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Year: 2010

Personality cult in the picture: Stalin, Enver Hoxha and Nicolae Ceauÿescu in the
Comparison

Origin, D

Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL:
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-40488 Book Section

Originally published at:

Origin, D (2010). Personality cult in the picture: Stalin, Enver Hoxha and Nicolae Ceauÿescu in comparison.
In: Hein-Kircher, H; Ennker, B. The leader in 20th century Europe. Marburg: Herder, 50-73.
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Special print

Conferences on East Central Europe Research 27

,

The leader in 20th century Europe

Published by
Benno Ennker and Heidi Hein-Kircher

"

Herder Institute Publishing House

Marburg 2010
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Personality cult in the picture: Stalin, Enver Hoxha and

Nicolae in comparison

from

Daniel Urs p run g

The personality cults surrounding Stalin, the Albanian ruler Enver Hoxha (1944-1985) and the
Romanian party leader Nicolae (1965-1989) are among the most excessive forms of ruler worship in
socialist systems of the 20th century. What is all the more astonishing is the fact that they have
hardly been examined comparatively by researchers. While there is a wealth of literature on the
Stalin cult, there are some basic, mostly descriptive works. Finally, the Hoxha cult has hardly found
any interest in scientific study. A comparison of these three ruler cults therefore has the
methodological problem of having to bring together three subject areas with completely different
levels of research. In the following, this will be done using the image production of the three cults.
Only the still image is considered, but not the film medium. In the context of this essay, only a few
central characteristics of the respective ruler iconography can be identified, which in comparison
turned out to be particularly typical for the respective personality cult. 1

Stalin: Allegory of Soviet Virtues

A characteristic feature of the image propaganda of the Stalin era was the principle of reproduction.
In addition to the mass technical reproduction of photos and, more often, artistic works, it was
common practice in the area of art production to repeatedly copy works by hand or to have them
created in different versions by the same or a different artist. In this context, characteristics such
as novelty, originality and uniqueness were less important for the value of an image. What was
important was the representation of the typical: the individual work should simply be a concrete
visual representation of a given symbolic language, a material representation of theoretical
specifications that have been labeled as final and immovable. 2 Implicitly there is a priority of
language, of ideological

I am indebted to Lars Häfner (Zurich) for help in obtaining literature.

2 See ANDRAs ZWICKL: “Copyright”. The problem of original and copy in painting in the 1950s, in:
Staatskunstwerk. Culture under Stalinism, ed. by PETERGYÖRGY

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ian message, expressed before the visual. Stalinist iconography can therefore
be understood less as a closed system in its own right, but rather as an
appendage of the verbal extended into the realm of the visual?
A central principle was the imperative of mass: with regard to the edition of
individual images as well as the format of a work of art and the number of
image details depicted, the motto was that what was larger and more numerous
was automatically considered more desirable. 4 This quantitative-linear
thinking, which placed the sheer quantity or physical dimensions in direct
relation to the inherent value, may be one of the system-immanent reasons
why once a ruler's worship had been set in motion, it had to constantly surpass
itself in ever new records. Modest self-restraint would have contradicted the
logic of the masses preached by the regime, which literally forced them to
achieve top performance, and would even have carried the risk of being
misunderstood. In the Soviet symbolic language, the small number, the
isolation, was a characteristic of the "other", the opponent and loser, against whom
The beginnings of the Stalin cult can be dated to the early 1930s. This was
visually expressed not only in the mass reproduction of Stalin images that was
now beginning, but also in the way in which Stalin was portrayed. The
previously dominant motif of the joint depiction of Stalin and Lenin became
less frequent or more focused on Stalin in the first half of the 1930s.6 Stalin's
position was now sufficiently consolidated to give him his primary legitimacy.

and HEDVIG TURAI, Budapest 1992, pp. 63-70; ANDRAs BALINT Kov Acs: Information on the Ilconography
of the Hungarian Newsreels of the Fifties, ibid., pp. 97-104; SUSAN E. REID: Socialist Realism in the Stalinist
Terror: The Industry of Socialism Art Exhibition, 1935-41, in: Russian Review 60 (2001), pp. 153-184, here p.
157; ROSALINDE SARTORTI: “I saw Stalin as a child”. Stalin and his representations, in: Art and Propaganda
in the Conflict of Nations 1930-1945, ed. by HANS-JÖRG CZECH and NIKOLA DOLL, Dresden 2007, pp.
172-181, here p. 173.

3
GEORG KOPPITZ: Art criticism under Stalin, in: Agitation for happiness: Soviet art of the Stalin era, ed. by
HUBERTUS GASSNER et al., Bremen 1994, pp. 76-80, hiet1>. 77.
4
GALINA Y ANKOVSKA Y A: The Economic Dimensions of Art in the Stalinist Era: Artists' Co-
operatives in the Grip of Ideology and the Plan, in: Slavic Review 65/(2006), 4, S. 769-791, hier v.a. S. 787-790;
SARTORTI (wie Anm. 2),S. 175.
5
DANIEL WEISS: All vs. One: on the distinction between good guys and bad guys in Soviet propaganda
language, in: Slavic Linguistics 1999. Papers of the XXV. Konstanz Slavic Working Meeting Konstanz, ed. by
WALTER BREU, Munich 2000, p. 235-
275.
6
VICTORIA E. BONNELL: Iconography of Power. Soviet Stalin, Posters under Lenin and
Berkeley et al. 1997 (Studies on the History of Society and Culture, 27), pp. 157-161; For an early example of
an isolated representation of Stalin that is quite modest compared to later works, see for example A. Zigunov ,
Diagramy po dokladu t. Stalina na XV s "ezde VKP( b ) . in: ELENA BARCHATOVA, ALEKSANDR SKLJARUK:
Kontivizm v sovets-kom posters = Soviet Constructivist Posters, Moskva 2005, p. 90.

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Timation no longer has to be derived from its predecessor. In this early phase, Stalin was portrayed as a
leader close to the people, who marched in a marching column with coal workers. However, he asserted
his priority by being at the forefront due to his position, the different clothing and the lack of work
equipment. The composition of the image and the inscription, which vaguely called for joint efforts, place
Stalin and the people in a different

.
direct relationship that did not require an intermediary. In the spirit of common interests (the inscription
speaks of "our program"), Stalin's fraternization with the workers was implicitly suggested. However, this
was based on an asymmetrical relationship - in addition to the visual emphasis on Stalin, Stalin and the
workers are also contrasted in the text with the words "we're with you".7

However, the staged solidarity with the people contrasted sharply with the real contacts that the ruler
maintained with his people. Stalin increasingly holed himself up in the Kremlin or at his dacha outside
Moscow and had virtually no personal presence in public . Photos were therefore a very poor medium for
the cult of personality. The majority of visual propaganda consisted of products from the visual arts:
paintings, graphics, etc. photomontages; They had the advantage over the photo that an image message
could be created in a much more targeted manner by designing situations that had never actually
happened.8 Knowing about the real Stalin, many of the Stalin images appear to be conscious Deception,
but this did not detract from their effectiveness. Rather, it was precisely this idealized world that showed
a Stalin with whom everyone could identify - much better than a personal encounter with the physically
unimpressive Stalin would ever have been able to do.9 Image propaganda filled a blank space here, which
was created by the absence of Stalin's person, and at the same time staged a virtual figure that symbolically
stood for everything that was politically opportune. The Stalin who appeared in the pictures, as a bust and
statue and, especially after the Second World War, increasingly as a film hero
in feature films10 , had little to do with the real Stalin, but was a compilation of Soviet virtues
condensed into an allegory .

In view of pictures in which a gigantic, aloof Stalin was shown, frozen into a colossal monument, so to
speak, towering over all mortals, it may seem surprising that artistic representations were also shown at
the same time.

7
Gustav Klucis, Real'nost' nasej programmy - 6to zivye Ijudi, eto my s vami [The reality of our program
- these are living people, this is us with you], 1931, in: MAR- GARITA TUPITSYN: De-Totalizing the
Total : Cases of False Identities, in: Kunst und Propaganda (as note 2), pp. 156-163, here pp. 157,
159.
8
IGOR GOLOMSTOCK: Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the
People's Republic of China, London 1990, S. 187.
9
SARTORTI (see note 2), p. 172.
10
Stalin never appeared here himself, but always had actors portray him; see in detail NIKOLAS
HÜLBUSCH: In the dictator's hall of mirrors: Stalin as a film hero in the Soviet feature film (1937-1953),
Alfeld 2001.

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genes exist that show Stalin as a simple person, on an equal level with his contemporaries. This
also includes some images that were distributed in mass circulation, which can certainly be
considered representative of the cult. In the second half of the thirties. In particular, the People's
Commissar for Defense, Kliment Vorosilov, was given the privilege of being portrayed on an equal
footing with Stalin on several occasions. One of the most widespread paintings of this period shows
Stalin with Voro-silov walking in the Kremlin - Stalin in a neutral raincoat, his be-. gliders in
uniform. The background, a clearing cloudy sky after a rain, can be understood metaphorically:
After the purges, a calming of the situation was promised and it was shown that alongside all the
exposed "traitors" there were also loyal comrades-in-arms. This visual alternative to the show
trials made it clear that unwavering loyalty was rewarded with Stalin. Hardly anything in the picture
indicates Stalin's prominent position; there is no clear hierarchy between the two people depicted.ll

A viewer unfamiliar with the contemporary context would have difficulty guessing Stalin's real
position in this or comparable pictures12 (Fig. 1). However, Stalin's hierarchical primacy was
known to his contemporaries in what was then the Soviet Union, even without special emphasis.
When Stalin was depicted next to Vorosi-lov, but in contrast to him without a military rank
insignia13, this symbolically referred to Stalin's superior position, who was no longer subject to
a concrete hierarchy. The missing medals implied a leader who towered over all areas of society.
whose priority no longer needed to be specifically emphasized. He embodied the prototypical
Soviet citizen, regardless of rank and hierarchy, and was thus touted as a figure of identification
for the broad masses of the people. 14 Such depictions of Stalin were particularly common in the
early years of the Second World War.

15

11 Aleksandr Gerasimov, IV Stalin i KE Vorosilov v Kremle [Stalin and Vorosilov in the Kremlin'],
1938, in: SARTORTI (as note 2), p. 177; see also JAN Spatial Poetics of the Personality Cult.
Circles Around Stalin, in: The Landscape o(Stalinism. The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space,
edited by EVGENY DOBRENKO and ERICNAIMAN, Seattle et al. 2003, pp. 19-50, here pp.
28-33; HUBERTUS GAßNER, ECKHART GILLEN : From the utopian draft order to the ideology
of reconciliation in aesthetic appearance, in: Agitation for happiness: Soviet art of the Stalin
era, edited by HUBERTUS GASSNER et al., Bremen 1994, pp. 27-59, here p. 52.

12
For example, Gustav KIucis, Da zdravstvuet raboce-krest'janskaja krasnaja armija - vernyj
straZ sovetskich granic! [Long live the Red Workers' and Peasants' Army T the true guardian
of the Soviet borders!], 1935, in: Russkij plakat: izbrannoe = Classic Russian Posters, ed.
by ALEKSANDR EFIMOVIC SNOPKOV, Moskva 2006, picture 79.
13
Vasilij Nikolaevic Elkin, Da zdravstvuet krasnaja armija - vooruzennyj otIjad pro-letarskoj
revoljucii! [Long live the Red Army - the Armed Revolution Division!],
1932, in: Russkij poster (as note 12), picture 68.
14
Compare, for example, the painting by Vasili Efanov, created in 1947, which shows Stalin
with Mo-lotov and three children in a meadow on the edge of the forest and shows an idyllic fami

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Fig. 1: Gustav Klucis, Da zdravstvuet raboce-krest'janskaja krasnaja armija - vemyj straz sovetskich ,

granie! [Long live the Red Workers' and 'Bauem Army - the true guardian of the Soviet
borders!], 1935' .

pretending to be on a trip between two father friends. in: GLEB .PROKHOROV: Art Under Socialist Realism. Soviet
Painting 1930"1950, Roseville East 1995, p. 33.
15 Cf. SARTORTI (as note 2), pp. 173-174.

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Only towards the end of the war, when the German When defeat was clearly looming, a clearly cultishly
exaggerated Stalin appeared again, often growing to colossal proportions , who, for example , showed the
way to victory as a general . 16 The dominant image type of the post-war period presented a Stalin who was
isolated, but at least iconically distinct from the people around him, while popular representations of Stalin
were no longer appropriate. The hierarchical position is clearly expressed in a painting that shows Stalin in
the Kremlin immediately after the end of the war in May 1945 , walking down a staircase at the head of a
large crowd . From the front to the back , the breadth of the following increased , with well-known faces such
as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vjaceslav Molotov, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR, Mikhail Kalinin, among the people immediately behind Stalin. Starting from Stalin , a real pyramid
of power can be seen here, a motif that appeared in a less explicit form in a variety of ways in Stalinist art
(Fig. 2).17

It was a basic principle of the Stalinist system to identify small heroic figures in all areas of society,
which, however, were only conceivable as a function of the supreme leader. Heroes and role models
around whom specific cults were created, but always aimed at the Stalin cult, existed in all regions,
population groups and fields of activity: local party leaders, workers who exceeded the norm (Stakhanov
movement), soldiers -tic role models or everyday heroes who were particularly active in building socialism,
or the Stalin Prize winners among artists. 18 They all represented an example worthy of emulation, with
the help of which the regime could achieve its

16
See for example N. Nikolaev, Vpered, za razgrom nemeckich zachvat6ikov i izgnanie i iz pre-delov
nasej rodiny! [Forward, to crush the German aggressors and drive them out of the borders of our
homeland!], 1944, in: Plakaty voennoj Moskvy [Posters from Moscow in a State of War], ed. by NN
GLUSKO et al., Moskva 2001, picture 66; A. Babickij, Pod voditel'stvom tovarisca Stalina, vpered - na
okoncatel'nyj raz-grom vraga! [Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin - forward to the final destruction
of the enemy!], 1944, ibid, picture 69.
/.
17
Dmitrij Nalbandjan, V Kremle, 24 maja 1945 goda [In the Kremlin, May 24, 1945], 1947, in: Dream Factory
Communism. The visual culture of the Stalin era = Dream Factory Communism. The Visual Culture of
the Stalin Era, ed. by BORIS GROYS and MAX HOLLEIN, Ostfildern-Ruit 2003, p. 154; see MATTHEW
CULLERNE BOWN: Art under Stalin, 1924-
1956, Munich 1991, p. 220; see also V. Stenberg, Budem dostojnymi synami i docer'-
mi nasej velikoj partii Lenina-Stalina [We will be worthy sons and daughters of our great party of Lenin
and Stalin], 1935, in: Simvoly epochi v plakate [Epoch symbols in the Soviet poster], ed. by TG
KOLOSKOVA, Moskva 2001, p.158.

18
HANS GÜNTHER: The pagan myth in socialist realism = The Heroic Myth in Socialist Realism, in:
Traumfabrik Communismus (as note 17), pp. 106-124, here p. 110-"
112, 116-117; HEIKO LUCKEY: Personified ideology. On the construction, function and reception of
identification figures in National Socialism and Stalinism, Göttin-gen 2008 (International Relations.
Theory and History, 5), pp. 298-300,

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Abb.2: Dmitrij Nalbandjan, V Kremle, 24maja 1945 goda [Im Kreml, 24. Mai 1945],1947

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Illustrated the demands placed on the population and encouraged each individual to achieve top
performance. Accordingly, they were also present in the image propaganda, for example the seven.
Aviation heroes who rescued the crew of the sunken research ship Celjuskin stranded in pack ice in
March 1934 .
It was therefore not in contradiction to the Stalin cult to associate the merits of the construction
of the Moscow Metro, a first-class prestige project, with the name of Lazar' Kaganovic, who served as
Moscow's party leader and transport minister, among other things; who could be seen on propaganda
posters together with Stalin and after whom the metro was named wm;de.2o In this respect, Stalin was
not the only preeminent leader at the. peak, but the supreme hero among heroes, who combined all
heroic qualities in himself. His example and his guidance were the conditions under which the many
heroic figures of the Stalinist Soviet Union were able to achieve their highest achievements. The
personality cult integrated the population of the Soviet Union into a huge family, headed by Stalin .
Father woke?l The Stalin cult was not exclusively aimed at one individual, but rather connected the
entire society in a network-like hierarchical network.

Therefore, the images that depict Stalin in a detached and isolated manner are not in contrast to
images in which he appears to be shown with little emphasis and other people. The latter are rather a
concretization of the basic type; which served the purpose of clarity and realism.

In the post-war period, an image type finally began to dominate that showed the Soviet leader
removed from any concrete spatio-temporal references. Stalin no longer appeared as an active person,
but his mere static presence was now enough to present him as an outstanding leader.22 An oil
painting that shows Stalin standing on a slight hill in the morning sun in a field can be considered
paradigmatic for this type of representation. The viewer sees Sta-lin's gaze out of the picture into the
distance, his white uniform and part of his face illuminated by the sun. In the background, the
achievements of socialist construction can be seen dimly: agricultural machines, electricity pylons,
factory chimneys. The festive atmosphere exudes calm and dignity

19 See, for example, the photomontage in: MARK GROSSET, NrCOLA's WERTH: The Stalin Era.
Life in a totalitarian society, Stuttgart 2008, p. 106; see also other pictures with Stalin and
Soviet heroes in: Simvoly epochi (like note 17), pp. 135, 139, 140.
20
Victor Deni, Nikolaj Dolgorukov, Est' metro! [DieMetro ist da!], 1935, in: BARCHATOVA!
SKLJARUK (as note 6), p. 211; DIETMAR NEU'FATZ: The Moscow Metro. From the first plans
to the major construction site of Stalinism (1897-1935), Cologne and others S. 53l.
21
DAVID L.HOFFMANN: Stalinist Values. The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modemity, 1917-
1941, Ithaca 2003, S. 156-157.
22
BOWN (see note 17), pp. 213-214; see for example the cover photo of Ogonek No. 52/1949,
in: The image of the state leader: Josef Stalin, in: Propaganda
Art and . (as note 2), pp. 202-211, here
p. 211; Boris F. Beresovski, Mikhail D. Solov'ev, Ivan Michailovic Sagin, Pod vodi- tel'stvom
velikogo Stalina - vpered k kommunizmu! [Under the leadership of the great Stalin - forward
to communism!], 1951, ibid, p. 208.

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Stalin's attitude signals satisfaction with what has been achieved and confidence about the future. It
is the image of a leader who no longer needs to prove his abilities and advantages, but can instead
let the achievements of his work speak for themselves.23 Such an image is without the context of
what has been going on for around a decade and a half intense cult of personality unimaginable.
The meaning of such images is hardly revealed to an ignorant observer without knowledge of the
contextual symbolism. 24 The expansion of the cult reached its climax here, with all the
characteristics that had exaggerated Stalin as a ruler in earlier depictions being omitted in favor of
an all-encompassing depiction. Given his size, Stalin's vaunted features could simply no longer be
depicted in a picture without tantamount to profanation. So the attributes of magnificence had to be
externalized to the imagination of the viewer.

Hoxha: People's Connected Patriarch

Comparable images that forego the explicit depiction of the ruler's prominent position can also be
found by Enver Hoxha25, although here they are less characteristic than in the Stalin cult. Rather,
,

the propaganda painted the picture of a leader who was very close to the people. A paradigmatic
example of this is the illustrated book published in 1978 in honor of his 70th birthday, entitled "Gju
me gju me popullin" [literally "knee to knee with the people", meaning "in direct contact, in the
middle of the People"] was published. One picture illustrated this motto particularly clearly - a
version of it is also printed on the dust jacket of the volume, so it was considered particularly
suitable to support the intended message of the illustrated book (Fig. 3).26 The camera is close to
Hoxha for this picture captured in his hometown of Gjirokaster, sitting slightly elevated, cross-
legged, leaning against a tree. The laughing expression on his face as well as on the faces of the
people gathered around him demonstrates

23 Fedor S. Surpin, Utra nasej rodiny [The Morning of Our Homeland], 1946-1948, in:
The image of the state leader (see note 22), p. 203.
24
See BORlS GROYS: Stalin's total work of art. The divided culture in the Soviet Union,
Munich et al. 1988, p. 63.
25
Spiro Kristo, Ndoc Kodhel, Agriculture in the Socialist People's Republic of Albania, Tirana
1982, '[So 3]; Page numbers in square brackets refer to volumes without page numbers;
Due to separated pages in the templates (removal of purified party cadres) and a different
starting point for the page count, only approximate page numbers are possible.

26
Gju me gju me popullin [In the midst of the people], Tirane 1978, [So 206]; The importance
of the image is shown by the fact that it is depicted in various other contexts, for example
in the illustrated book for the 75th birthday: Me popullin, mes shokeve [With the people, in
the midst of the people. nossen], Tirane 1983, [So 159], or Gjirokastra - museum-city, ed.
by EMINRIZA, Tira-na 1978, [Su 19].

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There is a visibly relaxed, even cheerful atmosphere. What was presented here was not an aloof
guide, but a sociable older gentleman who jokes and seems to have an almost friendly bond with the
villagers. The population gathered in a semicircle around Hoxha alone gives one an idea that an
important personality was obviously present here: in no way. Vv'1lrde, however, the authoritarian,
even dictatorial position that Hoxha occupied in Albania is visible in the composition of the picture.

Fig.3: Enver Hoxha visiting Mashkullora, March 1978

A comparable one, but still clear. A more accentuated statement conveys a picture of Hoxha's
1970 visit to the northern Albanian mountains around Tropoja, in which he - here sitting cross-legged,
literally "knee to knee" with his conversation partner - is talking to an older man, apparently a local
authority figure (Fig. 4).27 Since Hoxha rests his elbow casually on his counterpart's knee, the
situation makes a confidential and familiar impression. Literally at eye level, two people who are
basically equal in the hierarchy due to the composition of the picture are talking here. Only the
clothing (suit, tie) determines it

27
Gju me gju (as note 26), [So 151]; cf. a similar picture in Me popullin (like note 26), [So 106].

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Albanian party leader belongs to an urban, modern sphere, while his counterpart wears a plisi, the
traditional white felt cap, and thus evokes associations with a rural, archaic milieu.

Fig. 4: Enver Hoxha visiting Trop()ja, May 1970

How much this type of images corresponded to the regime's self-image and was part of the cult
of personality is shown by the fact that the motifs of solidarity with the people described here found
their way into the visual arts. A painting created in 1976 by Zef Shoshi, one of the most important
painters in the service of the Hoxha cult, - again entitled "Gju me gju me popullin" - shows a
mountain landscape in which people of all ages form a semicircle around the tree in the Enver Ho-
xha, sitting in the middle, was grouped?8 He lightly touched the thigh of the person sitting next to him
with the sleeve of his suit, also an older man with a pleated skirt. Just as in the photograph of
Tropoja, both Hoxha and the village elder are each holding a cigarette in their hand in the place of
honor next to him. Unlike in the photograph, however, the two cigarettes are aligned with each
other; they literally appear to be communicating with each other. This subtle means was used to
indicate that the ruler of Albania is seeking close contact with the population. Under

28 Albanian figurative arts. Painting [Albanische bildende Kunst. Malerei], Tirana 1978, Bild
175.

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Those present also include members of various social groups. They are both traditionally dressed.
Women and men can be
found as well as different age groups from children to old people.-
like various professional groups, from farmers and workers to soldiers to intellectuals. In short, the
whole of Albania is gathered in allegorical form in the painting - the national flag in the background clearly
underlines this. All eyes are on Hoxha, whose statements are followed with the utmost attention. The
semicircular shape towards the viewer is cut off at the edge of the picture. If you imagine this semicircle
extrapolated beyond the picture frame to form a closed circle, . the viewer is drawn into this circle.
integrated. 29 The composition of the image aims to include the image in the depicted function, to take
part in the meeting with the close connection between Hoxha and the population . Motive that became
central , especially in the late phase of his forty years of rule . Element of the personality cult
was, in earlier phases. There are strong borrowings from the Soviet Union model. Hoxha was
like that at the beginning of the 1950s. Portrait in the family room. from operative present As it were,
in the circle of the bust next to other photos - presumably families..bilq(;"!rn .-on which the. new
achievements of the socialistpOrdUI.mgs;YJ:l1bolisiette(Fig.

5)?0 The construction of the socialist order took on a central role in image propaganda during this
phase ; the cult of personality was still subordinated to this iconography of progress, at least it had. the
construction symbolism has not yet been pushed into the background. .
A typical picture is a decorated train des. festliph}.
with a locomotive on it. the images of emblazoned?1 The political leaders or
their image are not themselves, the purpose here. To build socialism, the image says, the leadership of
an outstanding personality is necessary who shows the path to be taken. The borrowings from the
Stalin cult, particularly of the 1930s, are clearly recognizable here, where the Soviet General Secretary
was repeatedly depicted as the helmsman of a ship or as a locomotive driver.

32 Which depends entirely on the leading personality alone

29
For a similar image structure, see 40 vjetshqiperi socialiste = 40 years of socialist AI-bania, Tirane 1984,
[So 128]. 10 vjetori i partise punes
30
shqiperise = Ten years of the Albania Party of Labor, Prague 1951, [So 77]; For a comparable image
structure, see also: Albania between the cross and the crescent, ed. by WERNER DAUM, Munich 1998, p.
252. 31 10 vjetori (as note 30), [So 69].
.

32
For example in the following drawings: B. Efimov, Kapitan Stalinysovetov vedet nas ot po- · bedy k pobede!
[Captain Stalin's advice leads us from victory to victory!], 1933, in: . Sest'sot plakatov [Six Hundred Posters],
ed. by ALEKSANDR SNOPCovu.a., Moskva 2004, Fig. 92, p. 34; D. Bulanov, Socialisticeskim otnoseniem k
parovozu i udarnices"t- from ... [With socialist attitude to locomotive and shock work ... ], 1931 , ibid., Fig.
406, p. 130; P. Sokolov-Skalja, Poezd idet ot s1. Socializm da s1. Communizm (The

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Directed iconography was only able to establish itself in the 1960s, after Hoxha had
consolidated his position of power and switched it off. 33 most important opponents
.

It is a characteristic feature of socialist personality cults that they almost always

lagged behind the respective rulers' development of power or, unlike most right-wing
authoritarian or fascist rulers of the interwar period, only after the definitive
consolidation -
use of power properly.

Fig.5: Portrait of Hoxha in the room of an agricultural cooperative, 1950s

Similar to other socialist personality cults, the Albanian case was also largely
characterized by the power struggle in the country's political leadership.
As instruments of power, the protagonists in Albania used the power centers, the Party of
Labor, which was chaired by Hoxha, and the "Democratic Front", which emerged from
the front organization of the Second World War and which exercised control over the
state organs?4 Hoxha With reference to the ideologically based leading role of the
party, opposed a dualism in which the party provided the theoretical directives and
the practical ones

Train travels from the Socialism station to the Communism station], 1939, ibid, Fig_ 407, p. 131.

33
BERND J. FISCHER: Enver Hoxha and the Stalinist Dictatorship in Albania, in: Balkan Strongmen.
Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe; hrsg. von DEMS., West Lafayette 2007, S.
239-268, hier S. 255 ; OWEN PEARSON: Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy. From Isolation to the
Kosovo War, 1946-1998, London u.a. 2006, S.505-
506.
34
BERND J. FISCHER: Albania at War, 1939-1945, West Lafayette 1999, S; 131,253.

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However, leadership on site was left to the front. During the cultural revolution in the second half of
the 1960s, the struggle revolved particularly around control over the mass organizations (trade unions,
youth organizations, women's associations, etc.), the link between the population and the regime. For Ho- _
_ _ _ _ fell.

. .. . .' 36

Against this background , the images of the popular Hoxha are understood as part of the strategy
to assert the party's or its general secretary's claim to supremacy, especially at the concrete administrative
level.
In historical flashbacks, Hoxha's role was particularly highlighted during the Second World War. A
well-known and repeatedly reproduced painting shows how the partisans broke through an enemy
encirclement. In a snowy high mountain landscape, Enver Hoxhaander marched at the head of a column
of partisans. The composition of the picture clearly identifies him as a chatismatic leader who defied
adversity powerfully and fearlessly and attracted the wondering and also hopeful looks of his
exhausted troops (Fig. 6)}7 when he was in Albania. However, the power is never in. the same one
person as in the Stalinist Soviet Union or Romania. The political leadership was largely made up of
representatives of a few families.3 Hoxha was less an Extent one
. Alleiorship
.

autocrat than the head of a traditional patriarchal association that exercised power
collectively.

However, it was always important to assert the dominance of one's own clan over rival groups, which
repeatedly resulted in waves of purges.39 The personality cult was not directed to the same extent as
in the case of Stalin and to a single person, but rather had The aim is to ensure the primacy of the
loyalist group led by Hoxha in the Albanian political system . It

BERNHARD TÖNNES: Special case of Albania. Enver Hoxha's "own path" and the historical origins
of his ideology, Munich 1980 (Investigations into Contemporary Studies in Southeastern Europe,
16), pp. 468-476.
36 NICHOLAS C. PANO: Albania in the Era of Kosygin and Brezhnev, in: Nationalism in the USSR &
Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev & Kosygin. Papers and Proceedings of the Symposium held
at University of Detroit on October3-4, 1975, hrsg. von GEORGE W.
SIMMONDS, Detroit 1977, pp. 474-494, here pp. 487-489.
37
Fatmir Haxhiu, <;ajme Rrethime [Wir durchbrechen die Belagerung], 1978, in: ENVER HOXHA:
Laying the Foundations of the New Albania, Tirana 1984, [Bildtafe18].
38 MICHAEL SCHMIDT-NEKE: Political System, in: Albania, ed. by KLAUS-DETLEV GROTHUSEN,
Göttingen 1993 (Southeastern Europe Handbook, 7), pp. 169-242, here pp. 208-210.
39 NICHOLAS P ANO: The Process of Democratization in Albania, in: Politics, Power, and the Struggle
for Democracy in South-East Europe, hrsg. von KAREN DAWISHA und BRUCE PARROTT, Cambridge
1997, S. 285-352, hier S. 292-296; JOHN KOLSTI: Albanianism: From the Humanists to Hoxha, in:
The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe, hrsg. von GEORGE KLEIN und MILAN J. REBAN, Boulder
u.a. 1981, S. 15-48, hier S. 30-36.

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therefore did not correspond to the logic of the Hoxha regime to present a singular leader who
was elevated far above the party committees. Corresponding advances were stopped.4o
Rather, the principle applied was that the party, the people and Enver Hoxha
be an unshakable unity.41

Fig.6: Fatmir Haxhiu, <;ajme Rrethime [We break the siege], 1978 depiction of
partisan combat during the Second World War (Hoxha above, slightly to
the right of the center of the picture)

The image of the popular ruler who entered into direct conversation with the people and thus
made clear on behalf of the party the claim to actually exercise real control on site as the primary
contact person and not to be content with a more abstract priority position fit well with this.
Since the party of

40 MICHAEL SCHMIDT-NEKE: "The Red Pashas": Ismail Kadare's role in the Hoxha system, in: Südosteuropa 51
(2002), 1-3, pp. 93-113, here pp. 95-96, 113; see also STANISLAV SRETENOVIC, ARTAN PUTO: Leader Cults
in the Western Balkans (1945-90): Josip Broz Tito and Enver Hoxha, in: The Leader Cult in Communist
Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, ed. by BALAzs ApOR et al., Basingstoke 2004, pp. 208-223, here
p. 218.
41 THOMAS KACZA: Between feudalism and Stalinism. Albanian history of the 19th century
and 20th century, Berlin 2007, p. 196.

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Although Albania's work was designed as a cadre organization according to the
Leninist model, only a small percentage of the population was involved in it. The
cult of personality was a means of binding the broad mass of the population to
the regime, including the highly nationalistically charged reference to it Albanian
history and the veneration of the national hero Skanderbeg counted;

outstanding autocrat

In comparison to the other two personality cults considered here, the cult's image prcipanda differed
primarily in... that the leader was presented here much more consistently as a single person, set apart
from his contemporaries. The image program suggests that there were no longer any prominent
representatives of the system apart from his wife, Beim, around whom a comparable cult had developed
since the late 1970s at the latest. At best, anonymous people appeared in the pictures, but they were
clearly assigned to a different sphere. were. This singularity was intentional. 'In November 1974, the party
press published a picture showing him alone on a speaker's platform. The high-ranking representatives
of the regime who had been present on site were quickly retouched.43 Retouching and image manipulation
were also part of the cults surrounding Stalin and Hüxha;44 but here they were mostly limited to those
who had traveled in the meantime. In Romania, people who were in office and dignity disappeared at the
time of publication . Here political. Opponents The sole representation is rather from the “official
apparatus” of the regime. out. The. 'Physical presence of high-ranking representatives of the party and
the state. would also have symbolically staged the official
recognition of his position by these institutions. The retouching visibly
emancipated itself from the organs that held the highest offices in the so it's not drllVtll,
party, at least formally, with the authority to dispose of the state apparatus.
Their function was to be pushed out of public consciousness, which included making them invisible.

An extremely common and very characteristic motif in the party press and
propaganda publications shows a speaker pushed to the far edge of the picture
in an elevated position, for example on a balcony, in front of those gathered below

42 PETER R. PRIFTI: Socialist Albania Since 1944. Domestic and Foreign Developments,
Cam-bridge u.a. 1978, S. 31-32.
43
Hermannstädter Zeitung, No. 1693 of September 8, 2000, p.l.
44
DA VID KING: Stalin's retouches. Photo and art manipulation in the Soviet Union, Hamburg
1997, pp. 66-71; ALAIN JAUBERT: Le commissariat aux archives, Paris 1986, p. 151-
156; PJETER MARUBI, ISMAIL KADARE, JUSUF VRIONi: Albania: visage des Balkans. Ecrits
de lumiere, Paris 1995, S. 110-111.

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Mass of listeners, which fills the majority of the picture (Fig. 7).45 This almost theatrical arrangement
based on the stage-audience principle, which is strongly reminiscent of corresponding propaganda
pictures by Mussülini, created a clear division of the picture. Taken in an unusual side perspective
and using an extreme horizontal format (aspect ratio of up to 1:4), the meaning of the
picture was to show the picture unfolding under the balcony. Scenery with densely packed,
anonymous crowds. Picture. to jerk. only took up a fraction of the picture area and was pushed
completely to the edge, like this. Because of his personality, he was the
focus of the Ikunian production. The organized masses of people fulfilled the function of a legitimizing
authority as a replacement for institutional committees. The advantage over formal legitimation by
a committee was that the members of a human waste society were not capable of coordinated
actions. From a sociological point of view, the masses are not an actor who can provide independent
help. It probably owes its fleeting existence to the efforts of the regime; to bring together a large
number of individuals. Therefore, this also controlled the interpretability of such a mass. The ritual
participation of individuals in homage could be cited as evidence of recognition of the position of
power ." W, msze{'ot always compares

Fig. 7: Nicholas at a speech from the balcony of the Central Committee building in Bucharest, June
1973

again implicitly, if never explicitly, disputed the competence of the bodies legally entitled to award
the highest state and party offices. Before the upcoming elections, organized masses, such as
company collections or grassroots organizations (trade unions, women's or youth associations),
promoted the election or unanimously proposed it for election.

The electoral bodies were thus put under pressure not to go against the often stated

45
Cf. DANIEL URSPRUNG: Legitimation of power between tradition and innovation, re-presentation and
staging of power in Romanian history in the pre-modern era and in Heidelberg et al. 2007, p. 348, picture 24;
p. 349, picture 26 and
Picture 27; P. 350, Image 29.
46 Ibid., p. 209.

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Berten's desire of the "popular masses" to decide what could be considered treason
.

..
In the image propaganda of Ritual stagings of the will of the people
therefore occupy a prominent place. Images of mass events at which organized masses carried
images had been part of everyday political life since the mid-1970s at the latest. This form, which was
no longer significantly modified until 1989, represented a direct visual connection between the leader
and the people, bypassing intermediate ones Organs of the state and the party. Here we can see
analogies to the image propaganda of Stalin and Hoxha, who also tried to put the ruler and the
population in a direct dialogue. But when Hoxha showed a dialogue on equal terms, there was one
Monologue delivered on two levels in the center. The masses, who paid homage to their leader, and
the leader, who demonstrated his mobilization potential, were sharply contrasted from one another.
Unlike Hoxha, the singular leadership figure was also clearly highlighted visually. But in
contrast to In the leader images of late Stalinism, which were almost transported into a transcendental
sphere, the adoring masses, which made the aspect of "rule" visible, always remained a central motif
of the visual. Above all, no images were conceivable here that were in the presence of clearly
identifiable personalities of the power apparatus - neither in intimate togetherness, such as Stalin's
walk with Vorosilov in the Kremlin, nor in a hierarchical form, as in the case of Nalbandyan's power
pyramid with Stalin at the top. Unlike the Stalin cult, there was no actual hierarchy, but only the
dichotomous translation of In the first years after coming to power in 1965

and everyone else.

In the press,
other people from the state and party leadership were often pictured and their pictures were
distributed to the marching citizens on official occasions.47 It was only towards the end of the 1960s
that the regime began to dominate: representatives of the regime became increasingly rare Page
shown.
His environment now increasingly consisted of unnamed people whose role was that of extras.48
However, they were usually highlighted prominently. For example, in a picture that shows him with
pioneers (members of the communist youth organization), he is standing in a dark suit surrounded
by dozens of young people in bright uniforms. The color contrast, the static posture and the
impassive gaze into the distance leave him among the young people

47 Fototeca onIine a comunismului romanesc [Online Photo Library of Romanian Communism] <http://
fototeca.iiccr.ro>, image G520 (cota 183/1968) and image G330 (cota 508/1967). pe insula culorilor.
48 V gl. AORIAN CIOROIANU: Constructia unicitätii in plastica on the Island of Colors. The
Romanian "omagialä" in der construction of the unit
rumänischen Huldigungsplastik], in: Insula. About isolating limits in imaginary space1, hrsg. von LUCIAN
BOlA ua, 1999, S. 280-311, hier S. 285-286.

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appear as a foreign body, momentarily removed from another sphere for the photo shoot.49 A
common motif in the images . .

were the dreaded work visits in

operation. A picture from the "Progresul" company in Btäila, for example, shows a man rushing
purposefully through the factory hall, who does not seem to notice the workers standing on the
machines and clapping along his path. Here too, a clear distance can be felt between the party leader and
the workers . Even in photographs with greeting scenes, he is usually depicted at some distance
from those he is greeting and waving to. Practically, however, there is always a certain amount of
free space around him, an invisible wall, while his body stands tightly packed together (Fig. 8).51
The pictures indicated that there was no direct .

. ,

Fig. 8: Nicholas on a working visit to Cönstanta, July 8, 1981

Conversation was possible, but rather it was a serial greeting act in which not one individual, but a
number of representatives of a certain professional or social group received greetings on behalf of
each other. The motif of solidarity with the people was significantly less central in the Romanian
cult of personality than in the other two cases compared here. Exalting the leader and marking the
distance between him and the people were common elements of propaganda. The cult lacked this
from the early phase in the late 1960s.

49

ADAM BURAKOWSKI: The genius of the Carpathians. 1965-1989 [This.

Dictatorship of Nicolae not der Karpaten. Ge-1965-1989], Warszawa, 2008 [Image 2].
Die Diktatur Nicolae 50 Scinteia, Nr. 8433 vom 23. Mai 1970,S. 3.
51 BURAKOWSKI (as note 49), [images 5, 7 to 9].

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Aside from the fact that it was at times very popular as a supposed challenger to Soviet hegemony
over Romania, it was a positive offer for integration. The constant appeals for national unity remained
diffuse and could not hide the growing gap between the people and the leader since the early 1970s.
Unlike in the USSR or Albania, the cult in Romania was therefore more exclusionary than integrating.

The only tangible people who could regularly be pictured in direct contact were foreign dignitaries.
In addition to the anonymous ethnic groups, they represented a second fictitious legitimizing
authority that the regime repeatedly invoked to legitimize its rule. He was portrayed by propaganda
as an internationally highly valued statesman who was in and out of the world's powerful.
His frequent visits abroad as well as his encounters with high-ranking foreign visitors to
Romania were therefore documented in detail in the picture. A Ptopaganda volume from 1988
reproduced a whole series of photos showing important personalities greeting people. Significantly,
many of these people were not mentioned by name in the caption, but only by their job title , while and
his wife were each mentioned by name. Even American presidents, the Pope, a UN Secretary
General and the President of the Soviet Council of Ministers remained anonymous. 52 The picture
did not serve the documentary purpose of recording meetings with specific people, but was intended
to show the worldwide appreciation that he enjoyed. The names of his conversation partners were
interchangeable; the sole purpose was to visually underpin the propaganda thesis.

In comparison, artistic representations are striking. to Stalinism, the insignia of power were very
often present, and an iconography aimed entirely at exalting what was depicted determined the
composition of the picture.
Sometimes he was portrayed with a sash in the national colors and a scepter (Fig. 9), sometimes he
was shown with a sash in a quasi-divine light shining directly on him from heaven. 54 It was a far cry
from the simple, but therefore no less effective, staging of some of Stalin's pictures. The principle of
explicitness applied to him; the ruler had to be unambiguously marked as such.

52 The Nicolae Ceau§escu era, the brilliant affirmation of Romania in the world's consciousness
[Die Epoche Nicolae Ceau§escus, glänzene Behauptung Rumäniens im Bewusstsein der
Welt], Bucu-re§ti 1988.
53 Compare the extensive collection of Ceau§escu paintings in the illustrated book CEAU,
ed. by CHRISTOPH BÜCHEL and GIOVANNI CARMINE, Göttingen 2008.
54
Omagiu pre§edintelui Nicolale Ceau§escu [Homage to President Nicolae Ceau§es-cu],
Bucure§ti 1978, pp. 491, 509.

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Fig.9: Oil painting by Dorin Rotaru [without Nan;eni, with and scepter

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Image propaganda of three personality cults in comparison

A comparison of the three personality cults reveals image propaganda with specific focuses. The moment
of social integration was not as important as in the case of the cults around Stalin and Hoxha. Central
motifs of .the
Romanian ruler iconography was about demarcation and exaltation of the ruler. Although it cannot be
said that the Stalin cult was practiced less intensively, the portrayal of the ruler was less crude, the
stylistic devices were more subtle, especially in the later phase, and the motifs were more cleverly
adapted to the changing context. Stalinist image propaganda had a qualitative dynamic that was not
achieved in Romania. From the mid-1970s onwards, it essentially only changed quantitatively. Above all, it
was based primarily on real depictions of the leader. Even if the visual arts are a . Although it produced a
large number of works for the cult, it was subordinate to the dominant media, photography and, above
all, television. It was therefore more difficult to create an idealized image of the ruler that was removed
from the sphere of human errors and errors.

always remained in a consistent

specific spatio-temporal context, especially since, unlike Stalin, he controlled the public
looking for easiness.

Unlike Stalin, he did not present himself as a helmsman who was removed from daily politics, who
only set the general direction but allowed others to be blamed for unpopular decisions.55 It was Stalin's
real invisibility that was largely responsible for the fact that, at least in parts of the world The population
of the Stalin myth survived even the worst catastrophes unscathed. In Romania, Ceau$escu's excessive
visual presence had the opposite effect: Ceau$escu was held personally responsible for all the system's
failings. Stalinism had always brought to mind enemies, saboteurs and traitors, at least in caricatures,
and thus provided a negative foil for the cult of personality onto which dissatisfaction could be projected.
In Romania, on the other hand, the propaganda was so focused that he personally, and not the enemies
propagated by the regime, was identified as the primary responsible for all the grievances. In addition to
the officially operated cult, there was a subversive but no less widespread counter-cult, which manifested
itself primarily in the culture of jokes.

Unlike Stalinism, he missed it also to make a positive

integration offer to broad sections of the population. If Stalin was celebrated as the supreme hero and
role model of all Soviet citizens, heroes from all walks of life could also be mentioned in the same breath.
For every Soviet citizen, the hero cult offered the opportunity to acquire social prestige in the shadow of
Stalin. While the Stalin cult was based on widespread needs among the population and also integrated popular
and entertaining elements (think of the cities that flourished especially after the Second World War).

55 ORIGIN (see note 45), p. 317.

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I

lin feature films), which reproduced a limited inventory of the same, stereotypical motifs, so that it
became increasingly difficult to find talented cult producers. 56 The cult here was much more focused
on the sole needs of the leader than in the Sqwjetuniop. Because of the insufficient inculcation in the
population, the cult became boring and monotonous over time .

'

.
,

The extensive reduction of the cult and his wife Elena contributed to this - there was no room for
contemporary heroes like in the Stalin cult. Only important personalities from national history had their
place at the side of the party leader, but even here only those from the more distant past.57 By
"nopolizing" the image, the medium "displaces" all others from the sphere of power. In the Stalinist
Soviet Union, the personality cult was the only consistently applicable strategy for marginalizing intra-
party rivals in Romania in the 1970s and 1980s. Stalin got rid of both real and perceived opponents in bloody
purges and terrorist waves and could therefore afford to publicly show his favor to comrades-in-arms
who had shown their loyalty.

The possibility of eliminating political

opponents was, however, very limited. ,Not. zuletit; !l,llS Considering the diverse political and economic
differences of the USSR and the Western powers, he could hardly have
afforded waves of terror or purges without seriously endangering his position . The visual isolation of
the Romanian leader arose from the fear of helping people gain publicity and popularity, from which the
claim to autocracy could have been challenged. Since the physical liquidation was not a solution, the
symbolic marginalization was all the more radical and did not stop at loyal Ari supporters.

Like Stalin, Hoxha also complained about Albania's ever-increasing isolation since the 1960s. less
consideration should be given to other factors . He was therefore also able to carry out the power
apparatus on repeated occasions. The Hoxha cult occupies a position in comparison with the two cults
around Stalin, which are contrasted here in a pointed form. Of the three leaders, he was the one who was
most likely to draw on authentic charisma. His role in the Second World
War has been massively overrated by propaganda, but the rise of the communists to rule in Albania was
much more linked than in the case of Stalin. However, JeHoxha, like Stalin and his position against intra-
party rivals, must be considered. In all three cases, the power struggle was an essential moment in the
emergence of the personality cult: it was a means of mobilizing followers
and made it possible

56
ADRIAN CIOROLANU: What which haunts the Romanians. The myth, the
representations and the cult of the leader in communist Romania, Bucharest 22005, S. 147.
57 LUCIAN BOLA: History and Myth. About the present of the past of those crazy Romanians
nische Gesellschaft, Cologne et al. 2003 (Studia Transylvanica, 30), p. 256.

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regular loyalty tests with symbolic submission. In Albania, iconography tailored to the leader alone
cannot be observed to the same extent as in Romania, but there was also no network of heroes that
spanned the entire society, as was the case under Stalinism. In Albania, which is comparatively small
and has only recently become politically independent, the traditional clan structures had a much more
central importance for everyday political life than in the USSR or Romania. The personality cult here
borrowed a significant amount from patriarchal social relationships. They expressed themselves in
Hoxha's direct relationship with representatives of all population groups, modeled on a traditional
extended family. It was also possible to draw on the Stalin cult, which also drew on the image of the
caring father. In contrast to Stalin and, depictions of a towering, quasi-superhuman Hoxha were not a
central motif of the Hoxha cult.

The visual aspects of the three personality cults, which are only sketched very schematically here,
give a rough impression of how the cults differed in key content statements. The question of which
factors these variations are related to - what role, for example, the different political contexts or the
different needs of those involved - is left to future research.
-,

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