Jouroti of Penootlity and SocuU Piyctutcgy Copyr*u 1984 by the

19(4, Vol 47, No 4, 780-792 American Plycholopcil Aaorimon, Inc.

Some Antecedents and Consequences of

Social-Comparison Jealousy
Peter Salovey and Judith Rodin
Yale University

In the present study we explored some antecedents and consequences of social-

comparison jealousy (traditionally termed envy). Eighty college undergraduates
were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions in which they
received either positive or negative feedback on a bogus personality test that was
either self-definitionaUy relevant or irrelevant, followed by feedback of successful
performance by another person in a domain that was either relevant or irrelevant
to the subject. Significantly greater jealousy of the other person was reported in
the condition in which the subject received negative feedback regarding own
performance on a self-involving characteristic, and in which the successful
performance of the other was on the same characteristic. Subjects in this condition
were more likely to disparage the rival and less likely to desire his or her
friendship. In addition, these subjects tended to feel more depressed and anxious
about interacting with the comparison person.

We envy those whose acquisitions and successful efforts
are a reproach to us. (Aristotle, c. 340 B.C./1932, p. 128)
When we compare ourselves to others and
find that we do not measure up, we may
experience envy and jealousy. Yet, although
such experiences are often implied in the
study of social comparison processes, they
rarely are explicitly investigated in that con-
text. In this study we examined some of the
personality and situational antecedents of the
experience of envy and jealousy in social
comparison situations as well as their cogni-
tive and affective consequences. We designed
the study in order to investigate the effects of
feedback that threatens one's self-concept on
anxiety, mood, and evaluation of others in a
social comparison context. From such data,
we can begin to infer the conditions that
promote social-comparison jealousy as well
as the resultant thoughts and feelings.
Portions of this article were presented as "A Self-
Esteem Maintenance Model of Envy" at the Annual
Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association in
Philadelphia in April 1983.
We would like to thank Susan Bers, Janice Marcus,
Jefferson Singer, Abe Tessa, and especially William
McGuire for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article.
Requests for reprints should be sent to either Peter
Salovey or Judith Rodin, Department of Psychology, Yale
University, P.Ot Box 11-A Yale Station, New Haven,
Connecticut 06520-7447.
780
We are using the terms envy and jealousy
interchangeably. Whether there is a distinction
between envy and jealousy has been the cause
for much philosophical debate (cf. Bryson,
1977; Gellert, 1976; Neu, 1980; Sabini &
Silver, 1982; Spielman, 1971; Titleman, 1982;
Tov-Ruach, 1980), albeit little empirical study.
Semantically, a distinction has been made
between jealousy and envy. Whereas jealousy
refers to the belief or suspicion that a desired
relationship is in danger of being lost, envy
is a discontent with one's own lot and a
desire for another's attributes, reputation, or
possessions (Bryson, 1977).
Bers and Rodin (1984), however, argue that
envy and jealousy are words used inter-
changeably by the lay person, and in many
situations the emotions, cognitions, and be-
haviors associated with envy and jealousy are
not clearly different. They suggest that there
is little heuristic value in distinguishing envy
and jealousy, but argue instead for the utility
of studying the kinds of situations that pro-
mote feelings labeled either envy or jealousy.
For an initial categorization, based on pilot
data, they suggest two kinds ofjealousy. Their
term social-comparison jealousy replaces the
typical notion of envy, because it involves a
desire for superiority on some dimension.
Social-relations jealousy involves a desire for
exclusivity in a relationship. When the rela-
tionship is a romantic one, a specific form of
 S O O A L P C O M P A R I S O N JEALOUSY 781

social-relations jealousy, called romantic jeal- back on self-evaluation. The major premise
ousy, can be said to exist. The present study of Tesser's theory is that individuals are mo-
focuses on social-comparison jealousy. tivated to maintain a positive self-evaluation.
(In a sense, Tesser's theory is really one of
Antecedents of Social-Comparison Jealousy self-evaluation maximization rather than self-
evaluation maintenance.) Given a situation
Valence of Information About the Self in which another person has possessions that
Relative to Others one desires or performs better than one on
Negative or esteem-diminishing informa- some task, either reflection or comparison
tion about oneself should promote feelings of can result Whereas reflection raises one's
social-comparison jealousy. According to Sil- self-evaluation, comparison lowers it When
ver and Sabini (1978), social-comparison the performance domain is relevant to one's
jealousy will result only when the possessions, self-definition, comparison is likely; reflection
attributes, and attainments of one person occurs when the domain is less relevant (cf.
diminish the status of another person. Such Cialdini et al., 1976). Individuals may actually
superiority of one person over another can try to maintain their self-evaluation, be it
be either ascribed or achieved and, as long as initially high or low, because there is a ten-
the superiority of one person threatens the dency to reject feedback showing that one
self-worth of another, jealousy may still result. has done better than he or she has expected
Silver and Sabini varied the difference in goal (see McGuire, 1966, for a discussion of some
attainment between two actors in videotaped of these "surprised by joy" studies). In the
scenarios and found that the number of present study, however, we are concerned
subjects predicting the display of envy or primarily with the situation in which one
jealousy by the unsuccessful actor varied person's successes threaten to diminish the
directly with the size of this difference. Sim- self-evaluation of another person.
ilarly, Bers and Rodin (1984) observed that There are several corollaries to Tesser's
among elementary school children, social position. First, we tend to be attracted to
comparison and resulting jealousy are com- others who perform well, so long as their
mon responses to failure situations in which superior performances are on dimensions not
another child is superior in some way or highly self-definitional. Second, we envy those
achieves something that is desired by the first who perform highly in self-definitional do-
child. mains because envy occurs when we feel
diminished (our self-evaluation is threatened)
Relevance of Information About the Self by the particularly relevant performances,
possessions, and attributes of another (recall
Although negative information about one- Silver & Sabini, 1978, discussed earlier).
self may result in social-comparison jealousy,
negative feedback that is particularly self- Relevance or Similarity of Successful Others
relevant may exacerbate feelings of jealousy.
Bers and Rodin (1984) found that sponta- Tesser's theorizing about the impact of self-
neous comparisons increased with age as the definitionally relevant social information is
children began to define domains that were tied closely to the final antecedent of social-
particularly self-relevant and increased espe- comparison jealousy examined in this study—
cially in these self-relevant domains. The the relevance of the source of that feedback
older children reported being bothered (an- to oneself. That is, how similar to me is the
gered and saddened) significantly more often successful comparison person? Traditionally,
by comparisons made in a domain that was similarity is the primary variable studied by
important to them. The younger children social comparison researchers (cf. Festinger,
were bothered by any comparison. 1954; Suls, 1977; but see Mettee & Smith,
Tesser's model of self-evaluation mainte- 1977), and it appears that comparisons are
nance (Tesser, 1980; Tesser & Campbell, 1980, most likely made with people who are similar
1982, 1983; Tesser & Smith, 1980) concerns to oneself (e.g., Goethals & Darley, 1977;
the impact of self-definitionally relevant feed- Wheeler et al., 1969). More recently, Dakin
782 PETER SALOVEY AND JUDITH RODIN
and Arrowood (1981) showed that compari-
sons are particularly likely with similar others
performing at levels slightly better than one-
self. We would expect that such situations
are particularly likely to foster social-com-
parison jealousy.
The relationship between the degree of
another's superiority and one's experience of
jealousy is, perhaps, nonmonotonic. On the
one hand, the more superior the other is, the
less likely he or she is to become an object
of social comparison. On the other hand, the
more superior the person who becomes a
social comparison object is, the more jealous
one feels. As a result of these opposing ten-
dencies, one is perhaps most likely to become
jealous of another person who is at an inter-
mediate level of superiority to oneself.
The Present Study
The three factors discussed earlier were
examined as potential antecedents of social-
comparison jealousy in the present study. We
hypothesized that such jealousy would be
most intensely experienced in situations (a)
containing negative feedback about oneself
(b) in a domain that is particularly self-
defining, (c) followed by comparison to an-
other person who has performed well on this
same self-defining dimension rather than on
another dimension.
Consequences of Social-Comparison
Jealousy
Degrading the Comparison Person
Silver and Sabini (1978) note that we
perceive another person as envious or jealous
when we see him or her inappropriately
attempt to demean someone in order to
maintain his or her own self-worth. In their
videotape scenario study, subjects ascribed
more envy and jealousy to the unsuccessful
actor when he or she acted inappropriately,
inconsiderately, or with insufficient restraint were able to examine this process directly.
and respect toward the successful actor. It
follows that the denning quality of social-
comparison jealousy should be degrading of
the comparison person.
Depressed Mood and Anxiety
There has been little research on the affec- parison jealousy; however, we will expand on
tive consequences of situations that provoke Tesser's notions by directly examining some
social-comparison jealousy. Bryson (1976) had
subjects choose from a list of affective states
those feelings most often experienced as a
consequence of jealousy. The factors that
emerged included emotional devastation (de-
pression and helplessness), reactive retribution
(desire to get even), general arousal, desire
for social support, intrapunitiveness, and an-
ger. In a second study (Bryson, 1977), subjects
reacted with feelings of anger, hurt, embar-
rassment, rejection, frustration, and sadness
to a laboratory simulation of a jealousy sit-
uation. Bers and Rodin (1984) found anger
at the other most strongly related to jealous
behavior. In addition, state anxiety tends to
correlate positively with self-report measures
of jealousy (Bringle, 1981; Jaremko & Lind-
sey, 1979).
The Present Study
In this study, then, we are interested in
two major classes of consequences of social-
comparison jealousy: (a) cognitive conse-
quences such as evaluations of the comparison
person, desire for his or her friendship, and
self-reported envy or jealousy, and (b) affective
consequences. We hypothesized that subjects
would manifest social-comparison jealousy
(in the conditions described earlier) by de-
valuing the comparison person, not desiring
future friendship with him or her, identifying
this state as one of envy or jealousy, and
feeling anxious and depressed at the prospect
of having to engage in any future interaction
with this person.
Theoretical Framework
We can summarize two primary theoretical
impetuses of the present study. The first is
Silver and Sabini's (1978) notion that envy
(i.e., social-comparison jealousy) can be said
to exist only when, following negative com-
parison, the injured party attempts to deni-
grate the rival. In the present experiment, we
The second influence is Tesser's model of
self-evaluation maintenance. We argue that
one aspect of social-comparison jealousy de-
rives from the need to maintain self-esteem.
Hence the processes that Tesser described
form an integral underpinning of social-com-
 SOCIAL-COMPARISON JEALOUSY
of the affective and behavioral consequences
of self-esteem maintenance (such as depres-
sion, anxiety, and degradation of others) not
made explicit in Tesser's model.
Method
Subjects
Eighty-two undergraduates in introductory psychology
courses who had identified themselves as having a career
interest in the medical sciences, business, or the perform-
ing arts participated in this experiment Forty of these
subjects were men and 42 were women; 28 indicated an
interest in medicine, 35 in business, and 17 in the
performing arts. The data from two women were elimi-
nated from the analysis because the women were suspi-
cious of the veracity of the false feedback manipulation.
Of the remaining 80 subjects, 5 men and 5 women were
randomly assigned to each of the 8 conditions of the
experiment in a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design involving the
three independent variables to be described. Subjects
with each of the three career interests were distributed
approximately equally across conditions.
Procedure
Subjects arrived at the laboratory for what they thought
was a study of "personality characteristics and career
choice." They had been scheduled in pairs, but care was
taken so that subjects had no contact with each other
before the start of the experiment The two subjects were
greeted by the male experimenter and led into two
different rooms separated by a folding wall. This arrange-
ment enabled subjects to become aware of activity in the
other room but to be unable to hear what was being said
there.
After subjects were seated comfortably in their rooms,
they were presented whh a consent agreement and a
short demographic questionnaire. In order to make salient
the career interest that formed the basis for their recruit-
ment, subjects once again indicated their chosen field of
study on the demographic questionnaire and were asked
to write a paragraph describing more specifically their
career interest
After completing these forms, subjects were reminded
that they were participating in a study of personality and
career choice; specifically, the investigators were interested
in what kinds of people seem to choose which professions.
As such, subjects were told, their first task would be to
complete a 72-item personality test called the Robertson-
Wagner Personality Profile (RWPP).1
After subjects completed the personality test, they were
told that a more subjective personality assessment needed
to be administered as well, and so they were given a
form in which they were asked to write a short self-
descriptive essay. Subjects were told that they would be
given about 10 min to write the essay, and that while
they were writing, the experimenter would score a few
of the subscales on the RWPP and let them know how
they had done. The subjects were then left alone to work
on their essays.
After IS mm had elapsed, the experimenter returned,
carrying a new set of forms to be filled out by the subject
and a graph resembling the Profile and Case Summary
783
sheet from the Minnesota Multiphase Personality Inven-
tory (MMPI). The experimenter told the subjects that he
had a few more personality scales for them to fill out
("in order to cross-validate the RWPP") and placed in
front of them a packet containing a 4-item positive/
negative mood scale, a 12-item self-concept scale, and
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory. Before the subjects
began working on these new scales, the experimenter
asked them if they would be interested in seeing some of
their results on the personality profile they had taken
earlier. The experimenter then produced the MMPI-like
score report, which contained the profiles of two subjects,
one plotted in red ink and the other in black. Subjects
were informed that the red line represented the results
of their profile and that the black line reflected the scores
of the subject in the next room. The experimenter then
gave the subjects a short lecture on the subscales of the
RWPP (e.g., medical science aptitude, business acumen,
performing arts sensitivity) and on the "norms" for each
subscale. The experimenter then went over the subjects'
profiles, which were always depicted as slightly above
average on all subscales but one. On this one scale,
subjects were shown as either well below or well above
average (depending on condition). The black line, repre-
senting the results of the subject-next-door, was also
depicted as slightly above average on all subscales but
one. On this one subscale, the other person was always
presented as well above the average. To make certain that
the independent variables were properly manipulated, the
experimenter elaborated on the meaning of the graphed
feedback and offered his opinion that the subject's score
was "surprisingly low" (or "surprisingly high") for a Yale
student.
It was at this point that the conditions of the experiment
were made salient to the subjects. Depending on which
condition they had been assigned, the subjects were given
one from among the following eight possible kinds of
feedback on the RWPP results: subjects were told that
they had scored either well above or well below average
on one of the RWPP's subscales. The particular subscale
was identified as one that either did or did not correspond
to the subject's stated career interest. And the profile of
the subject next door indicated a superior performance
on a scale that either corresponded or did not correspond
with the subjects' stated career interest.
Five minutes later, when subjects had completed the
new sets of forms, the experimenter returned, collected
them, and informed subjects that they had just one more
task to do. Another way to understand personality, subjects
were told, was to make judgments about another person.
In this task, they were to read the self-descriptive essay
written by the subject next door and then to imagine
what it would be like when the two of them met at the
end of the experiment. Subjects were given the "essay," a
list of 25 bipolar traits on which to make judgments
about the other person, a 20-item anxiety scale, and a
mood checklist on which they were to indicate how they
would feel after meeting and interacting with the other
person.
1
The RWPP was composed of items from Snyder's
(1974) Self-Monitoring Scale; Rosenberg's (196S) Self-
Esteem Inventory, Bringle, Roach, Andler, and Evenbeck's
(1979) Self-Report Jealousy Scale; and Rotter's (1966)
Internal-External Locus of Control Scale.
784 PETER SALOVEY AND JUDITH RODIN
The self-descriptive essay of the other person read as
follows:
I am a freshman at Yale with many interests. I enjoy
backpacking and camping as well as going to movies
and plays. My main interest lies in medicine [business
and management; theater music, and the performing
arts in general]—I hope to be a doctor [an executive
in industry, perform professionally] someday. I'm al-
ready taking some of the required courses and doing
pretty well in them—really well, actually, considering
my background in this area before coming to Yale. I
study a lot, and the hard work seems to be paying off.
Socially, things are only o.k. I have lots friends, but
no real romantic attachments. That, however, could be
changing in the near future. 1 certainly hope so.
Academically, though, things are great I've been
one of the top in all my classes—the couple of professors
that I have talked to say I have a promising future. . .
I guess time will tell!!
The essays were constructed so that subjects could find
both likable and annoying aspects of this person. Their
judgments of him or her (the person was always depicted
as the same sex as the subject) would then reflect how
much attention they had focused on the person's assets
or faults.
Subjects were given 1S min to complete their evaluations
of the other person and their anxiety and mood about
interacting with him or her. When they had finished, the
experimenter collected their forms and debriefed them.
Because of the deception involved in this study, extra
care was taken during debriefing to ensure that subjects
understood the bogus nature of the feedback that had
been given to them. During debriefing, any suspiciousness
regarding the procedure of the experiment was elicited.
Measures of Potential Mediating Variables
Immediately after the false feedback manipulation was
instantiated (thereby establishing the conditions of the
experiment for the subject), we administered three mea-
sures that might allow us to make inferences regarding
the cognitive/affective process associated with receipt of
such feedback. These three measures included a brief
affect scale, a self-concept scale, and the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Inventory.
Positive-negative affect scale. Four bipolar items pre-
sented on 7-point Likert scales (exhilarated/not exhila-
rated, sad/not sad, elated/not elated, unhappy/not un-
happy) were used to quickly assess subjects' affect im-
mediately after they received feedback on the personality
test This affect scale was chosen because in previous
studies involving mood induction, it has served as an
accurate mood manipulation check (Amrhein, Salovey,
& Rosenhan, 1981; Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981).
Self-concept scale. On the self-concept measure we
asked subjects to assess how they felt about themselves
on 12 bipolar items presented on 7-point scales that have
also demonstrated their utility as a self-appraisal measure
in an earlier study (Amrhein et al., 1981). The items on
this measure were popular/unpopular, unintelligent/in-
telligent,friendly/unfriendly,satisfied/unsatisfied with self,
unattractive/attractive, unselfish/selfish, unsure of self/
self-confident, trustworthy/untrustworthy, unsuccessful/
successful, nptimirtir/pftCTjmiaip., socially unskilled/so-
cially skilled, unhealthy/healthy. The direction of these
items was randomized and balanced.
Self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory
was presented. The items on this measure did not differ
from those included in the RWPP.
Dependent Measures
The dependent variables in this experiment were (a)
evaluations of the comparison other, (b) level of friendship
desired with the other person, (c) mood while anticipating
interacting with the other, (d) self-reported envy/jealousy
of the comparison other, and (e) anxiety reported in
anticipating an interaction with the other person.
Evaluations of the other Subjects evaluated the other
person on 25 bipolar traits (e.g., likable/unlikable, gen-
erous/selfish) presented on 7-point Likert scales. The
direction of these items was randomized and balanced;
in this report, however, higher scores indicate the more
positive pole on each trait.2
Desired friendship Subjects indicated on a single
7-point item how much they would want the person,
whose essay they had just read, as a friend. Responses
could range from very little to very much.
Mood. The measure of subjects' mood as they imag-
ined meeting the comparison person was the Depression
Adjective Checklist (DACL) developed by Zuckerman,
Lubin, and Robins (196S). The instrument consists of a
list of 34 feeling state adjectives. Subjects are asked to
check all that describe their current mood state. The
DACL is scored for depressive affect as the total number
of negative items checked plus the number of positive
items not indicated.
Envy/jealousy To measure self-reported envy and
jealousy in a subtle, nonreactive way, we inserted "envy"
and "jealousy" among the adjectives of the DACL. Subjects
were given an "envy/jealousy" score ranging from 0, if
2
The 25-item scale measuring subjects' evaluations of
the comparison person was reduced to a more manageable
set of variables. These items were subjected to a principle
axis factor analysis with vanmax rotation and commu-
nality estimated by the squared multiple correlation
coefficient. The analysis revealed four stable factors ac-
counting for 85% of the variance in the total scale. The
four factors and the traits loading on to them are as
follows: Factor 1 (understanding)—sympathetic (.73),
sensitive (.66), empathic (.64), and generous (.64); Factor
2 (competence)—careful (.77), responsible (.74), and
successful (.66); Factor 3 (soriophilia)—well adjusted
(.77), interesting (.74), strong (.74), romantic (.71), popular
(.66), sociable (.57), and attractive (.55); and Factor 4
(friendliness)—friendly (.76), happy (.76), warm (.75),
and nice (.59). However, the four factors correlated highly
with the full scale score (.45 < r < .89) and with each
other (F= .40). In addition subsequent analyses on the
four factor scores replicated analyses on the full scale
scores. Consequently only the full scale data is reported
in the remainder of this article. Two items (preppie/
nonpreppie; quiet/noisy) had no distinct positive or
negative pole and were dropped from the total scale
score.
 S0OAIX30MPAR1S0N JEALOUSY
neither item were checked, to 2 if both were t*t**t4 A
1 was assigned to subjects who ducked either jealousy
or envy.
Anxiety Anxiety about the prospect of meeting the
other person was assessed by the State Anxiety Inventory,
from Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene's (1970) State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). The STAI is a widely
used instrument composed of 20 items by which the
level of transitory anxiety experienced in performance-
demand situations is measured. The essential qualities
evaluated are feelings of apprehension, tension, nervous-
ness, and worry. Spielberger et al. (1970) reported the
psychometric properties of this scale.
Results3
Independent Variables' Relation to
Dependent Variables4
Multivariate analysis of variance. Table 1
illustrates the correlational relations among
the dependent variables. As this table indi-
cates, they tended to be intercorrelated. Be-
cause of such associations as well as the
number of dependent variables, we performed
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
on the combination of all dependent variables
to protect against Type 1 error. The MANOVA
revealed significant main effects for feedback
valence [Wilks's lambda = 0.73, F{5, 66) =
4.79, p < .0009], and for feedback relevance
[Wilks's lambda = 0.83, F(Sy 66) = 2.73, p <
.03], and marginally for similarity of the
comparison person [Wilks's lambda = 0.85,
7=1(5, 66) = 2.24, p < .06]. There were signif-
icant effects for all two-way interactions:
Wilks's lambda = 0.85, f\5, 66) = 2.28, p <
.05 for Valence X Relevance; Wilks's
lambda = 0.84, F{5, 66) = 2.44, p < .04
for Relevance X Similarity; and Wilks's
lambda = 0.84, F\5, 66) = 2.50, p < .04 for
Valence X Similarity. The three-way interac-
tion, Valence X Relevance X Similarity, did
not quite reach significance: Wilks's
lambda = 0.88, F(5, 66) = 1.67, p < .15.
Because of the largely significant MANOVA,
we analyzed the dependent variables individ-
ually. First, however, we reexamined the de-
pendent variables together, but in two groups
because two distinct types of measures had
been planned for this study. These were cog-
nitive variables—evaluations of the compar-
ison person, desired friendship with this per-
son, and self-perceived envy/jealousy—and
affective variables—depression and anxiety.
Cognitive dependent variables. The cell
785
Table 1
Correlations Among Dependent Variables
Variable 1
1. Other-evaluation — .78 -.44 -.37 -.35
2. Desired friendship — -.43 -.41 -29
3. Envy/jealousy — .33 .34
4. Depression — .56
5. Anxiety —
Note. For all correlations; if \r\ > .21, then p < .05, and
if fH > .28, then p< .01.
means for all of the dependent variables are
presented in Table 2. (Table 2 also shows the
results of univariate analyses.) A MANOVA on
the cognitive variables revealed (a) significant
effects for all three main effects [Wilks's
lambda = 0.77, J^3, 68) = 6.74, p < .0005
for valence; Wilks's lambda = 0.86, P(3t
68) = 3.66, p < .02 for relevance; and Wilks's
lambda = 0.86, PQ, 68) = 3.58, p < .02 for
similarity], (b) significant effects for all three
two-way interactions [Wilks's lambda = 0.86,
F(3, 68) = 3.78, p < .01 for Va-
lence X Relevance; Wilks's lambda = 0.86,
F(3, 68)= 3.81, p<.0l for Va-
lence X Similarity; and Wilks's lambda =
0.85, F(3, 68) = 3.93, p < .01 for Rele-
vance X Similarity], and (c) a nearly signifi-
cant three-way interaction [Wilks's lambda =
0.88, F(3, 68) = 2.52, p < .06 for Valence X
Relevance X Similarity].
In order to directly test the major hypoth-
esis of this study (that social-comparison
3
Correlation and multiple regression analyses that
included the personality scales that made up the RWPP
were conducted, and revealed little that was theoretically
interesting. With the exception of the Self-Report Jealousy
Scale, none of the measures was associated with the
dependent variables of this study. The Self-Report Jealousy
Scale, though significantly related to some of the dependent
variables, accounted for very little variance in them.
Results of these analyses are available from the authors
on request.
*ANOVAS revealed no occupational group differences
on any of the dependent measures. Women gave more
positive evaluations to the comparison person on com-
petence, F{1, 77) = 5.64, p < .02, and on sociophiua,
f[l, 77) = 6.40, p < .02. Data have been pooled over
gender and occupational group in the remaining analyses.
Because of the small n that would have resulted, ANOVAS
were not performed with sex and occupational group as
independent variables with the manipulated variables.
 786 PETER SALOVEY AND JUDITH RODIN

Table 2
Means and Analyses of Dependent Variables
Condition Other ratings Desired Friendship Envy/Jealousy Depression Anxiety
Positive valence
Irrelevant
Dissimilar
M 122.30. 4.50. 0.30. 6.30. 37.50.
SD 13.33 1.65 0.67 2.06 9.22
Similar
M 124.70. 4.80. 0.20. 7.90. 34.10.
SD 15.56 1.03 0.63 3.35 7.82
Relevant
Dissimilar
M 125.10. 5.20. 0.00. 5.20. 32.80.
SD 11.93 0.92 0.00 2.44 4.89
Similar
M 122.30, 5.00. 0.00. 5.90. 34.50.
SD 19.88 1.70 000 4.41 6.43
Negative valence
Irrelevant
Dissimilar
M 120.60. 3.60.h 0.30. 8.90. 34.20.
SD 17.68 1.84 0.67 5.57 8.94
Similar
M 109.78. 3.70.h 0.10. 8.50. 33.90.
SD 10.11 1.49 0.32 3.78 8.24
Relevant
Dissimilar
M 119.56. 4.90. 0.10. 6.00. 31.30.
SD 23.71 1.45 0.32 3.89 6.22
Similar
M 84.00* 2.30,, 1.30* 9.80. 39.70.
SD 21.42 0.82 0.95 5 14 10.97
Three-way A NOVA results
Contrast
F 39.19"* 21.85"" 38.87"** 4.43** 4.32"
df 1,70 1,72 1,72 1,72 1,72
Residual
F 0.97 2.04* 0.54 1.32 0.55
df 6, 70 6,72 6,72 6,72 6,72
•Valence
F 15.58*" 15.71"" 7.01"* 4.89" 0.00
df 1.70 1,72 1,72 1, 72 1,72
Relevance
F 3.23* 0.40 1.04 1.73 0.04
df 1,70 1, 72 1,72 1, 72 1,72
Similarity
F 8.46*" 3.62* 3.36* 2.55 0.79
df 1,70 1,72 1,72 1,72 1,72
V XR
F 3.59* 0.63 9.33*" 0.18 1.00
df 1,70 1,72 1,72 1,72 1.72
v Fxs 8.62"* 4.25" 5.02" 0.09 1.85
df 1,70 1, 72 1,72 1,72 1,72
R XS
F 3.53* 6.44" 9.33*" 0.85 3.67*
df 1,70 1,72 1,72 1, 72 1,72
VXRXS
F 1.56 3.04» 7.01"* 2.04 0.25
df 1,70 1,72 1,72 1,72 1,72
Note. V = valence; R = relevance, S = similarity. Subscripts refer to results of Tukey's Multiple Comparison Procedure.
Comparisons should be made vertically, and means that do not differ according to this criterion have the same subscript.
* p < .10. " p < .05. " • p < .01. " " p < .001.
 SOCIAL-COMPARISON JEALOUSY
jealousy would be felt most strongly under
conditions of negative self-relevant feedback
and the presence of a similar, successful other
person), means for this cell on the evaluation
measure, desired friendship, and envy/jeal-
ousy were compared with means in the re-
maining seven cells via an a priori weighted
contrast. The results of this contrast are
provided in Table 2. On other-evaluation,
desired friendship, and envy/jealousy, this
cell (termed the jealousy cell) was significantly
different from the remaining seven cells. In
addition, Ftest on the residual variance (after
the contrast variance was removed) were not
significant, indicating that there was little
systematic variance left following that ex-
plained by the a priori contrast. Table 2 also
presents the results from two other analyses,
the three-way univariate analyses of variance
(ANOVAS) and Tukey's Multiple Comparison
Procedure. Tukey's multiple comparisons
verified that the jealousy cell was different
from the remaining seven cells, for the most
part, and that there were few differences
among the seven nonjealousy cells.
Affective dependent variables. The cell
means for the two affective variables (depres-
sion and anxiety) are also presented in Table
2. A MANOVA on the combination of the two
affective variables revealed only a significant
main effect for feedback valence [Wilks's
lambda = 0.91, ^ 2 , 71) = 3.52, p < .03].
No other main effects nor any interactions
were significant: Wilks's lambda = 0.97, f\2,
71) = 1.08, p = .35 for feedback relevance;
Wilks's lambda = 0.96, F\2, 71) = 1.26, p =
.29 for similarity of the other person; Wilks's
lambda = 0.98, F(2, 71) = 0.51, p = .60 for
Valence X Relevance; Wilks's lambda = 0.97,
F(2, 71) = 1 . 0 7 , p = .35 for Va-
lence X Similarity; Wilks's lambda = 0.95,
F{2, 71)= 1.83, p = .17 for Relevance X
Similarity; and Wilks's lambda = 0.97, F(2,
71) = 1.08, p = .35 for Valence X Rele-
vance X Similarity.
As indicated in Table 2, the multiple com-
parison procedure revealed no differences
among the eight cells in anxiety or depression.
However, the planned weighted contrast of
the jealousy cell, as compared with the re-
maining seven cells, suggests that subjects
were indeed more anxious and depressed
when they received negative relevant feedback
and were compared with a similar, successful
787
other person. F tests on the residual variance
following the contrast are reported in Table
2 and are all nonsignificant, indicating that
there is no systematic variance left to explain
following the removal of the theoretically
interesting variance. Results from the three-
way ANOVAS, showing strong effects only for
valence, are presented in Table 2 as well.
Independent Variables' Relation to
Mediational Measures5
Cell means for the four mediational vari-
ables are presented in Table 3. Because these
four variables tended to be intercorrelated,
we performed a MANOVA for the combina-
tion of these variables. With regard to the
apparently weak mean differences depicted
in Table 3, it is not surprising that there
were no significant main effects [Wilks's
lambda = 0.95, F\4, 68) = 0.93, p = .45 for
feedback valence; Wilks's lambda = 0.95,
F\4, 68) = 0.88, p = .48, for feedback
relevance; Wilks's lambda = 0.94, ^ 4 , 68) =
1.12,/? = .35 for similarity of the comparison
person], nor any significant two-way interac-
tions [Wilks's lambda = 0.92, 7=1(4, 68) = 1.55,
p = .20 for Valence X Relevance; Wilks's
lambda = 0.99, F{4, 68) = 0.07, p = .99 for
Valence X Similarity; and Wilks's lambda =
0.95, 7=1(4, 68) = 0.97, p = .43 for Rele-
vance X Similarity], nor a significant Va-
lence X Relevance X Similarity three-way
interaction [Wilks's lambda = 0.99, 7=1(4,
68) = 0.23, p = .95]. Because of the lack of
significant results on the MANOVA, no further
analyses of these variables (e.g., univariate
ANOVAS) were undertaken.
Discussion
As hypothesized, individuals experienced
social-comparison jealousy only when they
received self-relevant negative feedback and
subsequently had to associate with a similar
(self-relevant), successful other person. The
5
ANOVAS revealed no significant main effects of gender
or occupational group on mediational measures. Data
have been pooled over gender and occupational group in
the remaining analyses, ANOVAS were not performed with
sex and occupational group as independent variables
with the manipulated variables to identify interaction
effects because of the small n that would have been
represented in each cell.
788 PETER SALOVEY AND JUDITH RODIN

Table 3
Means of Mediational Variables by Condition
Positive Negative

Irrelevant Relevant Irrelevant Relevant

Variable Dissim. Sim. Dissim. Sim. Dissim. Sim. Disam. Sim.

Positive/negative affect
M 21.00 18.50 20.20 19.30 19.50 17.50 18.30 18.60
SD 3.16 4.45 4.21 5.12 5.40 4.43 5.42 4.06
Self-concept
M 67.20 67.30 69.50 67.40 63.30 64.20 68.00 63.70
SD 4.71 7.11 6.93 5.44 14.00 9.75 5.98 9.75
Self-esteem
M 59.60 59.70 56.20 54.30 56.80 56.50 60.30 56.70
SD 5.76 6.98 6.66 6.29 11.27 11.70 4.24 8.01
Self-esteem change
M -0.30 0.90 0.40 1.20 -0.10 3.00 0.70 -O.30
SD 2.83 4.23 4.40 3.82 3.28 5.83 2.45 6.09

Note. Dissim. = dissimilar other, Sim. = similar other. There are 10 subjects in each cell.

experience of social-comparison jealousy was The Necessity of Three

manifested by individuals' disparaging of the
comparison person under these conditions.
In addition, subjects identified this situation
as one in which they experienced envy or
jealousy, and there was some evidence that it
engendered feelings of depression and anxiety
as well.
The state that we label social-comparison
jealousy is similar to that state described by
Tesser and Campbell (1983) as "the pain of
comparison" (p. 6). Tesser sees this painful
state as resulting from unfavorable compari-
sons with others on self-relevant dimensions,
and so do we. Both Tesser and we note the
necessity of self-relevant comparison objects
(i.e., we require that the other person must
be similar to us; Tesser states that the other
person should be in a close relationship with
us). In the present study we have extended
Tesser's "pain of comparison" notion by dis-
covering that such pain is composed of de-
pressed affect and anxiety. In addition,
whereas Tesser sees the results of such com-
parisons taking three potential forms—(a) a
decreased closeness with the other, (b) an
interference with the performance of the other,
or (c) an altering of one's self-definition—we
have identified a fourth consequence of com-
parison, the degradation of the character (and
not just the performance) of the rival.
Situational Conditions
Are all three conditions—negative feed-
back, self-relevant feedback, and a similar,
successfulrival—necessaryfor the experience
of social-comparison jealousy? Without doubt,
mere inspection of condition means indicates
that jealousy is most manifest (asrivaldepre-
cation, negative mood, anxiety, and self-report
of envy/jealousy) when all three conditions
are present. We used the a priori contrast in
the analyses of this experiment to test the
hypothesis that all three conditions are nec-
essary for social-comparison jealousy to be
experienced. For the case in which any one
of these conditions was absent, no jealousy
was predicted. Of course, the "low" condition
of any of the three independent variables is
really not equivalent to the absence of that
variable. As such it is not correct to speak of
an "all-or-none" effect of the three indepen-
dent variables on jealousy. Thus although a
multiplicative relation among these variables
may exist, the implications of this model are
not addressed by this study. Certainly, the
planned contrast positing all of the impact
of the three variables in just one of the eight
cells fits the data very well for all of the
cognitive and affective dependent variables.
We argue, then, that social-comparison jeal-
 SOCIAL-COMPARISON JEALOUSY
ousy is most manifest during the conjoint
action of these three situational factors. When
one or more of them is reduced, there is little
degradation of the rival, depression, or anxi-
ety, and almost no self-report of envy or
jealousy.
Alternative Explanations and
Mediational Variables
An alternative explanation for the main
findings of this study is that negative feedback
(particularly when it is self-relevant and in
the implied presence of a similar, successful
rival) causes a negative affective state in its
recipient. This depressed mood, then, primes
the availability of negatively toned material
in memory (cf. Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker,
Clark, & Karp, 1978) and promotes selective
attention to affectively negative external stim-
uli. As a result, the recipient of such feedback
is likely to evaluate other people negatively
and do the same for his or her own thoughts
and beliefs. Negative feedback thus leads to
a negative mood state, causing one to attend
to and recall only the negative aspects of
other people, the "feel-bad-see-others-as-bad"
hypothesis.
The best evidence for evaluating this hy-
pothesis comes from the mediational mea-
sures, administered immediately after the bo-
gus feedback was conveyed to the subject.
On all four of these measures—affect, reactive
self-concept, self-esteem, and self-esteem
change—no significant differences were noted
among the eight feedback conditions of this
experiment. According to the "feel-bad-see-
others-as-bad" hypothesis, at least, negative
feedback produces negative affective ratings
and, perhaps, negative views of oneself. This
was not the case. It seems, then, that the
negative feedback was processed (and mani-
fested itself) in a more subtle way. Rather
than causing an immediate mood and self-
concept deflation, it led to increased dispar-
aging of a potential rival (along with some
anxiety and depression) at a later point in
time. Perhaps such feedback only becomes
salient when the recipient thinks that he or
she is going to interact with the rival. Subjects
labeled such a state as envy or jealousy more
consistently than they termed it depression
or anxiety.
789
An explanation for subjects' behavior that
focuses on motivation to maintain positive
self-evaluation (cf. Tesser & Campbell, 1980)
may be more fruitful. Subjects may disparage
a potential rival (who outperformed them) in
order to decrease their similarity to him or
her, that is, they undercut his or her relevance
as an object of comparison. One possible
explanation for our results, not suggested by
Tesser's work, is that anxiety and sadness at
the prospect of having to interact with this
person may arise as a consequence of the act
of disparaging an "innocent" person, rather
than from this person's performance per se.
However, we can also integrate our work with
Tesser's in the following way. Antecedents
such as unflattering comparisons in self-rel-
evant domains, which provoke self-esteem
maintenance processes, should also lead to
the experience of jealousy. It is the feeling of
jealousy that in return increases depression,
anxiety, and behaviors that serve to degrade
the other.
Speculating further, it seems that when we
attack a similar other, we attack part of
ourselves, because our self-definition was ob-
tained through contextuaUy anchored pro-
cesses (i.e., social comparison) in the first
place. Thus our deprecation of rivals may,
rather than bolstering a diminished self-es-
teem, actually serve in some cases to diminish
it even further, thus exacerbating social-com-
parison jealousy. Of course, the positing of
such sequences of events is only speculative
in the context of the present study. There is
really no opportunity here to distinguish
among alternative sequence models. Perhaps
future researchers who use structural equation
designs and time series data will be able to
further illuminate these issues.
The Processing of Self-Definitional
Information
The effects of relatively negative versus
positive feedback in the presence of similar
or dissimilar others has had a somewhat long
history in the social comparison literature
(cf. Darley, 1966; Festinger, 1954; Singer,
1980; Suls & Miller, 1977). The processing
of self-relevant information, however, has only
recently become an area of particularly in-
790 PETER SALOVEY AND JUDITH RODIN
tense research in social cognition. Research
in this area may help us to understand why
feedback must be on a self-definitional di-
mension in order for it to have jealousy-
inducing consequences.
For feedback to be thoroughly attended to,
it must be consistent with one's self-schema.
Markus (1977) defines a self-schema as a
collection of "cognitive generalizations about
the self, deriving from past experience, that
organize and guide social experience" (p. 63).
The self-schema organizes personally relevant
experiences, serving as a template against
which individuals perceive and encode infor-
mation about themselves. Self-schema con-
gruent information is better remembered than
incongruent material (Markus & Sentis, 1982)
and, within certain bounds, is processed more
efficiently and in a more prototypic way
(Kuiper & Derry, 1980; Kuiper & Rogers,
1979; Rogers, Rogers, & Kuiper, 1979).
The negative feedback that led to jealousy
in this study was certainly not congruent
with a subject's self-schema. Yet the infor-
mation was still highly relevant. On the one
hand, individuals are inclined to ignore self-
schema incongruent information, but there is
a simultaneous tendency for self-relevant in-
formation to be especially affectively powerful.
As Higgins, Kuiper, and Olson (1981) note,
"a recurring theme in the 'self literature is
that increases in the perceived relevance of
an event to the self lead to heightened affect
or emotionality (Cooley, 1902; Epstein, 1973;
James, 1890; Rogers, 1951; Snygg & Coombs,
1959)" (p. 413). In the present study, the
same information could have been both self-
relevant and self-schema incongruent. For
example, a premedical student might have
received false feedback that he or she had
below-average medical science aptitude. Neg-
ative feedback on a dimension that is partic-
ularly important to oneself, then, may be
impossible to ignore because of its affective
consequences. The tension between the affec-
tive power of self-relevant information and
the predilection to ignore incongruent infor-
mation may underlie social-comparison jeal-
ousy.
This tension was often exhibited by subjects
in the jealousy-inducing conditions of the
present study. Such subjects often reported
during the debriefing that although they did
not want to believe the negative feedback,
they could not put it out of their minds. No
matter how much they tried to convince
themselves that perhaps a mistake had been
made, they still began to doubt their abilities
in the feedback domain. As one subject stated,
I tried to ignore the results on the graph because they
seemed so far from the truth. But no matter how much
I tried to get on with the task, my mind kept returning
to that below-average profile. Soon, I was feeling a bit
worried and very sensitive about my own abilities. Then,
when I read the other guy's story, I couldn't help but
think, "If he's such a not-shot premed and does so well
in his classes, I bet he's really just a nerd; I bet he's one
of those unfriendly, antisocial weenies that hang out in
the library 20 hours a day; he probably couldn't have an
interesting conversation with anyone." I hated him and
envied him at the same time because he seemed so good
at his work, while I was beginning to doubt my ability
to ever become a doctor, (emphasis added)
Such doubting of one's abilities in a self-
definitional domain seems to provoke social
comparison, perhaps in a determined effort
to reaffirm one's sense of competence. This
leads to sensitivity regarding the successful
performances of others in this domain and
ultimately to disparaging these people, as one
searches for factors that might mitigate their
apparent success. By degrading successful
rivals or their performances, jealous individ-
uals believe that they can regain their dimin-
ished status. Such attempts are often unsuc-
cessful in the long term and may make matters
worse by publicly revealing one's jealous feel-
ings.
In summary, the present study served to
systematically vary the antecedents of social-
comparison jealousy and examine their role
in producing cognitive, behavioral, and affec-
tive consequences, enabling us to identify
many of the component processes involved
in social-comparison jealousy. Further work
is needed, however, to fully understand the
integration of cognitive, affective, and physi-
ological processes in such complex emotional
states.
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Revision received February 3, 1984 •

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