Criminal Law

with
Shaveen Bandaranayake

Criminal Damage
Case Summaries

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Criminal Damage

1. R v G and another

House of Lords

Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn, Lord

Hutton and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry

The defendants, aged 11 and 12 respectively, entered the back yard of a shop in the
early hours of the morning. They lit some newspapers which they had found in the
yard, and each threw some lit newspaper under a large plastic wheelie-bin. They left
the yard without putting out the fire. The newspapers set fire to the wheelie-bin, and
the fire spread to a second wheelie-bin and then to the shop wall. Eventually the roof
of the shop and the adjoining buildings caught fire and the roof collapsed.
Approximately £1m worth of damage was caused. The defendants were charged with
reckless arson contrary to s 1(1) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Their case at
trial was that they had expected the newspapers to extinguish themselves on the
concrete floor of the yard. It was accepted that neither of them had appreciated that
there was any risk whatsoever of the fire spreading in the way that it eventually did.
The judge, holding himself to be bound so to do by binding authority, directed the jury
that the prosecution had to prove that the defendants had damaged the building by
fire, and that in doing what they had done, they had created a risk which would have
been obvious to an ordinary, reasonable, bystander that the building would be
damaged by fire, either without giving any thought to the possibility of there being
such a risk, or, having recognised that there was some risk involved, had none the less
gone on and done the act. The defendants were convicted. Their appeals against
conviction were dismissed, but the Court of Appeal certified the following point of law
of general public importance to be involved in its decision: whether a defendant could

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 properly be convicted under s 1 of the Act on the basis that he was reckless as to
whether property was destroyed or damaged when he had given no thought to the risk
but, by reason of his age and/or personal characteristics the risk would not have been
obvious to him, even if he had thought about it. The defendants appealed.

Appeals allowed.

It was a salutory principle that conviction of serious crime should depend upon proof
not simply that the defendant had caused (by act or omission) an injurious result to
another but that his state of mind when so acting was culpable. The most obvious
culpable state of mind was no doubt an intention to cause the injurious result, but
knowing disregard of an appreciated an unacceptable risk of causing an injurious
result or a deliberate closing of the mind to such risk would be readily acceptable as
culpable also. It was clearly blameworthy to take an obvious and significant risk of
causing injury to another. It was not, however, clearly blameworthy to do something
involving a risk of injury to another if (for reasons other than self-induced
intoxication) one genuinely did not perceive the risk. It was neither moral nor just to
convict a defendant (least of all a child) on the strength of what someone else would
have apprehended if the defendant himself had had no such apprehension. The
certified question would accordingly be answered in the following way: 'A person acts
recklessly within the meaning of s 1 of the 1971 Act with respect to (i) a circumstance
when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a
risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to
take the risk.'

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 2. R v Lloyd

Court of Appeal Criminal Division

MCCOWAN LJ OGNALL AND MAY JJ

MCCOWAN LJ

The burglary in question took place during the night of Sunday 3rd and Monday 4th
June 1990 at the shop of a Mr Patel in Rushey Green, south east London. Entry had
been gained through a hole in the wall made from the adjoining property which was
empty at the time. The property stolen included tobacco, cigarettes, cigars, video
cassettes, watches and cash taken from the tills and also from a "mushroom box" in
which there were a number of bank plastic bags with money in them. The total value of
the property stolen was about £4,000.

On 10th June 1991, in the Crown Court at Inner London Sessions House, the appellant
was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment. That was on
count 1 of an indictment. The appellant appealed against his conviction.

Decision:

"Certain propositions are quite clear. It is quite clear, without referring to authority,
that for a man to be found to have possession, actual or constructive, of goods,
something more must be proved than that the goods have been found on his premises.
It must be shown either, if he was absent, that on his return he has become aware of
them and exercised some control over them or -- and this was the case sought to be
made here -- that the goods had come, albeit in his absence, at his invitation or by
arrangement. It is also clear that a man cannot be convicted of receiving goods of

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 which the delivery has been taken by his servant unless there is evidence that he, the
employer, had given the servant authority or instructions to take the goods."

In our judgment, however, this was not enough. The appellant was not the only adult
living in that property and there was no evidence as to where he was at the material
time. To leave the case to the jury on that basis was, in our judgment, to invite the jury
to speculate. There was no sufficient case to go to the jury. It should have been stopped
against the appellant at the conclusion of the prosecution case.

Appeal allowed.

3. R v Steer

House of Lords

The defendant, who fired several shots at a house, was convicted of damaging property,
being reckless whether life was thereby endangered, contrary to the Criminal Damage
Act 1971 s 1(2)(b). On appeal, the conviction was quashed on the ground that the
offence was committed when life was endangered by reason of the damaged property
itself, not by reason of the method by which the property was damaged. The Crown
appealed.

Decision:

Guilty under s 1(2)(b), in addition to having intended or been reckless as to the damage
to property which he caused, the defendant must also have intended to endanger life or
been reckless as to whether life would be endangered 'by the damage' to property which
he caused. Those words were to be construed in their context: 'by the damage' did not
mean 'by the damage or by the act which caused the damage'.

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 Appeal dismissed.

4. Roper v Knott

Divisional Court

A milk carrier who damaged his employer's milk by adding water to it, with no
intention of injuring his employer, but in order to make a profit for himself by
increasing the bulk of the milk, was guilty of an offence under Malicious Damage Act
1861 (c 97) s 52 (repealed).

In order to constitute the offence of wilfully committing damage, injury, or spoil to

property within Malicious Damage Act 1861 s 52 (repealed), it was not necessary that
there should be malice towards, or intention to damage, the owner of the property, or
that loss should in fact be caused to him. It was sufficient if the act which caused
damage to the property was done with the intention of causing the damage, or with the
knowledge that the consequences of the act would be to cause the damage. Therefore if
a person fraudulently added water to milk which he was employed to sell, in order to
increase the bulk and to appropriate the surplus price, and the milk was thereby
damaged, but he had no malice towards or intention to injure his employer, the owner
of the milk, he committed the offence of wilfully committing damage to property within
the section (repealed).

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