THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CAYETANO
RAMAYRAT, defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General VILLAMOR, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTEMPT; DISOBEDIENCE OF AN ORDER NOT ADDRESSED TO
THE DEFENDANT. — A person can not be punished for contempt because of his alleged disobedience of an order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution issued by a justice of the peace to the sheriff, directing the latter to place the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the defendant. Such an order must be addressed to an officer of the court and not to either the plaintiff or the defendant. The party in possession may have been unwilling to deliver the land, but such unwillingness does not constitute an act of disobedience as defined by article 252 of the Penal Code. The disobedience contemplated by the said article consists in the failure or refusal to obey a direct judicial order and not an order which is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties. In the case at bar, while the order does direct that the party in possession shall surrender the property, it does not and could not order him so to do. The act of restoration is one which pertains to the sheriff alone, to whom the law intrusts the execution of judgments. 2. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE SHERIFF TO EXECUTE WRITS. — Nor does the failure of the party in possession himself to surrender the property constitute a disobedience of an order of an agent of the authorities. The duty of sheriff was to place the proper person in possession. Instead of so doing, the sheriff merely ordered the defendant to deliver the property. A sheriff has no power to require any person to perform an act which he is himself bound to perform. Under such circumstances, disobedience on the part of the person to whom the sheriff gave such order does not constitute a crime.
DECISION
MAPA, J : p
On the 8th of February, 1911, the provincial fiscal of Misamis, Agusan,
I concur. I think it proper, however, to indicate that as I understand it,
the majority opinion is not to be construed as holding that defendant would not have been guilty of the offense defined and penalized in article 252 of the Penal Code had he refused to surrender possession of the property to the sheriff himself, upon demand therefor, in order that the sheriff himself might give possession to the person entitled thereto as indicated in the writ.