Margo Humphreys). It also includes essays on
Jean-Michel Basquiat, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, and
Andres Serrano, as well as several essays on the
power art has to transform lives.
The book, however, is more than an academic
study of African-American artists. It is a sustained
meditation on the ways that race, class, and gender in-
form both the production and the reception of art. It
challenges us to expand our aesthetic visions. More-
over, its theoretical insights are powerfully coupled
390
with lived experience. This is postmodernism at its
best. Here the talk of "undermining" and of "mar-
ginal" exploration is not shallow rhetoric. hooks of-
fers us a compelling analysis of aesthetic regions that
the mainstream has neglected.
In "Beauty Laid Bare: Aesthetics in the Ordinary,"
hooks writes of a number of ways that beauty func-
tions in people's lives. For some, beauty is found in
consumer objects; for others, such as her grand-
mother, beauty is found outside of the marketplace.
hooks admits that contemporary feminists, herself in-
cluded, have achieved more financial success than
those of the past. She grapples with the problem of
how it is possible to reconcile the radical feminist
agenda to live simply and to distribute resources
equally with her own enjoyment of some expensive
luxury items. She calls on feminists to create an "eth-
ical approach to consumerism" that would allow peo-
ple to hold on to their passion for beauty and even
some luxury, while, at the same time, not reinforcing
"the structures of domination we seek to change" (p.
123). This might involve, for example, the sharing of
beautiful objects, gift-giving, tithing, sharing of liv-
ing space and money. The cultivation of beauty, for
hooks, is not merely related to individual desire; it can
be a revolutionary act.
One of the recurring concerns of this book, as well
as many of hooks's other writings, is the role that art
plays in the lives of working-class people. She dis-
cusses the transformative role that it played in her
own life, but also recognizes, as her sister says, that
art seems very far away from the concerns of many
working-class and under-class African Americans.
hooks maintains that many African Americans have
taken a cue from mainstream culture and have thus
tended to believe that art is not essential to their sur-
vival. When hooks writes that art can have a transfor-
mative effect on people's lives, this does not imply,
for example, that art must show African Americans
"at their best." The transformative power of art
comes from its ability to help us liberate ourselves
and others "by forging in resistance identities that
transcend narrowly defined limits" (p. 8). Such a
concern with the ways that nonprivileged peoples ex-
perience art illustrates how hooks not only theorizes
about difference, but actively engages terrain that is
beyond the borders of most scholarly writing on art.
Another essay, "In Our Glory: Photography and
Black Life," begins by explaining the significance
that a photograph of hooks's father had for her and
two of her sisters. The three sisters' differing reac-
tions to a photograph of their father introduces a dis-
cussion of the role that photography has played in
African-American culture in general. As such, the
essay illustrates the ways in which race, class, gender,
and individual taste form our reaction to art. While
reminding us of the differing perspectives of even
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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
those who share a great deal in common, it goes on to
analyze the shared sensibilities of a larger group.
hooks writes that cameras "gave to black folks, irre-
spective of class, a means by which we could partic-
ipate fully in the production of images" (p. 57). She
maintains that, today, most reformist and radical
blacks would agree that the struggle over representa-
tion is as important as the struggle for equal access.
At a time when African Americans had very little
power over the way they were portrayed in public
spaces, cameras gave them control over how they
would be represented in private domains such as on
the walls of their homes.
hooks's writings take us beyond the academies;
that is, beyond the galleries, museums, and writings
of the upper-class artworld and into the shacks of
poor southern blacks, and even into her own personal
struggles with luxury. But she also knows the acade-
mies; in particular, she knows all too well how the
academies have treated women of color. Her essay on
Alison Saar dissects the ways in which many critical
writings impose a "narrow identity politics" on Saar's
work. Saar was criticized for using images inspired
from folk art even though she comes from an upper-
middle-class black family. hooks argues that it is pos-
sible to borrow from others without exploiting them.
She explains that Saar was attracted to folk art in part
because of the commitment of those who make it.
These folk artists were not concerned with money or
fame, but rather with the "elevation of the human
spirit." They made art not for the elite but for all those
who would take the time to look at it.
At times, an overly narrow focus on the particular
race, class, or gender of an artist leads to an impover-
ished understanding of the artist's work. At other
times, critical writings are impoverished by failing to
attend sufficiently to the artist's background. In "Re-
membering Basquiat" hooks argues that much of the
meaning in Basquiat's work is lost if one concentrates
solely on his relationship with white male artists such
as Pollock, de Kooning, Rauschenberg, Twombly,
and Warhol. A more inclusive understanding of his
work requires that "one must be willing to accept the
tragic dimension of black life" (p. 39). Basquiat gives
public expression to the anguish that blacks have typ-
ically suffered in private. This is something that those
who focus only on his relationship to white artists
have missed.
The problem of narrow interpretive paradigms is
also discussed in relation to the 1993 Whitney Bien-
nial. hooks believes that the show failed in its efforts
to decenter mainstream culture because all of the
works were framed as works of revolt. By defining
these works in relationship to the mainstream,
"whiteness was not decentered, it was constantly the
point of departure" (p. 104). hooks draws a distinc-
tion between a reformist agenda that seeks to allow
Book Reviews
hitherto excluded groups more access to privileged
positions and a more radical position that would
transform the existing structure altogether.
When hooks conducts her interviews with artists,
there are constant reminders of how the careers of
African-American women artists have challenged pre-
vailing aesthetic norms. For example, in the interview
with Emma Amos, the artworld's prejudice against
women artists working in fabrics is discussed. Amos
reports that for a long time she did not admit to being a
weaver. Feminist theory has helped to expand the num-
ber of media that are accepted by the artworld. Amos
also had to fight, according to hooks, against the ex-
pectation that black artists should work with black fig-
ures. For a time Amos internalized this expectation,
but in her new work she "asserts her right to work with
the white image" (p. 167). hooks sees in Amos's work
a questioning of the notion that white and black are in-
herently separate-purely other to each other. Instead,
her work emphasizes the mixing that takes place be-
tween these two supposed opposites. hooks also sees in
Amos's work a space where white images of domina-
tion are challenged without attempting to establish any
other form of domination to take its place. hooks sug-
gests to Amos that her work has a "postmodern qual-
ity," for she frequently portrays people falling and
sometimes even dismembers her figures. But her fig-
ures are not meant to look scarred. hooks asserts, and
Amos agrees, that her art represents an embrace of the
flux of life. 'An ethic of reciprocity and mutual en-
gagement forms the aesthetic grounds where the sub-
ject can be constantly changing" (p. 170).
Amos notes that she still cannot pay the rent with
her paintings, and that only a very few artists are ever
that successful in the marketplace. She writes of the
"hustling," hard work, and lack of critical response
that characterize the lives of almost all artists. For
Amos, as for hooks, art is not an adornment for life,
but essential to it.
In short, Art on My Mind serves to remind us of
why questions of aesthetics might be important to the
lives of a wide diversity of peoples. Moreover, it re-
minds us, as few writings on aesthetics do, that aes-
thetic questions must not be addressed from the per-
spective of some mythical "universal viewpoint." By
situating her analyses in particular race, class, and
gender contexts, hooks is able to give us a more nu-
anced appreciation of the multitude of ways that art
and beauty function in all of our lives.
JAMES WINCHESTER
Department of Philosophy
Spelman College
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391
WALKER, WILLIAM. Locke, Literary Criticism,
and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1994, xviii + 227 pp., $54.95 cloth.
Locke, Literary Criticism, and Philosophy is based on
a Johns Hopkins Ph.D. dissertation in English litera-
ture, and bears some of the earmarks of that prove-
nance. Walker offers a reinterpretation of Locke's
epistemology as presented in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding in the light of Paul de Man's
reading of Locke. De Manian deconstructive practice
is the "literary criticism" of the title.
Walker's analytic strategy is to "identify and inter-
pret the principal figurative representations of mind
in John Locke's epistemological writing" (p. xiii). In
other words, he undertakes an analysis of the tropes
and figures that occur in Locke's presentation of his
epistemology. Though securely in the "deconstruc-
tive" analytical school of Paul de Man, Walker is "led
to question de Man's authority, and those who bow to
it" (p. xiv).
Walker tells us that it is a "commonplace in the
three-hundred-year commentary on Lockean episte-
mology" that Locke represents the mind "as an en-
closed space in which a man labors and accumulates
property in material," and that such an analogy is of a
piece with "Locke's major political work" (p. 52). He
then proceeds to challenge the allegedly standard as-
sumption that Locke's epistemology is an artifact of
such a crude analogy (p. 54).
As a corrective to this "standard" view, he offers an
alternative analysis of Locke's figures and tropes.
Firstly, he examines the analogy of "acquaintance" in
which this space is "designated as a scene of socio-
erotic activity." Walker cites "narratives" in which
pregnancy, nursery stories, courting, and embracing
are invoked by Locke in his account of learning and
knowing (pp. 57-72). Secondly, he turns to metaphors
of touching and seeing, concluding that "the optical
discourse of the Essay reduces to a discourse of tactile
sensation. When Locke uses ocular terminology to de-
scribe the mind, it is enclosed space which is represent-
ing the mental site and a material body capable of being
struck by other material bodies within that space which
is representing the mental agent" (p. 93). Finally,
Walker directly confronts Locke's dismissal of rhetor-
ical figures in a chapter entitled "Force," concluding
that "though Locke condemns the figurative word, his
representation of it as something that strikes the mind
makes it indistinguishable from ideas" (p. 123).
Walker now turns to an analysis of de Man's essays
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" (1969) and "The Epis-
temology of Metaphor" (1978). He finds de Man to
be in error. This chapter is perhaps the most Byzan-
tine in the book. It offers the following critique,
which is intricately and recurrently defended for an-
other six pages: "Markedly deficient as an appeal to