All Reading Questions

1/11/23

1. According to Hunt, what is “the most characteristic claim of modern philosophy?”

2. What is the Platonic-Aristotelian “way of inquiry?” How does it differ from Baconian-Cartesian “method?”
What is significant about “the idea of method itself” (cf. xi)? Does method imply an active or a passive way
of investigating the world (cf. xii)?

3. What is the starting point of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy? What is the world like that it takes for
granted? What is the world like for Baconian-Cartesian philosophy? What is the significance of law in this
world (cf. xii-xiii)?

4. What is the goal of philosophy for Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy? What is the goal of Baconian-
Cartesian philosophy (cf. xiii-xv)

1/13/23

1. In ¶4 of p. 2, Descartes describes the purpose of this essay (i.e. Discourse on Method). What is his purpose?
Why is not to teach people how to conduct their reason? Does this have anything to do with ¶1 on p. 1? (i.e.
the one that begins ‘Good sense….’

2. In ¶1 of p. 3, Descartes describes the goal of his life and education. What is his goal? Which subjects does
he think contribute to this goal, which ones do not? Why or why not? Hint: He mentions the following:
Greek/Latin; Poetry; History; Mathematics; Theology; Philosophy; Law; and Medicine.

3. Descartes first looks for his goal in letters and second in the great “book of the world.” What does he mean
by this latter phrase? Is he successful? What is the overall effect of his search in both letters and the book of
the world? Hint: See the final ¶ of §1 (i.e. the last full ¶ on p. 6).

1/18

1. Descartes describes his goal in the Discourse as that of divesting himself of all of his former opinions and
rebuilding them on the sure foundation of reason. On p. 9, Descartes says not everyone should follow him
in this task. Which two groups of people should not imitate him? Why not?

2. On p. 10, Descartes mentions three disciplines that will contribute to his plan of rebuilding all of his
opinions on the sure foundation of reason. What are these disciplines? What are their current defects? How
does Descartes remedy them?

3. What are Descartes’s four rules or principles constitutive of his method?

1/20

1. What are the four moral maxims Descartes ennumerates §3?

2. Why does Descartes need these four maxims?

1/23

1. What is Descartes’ first clear and distinct truth in metaphysics? Why is not something related to the senses
or mathematics?
2. Where does Descartes think the idea of perfection came from? How does he use it to prove the existence of
God?

3. Why does Descartes think the existence of God garauntees the truth of our clear and distinct ideas?

1/25

1. Discuss the differences between the speculative philosophy of the Schools (i.e. the classical mind) and the
practical philosophy of Descartes. What is the goal of this new philosophy? What does Descartes think it
will enable us to do?

1/30

ECHU §1

1. There are approximately 17 paragraphs (¶) in §1 of ECHU. Try your best to collect these ¶ into groups.
That is, try to divide for yourself §1 of Hume’s work. How many parts does it have?

2. What are two different kinds of moral philosophy? How does Hume describe them?

3. List the negative and positive advantages Hume thinks his work will bring (hint: the negative advantages
are ennumerated on p. 6, and the positive ones on the top of p. 7). Taking these lists together, state in your
own words the purpose of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

2/1

1. On p. 10, Hume distinguishes two species of perception. That is, perception is a genus of which ideas and
impressions are species. Explain this distinction. How do ideas and impressions differ? How would you
state their scientific definitions (i.e. specific difference + genus)?

2. In the second full ¶ on p. 11, Hume says that the creative power of the mind amounts to no more than four
things. What are these four activities or faculties (hint: look for the gerunds or -ing words)? Where do these
faculties derive their materials from?

3. What two arguments does Hume give to prove that ideas or feeble perceptions are but copies of
impressions?

4. What test does Hume propose on p. 13 for deciding whether a philosophical term has any meaning?

2/3

1. On p. 14, Hume lists 3 principles of connection among our ideas. What are they? What examples does he
give to illustrate these principles (hint: see next ¶ and the footnotes on p. 14)?

2. On p. 15, Hume divides the genus of ‘objects of human reason’ into two species: relations of ideas and
matters of fact. Explain this distinction. Which sciences fall under the first species (i.e. relations of ideas)
and which under the second? Which species contains truths whose contraries do not involve a
contradiction?
3. Upon what principle of connection (resemblance, contiguity in time or space, or cause and effect) are our
reasonings about matters of fact founded? Whence comes our knowledge of causes and their effects, from
 reason prior to experience (apriori reason) or from experience? What examples does Hume give to support
this conclusion?
2/6

1. Does Hume think our conclusions derived from experience of cause and effect are founded on reason or
understanding?

2. On p. 23, Hume argues that all of our reasonings concerning matters of fact rest on an unprovable premise,
one that can only be argued for in a circular fashion. What is that premise and why does it undermine
matter of fact reasoning?

2/8

1. On p. 28, Hume tells us the principle by which the mind is led to infer that future facts will be like past
facts. What is this principle? How does it work?

2/10

1. Why can Hume not give a genus-species definition of belief on p. 32 but only a description? What is that
description?

2/13

1. What is the relation between probability, the uniformity of nature, and belief? When thinking about matters
of fact, why do we believe that some effects will occur but not others?

2/15

1. What is the goal of §7? Hume states it on p. 40 and it concerns ideas of power, force, and necessary
connection.

2. What does Hume think about the ideas of power, volition, and necessity? Are they meaningful or absurd?
Where do they come from?

2/20

1. Hume distinguishes two species of skepticism on pp. 102-103. What are they? How are they related to
philosophy?

2. Hume discusses two major objections to philosophical objections to our belief in the external world in
§12.1. What are they?

2/21

1. Why does Hume say extravegant or Pyrrhonian scepticism is impossible (Hint: see pp. 109-110).

2. At the end of this text (pp. 112B-114), Hume ennumerates legitimate sciences from meaningless ones.
Which sciences fall into these two genera? Why does Hume say we can burn books in the latter group?
 2/27

1. What are the origins and objects of the arts and sciences according to Rousseau? (Hint: See pages 23-24).

2. What are the pernicious effects of the arts and sciences according to Rousseau? (See p. 24b; 25b; 27b; 29m;
30m)

3. How does Rousseau think philosophers can actually help rather than simply harm mankind? (see. pp. 34-
35).

2/29

1. What is Kant’s goal in the beginning of SBHH? What does he want to make “comprehensible”? How so?

2. Does Kant propose to render history meaningful simply by reflecting on human freedom and action? Why
not? Why does he need to tie to his speculative history to nature?

3. Describe the 4 stages of reason’s awakening, development, and perfection. How do these steps mark man’s
exit from nature and into a life of freedom and history?

4. What does Kant say about Rousseau on p. 54? How does his analysis of Rousseau fit into his larger vision
of the relationship between nature, freedom, and progress?

3/1

1. Having exited the state of nature, what are the 4 stages of human history?

2. What three things does Kant say cause reflective people to despair and grieve over providence? How can
we be reconciled to these evils, dissatisfactions, and vain desires?

3/15

1. Briefly skim the essay as a whole. How is the first part structured (i.e. what are its parts)? Briefly list,
number, and summarize theses 1-4.

2. On p. 29 (academic p. 17), Kant says history allows us to hope for something? What is that hope? Why is it
only a hope and not a certainty? How does this hope relate to the goal of the essay at the end of the
introduction?

3. Why did Kant bold the word ‘antagonism’ in the fourth thesis? Why is it so important in driving history
forward? How does it do so? In your answer pay attention to the paradoxical ‘unsocial sociability’ in
human nature.

3/17

1. Analyze the structure of the second part of the essay. That is, briefly list, number, and summarize theses
5-9.
2. What is “the greatest problem for the human species”? Why is it also “the hardest and the last to be
solved”?
3. Why does the establishment of a perfect civil constitution require “law-governed external relations among
nations”? Why does this idea seem so ridiculous according to Kant (p. 35)?

4. What are the three questions Kant raises for consideration on p. 35? Which one does he choose and why?

5. What is the purpose of human history as described by the eighth thesis? How does it represent a
“justification of providence”?

3/20/23

1. What does Kant mean when he defines Enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed
immaturity”? Why does such a great proportion of mankind choose to remain immature and unenlightened?

2. Why is freedom the only thing men need in order to achieve enlightenment? What kind of freedom is Kant
talking about, public or private? Does his distinction between public and private freedom correspond to
what we in the 21st century would consider public and personal freedom?

3. Do we live in an enlightened age? Why or why not? What can public rulers, kings, or princes do to advance
the cause of enlightenment? Should they get rid of all civic restraints, laws, and penalties?

3/22

1. According to the preface, does Nietzsche think it is good for humanity to do history for history’s sake, i.e.
for the sake of expanding our knowledge of the past?

2. What happy mean does Nietzsche propose regarding memory/the historical and forgetfulness/the
unhistorical? What happens when we have too much of the former? Too much of the latter?

3. Why do desire, whether for a new truth or beautiful person, and the will to act require the ability to forget
the past? Why does it require injustice and lack of conscience?

4. Why do historical and super-historical men say ‘no’ to live in the past? What reasons does the progressive
and super-historical man give for denying life in the past? To which group (perhaps neither) does Nietzsche
belong?

3/24

1. What three attitudes can one have towards the past? What kind of soul engages in monumental history,
which in antiquarian history, and which in critical history?

2. What are the positives of monumental history with respect to action and art?

3. What are the dangers of monumental history? Which kinds of people should not do it?
 3/29

1. To what kind of soul does antiquarian history belong? How does it help one “give thanks” for one’s
existence? How else does it serve life?

2. How does antiquarian history distort the past? How does its egalitarian perspective potentially endanger
life? How can it stifle high forms of life in the present?

3. To what kind of soul does critical history belong? How does it serve life, that “dark, driving, insatiably self-
desiring power”? Is critical history’s judgement on the past a matter of justice?

4. How can critical history harm life?

3/31

1. What does too much historical knowledge and the putatively objective science of history do to a man’s
soul?

2. Nietzsche argues that too much historical knowledge leads to a peculiarly modern phenomenon called
“inwardness.” What does he mean by this term? Is inwardness a good or bad thing for him?

3. How does Nietzsche define culture on p. 25? What is his assessment of German culture? Does it
possess a unity of artistic expression? What do you think Nietzsche would say about 21st century
American culture?

4/3

1. For some context, Nietzsche’s essay seems structured in the following way: §1 Introduces the distinction
between man and the beasts, namely that man needs both memory bounded by forgetfulness (a horizon);
§2-3 Discuss the 3 ways history can serve life (i.e. monumental, antiquarian, critical); §4 Introduces the
cause of modern man’s problems, the barbarous opposition between inward and outward. Now §§5-9 detail
5 consequences of this historically induced opposition between inner and outer. What are they? Which one
does he discuss in §5?

2. Why is modern man weak? What is his weakness? How does philosophy contribute to and suffer from this
weakness?

3. Are modern men more just than previous ones? What do you think Nietzsche even means by justice? It
seems like he doesn’t provide a definition, but only hints at one. Perhaps one could delimit justice
indirectly by looking at its relation to truth and objectivity. How are the desires for truth and justice related?
Is justice the same thing as historical objectivity?

4/5

1. In §7, Nietzsche is concerned with the third deleterious effect of the opposition between inwardness and
outwardness. It is connected to the second one, namely a pretense to justice. How does putatively
‘objective,’ historical justice undermine the conditions for life? How is ‘unconditional faith in something
perfect’ relevant to life?

2. How does a rigorous, historical education thwart the maturation or ‘ripenning’ of individual personality?
How does it lead to “dullness” or insensitivity in the soul of a student? How does it lead to disgust?
3. How does modern scholarship (i.e. the industrialized production of ever more specialized articles and
‘knowledge’) further undermine life?
4/14

1. Nietzsche’s fourth criticism of modern barbarism is its belief that it is “the end.” One can interpret this in
one of two ways. First, this belief can be interpreted nihilistically or pessimistically, i.e. there is nothing left
to do nor anything worth doing. How does Christianity and the Midaeval Age’s memento mori (remember
you must die) create this belief?

2. Second, one can interpret this belief (i.e. that we are at the end) “shamelessly,” as the “consumation of
world history.” What does Nietzsche mean by this on p. 47? How does this belief constitute a new religious
faith meant to replace Christian theology?

1. What deadly truths does Nietzsche identify on p. 55? Why are they deadly, leading to an ironic or cynical
way of life?

4/19

1. What two antidotes does Nietzsche propose on p. 62 to excessive historical education?

2. Why does Nietzsche think, on p. 63, that it is the mission of the youth to employ these antidotes to create a
newer, healthier culture?

4/21

The Philosophical Act §1, pp. 77-92

1. Provide definitions (genus-species, causal, descriptive, exemple, synonym etc.) for the following key terms:

a. The workaday world (p. 78):

b. Work (p. 78):

c. Common need (p. 78):

d. Common good (p. 78):

e. Freedom (p. 87 and p. 88):

f. Servile arts (p. 87):

 g. Philosophizing (“to philosophize”) (p. 77 and p. 90):

h. theorein (p. 90):

2. What is the difference between a physicist asking about the essence of physics and a philosopher asking
about the meaning of philosophy?

3. Why are philosophy and the workaday world incommensurable? What does Pieper mean by
incommensurable?

4. What other human activities, according to Pieper, resemble philosophy in going beyond the workaday
world? Can you think of any others?

5. What examples of counterfeit transcendence (i.e. pseudo-prayer, pseudo-poetry, pseudo-philosophy) does

Pieper give on pp. 84-85? Why are these counterfeits worse than the suppression of poetry, philosophy, and
prayer?

6. Why are the questions concerning philosophy’s uselessness and its freedom really the same thing? That is,
how is it the case that philosophy’s freedom is the as its uselessness viewed from another angle?

7. When is knowledge free? When is its servile? How do freedom and servility relate to what Pieper calls
“philosophy’s suicide” on p. 91? How is modern philosophy complicit in this suicide (see references to
Bacon, Descartes, and Marx on p. 91)?

The Philosophical Act, §2

1. Define the following terms:

a. Relationship (p. 62b of PDF):

b. Inside/Inwardness (pp. 62b-63t):

c. World (p. 63t)

d. Having a world (p. 63t):

e. Environment or Umwelt (p. 64):

f. Spirit (p. 65m):

 g. The World [of Spirit] (p. 67m):

2. In §1, Pieper stipulatively defines philosophical activity (along with prayer and poetry) as ways of
“stepping beyond the everyday or wordaday world. In §2, he clarifies this definition by developing the
concept of ‘world.’ He does so by differentiating ‘the world of spirit’ from the worlds of plants and
animals. What do all three worlds have in common (p. 63t, i.e. what is the genus ‘world’ mean again?), and
how do they differ? How does Pieper rank these worlds—in an egalitarian or hierarchical way?

3. Why is ‘the world’ of man radically unlike the enviornment of an animal? What does Pieper mean when he
says that, on the one hand, animals are imprisoned in and perfectly adapted through natural selection to
their enviornment but spirit, on the other, breaks through every enviornment? What examples does he cite
from Uexküll to illustrate this distinction?

4. Why are the concepts of spirit and world necessarily correlated to each other? That is, what does it mean to
say that ‘things are true’ or that there is a truth in things (pp. 66-67).

5. Why is philosophy, as stepping beyond the workaday world or the world conditioned by of procuring
things related to the common need, made possible by and indicative of human nature as finite or animal
spirit (p. 69)?

6. Describe a single activity or object from wider and wider (or deeper and deeper) contexts of meaning, as
Pieper describes listening to a lecture from the everyday, the psychological, the physical, and finally the
philosophical perspectives (pp. 71-72)? For instance, perhaps you can describe a painting in these ways, or
a football game, a dance, a book, etc.

The Philosophical Act, §3

1. How does you description above (i.e. Question #6) illustrate Pieper’s point that the philosophical act or
question does not withdraw from and discard the ordinary, workaday world but sees something deeper in it
(p. 73)?

2. Why is philosophical wonder contrary to ‘the bourgeois’ (p. 74)? What is the bourgeois and ersatz wonder
(i.e. entertainment (p. 75)?

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
3. Pieper distinguishes ancient and medieval philosophy from its modern counterpoint by means of their
different starting-point or, even better, their principal moods. The former begin in wonder, while the latter
begins with doubt. Are these the same, or does wonder go beyond doubt? You can answer this question by
looking at wonder in both its positive and negative aspects (pp. 78-79).

4. Why are all of the wonderful things (admirabilia) the delightful or joyful things (delectibilia)? What does
this identity have to do with Plato’s concept of Love (Eros) from the Symposium (pp. 79-80)?

5. Why does Pieper identify philosophy with hope? Why does he not identify the other sciences with hope?
(pp. 80-81)

6. What kind of wisdom does philosophy want? Can it ever fully have it? Why or why not? (p. 83)
 The Philosophical Act, §4

1. How does Pieper describe the relationship of philosophy to theology (p. 87)?

2. What does this relationship have to do with tradition? Why does theology have a prior interpretation of the
whole, and interpretation that tends to begin with the words “long before,” “from time immemorial,” or “in
the good, old days?”

3. Why does philosophy, Christian or Platonic, need this theological counter-point in order to be philosophy at
all? What does philosophy’s need for a theological counter-point entail for all apatheist philosophy (i.e. not
atheism, which says ‘God does not exist’ but rather the position that says ‘I don’t really care whether or not
God exists’)? In other words, why can we consider Nietzsche but not the last man a philosopher?