3Republtc of tbe ~bilippines

$Upreme <!tourt
Jlllanila

EN BANC

NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en bane issued a Resolution

dated AUGUST 29, 2023, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 205172 (Herminio T. Disini v. Republic of the

• Philippines).- Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and the Comment (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration) with Omnibus Motion2 filed by the Estate of Herminio T.
Disini, represented by Herminio Angel E. Disini, Jr., praying for
reconsideration of the Court's June 15, 2021 Decision3 that directed
petitioner Herminio T. Disini to pay the Republic temperate damages and
exemplary damages, as well as interest on the said damages at the rate of 6%
per annum from finality of the Decision until full satisfaction. 4

The Republic's motion is anchored on two grounds: first, the

Sandiganbayan did not err in relying on Exhibit E-9 to require petitioner to
pay the amount of USD 50,562,500.00, and second, the 6% legal interest
should be reckoned from the date of rendition of judgment pursuant to the
second guideline in Nacar v. Gallery Frames (Nacar). 5

Upon review, the Court is not persuaded by the arguments raised by

the Republic and resolves to deny its motion for reconsideration. The issues
raised therein have already been duly considered and passed upon in the

Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 903-915.

2
Id. at 942-1254.
Id. at 845-902. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by Senior
Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Associate Justices Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Alfredo
Benjamin S. Caguioa, Rosmari D. Carandang, Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, Rodil V. Zalameda, Mario V.
Lopez, Edgardo L. DeloS Santos, Samuel H. Gaerlan, Ricardo R. Rosario, and Jhosep Y. Lopez.
4
The fa/lo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART. The assailed April 11, 2012
Decision and October 24, 2012 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0013 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The order to account and reconvey
$50,562,500.00 is DELETED for lack of basis. Instead, petitioner is DIRECTED.to PAY the
Republic of the Philippines temperate damages in the amount of One Billion Pesos
(f'!,000,000,000.00), [sic] and exemplary damages in the amount of One Million Pesos
(f'l,000,000.00). These monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the finality of this Decision until their full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 903-904. 716 Phil. 267, 282-283 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
 '
Notice of Resolution -2- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

Decision, and the Republic has failed to adduce any substantial argument to
warrant the reconsideration sought.

On the first ground

;•'·

,,;,'· : Th~Republicinsists that the Sandiganbayan's reliance on Exhibit E-9

, :' ,vasproper (1) because even though the original document was not
; presented, its admission was not objected to by petitioner who was a party in
A@fault; (2) because the exhibit formed part of witness Angelo Manahan's
(Manahan) testimony and was identified and authenticated by the latter in •
his direct examination; (3) because it was supported by the testimonies of
witnesses Rodolfo Jacob (Jacob) and Jesus Vergara (Vergara); (3) because
Executive Order No. 14, series of 19866 provides that technical rules of
procedure and evidence should not be strictly applied to cases involving ill-
gotten wealth; and (4) because the amount of USD 30 million, as cited by .
the Sandiganbayan, is not far from the amount of USD 19,562,500.00
indicated in Exhibit E-9 as the "W" commission. 7

The Court is not convinced.

First, as discussed in the Decision, even though petitioner, who was a

party in default, failed to object to the admission of Exhibit E-9, the
Sandiganbayan still cannot validly admit incompetent evidence because the
Rules require that any judgment against a party in default be in accordance
with the evidence required by law, viz.:

Nevertheless, it should be noted that while a party in default loses

its right to present evidence, the court is still supposed to protect its right
by rendering judgment in accordance with the evidence required by law.
It may not admit nor rely on incompetent evidence:

While it may be said that by defaulting, the

defendant leaves himself [or herself] at the mercy of the
court, the rules nevertheless see to it that any judgment
against him Ior her) must be in accordance with the
evidence required by law. The evidence of the plaintiff,
presented in the defendant's absence, cannot be admitted if
it is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would
not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires
that only legal evidence should be considered against him
[or her]. If the same should prove insufficient to justify a
judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed.
And if a favorable judgment is justifiable, it cannot exceed
in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in
the complaint. 8 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the
original)

6 Entitled "DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF FORMER
PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS, MRS. IMELDA R. MARCOS, MEMBERS OF THEIR IMMEDIATE
FAMILY, CLOSE RELATIVES, SUBORDINATES, CLOSE AND/OR BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, DUMMIES,
AGENTS[,] AND NOMINEES." Approved: May 7, 1986.
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 904-909.

~
8
Id. at 892.
 Notice of Resolution -3- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

Second, contrary to the Republic's allegations, what Manahan

authenticated was his affidavit only and not Exhibit E-9, as discussed in the
Decision:

Exhibit E-9 was not authenticated:

A review of the records shows that Exhibit E-9 was indeed not
authenticated. Its due execution and genuineness were not proved by the
Republic in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 13 I.
•
Notably, during the presentation of Manahan, he only authenticated
his affidavit, [sic] and not Exhibit E-9. The transcript of stenographic
notes taken during his presentation reflect[ s] as much:

Q Do you recall having executed on January 26, 1989

an Affidavit [that] we have previously marked as
Exhibit "E", consisting of twelve pages, and [that]
was subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Estella Regina Q. Bernad, which annexes were
marked as Exhibits "E-1" to "E-11 "?
A Yes, Ma'am.

Q I am showing you this Exhibit "E" entitled Affidavit

dated January 26, 1989 together with all its annexes.
What is the relation of this document to the one that
you mentioned?
A It is the same, Ma'am.

Q Do you confirm that you affixed your signature on

the bottom portion on each and every page of this
Affidavit and above the typewritten name Angelo V.
Manahan found on page eleven of the said
Affidavit?
A Yes, Ma'am.

Q Mr. Manahan, do you affirm the truthfulness of

your statement in the said affidavit, and do you
understand fully its contents and the annexes
described as Exhibits "E-1" to "E-11"?
A Yes, Ma'am. (Emphasis in the original)

The only testimony on Exhibit E-9 was the one provided by

Manahan in his affidavit:

16. Exhibit 9 (Document 00727) is a one-page tabulation of

nuclear power plant commissions, (sic] typed in Mr. Disini's
stationery. Although I was [Herdis Group, Inc.'s (HGI's)] chief financial
officer, I was not informed of the details of the arrangement under which
HGI's [received] commissions from Westinghouse Electric Corporation
("Westinghouse") in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
("PNPP"). Anything that related to [Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)]
was treated as secret by Mr. Disini and his close advisors. The
Notice of Resolution -4- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

Westinghouse commission payments were handled by Mr. Jerry Orlina,

who was Mr. Disini's personal finance officer. The Westinghouse
commission payments were never received by HGI in the Philippines, and
my understanding is that. they were paid directly into foreign bank
accounts. The funds from the commissions never entered HGI's treasury.
(Emphasis in the original)

Such one-sentence description does not suffice to authenticate the

document. There was no statement that Exhibit E-9 was genuine and had
been duly executed or that it was neither spurious nor counterfeit [sic] or
executed by mistake or under duress. 9 (Citations omitted)

Third, the Republic's argument that Exhibit E-9 was supported by the
testimonies of Jacob and Vergara is inaccurate because what they only
supported was the existence of the commissions and not the amount thereof
as tabulated in the exhibit. 10 Since the total figure derived from the exhibit
was not supported by any competent evidence, the Court cannot base the
amount on such figure as prayed for by the Republic.
•
Fourth, while it is true that Executive Order No. 14, series of 1986
provides that technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly
applied to cases involving ill-gotten wealth, and thus the rules on
admissibility may be relaxed if warranted, the Court still cannot rely on the
exhibit because its probative value is weak. As discussed in the Decision,
the exhibit is patently vague, lacking in significant details such as the date of
writing and the author. 11 It also uses acronyms whose meanings were not
explained by Manahan nor the Republic. 12

Fifth, the Republic's opinion that the amount of USD 30 million is

"actually not that far" from the amount of USD 19,562,500.00, 13 being
relative in nature, cannot serve as the basis for using the exhibit to arrive at
the total amount of ill-gotten wealth.

On the second ground

The Republic assumes that the interest on the award of temperate and
exemplary damages was imposed pursuant to the second guideline in
Nacar, 14 which states:

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of

money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable

Id. at 885---S87.
10
Id. at 869-877.
11
Id. at 889.
" ld.
13 Id. at 908-909.
14
ld.at911.

•
 Notice of Resolution -5- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged. 15

The Republic argues that since the quantification of damages was

established at the time of judgment, the payment of interest should be
reckoned from that time and not from the finality of judgment as held in the
Decision. 16

The Republic is mistaken.

There is no basis to assume that the interest on the award of temperate

and exemplary damages was imposed pursuant to the second guideline. The
sentence expressly states that the imposition of the said interest is "at the
• discretion of the court." 17

Rather than being based on the second guideline, the interest in this
case was actually imposed pursuant to the third one, which reckons the
payment of interest from the finality of judgment, viz.:

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money

becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case
falls under paragraph l or paragraph 2, [sic] above, shall be 6% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 18

Hence, the Court correctly reckoned the payment of interest from the
finality of the Decision.

Petitioner's Comment (Re: Motion for

Reconsideration) with Omnibus
Motion
•
On the other hand, petitioner Estate of Herminio T. Disini, represented
by Herminio Angel E. Disini, Jr., asserts the following grounds: first, that
"the Republic failed to substantiate the specific averments in the amended
complaint; hence, the Court should not have given credence or weight to the
incompetent evidence presented to and thereafter supply a new theory of
claim"· 19 second that since there is absolutely no evidence of any
'
participation '
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sr. (Pres. Marcos)

15 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, at 282-283.

16 Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 909-911.
17 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, at 282. See also Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales,
Inc., G.R. No. 225433, September 20, 2022 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
18 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, at 283.
19 Rollo, Vol. 2, p. 954.
Notice of Resolution -6- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

and his wife, Imelda R. Marcos, in the alleged anomalous transaction, then
the logical consequence is that Disini should likewise be declared innocent; 20
third, that there is no proof that he induced Pres. Marcos to enter into a
contract with Westinghouse; 21 fourth, that Disini was denied due process
when he was deprived the opportunity to confront the charges against him; 22
and finally, that there is no proof of receipt or the amount of commissions,
hence there is absolutely no basis to conclude about damages. 23 Otherwise
stated, there is no basis for the award of temperate and exemplary
damages. 24 In any event, the award is excessive. 25

Petitioner's averments substantially refer to factual matters, which are

not proper in a Rule 45 petition. Besides, these contentions have already
been exhaustively and substantially discussed in the assailed Decision. We
find no imperative or compelling reason to go over the same arguments, nor ·
are We inclined to reiterate what We have already categorically ruled upon.

In addition, it will be recalled that petitioner was declared a party in

default by the Sandiganbayan, which ruling was sustained by the Court in its
July 5, 2010 Decision and which became final and executory on November
18, 20 l 0. As a party in default, petitioner is thus barred from presenting
further evidence, more so at this late stage of the proceedings.

However, as regards the amount of damages imposed, We find it

imperative to rev1s1t our pronouncement. To recall, We held that the
Republic has duly proved by preponderance of evidence that petitioner •
acquired ill-gotten wealth in the form of commissions from Westinghouse
Electric Corporation and Bums & Roe, Inc. by acting as their Special Sales
Representative. Consequently, We directed petitioner to pay the Republic
temperate damages in the amount of PHP 1 billion and exemplary damages
in the amount of PHP 1 billion with a legal interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of the Decision until full satisfaction.

In its Comment (Re: Motion for Reconsideration) with Omnibus

Motion, petitioner asserts in particular that the entitlement of the Republic to
temperate damages has not been proved by preponderance of evidence. 26
This argument fails to persuade. There is no equivocation that the Republic
suffered some pecuniary loss due to the illicit acts of petitioner of collecting
commissions in connection with a government project. This is already a
subject of a lengthy discussion in the assailed Decision and demands no
reiteration.

However, upon closer examination, We find that there is a need to •

20
Id. at 947.
21
Id. at 948.
22
Id. at 955.
23
Id. at 950.
24
Id. at 956.
25 Id.
26 Id at 1005.
•

Notice of Resolution -7- G.R. No. 205172

August 29, 2023

modify the amount of the award of temperate damages. In the assailed

Decision, We noted that the Republic's witnesses did not specifically
quantify the amount of commissions received by petitioner27 aside from the
fact that it was substantial. In short, the amount obtained by petitioner was
uncertain.

Concededly, a party in default, such as petitioner, may still raise on

appeal the contention that the amount of judgment is excessive or different
in kind from that prayed for. 28 In particular, petitioner claims that the award
of PHP 1 billion is excessive and implores the Court to consider the
valuation used in Republic v. Tuvera 29 where the Court awarded PHP 1
million in temperate damages vis-a-vis the prayed amount of PHP 48
million. We held:

If only the Court's outrage were quantifiable in sums of money,

respondents are due for significant pecuniary hurt. Instead, the Court is
forced to explain in the next few paragraphs why respondents could not be
forced to recompensate the Filipino people in appropriate financial terms.
The fault lies with those engaged by the government to litigate this case in
behalf of the State.

It bears to the most primitive of reasons that an action for recovery

of sum of money must prove the amount sought to be recovered. In the
case at bar, the Republic rested its case without presenting any evidence,
documentary or testimonial, to establish the amount that should be
restituted to the State by reason of the illegal acts committed by the
respondents. There is the bare allegation in the complaint that the State is
entitled to [PHP] 48 million by way of actual damages, but no single proof
[was] presented as to why the State is entitled to such [an] amount.

Actual damages must be proven, not presumed. The Republic

failed to prove damages. It is not enough for the Republic to have
established, as it did, the legal travesty that led to the wrongful obtention
by Twin Peaks of the [Timber License Agreement (TLA)]. It should have
established the degree of injury sustained by the State by reason of such
[a] wrongful act.

We fail to comprehend why the Republic failed to present any

proof of actual damages. Was it the inability to obtain the necessary
financial documents that would establish the income earned by Twin
Peaks during the period it utilized the TLA, [sic] despite the presence of
the discovery processes? Was it mere indolence or sheer incompetence?
Whatever the reason, the lapse is inexcusable, and the injury ultimately
conduces to the pain of the Filipino people. If the litigation of this case is
indicative of the mindset in the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases, it is
guaranteed to ensure that those who stole from the people will be laughing
on their way to the bank.

27
Id. at 880~88 l.
28 Otero v. Tan, 692 Phil. 714, 725 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division], citing Martinez v. Republic of
the Philippines, 536 Phil. 868, 875-880 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
29 545 Phil. 21 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
Notice of Resolution - 8- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023
•

However, there is sufficient basis for an award of temperate

damages, also sought by the Republic notwithstanding the fact that a claim
for both actual and temperate damages is internally inconsistent.
Temperate or moderate damages [may be availed] when "the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty." The textual language might
betray an intent that temperate damages [may not be availed] when the
case, by its nature, is susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss[,] and
certainly[,] the Republic could have proved pecuniary loss herein. Still,
jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate damages may
be awarded even in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically
have been proved with certainty.

In a host of criminal cases, the Court has awarded temperate

damages to the heirs of the victim in cases where the amount of actual
damages was not proven due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented
by the prosecution. These cases include People v. Oliano, People v.
Suplito, People v. De la Tongga, People v. Briones, and People v. Plazo.
In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, a civil action for
damages involving a vehicular collision, temperate damages were awarded
for the resulting damage sustained by a cargo truck, after the plaintiff had
failed to submit competent proof of actual damages.

We cannot discount the heavy influence of common law [sic] and

its reliance on judicial precedents [sicJ in our law on tort and damages.
Notwithstanding the language of Article 2224, a line of jurisprudence has
emerged authorizing the award of temperate damages even in cases where
the amount of pecuniary loss could have been proven with certainty, [sicJ
if no such adequate proof was presented. The allowance of temperate
damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is ultimately a
rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to those definitely
injured who are unable to prove how definite the injury [is]. There is no
impediment to [applying] this doctrine to the case at bar, which involves
one of the most daunting and noble undertakings of our young
democracy~the recovery of ill-gotten wealth salted away during the
Marcos years. If the doctrine can be justified to answer for the unlawful
damage to a cargo truck, it is a compounded wrath if it cannot answer for •
the unlawful exploitation of our forests, to the injury of the Filipino
people. The amount of [PHP 1 million] as temperate damages is proper.

The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the
award of exemplary dan1ages. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows for the
award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether
or not they should be adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook
demonstrations where damages by way of example or correction for the
public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve the
stigma left by exemplary damages, that "serve as a deterrent against or as
a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." The obtention of
the timber license agreement by Twin Peaks through fraudulent and illegal
means was highlighted by Juan Tuvera's abuse of his position as
Presidential Executive Assistant. The consequent exploitation of 26
hectares of forest land benefiting all respondents is a grave case of unjust
enriclunent at the expense of the Filipino people and of the environment
 Notice of Resolution - 9- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

[that] should never be countenanced. Considering the expanse of forest

land exploited by respondents, the volume of timber that was necessarily
cut by virtue of their abuse[,] and the estimated wealth acquired by
respondents through grave abuse of trust and public office, it is only
• reasonable that petitioner be granted the amount of [PHP I million] as
exemplary damages.

The imposition of exemplary damages is a means by which the

State, through its judicial arm, can send the clear and unequivocal signal
best expressed in the pithy but immutable phrase, "never again." It is
severely unfortunate that the Republic did not exert its best efforts in the
full recovery of the actual damages caused by the illegal grant of the Twin
Peaks TLA. To the best of our ability, through the appropriate vehicle of
exemplary damages, the Court will try to fill in that deficiency. For if
there is a lesson that should be learned from the national trauma of the rule
of Marcos, it is that kleptocracy cannot pay. As those dark years fade into
the backburner of the collective memory, [sic] and a new generation
emerges without proximate knowledge of how bad it was then, it is useful
that the Court serves [as] a reminder here and now.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan dated [May 23,] 2001 is REVERSED. Respondents Juan
C. Tuvera, Victor P. Tuvera[,] and Twin Peaks Development Corporation
are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay to the Republic of the
Philippines [One Million Pesos (PHP 1 million)] Pesos, [sic] as and for
temperate damages, and [One Million Pesos (PHP 1 million)] Pesos, [sic]
as and for exemplary damages, [sic] plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 30 (Citations omitted)

To recall, We held that the Republic proved by preponderance of

evidence that petitioner acquired ill-gotten wealth in the form of
commissions. However, the Republic failed to quantify with specificity the
pecuniary loss it suffered as well as the amount of commissions received by
petitioner; 31 hence, the grant of temperate and exemplary damages. 32 To
emphasize, the grant of such damages is left to the discretion of the Court in
accordance with the circumstances of each case. 33

Upon another closer examination, We find that the award of temperate

damages in the amount of PHP 100 million is more commensurate under the
circumstances .
•
First, it may be remembered that one of the factors considered by the
Court in assessing the amount of damages is the current status or condition
of the BNPP, thus:

Further, We note that the Filipino people have not at all benefitted
from the BNPP as it has remained inoperable as of this writing, a
proverbial [w]hite [e]lephant. Obviously, a considerable amount of public

30 Id. at 57-61.
31
Rollo, Vol. 2, p. 892.
32 Id. at 895 and 896.
33 C!VIL CODE, Art. 2216.
Notice of Resolution - 10 - G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

funds had been invested and allocated for the construction of the BNPP
which funds came from the blood, sweat[,] and tears of the Filipin~
taxpayers. The ill-gotten wealth should have been used and spent for and
by the rightful owner thereof and not just by one person or a select group
of people in power. 34

However, the Court notes that petitioner's liability has nothing to do

with the present condition or status of the BNPP. His liability lies in his
illicit use of influence, power, and government connections to secure special
concessions in relation to the BNPP project. Such illicit use is clearly
independent of the status or condition of the BNPP today, which is
predominantly a product of legislative and/or executive discretion.

Besides, despite the illicit acts committed by petitioner, the subject

nuclear power plant was completed and delivered to the Republic. The fact
that the subject nuclear plant has remained inoperable despite the
considerable amount invested and allocated for its construction should thus
not be imputed to the acts of petitioner. To recall, it was then Pres. Corazon
C. Aquino, by virtue of Executive Order No. 55, series of 1986,35 who
decided not to operate the subject nuclear plant for reasons of safety and
economy. Clearly, it was not due to the illicit acts of petitioner. Hence,
whatever happened to the BNPP should not have been a factor in assessing
the amount of temperate damages.

Second, following the Court's valuation in Republic v. Tuvera, 36 the

amount of PHP 100 million is more reasonable under the circumstances. In
Tuvera, the Court awarded temperate damages equivalent to about 2% of the
total amount claimed by the Republic. 37 Here, the original award of PHP 1
billion represents about 35% of the amount being claimed by the Republic
(USD 50,562,500.00). 38 Clearly, such amount is excessive and out of
proportion, and must therefore be reduced. Given the circumstances, the
amount of PHP 100 million, or about 3.5% percent of the total money being
claimed by the Republic, is more appropriate.

Finally, the Court stresses that there is nothing on record that links
fonner Pres. Marcos and his wife Imelda R. Marcos to the commissions
received by petitioner in relation to the BNPP project. As the
Sandiganbayan categorically found:

However, there is no direct evidence on record that purports to

34
Rollo, Vol. 2, p. 897.
35 TRANSFERRING TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT THE PHILIPPINE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I (PNPP-1),
ITS EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, FACILITIES, RECORDS[,] AND URANIUM FUEL. PROVIDING FOR THE
ASSUMPTION OF THE REMAINING FOREIGN LOAN OBLIGATIONS OF THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NAPOCOR) WITH FOREIGN LENDERS UNDER THE LOANS CONTRACTED BY THE
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION AND GUARANTEED BY THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OF THE
PESO OBLIGATIONS INCURRED TO FINANCE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAID NUCLEAR PLANT BY THE .
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved: November 4, I 986.
36 Republic v. Tuvera, 545 Phil. 21 (2007) [Per J. Tinga. Second Division].
37
Id. at 57--60.
38 Using the conversion rate of PHP 1.00 to USD 56.98 as of August 14, 2023.
 Notice of Resolution - 11 - G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

show that the late President or his wife, Imelda, in fact, actually
received any part of these commissions. The only evidence that would
have connected the Marcoses with these commissions were the affidavits
of Jesus Disini[,] which unfortunately, cannot be used by this Court
because of his immunity agreement, upheld by the Supreme Court.

Considering that there is no preponderant evidence that

defendant Marcoses received any part of these commissions, the
Court cannot pronounce any liability on their part. 39 (Emphasis
supplied and citation omitted)

Upon a careful re-examination of the records, the Court sustains such

• finding and affirms that the Marcoses were not, in any way, shown to have
acted illicitly in the award of the BNPP contracts to Westinghouse Electric
Corporation and Burns & Roe, Inc. by reason of petitioner's acts. · The
evidence on record only pointed to petitioner receiving ill-gotten wealth.
Hence, only petitioner may be held liable to pay damages in this case.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DENY WITH FINALITY

the Republic of the Philippines' October 28, 2021 Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner Herminio T. Disini's Comment (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration) with Omnibus Motion as well as his Supplement to the
Comment with Omnibus Motion are NOTED and PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The award of temperate damages is REDUCED to PHP
100,000,000.00. All other aspects of the assailed Decision STAND.

No further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case. Let

the entry of judgment be issued immediately." Gesmundo, C.J. and Lazaro-
Javier, J., no part. Lopez M., J., on official leave. (4)

By authority of the Court:

MARIFEM. -CUEVAS
ourt r

39
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 118-124.
 •
Notice of Resolution -12- G.R. No. 205172
August 29, 2023

BERNAS LAW OFFICES (x) THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (x)

(through Atty. Jose A. Bernas) Counsel for Respondent Republic of the Philippines
Counsel for Petitioner Office of the Solicitor General
4/F Raha Sulayman Building 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village
108 Benavidez St., Legaspi Village Makati City
Makati City
bernaslaw@gmail.com HON.AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG (x)
litigation@bernaslaw.com Presiding Justice
ATTY. MA. TERESA S. PABULAYAN (x)
ESTATE OF HERMINIO T. DISINI Executive Clerk of Court IV
Petitioner Sandiganbayan
[Represented by HERMINIO E. DISINI, JR] (x) Sandiganbayan Centennial Building
No. 1 Lark Street, Greenmeadows Subdivision Commonwealth Ave., Diliman _ , ,)
Quezon City 1121 Quezon City c_/-
JUDICIAL RECORDS OFFICE (x) •
JUQ!,MENT DIVISION (x)
,,MJBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (x)
LIBRARY SERVICES (x)
Supreme Court
[For uploading pursuant to A.M. No. 12-7-1-SCJ

G.R. No. 205172

grace 082923 (URes4) 010424