COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS EASTERN SEA TRADING

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were
pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there
was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of
the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to
the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.
HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3
of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government
than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of
exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or
‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin,
may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the
large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in
our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the
approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax
on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those
with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.
PIMENTEL VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern
xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The
Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature
until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the
Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory states. Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the
Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
Issue: Whether or not the executive may be compelled to transmit the copy of the treaty signed to the Senate
for its concurrence under the constitution.
Held: No. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations.
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the
legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution
provided:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate, to make treaties xxx.
Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treatymaking process was deemed essential to provide a
check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in
the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance
necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the
instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N.
Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his
authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which
they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of
the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the
basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues
involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under
consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This
step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing
the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases
where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the
alternate, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring
home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions
of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to
examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they
find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and
consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them. x x x
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually
also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where
ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed
effective upon its signature. [emphasis supplied]
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It
should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps
in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the
states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act
by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus,
Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the
guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty
has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign
Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed
copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department
of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of
the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it
effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:
Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement. The
domestic requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment
thereto, shall be as follows:
A. Executive Agreements.
i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for
the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall include the highlights of the agreements and
the benefits which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them.
ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned agency, shall transmit
the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his ratification. The original signed instrument of
ratification shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action.
B. Treaties.
i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements provided in subparagraphs
1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs
shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the ratification by the President.
A certified true copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate, together with a
certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall accompany the submission of the treaties to the
Senate.
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the
treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to
the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself
requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness
to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the
President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully
study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people.
Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative
whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to
defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of
treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify
a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it
goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or
whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject
to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although
the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be
taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached
by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus
prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government
to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
TANADA VS ANGARA
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators
via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for
the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free
market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken
for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound
by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own
laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is
a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations
(UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What
Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or
viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a
member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade
law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

INCHONG VS HERNANDEZ
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no
strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty
of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country”.
But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs.Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260),
and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs.
Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).

FACTS:

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities
herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese
businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay.

Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose
of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).

He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income
generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
“”does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced””;
and, that the equal protection clause “”is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.””

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then
the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent
could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer
assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

DEUTSCHE BANK VS CIR

FACTS

Deutsche Bank remitted to the CIR an amount representing 15% of its branch profit remittance tax for 2002
and prior taxable years. Believing it made an overpayment, it filed an administrative claim for refund and
requested a confirmation of its entitlement to a preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty.

The CTA denied this claim based on RMO No. 1-2000 saying that Deutsche Bank violated the 15-day rule
for tax treaty relief application. It also cited Mirant which stated that before the benefits of the tax treaty
may be extended to a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the
provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Deustche Bank.

Laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled
thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs
provided for under international agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide
for any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.

The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good
faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in good
faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.

Laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled
thereto.

REAGAN VS CIR
FACTS:
Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the
US Air Force in the Philippines, questioned the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent
CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the
transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, that in legal
contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional
power to tax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by him be refunded.
ISSUE: WON the Clark Field Air Base is a foreign property therefore excluded from the power of
Philippine taxation.
HELD: NO.
By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that
the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. This provision is not and can not on principle
or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government.
The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease
to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot
be foreign territory.
GUERRERO TRANSPORT VS BLAYLOCK
FACTS
In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the
right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding was won by
Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion
Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport
Services Blayblock. Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).

When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union
filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1,
Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerrero’s MTD on
jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal,
the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to
“absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline” set by Guerrero, except
those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.

Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC
Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who failed to submit
themselves for processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals.
The Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasn’t appealed so it was declared
final & executory

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of
Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination
shall be final. The agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor
ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.

ISSUE

Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero.

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook,
consistent w/ military requirements, "to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services
are contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority
consideration to affected employees for employment.

A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement between states, and as municipal law for the
people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the treaty
enters into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In
view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the
employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition
of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.
Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as
to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such
determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through
Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's
Transport Services, subject to the following conditions:

a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its concession expired;
and
b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base
concerned.

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S.
naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the members of the Union.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the force
and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is
settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable
by execution upon approval by the court.

USA VS PURGANAN
FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish
Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the
Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the
USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition
praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an
alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M
in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside
the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash
which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court
is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima
facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing
upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought
to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would
give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could
have intended.
 Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice
or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine
the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding
is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence
of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that
the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended”
finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.”

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the
trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the
court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted
with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may
negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition
for Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine
of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting
state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Facts:
Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed a
petition questioning said act because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic
Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency.

Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for military stock pile purposes
(the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for
special authority). He also contends that there is no prohibition on importation made by the “Government
itself”. He also further that the Government has already entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and Burma;
that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; and, that such agreements
became binding and effective upon signing thereof by the representatives of both parties. Hechanova also
maintains that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition
herein and secure the relief therein prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court".
Issues:
3. What is the nature of the government contracts with Vietnam and Burma? Are they valid?

4. May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts?

RULING:
3. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even
assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as
well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not,
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing
the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 138, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or
for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation
involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

4. Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section
2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law,
but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
USAFFE v Treasurer of the Philippines
GR No. L-10500; June 30, 1959
FACTS:
In October 1941, by two special orders, General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of the U.S.
Army Forces in the Far East (known as USAFFE) placed under his command all the Philippine Army units
including the Philippine Constabulary, about 100,000 officers and soldiers. Out of the total amounts thus
appropriated by the U.S. Congress as itemized, P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the Philippines
Armed Forces by means of vouchers which stated "Advance of Funds under Public law 353-77th Congress
and Executive Order No. 9011". This amount was used (mostly) to discharge in the Philippine Islands the
monetary obligations assumed by the U.S. Government as a result of the induction of the Philippine Armed
Forces into the U.S. Army, and of its operations beginning in 1941. Part of these obligations consisted in
the claims of Filipino USAFFE soldiers for arrears in pay and in the charges for supplies used by them and
the guerrillas. Of the millions so transferred, there remained unexpended and uncommitted in the possession
of the Philippine Armed Forces as of December 31, 1949 about 35 million dollars. As at that time, the
Philippine Government badly needed funds for its activities, President Quirino, through Governor Miguel
Cuaderno of the Central Bank proposed to the corresponding officials of the U.S. Government the retention
of the 35-million dollars as a loan, and for its repayment in ten annual installments. After protracted
negotiations the deal was concluded, and the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was signed in Washington on
November 6, 1950, by the then Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos P. Romulo, and the then
American Secretary of the Treasury, John W. Snyder.
In this appeal, the Usaffe Veterans reiterated with extended arguments their basic propositions. They insists:
first, the money delivered to the U.S. to the Armed Forces of the Philippine Island were straight payments
for military services; ownership thereof vested in the Philippine Government upon delivery, and
consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; and second, the Romulo-Snyder
Agreement was void because it was not binding on the Philippine Government for lack of authority of the
officers who concluded the same.
ISSUE: Is the Romulo-Snyder Agreement void because it was not binding on the Philippine Government
for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same?
RULING: NO. That the agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the Constitution, is conceded.
The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence (Art. VII, Sec. 10 (7)). However, it must
be noted that a treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of the
treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the government over
international relations. Consequently, executive agreements may be entered with other states and are
effective even without the concurrence of the Senate.
Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting
external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as
presidential agreements and (2) agreements entered into in pursuant of acts of Congress, which have
been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely on September 18,
1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the President of the Philippines to obtain such
loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government of the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities.
Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintained that the
Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category, namely,
"agreements entered into purely as executive acts without legislative authorization." This second category
usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said
that this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this kind.