History and Philosophy of Logic

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Modal Homotopy Type Theory. The Prospect of a

New Logic for Philosophy
by D. Corfield, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020. x + 180 p. £69. ISBN:
978-0-19-885340-4.

A. Klev & C. Zwanziger

To cite this article: A. Klev & C. Zwanziger (2023) Modal Homotopy Type Theory. The
Prospect of a New Logic for Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic, 44:3, 337-342, DOI:
10.1080/01445340.2022.2107383

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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC
2023, VOL. 44, NO. 3, 337–342

REVIEW ARTICLE

Modal Homotopy Type Theory. The Prospect of a New Logic for Philosophy,
by D. Corfield, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020, x + 180 pp., £69, ISBN:
978-0-19-885340-4

1. Introduction
The theory referred to by the—perhaps intimidating—main title of this book is an extension
of Per Martin-Löf’s dependent type theory. Much philosophical work pertaining to dependent
type theory takes as its starting point Martin-Löf’s meaning explanations, that is, a system of
careful explanations by virtue of which type theory is not merely an object of metamathematical
study, but a meaningful formalism fit for the expression of logico-mathematical thought. The
present book takes a different approach. David Corfield sets out to harvest philosophical fruits
from the rich syntax of dependent type theory and its deep connections to category theory.
This places the book in line, on the one hand, with work in linguistics utilizing dependent type
theory, and on the other hand, with philosophical work on, or inspired by, category theory.
The book’s subtitle points to its programmatic character. The preface and the conclusion
each opens with quotations from the final paragraph of Russell 1914, ch. 2, which praises the
advantages of the new logic invented by Frege and Peano over the old logic inherited from
Aristotle and the schoolmen. A ‘new new logic’, as Corfield calls it (p. 163), has now appeared
in the form of modal homotopy type theory, which should become the new ‘formal language of
choice’ in philosophy (p. v). To get there, ‘a large-scale retraining exercise’ would be necessary
(p. vi). In the process, a reconsideration of central parts of analytic philosophy would follow
(p. 27).
As befits a book containing such programmatic statements, it probes widely rather than
deeply. Others may come after and develop individual topics in more detail. Apart from the
technical material that makes up Corfield’s presentation of modal homotopy type theory itself,
topics dealt with range from the methodology of philosophy to the ontology of events, from
definite descriptions to the nature of present-day work in geometry. Also befitting the pro-
grammatic character of the book is the enthusiasm Corfield shows for its subject matter. This
enthusiasm may indeed inspire readers to follow the call to explore the prospects of modal
homotopy type theory as a new logic for philosophy.
We proceed with a general discussion of modal homotopy type theory in Section 2 and a
critique of Corfield’s book in Section 3.

2. Modal Homotopy Type Theory

Modal homotopy type theory is a combination of two extensions of dependent type theory
that are currently subjects of active research: homotopy type theory and modal dependent
type theory. The first of these has been widely publicised and may be familiar to the reader
of this review. Dependent type theory is here extended with principles motivated by homotopy
theory. Famous among these is univalence, a principle which entails that all expressible prop-
erties of mathematical objects are structural properties. Modal dependent type theory is less
well-known. Here, dependent type theory is extended with type operators whose behaviour is
to reflect that of the propositional operators of ordinary modal logic.
338 ANSTEN KLEV AND COLIN ZWANZIGER

Dependent type theory is a refinement of simple type theory in which not only terms,
but also types, may depend on variables. The notation x : A  B(x) indicates that a type B(x)
depends on a variable x : A. The notation x : A  b(x) : B(x) indicates that both the term b(x)
and its type B(x) depend on a variable x : A. The presence of dependent types makes possible
the treatment of quantified propositions as types, as required by the propositions-as-types prin-
ciple. The universally quantified proposition (∀x ∈ A)B(x) is identified with the generalized
Cartesian product, (x : A)B(x), and the existentially quantified proposition, (∃x ∈ A)B(x),
with the generalized disjoint union, (x : A)B(x). Alternatively, dependent type theory may
be thought of as extending predicate logic with vocabulary for talking about indexed families.
That is, under a model-theoretic interpretation, x : A  B(x) denotes an indexed family of sets,
(Bx )x∈A , and x : A  b(x) : B(x) denotes an indexed family of elements.
Although dependent type theory was developed for formalising mathematics, it has turned
out to be a sophisticated tool also for modelling contextual and anaphoric dependencies in
natural language. An early example is the following compositional translation of the donkey
sentence (Sundholm 1986, p. 502):

D :≡ (z : (x : farmer)(y : donkey) owns(x, y)) beats(π1 (z), π2 (z))

Under a natural model-theoretic interpretation, the variable z here ranges over triples (x, y, e),
where x is a farmer, y is a donkey and e is an element of 1(= {∅}) if x owns y and an element of
0(= ∅) otherwise. The functions [[π1 ]] and [[π2 ]] are the first and second projections, respec-
tively. An element of the set [[D]] is a function that takes such a triple and outputs an element
of 1 if x beats y and an element of 0 otherwise. We then have [[D]] ∼ = 1 if the donkey sentence
is true and [[D]] ∼= 0 otherwise. This and related applications of dependent type theory in lin-
guistics have been developed by Ranta (1994) and several linguists following in his wake. To
this day, however, mention of dependent type theory remains absent from mainstream intro-
ductory resources on dynamic semantics. One could see Corfield’s book as part of a joint effort
by committed type theorists to remedy such apparent ignorance of their subject, not only in
linguistics, but also in philosophy.
Under the propositions-as-types principle, the identity predicate, a =A b, is identified with
a dependent type IdA (a, b). Homotopy type theory is the result of a surprising interpretation of
terms of type IdA (a, b) as paths between points a and b in a space A. Under the same interpreta-
tion, a term of a type of the form IdIdA (a,b) (p, q) is a homotopy between the paths p and q. As the
reader might guess, all of this allows for the formalisation of homotopy-theoretic arguments.
Closer to home, homotopy type theory has drawn the attention of philosophers of math-
ematics interested in structuralism. In dependent type theory, we may form the type S of
structured sets of a given kind and size. For such structured sets A and B, the univalence prin-
ciple identifies terms of the type IdS (A, B) with isomorphisms from A to B. Since identity
types are governed by a suitable analogue of the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, any
expressible property of A may then be transferred to B using a given isomorphism. All prop-
erties of structured sets expressible in homotopy type theory are thus structural in the sense
of being isomorphism-invariant. Indeed, all properties of mathematical objects expressible in
homotopy type theory are structural in the appropriate sense (see Awodey 2014).
Just as predicate logic may be refined with modal operators on formulas, dependent type the-
ory may be refined with modal operators on dependent types, leading to modal dependent type
theory. It would take us too far afield to sketch the interpretation of the box operator on depen-
dent types in a Kripke model. We may, however, note that, in the degenerate case of a simple
type A, the type A recovers the type of intensions of type A, in the sense of Montague 1973
(see Zwanziger 2017).
We concur with Corfield that modal dependent type theory will lead to more nat-
uralistic and tractable formalisations of modal arguments, such as appear in philosophy
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 339

of language and metaphysics. For instance, because modal operators on dependent types
generalise modal operators on (potentially open) formulas, modal dependent type the-
ory involves a sophisticated treatment of what Quine (1953) termed the ‘third degree
of modal involvement’. Indeed, the foundational work on modal dependent type theory
(Nanevski et al. 2008) provides the modern treatment of ‘quantifying in’. In this concep-
tion, the variable x in a formula φ(x) is available for quantification and substitution of
equals for equals, with the proviso that it must be formally rigid (or valid, as Nanevski
et al. say).
Modal homotopy type theory, a field that uses modal dependent type theories to formalise
arguments in areas of geometry related to homotopy theory, is still in its infancy. It has roots
in a line of modal logic that may be little-known to philosophers. In topos theory, the result,
j(φ), of applying the so-called Lawvere–Tierney modality j to a formula φ may be glossed as ‘it
is locally the case that φ’ (see Goldblatt 1981). The operator j satisfies axioms extending those
for an S4 diamond operator—whence the connection to modal logic. Early efforts in modal
homotopy type theory (Univalent Foundations Program 2013) extended the operation of j to
dependent types. The ambitions of modal homotopy type theory, however, extend far beyond
this. Indeed, modal homotopy type theorists would like to axiomatise many areas of modern
geometry. Schreiber (2019), for instance, calls for augmenting homotopy type theory with thir-
teen interacting modal operators in order to create a system of ‘super homotopy type theory’,
to which a few more modal operators must be added in order to formalise arguments in string
theory.

3. Critical Remarks
Only time will tell whether the revolution in philosophical logic that Corfield hopes for is
realised. It does not seem likely to us that modal homotopy type theory will become the go-
to area of logic for philosophers, but we certainly are at one with Corfield in hoping that more
philosophers will come to appreciate the conceptual and technical riches of dependent type
theory. Some of these philosophers may come to prefer a modal-homotopic version.
Abstracting from the aspirations on behalf of modal homotopy type theory expressed at
various places in the book, we find an introduction to this brand of type theory aimed at philoso-
phers. It is naturally divided into two components: a technical component presenting the theory
and a philosophical component sketching various applications in the philosophy of language,
metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics.

3.1. Technical Component

The technical component is not—and does not pretend to be—a self-standing introduction to
type theory. Someone who sets out reading this book with little or no knowledge of dependent
type theory, or indeed of homotopy type theory, must therefore expect to have to consult other
sources as well. In fact, we think the book would serve quite well as a supplement to the standard
reference on homotopy type theory (Univalent Foundations Program 2013). Corfield illustrates
several of the basic ideas of dependent type theory with non-mathematical examples, and he
explains in an accessible way how homotopy type theory and its extensions by modalities relate
to recent developments in mathematics, such as the work of Jacob Lurie.
To learn the language of type theory means in part to learn a great number of rules, in
particular the formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules associated with each
type-forming operator. The central role of rules in type theory suggests to Corfield a fruitful
exchange of ideas between it and so-called inferentialism in the philosophy of language (pp. 55,
60, 73, 109). However, Corfield does not present these rules in any detail, instead preferring
340 ANSTEN KLEV AND COLIN ZWANZIGER

informal explanations. The pedagogical value of informal explanations is clear, but it is our
view that familiarity with the rules is required for a proper understanding of type theory. An
appendix of a few pages outlining the rules, such as is given in (Univalent Foundations Program
2013), might have been helpful to some readers. (This may be an appropriate place to note a
serious typo in the formulation of the premisses of the -introduction rule on page 55. The pre-
misses should be the two judgements x : X and a : A(x) and not the single hypothetical judge-
ment x : X  a(x) : A(x). Of course, this typo does not affect the rest of Corfield’s discussion
of -types.)
From the partly biographical Chapter 1 we learn that category theory was Corfield’s point of
departure on his own ‘path to a new logic’ (as the chapter is called). For many years, Corfield has
advocated a philosophy of mathematics integrating the lessons of category theory. A category-
theoretical attitude is conspicuous also in the present book. The type-theoretical counterparts
of the logical operators are explained, not only informally and through some of the associated
rules, but also as certain adjoint functors (pp. 40–41, 55–56). In some cases, such as in the
presentation of the notion of a universe (pp. 83–85) and in the presentation of modalities, the
category-theoretical viewpoint dominates entirely.
A universe is a type whose terms are (codes of) types. Universes are essential if one wishes to
develop mathematics within dependent type theory. Although the type-theoretical definition
of a universe should be readily accessible to a reader who has mastered the concept of a set of
sets, Corfield does not give this definition, rather explaining universes by way of the notion of a
moduli space from algebraic geometry and the notion of a classifying object from topos theory.
Corfield also opts for a discussion of the categorical semantics of modal dependent type the-
ory rather than a syntactic presentation. This choice is regrettable, as it means that the book’s
titular subject matter is treated indirectly. Although this category-theoretic treatment is mostly
on-target, the discussion would have benefited from closer engagement with the literature. Cor-
field’s general approach is rooted in the categorical semantics of S4 modal logic developed by
Ghilardi and Meloni (1988) and Reyes and Zolfaghari (1991), but this goes unremarked.

3.2. Philosophical Component

The philosophical applications of type theory that Corfield sketches in the book are wide-
ranging: the need for types, the semantics of ‘and’, presupposition versus consequence, events,
sortalised identity, definite descriptions, the notion of structure, the notion of modality, and
modern geometry.
Discussions of type theory among present-day philosophical logicians tend to be concerned
with a simple type hierarchy over a base type of individuals: ι is a type, and if α1 , . . . , αn are
types, then so is (α1 , . . . , αn ), namely the type of n-ary propositional functions whose kth argu-
ment is of type αk . One question asked is whether type theory in this sense has anything to offer
the philosopher that is not already provided by set theory (see e.g. Linnebo and Rayo 2012).
Dependent type theory has a much more refined type structure than simple type theory. In
particular, it has, instead of the one or two base types typically recognized in simple type the-
ory, an indefinite range of types, including the type N of natural numbers, the type N × N of
pairs of natural numbers, and the type N → N of functions from natural numbers to natural
numbers. When Corfield argues for the need for types (pp. 29–36), he must be seen primarily as
arguing for the need for such finer type distinctions. Being committed type theorists ourselves,
we can only agree with the drift of Corfield’s argument. Corfield (pp. 72–75) is also right to
note the need to restrict identity to such types, as is done in the identity type IdA (a, b) and,
more generally, throughout dependent type theory.
Corfield’s discussion (pp. 41–48) of ‘and’ hints at how dependent types may be used to cap-
ture anaphoric reference. Corfield’s translation of ‘Pam took a key out of her bag and unlocked
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 341

the door with it’ is, however, just a type-theoretical rendering of a predicate-logical sentence
with shape
(∃x ∈ key)(Takes−out(x) ∧ Unlocks−door(x))
This translation is not compositional, since the existential quantifier ranges over both conjuncts.
As Ranta (1994) has emphasized, compositionality can be obtained by making use of -types
in the following way:
 
y : (x : key)Takes−out(x) Unlocks−door(π1 (y))

Such an analysis allows the extension by further conjuncts, for instance ‘and then put it back in
the bag’:
   
z : y : (x : key)Takes−out(x))Unlocks−door(π1 (y)) Puts−back(π1 (π1 (z))

Although Corfield does not give this analysis for the conjunction, he does give the correspond-
ing analysis for implication (p. 49), in particular of the sentence ‘if there is something you like,
you should buy it’.
Corfield’s type-theoretical account of definite descriptions (pp. 89–100) is original, but
unconvincing, in our view. Russell’s definite-description operator, ι, takes a propositional func-
tion P over some domain A and yields a term, (ιx : A)P of type A. Owing to the intended
meaning of ι, it is required for the well-formedness of (ιx : A)P that there be a unique a in A such
that P(a) is true. This grammar of ι is assumed, not only by Hilbert and Bernays (1934), but also
in works on definite descriptions of more direct relevance to dependent type theory, namely
Stenlund 1975 and Carlström 2005. Corfield does consider a treatment of definite descrip-
tions along these lines (p. 96), but he develops in more detail a different account, where the
definite-description operator operates on domains A with a unique inhabitant. One reason to
be sceptical of this alternative account is the consequence that, for instance, ‘the smallest prime
number’ ends up having the type ‘smallest prime number’ rather than, say, ‘prime number’ or
‘natural number’.
Corfield applies this account of definite descriptions to an analysis of ‘the structure of A’
(pp. 100–105), offered as a contribution to the debate on structuralism in the philosophy math-
ematics. Under that account of definite descriptions, Corfield must then first form a type, str(A),
with a unique inhabitant. Corfield chooses the type (X : U)eq(X, A), where eq(X, A) means
that X and A are equivalent in the category-theoretic sense. Objects of this type are pairs (X, f ),
where X is a type in the universe U, and f is a witness to the equivalence of X and A. The reflexiv-
ity of equivalence together with the univalence axiom entails that str(A) has a unique inhabitant,
hence it may serve as the operand of the definite-description operator as conceived by Cor-
field. It is not clear to us that this analysis is simpler or more natural than a more traditional
analysis in terms of propositional functions: if Str(A) is the propositional function defined by
Str(A)(X) :≡ eq(A, X) for X in the universe U, then the reflexivity of equivalence together with
univalence allow us to form (ιX : U)Str(A)(X) of type U.
In the last chapter of the book (Chapter 5), Corfield argues that homotopy type theory and
its modal extensions should be of interest to the philosopher of mathematics at a more general
level, that is, not just because of the light it might shed on structuralism. Corfield suggests, in
effect, that this novel form of type theory may provide a royal road to modern geometry. More
precisely, he wonders whether knowledge of modal homotopy type theory will allow someone
seeking to understand modern geometry to ‘leap-frog’ the developments in mathematics in the
period from Grothendieck to Lurie. If this turns out to be so, Corfield argues, we might expe-
rience a revival of a philosophy of geometry that is more or less up to date on the relevant parts
342 ANSTEN KLEV AND COLIN ZWANZIGER

of contemporary mathematics, as was the case in the early 20th century. That would certainly
a be welcome development, but as with the other programmatic claims in this book, it remains
to be seen whether it comes to pass.

Funding
Both authors are grateful for the financial support provided by a Lumina quaerentur fellowship, LQ300092101,
from the Czech Academy of Sciences.

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Ansten Klev
Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences,
Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czechia
klev@flu.cas.cz
Colin Zwanziger
Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences,
Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czechia
zwanziger@flu.cas.cz

© 2022 Ansten Klev

https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2107383