G.R. Nos.

148939-40 February 13, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ORILLA

Facts:

Respondent was convicted of raping his 15-year old sister Remilyn twice inside her house one
dawn. Thus, two information for rape was tried by the trial court wherein regarding the first information it
found a that the rape was consummated, victim is a minor and attended by an alternating circumstance of
relation. The second information is merely considered as qualifying circumstance in the imposition of the
death penalty, as the Court submits the view that there is only one crime of rape committed although
there were two ejaculations done on the victim.

Respondents defense was an alibi that he was a stay-in worker at a fishpond at the adjacent
barangay in which a wide river separated him and Remilyn’s house; that the rape occurred around 3 AM
in the morning wherein due to the lack of insufficient lighting could have probably mistook her assailant as
him. He even presented Reneboy, his companion and sibling to both accused and victim, to corroborate
his alibi.

The trial court ave credence to Remilyn’s testimony because her testimony was very "natural and
convincing." In contrast, the testimony of the defense witnesses failed to convince the trial court. It also
ruled that Remilyn positively identified appellant as the one who raped her. True, no electric light or
kerosene lamp lit the room where the rape took place. However, since it was already 3:00 a.m., a ray of
light from the eastern horizon enabled Remilyn to recognize appellant. When appellant threatened and
ordered Remilyn not to shout, or else he would kill her, Remilyn was able to recognize appellant’s voice.
The trial court concluded that even if appellant attacked Remilyn during "the darkest portion of the
night," appellant’s voice alone could have made it known to Remilyn that her attacker was appellant, her
own brother. It rejected appellant’s defense of alibi. One can negotiate the distance between appellant
and the victim by riding passenger jeepneys and tricycles and by riding a motorboat to cross the river.
Appellant failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have access to the place
where the crime happened.

Issue:

WON the trial court is correct in considering the second information as a qualifying circumstance
to impose the death penalty.

Ruling:

No, appellant is guilty of rape as charged in the first information but the proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua, not death. Since appellant committed only one count of rape, the second criminal
case must be dismissed.

The Court agrees with the trial court in concluding that Remilyn identified appellant through voice
recognition. A person’s voice is an acceptable means of identification where there is proof that the
witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years. Appellant is no
stranger to Remilyn for she had known him with much familiarity. Appellant is Remilyn’s own brother.
Thus, when appellant threatened Remilyn not to shout and move, or else he would kill her, the trial court
logically inferred that Remilyn recognized appellant through his voice. Remilyn’s narration of how
appellant ravished her meets the test of credibility. When a woman says that the accused raped her, in
effect, she says all that is necessary to show that the accused raped her, and if her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the court may convict the accused on that basis.
 The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn’s hymen does not prove that appellant did not rape
her. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate
rape. In addition, a medical examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not
indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case. The credible disclosure of a minor that the accused
raped her is the most important proof of the sexual abuse.

Remilyn testified that appellant’s penis penetrated her genitalia. At that point, appellant had
already consummated the rape. The mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victim’s
genitalia engenders the crime of rape. Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia that consummates rape.

Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape. Appellant did
not withdraw his penis to insert it again into the vagina or to "touch" the labia majora or the labia
minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is not the number of times that appellant ejaculated
but the penetration or "touching" that determines the consummation of the sexual act. Thus,
appellant committed only one count of rape.

The trial court erred when it did not dismiss outright the second criminal case and instead
considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. In short, the trial
court considered the second ejaculation by the accused as a qualifying circumstance to raise the penalty
to death. This has no basis in law.