_- Approved For Release t990108@e bi e RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 A Vorking Paper prepared in 2954-1955 ‘SECRET Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24 - CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 T 1 II, The Role of the Peasantey 3 TIT, Chinese Agrarian Tactics 7 TY, Communist Agrarian Tactics in India 16 Y. Short Surveys of Other Countries 29 A. Indo-China 2 By Indonesia . a C. Tram ™ dD. Japan .. 38 EB. Italy . a SHE Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/2¢ RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 COMMTNTST AGRARIAN TACTICS 1. Introtuction International Cowmuniam ts today pressing hard in order to spread and consilidate ite influence vithin the so-called “backward” areas of the vorl4, ‘Sowunist successes to date attest to the Com nunist use of tactien ami techniques designed to take full advantage of conditions existing within these erees and to organise and control "usss pover" sufficient to propel Comunist leadership to the front. The Pree Vorld's success in keeping such areas ‘ron falling eventually unter complete Communist doxination depends upon its full unerstanding of the tactics ant techniques emploved by the Cowvuniste, as vel] as upon its vigorous presentation of countarattnactions to take the place of the penacsas ani leadership offered by the Comvuntats. For in these areas, just az in other countries of the free verld, Comnmists are Seeking popular support ani nover not through pushine Cowunistic platforne but by espousing non—“ornmist ideas, They are promising to abolish those things vhich are irritating a nation and are appealing to those sentiments vithin 2 country which offer the createst onportunity for a “united front” movenent susceptible of Cowunist control ond manipulation, Throuphout these underdeveloped areas of the worl4 vhere the Commmists are nov a0 setive, there are several cowen factors vhich are present in almost a!1 comtries, "here is « revulsion against poverty ani hunger ns a norxal wode of existence. ‘There is alse a reaction arainst colonial derendency or foreign doxination of any kind, Tn sone countries one factor 1s stronger then the other. ‘ational sovenenta enrentered ty these factors, hovever, can seldes be started without leadership, Tn sows areas this has cove from within, such an by Candhi in Tria. Pot vhere native leadership bas been lacking, the “ov-untats have furnished native leaders trained in “oseow. And vhen nationalistic novenents have been started without Coummist par tletpation, the “owmuniate haw attenpted to ‘ake over these covenants ty one vethod or another. Vor-Townmist leaters, confronted vith the explosive problens of a critical transitory period in their country, have been harassed by the necessity of keeping Communism fron diverting nationalistic aspirations. Into this battle, international Cox-unies has trought proven organising techniques, trained eatres, a vorl¢wvide propaganda vachine, naterial aid, and, above all, a deternined procran looking tower? a Aefinite roel. Tn countries whose econcry and culture are predominantly agrarien, the Communists, In order to rain pover, have turned fron traditional Approved For Release 1999/08/2¢ 1A-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release {999/084 RGRUEROP78-00915R000700120002-8 eaphasis on the "urban proletariat" tovard increased organisational vork axong the peasantry. This has been particularly apparent vithin ‘tha coloniel ani sent-colonial areas vhich cenerally lack an active or strong urban proletariat. This politically tetated shift of enphasis to the agrarian peasant was initially followed ty the Chinese Communists under Yao Tae-tung, and its successful application in China forecast any of Cowvuniom's present agrarian tactics in the Free World. China served as the testing crouni for Asiatic Comunten and the agrarian tactics and techniques evolved there epread to surrounding countries and later to other countries vhere Coummist leaders perceived that exploitation of reasant erievances could furnish "nase never." That this "any have constitute’ a departure frou Cornmisn's theoretical concepts concerning the role of the urban proletariat vas cvershadoved by the Communists’ annreefation of political realities. Cormumist efforts to exploit peasant iiscontents are particularly arparent in the "ar ani ‘idile fast. Sut siniler Coomuniat tactics are also beine followed 1n tery [atin Anertcan countries and are being used to increase agrarian agitation in Vestern Turope as vall. In atiition te the losal attention being given to orvanisational vork among the veasantry in nary countries, a neasure of the international impertanes viieh Communism now attaches to agrarian tactics was deaon— Rtrated by the Third Congress of the Commumist—comtrolled Vorld Federation of "rate Unions (WPTU) held in Cotoher, 1953, This Congress clearly emphasised the Covnunist desire for increased attention to the under jeveloned countries of the vorl4 ani pointed up the important role vhich agrarian organtzations can play in support of international Conmunign's push for pover. The Vorld Conference of Agricultural ani forestry Yorkers, held shortly after the WFTU Congress, followed the general policies lai4 tom by the ¥FTU, confirmed the exphasis on the "backward" areas, and specifically sparked fresh Communist activities looking to the organization of peasant novenents ani actions ani the penetration of existine arrarian ormantsations. eee Approved For Release 1999/08/2¢ '1A-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release a ee ee ee TT, The Role of the Pansantry Communist successes axong the peasantry in the underdeveloped areas do not ston froa an aceeptance or an unterstanding of Cowmmist {deology by these peasant masses, Cowsunist successes stem largely fron the effective anplication of operational techniques vile trus Comune 1declopy 1s disguised. Wevertheless, Coummisn ae an ideology fs the creed of the saall militant and rewer-humgry groups who direct the mass operations. Tor this reason, it 1s pertinent to unteratant something of the doctrines concerning the peasantry vhick are held by those who Lreet Commumism' ttack. Although Cownmism theoretically operates as a result of doctrines which are held to be based on an infallible historic science, new rationslisations are devised to fit new experiences. Behind a facade of unerring consistency and unfailing foresisht, Communism adjusts itself to politioal realities, Such flexibility is 4emonstrated in Covmnisd's present exphasis on the role of the reasantry. An understanding of this role vill aesiat in an umerstanding of the actual arrerian ‘actics utilised by the Commnists. A. PrecMag In its early fern, Yarxion 414 not regard the peasantry as an independent creative ferce in huven history, The early Marxist movenent believed that the central drama of Coumnisa vould be enacted in capitelisn's original hove and not in the backward areas. Before lenin, there vas not even a hint that » small proletariat, vell organised ani led by professional revolutionaries, could initiate the varld revolution in a "backvard area". f1though the peasantry vas considered to be a victim of feudal society, it vas not considered to te the real agent for the overthrow of fevialiss. This role belonged to the urben bourzeoisie, In the transition fron a capitalist sosiety to a soctalist scelety, the creative role was expected to fall to the urban orcletariat. ‘ith Ientn, the role of the pessantry tecane sonevhat nore problenatic, After peasant uprisings in Russia in 1905, Lenin became intent on harnessing the peasant force to the revolutienary varon. This resulted in his theary of the "democratic Sietatorshin of prole- tariat and peasantry”, according to vhich the peasantry vas capable of certain linited creativity in Presta, Fut lenin never for a moment neant to imply that the peasantry voul‘ rlay a central role in the revolntion, ‘e veant thet only by allying itself vith the proletariat could the peasantry hope to realise the acrarian revolution. ‘Lenin vas also appreciative of the dynanic potentialities of the backvard areas ani at an early date hed preceived that the nascent nationalisn vithin these areas oonld iteelf be utilised as e force in realizing the vorl4 revolotion, Thia rerception resulted in the Leninist theory of inverialisn vhereby alnoat the entire onus for the wretchedness of the vackvar’ areas vas laid at the oor of international finance capital. 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/2¢ A-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08,¢£ PRER-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 Yet lenin sharply distinguished between Russia, vhere capitalism had male sone rroads ant vhere 2 small but vigorous proletariat existed, and the colonial ant sexi-colontal areas vhich vere vietina of inperi- alien ani vere a modern intustrial proletariat hardly existed, if at all, Although he flirted with the theory that « capitalist phase of evolution wight not be necessary in the backvard aress, Lenin disearied thie in the face of the strategie needs of the Soviet Union and re- enphastsed that the natural leader of a revolution vas the proletariat hich whould place itself at the forefront of the nasses. “urtheraore, the Leninist eonsept of the "Party" insisted on an orvante relation between the Communist Party ani the proleteriet. According to lenin, political parties could be nothing nore than political superetructores concentrating the politieal power of piven seconde |. Tn Russia, the Bolsheviks clained the proletariat monopoly Shi Tanin elvape believed that the, Communist Tarty vas netting acre or less than the political organ of the infustrial proletariat. Tt wes only because of ite organic relation to the proletariat that the Conmmist Party could set as the oracle of history. Thus, within the Marxist-Leninist tratition, there arose the dogua that some actual relationship between the proletariat and the Cowwnist Party was essential to a Party's continued existence. Yet Lenin hed at least made the important point that the peasantry could serve as a revolutionary supporting force, ‘The strategy of international Co-vunisa vas refined under Stalin as he shifted ewphasis froe pronoting Commnisn on the basis ef a vorlé-vide revolutionary effort to making Russia into the bulwark of Communism for the vhole world, Chile Stalin interpreted many of Tenin'a theories in the light of prevailing practical politics, there vas no apparent realization of the peasantry's inherent revelutionsry foree and no abandonment of the doctrine of the "vanruerd of the proletarint”. It reaained for Meo “se-tung in China to denonetrate the ereat significance of the peasantry to = national revolutionary novenent in backvard areas of the vorld, In so doing, he actually put in doubt the Comvmist Party's claim te representation of the Industrial proletariat, P. tnder Meo Vile Lenin vas coneluting that the peasantry could serve a5 a revolutionary supporting foree, certain leaders within the young Chinese “owmnist Party (CCP) vere realising that the peasantry “oonsti- tutes the overvhelning majority of the Chinese people and is, of course, a great foree in the national revolution. If the Chinese revolution does not enlist the peasants, it will be uost difficult fer it to snoceed as a creat nationel refclution’. Py 1927, Yao Tee-tung appeared to be the chief exponent of this attituie, Inpressed with the unexpected revolutionary dynevien displayed by the Chinese peasantry in opposing 4 Se Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Peosuse Mao's theory about the peasantry fitted is ili! bs at anenlathlats Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R0007001 2000: weatly into prevailing conditions, his strategy am! leatership vithin rele jens vidio interest 41 on ready action passant decperate Yurthereere, in the of por ‘were infepentent varlerts ani the goverment aid net have as firm centre! ‘the Chinese Comnmist mevenent ven cut by 1952-33, as in the cities, 18 | 2193 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 rs certain stage of capitalien, played a vital role in Chinese Commmisn. ‘The Leninist concept of elitism vas expressed in the fora of a highly- ‘iseiplined bighly-organtse! party leadership, perpetuated by the absorption of "positive elements" discovered and trained turing the agrarian reform and other mass movesents, ‘The path to power of this elite croup followed the Jeninist formula of using the dynanisn enrendored by the iunediate needs and Alscontents of the masses, The experience of the Chinese Cormumist Rovenent unier “ao siuly Jenonstrate that a mass basis could be provided ty the reasantry and other strata of society ani that the industriel vroletariat need play no part in the rise to pwer of an elite rroup organized on leniniat lines, As such, this experience enhanced the Cowantst potential in unierteveloped areas of the vorl4 and stimlated the spreai of Comunist agrarian tacties. Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9g i. Nin, 434) t 5 Ae ake vs sf Ale { { 2 ea a 2 1 Be epee eee ene A ! ie neat | CGE er Aaa gj il Hi itll Hie Ht if Ne i b(n eee He i i ai lie vsti iit iijtleat ae Tenia i i we Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24 jf bigg PP 78-00915R000700120002-9 Chinese masses, confronted vith varying forus ef goverment from vhieh te choose, Communion offered a fixed destrine vith specific eteps to be taken to achieve established goals. To a marked degree, the Commumist's agrarian tactics vere sintlar during beth the perfed of their rise to pover and the period ixwdiately forces ‘the wainland.Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 China's great peasant muse after the civil var had ended. “land reforn* became a Veapon of far-reaching political contrel and ves generally ‘the beginning of Communist activities vithin an area. Mention has services—all the while gathering data on the village, ‘The investigation i i i i § i ‘ Hi i ate, 2 peat ‘Through group activities, individual tells, and meticulous in veatimntion, the cadres systematically rallied around then the "positive Tlaests" erong the pose Peaaente and farm laborers. ‘beste vork the sleet those "active elenents” axong the the organisation of « peasants’ aseoeta ‘the sev "people's militia’, ‘ithin the villages, the peasente! ite conter of the nev political paver *elonente” iApproved For Release 1999/08/2¢ P78-00915R000700120002-9 Tland reform sregren' was eneploted view the "peat tive sleueate” ware rallied together and indoctrinated, the peasants “avakengd” by prope ganda and agitation, and {information collected on the distriet. ‘The next step centered on the breaging dom of the traditional pover-structure in the village end the power-inage in the wins of the peasants. “ore speeifically, this next step ves to “set the masses in notion’ 20 a8 te develop a situation of "class stracgle". During this steps the Koy features tere nace nestingn to sovuse and punish the joeal despote” ami mass westings to differentiate eleas utatus. The Faccaral otra es aa ina leat ta] ter sae asa agricultural leberers and riddle peasante xf to nectraline the stand of the rich peasants 20 as to isolate the landlords as a croup target for tmediate attesk. sant received fron landlords and rich reeple, to contrast their living conditions with the rich landewners, and to see “whe eupperted vhon*. After one infividvel vas convinesd of the cause, and the wicht of the £0 to eappory the canna, be was encenramnd 10 cextnct other, reagents and convines thea, Vhen a larze onough mumber had seen the light, « In putting on the usetines to accuse and punish the "local despots", the cadres carefully picked one or several local despots vho were renuinely unpopular because of exorbitant rents, ete., or forser local officials notorious for their bribery, ete, The cadres collected propaganda (loud and the peasants vere invited to air their grievances. At the elinex Of paneant agitation, the chairaan of the meeting vould anmoues that Justice vould be dome. The peasants vere then told hew in this vay ‘they vere coverful as a collective force, ani poverful encugh to their “fewial orpressars from regaining their ferer authority". i Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : -RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 widdle peasants would not be feolated; and practical progress had te be ia- Plenented to suit speaifie loral meds. The setting wp of ax ation often included a variety of propagnia ings, wech os and gongs, portraite, sl . control and influence fron the very begianing of the lend refore. were, as a rule, Party cadres, » hard work and seal gave then additional prestice. After the "land refere” ves water vay, the Party's econtrel wee further strengthened systematic sbecrption vy controlling the mass organisations, by serving the o & source of help and eonfart, by decds, and by integrating the best elenents the peasants into the Party, the CCP acquired a firs and effective control at the grass level Although the core of leafership aneng the peasants when the new order cane to a village vere the cadres sent in fron cuteide, the Approved For Release scconaitttOicerssooteroorooteez2Approved For Release 1999/08/24 “ERB RP7® P00" SRo0o7a0120002-9 most dissatisfied vith the past sconente system and vho locked to the nev order as a solution. Yor these, the Comnmist authorities contnated Indoctrination courses vhere they vere taught the stantard qualifications of Party ~eubers and how to attain then. candidate acceptable te the Party, he would then be required te vork amt show good results in varices political and produetion campaigns. TE successful, he would then be elevated te cadre love! ani participate in the leadership of loval organisations, Ry this censral process, native leadership vas fostered and integrated into the Party systen to create the core of a stable political orier, The Peasants! tesosi— ation vas naturally one of the nest inportant, if not the nese impartent, of the losal crvanisetions vhere the (CP maintained a firs contrel. There vere other organizations vhieh the CCP utilised to further its land reform progres as well as to achieve polities! and payehelogical control of the peasants, In adlition to the Peasants’ Association, the peasants vere channeled into a muber of grow activities, notably ‘the wutual-aid tewes, rural cooperatives, the wonen's leagus, the youth corps, the people's militia, as well as varices cultural and edueational organisations such as reading classes and drama 5 ‘The ~utual-aid team, which involved the pooling together on « puntery desis of man-power, aninals, ivplements and ether rural resources, was ‘wed by the Communists not only for ita ecenonic advantages tt also as an instrument to ecousten the individualistic peasants to ccoperative . Tn organising such teas, the Communists demonstrated the advantages of such tears te the standard of living of the peasant, i ‘ i younr of the Peasants! Assoetation and other mass activities, and Sealously the social reforus. The rural cooperatives vere generally developed after the peasants were mobilised uriny the laad refers, zt conetines vere started at the vary beplmine of the wregres. tn the early days of “CP power, these scoperatives supplied the peasants With neceasition at levgr rates, granted loune at lever interest, ote.» trae eee ces nane eas ete te ce the Communists turing the agrarian reform. Fron the foregoing pleture, it is evident that the Chinese Cem sunita regariod "peychological xobilisation’ as of “equal impertance vith the redistribution of land.” Their methods of psychological mobilisation fell into the two categories of permasion end esercion, @ Approved For Release 1999/08/24 ‘CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 A muber of traditions] the people's in Chimese rural sectety vere skillfully Hh a3 steely Ati tll pita fd Able refers ded an Accusations ant punishusnt of lantlerd- Aa integral part of the lant ‘speak bitterness” mectings vaich Catharats. for the peasants. fac » '78-00915R000700120002-9 Approved For Release 1999/0!j i.fH ad iH it ati ibe nite! i Hee a d ini iW i He H ass bili a 1 ih Le EE ne it Po feed Fe Aen Waal aati eh ni a a if, hii a el Hy * 2 ut Mal Hieael il Hie wae He bl Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R0007001 2000: SERRE te peasants and scléiors by eireuit teans and vere closely ccortinated ‘with current agrarian reforn programs. to conditions in colonial areas of the Le Today, in China, cellectivisation ts apparently being speeied up and, with an increased et developusnt in China, the CCP is now pushing the "alliance verter Nevertheless, 1% is alee apparent that the Chinese Comuntste have Fomeined appreciative of the lessens of thetr earlier period. 1 peychelogical acbilisation continues te be am important factor of all CCP prograns, agrarian or otherwise, and the peasant is evidently stil) recognised as the "mass pover* vhich propelled the professional revolutionaries into politieal power. as Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9iy yl ihe ut i wi a ae Wh Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R0007001 2000: & } s jag lta wei Bhs i didi abi hee : # at, il veh aa ! j fanttaih, My ne il Hata Po fren Soviet Comnmiste. the stage journal call 43 ube ii 1DP78-00915R000700120002-9 we Approved For Release 1999/0:1DP78-00915R000700120002-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/2¢ i i i 3 ‘ a Mme i athe iss lit Le # tule aatilaeiatiin ‘ qighsl 12 pill fi it. il } ips i Hit a a i pihay t }3 tig if He ia a Gea uh id ae] piel hah gags ae iaiasi diab al; it [2azets au yu phi i eee navies a mii jail 3 i Meri ay ge ace eee ne 7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA.RDP78-00945R000700420002-9-Approved For Release 19991081246 (Gl pspO78-00915R000700120002-8 ‘the vhole people, leads the battles in toms and rural areas to Liber- stion,;." Tron while greetly elevating the inpertance ef the peasants ‘to place the at the head of In general terns, the Commnist United Froat strategy, ef Vhich the peasant sovenent ie parte defines the principal enenion synonynous fer althongh Tntia 1» no longer a colony, the maintain the: feviniion Calate there a a strult of tos Conds of Indian ant Britich nonopolists, And the fight against American imertalion i treated as syhonynous with a fight for "Peace". Under « United Front course, baste stratery for cverthroving a regime is the foraation of « uiited front of all growpe opposed to the regine. Throwghtthe formation of abiinited Front the vay will be paved for the formation of a of People's Oenceracy, ami the nesensary and essential step to this ultinete ereation is the establishment of a "Coverment af Denceratic Unity". All this will be ecesnplished through mass mobilisation and & is wvalloved up in it, The Communist Party wast ressia intect and “pure"—e lesson the CPI learned fron the @ilution vidich overtosk the Hyderabad Party within a Tnited Front. accomplish its ends, the CPI recognised that its tasks rest ber (G) to"betia the Partyy’ (b) to bulld the nase organiantionss and (c) to build the “emocratic Front. Accerding te the CPI, the Takted Denoeratio "ront could caly be a front of pelitieal partion, groups and individvals arriving at agresnents frou place to place amt tine to tine, even widening the scope of these agressents, The Party's More specifically, the CPI has noted... "Under the existing conditions therefore it is only the eoning together ef the various groupe, pertios and iniividuals on Vhatever ieaues and in vhatever place they can and 18 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9Approved For Release 1999/08/24, RDP78-00915R000700120002-9 sading the nesses in their day-to-day struggles that vill help in ‘the process of the develormest af the United Trent. As a result of the coming tovether and leading the struggle of the nasses common understanding rove betieen the partios vhich helps in the proses of the orystellisation of the commen progran, The agreement on such ‘& program iteelf vill becove witer ant vider as a resalt of the struggling together and leading the masses in their struggles." Commanist agrarian taction in India thus constitute an attempt to weld the peasant masses into an organisation which can be an effective "transaission belt” betveen the Party and this large eegnent of the people and, at the same tine, charmel the pelitical and eeonosic denands of these peasant masses against axtl-Comnmist forces ant tovard the creation of a Tnited Front im vbich the CPI would play the predominant part, As such, Communist agrarian tactios heeoe aintler to those Which the CPT follows vith respect to trade untonists, vown, stuients, Intellectrals, ate, Tn sone respecte, the peneants an a group constitute one of the greatest challenges to CPT organtsational talents because of the econonie differences existing in various reographic areas of the country and besanse af the comnlexition inherent in the way religions, castes and languages of India, On the other hand, “PT activities among ‘the pansante represent an important Party underteking because the peasants represent approxinately tvo-thirds of the population and Decause the Comruniats' roa’ to power in India nay vell be the agrarian road, ‘There is an intensity of discontent about agrarian satters in Tndia, and in areas vhere agrarian tension has most acute, the Communist organisation and agitation has been at its best. Initiative in the matter of land reforz—et least in some sections of the country—passed into Comunist hands rather than the Government's, Sections of the peasant population are acquiring positive faith in the ecrarian progran pronieed by the Co-wuntsts for the imediate future, “hat the CPT has rot been even ware successful to date anong the peasants sess to result in sany instances fron the Party's om inertia or precocupation vith other mss sovenente, ‘The problems of creating and controllins s peasant novesent in India, particularly one that sought to be an "All India” acvement, were recomised ty the CPI. Tt acknowledged that,.."It west be under Stood that because of the vast expanse of our eountry, because af the uneven developuent af the agrarian crisis and of the vorking class m4 peasant novenent, ant the uneven state of organisation and con- selousness of the peasant masses and the influence of the Party, the peasant rovenent vill not develop at the same tempo everyvhere ant different forms cf organisation ant strugrie vill have to be sdopted, depending on tha maturity ef the crisis, the degree of unification of the peasant masses and their wood, the strength ani the influsnes of the Party and other facters..." 'ithin the varicus previness of Indie anf even in varions fistricts of the sane province, Comuntst acrarian tactics have indeed develoved eat different tempos and in 19 Approved For Release 1999/08/2. 1A-RDP78-00915R000700120002-9