Name: BANTO, H.M.

Section: 5

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CANONICAL DOCTRINES
TOPIC CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE
PRINCIPLES OF Alpha Investigation The issue involved Labor Arbiter Aziz rendered The joint and and several Liability of the
CONSTRUCTION: and Security a decision that AISA and Mariano State contractor and the principal is mandated by the
University to pay the complainant a sum of Labor Code to ensure compliance with its
Law Construed as a Agency, Inc. v. 787,730.69 Pesos covering the month of Feb provisions. Including the statutory minimum
Whole National Labor 16,1990 - Sept 30,1991. Which the AISA wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of
Relations interposed separate appeal which the NLRC his status as direct employer, while the principal
Commission, et al rendered a decision affirming the solidarily becomes the indirect employer of the former's
liability of AiSA and DMMSU and remanding employee for the purpose of paying their wages
the records of the case to the arbitration branch in the event of failure of the contractor to pay
of origin for computation of the salary them. This gives the workers ample protection
differential awarded by the labor arbiter. The consonant with the La
AISA filed a motion for reconsideration which bor Code and social Justice provisions of the
denied by NLRC for Lack of Merit. AISA 1987 Constitution.
alleges that the payment of the wage increase It is a cardinal Rule in Statutory Construction
under the current minimum wage order should that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a
be borne exclusive of DMMSU pursuant to term used in a law, a careful review of the
Section 6 of Republic Act No.6727 "In case whole law involved, as well as the intendment
of contracts for construction project and for of the law must be made. In fact, Legislative
security, janitorial, and similar services, the intent must be ascertained from a
prescribed increase in the wage rates of the consideration of a statutes as a whole, and not
workers shall be borne by the principals or an isolated part or a particular provision alone.
clients of the construction/service
contractors and the contract shall be deemed
amended accordingly. In the event, however,
that the Principal or Client fails to pay the
prescribed wage rates, the
construction/service contractors shall be
jointly and severally liable with his principal
or clients." And further contends that Art
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code
generally refer to the Contractor or sub
contractor to pay wages based on Labor
code with a mandate that failure to pay such
wages would make the employer and the
contractor jointly and severely liable for
such payment. AISA insists that the case
involved hinges on wage differential or
wages increases, as prescribed in Sec 6 of RA
 No. 6727 and not wages in General as
provided in the Labor Code.
Caudal v. Court of The issue of the case concerned with the
definition of the term “residential unit” under
Appeals the B.P. Blg. 877otherwise known as the
“Rental law” and whether the lessor has the
right to eject the lessee from the leased unit for
the use by the lessor and his immediate family
as a residential unit under section 5(c) of B.P.
Blg.877 which provides as the ground for
ejectment. the legitimate need of the
owner/lessor to repossess his property for his
own use or for the use of any immediate
member of his family as a residential unit. One
of the arguments raised against the ejectment
was that the lessor will use a portion of the
leased unit as servant’s quarter, which meant
that it was not to be used as actual living space
of the lessor’s household.
Claudio v. Comelec The case involved is the interpretation of
Section 74 of the Local Government Code on
Recall Election That ”No recall shall take place
within (1) year from the date of the official
assumption to office or (1) year immediately
preceding a regular election. The main issue in
the case was whether the word” recall” as used
in the Section 74 of the Local Government
Code includes the convening of the Preparatory
Recall assembly and its approval of the recall
resolution.
The Petitioner argued that the preparatory recall
Assembly was convened less than (1) year after
his assumption in office, and hence it was void
for violating Section 74 of the Local
Government Code.
National Police The issue pertained to the definition of the term
The definition of Residential unit based on the
Rental Law is that it is not necessary that the
residential unit be used exclusively as the
residence of the owner and immediate members
of the family. It can be readily ascertained from
the definition of the term “residential unit” under
Section 2(b) of the Rental Law which defines it
as” an apartment, house and/or land on which
another’s dwelling is located and used for
residential purposes and shall include not only
buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as
dwelling places but also those used for home
industries, retail stores or other business
purposes if the owner thereof and his family
actually live therein and use it principally for
dwelling purposes.
In the interpretation of the Statutes when the
definition of the term in a statute is in question,
one must first look into the same statutes to see
how much term is expressly defined therein or
the manner by which the term is used in other
provisions of the same statute.
It was held that section 69 of the same law states
that the “Power of recall shall be exercised by
the registered voters of the Local Government
unit to which the local elective official belongs.
And held that since the power vested in the
electorate is not to initiate recall proceedings but
rather the power to elect an official into office.
The Limitation under Section 74(b) of the local
Government code cannot be deemed to apply to
the entire recall proceedings, and should only
be considered as referring to the recall election
itself, excluding the convening of the
preparatory Recall Assembly
In the interpretation of the Statutes when the
definition of the term in a statute is in question,
one must first look into the same statutes to see
how much term is expressly defined therein or
the manner by which the term is used in other
provisions of the same statute.
In determining the meaning of the INP Section
Commission v. de “Integrated National Police” under R.A. No.
Guzman 6975, which established the Philippine National
Police. Among others, SECTION 39 of R.A.
No. 6975 provides for a compulsory retirement
age of 56, and pursuant to the said provision.
The petitioner sent notices of retirement to
private respondents who were all members of
the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have
already reached the age of 56. In response, the
private respondent filed a case questioning their
compulsory retirement, claiming that they were
also covered by Section 89. 4 years transition
period which will then take effect of this act,
The following member of INP shall be
considered compulsory retired.
1. Those who shall attain the age of 60 on the 1st
year of the effectivity of this act.
2. Those who shall attain the age of 59 on the 2nd
year of the effectivity of this act.
3. Those who shall attain the age of 58 on the 3rd
year of the effectivity of this act.
4. Those who shall attain the age of 57 on the 4th
year of the effectivity of this act.
Private respondent argued that the term “INP”
includes both the formers of the Philippine
Consrtabulary and the local police force under
PD NO. 765.
Sajonas v. Court of This issue pertains to interpreting a sentence or
Appeals phrase in a legal provision in Isolation. The
case is about the Proper Interpretation of
Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known
as the "Property Registration Decree"
specifically with respect to the Legal Effect of
an annotated adverse claim on the title after 30
days from its annotation and whether the
Notice of adverse claim automatically losses
its force after a period of 30 days from its
annotation on the title. The CA held in the
affirmative and invoked the plain meaning rule
of construction and held that Sec 70 of P.D. No.
1529 is specific and Unambiguous and does not
require any interpretation which The SC
reversed the ruling of CA and held that the said
provision cannot and should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to the
sentence " After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition thereof by the
party in interest.
90 of R.A, No. 6975 distinguishes the Philippine
Constabulary and INP.
SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-
INP – Upon effectivity of this act, the Present
National Police Commission and the Philippine
Constabulary Integrated National Police shall
cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the Nucleus of the Philippine
Constabulary- Integrated National Police shall
cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Integrated national
Police, which is the Civilian Component of the
Philippine Constabulary- Integrated National
Police shall cease to be the National Police
Force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall
be established and constituted pursuant to this
act.
In the interpretation of the Statutes when the
definition of the term in a statute is in question,
one must first look into the same statutes to see
how much term is expressly defined therein or
the manner by which the term is used in other
provisions of the same statute.
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections, and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently, each part
or section should be construed in connection
with every other parts or section so as to
provide a harmonious whole. It is not proper
to confine its intention to the.one section
construed. It is always unsafe way of
construing a statute or contract to divide it by
a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words and then apply to each, thus
separated from the context, some particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase
usually to be ascertained from the context.
A statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize it
with other laws on the same subject matter, as
to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system. " Interpretare et concordare leges
legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or
every statue must be construed and
harmonize with other statutes as to form a
The Validity or efficacious of the claim may uniform set of Jurisprudence. Thus, efforts
only be determined by the court upon petition should be made to harmonize the provision of
by an interested party, in which event, The a law or of two laws so that each should be
court shall order the immediate hearing thereof effective. This principle is also relevant in the
and make the proper adjudication as justice and interpretation of statutes in light of its
equity may warrant. And it is only when such Legislative history.
claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be
cancelled. Thereby protecting the interest of the
adverse claimant and giving notice and warning
to third parties
 PRINCIPLES OF Floresca, et al. v.
CONSTRUCTION: Philex Mining
Corporation
Presumption of Justice
The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the action of an injured employee or
that of his heirs in case of death under
Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive,
selective, or cumulative, meaning, whether they
have a right of selection or choice of action
between availing of the workmen’s right under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in
the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages by virtue of negligence or
fault. Section 5 and 46 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act provides:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation-
The rights and remedies granted by this Act
to an employee by reason of a personal injury
entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury…
Section 46. Jurisdiction- The Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims
for compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Article 10 of the Civil Code provides that “in
case of doubt in the interpretation of laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
The Court held that, notwithstanding the
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
the heirs of the employees ay still file an action
for damages against Philex for negligence under
the Civil Code. This is because the rationale for
awarding compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act differs from that in giving
damages under the Civil Code. The Court also
opined that it was not legislating in its decision,
and was merely interpreting the Workmen’s
Compensation Act in light of the constitutional
policy on protecting labor and of Article 10 of
the Civil Code, which states that in case of doubt
in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail.
Construction Beltran et al, v. The case involves petitions challenging Class legislation, discriminating against
Consistent with the Secretary of Health the constitutionality of Section 7 of some and favoring others is prohibited;
Constitution Republic Act No. 7719, also known as but classification on a reasonable basis
the "National Blood Services Act of and not made arbitrarily or capriciously
1994," and the validity of is permitted.
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9,
series of 1995, which implements the
law. The petitioners, mainly composed The Court upholds the constitutionality
of the Board of Directors of the of Republic Act No. 7719, deeming the
Philippine Association of Blood Banks, closure of commercial blood banks a
contest the annulment of Section 7 and valid exercise of the State's police
A.O. No. 9. Both petitions seek a writ power. It asserts that the classification is
of prohibitory injunction against the reasonable, being based on substantial
Secretary of Health from implementing distinctions that align with the law's
the law and its rules, as well as a purpose of ensuring a safe and adequate
mandatory injunction to renew the blood supply. The Court emphasizes that
licenses of the petitioners' commercial the closure is a legislative decision
blood banks. within the realm of the separation of
powers, and it rejects challenges to the
non-impairment clause, asserting that
The petitioner argues that the contested individual rights must yield to loftier
provisions violate the equal protection purposes targeted by the government in
clause by discriminating against the regulation of public health.
commercial blood banks without a
relevant purpose. Additionally,
petitioners assert that the phase-out of
commercial blood banks, as mandated
by Section 7, is detrimental to their
businesses and violates the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.
The Secretary of Health, in defense,
contends that closing commercial blood
banks is necessary to ensure a safe
blood supply, protect public health, and
promote voluntary blood donation.
Heirs of Ardona et The case involves the Philippine
al, v. Reyes, et al Tourism Authority (PTA) filing
complaints to expropriate
approximately 282 hectares of land
located in Barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, for the development
of an integrated resort complex. The
proposed project, covering about 1,000
hectares, includes plans for a sports
complex, golf course, children's
playground, nature area, and
complementary facilities such as an
electric power grid, deep wells for
water supply, and a sewerage and
drainage system. The PTA justifies the
expropriation under its express
authority "to acquire by purchase,
negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land within
and without the tourist zones" for the
development of tourist destinations, as
outlined in its Revised Charter (PD
564).
In response, the petitioners raise
constitutional concerns, contending that
there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of
private property for tourism purposes.
They question whether the proposed
expropriation truly serves a "public
use" as required by eminent domain
principles. The petitioners argue that
the absence of the term "tourism" in the
Constitution renders the expropriation
unconstitutional.
The power of eminent domain does not
depend for its existence on a specific
grant in the constitution. It is inherent in
sovereignly and exists in a sovereign
state without any recognition of it in the
constitution.
The court, in its ruling, rejects the
petitioners' argument and emphasizes
that the power of eminent domain is
inherent in sovereignty and does not rely
on specific constitutional grants. The
court interprets the Constitution's
provisions, focusing on broader policy
objectives like social justice, local
autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony,
public interest, and general welfare. It
clarifies that public use is not confined
to traditional purposes like roads and
bridges but can extend to projects
contributing to the overall welfare of the
public.
Benguet This legal dispute involves Benguet
Management Management Corporation (BMC) and
Corporation v. Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. (KBPI)
Court of Appeals over a syndicated loan and mortgage
agreement. BMC failed to meet its
payment obligations, leading KBPI to
initiate extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. BMC contested the
foreclosure applications, arguing
insufficiency in form and substance,
unauthorized penalties, and non-
compliance with a 60-day grace period.
BMC also raised concerns about the
Mortgage Trust Indenture's registration.
Despite BMC's efforts, KBPI's
foreclosure application was approved,
prompting BMC to file a certiorari
petition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to invalidate the foreclosure
and halt the sale of its properties. The
Court of Appeals denied BMC's request
for a restraining order, emphasizing the
need for proof of the foreclosure's
nullity. BMC subsequently filed
supplemental petitions, challenging the
bid price, alleging violations in the sale
process, and proposing an alternative
settlement with other creditor banks.
The Court of Appeals maintained its
stance, asserting that unless BMC
proves the foreclosure's nullity, the
consolidation of titles in KBPI's name
should proceed. The court also initiated
an investigation into an unauthorized
insertion in its notice.
The doctrine emerging from this case
revolves around the principle that in
challenging foreclosure proceedings, the
party contesting it must provide concrete
evidence proving the nullity of the
foreclosure.
Mere objections and claims of
improprieties are not sufficient; there
must be substantial proof presented to
justify halting the foreclosure process or
the consolidation of titles. The court, in
emphasizing the need for proof,
underscores that foreclosure proceedings
involve the positive rights of the buyer,
and unless the challenging party can
convincingly demonstrate the
wrongdoing, the foreclosure process
should proceed as per legal
requirements. This doctrine emphasizes
the importance of evidence and
substantiation in contesting foreclosure
actions.
Construction Tanada v. Tuvera The case about the petitioners had filed this
Consistent with the petition for mandamus to compel the
respondents to publish or cause the publication
Constitution of presidential decrees, LOI, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. The respondent
questioned the legal personality of the
petitioners, but the petitioners maintained that a
public right was at stake in this case. Also, the
respondent maintained that publication was
only required if the law did not provide for its
effectivity date. The issue is whether or not the
publication of the abovementioned laws is
required. The court ruled that it was. The
publication of presidential issuances “of a
public nature” or “of general applicability” is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. In Peralta v Comelec,
the requirement of due process and the rule of
law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and
publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where
to obtain their official and specific contents.
For presidential decrees promulgated prior to
this case, the court applied the doctrine of
operative fact. The implementation or
enforcement of presidential decrees prior to
their publication in the Official Gazette is “ an
operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial
declaration…that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.” In the court’s resolution, it
reiterated that publication of laws is in keeping
with the due process of law. According to the
court, the reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication),
it is likely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not
Section 3. rule 65 of the rules of court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.- When any
tribunals, corporation, board or unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As
early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, this court held that while the general
rule is that ” a writ of mandamus would be
granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be sub served, or some particular right
to be protected, independent of that which he
holds with the public at large,” and “ it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved [Mithcell
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],”nevertheless,
“when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws [High Extraordinary
Legal Remedies. 3rd ed., sec.431].
The New Civil Code article 2. Law shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided.
 because of a failure to comply with it but
simply because they did not know of its
existence. All laws, general or specific (e.g.
laws granting citizenship to a particular
person), should be published. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which
any member of the politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even
in the courts of justice.
Construction Yu Cong Eng v. This case is a writ of certiorari to review a
Consistent with the Trinidad decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands denying an original petition for
Constitution prohibition against the enforcement by criminal
prosecution of Act No. 2972 of the Philippine
Legislature, known as the Chinese
Bookkeeping Act, on the ground of its validity.
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what
languages account books shall be kept, and to
establish penalties for its violation), also known
as the “Chinese Bookkeeping Act” was passed
by the Philippine Languages and approved in
1921.
Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the
books of account of his lumber business in
Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor
understand English, Spanish, or any local
dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No.
2972, and his books were seized.
Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in
the court of first instance of Manila for
violating Act 2972.
Before the trial was about to proceed, Yu Cong
Eng and another petitioner, Co Liam (on behalf
of all other Chinese merchants in the
Philippines) filed a petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of the criminal
proceedings of the said Act with the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on the grounds of its
invalidity GR No. L-20479.(petition lost)
Yu Cong Eng et al. filed a petition for writ of
certiorari with the US Supreme Court-271 US
The interpretation given by respondent is in
accord with this court’s construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, this court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.
We come then to take up the question of the
validity of Act No. 2972. Said Act reads as
follows:
No. 2972- AN ACT TO PROVIDE IN WHAT
LANGUAGE ACCOUNT BOOKS SHALL BE
KEPT, AND TO ESTABLISH PENALTIES
FOR ITS VIOLATION.
Be it enacted by Senate and House of
Representative of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
company, partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the
purpose of profit in the Philippines Islands, in
accordance with existing law, to keep its account
books in any language other than English,
Spanish or any local dialect.
SECTION 2. Any person violating the provision
of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or
by imprisonment for not more than two years or
both.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on
November first, nineteen hundred and twenty
one. Approved, February 21, 1921.
The Philippines Bill of Rights provides that:
“No law shall be enacted in said Islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the
laws.”
 500. (petition won)
The issues won the Philippine Supreme Court
made a valid construction of Act No. 2972 and
won Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional.
The rulings: A.NO. It is the duty of a court in
considering the validity of an act to give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to
bring it within the fundamental law. However, a
court may not exercise legislative functions to
save the law from conflict with constitutional
limitation.
B. YES. The law is invalid because it deprives
Chinese persons of their liberty and property
without due process of law, and denies them
the equal protection of the laws.
Construction to Render JMM Promotions and This case involves the National Labor
Provision Effective Management, Inc. v. Relations Commission, as the respondent, and
National Labor Relations JMM Promotions and Management, as the
Commission petitioner. The case is about the dismissal of
the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on the ground of failure to post
the required appeal bond. The petitioner
contends that the National Labor Relations
Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying Article 223 of the Labor
and Code Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules
of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission decisions rendered by the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. The petitioner also argued that
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. However, the said
provision provides that it is necessary to post
the appeal bond required pursuant to Section 6,
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA and as an addition to the
monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule. Thus, the
It that guaranties equivalent to the due process
and equal protection of the law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the twice in jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the
substantial guaranties of the Sixth Amendment,
exclusive of the right to trial by jury, were
extended to the Philippine Islands. It is further
settled that the guaranties which Congress has
extended to the Philippine Islands are to be
interpreted as meaning what the like provisions
meant at the time when Congress made them
applicable to the Philippine Islands.
The legal maxim “ut res magis valeat quam
pereat” which means that “let the thing be more
valued than it perishes” is a principle of legal
hermeneutics that is commonly applied in the
interpretation of statutes and legal documents.
This means that in interpreting a statute, care
should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Under the petitioner's
interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity,
but the Court do not see any such redundancy;
on the contrary, it was found that Section 6
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule
is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.
 petitioner is still required to post an appeal
bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the
POEA to the NLRC.
Vicencio was a candidate for the post of
punong barangay. In his Certificate of
Candidacy, he stated that his profession was a
Certified Public Accountant. He won in the
elections. Sometime after Vicencios
Lluz and Aldeosa v. proclamation, petitioners charged him before
Comelec the Law Department of the COMELEC with
violation of Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 74 of
BP 881. The COMELEC held that despite the
deceitful act he did, it could not prosecute him
for an election offense, but possibly only for an
administrative or criminal offense. The Court
held that the alleged misrepresentation of
profession on a COC is punishable as an
election offense under Sec. 262 in relation to
Sec. 74 of BP 88. No elective office, not even
the office of the President, requires a certain
profession or occupation as a qualification. For
local elective offices, including that of punong
barangay, the LGC prescribes only
qualifications pertaining to citizenship,
registration as a voter, residence and language.
Profession not being a qualification for elective
office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.
A misrepresentation is a certificate in a COC is
material when it refers to a qualification for
elective office and affects the candidate’s
eligibility. When a candidate commits a material
misrepresentation, he or she may be proceeded
against through a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a COC under Sec. 78, or through
criminal prosecution under Sec. 262 for violation
of Sec. 74 of BP 881. A misrepresentation of a
non-material fact, or a non-material
representation, is not a ground to deny due
course to or cancel a COC under Sec. 78. In
other words, for a candidates COC to be denied
due course or cancelled by the COMELEC, the
fact misrepresented must pertain to a
qualification for the office sought by the
candidate.
Penal Law Centeno v. Villalon- The case is about the officers of a civic
Pornillos organization who launched a fund drive
for the purpose of renovating a chapel.
They admitted that their solicitation
was carried out without a permit from
the DSWD. As a result, an information
was filed against them for violating
P.D. No. 1564 or the Solicitation
Permit Law. Petitioner filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense, claiming that
P.D. No. 1564 only covers solicitations
made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a
religious purpose such as the
construction of a chapel. This was
denied, trial ensued, followed by a
judgment rendering them guilty.
Nevertheless, upon finding that the
accused acted in good faith, the trial
judge recommended executive
clemency. Accused appealed to the
RTC only to have his penalty modified
to an increased penalty. The case
eventually reached the highest tribunal,
questioning whether solicitations for
religious purposes are within the ambit
of P.D. No. 1564.
The 1987 Constitution treats the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and
independently of each other. Thus, the word
"charitable" is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution which provides that
"charitable institutions, churches and
personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation."
In the interpretation of a penal statute,
the tendency is to subject it to careful
scrutiny and to construe it with such
strictness as to safeguard the rights of
the accused. If the statute is ambiguous
and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which
operates in favor of a party accused
under its provisions is to be preferred.
The principle is that acts in and of
themselves innocent and lawful cannot
be held to be criminal unless there is a
clear and unequivocal expression of the
legislative intent to make them such.
Whatever is not plainly within the
provisions of a penal statute should be
regarded as without its intendment.
United States v. Go The defendant is charged with violation of In the opinion of this court, it is not
Chico Section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine necessary that the appellant should have
Commission. He displayed in one of the
windows and one of the showcases of his
store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of
medallions, in the form of a small button,
upon the faces of which were imprinted in
miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo,
and the flag or banner or device used
during the late insurrection in the
Philippine Islands. He was ignorant of the
existence of a law against the display of the
medallions in question and had
consequently no corrupt intention.
The appellant appealed on the grounds
that he had no criminal intent and that
what the law prohibits is the use of the
identical banners, devices, or emblems
actually used during the Philippine
insurrection.
acted with the criminal intent. The display
of a flag or emblem used particularly within
a recent period, by the enemies of the
Government tends to incite resistance to
governmental functions and insurrection
against governmental authority just as
effectively if made in the best of good faith
as if made with the most corrupt intent. The
display itself, without the intervention of
any other factor, is the evil.
It is said that notwithstanding this rule
(the penal statutes must be construed
strictly) the intention of the lawmakers
must govern in the construction of penal
statutes. That though penal statutes are
to be construed strictly, they are not be
construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislature.
Quimvel v. People The petitioner in this case appealed
of the Philippines before the Highest Court of the ruling
which sustained his conviction of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Sec. 5(b), Article III of RA
7610. He assails that he may be
convicted only of acts of lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal
Code and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of
RA 7610 as he alleges that to be held
liable under the latter law, it is
necessary that the victim is involved in
or subjected to prostitution or other
sexual abuse
Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct committed
on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It
covers not only a situation where a child is
abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion, intimidation or
influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes
not only child prostitution but also other
forms of sexual abuse against children.
Ratio legis est anima. The reason of the
law is the soul of the law. In this case,
the law would have miserably failed in
fulfilling its lofty purpose of providing
special protection to children from all
forms of abuse if the Court were to
interpret its penal provisions so as to
require the additional element of a prior
or contemporaneous abuse that is
different from what is complained of,
and if the Court were to require that a
third person act in concert with the
accused.
Tax Laws CIR v. Court of Appeals, Private respondent is a non-stock, non-profit
et al, educational institution with auxiliary units and
branches all over the Philippines. One such
auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine
Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality
separate and distinct from that of private
respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit
engaged in social science studies of Philippine
society and culture. Occasionally, it accepts
sponsorships for its research activities from
international organizations, private foundations,
and government agencies. Private respondent
received from petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) demand letters for
alleged deficiency contractors’ tax and alleged
deficiency income tax, Denying said tax
liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a
letter-protest and subsequently filed with the
latter a memorandum contesting the validity of
the assessments. Now the issue at hand is
whether Ateneo de Manila University,
through its auxiliary unit or branch — the
Institute of Philippine Culture — performing
the work of an independent contractor and,
thus, subject to the three percent contractor's
tax levied by then Section 205 of the National
Internal Revenue Code?
DOCTRINE OF STRICT INTERPRETATION
IN THE IMPOSITION TAXES. IN CASE OF
DOUBT, SUCH STATUTES ARE TO BE
CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT AND IN FAVOR OF
THE SUBJECTS OR CITIZENS BECAUSE
BURDENS ARE NOT TO BE IMPOSED NOR
PRESUMED TO BE IMPOSED BEYOND
WHAT STATUTES EXPRESSLY AND
CLEARLY IMPORT
To fall under its coverage, Section 205 of the
National Internal Revenue Code requires that the
independent contractor be engaged in the
business of selling its services. Hence, to impose
the three percent contractor's tax on Ateneo's
Institute of Philippine Culture, it should be
sufficiently proven that the private respondent is
indeed selling its services for a fee in pursuit of
an independent business. In the case at bench, it
is clear from the evidence on record that there
was no sale either of objects or services because,
as adverted to earlier, there was no transfer of
ownership over the research data obtained or the
results of research projects undertaken by the
Institute of Philippine Culture. Therefore, the
funds received by Ateneo’s Institute Philippine
Culture are not given in the concept of a fee or
prince in exchange for performance of service or
delivery of an object but rather an endowment or
donation for the purpose of sponsoring or
funding the research w/no string attach.
CIR v. SM Prime
Holdings. Inc. Respondents SM Prime and First Asia are
domestic corporations, and both engaged in the
business of operating cinema houses.
The issue in this case is whether the gross
receipts derived by operators or proprietors of
cinema/theater houses from admission tickets
are subject to Value-Added Tax (VAT).
Petitioner argues that the enumeration of
services subject to VAT in sec. 108 of the NIRC
is not exhaustive because it covers all sales of
services unless exempted by law. He claims
that the CTA erred in applying the rules on
statutory construction. Thus, he maintains that
the exhibition of movies by cinema operators or
proprietors to the paying public, being a sale of
service, is subject to VAT.
The Respondents, on the other hand, argue that
a plain reading of sec. 108 of the NIRC of 1997
shows that the gross receipts of proprietors or
operators of cinemas/theaters derived from
public admission are not among the services
subject to VAT. According to them, the
absence of gross receipts from cinemas/theaters
admission tickets from the list of services
which are subject to the national amusement
tax under sec. 125 of the NIRC of 1997
reinforces this legislative intent. Respondents
also highlight the fact that RMC No. 28-2001
on which the deficiency assessments were
based is an unpublished administrative ruling.
MARSHALL DOCTRINE: THE POWER OF
TAXATION IS SOMETIMES ALSO CALLED
THE POWER TO DESTROY.
Therefore, it should be exercised with caution to
minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a
taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and
uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that
lays the golden egg." And, in order to maintain
the general public's trust and confidence in the
Government this power must be used justly and
not treacherously.
It is the legislative intent not to impose VAT
on persons already covered by the amusement
tax. This holds true even in the case of
cinema/theater operators taxed under the LGC of
1991 precisely because the VAT law was
intended to replace the percentage tax on certain
services. To hold otherwise would impose an
unreasonable burden on cinema/theater houses
operators or proprietors, who would be paying
an additional 10% VAT on top of the 30%
amusement tax imposed by Section 140 of the
LGC of 1991, or a total of 40% tax. Such
imposition would result in injustice, as persons
taxed under the NIRC of 1997 would be in a
better position than those taxed under the LGC
of 1991. We need not belabor that a literal
application of a law must be rejected if it will
operate unjustly or lead to absurd results.
National Power
Corporation v. City of National Power Corp. (NPC), the petitioner, is
Cabanatuan a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created under
Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended. For
many years, NPC sold electric power to the
residents of Cabanatuan city, the respondent.
Pursuant to a 1992 ordinance, the respondent
assessed the petitioner a franchise tax.
In refusing to pay the tax assessment, petitioner
argued that the respondent had no authority to
impose tax on government entities like itself
and that it was a tax-exempt entity by express
provision of law. Hence, respondent led a
collection suit demanding payment of the
assessed tax due alleging that petitioner’s
exemption from local taxes has been repealed
AS A RULE, TAX EXEMPTIONS ARE
CONSTRUED STRONGLY AGAINST THE
CLAIMANT. EXEMPTIONS MUST BE
SHOWN TO EXIST CLEARLY AND
CATEGORICALLY AND SUPPORTED BY
CLEAR LEGAL PROVISIONS.
In the case at bar, the petitioner's sole refuge is
section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 exempting
from, among others, "all income taxes, franchise
taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National
Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities
and other government agencies and
instrumentalities." However, section 193 of the
LGC withdrew, subject to limited exceptions, the
sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by
private and public corporations. Contrary to the
contention of petitioner, section 193 of the LGC
is an express, albeit general, repeal of all statutes
granting tax exemptions from local taxes. It is
worth mentioning that sec.192 of the LGC
empowers the LGU’s, through ordinances duly
approved, to grant tax exemptions, initiatives or
reliefs. But in enacting sec. 37 of ordinance No.
165-92 which imposes an annual franchise tax”
notwithstanding any exemption granted by law
or other special law,” the respondent city
government clearly did not intend to exempt the
petitioner from the coverage thereof.
Surigao Electric Surigao Electric Co,The petitioner, has
Co.,Inc. v. CTA and deficiency franchise tax liability of
CIR P21,156.06 excluding surcharge from
the period of September 1947 to June
1959 on which it asked for motion for
reconsideration. On April 29, 1963
(received by the petitioner on May 8,
1963) the revised assessment was
P11,533.53, representing the
petitioner's deficiency franchise-tax and
surcharges thereon for the period from
April 1, 1956 to june 30, 1959. The
petitioner then requested a should be counted from May 8, 1963, which
recomputation of the revised
assessment in a letter to the
Commissioner dated June 6, 1963
(sent by registered mail on June 7,
1963). The Commissioner, however, in
a letter dated June 28, 1963 (received
by the petitioner on July 16,1963),
denied the request for
recomputation.On August 1, 1963 the
petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax
Appeals. The tax court dismissed the
appeal on October 1, 1965 on the
ground that the appeal was filed beyond
the thirty-day period of appeal provided
by section 11 of Republic Act 1125.
Under Section 11 of Republic Act 1125, any
person adversely affected by a decision or
ruling of the Collector of Internal
Revenue,may file an appeal in the Court of
Tax Appeals within 30 days after the receipt
of such decision or ruling. The Court of Tax
Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for
review for having filed beyond the thirty
day period. The revised assessment
embodied in the Commissioner's letter dated
April 29, 1963 being, in legal
contemplation, the final ruling reviewable
by the tax court, the thirty-day appeal period
is the day the petitioner received the letter.
From May 8, 1963 to June 7, 1963 (the day
the petitioner, by registered mail, sent to the
Commissioner its letter of June 6, 1963
requesting for further recomputation of the
amount demanded from it) saw the lapse of
thirty days. The June 6, 1963 request for
further recomputation, partaking of a motion
for reconsideration, tolled the running of the
thirty-day period from June 7, 1963 (the day
the petitioner sent its letter by registered
mail) to July 16, 1963 (the day the petitioner
received the letter of the Commissioner
dated June 28, 1963 turning down its
request). The prescriptive period
commenced to run again on July 16, 1963.
The petitioner filed its petition for review
with the tax court on August 1, 1963 —
after the lapse of an additional sixteen days.
The petition for review having been filed
beyond the thirty-day period, we rule that
the Court of Tax Appeals correctly
dismissed the same.
CIR v. Algue, Inc., et Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
al. petitioner, contends that the claimed
deduction of Algue, Inc., the respondent,
worth P75,000.00 was properly disallowed
because it was not an ordinary reasonable
or necessary business expense.
The petitioner claims that these payments
are fictitious because most of the payees
are members of the same family in control
of Algue. It is argued that no indication
was made as to how such payments were
made, whether by check or in cash, and
there is not enough substantiation of such
payments. In short, the petitioner suggests
a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a
legitimate assessment by involving an
imaginary deduction.
Republic of the The case is about a petition for review on
SEC. 30. Deductions from gross income.--In
computing net income there shall be
allowed as deductions — (a) Expenses: (1)
In general.-All the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business,
including a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered; …
The Court of Tax appeals agreed with the
respondent court that the amount of the
promotional fees was not excessive. The
total commission paid by the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Co. to the private
respondent was P125,000.00. After
deducting the said fees, Algue still had a
balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from
the transaction. The amount of P75,000.00
was 60% of the total commission. This was
a reasonable proportion, considering that it
was the payees who did practically
everything, from the formation of the
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the
actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate
properties. This finding of the respondent
court is in accord with the provision of the
Tax Code.
Government-owned or controlled
Philippines v. certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
corporation refers to any agency organized
Parañaque, G.R. No. of Civil Procedure, on pure questions of as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested
191908, 18 law, assailing the January 8, 2010 Order of
with functions relating to public needs
July 2012 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, whether governmental or proprietary in
Paranaque nature, and owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities
City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner, either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
Philippine Reclamation Authority case of stock
(PRA), is a government-owned and corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-
controlled corporation (GOCC), a one
(51) percent of its capital stock
taxable entity, and, therefore, not
exempt from payment of real property Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
taxes. National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter

From the above definitions, it is clear that a

GOCC must be "organized as a stock or
nonstock corporation" while an
instrumentality is vested by law with
corporate powers. Likewise, when the law
makes a government instrumentality
operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National
Government machinery although not
integrated with the department framework.

Here, PRA is not a GOCC because it is

neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation.
It cannot be considered as a stock
corporation because although it has a capital
stock divided into no par value shares as
provided in Section 7 4 of P.D. No. 1084, it
is not authorized to distribute dividends,
surplus allotments or profits to stockholders.
There is no provision whatsoever in P.D.
No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent
executive issuances pertaining to PRA. PRA
cannot be considered a non-stock
corporation either because it does not have

Social Legislation INTERNATIONAL Prior to the expiration of the CBA agreement
PHARMACEUTICALS, between petitioner International
INC., petitioner, Pharmaceutical, Inc. (Company) and the
vs. Associated Labor Union (union), the latter
HON. SECRETARY OF submitted to the company its economic and
LABOR and political demands. However, these were notmet
ASSOCIATED LABOR by the company, hence a deadlock ensued, the
UNION (ALU), Union filed a notice of strike with the National
respondents. Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department
of Labor and Employment, After all
conciliation efforts had failed, the Union went
on strike and the company’s operation were
completely paralyzed.
Considering that the company belong to an
industry indispensable to national interest, it
being engaged in the manufacture of drugs and
pharmaceuticals and employing around600
workers, the Acting Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
issued an order directing the parties to return to
the status quo before the work stoppage
invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
The union filed a motion, they questioned the
power of the Sec. of Labor to assumed
jurisdiction
The issue before us is whether or not the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment has the power to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its
incidental controversies, including unfair labor
practice cases, causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest.
members. A non-stock corporation must
have members. Moreover, it was not
organized for any of the purposes mentioned
in Section 88 of the Corporation Code.
Specifically, it was created to manage all
government reclamation projects.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which
declares:(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in anindustry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration
Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the
NLRC which states: Disposition of
cases.Provided, that when the Minister
(Secretary) of Labor and Employment has
assumed jurisdiction over strike or lockout
dispute or certified the same to the Commission,
the parties to such dispute shall immediately
inform the Minister (Secretary) or the
Commission as the case may be, of all cases
between them pending before any Regional
Arbitration Branch, and the Labor Arbiter
handling the same of such assumption or
certification, whereupon all proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter concerning such cases shall
cease and the Labor Arbiter shall await
instructions from the Minister (Secretary) or the
Commission.
All doubts in the interpretation and
implementation of labor laws should be resolved
in favor of labor. In upholding the assailed
orders of the Secretary, the Court is only giving
meaning to this rule. The Court should help labor
authorities provide workers immediate access to
their rights and benefits, without being hampered
by arbitration or litigation processes that prove
to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially
burdensome in the long run. 13 Administrative
rules of procedure should be construed liberally
in order to promote their object and assist the
parties, especially the workingman, in obtaining

Rules of Court Office of the Court Respondent Garong, Court Interpreter III was
Administrator v. Garong charged with frustrated homicide. Judge
Leynes, issued the corresponding warrant of
arrest against respondent. While this was
pending, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash Warrant of Arrest. The Court Appeals
granted the Urgent Motion To Quash filed by
respondent, lifting the Entry of Judgment.
Respondent's former counsel notified the trial
court of his change of address, the copy of the
judgment of conviction against respondent was
sent to his old address.
The notice of judgment should have been sent
to respondent's counsel of record's new address,
and the sending of the same to counsel's old
address was improper and invalid. For this
reason, respondent's period to file motion for
reconsideration from said decision could not
have commenced to run.
In this case, respondent's life and liberty is at
stake. The trial court sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months
of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of Prision
Correccional, as maximum, together with the
accessory penalties provided by law plus costs.
It is but just, therefore, that respondent be given
every opportunity to defend himself and to
pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be
tantamount to a grave injustice.
The administrative proceedings should be held
in abeyance pending the final outcome of the
appeal in the criminal case.
Paz Reyes Aguam v. CA An action for sum of money and damages
arising from malicious mischief filed by
petitioner, Reyes against respondent Ronsayro,
rendered decision in favor of the defendant
dismissing the complaint.
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
their respective claims and defenses. By virtue of
the assailed orders. The Union and its members
are relieved of the burden of litigating their
interrelated cases in different tribunals.
Rule 1, Section 6, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that: SEC.6 CONSTRUCTION.
These rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
In the case of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, the filing of respondents-spouses'
motion for reconsideration did not stop the
period of appeal because xxx the reglementary
period within which respondents-spouses should
have appealed expired on 23 November 1989.
Where a rigid application of the rule will result
in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
then the rule may be relaxed.
Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order
to resolve the case. After all, no party can even
claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigation
should as much be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities.
The law abhors technicalities that impede the
cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a
game of technicalities.

The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to
set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing petitioner's appeal because
petitioner's motion for extension to file
appellant's brief was filed late by nine (9)days
due to counsel's mistake in counting the period
for filing the same. The court also denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue raised is whether or not the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioner's appeal because of the
late filing of appellant.
Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss
an appeal for failure to file appellant's brief on
time. However, the dismissal is directory, not
mandatory."
The Court can overlook the late filing of the
motion for extension, if strict compliance with
the rules would mean sacrificing justice to
technicality.
The Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion for
extension of time to file appellant's brief, and in
dismissing the appeal.
ADOPTION LAWS; Co Kim Chan v. The case involved the Private respondents filed
Valdez Tan Keh and complaints for illegal dismissal against
petitioner William Go Que Construction and/or
Dizon William Go Que (petitioner) before the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), National Capital Region-North Sector
Arbitration Branch, claiming that they were
hired as steelmen on various dates, and were
regular employees of petitioner until their
illegal dismissal on June 3, 2006. Moreover,
they alleged that petitioner failed to pay their
monetary benefits, such as service incentive
leave pay, holiday pay, and 13 th month pay. For
his part, petitioner averred that private
respondents were hired as project employees,
and were informed of the specific period or
phase of construction wherein their services
were needed. Sometime in May 2006,
petitioner learned that some workers were
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a
rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts.
Litigations must be decided on their merits
and not on technicality. Every party litigant
must be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.
Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their
merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not
override substantial justice.
It is a far better and more prudent course of
action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not
miscarriage of justice.
Case law states that "[v]erification is required
to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct, and not merely
speculative. “On the other hand, "[t]he
certification against forum shopping is
required based on the principle that a party-
litigant should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different fora. “The
important purposes behind these requirements
cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their
relaxation. Thus, by simply treating the
insufficient submissions before it as
compliance with its Resolution dated August
13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a
proper verification/certification against forum
shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored
 getting excess and cutting unused steel bars,
and selling them to junk shops, prompting him
to announce that he will bring the matter to the
proper authorities. Thereafter, private
respondents no longer reported for work, and
were identified by the other workers as the
thieves.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint for
theft against private respondents and a certain
Jimmy Dulman before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Quezon City.10 After preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor
found probable cause against them 11 and filed
the corresponding Information12 before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-07-149245. The issue
for the Court's resolution is does the CA
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to dismiss the petition
for certiorari before it on the ground of non-
compliance with the requirements of
verification and certification against forum
shopping.
This case involves the adoption of
Michelle Lim and her brother Michael.
IN RE: PETITION They were previously registered by
FOR ADOPTION Monina P. Lim and his late husband Primo
OF MICHELLE P. Lim. Monina remarried and decided to
LIM AND adopt the children by availing of the
MICHAEL JUDE amnesty given under RA 8552 to
LIM individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. The trial court dismissed the
petitions for adoption and ruled that since
Monina had remarried, she should have
filed the petition jointly with her new
husband.
Monina appealed contending that the rule
on joint adoption must be relaxed because
it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare
of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues
that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is
not applicable to adoption cases. It boils
settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely
abused its discretion. All things considered,
the proper course of action was for it to
dismiss the petition.
it is well to stress that "procedural rules are
not to be disdained as mere technicalities that
may be ignored at will to suit the convenience
of a party, x x x. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. “Resort
to the liberal application of procedural rules
remains the exception rather than the rule; it
cannot be made without any valid reasons
underpinning the said course of action. To
merit liberality, the one seeking such treatment
must show reasonable cause justifying its non-
compliance with the Rules, and must establish
that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of substantial
justice Procedural rules must, at all times, be
followed, save for instances when a litigant
must be rescued from an injustice far graver
than the degree of his carelessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure. The
limited exception does not obtain in this case.
Under the R.A. No. 8552 that the husband
and wife shall jointly adopt is mandatory
requirement, and this requirement cannot be
waived even if the petitioner-adopter
remarried only after filing the petition for
adoption. “Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse
seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally
separated from each other.”
The use of the word "shall" in the above-
quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint
 down to the issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly
adopt.
PRINCIPLES OF San Juan v. Civil This Case Involves a petitions for certiorari
CONSTRUCTION: filed by Reynaldo San Juan, the governor of the
Service Commission province of Rizal, seeking the nullification of
Local Autonomy the Civil Service Commission’s (CSC)
resolution upholding the appointment of Cecilia
Almajose as the provincial Budget Officer
(PBO) of Rizal. The petitioner argues that he
has the sole right to recommend nominees of
the position of PBO and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. The issue
resolves around the interpretation of the
Executive Order No. 112 and the extent of the
governor’s recommending power.
parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation. The law is clear. There is no
room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
ARTICLE II, SECTION 25, THE STATE
SHALL ENSURE THE AUTONOMY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
ARTICLE X, SECTION 2, THE
TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS SHALL ENJOY LOCAL
AUTONOMY
The phrase “upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned” must be given
mandatory application in consonance with the
state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed in
the 1987 constitution.
The principle of local autonomy, which
guarantees the independence and self-reliance of
local government units. It emphasizes that the
power to recommend nominees for a position
should not be unduly hampered or interfered
with, provided the appointee meets the
requirements prescribed by law.
 Everett Steamship v. This case involve disputes between Everett
Municipality of Steamship Corporation and the Municipality of
Medina, Misamis Oriental, regarding the
Medina imposition of a berthing fee under an ordinance
enacted by the municipality. The corporation
paid the fee under protest and later sought a
refund, arguing that the ordinance is null and
void and ordered the municipality to refund the
amount paid. The municipality appealed the
decision.
Naturalization Laws In Matter of Petition This case involves the appeal of a
for Naturalization decree granting the petitioner’s petition.
as Filipino Citizen. The petitioner, Hao Su Siong alias
Ramon Cuenco v. Ramon Cuenco, filed a petiton for
Republic of the naturalization in 1956 claiming
Philippines exemption from filing a declaration of
intention due to his continuous
residence in the Philippines for over
thirty years. The government appealed
grant of the petition, arguing that the
petitioner did not meet the education
requirement for his children and failed
to provide sufficient evidence of
compliance with other qualifications
for naturalization. The court reversed
the lower court’s decision, dismissing
the petition for naturalization.
LOCAL AUTONOMY ACT, SECTION 2. NO
MUNICIPALITY MAY LEVY CUSTOMS
DUTIES, REGISTRATION, WHARFAGE ON
WHARVES OWNED BY THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, TONNAGE, AND ALL
OTHER KINDS OF CUSTOMS FEES,
CHARGES, AND DUES.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 472, SECTION
3. IT SHALL BE BEYOND THE POWER OF
ANY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL TO IMPOSE
CUSTOMS DUTIES REGISTRATION,
WHARFAGE, TONNAGE AND ALL OTHER
KINDS OF CUSTOMS FEES, CHARGES AND
DUES.
The power to tax and license as a means of
raising revenue is not inherent in a municipal
corporation. It must be expressly conferred in
plain terms or arise by necessary implication
from the powers expressly granted. Any grant of
power to tax and license is strictly construed
against its exercise and in favor of the public
especially where the purpose is to raise revenue.
The court emphasized that in
naturalization cases, the burden is on the
applicant to prove, by competent and
satisfactory evidence, that they meet all
the qualifications specified by law. The
court also stated that the naturalization
law should be strictly construed, with
any doubts resolved against the
applicant.
 This case involves a dispute over the
Election Laws Rolluda v COMELEC substitution of candidates in a barangay
election. Petitioner Petronila Rulloda sought to
run as a substitute candidate for barangay
chairman after her husband, the original
candidate passed away. However, the
COMELEC I issued a resolution denying her
request and proclaiming the respondent,
Remegio Placido, as the winner. The issue
before the court was whether or not the
substitution of candidates is allowed in
barangay elections.
The petition was granted. The assailed
Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on
Elections, insofar as it denied due course to
petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declared
NULL and VOID. The proclamation of
respondent Remegio L. Placido as
Barangay Chairman is SET ASIDE, and
the Board of Canvassers is ORDERED to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman.
The jurisdiction of the Court’s states that an
election means the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote
through the use of the ballot, and the elected
officials which are determined through the will
of the electorate. An election is the embodiment
of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who receive the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that
office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
Respondents base their argument that the
substitution of candidates is not allowed in
barangay elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus
Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of
another. – If after the last day of the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-
day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any
board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a
candidate or, in the case of candidates

Election laws Yapdiangco v. This case involves the issue of whether a
Buencamino Sunday or legal holiday can interrupt the
prescription of an offense. The petitioner-
apellant, Rafael Yapdiangco, argued that 60 th
day of filing information fell on Sunday, and
therefore, the action had already prescribed.
The respondents, the Hon. Concepcion B
Buencamino and Hon. Justiniano Cortez,
contended that the law should allow the filing
of charges on the next succeeding business day.
The court ultimately ruled in favor of the
petitioner-apellant, stating that the rules on time
computation for ordinary acts do not apply to
the prescription of a criminal action. The Court
emphasized that the statute of limitations in
criminal cases is an act of grace by the state,
and delay in prosecuting offenders can be
to be voted by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
The respondent also contends that the votes in
petitioner’s favor cannot be counted because she
did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other
words, he was the only candidate for Barangay
Chairman. His claim is refuted by the
Memorandum of the COMELEC Law
Department as well as the assailed Resolution
No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that
petitioner’s letter-request to be allowed to run as
Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her
late husband was treated as a certificate of
candidacy.
Election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers must yield
if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective officials. Laws
governing election contests must be literally
construed to ensure that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials is not defeated by
mere technical objections. The Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law that would
hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but
also the correct ascertainment of the results.
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
light offenses prescribe in two months. Article
13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of months, it shall be understood that
months are of thirty days each.
“Article 90. Prescription of crimes. —Crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.”
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:--
"Computation of prescription of offenses. The
period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information, and shall
detrimental to public justice. Wherefore, the
petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted.
The questioned order of the respondent court is
SET ASIDE. The motion to quash is
GRANTED and the information before the city
court is DISMISSED.
commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.”
Petitioner- Appellant’s arguments, “as a general
rule, exceptions will not be implied to the
statutes of limitations of criminal offenses, and
hence, in criminal prosecutions unless the statute
of limitations contains an exception or condition
that will toll its operation, the running of the
statute is not interrupted, save only by
indictment or other sufficient procedure
commencing the prosecution of the offense.
After the statute has commenced to run it will
not be interrupted by the happening of any
subsequent event or disability . . ..'
The respondents cite the following provision of
the Revised Administrative Code to sustain their
side:
"SEC. 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the
day, or the last day, for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may
be done on the next succeeding business day."
The law requires or permits the filing of the
information within two months or sixty days
from the date the crime was discovered by the
offended party. Since the 60th day or last day for
the filing of the information in this case fell on a
holiday, according to the respondents-appellees
the law should allow the filing of charges to be
done on the next succeeding business day.
If we follow the ordinary rule of time
computation, based on the common law, which,
in construing statutes of limitations excludes the
first day and includes the last day unless the last
day is dies non in which event the following day
is included, the stand of the respondents-
appellees would be correct.
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of
the Old Rules of Court deal with the
computation of time allowed to do a particular
act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before
a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint,
taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to
lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to
prosecute those who committed a crime against
it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute
such offenders is automatic and by operation of

PRESCRIPTIVE Yapdiangco v. This case involves the issue of whether a
PERIOD Buencamino Sunday or legal holiday can interrupt the
prescription of an offense. The petitioner-
apellant, Rafael Yapdiangco, argued that 60 th
day of filing information fell on Sunday, and
therefore, the action had already prescribed.
The respondents, the Hon. Concepcion B
Buencamino and Hon. Justiniano Cortez,
contended that the law should allow the filing
of charges on the next succeeding business day.
The court ultimately ruled in favor of the
petitioner-apellant, stating that the rules on time
computation for ordinary acts do not apply to
the prescription of a criminal action. The Court
emphasized that the statute of limitations in
criminal cases is an act of grace by the state,
and delay in prosecuting offenders can be
detrimental to public justice. Wherefore, the
petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted.
The questioned order of the respondent court is
SET ASIDE. The motion to quash is
GRANTED and the information before the city
court is DISMISSED.
law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday,
the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the
next working day. Prescription has automatically
set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution
to file the information on the last working day
before the criminal offense prescribes.
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
light offenses prescribe in two months. Article
13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of months, it shall be understood that
months are of thirty days each.
“Article 90. Prescription of crimes. —Crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.”
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:--
"Computation of prescription of offenses. The
period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.”
Petitioner- Appellant’s arguments, “as a general
rule, exceptions will not be implied to the
statutes of limitations of criminal offenses, and
hence, in criminal prosecutions unless the statute
of limitations contains an exception or condition
that will toll its operation, the running of the
statute is not interrupted, save only by
indictment or other sufficient procedure
commencing the prosecution of the offense.
After the statute has commenced to run it will
not be interrupted by the happening of any
subsequent event or disability . . ..'
The respondents cite the following provision of
the Revised Administrative Code to sustain their
side:
"SEC. 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the
day, or the last day, for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may
be done on the next succeeding business day."
The law requires or permits the filing of the
information within two months or sixty days
from the date the crime was discovered by the
offended party. Since the 60th day or last day for
the filing of the information in this case fell on a
holiday, according to the respondents-appellees
the law should allow the filing of charges to be
done on the next succeeding business day.
If we follow the ordinary rule of time
computation, based on the common law, which,
in construing statutes of limitations excludes the
first day and includes the last day unless the last
day is dies non in which event the following day
is included, the stand of the respondents-
appellees would be correct.
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of
the Old Rules of Court deal with the
computation of time allowed to do a particular
act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before
a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint,
taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to
lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to
prosecute those who committed a crime against
it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute
such offenders is automatic and by operation of
law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday,
the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the
next working day. Prescription has automatically
set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution
to file the information on the last working day
before the criminal offense prescribes.
The Constitution Francisco v. House of The main issue in this case is when an
Representatives, et al. impeachment proceeding shall be deemed as
having been initiated for purposes of Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides in part that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one
year.” The Court held that the term “to initiate”
refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial
action on the said complaint, or by the act of
filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on justice, or by the filing by at
least one-third of the members of the Secretary
General of the House, applying the literal and
ordinary definition of the term.
The Constitution Oposa v. Factoran, et al Concerned over the continued deforestation of
the country, petitioners, all minors represented
by their parents, instituted a civil complaint as a
taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforest” and “arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”
They pray for the cancellation of all existing
timber license agreements (TLA) in the country
and to order the DENR to cease and desist from
approving new TLAs. On motion of then
DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of a cause of action.
Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an issue
political which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches. Petitioners,
claiming to “represent their generation as well
as the generation yet unborn”, allege their
fundamental right to a balanced and healthful
ecology was violated by the granting of said
TLAs.
The court laid down the framework for
interpreting the Constitution.
To determine the merits of the issues raised in
the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the
well settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where the
technical terms are employed. Second, where
there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent pf its framers.
Finally, ut magi squam pereat. The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole. If, however, the
plain meaning of the word is not found to be
clear, resort to other aids available.
The court further held that while the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter.
In Justice Feliciano’s separate concurring
opinion, he opined that the Article II, Sec. 15 and
16 of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable in its present form.
Manila Prince Hotel v. In this case, the Government Service Insurance
GSIS System, pursuant to the privatization program
of the government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding
shares of stock of Manila Hotel Corporation
which owns the Manila Hotel. Only two
bidders participated, petitioner MPHC, a
Filipino corporation, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm. Renong’s Financial bid of Php
44 per share is higher than MPHC’s bid of Php
41.58 per share. MPHC filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with the Supreme
Court, invoking the second paragraph of article
x, section 10 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos.” GSIS argued that the
second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of
the Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy “since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing
legislation.”
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and principle. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws
and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A
provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action.
Construction of Words and Colgate Palmolive A corporation manufacturing toilet preparations
Phrases in a Statute Philippines, Inc. v. and household remedies imports materials like
Gimenez, et al., G.R. stabilizers and flavors. They pay 17% special
No. L-14787, 28 January excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
1961 cost, transportation, and other charges under
RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. The
corporation seeks a refund of P113,343.99 for
the 17% excise tax. The court ruled yes, stating
that the foreign exchange used for the
importation of dental cream stabilizers and
flavors is exempt from the 17% excise tax. The
petitioner argued that the stabilizers and flavors
used fall under food products, book supplies,
and medical supplies. The court ruled that the
stabilizers and flavors were not food products,
as they were not used as toothpaste. The court
emphasized that the rule of construction that
general and unlimited terms is restrained by a
particular recital does not require rejection of
general terms entirely.
Ramirez v. Court of Ramirez filed a civil case against Garcia,
Appeals, G.R. alleging he vexed, insulted, and humiliated her.
No.93833, 28 September She produced a transcript of their conversation
1995 from a tape recording. Garcia filed a criminal
complaint against Ramirez for violating RA
4200, which prohibits wire-tapping and other
private communication violations. Ramirez
filed a motion to quash, arguing that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that
the violation punished under RA 4200 refers to
the tapping of a communication by someone
other than a participant. The court ruled that
RA 4200 applies to tapping a private
conversation by one party, and the petition was
denied. The court concluded that even a person
privy to a conversation who records their
private conversation without the knowledge of
the other party qualifies as a violator. The court
also reviewed Senate Congressional Records
and concluded that the express letter of the law
is consistent with the legislative intent,
indicating that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to private communications.
SECTION 113 OF CENTRAL BANK
CIRCULAR NO. 960, PROVIDING THAT
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS SHALL
BE EXEMPT FROM ATTACHMENT,
GARNISHMENT OR ANY OTHER ORDER
OF ANY COURT OR ANY GOVERNMENT
AGENCY OR BODY; HELD
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE BECAUSE
OF ITS PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Court justified its departure from the literal
application of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 and
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by
invoking Article 10 of the Civil Code, which
provides that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. While the Court
recognized that the questioned provision is clear
on its face, it also found that the application of
this provision to the case at bar will result in
such a grave injustice that the Court found that
such result would never have been the intention
of the legislature.
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 4200 ENTITLED,
'AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE
WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED
VIOLATIONS OF PRIVATE
COMMUNICATION AND OTHER
PURPOSES,' PROVIDES:
SECTION 1. IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR
ANY PERSON, NOT BEING AUTHORIZED
BY ALL THE PARTIES TO ANY PRIVATE
COMMUNICATION OR SPOKEN WORD, TO
TAP ANY WIRE OR CABLE, OR BY USING
ANY OTHER DEVICE OR ARRANGEMENT,
TO SECRETLY OVERHEAR, INTERCEPT,
OR RECORD SUCH COMMUNICATION OR
SPOKEN WORD BY USING A DEVICE
COMMONLY KNOWN AS A DICTAPHONE
OR DICTOGRAPH OR DETECTAPHONE OR
WALKIE-TALKIE OR TAPE RECORDER, OR
HOWEVER OTHERWISE DESCRIBED.
The Supreme Court held that the phrase "any
person" in Section 1 of R.A. No.. 4200,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Wire Tapping
Act," should be interpreted as referring to any
person, whether involved or not in the private

Dabalos v. Regional In 2009, a complainant sought payment for
Trial Court money she had lent to a petitioner, who was
unable to pay. She asked if the petitioner was
responsible for spreading rumors about her and
slapped him, causing him to use personal
violence on her. The RTC issued a warrant for
the petitioner, and he posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty. In 2010, the petitioner filed
a motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. The RTC ruled against the
petitioner, stating that the infliction of slight
physical injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children. The court
decided that the petitioner is liable under RA
9262, as it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of the relationship.
The court affirmed the orders of the Regional
Trial Court.
Movie and Television ABS-CBN aired an episode of "The Inside
Review and Story" that depicted female students
Classification Board v. moonlighting as prostitutes to pay for tuition
ABS-CBN Broadcasting fees. The episode caused uproar in the PWU
Corporation, et al. community, with the chancellor and parents
filing letter-complaints with the MTRCB. The
communication, as the law does not distinguish.
The legislative intent is determined principally
from the language of a statute and that where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible, absurd or would lead to an injustice.
This maxim is founded on logic and is a
corollary principle that general phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their
natural and general significance. It requires that
a general term or phrase should not be reduced
into parts and one part distinguished from the
other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law.
SECTION 5(A) OF R.A. NO. 9262, WHICH
PROVIDES THAT VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN CAN BE
COMMITTED BY "CAUSING PHYSICAL
HARM TO THE WOMAN OR HER CHILD,"
The Court ruled that prosecution under Section
5(a) of R.A. No. 9262 does not require that the
physical injuries inflicted upon the victim must
have as its proximate cause the dating
relationship.
When the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts- The limitations of the law
should only be set by itself.
The Court held that the punishable acts under
Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 9262 refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986 which grants the
MTRCB the power “to screen, review and
examine all motion pictures as herein defined,
television programs, including publicity
materials such as advertisements, trailers and
stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity
 MTRCB alleged that ABS-CSB did not submit
the program for review and exhibited it without
permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986. ABS-
CBN argued that the program is protected by
the constitutional provision of freedom of
expression and of the press and that MTRCB
has no power to impose any form of prior
restraint. In 1993, MTRCB ordered ABS-CBN
to pay P20K for non-submission and ordered
all subsequent programs to be submitted for
review. ABS-CBN filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the RTC QC, seeking to
declare several sections of PD 1986
unconstitutional. The RTC annulled the
decision and declared the identified provisions
of PD 1986 unconstitutional. The MTRCB has
the authority to review "The Inside Story"
before its broadcast, as stated in INC v. CA.
The court has stated that freedom of expression
and press is protected by the Constitution, not
freedom of religion. ABS-CBN's argument is
based on freedom of speech and press, but the
Constitution does not explicitly state that
freedom of speech or press has preferred status.
The Court is not tasked with determining if
MTRCB violated the Bill of Rights, as it did
not disapprove or ban the program. The petition
was granted. The Decision of the RTC and
Order are reversed.
Llamas v. Executive A case was filed against the governor of Tarlac
Secretary Province for alleged graft and corruption. After
serving his 90-day suspension, the vice-
governor, Petitioner, assumed office. Within 30
days, the governor returned with a resolution
granting executive clemency. The court ruled
that the executive clemency granted in favor of
the governor is constitutional. The 1987
Constitution allows the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The court applied the doctrine "Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire
debemos," meaning if the law does not
distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
court argued that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, she
should also grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are less serious
materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical
distribution, for television broadcast or for
general viewing, imported or produced in the
Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they
be for local viewing or for export”
The Court held that settled is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not make
any exception, courts may not except something
therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it. Ubi Lex non
distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when
the law says 'all television programs, the word
'all' covers all television programs, whether
religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc.
The principle assumes that the legislative body
made no qualification in the use of general word
or expression.' Arelated maxim is generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda, or that the
law does not make a distinction prevents us from
making one.8 Thus, the word "parents" in the
phrase "dependent parents" in Article 1676) of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, should be
understood in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" by the
Employees Compensation Commission which is
tasked with implementing the aforementioned
law.
Article VII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
which states in part that "except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment."
The Court applied the doctrine Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos, which
means that if the law does not distinguish, the
court should not distinguish. The Court noted
that the Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, and the fact that
impeachment cases were expressly excluded
from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19,
also shows the intention to not exclude
administrative cases for to say that the power can
 than criminal offenses.
Provisos Collector of Internal The issue is whether an internal revenue tax
Revenue, et al. v. de los that was assessed in 1935 could, some 20 years
Angeles thereafter, still be collected by distraint and
levy. The administrator of the estate of the
deceased filed a return showing that the heirs
had an inheritance tax liability of P185.94 each,
the Collector of Internal Revenue, sent
assessment notice to each heir requiring
payment of that amount. All the heirs paid
except the said respondent, who refused the
demand on the grounds that he had not yet
received his share of the inheritance and that
there were still questions pending in court
relative to the distribution of the estate.
20 years after the assessment, a warrant of
distraint and levy was issued and sent to the
deputy provincial treasurer of Rizal for
execution. Served with the warrant, the
respondent taxpayer, without disputing the
legality of the assessment, protested the
distraint and levy on the ground of prescription
and then petitioned the Court of Tax Appeals to
declare the warrant illegal and enjoin its
enforcement.
only be exercised in criminal cases means that
there is no need to explicitly exclude
impeachment cases from the coverage of said
Constitutional provision.
SEC. 331. Period of limitation upon assessment
and collection. — Except as provided in the
succeeding section, internal revenue taxes shall
be assessed within five years after the return was
filed, and no proceeding in court without
assessment for the collection of such taxes shall
be begun after the expiration of such period. For
the purpose of this section a return filed before
the last day prescribed by law for the filing
thereof shall be considered as filed on such last
day: Provided, that this limitation shall not
apply to cases already investigated prior to
the approval of this Code.
The limitation is, however, in both cases made
subject to the exceptions provided for in section
332. That section reads:j
SEC. 332. Exceptions as to its period of
limitation of assessment and collection of taxes.
- (c) Where the assessment of any internal-
revenue tax has been made within the period of
limitation above prescribed such tax may be
collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding
in court, but only if begun (1) within five years
after the assessment of the tax, or (2) prior to
the expiration of any period for collection agreed
upon in writing by the Collector of Internal
Revenue and the taxpayer before the expiration
of such five-year period. The period so agreed
upon may be extended by subsequent
agreements in writing made before the expiration
of the period previously agreed upon.
It is contended, however, that the prescriptive
period of five years fixed in subdivision (c) of
section 332 of the Internal Revenue Code cannot
be applied to the present case because of the
proviso to section 331 which says that the
limitation provided in that section shall not apply
to cases already investigated prior to the

Fernandez v. National This case involved a petition for certiorari of
Labor Relations whether or not the National Labor Relations
Commission Commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter's
decision by dismissing the complaints for
illegal dismissal, one of which is petitioner's,
on the finding that they were project
employees. Petitioner was hired as a laborer at
the D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction firm,
when his employment was terminated on the
ground that the project petitioner had been
assigned to was already completed and there
was no more work for him to do.
Petitioner brought his plight before the Labor
Arbiter who consolidated the same with three
(3) other separate complaints for illegal
dismissal and various money claims against
private respondent. After filing their respective
position papers and other documents pertinent
to their causes/defenses, the parties agreed to
submit the case for decision based on record.
approval of the Code is untenable. The
"limitation" mentioned in the proviso to section
331 can refer only to the limitation established in
that section, and not to the limitation of period
prescribed in section 332 (c). This must be so
because the natural and appropriate office of a
proviso to a statute or to a section thereof is to
restrict or qualify the provisions immediately
preceding it. Hence, it had been made a rule of
construction that a proviso shall be confined to
that which directly precedes it, or to the
section to which it has been appended, unless
it clearly appears that the legislature intended
it to have a wider scope.
Article 280 of the Labor Code as legal basis for
the decision of the Labor Arbiter in his favor.
The text of Article 280 states as follows:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. —
The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the
oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if
it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who
has rendered at least one year of service
whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed
and his employment shall continue while such
actually exists.
The proviso in the second paragraph of Article
280 of the Labor Code has recently been
explained in Mercado v. NLRC, where it was
held that said proviso deems as regular
employees only those "casual" employees who

Arenas v. City of San This case involved the Interpretation of Section
Carlos 7 of R.A. No. 5967 provides that the basic
salaries of city judges of second and third class
cities shall be P18,000 per annum. The
petitioner, a City Judge of San Carlos City,
which at the time of its creation up to the time
of promulgation of the case, is a third class city,
demanded the adjustment of his salary as
provided in Section 7 (c) of Act No. 5967. At
the time, the petitioner judge was receiving an
annual salary of Php12,000. On the other hand,
the respondent city argued that its City Mayor
was receiving an annual salary of Php13,200,
and pursuant to the proviso of Section 7 of Act
No. 5967, the petitioner was receiving Php100
per month less than its City Mayor.
Ordinary Words Carandang v. Santiago, et This case is about a petition for certiorari
al.
have rendered at least one year of service
regardless of the fact that such service may be
continuous or broken. It is not applicable to
"project" employees, who are specifically
excepted therefrom.
Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special
law provides higher salary, the city judge in
chartered cities shall receive a basic salary which
shall not be lower than the sums as provided
therein below:
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen
thousand pesos per annum;
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and
other first class cities, the city judge shall receive
one thousand pesos less than that fixed for the
district judge, and for second and third class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand
five hundred pesos less than that fixed for the
district judge, and for other cities, the city judge
shall receive two thousand pesos less than that
fixed for the district judge: Provided, however,
That the salary of a city judge shall be at least
one hundred pesos per month less than that of
the city mayor.
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that
the intention of Congress in enacting Republic
Act No. 5967 was that the salary of a city judge
should not be higher than the salary of the city
mayor. The saving clause "Provided, however,
That the salary of a city judge shall be at least
P100.00 per month less than that of the city
mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which
fixes the salary of city judges for second and
third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum. The
primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the
general language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancy between the
proviso and the body of the statute the former
is given precedence over the latter on the
ground that it is the latest expression of the
intent of the legislature.
NOSCITURA SOCIIS
A doctrine or rule of construction: the meaning of an
Understood in Ordinary against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of
Sense, Technical Words in the court of First Instance of Manila, to annul
Technical Sense his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled
Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et
al., suspending the trial of said civil case to
await the result of the criminal Case No. 534,
Court if First Instance of Batangas. Tomas
Valentron, Jr. was found guilty of the crime
frustrated homicide committed against the
person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein.
Valeton Jr. appealed the decision of the Court
of Appeals where the case is now pending.
Petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover from the
defendant Valentron Jr. and his parents,
damages, both actual and moral for the bodily
injuries received by him. Defendants presented
a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case,
pending the termination of the criminal case
against the the petitioner in the court of
appeals. The judge ruled that the trial of the
civil action must await the result of the criminal
case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration
was submitted, but the court denied the same,
hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner
invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code,
which is as follows: “In cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, maybe brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Ordillo,et al. V. The case is about the people of the provinces of
Commission on Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
Elections
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of
the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14,
1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the
Organic Act for the Region has been approved
unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract)
should be determined by considering the words with it
is associated in the context. The meaning of
questionable words or phrases in a statute may be
ascertained by reference to the meaning or words or
phrases associated with it and may be known from the
accompanying words. Respondents argue that the term
"physical injuries" is used to designate a specific
crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and
therefore said term should be understood in its
peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the
rule's statutory construction. Article in question uses
the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical
injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their
ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these
terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that
these two terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical meaning in
the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
Evident that the term "physical injuries" could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined
in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe
that the Code Commission would have used terms in
the same article some in their general and another in
its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical
injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury,
not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms
used with the latter are general terms.
EJUSDEM GENERIS “of the same kind” --
Difference between Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur A
Sociis Ejusdem Generis is used for interpreting
loosely written statutes legislation.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in
Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that “region” is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The
term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces. This is supported by the fact
that the thirteen (13) regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes
are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas. It joins other units because
of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
 and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in
the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to
declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for
the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can
be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only
one province as the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed
of more than one constituent unit.
Ordinary Words Understood Collector of Internal This case involves an appeal by the Collector
in Ordinary Sense; Revenue v. Manila of Internal Revenue from decision of the Court
Technical Words in Lodge No. 761 of Tax Appeals. The issue at hand is whether
Technical Sense Manila Lodge No. 761 of the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks is liable for privilege
taxes imposed by Section 193 of the Tax Code
on its sale by retail of liquor and tobacco
exclusively to its members and their guests at
no profit. The Court of Tax Appeals held that
lodge is not liable for these taxes, reversing the
decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
A libel suit was filed against Daily
Manila Herald Record. With the filing of this suit, the
Publishing v. Ramos plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary
attachment upon putting up aP50,000
bond. The sheriff levied an attachment
upon the office of Daily record. Manila
heritage, economic and social structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case. Article III,
Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide
that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that: “SECTION 2. The
Regional Government shall exercise powers and
functions necessary for the proper governance and
development of all provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region.”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress
never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we
would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the
same small area.
The Court held that the word “business” as used
in the law should be understood in its ordinary
and common usage as designating “human effort
which have for their end living or reward.” It
further held that “an enterprise not conducted as
means of livelihood or for profit doesn’t come
within its ordinary meaning of the terms,
“business, trade or industry.” Thus, the plain
ordinary meaning of “business” is restricted to
activities or affairs where profit is the purpose of
livelihood is the motive. Fraternal, civic, non-
stock, non-profit organizations that sell liquor
and tobacco exclusively to their members and
guests, with just enough margin to cover
operational expenses, are not considered
engaged in the business of selling liquor and
tobacco and are therefore not liable for privilege
taxes.
Words with technical or legal meaning:
General rule:
words that have, or have been used in, a
technical sense or thosethat have been
 Herald separate third party claims judicially construed to have a certain
because they owned the property. meaning should be interpreted according
Unsuccessful in their attempt to quash to the sense in which they have been
the attachment the Manila Herald PREVIOUSLY used, although the sense
commenced a joint suit against the may vary from the strict or
sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and literal meaning of the words.
Insurance Co. Inc. Judge Ramos
dismissed the suit and declared that Presumption:
what Manila Herald should do is just language used in a statute, which has a
intervene in the libel case. The SC technical or well-known meaning, is
held that the Respondent court acted used in that sense by the legislature.
with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case without any formal
motion to dismiss. Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court provides that the only instance
in which the court may dismiss upon
the court's own motion an action is,
when the "plaintiff fails to appear at the
time of the trial or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of
time or to comply with the Rules or any
order of the court." Section 14 of
rule 59 provides that "Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such third
person from vindicating his claim to the
property by any proper action."

Luzon Stevedoring This case involves a dispute between
Company v. Luzon Stevedoring Company and
Trinidad Wenceslao Trinidad, the collector of
Internal Revenue. The plaintiff sought
to recover the amount of P2,422.81,
which it had paid to the defendant
under protest as a percentage tax on its
gross receipts. The defendant argued
that the plaintiff, as a contractor, was
subject to the tax under Section 1462 of
Act No. 2711. The court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff, finding that it was not a
The term “contractor” in Section 1462 of
Act no. 2711 must have a limited and
restricted meaning. It cannot include
every person who enters into contract.
The true test of a contractor is that they
render a service in the course of an
independent occupation, representing the
will of their employer only as to the
result of their work and not as to the
means by which it is accomplished.
 contractor within the meaning of the
law. The defendant appealed to the
decision.
Generic Words and Rolando E. Geotina Petitioner commissioner of customs has “articles of prohibited importation”,
Progressive vs. The Court of Tax filed the instant petition challenging the when used in Tariff and Customs Code
Construction Appeals and validity of the decision of the Court of Tax embrace not only those declared
Unitrade, Inc. Appeals granting and ordering petitioner prohibited at time of adoption, but also
commissioner to release on P550,000.00
goods and articles subject of activities
bond an alleged no-dollar shipment of
37,042 cartons of fresh apples without the
undertaken in subsequent laws.
corresponding Central Bank release
certificate Vessel M/V "Mindanao Sea"
arrived at the Port of Manila carrying
cartons fresh apples consigned to herein
petitioner. While being unloaded from the
carrying vessel and transported to the
designated cold storage house, the
Collector of Customs issued warrants of
seizure and detention ordering the seizure
of a portion of the goods already unloaded
and their detention for allegedly having
been imported in violation of several
Central Bank Circulars, in relation to
Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs.
The tax court thereafter issued a resolution
for the immediate release of the apples, on
the basis of respondent's surety bond for
P550,000.00. On appeal via certiorari,
Petitioner commissioner submits that since
the importation of fresh apples and other
goods similarly classified by the Central
Bank as non-essential consumer (NEC)
products is prohibited under Central Bank
Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295, the
questioned importation is considered a
prohibited importation under Section 102
(k) of the Tariff and Customs Code,4 and
he was but complying with his mandate
under section 1207 of the same Code,
quoted supra, page 3, "to exercise such
jurisdiction in respect thereto as will
prevent importation" by refusing to allow
the discharge of the said shipment.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the release of
fresh apples on the basis of a surety bond is
 valid.

Generic Words and Martin Diuquino vs. 1. NEGLIGENCE; ARTICLES 1902 and These two cases impliedly hold that if
Progressive Araneta, et.al 1903, CIVIL CODE; OWNER’S the owner of a private vehicle is
Construction RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE negligent in the choice of or vigilance
OF DRIVER OF AUTOMOBILE FOR over his driver, he (the owner) is liable.
PRIVATE USE. — It is needless to say that
In the instant case, the defendant was
article 1902 is not applicable against the
present defendant — even assuming as true
negligent in these particulars, as alleged
the allegation that he failed to exercise all in the complaint and admitted by
the diligence of a good father of a family in defendant in his motion to dismiss.
the selection of his chauffeur — because
such failure on his part was not the
proximate cause of the damage complained
of. He did not by such act or omission
cause the damage in question. Said article
would be applicable against the
defendant’s chauffeur alone, who himself
was guilty of the negligent acts by which
the damage was caused. (Johnson v. David,
5 Phil., 663, 666-667.) It is, however,
insisted for the appellant that the appellee
should be held responsible for the acts of
his chauffeur under article 1903. But said
article specifies the persons who are held
responsible for the acts and omissions of
another; and, as found by this Court in the
cases of Johnson v. David, supra, and
Chapman v. Underwood, 27 Phil., 374,
"the driver does not fall within the list of
persons in Article 1903 of the Civil Code
for whose acts the defendant would be
responsible." It is not alleged that the
appellee is the owner or director of an
establishment or business and that he was
employing his chauffeur in such business
at the time the latter is alleged to have
caused the damage.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — We are not persuaded

that the interpretation of the codal
provisions in question heretofore made by
this Court in the cases above cited is
wrong. Indeed, we feel that for the Court to
so interpret said provisions as to include
 persons other than those therein specified
as liable for the acts and omissions of
another would be an invasion of the
powers and prerogatives of the legislature.
The later of the two cases above cited
(Chapman v. Underwood) was decided by
this Court on March 28, 1914, and for
nearly three decades the legislature has not
seen fit to change the law as interpreted by
this Court.
Punctuation Marks Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the
Agcaoili v. Suguitan peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos
Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916,
with authority to have and hold the said office
with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments
thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject
to the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili
received a letter from Luis Torres,
Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should
cease to be a justice because he is now over 65
years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a protest
through a letter addressed to the undersecretary
to which he asserted that he will not cease from
the office because he was appointed as justice
of peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and
he has the right to hold office during good
behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial
Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply,
but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for
writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the Province
of Ilocos Norte.
A semicolon ( ; ) is a mark of grammatical
punctuation, in the English language, to
indicate a separation in the relation of the
thought, a degree greater than that expressed
by a comma, and what follows that semicolon
must have relation to the same matter which
precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the
purpose of introducing a new idea. A
semicolon is used for the purpose of
continuing the expression of a thought, a
degree greater than that expressed by a mere
comma. It is never used for the purpose of
introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose,
namely, to divide sentences and parts of the
sentences, the only difference being that the
semicolon makes the division a little more
pronounced than the comma.
Thus, the court decided that section 216 of Act
190 is applicable to the petitioner and that the
Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation
of office and franchise. Section 216 provides
“Nothing herein contained shall authorize an
action against a corporation for forfeiture of
charter, unless the same be commenced within
five years after the act complained of was done
or committed; nor shall an action be brought
against an officer to be ousted from his office
unless within one year after the cause of such
ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.” The
Supreme Court held that this provision is
applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has
no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice
of the peace. The second point the court made
is with regard to the rules of Statutory
Construction, given that the said provision is
applicable to public officials, the sentence

Punctuation Marks United States v. Hart The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad
were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga and found guilty of vagrancy under
the provisions of Act No. 519, each sentenced
to six months' imprisonment. Hart and Miller
were further sentenced to a fine of P200, and
Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed.
Prosecution based its argument on the
evidences presented showing that Hart pleaded
guilty and was convicted of gambling two or
three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy
charge.
Defense showed that Hart and Dunn operated a
hotel and saloon in Angeles which did business
of 96, 000 php during its 19 months before the
trial. Hart was also the proprietor of a saloon in
Tacondo, raised import hogs which he sold to
the Army garrison, and had other businesses.
From this evidence it will be noted that each of
the defendants was earning a living at a lawful
trade or business, quite sufficient to support
himself in comfort, and that the evidence which
the prosecution must rely upon for a conviction
consists of their having spent their evenings in
regularly licensed saloons, participating in
gambling games which are expressly made
unlawful by the Gambling Act, No. 1757, and
that Miller frequented a dance hall and houses
of prostitution.
In the case at bar, all three of the defendants
were earning a living by legitimate methods in
a degree of comfort higher that the average.
Their sole offense was gambling, which the
legislature deemed advisable to make the
subject of a penal law. The games in which they
participated were apparently played openly, in a
licensed public saloon, where the officers of the
law could have entered as easily as did the
patrons. It is believed that Act No. 1775 is
after the word “committed;” should not be
treated as a separate thought from the
preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled
that the petitioner remain in office.
When the meaning of the legislative enactments
in question, it is the duty of the courts to
ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that construction of the
statute which will give it effect. The construction
finally adopted should be based upon something
more substantial than the mere punctuation
found in a printed Act. If the punctuation of the
statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable
and in apparent accord with legislative will, it
may be used as an additional argument for
adopting the literal meaning of the words of the
statute thus punctuated. But an argument based
upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the
courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation
when necessary, to give the Act the effect
intended.
Section 1 of Act No. 519 is divided into seven
clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause
enumerates a certain class of persons who,
within the meaning of this statute, are to be
considered as vagrants. For the purposes of this
discussion, we quote this section below, and
number each of these seven clauses.
(1) Every person having no apparent
means of subsistence, who has the
physical ability to work, and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to
some lawful calling; (2) every person
found loitering about saloons or dram
shops or gambling houses, or tramping
or straying through the country without
visible means of support; (3) every
person known to be a pickpocket, thief,
burglar, ladrone, either by his own
confession or by his having been
convicted of either of said offenses, and
having no visible or lawful means of
support when found loitering about any
gambling house, cockpit, or in any
outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every
idle or dissolute person or associate of
 adequate, if enforced, to supress the gambling
proclivities of any person making a good living
at a lawful trade or business.
USE OF SPECIFIC Microsoft Corporation
WORDS: v. Manansala, et al. The issue involves Manansala, who, without
Use of the words "and"/"or" authority from Microsoft Corporation, was
engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft
computer software programs. Then, petitioner
filed an Affidavit-Complaint in the DOJ.
However, the State Prosecutor dismissed the
charge against private respondent for violation
of Section 29 P.D. 49.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial
reconsideration arguing that printing or copying
is not essential in the crime of copyright
infringement under Section 29 of PD No. 49.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review with the DOJ, which denied the
petition for review. the CA rendered the
assailed decision affirming the dismissal by the
DOJ.
known thieves or ladrones who wanders
about the country at unusual hours of
the night; (5) every idle peron who
lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse,
vessel, or place other than such as is
kept for lodging purposes, without the
permission of the owner or person
entitled to the possession thereof; (6)
every lewd or dissolute person who
lives in and about houses of ill fame;
(7) every common prostitute and
common drunkard, is a vagrant.
A further thought suggest itself in connection
with the punctuation of the paragraph in
question. The section, as stated above, is divided
into seven clauses, separated by semicolons. To
say that two classes of vagrants are defined in
paragraph 2, as to one of which visible means of
support or a lawful calling is not a good defense,
and as to the other of which such a defense is
sufficient, would imply a lack of logical
classification on the part of the legislature of the
various classes of vagrants. This we are not
inclined to do.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 49:
Section 5. Copyright shall consist in the
exclusive right;
(A) To print, reprint, publish, copy, distribute,
multiply, sell, and make photographs, photo-
engravings, and pictorial illustrations of the
works;
(B) To make any translation or other version or
extracts or arrangements or adaptations thereof;
to dramatize it if it be a non-dramatic work; to
convert it into a non-dramatic work if it be a
drama; to complete or execute if it be a model or
design;
(C) To exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or
reproduce, the work in any manner or by any
method whatever for profit or otherwise; it not
reproduced in copies for sale, to sell any
manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof;
(D) To make any other use or disposition of the
work consistent with the laws of the land.
Under the rules on syntax, the conjunctive word
"and" denotes a "joinder or union" of words,

Use of the words "and"/"or"
Romulo Mabanta
Buenaventura Sayoc & The issue is concerned with whether Romulo,
De Los Angeles v. Home Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los
Development Mutual Angeles, a law firm, was exempted from the
Fund Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by Home
Development Mutual Fund because of a
superior retirement plan, pursuant to Section 19
of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No.
7742.
The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued
Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995,
amending and modifying the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As
amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that
for a company to be entitled to a waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a
plan providing for both provident/retirement
and housing benefits superior to those provided
under the Pag-IBIG Fund.
The President and Chief Executive Officer of
HDMF disapproved petitioner's application on
the ground that the requirement that there
should be both a provident retirement fund and
a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase
"and/or."
phrases, or clause; it is different from the
disjunctive word "or" that signals disassociation
or independence. However, a more important
rule of statutory construction dictates that laws
should be construed in a manner that avoids
absurdity or unreasonableness.
The conjunctive "and" should not be taken in its
ordinary acceptation, but should be construed
like the disjunctive "or" if the literal
interpretation of the law would pervert or
obscure the legislative intent.
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7742:
Sec. 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plan- An
employer and/or employee-group who, at the
time this Decree becomes effective have their
own provident and/or employee-housing
plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the
following purposes:
(a) For annual certification of waiver or
suspension from coverage or participation in the
Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of
verification that the waiver or suspension does
not contravene any effective collective
bargaining agreement and that the features of the
plan or plans are superior to the Fund or
continue to be so; or
(b) For integration with the Fund, either fully or
partially.
The establishment of a separate provident
and/or housing plan after the effectivity of this
Decree shall not be a ground for waiver of
coverage in the Fund; nor shall such coverage
bar any employer and/or employee-group from
establishing separate provident and/or housing
plans.
The term "and/or" means that the effect shall be
given to both the conjunctive "and" and the
disjunctive "or"; or that one word or the other
may be taken accordingly as one or the other
will best effectuate the purpose intended by the
legislature as gathered from the whole statute.
The term is used to avoid a construction which
by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will
exclude the combination of several of the
alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive
"and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the

Mandatory and Permissive The Director of Lands v.
Words; Shall/May Court of Appeals The issue involves the private respondent's
petition for original registration of his title over
a land under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529. The land registration court dismissed the
petition for want of jurisdiction.
The Court noted that applicants failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of
PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
Consequently, the Court has not legally
acquired jurisdiction over the instant
application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of
PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
"published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation."
The notice in the case was published in the
Official Gazette but not in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Mandatory and Permissive Ledesma v. Court of
Words; Shall/May Appeals The issue involves an owner-lessor of an
apartment building in which two units of said
apartment building were leased to the private
respondent, who violated one of the terms and
conditions of the Contract of Lease.
Upon failure of the private respondent to honor
the demand letters, petitioner referred the
matter to the Barangay for conciliation which
alternatives standing alone.
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention
of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is
that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be
used interchangeably.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication,
etc. — The court shall, within five days from
filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which
shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing
of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the
time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines:
Provided…
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the
work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said
word denotes an imperative and thus indicates
the mandatory character of a statute. While
concededly such literal mandate is not an
absolute rule in statutory construction, as its
import ultimately depends upon its context in the
entire provision, the Court held that in the
present case the term must be understood in its
normal mandatory meaning.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508:
Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2
hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation of the
 eventually issued a certification to file action.
Petitioner was assisted by her son, (who is not a
lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she
was suffering from recurring psychological and
emotional ailment as can be seen from the
receipts and prescriptions issued by her
psychiatrist.
Petitioner initiated ejectment proceeding. The
Manila Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a
decision ordering private respondent to vacate
the premises. The RTC, on appeal, affirmed the
MTC ruling.
However, CA ordered the dismissal of her
ejectment complaint before the MTC for lack
of cause of action due to non-compliance with
Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law).
Mandatory and Permissive Diokno v. Rehabilitation
Words; Shall/May Finance Corporation The issue involves plaintiff who is the holder of
a backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by
the Treasurer of the Philippines under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 304.
When the action was brought, he had an
outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation in the total sum of
P50,000, covered by a mortgage on his
property with interest at 4 per cent per annum,
of which P47,355.28 was still unpaid.
In this action, he seeks to compel the defendant
corporation to accept payment of the balance of
his indebted with his backpay certificate. The
court a quo held that section 2 of Republic Act
No. 304 (Backpay Law) is permissive merely,
and that even if where mandatory, plaintiff's
case can not fall thereunder because he is not
acquiring property for a home or construing a
residential house, but compelling the
acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a
debt he contracted after the enactment of
Republic Act No. 304. It, therefore, dismissed
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary
or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon
or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated. . . .
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1508:
Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. — In all
proceedings provided for herein, the parties
must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of
minors and incompetents who may be assisted
by their next of kin who are not lawyers.
As explained by the Minister of Justice with
whom the Court agree:
To ensure compliance with the requirement of
personal confrontation between the parties, and
thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay
conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute
resolution, the above-quoted provision is
couched in mandatory language.
In addition to the word "shall," the mandatory
nature of a provision of a statute can also be
expressed in similar terms.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 304:
. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or
banks or other financial institutions owned or
controlled by the Government shall, subject to
the availability of loanable funds, and any
provision of the their charters, articles of
incorporation's, by-laws, or rules and regulations
to the contrary notwithstanding, accept or
discount at not more than two per centum per
annum for ten years such certificate for the
following purposes only: (1) the acquisition of
real property for use as the applicant's home, or
(2) the building or construction of the residential
house of the payee of said certificate: . . .
The Court held that while the ordinary
signification of the term "shall" is that it is a
word of command, this interpretation will not
always be followed, and the statute shall be
understood as directory when so required by the
context or the intention of the statute. In this
case, the Court took note of the fact that the
above quoted provision contains the

Association and
Relationship of Words,
Phrases, and Provisions
the complaint with costs.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez A petition for mandamus was initiated against
Tan Keh and Dizon the respondent judge, praying that the latter be
ordered to continue a civil case proceeding that
was instituted during the Japanese Military
Occupation of the Philippines. The Respondent
judge contended that he cannot take cognizance
of the said case in compliance to an order made
by Gen. Douglas McArthur which invalidates
and nullifies all judicial proceedings and
judgements in the courts of the Philippines
during the Philippine Executive Commission,
which is the government established by the
Japanese. Under this case three questions have
been raised. First, whether the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court existing in the
Philippine Executive Commission of the RP
were good and valid even after the the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the US. Second, whether the proclamation
issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur has
invalidated all judgement and judicial acts and
proceeding of the said courts. Third, if the
second issue is affirmative, does the present
courts of the commonwealth, which were the
same courts prior to, and continued during the
Japanese occupation , may continue those
proceeding pending during the reoccupation of
the US of the Philippines.
qualification "subject to availability of loanable
funds."
1. It is a legal truism in political and
international law that all acts and proceedings of
the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good
and valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus
summed up by Halleck, in his work on
International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of
one belligerent to occupy and govern the
territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. it is
evident that the Philippine Executive
Commission, which was organized by Order No.
1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government
of the second kind.
2. According to a well-known rule of statutory
construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a
statute ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction
remains." It is, therefore, evident that the
proclamation of General MacArthur of October
23, 1944, which declared that "all laws,
regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control," has not
invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings,
which are not a political complexion, of the
courts of justice in the Philippines that were
continued by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation, and that
said judicial acts and proceedings were good and
valid before and now good and valid after the
reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.
3. the present courts have jurisdiction to
continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in
cases, not of political complexion, pending
therein at the time of the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government.

ASSOC BUENASEDA v. This legal document involves a Petition for
IATIONS And Relationship FLAVIER Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus filed by
of words, Phrases and petitioners who sought to nullify an order from
Provisions the Ombudsman for their preventive
suspension. The order was related to an
administrative complaint filed against them for
alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The petitioners argued that the Ombudsman's
order was issued without giving them the
chance to refute the charges and sought
disqualification of certain individuals involved
in the investigation. The case went through
several stages of motions, submissions, and
resolutions.
People vs Delantar The case is about violation of section 5, article
3 of RA no. 7610 in which the appellant was
convicted and brought on appeal to the supreme
If the proceedings pending in the different courts
of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the
Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason
that the same courts, which had become
reestablished and conceived of as having in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and
liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the
principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in
cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings.
Under, Noscitor a sociis, the word ‘suspension’
should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a
particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made
specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated.
SECTION 24 OF R.A. NO. 6770, which grants
the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, is a
procedural not a penal statute.
The Supreme Court examined the surrounding
words and phrases associated with "suspension"
to clarify its intended meaning within the
statutory context. This analysis was crucial in
determining whether the Ombudsman had the
power to issue preventive suspension to officials
and employees under investigation by the office,
irrespective of whether they were employed "in
his office" or in other government offices. By
associating and considering the term
"suspension" alongside other related terms and
provisions in the law, the court derived a more
specific interpretation of the power vested in the
Ombudsman to issue preventive suspension,
thereby clarifying the scope and application of
this authority in the context of the case.
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
court. the appellant argues that the trial court
erred in convicting him of the crime charged
despite of the failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that
the trial court erred for convicting him of 2
violations of section 5 of article 3 of RA 7610
despite the fact that only a single information
was filed by the 2nd Assistant prosecutor of
Pasay City, and that the trial court erred in
imposing the penalty for the crime charged in
its maximum period when there is no showing
in its decision of the attendance of a qualifying
circumstances which would warrant the
imposition of maximum penalty.
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. There is no doubt, drawing
from the evidence, that AAA was a child who
was exploited in prostitution as defined in
Section 5, Article III quoted above. The law
punishes not only the person who commits the
acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with the child but also those who engage in or
promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution.
Appellant is one such person.
according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the
correct construction of a word or phrase
susceptible of various meanings may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of
words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610
contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the
victim which will justify the imposition of the
maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator
is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that
the words with which "guardian" is associated in
the provision all denote a legal relationship.
From this description we may safely deduce that
the guardian envisioned by law is a person who
has a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being
the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or
by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither
AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.
premises considered, the 31 May 2005 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
00977 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellant SIMPLICIO
DELANTAR y REDONDO is found guilty of
one count of violation of Section 5(a), R.A. No.
7610. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as

National Power This case, National Power Corporation is being
Corporation v. Angas, et ordered by the court to pay private respondents
al for the expropriation of their land. An issue
arise whether the applicable law is Article 2209
of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal
interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416
which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per
annum. the private respondents contends that it
is Central Bank Circular No. 416 should be
applied. On the contrary the petitioner contends
it is the civil code that should be applied.
maximum, and to pay a fine in the sum of
₱20,000.00 to be administered as a cash fund by
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation
of AAA,88 and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads: By virtue
of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of
Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as
the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its
Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has
prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and
the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of
express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
be twelve per cent (12%) per annum.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the
Central Bank circular applies only to loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits.
Under this doctrine EJUSDEM GENERIS, where
general terms follow the designation of
particular things or classes of persons or
subjects, the general term will be construed to
comprehend those things or persons of the same
class or of the same nature as those specifically
enumerated. The term "judgments" as used in
Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central
Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to
mean only judgments involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits.
Based on these, the law that should be is Article
2209 of the civil code, as the CBC no. 416 is
only applicable to judgements on loans mention
therein. In the case at bar, it is not a loan but an
indemnification for the expropriation.
 MUTUC v. COMELEC The case involves Amelito Mutuc, a candidate
for delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
The Commission on Elections prohibited the
use of taped jingles for campaign purposes by
sending a telegram to Mutuc, citing a provision
in the Constitutional Convention Act that
banned the distribution of certain electoral
propaganda gadgets. Mutuc challenged this
prohibition through a special civil action for
prohibition, asserting that it violated his
constitutional right to freedom of speech.
EXTRI
NSIC AIDS OF PEOPLE VS. This case is about the appeal of
CONSTRUCTION MUÑOZ Feliciano Muñoz and Justo Millora,
who were convicted of the crime of
murder. The Trial court found Muñoz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced him to death, while Millora
who was only 14 years old at the time
of the crime, had his judgement
suspended and was committed to the
custody of the commanding general of
the First Regional Command. The
appellants raised several errors,
including the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, the admissibility
of Muñoz alleged confession, and the
existence of a conspiracy between the
appellants.
The doctrine utilized in this case is the principle
of "ejusdem generis." This principle refers to a
rule of statutory construction where general
words in a statute or law that follow specific
words should be interpreted and confined to the
same kind, class, or nature as those specifically
mentioned. In simpler terms, when a statute lists
specific things and is followed by general words,
the general words are interpreted in light of the
specific items mentioned.
The Court invoked the principle of ejusdem
generis to assess the prohibition of the use of
political taped jingles. It questioned the authority
of the COMELEC to impose such a ban under
the Constitutional Convention Act, stating that
the general prohibition lacked a specific basis
within the Act, and applying the doctrine, it was
reasoned that such a ban could not be implied or
extended beyond the specific items listed within
the Act.
The court held that the direct and
positive identification of the appellants
by the prosecution witnesses sufficiently
established their guilt. The court also
found that the alleged confession of
Muñoz was admissible as it was not
proven to have been extracted under
duress, violence, threat, or intimidation.
Additionally, the court ruled that the
existence of a conspiracy could be
inferred from the specific acts done by
both appellants, even without evidence
of evident premeditation.
Due to the interpretation of Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the constitution on
whether the death penalty has been
abolished and its effect on the range of
penalties imposed in the Revised Penal
Code, The Court held that there is
nothing in article III, Section 19 (1)

EXTRINSIC AIDS OF China Banking This case is about Vicente Acaban who
CONSTRUCTION Corporation, et al. v. won in a civil case for sum of money
Ortega, et al. against B & B Forest Development
Corporation. To satisfy the judgment,
the Acaban sought the garnishment of
the bank deposit of the B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the
China Banking Corporation (CBC).
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment
was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the
trial court and served on said bank
through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong.
Liong was ordered to inform the Court
whether or not there is a deposit in the
CBC of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, and if there is any deposit,
to hold the same intact and not allow
any withdrawal until further order from
the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to
comply with a court process garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor
by invoking the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits
the disclosure of any information
concerning to bank deposits.
which expressly states that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. The Court also noted that there
is no need to resort to extrinsic aids of
construction like records of the
constitutional convention since the
language of the Constitution is plain.
The lower court did not order an
examination of or inquiry into deposit of
B & B Forest Development Corporation,
as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the
court whether or not the defendant B &
B Forest Development Corporation had
a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for the purposes of the
garnishment issued by it, so that the
bank would hold the same intact and not
allow any withdrawal until further order.
It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition
against examination of or inquiry into
bank deposit under RA 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure
satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there
is no real inquiry in such a case, and the
existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to the
execution process. It is hard to conceive
that it was ever within the intention of
Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if
ordered by the Court, through the
expedient of converting their assets into
cash and depositing the same in a bank.
The relevant provisions of R.A. No.
1405 that provide:
Section 2. 1 All deposits of whatever
nature with banks or banking institutions
in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of

De Villa VS. Court Petitioner Cecilio S. De Villa was
of Appeals, et al. charged in RTC Makati with violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or
Drawing and Issuance of a Check
without Sufficient Funds or
Credit and for Other Purposes).
the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau
or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases
of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or
in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any
official or employee of a banking
institution to disclose to any person
other than those mentioned in Section
two hereof any information concerning
said deposits.
Section 4. All Acts or parts of Acts,
Special Charters, Executive Orders,
Rules and Regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed.
Section 5. Any violation of this law will
subject offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five
years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion
of the court.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory
construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish.
Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss
the Information on the following
grounds:
(a) Respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(b) That no offense was committed
since the check involved was payable
in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An
Act to Assure Uniform
Value of Philippine Coin and
Currency). – (additional FYI: as per
petitioner’s defense, the
questioned check was drawn on a dollar
account with foreign bank, outside
territorial
jurisdiction of PH) – Denied for lack of
merit.
 Petitioner motioned for
reconsideration but his motion was
subsequently denied by respondent
court due to lack of merit.
 A petition for certiorari
seeking to declare the nullity of the
RTC Ruling was filed by petitioner in
the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the
petition with cost against petitioner.
 A motion for reconsideration
of CA decision was filed by the
petitioner, and denied by CA, thus
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Cecilio S. De Villa was
charged in RTC Makati with violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or
Drawing and Issuance of a Check
without Sufficient Funds or
Credit and for Other Purposes).
 Petitioner moved to dismiss
the Information on the following
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P.
Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they
are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside
thereof, or made payable and dishonored
in the Philippines though drawn and
issued outside thereof, are within the
coverage of said law. The law likewise
applied to checks drawn against current
accounts in foreign currency.
[I]t is well established that courts may
avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body to
assist in determining the construction of
a statute of doubtful meaning (citation
omitted). Thus, where there is doubts as
to what a provision of a statute means,
the meaning put to the provision during
the legislative deliberation or discussion
on the bill may be adopted (citation
omitted). The records of the Batasan,
Vol. III, unmistakably show that the
intention of the lawmakers is to apply
the law to whatever currency may be the
subject thereof. Courts may avail
themselves of the actual proceedings of
the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute
of doubtful meaning.
grounds:
(a) Respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(b) That no offense was committed
since the check involved was payable
in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An
Act to Assure Uniform
Value of Philippine Coin and
Currency). – (additional FYI: as per
petitioner’s defense, the
questioned check was drawn on a dollar
account with foreign bank, outside
territorial
jurisdiction of PH) – Denied for lack of
merit.
 Petitioner motioned for
reconsideration but his motion was
subsequently denied by respondent
court due to lack of merit.
 A petition for certiorari
seeking to declare the nullity of the
RTC Ruling was filed by petitioner in
the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the
petition with cost against petitioner.
 A motion for reconsideration
of CA decision was filed by the
petitioner, and denied by CA, thus
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Cecilio S. De Villa was
charged in RTC Makati with violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or
Drawing and Issuance of a Check
without Sufficient Funds or
Credit and for Other Purposes).
 Petitioner moved to dismiss
the Information on the following
grounds:
(a) Respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(b) That no offense was committed
since the check involved was payable
in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An
Act to Assure Uniform
Value of Philippine Coin and
Currency). – (additional FYI: as per
petitioner’s defense, the
questioned check was drawn on a dollar
account with foreign bank, outside
territorial
jurisdiction of PH) – Denied for lack of
merit.
 Petitioner motioned for
reconsideration but his motion was
subsequently denied by respondent
court due to lack of merit.
 A petition for certiorari
seeking to declare the nullity of the
RTC Ruling was filed by petitioner in
the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the
petition with cost against petitioner.
 A motion for reconsideration
of CA decision was filed by the
petitioner, and denied by CA, thus
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner was charged before the
Regional Trial Court with violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. After
arraignment and after private
respondent had testified on direct
examination, petitioner moved to
dismiss the Information on the
following grounds: x x x That no
offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence,
the obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An
Act to Assure Uniform Value of
 Philippine Coin and Currency).
Accused’s motion to dismiss was
denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but his
motion was subsequently denied by
respondent court.
League of Cities R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But
VS. Commission These cases were initiated by the the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
on Elections, et al. consolidated petitions for prohibition 9009 through the exemption clauses
filed by the League of Cities of the found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City explicitly exempted the concerned
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
assailing the constitutionality of the No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
sixteen (16) laws, each converting the therefore, also amendments to the LGC
municipality covered thereby into a itself.
component city (Cityhood Laws), and Nevertheless, Substantial distinction lies
seeking to enjoin the Commission on in the capacity and viability of
Elections (COMELEC) from respondent municipalities to become
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the component cities of their respective
subject laws. In the Decision dated provinces. Congress, by enacting the
November 18, 2008, the Court En Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity
Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the and viability of respondent
petitions and struck down the Cityhood municipalities to become the State's
Laws as unconstitutional for violating partners in accelerating economic
Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the growth and development in the
equal protection clause. In another provincial regions, which is the very
Decision dated December 21, 2009, the thrust of the LGC, manifested by the
Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, pendency of their cityhood bills during
declared the Cityhood Laws as the 11th Congress and their relentless
constitutional. On August 24, 2010, the pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
Court En Banc, through a Resolution,
by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
and Motion to Annul the Decision of Cityhood Laws are declared
December 21, 2009. CONSTITUTIONAL
Manila Jockey The issue involved Republic Act No. 1502 Legislative debates are expressive of the
Club, Inc. v. Games increased the sweepstakes draw and races views and motives of individual members
and Amusement of the PCSO to twelve, but without and are not safe guides and, hence, may not
Board specifying the days on which they are to be
be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning
run. To accommodate these additional and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is
races, the GAB resolved to reduce the impossible to determine with certainty what
number of Sundays assigned to private construction was put upon an act by the
 individuals and entities by six. Appellants members of the legislative body that passed
protested, contending that the said the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the
increased should be taken from the 12 members thereof. Those who did not speak,
Saturdays reserved to the President, for may not have agreed with those who did;
charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or and those who spoke, might differ from each
should be assigned to any other day of the other. The legal act, so to speak, is made up
week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal of two elements — an internal and an
holiday. They also hold that respondent external one; it originates in intention and is
PCSO does not have the right or power to perfected by expression. Failure of the latter
appropriate or use the race tracks and may defeat the former.
equipment of petitioner without its consent,
nor can respondents compel petitioner to so
allow such use of its race tracks and
equipment under pain of having its license
revoked. Does the legislative debates and
explanatory statements by members of the
legislature may be resorted to in the
interpretation of statutes.
CONSTRUCTING OF CITY OF NAGA, 1970 City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. Each approved ordinance or motion shall be
CONFLICTING VICENTE P SIBULO 360 changing and amending the graduated sealed with the seal of the Board, signed by
PROVISION as Mayor and tax on quarterly grass sales of merchants the presiding officer and secretary of the
JOAQUIN C. prescribe Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Board and recorded in book for the purpose
CLEOPE Naga to percentage tax on gross sales and shall, on the day following its passage,
Vs. provided for in section 2 thereof. be posted by the secretary at the main
CATALINO AGNA, 1971 respondents filed with the City entrance to the city hall, and shall take effect
FELIPE AGNA and Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim for and be in the force on and after the 10 th day
SALUD VELASCO, refund of amounts paid, together with following its passage, unless otherwise
interest from the date of payments paid to stated in said ordinance, resolution or
the City of Naga the taxes on their gross motion or vetoed by the Mayor as
sales, for the quarter from July to hereinafter provided
September of 1970.
SC dismissed the petition; ruling 2304 of
the Revised Administrative Code can be
reconciled with R.A. 2264 Local
Autonomy Act by applying a clause on
those Acts defending on the case at hand.
In this case R.A. 2304 referring to the
“effectivity of an ordinance changing or
repealing a municipal licensed tax already
in existence” is applicable. Therefore,
Ordinance no. 360 should be effective and
enforceable in the next succeeding year
after the year of its approval or in 1971. a
case holding that section 2304 of the
Revised Administrative Code and section 2
 of the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act
No. 2264) can be reconciled by applying
the first clause of section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
In view of foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby dismissed.
HON. RICHARD J. San Sebastian Drug Store and Olongapo Implications, a law that provides the power
GORDON City Drug Store, owned by Yambao, is to grant licenses implies that there is also
Vs. potentially being stripped of its license to granted power to revoke such licenses.
JUDGE REGINO T. operate. An undercover team did a “test However, the limitation of such implications
VERIDIANO II and buy” of certain drugs without prescription, is that there should be a violation or express
spouses to which both drug stores complied without disregard for pertinent conditions attached
EDUARDO and question. to the maintenance of permit for the
ROSALINDA Spouses Yambao then filed a complaint for revocation to be valid.
YAMBAO, mandamus and damages as well as writ of
preliminary injunction against Olongapo
Mayor Gordon for the latter’s attempt 10
suspend the Mayor’s Permit of San
Sebastian Drug Store for rampant violation
of R.A 5921, otherwise known as the
Pharmacy Law and Republic Act 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Mayor of Olongapo City has the authority

and jurisdiction to suspend the operations
of drug stores. Yes, for the Olongapo City
Drug Store (violation of permit) NO, for
San Sebastian Drug Store (FDA has the
authority over the committed violation).

Wherefore, the challenged orders of July 6,

1980 and September 4, 1980, are modified
in the sense that the suspension of Mayor’s
Permit No.1955 shall be considered valid
but only San Sebastian Drug Store and
Olongapo City Drug Store return to their
original sites as specified by FDA licenses
and the Mayor’s Permit or until the request
for transfer, if made by the private
respondents, is approved but the petitioner
the rest of the said orders are AFFIRMED,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO, ORDERED.
EMILI FLORES, ET • The petitioners, former employees The ruling below cannot be upheld, the
AL., in respondents’ electric and ice plants in prescriptive period provided for in the
Vs. Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed three suits on minimum wage law (section 17) Republic
VICENTE SAN May 7, 1957, in the Court of First Instance Act No. 602 specifically refers to the
PEDRO, ET AL of that province to recover compensation enforcement of any causes of action arising
for overtime work alleged to have rendered under the Eight-Hour Labor Law on the
by them during the period of their theory propounded by the lower court that
employment. the two laws are in pari materia because in a
• The aggregate sums claimed, point of fact they are not.
including damages, interest and attorney’s
fees, being 152,473.34. the defendants, In view of the foregoing, the order
now respondents herein, moved for the complaint of is modified in the sense that
dismissal of the suits on the ground the petitioners’ complaints shall be amended
prescription, invoking the three-year to include only those portions of petitioners’
prescriptive period provided for the claims for overtime payment as are within
minimum wage law (Republic Act No.602) the period of six years counted form the
in default of prescriptive period for action accrual of their respective causes of action.
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
This case deals with the prescription of
action for the recovery of overtime
compensation under Eight-Hour Labor
Law (Com. Act No. 444)
The court below ruled that the period
prescribed in the minimum wage law for
enforcing a cause of action arising their
under should also apply to actions for
enforcing the Eight-Hour Labor Law since
the latter law did not provide for a
prescriptive period of its own.
HON. GEMILIANO The Vice Mayor of Manila and presiding It had held that no appeal lies from the
C. LOPEZ, JR. Officer of the City of Manila, the Hon. decision of the Civil Service Commission,
Vs. Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil and that parties aggrieved thereby may
THE CIVIL Service Commission, through the Regional proceed to this court alone on certiorari
SERVICE Director of The National Capital Region, under rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within
COMMISSION, the appointments of the nineteen officers thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof,
HON. DANILO R. and employees in the executive staff of the pursuant to section 7, Article IX, of the
LACUNA, and office of Manila, pursuant to the provisions Constitution.
THE CITY of section 15, of said Republic Act No.409.
COUNCIL OF This opinion transmitted by the secretary to
MANILA, the City Mayor to the Commission, the
Commission held that it is the City Council
to which the appointing power is vested the
petitioner contends, Section 15 of the
Republic Act No. 409 as amended has
supposedly been repealed by the Republic
Act No.5185, Specifically Section 4
thereof.

Interpretation of Contracts
Whether or not Section 15 of the Charter of
the City of Manila has been repealed
Republic Act No.409 which provides for
the organization of the Government of the
City of Manila, is special law whereas
Republic Act No.5185 Batas blg.337,
which apply to municipal government in
general, are general laws.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
JOSE L. • When in July 1952 the Mayor of
LAXAMANA, Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the
Vs. vice-mayor Jose T. Salazar, assumed the
JOSE T BALTAZAR, officeas mayor by virtue of section 2195 of
Revised administrative Code, However the
Provincial governor, acting under section
21 (a) of Revised Code (R.A.180), with the
consent of the provincial board appointed
Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan,
who immediately took the corresponding
official oath.
• Result: this quo warranto
proceeding, based solely on the petitioner’s
proposition that the section first mentioned
has been repealed by the subsequent
provision of the Revised Administrative
Code.
• If there was such repeal, this
petition should be granted, and Laxamana
declared the lawful mayor of Sexmoan,
Pampanga, otherwise it was be denied.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, --
especially the two sections indicated—
there was no doubt in Government circles
that when the municipal president was
suspended from the office, the vise-
president took his place.
This quo warranto petition is dismissed
with costs. So, Ordered.
NATIONAL This case involves a dispute between the
It is reasonable to assume that the
incorporation of the above section 2180 into
the Revised Election Law as section 21 (a)
did not have the effect of enlarging its
scope, to supersede or repeal section 2195,
what with the presumption against it has
received implied repeals. “Where a statute
contemporaneous and practical
interpretation and the statute as interpreted
is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is
accorded greater weight that it ordinarily
receives, and is regarded as presumptively
the correct interpretation of the law. The rule
here is based upon the theory that the
legislature is acquainted with the
contemporaneous interpretation of the
statute, especially when made by an
administrative body or executive officers
charged with the duty of administering or
enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly
adopts the interpretation upon re-
enactment.” (Sutherland Statutory
Construction, sec.5109.)
The court distinguished between contract
IRRIGATION National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and
ADMINISTRATION v. Estanislao Gamit over a contract of lease with
GAMIT the right to purchase. Gamit filed a complaint
seeking reformation of the contract, recovery of
possession, and damages. The trial court held
that the contract was a lease with the right to
purchase, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modifications.
THE DIRECTOR OF In this case, the Director of Public Works
PUBLIC WORKS v. filed a lawsuit against Sing Juco, Sing Bengco,
SING JUCO, et al. and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
recover the amount owed under a contract for
filling land with dredged material. The land in
question was owned by Mariano de la Rama,
Gonzalo Mariano Tanboontein, Sing Juco, and
Sing Bengco, and was subject tot a mortgage
held by PNB. The government had entered into
a contract with the ownersto deposit dredged
material on the land as part of a harbour
improvement project. The trial court held that
the government’s lien for the filling
improvement had priority over PNB’s
mortgage, and also held the owners and sureties
liable for the amount owed to the government.
The defendants appealed the decision.
interpretation and contract reformation:
‘interpretation’ is the act of making intelligible
what was before not understood, ambiguous, or
not obvious. It is a method by which the
meaning of language is ascertained. The
‘interpretation of a contract is the determination
of the meaning attached to the words written or
spoken which make the contract. On the other
hand, ‘reformation’ of an instrument is a
remedy in equity by means of which a written
instrument made or construed so as to express or
conform to the real intention of the parties and
that aims to confirm and perpetuate the real
contracts between the parties when the written
instrument does not reflect their true intention. It
is granted when there is a mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct, or accident that caused the
instrument to fail to express the true intention of
the parties. As aptly observed by the code
commission, the rationale of the doctrine is that
it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the
enforcement of a written instrument which does
not reflect or disclose the real meeting of the
minds of the parties.
The principles of statutory construction can be
applied in the interpretation of contracts,
considering that the rules of statutory
construction take into account the meaning of
the words used in a legal instrument. In this case,
the court applied the rule of ejusdem generis in
construing the meaning of the words used in a
power of attorney and concluding that the
contracts named in the power of attorney which
the attorney-in-fact can execute are of the nature
that does not contemplate the grant of suretyship
or guaranty. The court held that the
government’s lien for the filling improvement
did not have priority over pnb’s mortgage. The
court reasoned that the mortgage was registered
before the filling contract, and therefore, the
mortgage had priority. The court also held that
the surety, tan ong sze, was not liable under the
contract of suretyship because there was no
specific authority given to the attorney-in-fact to
create a contract of suretyship.
EMPIRE INSURANCE This case involves a petition for review on
COMPANY v. RUFINO, Certiorari of the order to the Court of First
et al. Instance of Rizal dismissing a case filed by
Empire Insurance Company against the heirs of
Vicente A. Rufino. The petitioner sought
payment from the respondents based on their
undertaking in a partition agreement to assume
and pay all the outstanding liabilities and
obligations of the decedent. The trial court
dismissed the case, ruling that the claim should
have been filed in the intestate proceedings of
the decedent. The Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal, holding that the petitioner’s cause of
action was not a money claim against the estate
but a claim against respondents personally.
OIL and NATURAL This case involves the enforcement of a
GAS COMMISSION v. foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge
COURT OF APPEALS, of Dehra Dun, India in favour of the petitioner,
et al. Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), and
against the private respondent, Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. The dispute arose from a
contract between the parties for the supply of
oil well cement. The private respondent failed
to deliver the cement, and negotiations ensued
regarding a replacement. The replacement
cement did not meet the petitioner’s
specifications, leading to a referral of the
dispute to an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled in
favour of the petitioner, and the foreign court
adopted the arbitrator’s award as its judgment.
The petitioner sought to enforce the foreign
judgment in the Philippines.
The court applied the principle of exclusio
unius est exclusion alterius in interpreting a
partition agreement among heirs. The intention
of the parties in a contract should be pursued,
and when a general provision is inconsistent
with a particular provision, the latter prevails.
The enumeration of liabilities or obligations in a
contract implies the exclusion of all others.
The court applied the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis in interpreting the dispute resolution
clause in a contract for the supply of oil well
cement. The court interpreted the contract
between the parties and determined that the non-
delivery of the oil well cement was not a proper
subject for arbitration under clause 16 of the
contact. However, the failure of the replacement
cement to conform to the specifications of the
contract fell within the scope of the clause 16.
The court also held that the foreign judgment,
which incorporated the arbitrator’s award, was
enforceable in the philippines. The court further
noted that while noscitur a sociis is normally
used in the interpretation of statutes, it also
applies in the interpretation of contracts.
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION

Law Construed as a Whole

Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al
Caudal v. Court of Appeals
Claudio v. Comelec
National Police Commission v. de Guzman
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals

Presumption of Justice
Floresca, et al. v. Philex Mining Corporation

Construction Consistent with the Constitution

Beltran, et al. v. Secretary of Health
Heirs of Ardona, et al. v. Reyes, et al.
Benguet Management Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.
Tanada v. Tuvera
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad

Construction to Render Provision Effective

JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. v. NLRC
Lluz and Aldeosa v. Comelec

Penal laws
Centeno c. Villalon-Pornillos
United States v. Go Chico
Quimvel v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017

Tax Laws
CIR v. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 115349, 18 April 1997
CIR v. SM Prime Holdings. Inc.
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan
Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. CTA and CIR
CIR v. Algue, Inc., et al.
Republic of the Philippines v. Parañaque, G.R. No. 191908, 18 July 2012

Social legislation
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor

Rules of Court
Office of the Court Administrator v. Garong
 Paz Reyes Aguam v. CA

Adoption Laws
William Go Que Construction and/or William Go Que v. CA
In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

Local Autonomy
San Juan v. Civil Service Commission
Everett Steamship v. Municipality of Medina

Naturalization Laws
In the Matter of the Petition for Naturalization as Filipino Cotizen, Hao Su Siong alias Ramon Cuenco v. Republic of the
Philippines

Election Laws
Rulloda v. Comelec
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino

Prescriptive Period
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino

The Constitution
Francisco v. House of Representatives, et al.
Oposa v. Factoran, et al.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES IN A STATUTE

Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Gimenez, et al., G.R. No. L- 14787, 28 January 1961
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, 28 September 1995.
Dabalos v. Regional Trial Court
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, et al.
Llamas v. Executive Secretary

Provisos
Collector of Internal Revenue, et al. v. de los Angeles
Fernandez v. National Labor Relations Commission
Arenas v. City of San Carlos

Ordinary Words Understood in Ordinary Sense; Technical Words in Technical Sense

Carandang v. Santiago, et al.
Ordillo, et al. v. Commission on Elections
 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge No. 761
Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad
Manila Herald Publishing v. Ramos

Generic Words and Progressive Construction

Geotina v. Court of Tax Appeals
Diuquino v. Araneta, et al.

Punctuation Marks
Agcaoili v. Suguitan
United States v. Hart

Use of Specific Words

Microsoft Corporation v. Manansala, et al
Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De Los Angeles v. Home Development Mutual Fund
The Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals
Diono v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

Association and Relationship of Words, Phrases, and Provisions

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon
Buenaseda v. Flavier, et al.
People v. Delantar
National Power Corporation v. Angas, et al.
Mutuc v. Commission on Elections

EXTRINSIC AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION

People v. Muñoz
China Banking Corporation, et al. v. Ortega, et al.
De Villa v. Court of Appeals, et al.
League of Cities v. Commission on Elections, et al.
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING PROVISIONS

City of Naga v. Agna
Gordon v. Veridiano
Flores, et al. u. San Pedro, et al.
Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, et al.
Laxamana v. Baltazar

INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
National Irrigation Administration v. Gamit
The Director of Public Works U.
Sing Juco, et al.
Empire Insurance Company u. Rufino, et al.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, et al.