Critical Mathematics Education - Theory, Praxis and Reality

Critical
Mathematics Education
Theory, Praxis, and Reality
A Volume in
Cognition, Equity, & Society: International Perspectives
Series Editors
Bharath Sriraman, University of Montana
Lyn English, Queensland University of Technology
Cognition, Equity, & Society:
International Perspectives
Bharath Sriraman and Lyn English, Series Editors
Critical Mathematics Education: Theory, Praxis, and Reality (2016)
edited by Paul Ernest, Bharath Sriraman, and Nuala Ernest
Refractions of Mathematics Education: Festschrift for Eva Jablonka (2015)
edited by Christer Bergsten and Bharath Sriraman
Emerging Perspectives on Gesture and Embodiment in Mathematics (2014)
edited by Laurie D. Edwards,
Francesca Ferrara, and Deborah Moore-Russo
Mathematics Teacher Education in the Public Interest:
Equity and Social Justice (2013)
edited by Laura J. Jacobsen, Jean Mistele, and Bharath Sriraman
International Perspectives on Gender and Mathematics Education (2010)
edited by Helen J. Forgasz, Joanne Rossi Becker,
Kyeonghwa Lee, and Olof Steinthorsdottir
Unpacking Pedagogy: New Perspectives for Mathematics (2010)
edited by Margaret Walshaw
Mathematical Representation at the Interface of Body and Culture (2009)
edited by Wolff-Michael Roth
Challenging Perspectives on Mathematics Classroom Communication (2006)
edited by Anna Chronaki and Iben Maj Christiansen
Mathematics Education within the Postmodern (2004)
edited by Margaret Walshaw
Critical
Theory, Praxis, and Reality
Edited by
Paul Ernest
Exeter University
Bharath Sriraman
The University of Montana
and
Nuala Ernest
Royal College of Psychiatrists
INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC.

Charlotte, NC • www.infoagepub.com
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Critical mathematics education : theory, praxis, and reality / edited by

Paul Ernest, Exeter University, and Bharath Sriraman, The University of
Montana.
pages cm. -- (Cognition, equity, & society: international
perspectives)
ISBN 978-1-68123-259-1 (paperback) -- ISBN 978-1-68123-260-7 (hardcover) --
ISBN 978-1-68123-261-4 (ebook) 1. Mathematics--Study and teaching. 2.
Educational sociology. I. Ernest, Paul. II. Sriraman, Bharath.
QA11.2.C77 2016
510.71--dc23
2015029904
Copyright © 2016 Information Age Publishing Inc.
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from the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America

Contents
Foreword
Paul Ernest and Bharath Sriraman..................................................... vii
Introduction
Bharath Sriraman.............................................................................. xii
1. Mathematics: A Critical Rationality?

Ole Skovsmose...................................................................................... 1
2. Ethnomathematics: A Response to the Changing Role of

Mathematics in Society
Ubiratan D’Ambrosio.......................................................................... 23
3. Mathematics Education Ideologies and Globalization

Paul Ernest........................................................................................ 35
4. Scripting the World in Mathematics and

Its Ethical Implications
Keiko Yasukawa, Ole Skovsmose, and Ole Ravn................................... 81
5. The Scope and Limits of Critical Mathematics Education

Paul Ernest........................................................................................ 99
6. The Elephant in the Room: Equity, Social Class, and

Mathematics
Robyn Jorgensen (Zevenbergen)......................................................... 127
v
viâ•‡â•‡Contents
7. Connecting the Notion of Foreground in Critical

Mathematics Education With the Theory of Habitus
Tine Wedege .....................................................................................147
8. The Hegemony of English Mathematics

Brian Greer and Swapna Mukhopadhyay ..........................................159
9. School Curriculum and Different Mathematics Language

Games: A Study at a Brazilian Agricultural-Technical School
Ieda Maria Giongo and Gelsa Knijnik ..............................................175
10. Ethnomathematics as a Human Right

Karen François ................................................................................ 187
11. Negotiating Critical Pedagogical Discourses:

Stories of Contexts, Mathematics, and Agency
Annica Andersson and Paola Valero.................................................. 199
12. Critical Mathematics Education in the Context of

“Real-Life Education”
Helle Alrø and Marit Johnsen-Høines................................................ 227
13. The Role of Mathematics in Politics as an Issue for

Mathematics Teaching
Mario Sánchez Aguilar and Morten Blomhøj .................................... 253
14. Investigating Critical Routes: The Politics of Mathematics

Education and Citizenship in Capitalism
Maria Nikolakaki .............................................................................273
15. Are There Viable Connections Between Mathematics,

Mathematical Proof and Democracy?
Dennis F. Almeida............................................................................ 287
16. A Historical Analysis of Democracy in Mathematics and

Mathematics Education in European Culture
M. Sencer Corlu................................................................................311
17. Futures at Stake: Children’s Identity Work in the Force Field

of Social Valorization of School Mathematics
Troels Lange......................................................................................319
About the Authors................................................................................... 341

Foreword
Paul Ernest and Bharath Sriraman
Mathematics is traditionally seen as the most neutral of disciplines, the

furthest removed from the arguments and controversy of politics and social
life. However, critical mathematics challenges these assumptions of neu-
trality and actively attacks the idea that mathematics is pure, objective, and
value neutral. It argues that history, society and politics have shaped math-
ematics—not only through its applications and uses, but through moulding
its concepts, methods, and even mathematical truth and proof, the very
means of establishing truth. Critical mathematics education also attacks
the neutrality of the teaching and learning of mathematics, showing how
these are value laden activities indissolubly linked to social and political
life. Instead it argues that the values of openness, dialogicality, criticality
toward received opinion, empowerment of the learner and social/political
engagement and citizenship are necessary dimensions of the teaching and
learning of mathematics, if it is to contribute toward democracy and social
justice.
This book draws together critical theoretic contributions on mathematics
and mathematics education from leading researchers in the field. It
explores many facets of the practical implications of these critical views for
the varying stages and phases of mathematics education around the globe.
Critical Mathematics Education:

Theory, Praxis, and Reality, pp. vii–viii
Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. vii
viiiâ•‡â•‡P. Ernest and B.Sriraman
Recurring Themes in the Book Include:
• The natures of mathematics and critical mathematics education,

issues of epistemology and ethics;
• Ideology, the hegemony of mathematics, ethnomathematics, and
real-life education;
• Capitalism, globalization, politics, social class, habitus, citizenship
and equity.
The book demonstrates the links between these themes and the disci-
pline of mathematics and its critical teaching and learning. The outcome
is a groundbreaking collection unified by a shared concern with critical
perspectives of mathematics and education and of the ways they impact
on practice.
Introduction
CRITICAL
MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
Cliché, Dogma, or Commodity?
Bharath Sriraman
The present volume revisits an old theme in mathematics education,

namely the significance of incorporating a “critical” approach to the teach-
ing and learning of mathematics with emphasis on real world contexts.
A critical approach to any domain of inquiry is preferred to a dogmatic
approach, but this begs the question—does an excessive focus on this term
in the domain of mathematics education make it clichéd? What does a
critical approach refer to really? Does it mean an emphasis on culture in a
broader sense that would include different points of view on the nature and
significance of mathematics, its teaching and learning? Or does it mean a
politicized approach influenced by critical theory, which suggests a social
justice and “democratic” agenda?
The critical approach to mathematics education can be traced back
via several lineages. For the sake of brevity, I will pick on two well-known
schools of thought because of their contrasting features. One is the work
of Alan Bishop (1988) on Mathematical Enculturation and the other is Ole
Skovsmose’s (1994) Towards a Philosophy of Critical Mathematics Education.

Theory, Praxis, and Reality, pp. ix–xii
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ix
xâ•‡â•‡B.Sriraman
The former characterizes mathematics as a pan-cultural activity character-

ized by (1) playing, (2) designing, (3) locating, (4) explaining, (5) counting,
and (6) measuring. In such a view, no culture (Eastern, Western or other-
wise) can claim dominance or precedence for the creation of mathematics.
The critical aspect of this school of thought is to uncover the unneutral
nature of school mathematics and tacit meanings conveyed to the learners
of mathematics. For instance, some of the research influenced by Bishop’s
work has focused on school mathematics in different parts of the world
that still contain vestiges of a colonial past and ways in which school math-
ematics can be made truer to the local culture. The latter characterizes
mathematics as an invisible structure that plays a role in the way societies
are shaped and mutate, and, in the ensuing research that has followed
Skovsmose’s school of thought, mathematics is viewed as a tool (and means)
of emancipation, and learners “foregrounds” predispose them ontologi-
cally and even epistemologically.
If one removes the word “mathematics” from the term critical math-
ematics education, do the two schools of thought still hold any weight or
significance, or is it the centrality of mathematics in culture and society that
propels their arguments forward? One can argue that enculturation shapes
student lives within institutions such as family, community, schools, and so
on, and mathematical enculturation in an unneutral sense often perpetu-
ates incorrect ideas about the origins, transmission and the development
of mathematics, and the tools that constitute doing mathematics. Similarly,
critical education is meant to foster critical thinking or critical pedagogy
where learners are transformed from being passive recipients of institu-
tionalized knowledge to those that question, challenge, and even shape
the nature of their learning experience. This means critical mathematics
education proposes conditions in which learners become critical of the role
of mathematics in society.
In spite of the overuse of the term “critical” in the recent mathematics
education literature, this domain of inquiry still remains wide open from
many perspectives, particularly ways in which it is branded, commoditized,
and sold to less affluent countries under the guise of equity or progress or
democratization. Consider the conjoined notions of “mathematical liter-
acy” and “reading literacy,” which are major components of items found on
the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), a test devised by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
originally a selective group of affluent European nations interested in pro-
moting economic cooperation and generating wealth. The OECD now
includes partners from non-European nations such as Israel and South
Korea, and is keen to involve partnerships from countries such as Brazil,
India, and other “developing countries” on the cusp. PISA is touted as an
assessment tool that provides a barometer of how “competent” students are
Introductionâ•‡â•‡xi
in areas such as mathematics, science, literacy, and so on, and in a broader

sense of the “quality” of schooling that students have access to. In other
words, demographic questionnaires administered to participants can reveal
variations in performance as a function of socioeconomic class and other
variables. There is no causal link between a country’s performance and the
state of its educational services.
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose a nation,
“Mathistan,” agrees to administer this expensive assessment and finds that
its students performed woefully in comparison to, say, the Netherlands,
Finland, or South Korea. Does this mean that students in this hypothetical
country are lagging behind on domain specific knowledge in comparison
to students in these other countries? Or does this mean that the school cur-
ricula in “Mathistan” does not cover material necessary for proficiency in
the types of items found on the PISA? If this is indeed the case, one way to
improve their students’ performance would be to replicate curricula from
countries that have been successful in the test by importing professional
development and a host of other teacher-training and student-training
tools at a considerable cost from one of the OECD countries! The unasked
question in this scenario is, why should “Mathistan” bother? Are the types
of competencies being touted by PISA really essential or “critical” to the
schooling and societal needs of this country? It may very well be the case
that the mathematics curricula in place is more than adequate for the sci-
entific and industrial needs of that country! Many mathematics educators
jumped on the modeling curricula bandwagon as a way to improve stu-
dent’s performance on PISA. Why should a modeling based mathematics
curriculum act as a panacea for this country? Or why should mathematics
be homogenized because an economic organ has devised an assessment
tool that claims to measure competencies considered “critical” for their
citizenry in the twenty-first century? These are critical questions that are
unasked. When poverty and day-to-day infrastructure are more prescient
for the developing world, why should these countries bother with admin-
istering an expensive assessment tool that commoditizes competencies
deemed to be critical by an economic body? Economic growth and wealth
may be “critical” for the developed world to sustain its current rates of
consumption and standards of living, but this need not be the case for
the rest of the world grappling with more basic problems and a reality not
based on consumption. However, PISA even claims that low educational
performance on its assessment has an economic impact on the countries in
question. The reader is advised to critically think about the validity of such
a claim by examining the data provided in Hanushek and Woessmann’s
(2010) report for the OECD.2
This book does not address these larger questions, but it does address
attempts by mathematics educators trying to incorporate a critical approach
xiiâ•‡â•‡B.Sriraman
to questions within mathematics education. It not only theorizes the “criti-

cal” aspect of mathematics education but also provides avenues for praxis
situated in current realities.
NOTES
1. The astute reader will note that I have omitted Mellin-Olsen’s (1987) work
on the political aspects of mathematics education as well as D’Ambrosio’s
(1980) work on mathematics and society, which are more or less concurrent
with the two schools of thought under discussion here.
2. http://www.oecd.org/pisa/44417824.pdf
References
Bishop, A. (1988). Mathematical enculturation: A cultural perspective on mathematics

education. Dordrecht, The Netherlads: Kluwer.
D’Ambrosio, U. (1980). Mathematics and society: Some historical considerations.
International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 11,
479–488.
Hanushek, E. A., & Woessmann, L. (2010). The high cost of low educational perfor-
mance: The long-run economic impact of improving pisa outcomes. Paris, France:
OECD.
Mellin-Olsen, S. (1987). The politics of mathematics education. Dordrecht, The Neth-
erlands: Reidel.
Skovsmose, O. (1994). Towards a philosophy of critical mathematics education. Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer.
chapter 1
Mathematics
A Critical Rationality?
Ole Skovsmose
“Mathematics” is an open concept with many possible meanings. In Philo-

sophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/1958) talks about the
variety of language games, and “mathematics” may operate in a huge
number of such games. While mathematics as a research field includes a
vast domain of unsolved issues and conceptions in development, mathe-
matics as a school subject refers to a rather well-defined body of knowledge
parcelled out in bits and pieces to be taught and learned according to
preformed criteria. Mathematics could, however, also refer to domains
of knowledge and understanding that are not institutionalized through
research priorities or curricular structures. Thus, we can locate mathemat-
ics in many work practices.1 It is part of technology and design. It is part of
procedures for decision making. It is present in tables, diagrams, graphs,
and we can experience a lot of mathematics just leafing through the daily
newspaper.
According to the language-game metaphor, such occurrences of math-
ematics need not be different expressions of the same underlying “genuine
mathematics;” instead very different formats of mathematics might be in

Theory, Praxis, and Reality, pp. 1–22
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 1
2â•‡â•‡O. Skovsmose
use with only the name in common. As a consequence, perhaps we had

better give up the assumption that it is possible to provide a defining clari-
fication of mathematics. Well-intended definitions, as suggested by classic
positions within the philosophy of mathematics—where logicism describes
mathematics as a further development of logic;2 formalism describes it
as a formal game governed by explicitly stated rules;3 and intuitionism
describes mathematics as a particular mental process4—might simply be
concealing the fact that there are no unifying characteristics of mathemat-
ics to be identified. I shall try to keep this observation in mind when, in
what follows, I continue to use the word “mathematics.”
During time, different perspectives on mathematics have been presented.
One can see mathematics: (1) As a divine rationality, which represents the
pinnacle of human intellectual enterprise. Such a perspective is deeply
rooted in both Platonism and in the conception of mathematics as propa-
gated by the scientific revolution; and it has been elaborated, although in
different set-ups, by logicism, formalism, and intuitionism. (2) As a malig-
nant rationality through which instrumental forms of thinking spread to
different forms of life. This conception has, for instance, been elaborated
by the Frankfurt School. And (3) as an insignificant way of thinking, a per-
spective which, although indirectly, has been propagated by much recent
social theorizing.
In the following three sections, we are going to consider these three
perspectives more carefully before we discuss mathematics in action in
preparation for the formulation of a fourth possibility, namely seeing math-
ematics as a critical rationality.
A Divine Rationality?
One basis for considering mathematics a divine rationality is found in

Platonism. This represents a broadly accepted philosophy of mathemat-
ics assuming a reality of ideas with which mathematics is concerned.5 We
do not have access to this reality through our senses, yet we can grasp its
characteristics through our rationality. Thus a triangle, as belonging to the
world of ideas, has many properties. While these properties might appear
only in an approximate format as properties of triangles of our sense per-
ceptions, they apply exactly to triangles of the world of ideas. Only through
our thinking we can come to grasp that these properties apply with cer-
tainty to the ideal triangles.
Certainty has been associated with the Euclidian paradigm, according to
which a body of knowledge should be formulated as an axiomatic system.
The axioms should be few and simple, and from these axioms deductions
will take us to theorems. The simplicity of the axioms would ensure that
Mathematics: A Critical Rationality?â•‡â•‡ 3
human intuition could be reliable enough for assigning truth to the axioms
of the system, while the properties of deduction would ensure that truth
propagates to all theorems of the systems. In this way axiomatics ensures a
body of knowledge to be true with certainty.6
The scientific revolution brings a further dimension to this paradigm. It
appeared that the properties of nature could be expressed in mathemati-
cal terms, meaning that God had created the world within a mathematical
format. It has to be remembered that all the representatives of the scientific
revolution, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton expressed a
firm belief in the existence of God; atheism as an intellectual possibility did
not come about until later. As God had followed mathematical patterns, the
secrets to God’s creation, that is, the secrets of Nature, could be grasped
mathematically. The essential point, then, was to formulate the laws accord-
ing to which Nature was operating.
In The World, Descartes (1664/1998) tried to formulate such laws, and
he talked about Laws of Nature as being imposed on Nature by God.7
According to Descartes, God was the creator of the universe, while after
the creation God left things to themselves, meaning that the universe was
running like a clockwork according to the imposed laws.
Descartes (1664/1998) found that the Laws of Nature were both simple
and few: The first law states that “each particular part of matter always
continues in the same state unless collision with others forces it to change
its state” (p. 25). In other words, there are no tendencies in nature, as
formulated within the Aristotelian physics: a stone is not searching for it
natural place, and so on. Nature operates as a mechanism, and not as an
organism. The second law states that when a body pushes another “it cannot
give the other any motion except by losing as much of its own motion at
the same time; nor can it take away any of the other’s motion unless its
own is increased by the same amount” (p. 27). This is a formulation of a
principle of action and reaction: there can be neither more nor less in the
reaction, than was in the action itself. This law ensures that the material
unities of which nature is assumed to consist operate like a system of billiard
balls. The whole universe is comparable to a game of billiards, where God
made the initial stroke. The third law states that “when a body is moving,
even if its motion most often takes place along a curved line ... each of its
parts individually tends always to continue moving along a straight line”
(p. 29). This law includes the formulation of the principle of inertia. This law
negates the Aristotelian idea that heavenly bodies move in circles according
to some particular laws applicable only to heavenly bodies. According to
the third law there is nothing called a “natural circular movement.” Instead
there must be some force which causes the circular movement, in particular
there must be a force that ensures the rotation of the earth around the sun.
After enumerating these three laws, all having to do with mechanical

movements, Descartes (1664/1998) states: “I shall be content to tell you
that, apart from the three laws that I have explained, I wish to suppose no
others” (p. 31). This is really a profound insight Descartes claimed to have
reached. He had identified the laws of nature, three in total, and this means
that, according to the Euclidian paradigm, one would be able to deduce all
true statements about nature from these three laws, taken as axioms (simul-
taneously observing all mathematical truths, as Descartes also emphasizes).
Descartes (1664/1998) provided a verbal formulation of the Laws of
Nature, but they could be restated in a mathematical format. This means
that one can achieve tremendous insight into nature by means of math-
ematics. God created Nature as he imposed the three Laws of Nature on
it, and as soon as these laws are identified, there are no secrets of Nature
which humankind could not come to grasp. By deductive reasoning one
could reach any truth concerning Nature. Mathematical rationality had
really taken a divine form.
Through mathematics a perfect harmony between knowledge and what
is to be known can be established, and knowledge in the sense of true-
with-certainty can be obtained.8 This conception brings about a certain
set of preoccupations within the philosophy of mathematics which can
be condensed into the following two questions: What is the domain of
mathematics? What is the nature of certainty in mathematics? These two
questions—concerning ontology and epistemology—establish a broad par-
adigm within the philosophy of mathematics, where logicism, formalism,
and intuitionism have taken up their positions. This paradigm prolongs
the celebration of mathematical rationality.9
A demonic rationality?
While the scientific revolution has symbolized what scientific progress

could mean, the industrial revolution, which was soon to follow, symbolized
progress in a broader technological and economic form. At least this was
the common assumption of modernity. Furthermore, it was claimed that
scientific progress was the “motor” of progress on a grand scale.10 However,
it became obvious that the industrial revolution could hardly serve as an
enduring example of progress. One only had to consider the working and
life conditions of the workers and their families. Sharp observations have
been presented, for instance, by Friedrich Engels (1844/1993) in The Condi-
tion of the Working Class in England, Émile Zola in Germinal (1885/1954), and
George Orwell in The Road to Wigan Pier, first published in 1937. There is
much more included in science-based industrial changes than progress.
The approach of the Frankfurt School includes a critique of positiv-
ism in all its ramifications, and in One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse
(1964/1991) points out problematic aspects of science.11 He finds that the

very rationality of science, shaped as it is according to positivist standards,
is problematic. According to logical positivism all sciences belong to the
same family. The basic science is physics, while other sciences, like chemis-
try, biology, psychology can be reduced to dealing with the physical reality.
This reductionism is basic to the claim that a universal science—observing
the same standards, the same criteria for quality, the same methods—is
possible. And as mathematics can be considered the language of physics (an
idea that is immanent in Descartes’ formulation of the mechanical world
view) it can be seen as the language of science in general. It represents
the rationality of science. According to Marcuse, however, this rationality
brings about a devastating formation of the social sciences and, in turn, of
society in general. This rationality, which Marcuse refers to as instrumental
reason, turns sciences into schemes of domination.
Following this observation, there is nothing surprising in what Engels,
Zola, and Orwell have described: Instrumental reason, in all its rami-
fications in science and technology, is a rationality of suppression and
exploitation.
Recently a similar observation was formulated by Ubiratan D’Ambrosio
with direct reference to mathematics. In “Cultural framing of mathematics
teaching and learning,” he makes the following comment:
In the last 100 years, we have seen enormous advances in our knowledge of
nature and in the development of new technologies.... And yet, this same
century has shown us a despicable human behaviour. Unprecedented means
of mass destruction, of insecurity, new terrible diseases, unjustified famine,
drug abuse, and moral decay are matched only by an irreversible destruc-
tion of the environment. Much of this paradox has to do with an absence
of reflections and considerations of values in academics, particularly in the
scientific disciplines, both in research and in education. Most of the means
to achieve these wonders and also these horrors of science and technology
have to do with advances in mathematics. (D’Ambrosio, 1994, p. 443)
With this formulation we leave behind any assumption of mathemat-

ics representing a universal logic of progress. Instead D’Ambrosio (1994)
points out that mathematics is part of not only the achievement of wonders,
but the production of horrors as well. In fact his formulation expresses that
mathematical rationality is critical, a point that we will return to later.
An insignificant rationality?
When I refer to “social theorizing,” I do not have particular sociological

studies in mind, but rather the formulation of broader conceptual
perspectives through which one tries to grasp basic features of our “social
condition.” Let me refer to a few examples of such social theorizing.
Anthony Giddens presents the notion of structuration through which
he tries to capture how actions and structures are related in complex
social processes.12 The notion of structuration highlights a general quality
of social phenomena, namely as both given and constructed. They are
both facts and fabrications. In Giddens’ sociological writings there is no
elaborated reference to mathematics. It appears that the very concept of
structuration can be developed without reference to any form of operation
of mathematical rationality. In this sense I see Giddens as representing the
position that mathematics is insignificant for social theorizing.
Zygmunt Bauman elaborates on the notion of postmodernity and makes
profound observations about the social conditions of our time.13 Through
the notion of liquid modernity he tries to grasp a characteristic feature of
these conditions.14 While social structures and priorities of a more perma-
nent character might have been characteristic of what can be referred to at
classic modernity, life-conditions of today have lost solidity. Not only social
institutions, but also social priorities and conceptions dissolve as founda-
tions with respect to human priories. Values are taken by the stream of
changes. While we, during modernity, might at least have had the illusion
of being on firm ground—for instance with respect to notions of progress,
improvement, and knowledge—liquid modernity has thrown us into the
open sea. Bauman provides his interpretation of liquid modernity with
many references: to philosophy, to sociology, to literature. However, it
is not easy in any of his writings to find references to mathematics. This
rationality seems to have nothing to do with the liquid turn of modernity.
Michael Foucault has explored the knowledge-power dialectics, and he
provides a new opportunity for investigating the role of science in society.15
With reference to Giddens, Foucault’s overall point could be formulated
as: a knowledge-power dialectics is part of a structuration. And with refer-
ence to Bauman, one could claim that this dialectics turns modernity fluid.
Foucault investigates the knowledge-power dialectics without any particular
reference to mathematics and natural sciences. He does not explore the
possibility that a main site for such dialectics could be the exact sciences
and in particular mathematics. In this way, I see Foucault as representing
the position that mathematics is of little significance for social theorizing.
Foucault located the sites for his knowledge-power archaeology within the
humanities and in vast distance from the so-called exact sciences. In this
way the paradigmatic format of Foucault’s work has de facto fortified the
assumption that mathematics is insignificant for excavating relationships
between science and power and for social theorizing in general.
Jacques Derrida referred to mathematics when he commented on Hus-
serl’s Origin of Geometry.16 However, these comments do not help to identify
mathematics as part of significant social processes. Derrida does not provide

an opening for seeing mathematics as being relevant for social theorizing.
Derrida has inspired the development of different notions, and let me just
refer to deconstruction.17 This notion refers to the investigation of a social
phenomenon and the notions of which this phenomenon is constituted.
A deconstruction may reveal the profound depths of assumptions, ideas,
and discursive fragments that form the phenomenon in question. The
poststructuralist position, as associated with Derrida’s work, has provided
a broad inspiration for the deconstruction of a variety of social phenom-
ena. However, within poststructuralism it is difficult to find examples of
the deconstruction of formal techniques or of any form of applied math-
ematics.18 In this way this position has not assigned any significance to
mathematics for understanding the social condition.
Richard Rorty establishes a complex integration of different philosophic
positions in order to grasp features of our social condition. A particularly
important notion in this respect is contingency, by which he emphasizes that
social development does not run along already constructed rails making
social forecasting possible.19 Contrary to any form of social determinism,
Rorty finds that contingency represents a social condition. The future is
not anticipated by the past, nor by the present. In his development of the
notion of contingency, Rorty does not refer to mathematics, which appears
insignificant for understanding contingencies.
Certainly there are many differences between Giddens, Bauman, Fou-
cault, Derrida, and Rorty. However, my short presentation served to point
out two similarities. First, they all develop perspectives for reading the most
general features of our social condition; and, second, they do not pay any
particular attention to the role of mathematics in developing these per-
spectives. In this (indirect) way they have helped position mathematics as
being insignificant for social theorizing.
Mathematics in action
There are at least two points I want to emphasize when talking about
mathematics as being critical. First, I see the rationality of mathematics as
being significant in the sense that it has an impact on all spheres of social
life. Something can be done through this rationality, not least through
technology.
Second, I see the impact of mathematical rationality as undetermined in
the sense that it could go in all possible directions: it may, as emphasized
by D’Ambrosio, provide “wonders” as well as “horrors.” Thus, I do not
associate any essence with mathematical which could ensure that it will
operate in particular ways. Mathematics has no nature that implies that
applications of mathematics will be for the sake of everybody.20 It might

be that mathematics may provide wonders, sometimes, and that it might
provide horrors, sometimes. However, we should not be trapped by any
kind of dualism, including a horror-wonder dualism. It might be better to
give up all dualistic frameworks, and associate being undetermined with a
much more complex set of possibilities. One could think of mathematical
rationality as opening up an indeterminism surpassing any form of dualism.
Mathematics might make available unexpected possibilities; bring about
devastating risks, serve particular business interests; be a part of schemes
of surveillance and domination; and so on.
When I state that mathematics is critical I suggest that it is significant
and undetermined. And let me emphasize again that mathematics is an
open concept, and that the critical nature of mathematics refers to any
form of mathematics: applied mathematics, pure mathematics, ethnomath-
ematics, and everyday mathematics.
In order to be more specific about the critical nature of mathematics,
I will address the following features of mathematics in action, paying a
special attention to what loosely can be referred to as engineering math-
ematics: (1) Technological imagination which refers to the possibility of
inventing and specifying technical possibilities. (2) Hypothetical reasoning
which addresses consequences of not-yet-realized technological construc-
tions and initiatives. (3) Legitimation or justification which refers to possible
validations of technological actions. (4) Realization which refers to the point
that mathematics itself comes to make part of reality. And, (5) an elimina-
tion of responsibility which might occur when ethical issues related to the
implemented action become eliminated from the general discourse about
technological initiatives and their implications.21
Through the following I will also try to point out that the notions of
structuration, liquid modernity, knowledge-power dialectics, deconstruc-
tion, and contingency become enriched when we consider mathematics
in action.
Technological imagination
Technology is advanced through imagination. Here and in the following I

use “technology” as an almost all-embracing concept referring to any form
of design and construction (of machines, artefacts, tools, robots, automatics
processes, networks, and so on) decision making (concerning management,
advertising, investments, and so on), and organization (with respect to pro-
duction, surveillance, communication, money-processing, and so on). In all
such domains we find that mathematics-based technological imagination
has been put in operation.
As a paradigmatic example of such imagination, one can think of the

conceptualization of the computer. This mathematical construct, in terms
of the Turing machine, was investigated in every detail on paper.22 Even the
computational limits of the computer were clarified before the construction
of the first computer. In general: any digital information and communica-
tion technology is deeply rooted in mathematics-based imagination.
Powerful possibilities for cryptography were identified through math-
ematical clarifications of number-theoretical properties.23 A particularly
important observation was the identification of what could be referred
a one-way function. This is a function, f, where it is easy to calculate y =
f(x), when x is given, but impossible in any feasible way to calculate x =
f-1(y), when only f and y are given. That it is possible to construct one-way
functions is based on number theoretical insight, and in particular on
the observation of the extreme complexity of factorizing a product of two
very large (say at least 50 digits) unknown prime numbers. In this case, it
is easy to calculate y = f(x1, x2) = x1 x2, but almost impossible to factorize
y and in this way determine x1 and x2. The identification of one-way func-
tions brought about a new approach to cryptography. Calculating y = f(x)
from the value of x can be associated with encryption, while the impossible
task of calculating x = f-1(y) can be associated with decryption. In this way
a mathematical construct, a one-way function, provided completely new
technological possibilities. There is no commonsense-based imagination
equivalent to mathematics-based imagination. Furthermore, it must be
noted that mathematics-based imagination operates beyond any scheme of
prediction; instead it brings about contingencies as a characteristic feature
of technological development.
Let us consider another example where a mathematics-based techno-
logical imagination is acted out: the determination of prices. We can take
air-fares as an example: in this domain we see very different schemes for
price setting, and as one element of such schemes airlines deliberately
overbook.24 The overbooking is carefully planned, and it is part of the
whole computational experimentation for maximizing profits. In particu-
lar, the degree to which a flight can be overbooked needs to be estimated
from the statistics of the numbers of no-shows for the departures in ques-
tion. (A “no-show” refers to a passenger with a valid ticket who does not
show up for the departure.) The costs of bumping a passenger need to be
estimated as well. (“Bumping” a passenger means not allowing a passenger
with a valid ticket to board the plane.) The predictability of a passenger for
a particular departure being a no-show is naturally an important parameter
in designing the overbooking policy. This predictability can be improved
when tickets are grouped in different types defined by specific conditions,
for instance with respect to the possibility of changing the ticket. The whole
overbooking policy can be experimented with mathematically, until one
has reached a price-setting, which in turn takes the form of an algorithmic-

based ongoing process.
Such experimentation and economic decision making takes place in all
kinds of business, in marketing, in production planning, in big companies,
in small companies, in any economics sector of society. Such model-based
experimentation represents a structuration, to return to Giddens’ term.
However, mathematics-based technological imagination provides a struc-
turation not only of what is taking place, but also of what could take place.
It provides a formatting of what could be done, and of what could not be
done. As a consequence, the structuration exercised through technological
imagination represents a tremendous knowledge-power dialectics.
Hypothetical reasoning
Hypothetical reasoning is counterfactual, as it takes the form: “if p then

q, although p is not the case.” Such reasoning is essential to any kind of
technological enterprise as well as to our everyday decisions.
If we do p, what would be the consequence? It is important to address
this question before in fact doing p. In order to carry out any more specific
hypothetical reasoning within the domain of technology, mathematics is
brought in action. A mathematical model comes to represent an imagined
situation, which could refer to any form of technological design, deci-
sion-making, or organizational reforms. The mathematical format of the
imagined situation becomes the basis for coming to grips with implications
of realizing what was imagined. However, the implications that are inden-
tified by investigating the mathematical layout of the imagined scenario
are not real-life implications; they are calculated implications. And it is far
from obvious what might be the relationship between calculated implica-
tions and real-life consequences of completing a technological enterprise.
For instance, the possible impact of a particular over-booking strategy
can be investigated through model-based hypothetical reasoning. Still the
real business implications could turn out to be radically different. This
applies not only to the design of price-policy. It applies to any kind of
economic enterprise. It applies to any form of technological enterprise.
One carries out calculations based on a mathematical construct in order
to estimate consequences of not-yet performed actions. However, in many
cases there appear no other way of doing so.
Considering the mathematical format of hypothetical reasoning, we see
how risks can be produced. When we identify implications of completing
a certain construction based on mathematics, there is always a risk of
something being overlooked. In fact very many aspects are by definition
overlooked, as mathematics only represents particular features of a situation.
There is no direct similarity-relationship between a real-life situation and its

mathematical representation. Mathematics-based hypothetical reasoning
is formulated within a logical space provided by a mathematical construct,
implying that only consequences within such a space can be grasped.
Risks emerge from the fact that mathematical modelling is by definition
a technique for overlooking. It is always accompanied by similarity gaps,
which is fertile soil for the growth of contingencies. The emergence of the
risk society is part of the development of mathematics-based technologies.
Legitimation or justification?
According to a classic perspective in philosophy, justification refers to a

proper and genuine logical support of a statement, of a decision, or of an
action. Naturally, what is proper and genuine and what is logical are not
simple to define, but the notion of justification includes an assumption that
some degree of logical honesty can and has been exercised. The notion of
legitimation does not include such an assumption. One can try to legiti-
mate an action by providing some argumentation, although without much
logical significance. The point of providing a legitimation of an action is
to make it appear as if it is justified. In general, a legitimation is an as-if
justification.
However, it might only be within an idealized philosophical framework
that it is possible to distinguish between legitimation and justification.
Mathematics might blur such a distinction. When a mathematical model is
brought into effect, it can serve as both a legitimation and a justification.
It can help to provide priorities, although the basis for doing so might be
obscure.
Let me try to illustrate by a quotation from an article “The Predator
War” by Jane Mayer in The New Yorker, which addresses the United States’
use of unmanned aircraft which can be used for identifying targets and for
launching missiles:
Though the C.I.A.’s methodology remains unknown, the Pentagon has cre-
ated elaborate formulas to help the military make such lethal calculations.
A top military expert, who declined to be named, spoke of the military’s
system, saying, “There’s a whole taxonomy of targets.” Some people are ap-
proved for killing on sight. For others, additional permission is needed. A
target’s location enters the equation, too. If a school, hospital, or mosque is
within the likely blast radius of a missile that, too, is weighed by a computer
algorithm before a lethal strike is authorized.25
Although the particular details of such “elaborate formulas” for helping

the military most likely will remain military secrets, we can speculate about
the kind of rationality that become acted out through a taxonomy of targets.
Such rationality makes part of a scheme for decision making. In principle,
one could assume that an automatic connection between the processes
of calculation and the military action has been established. Apparently,
according to the article one should assume that the decision—firing or not
firing—is a human decision, although guided by the result of the calcula-
tions. However, “killing on sight” need not refer to any human sight; “on
sight” could refer to a mathematized and automatized scheme of pattern
recognition.
We could imagine that the elaboration of the taxonomy has a cost-bene-
fit format. On the benefit side must be enumerated: the importance of the
target, and the likelihood that the target would in fact be eliminated by the
attack. But I am sure that many other military gains could be considered.
The costs of the action also have to be estimated, which also presupposes
a range of parameters to be considered. First one could think of death of
American soldiers, but as we in this case have to do with unmanned aircraft
this parameter might not enter the cost-calculations. However, the value
of the airplane must be included, although multiplied by the rather small
likelihood that the plane will get lost in the operation. The value of the
missile fired will clearly represent a cost. But there are more parameters
to consider: nontargeted people might get killed. This could be people
from the neighborhood in general, but, as pointed out, the target could be
located close to schools, hospitals and mosques. How does a school become
“weighted” by a computer algorithm? Through the number of expected
school children killed? Or through the economic value of such a child? Or
is it not the school children as such that have to valued, but the negative
impact the bombing of school might have? How to measure such negative
impact? By the cost of the damage control that has to be conducted? Do
similar considerations apply to hospitals and mosques? How to add up all
such costs?
The crucial point of cost-benefit analysis is that costs and benefits
become measured in the same units. This makes it possible to elaborate
a taxonomy. But how are military costs and benefits measured? What is
the shared unit for cost and benefits, including the value of fired missiles,
American soldiers, civilians in general, school children, hospitals, mosque,
and so on? How many killed school children may counterbalance a suc-
cessful elimination of an enemy target? What is value of a school child
compared with the value of an American soldier?
Such questions about equivalence represent the brutality included in any
such cost-benefit analysis, and they can only be answered through some
cynical equations, where one stipulates units of measurement. Cynical equa-
tions are necessary for any cost-benefit analysis and for turning a process
of decision making into a process of calculation. This applies to military

decision making as well as to any form of decision making.
The implementation of any form of cynical equations blurs the dis-
tinction between legitimizations and justifications. A deconstruction of
examples of formal-based justification and legitimation might be highly
relevant in order to come to understand how formal reasoning could
dominate other forms of reasoning, and simultaneously serve any kind of
interest. This applies to any practice—in engineering, economy, business,
administration, military—where a mathematics-based taxonomy makes
part of a decision-making procedure and might provide a suspicious legiti-
mation with a glimmer of justification.
Realization
A mathematical model can become part of our environment. Our life-

world is formed through techniques and practices as well as categories
and discourses emerging from mathematics in action. Technology is not
something “additional” which we can put aside, as if it was a simple tool,
like a hammer. We live in a technologically structured environment, a
techno-nature. Our life-world is situated in this techno-nature, and we
cannot even imagine what it would mean to eliminate technology from
our environment. Just try to do the subtraction piece by piece. We remove
the computer, the credit card, the TV set, the phone. And we continue
by removing medicine, newspapers, cars, bridges, streets, shoes. We have
no idea about what kind of life-world such a continued subtraction would
bring us into. In this sense our life-world is submerged in techno-nature.
Mathematical constructs make integral part of both techno-nature and
life-world. Thus all the things referred to: computer, credit card, TV set,
phone, medicine, newspapers, cars, bridges, streets, and shoes are today
produced and distributed through processes packed with mathematics.
But not only the objects which make part of our techno-nature are format-
ted through mathematics; so are many practices. Mathematics establishes
routines. The travel business can again serve as an example. When I want
to buy a ticket, the assistant at the travel agency can easily provide infor-
mation about prices and schedules. The whole computational survey of
information is part of the routines of the agency.
Economy has turned into a highly mathematized discipline. Let me
refer to one remark Giddens makes about mathematics in Social Theory
and Modern Sociology. Here he points out the problem of including mathe-
matics-based models in macroeconomic theorizing. His point is that such
models include a range of assumptions of questionable descriptive value,
for instance about the rationality of the consumer, specified in terms of the
logical structure of preferences. Giddens might be quite right in claiming

that any real-life consumer operates quite differently from the mathe-
matically described rational consumer. As a consequence, Giddens finds
such grand-scale modelling to be of questionable use. This is, however,
only one element of the story. Grand-scale economic models are used in
a variety of domains due not to their descriptive, but to their prescriptive
functions. Tax-payment is defined through the use of models, exchange
rates are continuously defined by means of mathematical algorithms, all
economic indices as well. Such indices represent parameters for economic
decision-making by governments, by huge companies, by small companies,
by consumers. In this sense mathematics models come to make part of
our real-life context. Or life-world is not run according to mathematical
descriptions, but is stuffed with mathematics-produced parameters which
structure decisions and actions at all levels of society.
Surveillance illustrates that mathematics is more than a device for mod-
elling an already existing reality. As it is possible to store and process huge
amounts of data, one can establish surveillance on a grand scale. As an
illustration one could just consider that it is possible to survey any browsing
on the internet, and, for instance, to identify any uncommon (maybe suspi-
cious?) pattern of browsing. It is possible to connect the particular browsing
history to a particular computer. Such huge scale forms of surveillance are
made possible only through mathematics, and when implemented math-
ematics comes to make part of our reality.26
Mathematics in action comes to transcend the classic theory-reality dis-
tinction. Many have questioned the existence of any theory-independent
reality. However, we can add that the most substantial form of reality can
be mathematics-created, and in many cases there was no reality before
mathematics made it; data-banking may serve as an example. The mathe-
matics-based reality-creation is not any free creative process. For instance,
the mathematics-based technology of surveillance is only implemented to
the extend it fits other forms of political or economic interests. Mathemat-
ics in action integrates with many other forms of actions and interests.
Elimination of responsibility
Mathematics-based actions may erase responsibility. Let us again consider

the example with the travel agency. The assistant can tell the customer the
price of the ticket and whether tickets are available on a certain date or
not. The assistant cannot provide a ticket if the computer does not allow
so. Even if the costumer might be able to demonstrate that the travel is
of extreme importance, the assistant cannot do anything. The assistant
is in no way responsible for what the computer states. Nor is he or she
responsible for the price of the ticket, the conditions of payment, or for
anything that transpires on account of algorithmically defined procedures.
One could ask who is responsible for the actions exercised by use of a
computer. Somehow responsibility seems to evaporate. It cannot be the
assistant using the computer-based model who is responsible. Nor can
it be the model itself. Mathematics cannot be responsible, even when it
is brought in action. But might we not say, at least, that a certain way of
thinking is responsible? Could the people who constructed the model be
responsible? Are the responsible those who have ordered the model? One
feature of the liquidity that Bauman refers to is that the very structure of
responsibly is streaming away.
Mathematics in action seems to be missing an acting subject. As a con-
sequence, mathematics-based actions easily appear to be conducted in
an ethical vacuum. They may appear to be the only actions relevant in
the situation. They might appear to be determined by some “objective”
authority as they represent a necessity provided by mathematics. There are
many ways of inserting objectivity in calculations: one principal pattern is
through the formulation of cynical equations. Their arbitrariness, however,
might be covered by an overwhelming mass of formal calculations for for-
malities, and in this way endow the result with a necessity, although an
inserted necessity. In this way the elimination of responsibility might be
part of mathematics in action, which in turn constitutes part of a knowl-
edge-power dynamics.
A critical rationality?
Let us imagine the situation in an airport where a passenger gets bumped.

We imagine that we want to research the “bumping situation” and that we
have been tape-recording the conversation between the passenger, who
states that she has a valid ticket for this particular departure, and the airline
assistant who informs her that the airplane, most unfortunately, has been
overbooked and that there are no more seats available. The passenger
complains and points out the importance of the meeting she is going to
attend. The assistant states that he is sorry about the inconvenience caused
by the computer problem, but adds that a rebooking will be done and that
the passenger will receive some compensation.
On the basis of a careful transcription of the whole conversation, we
may try to reach an understanding of what has taken place. We can identify
different elements of the dialogue; we can point out how the passenger’s
irritation is acted out in the dialogue, and how the assistant’s professionalism
helps to keep a business-like feature to the conversation. We can imagine
elaborating on all these observations, resulting in a detailed discourse
analysis. However, whatever we do, based on our empirical material, we

will miss a crucial point in understanding the event: the bumping of
the passenger is not done by the airline assistant, and it not caused by
a computer mistake. It is part of a carefully elaborated booking strategy
according to which the overbooking is carefully planned according to cost–
benefit calculations recognizing the statistically determined probability of
a passenger being a “no show” at a particular departure. Mathematics-
based procedures for decision-making structure the situation, and
if this mathematical agency is not addressed, the situation will remain
incomprehensible.
The “bumping situation” only serves as an illustration of the vast range
of situations where a mathematical undercurrent provides a structuration.
This undercurrent has to be identified as part of the interpretation of what
is taking place. We can think of any feature of the techno-nature that enve-
lopes our daily-life situations. Social theorizing needs to address how any
form of design, decision-making, and organizational structures are formed
through mathematics in action.
I have tried to be more particular about the relevance of addressing
mathematical agency as part of social theorizing by pointing out that
notions like structuration, liquid modernity, knowledge-power dynamics,
deconstruction, and contingency can be developed further through discus-
sions of mathematics in action. Thus, we can think of mathematics in action
as the distributor of contingencies to all provinces of our techno-nature:
both by bringing extreme discontinuities into technological imagination
and by opening similarity gaps around any modelling process. While
Foucault addressed the knowledge-power dynamics within the humani-
ties—considering the conception of madness, the history of sexuality, and
the birth of the prison—one could provide an even more profound study
of this dynamics by considering mathematics in action. A new terrain for
deconstruction can be explored as we consider the assumptions, precon-
ceptions, and priorities that make part of any mathematics-based form of
legitimation and justification, and of the discourse claiming neutrality and
objectivity. It is difficult to see how one can operate with overall notions
like structuration and liquid modernity and at the same time ignore the
specificity of mathematics in action. A mathematics undercurrent can be
identified within a huge variety of social phenomena, and this current has
an impact on all spheres of life.
Let us again remind ourselves that mathematics is an open concept.
I have discussed of mathematics in action with particular references to
engineering mathematics. However there are many more discussion of
mathematics in action that are needed, for instance with reference to dif-
ferent forms for ethnomathematics. Also in such case we can consider how
techno-nature and life-worlds become formed; and we can consider the
whole spectrum between horrors and wonders as well as stepping beyond

this dualism.
I find that mathematical rationality, in its many forms, is critical in the
sense that it is significant and undetermined. Like any form of action,
mathematics in action can be discussed in terms of a range of qualities.
Such actions might be beneficial, expensive, surprising, risky, mischie-
vous, boring, and so on. In this sense, I consider mathematics as a critical
rationality. The Engels, Zola, and Orwell of today need to recognise how
mathematical constructs make part of misery. But not only of misery: of
almost any aspect of techno-nature and life-worlds, whatever qualities these
aspects might be claimed to have.
Acknowledgments
Many of the ideas I have presented here are inspired from cooperation with
others, and, together with Keiko Yasukawa and Ole Ravn, I have explored
many aspects of mathematics in action. I want to thank Denival Biotto
Filho, Brian Greer, Renato Marcone, Raquel Milani, and Miriam Godoy
Penteado for many suggestions for improvements, and Kristina Brun
Madsen for a careful proof reading of the manuscript.
NOTES
1. See, for instance, FitzSimons (2002).

2. See Frege (1879/1967, 1892/1969); and Whitehead and Russell (1910–1913).
3. See Hilbert (1925/1967a, 1927/1967b, 1899/1968) and Curry (1951).
4. See Brouwer (1913/1975a, 1948/1975b), and Heyting (1956).
5. Platonism in mathematics is, for instance, formulated by Frege who distin-
guishes between “sense” and “reference” of both concepts and statements
(see, for instance, Frege, 1892/1969). Frege points out that while the senses
can be addressed by psychology, the references represent a world of their
own which can be addressed adequately only by logic and mathematics. The
world of references has, according to Frege, a Platonic format.
6. If we regard Euclid’s Elements (see Euclid, 2003) as the first paradigmatic
layout of the Euclidean paradigm, we may consider Whitehead and Russell’s
Principia Mathematica (1910–1913) the closing presentation, still maintaining
the idea that axioms are true and that all deduced theorems, therefore,
are true. The emerging formalism emphasized, however, that within
mathematics nothing can be said about the truth of the axioms. One can
only claim that if the axioms are considered true, then the theorems can be
considered true as well.
7. For a discussion of Descartes’ formulation of Laws of Nature, see also
Skovsmose (2009).
8. This was what Descartes concluded in his Meditations (Descartes, 1641/1993).

9. Many investigations within this paradigmatic limitation have been conduct-
ed: as an example one can refer to Shapiro (2000). A collection of articles de-
fining this paradigm is found in Benacerraf and Putnam (1964). The purity
of mathematics has been expressed in many different ways. Thus Bourbaki
(1950) and Dieudonné (1970) present mathematics as a pure logical archi-
tecture, while Hardy (1940/1967) presents it as a sublime form of art. To-
gether with Ole Ravn, I have proposed a philosophy of mathematics which
steps beyond this paradigm, see Skovsmose and Ravn (2011).
10. For a discussion of the notion of progress, see Bury (1932/1955), where
Beard’s introduction celebrates science and technology as the icons of prog-
ress. See also Nisbet (1980) and Christensen (2003).
11. For a critique of positivism see also Horkheimer (1947/1999, 1968/2002)
and Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/2002).
12. See Giddens (1984).
13. See, for instance, Bauman (1998, 2001).
14. See, in particular, Bauman (2000, 2003, 2005).
15. See, for instance, Foucault (1969/1989, 1966/1994, 2000).
16. See Derrida (1962/1989).
17. See Derrida (1967/1974).
18. It would be an unfair simplification to try to fix the label of postmodernity
to Žižek’s tremendous production. Anyway, his broad approach does not ac-
knowledge that the role of mathematics might be significant to consider for
social theorizing. See, for instance, Žižek (2008, 2009).
19. See, Rorty (1989).
20. It has been argued that the very nature of mathematical thinking is demo-
cratic, and that, as a consequence, it was no coincidence that mathematics
and democracy developed during the same period in Ancient Greece (see
Hannaford, 1998).
21. For presentations and discussions of mathematics in action see Skovsmose
(2005, 2009, 2011); Skovsmose and Yasukawa (2009); Christensen and
Skovsmose (2007); Christensen, Skovsmose, and Yasukawa, K. (2007); Yasu-
kawa, Skovsmose, and Ravn (this volume); and Skovsmose and Ravn (2011).
The following presentation of mathematics in action draws directly on this
material.
â•… A range of sociological studies can be related to the discussion of math-
ematics in action. However, while the sociology of mathematics points
out how the social has an impact on mathematics, the discussion of math-
ematics in action points out how mathematics has an impact on the social
(acknowledging that mathematics itself is a social construct). Bloor (1976)
and Wilder (1981) provide an opening for the sociology of mathematics,
and many studies have followed.
â•… A range of studies have addressed how information and communica-
tion technologies have a particular impact on the social. In many cases
these studies, however, have only addressed the features of these technol-
ogies in the most general way. Bell (1973, 1980) provided an important
opening for the discussion. See also Castells (1996, 1997, 1998).
22. See, Turing (1936/1965), as well as Skovsmose (2009) for a discussion for this
example and the following example of technological imagination.
23. For a more elaborated presentation of this example, see Skovsmose and Ya-
sukawa (2009). More general presentations are found in Schroeder (1997)
and Stallings (1999). See also Diffie and Hellman (1976) for the presenta-
tion of the original idea.
24. For a more elaborated presentation of this example, see Skovsmose (2005).
25. Brian Greer drew my attention to this quotation. See the whole arti-
cle at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_
mayer?currentPage=all (accessed May 10, 2012).
26. Medicine is another domain where mathematics-based prescriptions shape
reality. Thus diagnoses are established with reference to statistics-based defi-
nitions of what is normal. The decision to be made depends on the devia-
tion from the norm according to certain parameters (concerning the level of
cholesterol and blood pressure, for instance). Decision making can be rou-
tinized, treatment can be routinized, and the extension of such routinization
can ensure efficiency. At the same time the procedures include new risks, as,
being defined through a mathematics-based norm setting, they need not ap-
ply adequately in all situations.
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chapter 2
ETHNOMATHEMATICS
A Response to the Changing Role of
Mathematics in Society
Ubiratan D’Ambrosio
The world’s civilization is anchored in mathematics. No one disagrees that

mathematics is the dorsal spine of the modern world. But this leads to focus
the concerns about the future on Mathematics. I give the word to Mikhail
L. Gromov, the Abel Prize laureate of 2009, who, in an interview given to
Raussen and Skau (2010), said:
Earth will run out of the basic resources, and we cannot predict what will
happen after that. We will run out of water, air, soil, rare metals, not to men-
tion oil. Everything will essentially come to an end within fifty years. What
will happen after that? I am scared. It may be okay if we find solutions, but if
we don’t then everything may come to an end very quickly!
Mathematics may help to solve the problem, but if we are not successful,
there will not be any mathematics left, I am afraid!
I will not live enough to see the scenario anticipated by Gromov. But I am
scared and afraid too, moved by love. My youngest granddaughter, born

24â•‡â•‡U. D’Ambrosio
last year, will be fifty years old by then. What kind of world we are leaving
to them?
The tensions within our contemporary societies add to create this feeling
of scare and fear. As a mathematician and mathematics educator, I feel I
have a responsibility with the future. We have to find ways both to recog-
nize and to respond to these feelings. The critical perception of past and
of future may be a guide for action in the present.
I repeat the beginning of my talk from the 15th PME-NA, in 1993:
Although the main concern of this meeting is mathematics education, I
believe I will be allowed to subordinate my comments to a higher objective:
the survival of civilization on Earth with dignity for all. This is not merely
jargonizing. The world is threatened, not only by aggressions against nature
and the environment. We are equally concerned with increasing violations
of human dignity. We face more and more cases of life under fear, hatred
and violation of the basic principles upon which civilization rests.
Mathematics education is a rich research area. Its importance for
education in general is unquestionable. As a research area, mathematics
education is remarkably interdisciplinary. It relies on research in various
disciplines, particularly in cultural studies and cognitive sciences.
The main issues affecting society nowadays can be synthesized:
• the preservation of natural and cultural resources

• national security; personal security;
• government/politics;
• economics: social and environmental impact;
• relations among nations;
• relations among social classes;
• people’s welfare.
Mathematics is deeply involved with all these issues. History tells us that
the technological, industrial, military, economic, and political complexes
have developed thanks to mathematical instruments. And that mathe-
matics has been relying on these complexes for the material bases of its
continuing progress.
It is also widely recognized that mathematics is the most universal mode
of thought and that survival with dignity is the most universal problem
facing mankind.
It is expected that scientists, in particular mathematicians and math
educators, be concerned with the most universal problem, that is, survival
with dignity, and also have much familiarity with the most universal mode
of thought, that is, mathematics. It is absolutely natural to expected that
Ethnomathematicsâ•‡â•‡25
mathematicians and math educators look into the relations between these
two universals, that is, into the role of mathematicians and math educa-
tors in the pursuit of a civilization with dignity for all, in which inequity,
arrogance, and bigotry have no place. This means, to achieve a world in
peace (D’Ambrosio, 2001).
Mathematics and
Mathematics Education and Peace
Peace must be understood in its multiple dimensions:
• inner peace
• social peace
• environmental peace
• military peace.
As a mathematician and mathematics educator I feel an urge to

understand our role in offering venues for peace. The Program Ethno-
mathematics is a response to this.
Let me begin with a few basic questions, which guide the research
program, on mathematics, history, education, and on the curriculum.
We need a reflection on the nature of mathematical behavior. How is
mathematics created? How different is mathematical creativity from other
forms of creativity?
To face these questions there is need of a complete and structured view
of the role of mathematics in building up our civilization, hence a look into
the history and geography of human behavior.
I emphasize that history not only as a chronological narrative of events;
focused in the narrow geographic limits of a few civilizations, which have
been successful in a short span of time. Also, the course of the history
of mankind can not be separated from the natural history of the planet.
History of civilization has developed in close and increasing interdepen-
dence with the natural history of the planet.
Some form of education has been present in all phases of human history,
in every culture. I claim that the major goals of education are:
• to promote creativity, helping people to fulfill their potentials and

raise to the highest of their capability, but being careful not to
promote docile citizens. We do not want our students to become
citizens who obey and accept rules and codes which violate human
dignity.
• to promote citizenship transmitting values and showing rights and

responsibilities in society, but being careful not to promote irre-
sponsible creativity. We do not want our student to become bright
scientists creating new weaponry and instruments of oppression
and inequity.
The big challenge we face is the encounter of the old and the new. The
old is present in the societal values, which were established in the past and
are essential in the concept of citizenship. And the new is intrinsic to the
promotion of creativity, which points to the future.
The strategy of education systems to pursue these goals is the curricu-
lum. Curriculum is usually organized in three strands: objectives, contents,
and methods. This Cartesian organization implies accepting the social
aims of education systems, then identifying contents that may help to reach
the goals and developing methods to transmit those contents.
The Political Dimension of

To agree on objectives is regarded as the political dimension of education,

but very rarely has mathematics content and methodology been examined
with respect to this dimension. Indeed, some educators and mathemati-
cians claim that content and methods in mathematics have nothing to do
with the political dimension of education.
Even more disturbing is the possibility of offering our children a world
convulsed by wars. Because mathematics conveys the imprint of western
thought, it is naïve not to look into a possible role of mathematics in framing
a state of mind that tolerates war. Our responsibility as mathematicians and
mathematics educators is to offer venues of peace (D’Ambrosio, 1998).
There is an expectation about our role, as mathematicians and math-
ematics educators, in the pursuit of peace. Anthony Judge, the director of
communications and research of the Union of International Associations,
expressed in (Judge, 2000) how we, mathematicians, are seen by others:
Mathematicians—having lent the full support of their discipline to the
weapons industry supplying the missile delivery systems—would claim
that their subtlest thinking is way beyond the comprehension of those
seated around a negotiating table. They have however failed to tackle the
challenge of the packing and unpacking of complexity to render it com-
prehensible without loss of relationships vital to more complex patterns. As
with the protagonists in any conflict, they would deny all responsibility for
such failures and the manner in which these have reinforced unsustainably
simplistic solutions leading to further massacres.
I see my role as an educator and my discipline, mathematics, as comple-

mentary instruments to fulfill commitments to mankind. To make good use
of these instruments, I must master them, but I also need to have a critical
view of their potentialities and of the risk involved in misusing them. This
is my professional commitment.
It is difficult to deny that mathematics provides an important instru-
ment for social analyses. Western civilization entirely relies on data control
and management. “The world of the twenty-first century is a world awash
in numbers” (Steen, 2001, p. 1). Social critics will find it difficult to argue
without an understanding of basic quantitative mathematics.
Since the emergence of modern science, enormous emphasis has been
placed on the rational dimension of man. Recently, multiple intelligences,
emotional intelligence, spiritual intelligence, and numerous approaches
to cognition, including new developments in artificial intelligence, chal-
lenge this. In mathematics education, this challenge is seen in the exclusive
emphasis given to skill and drilling, as defended in some circles of math-
ematicians and mathematics educators.
In this chapter I argue that the emphasis on the quantitative cannot be
detrimental to the equally important emphasis on the qualitative. My pro-
posal of literacy, matheracy, and technoracy, discussed below, is an answer to
my criticism of the lack of equilibrium. Literacy is a communicative instru-
ment and, as such, includes what has been called quantitative literacy or
numeracy. This is very much in line with the mathematics learned from the
Egyptians and Babylonians, but not central in Greco-Roman civilization
or in the High Middle Ages. It was incorporated into European thought
in the Lower Middle Ages and it was essential for mercantilism and for
the development of modern science. Indeed, it became the imprint of the
modern world. In contrast, matheracy is an analytical instrument, as pro-
posed by classical Greek mathematicians (for example, in Plato’s Republic).
I will return to this subsequently.
It is an undeniable right of every human being to share in all the cultural
and natural goods needed for material survival and intellectual enhance-
ment. This is the essence of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) to which every nation is commit-
ted. The educational strand of this important profession on the rights of
mankind is the World Declaration on Education for All (UNESCO. 1990) to
which 155 countries are committed. Of course, there are many difficulties
in implementing United Nations resolutions and mechanisms. But as yet
this is the best instrument available that may lead to a planetary civiliza-
tion, with peace and dignity for all mankind. Regrettably, mathematics
educators are generally unfamiliar with these documents.
Critical Mathematics Education

It is not possible to relinquish our duty to cooperate, with respect and
solidarity, with all the human beings who have the same rights for the
preservation of good. The essence of the ethics of diversity is respect for,
solidarity with, and cooperation with the other (the different). This leads
to quality of life and dignity for all.
It is impossible to accept the exclusion of large sectors of the population
of the world, both in developed and undeveloped nations. An explanation
for this perverse concept of civilization asks for a deep reflection on colo-
nialism. This is not to place blame on one or another, not an attempt to
redo the past. Rather, to understand the past is a first step to move into the
future. To accept inequity, arrogance, and bigotry is irrational and may lead
to disaster. Mathematics has everything to do with this state of the world. A
new world order is urgently needed. Our hopes for the future depend on
learning—critically—the lessons of the past.
We have to look into history and epistemology with a broader view. The
denial and exclusion of the cultures of the periphery, so common in the
colonial process, still prevails in modern society. The denial of knowledge
that affects populations is of the same nature as the denial of knowledge
to individuals, particularly children. To propose directions to counteract
ingrained practices is the major challenge of educators, particularly math-
ematics educators. Large sectors of the population do not have access to
full citizenship. Some do not have access to the basic needs for survival.
This is the situation in most of the world and occurs even in the most
developed and richest nations.
Let me discuss the proposal of a new concept of curriculum, synthesized
in three strands: literacy, matheracy, and technoracy (D’Ambrosio, 1999b).
The three provide, in a critical way, the communicative, analytical and
technological instruments necessary for life in the 21st century. Let me
discuss each one.
Literacy is the capability of processing information, such as the use of
written and spoken language, of signs and gestures, of codes and numbers.
Clearly, reading has a new meaning today. We have to read a movie or a
television program. It is common to listen to a concert with a new reading
of Chopin. Also, socially, the concept of literacy has gone through many
changes. Nowadays, reading includes also the competency of numeracy,
the interpretation of graphs and tables, and other ways of informing the
individual. Reading even includes understanding the condensed language
of codes. These competencies have much more to do with screens and
buttons than with pencil and paper. There is no way to reverse this trend,
just as there has been no successful censorship to prevent people from
having access to books in the past 500 years. Getting information through
the new media supersedes the use of pencil and paper, and numeracy is
achieved with calculators. But, if dealing with numbers is part of modern

literacy, where has mathematics gone?
Matheracy is the capability of inferring, proposing hypotheses, and
drawing conclusions from data. It is a first step toward an intellectual
posture, which is almost completely absent in our school systems. Regret-
tably, even conceding that problem solving, modeling, and projects can be
seen in some mathematics classrooms, the main importance is usually given
to numeracy, or the manipulation of numbers and operations. Matheracy
is closer to the way mathematics was present both in classical Greece and
in indigenous cultures. The concern was not with counting and measur-
ing, but with divination and philosophy. Matheracy, this deeper reflection
about man and society, should not be restricted to the elite, as it has been
in the past.
Technoracy is the critical familiarity with technology. Of course, the oper-
ative aspects of it are, in most cases, inaccessible to the lay individual.
But the basic ideas behind technological devices, their possibilities and
dangers, the morality supporting the use of technology, are essential issues
to be raised among children at a very early age. History show us that ethics
and values are intimately related to technological progress.
The three together constitute what is essential for citizenship in a world
moving swiftly toward a planetary civilization.
The Program Ethnomathematics
A realization of this new concept of curriculum is the Program Ethnomath-

ematics.
To build a civilization that rejects inequity, arrogance, and bigotry, edu-
cation must give special attention to the redemption of peoples that have
been for a long time subordinated and must give priority to the empower-
ment of the excluded sectors of societies.
The Program Ethnomathematics contributes to restoring cultural
dignity and offers the intellectual tools for the exercise of citizenship. It
enhances creativity, reinforces cultural self-respect, and offers a broad view
of mankind. In everyday life, it is a system of knowledge that offers the
possibility of a more favorable and harmonious relation between humans
and between humans and nature (D’Ambrosio, 1999a).
The Program Ethnomathematics offers the possibility of harmonious
relations in human behavior and between humans and nature. It has,
intrinsic to it, the ethics of diversity:
• respect for the other (the different);

• solidarity with the other;
• cooperation with the other.
Let me elaborate on the genesis of this research program, which has

obvious pedagogical implications.
An important question, frequently asked about ethnomathematics, is its
nature: is it research or practice?
I see ethnomathematics arising from research, and this is the reason for
calling it the Program Ethnomathematics. But equally important, indeed
what justifies this research, are the practical implications, for example in
curriculum innovation and development, in teaching and teacher educa-
tion, in policy making and in the effort to erase arrogance, inequity, and
bigotry in society.
My current concerns about research and practice in math education fit
into my broad interest in the human condition as related to the history of
natural evolution (from the Cosmos to the future of the human species),
to the history of ideas and, particularly, to the history of explanations of
creation and natural evolution.
An insight is gained by looking into non-Western civilizations. I base
my research on established forms of knowledge (communications, lan-
guages, religions, arts, techniques, sciences, mathematics) and in a theory
of knowledge and behavior which I call the “cycle of knowledge.” This
theoretical approach recognizes the cultural dynamics of the encounters,
based on what I call the “basin metaphor.” All this links to the historical
and epistemological dimensions of the Program Ethnomathematics, which
can bring new light into our understanding of how mathematical ideas
are generated and how they evolved through the history of mankind. For
details, see (D’Ambrosio, 2000).
It is fundamental to recognize the contributions of other cultures and
the importance of the dynamics of cultural encounters. Culture is under-
stood in its widest sense, which includes art, history, languages, literature,
medicine, music, philosophy, religion, and science. Research in ethno-
mathematics is, thus, necessarily transcultural and transdisciplinarian. The
encounters are examined in its widest form, to permit exploration of more
indirect interactions and influences, and to permit examination of subjects
on a comparative basis. Although academic mathematics developed in the
Mediterranean Basin, expanded to Northern Europe and later to other
parts of the World, it is difficult to deny that the codes and techniques to
express and communicate the reflections on space, time, classifying, com-
paring, which are proper to the human species, are contextual. Among
these codes are measuring, quantifying, inferring, and the emergence of
abstract thinking.
At this moment, it is important to clarify that my view of ethnomathe-
matics should not be confused with ethnic-mathematics, as it is understood
by many. This is the reason why I insist in using the denomination Program
Ethnomathematics. This program tries to explain mathematics, as it tries
to explain science, religion, culinary, dressing, football, and several other

practical and abstract manifestations of the human species.
Of course, the Program Ethnomathematics was initially inspired by rec-
ognizing ideas and ways of doing that reminds us of Western mathematics.
What we call mathematics in the academia is a Western construct. Although
dealing with space, time, classifying, comparing, which are proper to the
human species, the codes and techniques to express and communicate the
reflections on these behaviors is undeniably contextual. I got an insight
into this general approach while visiting other cultural environments,
during my work in Africa, in practically all the countries of continental
America and the Caribbean, and in some European environments. Later,
I tried to understand the situation in Asia and Oceania, although with no
field work. Thus, came my approach to cultural anthropology (curiously,
my first book on ethnomathematics was placed by the publishers in a col-
lection of anthropology).
To express these ideas, which I call a research program (maybe inspired
by Lakatos?), I created a neologism, ethno + mathema + tics. This caused
much criticism, because it does not reflect the etymology of “mathemat-
ics.” Indeed, the “mathema” root in the word ethnomathematics has little
to do with “mathematics” (which is a neologism introduced in the four-
teenth century). The idea of organizing these reflections occurred to me
while attending International Congress of Mathematicians in Helsinki,
in 1978. In my spare time I played with Finnish dictionaries (to play with
dictionaries is a favorite pastime). I combined words for the ways people
find explanations in a cultural environment and the result was alustapasiv-
istykselitys. Bizarre! So, I believed the word ethnomathematics would be
more palatable.
I understand that there are immediate questions facing world societ-
ies and education, particularly mathematics education. As a mathematics
educator, I address these questions. Thus, the Program Ethnomathematics
links to the study of curriculum, and to my proposal for a modern trivium:
literacy, matheracy, and technoracy.
The pursuit of peace, in all four dimensions mentioned above, is an
urgent need. Thus, the relation of the Program Ethnomathematics with
peace, ethics, and citizenship.
These lines of work in mathematics education link, naturally, to the
pedagogical and social dimensions of the Program Ethnomathematics.
It is important to insist that the Program Ethnomathematics is not
ethnic mathematics, as some commentators interpret it. Of course, one
has to work with different cultural environments and, as ethnographers,
ethnomathematicians try to describe mathematical ideas and practices of
other cultures. This is a style of doing ethnomathematics, which is abso-
lutely necessary. These cultural environments include not only indigenous
populations, but labour and artisan groups, communities in urban envi-

ronment and in the periphery, farms, professional groups. These groups
develop their own practices, have specific jargons and theorize on their
ideas. This is an important element for the development of the Program
Ethnomathematics, as important as the cycle of knowledge and the recog-
nition of the cultural encounters.
Basically, investigations in ethnomathematics start focus three basic
questions:
1. How are ad hoc practices and solution of problems developed into

methods?
2. How are methods developed into theories?
3. How are theories developed into scientific invention?
It is important to recognize the special role of technology in the human

species and the implications of this for science and mathematics. Thus, the
need of history of science and technology (and, of course, of mathemat-
ics) to understand the role of technology as a consequence of science, but
also as an essential element for furthering scientific ideas and theories
(D’Ambrosio, 2004).
Once recognized the role of technology in the development of math-
ematics, reflections about the future of mathematics propose important
questions about the role of technology in mathematics education. Besides
these more immediate concerns, there are long term concerns. Of course,
they are related. Hence, the importance of linking with future studies. And,
in particular, with distance education.
Reflections about the presence of technology in modern civilization
leads, naturally, to questions about the future of our species. Thus, the
importance of the emergent fields of primatology and artificial intelli-
gence, which lead to a reflection about the future of the human species.
Cybernetics and human consciousness lead, naturally, to reflections about
fyborgs (a kind of “new” species, that is humans with enormous inbuilt tech-
nological dependence). Our children will be fyborgs when, around 2025,
they become decision makers and take charge of all societal affairs. Edu-
cating these future fyborgs calls, necessarily, for much broader concepts of
learning and teaching. The role of mathematics in the future is undeniable.
But what kind of mathematics?
To understand how, historically, societies absorb innovation, is greatly
aided by looking into fiction literature (from iconography to written fiction,
music and cinema). It is important to understand the way material and
intellectual innovation permeates the thinking and the myths, and the
ways of knowing and doing of noninitiated people. In a sense, how new
ideas vulgarize, understanding vulgarize as making abstruse theories and

artifacts easier to understand in a popular way.
How communities deal with space and time, mainly to understand the
sacralization of chronology and topology in history, is also central.
As a conclusion
We have to look into the cultural dynamics of the encounter of generations

(parents and teachers and youth). This encounter is dominated by mis-
trust and cooptation, reflected in testing and evaluation practices, which
dominate our civilization. In mathematics education, this is particularly
disastrous. Mathematics is, usually, seen by youth as uninteresting, obsolete,
and useless. And they are right. Much of is in the traditional curriculum is
uninteresting, obsolete, and useless.
It is important to understand children and youth behavior and their
expectations. History gives us hints on how periods of great changes affect
the relations between generations. Most interesting is the analysis of youth
movements after World War II and Vietnam War, particularly 1968.
Regrettably, education, in general, is dominated by a kind of “corporate”
attitude, in the sense that there is more concern with the subjects taught
than with the children. This is particularly true with mathematics educa-
tion. There is more concern with attaining predecided goals of proficiency,
which favors sameness and may lead to the promotion of docile citizens
and irresponsible creativity. Tests are the best instruments to support this
corporate aspect of education. Tests penalize creative and critical educa-
tion, which leads to intimidation of the new and to the reproduction of this
model of society.
Resources for testing is the main argument to justify current math con-
tents. The claims of the importance of current math contents are fragile.
Myths surround these claims.
The Program Ethnomathematics is a proposal to demystify mathemat-
ics, by showing that the human mind acts mathematically when facing new
situations and problems posed by the real world.
References
D’Ambrosio, U. (1998). Mathematics and peace: Our responsibilities. Zentralblatt

für Didaktik der Mathematik/ZDM, 30, 67–73.
D’Ambrosio, U. (1999a). Ethnomathematics and its first international congress.
Zentralblatt für Didaktik der Mathematik, ZDM, 31, 50–53.
D’Ambrosio, U. (1999b). literacy, matheracy, and technoracy: A trivium for today.
Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 1, 131–153.
D’Ambrosio, U. (2000). A historiographical proposal for non-Western mathematics.

In H. Selin (Ed.), Mathematics across cultures. The history of non-Western
mathematics (pp. 79–92). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
D’Ambrosio, U. (2001). Mathematics and peace: A reflection on the basis of Western
civilization. Leonardo, 34, 327–332.
D’Ambrosio, U. (2004). Ethnomathematics and its place in the history and peda-
gogy of mathematics. In T. P. Carpenter, J. A. Dossey, & J. L. Koehler (Eds.),
Classics in mathematics education research (pp. 194–199). Reston VA: National
Council of Teachers of Mathematics.
Judge, A. (2000). And when the bombing stops: Territorial conflict as a challenge
to mathematicians. Union of International Associations. Retrieved October 5,
2010, from http://www.uia.org/uiadocs/mathbom.htm
Raussen, M., & Skau, C. (2010). Interview with Mikhail Gromov. Notices of the AMS,
57, 391–409.
Steen, L. A. (Ed.). (2001). Mathematics and democracy: The case for quantitative literacy.
Princeton, NJ: National Council on Education and the Disciplines.
United Nations. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. Retrieved October 5,
2010, from http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
UNESCO. (1990). World declaration on education for all. Retrieved October 5, 2010,
from http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/background/jomtien_
declaration.shtml
chapter 3
MATHEMATICS
EDUCATION IDEOLOGIES
AND GLOBALIZATION
Paul Ernest
In this chapter I tell two tales. One is a tale of the role of ideology in the
globalization of mathematics, science, and technology education research,
and its social and political implications. The other thinner tale is the story
of my personal situatedness within the intellectual and material worlds
I inhabit. To critique the globalization of educational research in these
domains without acknowledging my situatedness and the boundaries of my
complicity would be only half of the story, and would lack reflexivity and
the necessary acknowledgement of the complexity of the issues involved.
Postmodernity has adopted Bacon’s (1597/1997) insight that knowledge
is power and exploited it in the knowledge economy. My aim is to partly
subvert this order and, through providing a lens that reveals some of the
ideologies at work in educational research, to offer knowledge workers
a tool for carrying their endeavours forward and resisting or harnessing
some of the forces at play in globalization.

36â•‡â•‡P. Ernest
GLOBALIZATION AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
One of the defining characteristics of postmodernity is the dramatic

emergence of globalization across the domains of industry, commerce,
technology (including information and communication technologies),
culture, and education. Globalization is the social change brought about
by increased connectivity among societies and their elements, including
the merging and convergence of cultures. The principal means is the dra-
matic enhancement of transport and communication technologies used
to facilitate international cultural and economic exchange. This has led to
the formation of a “global village” (McLuhan, 1964), with closer contact
between different parts of the world, providing increasing possibilities of
personal exchange, mutual understanding, and friendship between “world
citizens,” which is especially notable and important in the worlds of educa-
tion and research.1
However, the principal driver is economic globalization. This consists
of the opening up of international markets and the freedom to trade in
them, and the multinational location of corporations controlling workers
in several countries and marketing products and services in many, possibly
other, countries (Hobsbawm, 1994). The outcome is the corresponding
erosion of national sovereignty in the economic sphere as profit-making
multinational or transnational corporations circumvent the bounds of
local laws and standards through moving their operations from country to
country. Reinforcing this principal driver is the promotion of the culture-
ideology of consumerism. In this the world media act as purveyors of the
“relatively undifferentiated mass of news, information, ideas, entertain-
ment, and popular culture to a rapidly expanding public, ultimately the
whole world” (Sklair, 2004, p. 74). This is at one and the same time one
of the major products for sale on international markets, and also the prin-
cipal component of the culture-ideology of consumerism that creates and
expands the markets. Thus globalization is often seen as global Westerniza-
tion (Sen, 2004).
A central dimension of globalization is the new role of knowledge, and
in particular its commodification and exploitation in the global knowl-
edge economy (Peters, 2002). The knowledge economy differs from the
traditional economy in that it is knowledge, rather than products or ser-
vices, that is treated as the primary saleable and exploitable commodity.
In addition to knowledge-products, human capital in the form of human
knowledge and competencies are the key component of value in a knowl-
edge economy and knowledge-based organizations. Through the focus
on knowledge, the use of appropriate technologies is able to diminish the
effect of geographical location (Skyrme, 2004).
Mathematics Education Ideologies and Globalizationâ•‡â•‡ 37
Both governments and corporations have become aware of the tremen-

dous power and profitability of knowledge and information. Knowledge is
not only power, as Francis Bacon (1597/1997) said, but is also money. Hence
the capitalist principles of ownership, investment, production, marketing,
and profit maximization have been utilized in the domain of knowledge.
The consequent application of business models and policies in this area
results in the increasingly tight control and hierarchical management of
knowledge. As capitalism colonizes the knowledge domain, and applies
the “science of production” to it, there has been a policy transfer into edu-
cation. “At international level there has emerged a coherent set of policy
themes and processes through which policy makers (at national, interna-
tional, and transnational) levels are reshaping education systems” (Ozga,
2005, p. 118). The traditional humanistic values of education policy have
been “replaced by a totalizing and unreflective business-oriented ideology
expressed through a discourse based on markets, targets, audits, “quality
performance,” and human resource management” (Avis, Bloomer, Esland,
& Hodkinson, 1996, p. 20).
The commodification of knowledge has led to performativity and mana-
gerialism in schools, universities, and throughout education and its policy
drivers and management. From this new perspective the success of educa-
tion is measured in terms of the achievement of numerical targets. The
value of teachers and academics is defined in terms of performance mea-
sures. Educational institutions and structures are managed as systems with
resource inputs and performance outputs. According to this system the
underlying values are those of efficiency, “value-for-money” and productiv-
ity, underpinned by the profit motive and its analogue, the maximization
of outputs. Teaching and research are viewed as mechanical processes, a
means to the end of producing knowledge and human capital.
From an ethical standpoint the transfer of the values of the corporate
world into education is deeply problematic. Bakan (2004) has described
the behavior of the corporation as psychopathic.
As a psychopathic creature, the corporation can neither recognise nor act

upon moral reasons to refrain from harming others. Nothing in its legal
makeup limits what it can do to others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and it is
compelled to cause harm when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
(Newton, 2004, p. 52)
Thus to apply the values and ethics of the corporation to social and human
undertakings, such as education and research, not to mention governance,
medicine and other professions whose ultimate focus is human well being,
is a travesty of their underlying purposes. While economics (money and its
equivalents) plays a part as a means of improving human well being, hap-
piness, social justice, and so forth, it should never become an end in itself
as it is in the corporate world. By applying the values of corporations and

institutions to human beings the incongruity and inappropriate nature of
these values for the world of human-centred concerns is highlighted.
At first glance the attribution of human psychological characteristics like
psychopathy to social and political entities seems far-fetched, even though
in law the corporation (named after its analogue, the body) is treated in
many ways like a person, with rights and responsibilities. However this
analogy goes back a long way: “by art is created that great Leviathan called
a commonwealth, or state, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man”
(Hobbes, 1651/1962, p. 59). Hobbes goes on to develop in some detail
the analogy between the powers and functions of the state and the human
body. More recently critical theorists of the Frankfurt school applied Freud-
ian and other concepts from depth psychology to modern society. Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinsion, and Sanford (1950) studied the origins of
fascism in the psychology of the authoritarian personality. Miller (1983)
locates it in the psychological damage resulting from abusive child-rearing
practices. Others, such as Marcuse (1964), continued to explore the psy-
chological roots of social organizations and ideologies, including some of
the pathologies of modern society, similar to the characterization of the
corporation as psychopathic. Anthropologists have also utilized the corre-
spondence between the psychological and the social. Douglas (1966) offers
a bold theoretical analogy between purity, ritual cleansing, and concern
with individual’s body boundaries and orifices, on the one hand, and social
group membership, structures, and group actions, on the other. In each
case these and other theorists (e.g., Lasch, 1984; Vygotsky, 1978) argue
for the existence of a strong relationship between characteristics on the
psychological plane and the social or group plane. There is controversy
over in which direction, if either, the causal links flow, although my own
view is that social and psychological characteristics are linked in an endless
mutually-constitutive cycle.
However, in the present context, the key point is the dramatic juxta-
position of, and contrast between, the values of corporations and social
groups on the macrolevel and the widely accepted personal values of caring
and connection on the microlevel, as they apply to personal behavior and
interpersonal relationships (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984). Foreground-
ing this contrast serves to emphasize the inappropriateness of applying a
business-oriented ideology with its knowledge commodification, perfor-
mativity, and managerialist values to education. The potential damage is
greater than simply the degradation of the employment conditions and
lives of educators, researchers, and knowledge workers, as bad as this might
be. By degrading the contexts and conditions of learning there is also the
risk of damage to the nurture and growth of children. Throughout their
years of education learners are vulnerable, but especially so in the early
years of schooling. At this stage much of the child’s basic social and moral
growth, is taking place, as well as the foundations for their overall intellec-
tual and identity development. Threats to the health of these areas could
have serious unanticpated negative consequences for society as well as for
the individuals involved. But to the corporate and materialist mentality
this is an irrelevant “externality,” Milton Friedman’s term for the external
effects of a transaction or activity on a third party or any other who is not
involved in the transaction (Newton, 2004). Unlike the military term “col-
lateral damage,” horrific as it might be, the term “externality” does not
even acknowledge the negativity of such incidental impacts or by-products.
The Knowledge Economy

and Mathematics Education
In this chapter my aim is to explore the relevance and impact of globaliza-

tion and the knowledge economy for research in mathematics education,
taking particular cognizance of the “developing” country perspective.2
Mathematics education is both a set of practices, encompassing mathemat-
ics teaching, teacher education, curriculum development, researching,
and research training, as well as a field of knowledge with its own terms,
concepts, problems, theories, subspecialisms, papers, journals, and books.
Likewise, educational research is both a process and a product. Looking
at these fields as processes and practices, since they are geographically
located and embodied in organized social activities, is more immediately
revealing of the role they play in the knowledge economy than starting
with the objectivized products of research, although the latter will rapidly
figure in my account too. My primary expertise lies in the area of math-
ematics education, but there are several aspects of the following account
that extend more widely to incorporate science and technology education
as well, and sometimes further afield, so I shall broaden my claims where
this seems appropriate.
There are a number of ways in which the effects of the global knowledge
economy impacts on mathematics, science, and technology education.
I have identified four main dimensions or areas of impact as follows,
although there may well be more. First of all, there is the export of uni-
versity education from Western countries to Eastern and “developing”
countries. Students are recruited internationally to engage in educational
study and research both through international franchising and distance
learning courses in their home countries, and through study at universi-
ties in the exporting countries. This is supported by scholarships financed
by the students’ countries of origin, by self-funding for those from wealthy
backgrounds, or less often, by grants from “developed” countries such as
Commonwealth Scholarships. The result is a net inflow of funds to “devel-

oped” countries (the asymmetric economic effect) and an inflow of knowledge
and expertise to “developing” countries. However, there are two subsidiary
effects, which I shall term the ideological and recruitment effects. The
ideological effect is the ideological orientation or saturation that accompa-
nies the flow of knowledge and expertise to “developing” countries. For
the intentional importation of knowledge, skills, expertise, and research
methodologies is always accompanied by a set of implicit values, together
with epistemological and ideological orientations. These may replace or
coexist with the recipient student’s own orientation, but cannot be wholly
rejected if the recipient is to be successful in acquiring and applying the
knowledge and expertise. The recruitment effect concerns the recruitment of
the most able personnel of “developing” countries to work for knowledge
organizations (academic or commercial) based in the “developed” coun-
tries, including what is traditionally known as the “brain drain.”
Second, there is the recruitment and mobility of educational researchers
and academics for employment, consultancy and research projects inter-
nationally. This includes the importation of expertise from the West or
“developed” countries in the form of permanent or fixed term contracted
staff, including researchers and project staff, as well as bought-in consul-
tants for the faculty of higher education institutions, acting as external
examiners, staff trainers, and so on. One outcome of this inflow of expertise
and knowledge to “developing” countries is the ideological effect noted
above, because overseas trained experts must, inescapably, bring their ide-
ological orientations with them. The movement of personnel also includes
visits by academic research staff funded from “developed” countries to
conduct research in “developing” countries. Such projects may be focused
on specific features of the local culture such as the gathering of ethnomath-
ematical field data, typical of research in the interpretative paradigm (e.g.,
Saxe, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991). They can also be focused on applying
some predetermined framework as in international assessment and com-
parative studies (e.g., SIMS, TIMSS, PISA) typical of scientific paradigm
research. In both of these types of research there is what I shall term the
appropriation effect. In this, locally gathered knowledge from “developing”
countries is appropriated for academic and other uses in “developed”
countries.3
Third, there is the international regulation (and promotion and mar-
keting) of the products of educational research via international bodies,
conferences, and associated publications, discussed further below. In math-
ematics education there are international coordinating bodies such as the
International Commission on Mathematical Instruction (2001) organizing
conferences and study projects, including the ICME, PME, HPM, IOWME
organizations and conferences, and independent series of conferences
(e.g., MES, ALM, CERME) bringing together researchers from many coun-
tries.4 These often make concerted attempts to include representation of
researchers from “developing” countries and hold conferences in such
locations as well. However, due to the underlying economic inequalities
and the high costs of international travel (as well as the institutional biases)
the representation from “developing” countries is limited. The number
of international conferences held in “developing” countries is also very
limited (ICME 11 in Mexico in 2008 will be the first in this series, and
only 10 per cent of the approximately 30 PME conferences to date have
been held in “developing” countries (Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa).
The locations are primarily chosen to suit the convenience of mathematics
education researchers in “developed” countries, who make up the largest
attendance group. Because of this location bias an outcome is another
instance of the asymmetric economic effect, the net inflow of funds to
“developed” countries.
There also is an increasing number of regional international conferences
such as in the Caribbean and Latin America, South East Asia (EARCOME),
and Southern Africa (SAARMSTE), organized and run primarily for
regional participants and benefits. However, these are internationally per-
ceived to be of second rank in importance, value and prestige.5 This is due
to what might be termed the dominance effect. Research and researchers from
the Northern and “developed” countries who communicate and publish in
English dominate the international research community in mathematics,
science, and technology education, in terms of both power and prestige.
Second in order of dominance come Northern and “developed” country
researchers who communicate and publish in other European languages,
for example French, German, and Spanish. Last come the researchers in
“developing” countries communicating and publishing in local, that is
non-European, languages.
Fourth, there is the primary source of the dominance effect, the inter-
national journals and other research publications in mathematics, science
and technology education. This research literature, which incorporates
the full range of academic publications including journals, texts, hand-
books, monographs, and web sources is largely based in Northern and
“developed” countries, and is largely Anglophone at the high prestige end.
Although journals, publishers, and conference committees reach out to
many countries for their editorial panels and members the locus of control
remains firmly Eurocentric. This leads to the intensification of the ideologi-
cal effect, as does the Eurocentricity of international research organizations
and conferences mentioned above. In addition, the research literature is
marketed internationally adding to the asymmetric economic effect, an
inflow of funds to “developed” countries. The high prestige end of the
research literature market is in many cases matched by high prices (e.g.,
the expensive Kluwer/Springer books), although prices are even higher

for some other scientific and medical publications. Some of the literature
originating in not-for-profit organizations, such as the Journal for Research
in Mathematics Education (United States) and For the Learning of Mathematics
(Canada), is sold at moderate prices by Western standards. Nevertheless,
it remains expensive for “developing” countries when the costs of foreign
currency conversion and international postage are included.
These four dimensions of the knowledge economy in mathematics,
science, and technology education combine to give an asymmetric set of
flows. The primary activity is that of the sale of knowledge and expertise
by “developed” to “developing” countries. This leads to the asymmet-
ric economic effect, the inflow of money from “developing” countries to
“developed” countries. This is no surprise as the knowledge economy is all
about the commodification and sale of knowledge. The role of “developed”
countries as the source of knowledge and expertise also leads to the domi-
nance effect, in which Western and “developed” countries dominate the
production and warranting of high value knowledge through control of the
high prestige publications and conferences and impose Eurocentric epis-
temologies, methodologies and standards on it in their gatekeeper roles.
It also leads to the ideological effect, whereby researchers in “developing”
countries are subject to and internalize the ideological and epistemologi-
cal presuppositions and values of this dominant research culture. For to
fail to do so is to be excluded from the high prestige channels for knowl-
edge publication and dissemination. A further outcome of the ideological
effect whereby researchers subscribe to Eurocentric research standards and
values, is the recruitment effect. This is the “brain drain,” the migration of
some of the most skilled researchers and knowledge workers from “devel-
oping” to “developed” countries. The acceptance of and admiration for
Western academic standards makes the temptation of improved personal
economic standing, as well as improved conditions of work and career
opportunities, almost irresistible.
One final asymmetry arises from the appropriation effect. This is where
“developed” country researchers capture local knowledge and make rep-
resentations of local practices and take this knowledge home with them.
There it is reconfigured in a high prestige way such that it has significant
value in the “academic market.” The career value of such data in fields
such as anthropology has long been a feature of the academic scene, and
this effect has also emerged in mathematics and science education in the
last two decades or so, with growing attention to ethnomathematics and
ethnoscience. International assessment and comparative data in educa-
tion is similarly imported, possibly after collection with local help, and is
a marketable and prestigious academic product in “developed” countries,

where it features in many leading research publications. It also has extra
value because it feeds into the managerialist mechanisms of education
policy and control. Governments and other agencies take international
comparison data as a key measure of performance and use it to evaluate
and judge educational systems (analogous to the role of economic indica-
tors). As an indicator of success in education it is a source of national pride
(or shame) and it is also selectively used in the media to influence political
and popular opinion.
Making space for the personal
In the above account I have used the voice of an impersonal structural

analyst to describe the role of the knowledge economy in the managerializa-
tion of education, and its role in the globalization and internationalization
of mathematics, science and technology education. Conducting an analysis
from this perspective reveals important imbalances and dimensions of
exploitation, but it obscures two features. The first is the agency, and at
times the resistance and countervailing intentions, of the actors in play.
Second, it is an outward gaze that hides the identity of the commenting
observer.
My structural analysis of the knowledge economy in education and edu-
cational research is painted in broad brush strokes that fail to show in fine
detail the varied roles, motivations and expressions of agency among the
individuals directly involved, as well as those on the sidelines. Ideological
orientations are by no means monolithic in any research culture, whether in
“developing” or “developed” countries. Educational practice and research
are primarily vocational undertakings which are usually motivated as
ends in themselves, dedicated to the improvement of education and the
enhancement of understanding, rather than driven by ulterior motives.
While most individuals combine the goals of contributing to education
and research with expectations of their own personal material and esteem
enhancement, it does not seem inappropriate that individuals should be
rewarded and recognized for their contributions, if they are not profiting
unduly or at others’ expense. Likewise, individuals involved in the frontline
of the knowledge economy, marketing higher education, and research to
“developing” countries, or cooperating at the receiving end, are entitled to
feel they are performing a useful and valuable function for all of the parties
concerned, provided, in my view, that this service is nonexploitative. This
raises the issue of how to characterize exploitation, and I suggest that some
of the criteria that might be used to distinguish useful from exploitative
aspects of the knowledge economy are as follows:
1. The service provided should be beneficial for the individuals in-

volved, such as learners, students, and local researchers.
2. The education and research activities should be undertaken in a
way that is cognizant of the local context of the recipient country
and should be suited or tailored to local needs and local percep-
tions of needs.
3. The provision should enhance self-reliance and economic and edu-
cational development in the recipient country.
4. The underlying economic arrangements should not be an excessive
drain on the resources of the recipient country.6
Of course the decision as to whether any particular knowledge provision

activity meets these conditions depends on the perceptions and values of
whoever is making the judgment. So no such justifications can be absolute
or even persuasive to everyone involved.
Likewise, educational researchers visiting “developed” countries and
collecting and taking local knowledge home with them need not be seen
as primarily exploitative. What I have described as the appropriation effect
can be motivated by the wish to seek recognition and prestige for culturally
embedded knowledge and practices for the benefit of both “developing”
and “developed” countries. The conceptualization and recognition of eth-
nomathematics, for example, contributes both to a positive revaluing of
culturally embedded modes of thinking and the reconceptualization of
mathematics as a less Eurocentric field of knowledge. It also provides a
set of multicultural resources for the teaching of mathematics to diverse
groups as a global resource.
The inclusion of a more representative set of researchers in the organiza-
tion and management of international research associations, conferences
and editorial boards, as well as among the contributors to conferences and
publications, need not be viewed merely as tokenism. It is beneficial because
it enables the voices and concerns of researchers from “developing” coun-
tries to be heard and for them to contribute to academic decision making
within the international community of researchers. This can broaden the
research agenda and also make research more accountable to the social
concerns of a broader range of constituents and stakeholders. In addition,
it can have an impact, albeit small in the first instance, in reducing the
dominance effect described above via the reduction of the knowledge and
expertise imbalance and the shifting or broadening of the underpinning
ideological orientations.
Countries whose participation in educational research is recent or on a
relatively small scale can gain and probably have already benefited from the
traditions and activities in “developed” countries, especially in mathematics,
science and technology. For many would regard educational research
as currently being in a healthy state worldwide. There are strong links

between theory and practice, and space is made for constructive dialogue
and critique. A wide variety of research methods and methodologies are
disseminated and legitimated worldwide. A broad range of issues including
social issues have been problematized as suitable topics and questions
for research. Furthermore, “developed” countries no longer control and
impose their research agendas and practices on “developing” countries
as they once did in the immediate postcolonial eras. Thus researchers in
mathematics, science and technology education in “developing” countries
are more epistemologically empowered, and increasingly set their own
research agendas, as this book illustrates in a modest way. They have more
space for resistance and critique, for intellectual self-determination and
autonomy, and increasingly have access to the necessary concepts and tools
for conducting high quality research. Some of this is home-grown, but
much of the knowledge, expertise, and epistemological self-confidence
originates through knowledge links with “developed” countries on a
personal, institutional or national scale.7
The second aspect of the personal I want to treat is my own identity
as a mathematics education researcher. This text does not issue from
some objective logical space or an idealized rational being. It is voiced by
an embodied and culturally situated human being. I, the author, am an
academic who has been permanently employed in a university in Great
Britain, a “developed” country and an excolonial power.8 My direct experi-
ence of “developing” countries is limited, comprising short visits to most
continents for academic work or leisure purposes, as well as a two year stint
as a locally employed academic in the Caribbean region (Jamaica) in the
early 1980s. Thus my intellectual outlook on the issues of globalization
and education, my “gaze,” is that of a “developed” country intellectual.
This position gives me the autonomy and the intellectual and material
freedom to consider, critique and theorize. But it also means that I do
not have the direct experience of oppression and the anger it kindles as
resources to sublimate into my intellectual work.9 My academic identity is
a result of enculturation into the practices, modes of thinking and presup-
positions of my Anglocentric cultural milieu. Presumably my gaze, voice,
and academic output of talks and writings are emanations and produc-
tions of my academic identity and underlying presuppositions. But, as we
have learned from poststructuralism, individuals have multiple identities
which are produced and elicited in different contexts (Henriques, Hol-
loway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). So the question of authenticity
arises: to what extent am I able to comment authentically on issues con-
cerning “developing” countries? There is also an ethical question: to what
extent is it morally legitimate for me, given my positioning, to comment
on issues concerning oppression, social justice, the problems of “develop-
ing” countries, and those of minorities or oppressed groups defined by sex,

race, class, or disability?
On the one hand, I can feel, in a miniature and fleeting way, through
the pan-human faculty of empathy, the pain of excluded and oppressed
peoples. I believe that all human morality is founded on the principle that
you and I are the same, and that but for luck your pain and suffering could
just as easily be mine. So I should help you overcome what I would not like
to experience myself. But on the other hand, is my academic work on social
issues part of the appropriation effect described above? Am I intellectu-
ally colonizing the problems and issues that belong to others for my own
academic benefit and enhanced cultural capital?
I reject these (self-directed) charges put in such stark terms. For my view
is that the problems of any oppressed group do not belong solely to that
group but are problems of humankind. Therefore the ethical issue is not
one of the ownership of social problems but that of their exploitation. If
academics like myself use social problems and issues in academic writing
for personal benefit without contributing in some direct or indirect way to
the clarification or solution of the problems, or to consciousness raising
about their existence, then this risks being exploitative.
This discussion raises again the interesting philosophical question of the
extent to which any individual’s epistemological and ideological outlook is
a function of their personal psychology, their upbringing, and their experi-
ence of the surrounding sociocultural milieu. From the perspective of social
constructivism and other perspectives including constructivism, depth psy-
chology, and anthropology, it is clear that an individual’s worldview is in
some sense a function or product of their experiences, both private (psy-
chological) and public (social/cultural). Thus, one can sometimes see links
between an individual’s experiences and their worldviews, and sometimes
also see the link between specific events and changes in their outlooks.
Actually the word “see” is a misleading metaphor here, because often it
will be biographical or autobiographical narratives that tell us about these
changes and their imputed causes. Valerie Walkerdine (Walkerdine & Lucey,
1989) has written about how being a woman of working class origins in the
context of her family background expectations meant that her academic
advancement and success was perceived as a greedy, hubristic overreaching
of herself, epitomized in the critical dictum “much wants more” frequently
thrown at her. She makes the point that her persistent internal anger at
this negation of her aspirations, and her related identity conflicts, help to
fire her critical academic work.
However, it is also clear that the “functionality” described is not mechan-
ically causal. Individual humans construct their own identities in complex,
unpredictable and ultimately not fully knowable ways, and their course of
(self)development may include qualitative changes in both consciousness
and outlook triggered internally by relatively small experiences. Womack

(1983) illustrates this when he describes how an interest in pursing a single
mathematics problem while a student in school led to success, teacher
encouragement, and the growth of a fascination with mathematics which
resulted ultimately in his choice of a career in mathematics education.
But others might well have responded differently, for there is no simple
causal link between experiences and personal outlook and identity. Fur-
thermore, as noted above, individuals do not end up, at any given moment,
with a single essential identity but construct multiple identities which are
produced and elicited in different contexts (Henriques et al., 1984). The
central issue is that the key intervening processes between the social context,
background, and experiences, and the personal identity and worldview of
an individual are the idiosyncratic meaning and interpretation functions
of that individual (Schütz, 1972). Identity formation is a recursive process,
whereby personal development at any given time depends on preced-
ing personal development. This provides an interpretative “lens” through
which all experiences are refracted and made sense of, which holistically
leads to further personal development and growth, including growth and
development of the interpretive lens itself.
With all these caveats, it remains possible to see (read) individuals whose
outlooks, worldviews and intellectual productions reflect their origins and
personal experiences, as well as others who transcend their origins. These
two descriptors can even apply to the same individual. In the present era of
globalized educational outcomes comprising marks and grades it is easy to
forget that one of the traditional aims of education is to facilitate and enable
people to transcend and overcome their origins. The German concept of
Bildung refers to the process of education as spiritual, intellectual, and
character formation, that is the growth, development, enhancement, and
fulfillment of an individual’s human potential through the experience of
education. From this perspective the main goal of education is to enable
the student to transcend the limited outlooks of their childhood and social
origins.
Dewey argues that a key purpose of education is to take “the child out
of his familiar physical environment, hardly more than a square mile or
so in area, into the wide world—yes, and even to the bounds of the solar
system. His little span of personal memory and tradition is overlaid with
the long centuries of the history of all peoples” (Golby, Greenwald, & West
1975, p. 151). Dewey uses geography and history as metaphors for the
boundedness of the child’s experience and understanding, limits imposed
by their origins, something that education should enable the child to tran-
scend. Another metaphor from my own childhood and adolescence spent
immersed in reading is that it allows one to see the world through a thou-
sand pairs of eyes. Books open up the life narratives of many others to
the reader, and good fictional narratives contain the lived truth of human
experience, as the interpretative research paradigm acknowledges (Ernest,
1994). In this respect I feel that literacy can potentially play a larger part in
Bildung than numeracy, although this latter undoubtedly has an important
part to play in the development of critical citizenship (Ernest, 1991, 2000;
Frankenstein, 1983).10
As a knowledge worker, I am not simply a researcher and writer. A key
dimension of my academic role, one that brings funds in more directly to
my employer, is that of teacher. I no longer teach children or train/educate
beginning teachers, which I did for more than 20 years. My primary role
now is to teach and supervise midcareer teachers and other education
professionals on masters and doctoral programmes, both doctor of edu-
cation (EdD) and doctor of philosophy (PhD). Since 1994 most of this
teaching and supervision has been distance learning based, both for British
and overseas students. A large part of this involves participation in the
global export of education, with my master’s and doctoral students spread
across the world, including North and South America, the Caribbean, the
Bahamas and Bermuda, mainland Europe, Africa, and the Middle and Far
East. Costs rarely permit the students travel to me, or me to travel to them,
so communication is by post, telephone, and currently mostly by electronic
means such as e-mail. I sit like a spider at the centre of a web disseminat-
ing knowledge of mathematics education and research methodologies and
methods. Initially, this takes the form of handbooks on selected central
themes in mathematics education.11 However, the transactional style I
employ is to elicit from the students a choice of research topics related to
their own professional context and then help them to refine, shape and
make feasible their own chosen areas of investigation. Then pairwise we
engage in an extended “conversation” as they conduct their research and
write up their reports. Both master’s and taught doctorate (EdD) students
have to work through smaller assignments, each self-selected and con-
ducted in this way, before extending their reach to a final larger study for
the dissertation or thesis. In addition, a part of the students’ developing
research skills is to identify an appropriate literature base themselves as is
needed for their specialist, self-chosen investigations.
In terms of content, students are exposed to an overview of themes in
mathematics education selected by me (with peer approval in the original
accreditation processes), as indicated above. However they explore self-
selected topics relevant to their own professional contexts and interests in
depth for their assignments, both empirically and in terms of the literature.
Thus they apply the theory they meet on the courses and in the literature
to their own professional practice. In terms of pedagogy, there is a com-
bination of exposition via the handbooks, and a negotiated self-directed
investigational style, as they pursue their own assignment topics. In terms
of assessment, students work in progress is formatively assessed and then

their completed research reports summatively assessed. The whole assess-
ment load is on the project reports which combine a learning and research
exercise with an assessment exercise.
In terms of the global knowledge economy, my teaching activities in
mathematics education contribute to a number of the dimensions iden-
tified above. First of all, through recruiting international students I am
exporting university education to both “developed” and “developing”
countries from the United Kingdom, contributing to the asymmetric eco-
nomic effect. Second, there is an accompanying ideological effect. For as
I have argued, the communication of knowledge, skills, expertise, and
research methodologies is accompanied by epistemological and ideologi-
cal presuppositions and values. This also reinforces the dominance effect,
because my language of instruction is English, and the vast preponderance
of papers, books, and researchers I cite are from the Europe and North
America. This communicates a Eurocentric view of mathematics educa-
tion research, which is further reinforced by the assessment standards and
procedures I apply. Here, of course, there are institutional checks and
balances at work, so that even if I tried to apply “rogue” anti-Eurocentric
assessment standards, whatever these might be, they would be challenged
and reformatted in the accepted mode.
It is possible to partially justify these practices, even if they sustain the
ideological and dominance effects, by an argument that can be applied
analogously to the goals of schooling. In school teaching it is necessary to
address society’s assessment targets to provide the basis for learner prog-
ress, both in terms of certification and applicable knowledge. Likewise,
education courses (in mathematics, science, and technology education)
need to provide both the accepted forms of certification (higher degrees)
and the high prestige knowledge and skills for expert professional func-
tioning and career progression.
This argument provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for the
selection of content for the programmes I teach. In addition to the brief
justification provided above with regard to the content, I would strongly
defend the importance of the skills targeted for development, including the
central one of criticality. Briefly, this is the ability to engage in the careful
formulation, analysis and evaluation of claims so that they are linked to an
evidential basis and a carefully reasoned argument or narrative. Wielded
knowledgeably, this skill enables students to make social and philosophi-
cal critiques and fosters their autonomy and independence of thought.
Indeed, it is a central element of critical citizenship (Ernest, 1991, 2000;
Frankenstein, 1983). This, together with other skills involved in research,
is central to those elements of Western academic values that I would wish
to defend. However, there are further covert values and epistemological
assumptions making up the ideological effect, which I analyze more closely

and critique in the next section.
However, before moving on to this I feel I ought to account for my own
critical “gaze” and research methodology. I have argued that as a situated
“developed” world academic I have been enculturated into one of the dom-
inant research ideologies, which in my case is critical academic liberalism.
This is reflected in my choice of teaching topics and emphasis on guided
autonomy and criticality as aims and values in my teaching. But this does
not reveal the sources of my research methodology and methods. For this
I need to give a brief account of my intellectual development.
I was trained in mathematics, logic, and philosophy, especially the phi-
losophy of mathematics. However, to make a living I became an untrained
secondary school teacher and then teacher trainer in the area of math-
ematics. Through these practices I became enculturated into the worlds
of mathematics teaching and later mathematics education. Initially my
research as a mathematics educator was on pedagogical issues, the primary
problematic issues for teaching and teacher education. However, it was not
very long before I realized that my intellectual resources as a philosopher of
mathematics were applicable to mathematics education. At first I strove to
find direct links between the philosophy of mathematics and mathematics
teaching (Ernest, 1985). But in pursuing these ideas more deeply I was led
into considering the implicit philosophies of teachers (their beliefs and
belief systems) and those underpinning mathematics curricula (their covert
ideologies and epistemologies) (Ernest, 1991). The research methods I
used were to look beneath the surface of teachers’ actions and utterances
for deeper meanings, and likewise to analyze curriculum texts for indica-
tors of their covert values, ideologies, and epistemologies. This has led to
my characteristic research methods and methodology, namely to analyze
texts of different kinds for covert meanings, somewhat in the style of liter-
ary criticism. This is the method that underpins my claims to discern covert
ideologies and values in varying domains of mathematics education, such
as in this chapter.
Of course this research methodology is risky. It depends in part on my
personal intuition and discernment, and is hard to validate empirically. But
my research does not rely solely on my powers of discernment. Through
acquaintance with a broad range of literatures across the sciences, social
sciences, humanities, and arts I am able to apply a variety of concepts and
methods of analysis that are novel or less frequently used in mathematics
education research. To strengthen my claims I utilize this literature to cite
supporting insights, theories, and analyses. Beyond this I rely on the criti-
cal judgment of colleagues and referees to help me distinguish between
analyses worth pursuing and those that are commonplace or unconvincing.
Ideology and Educational Research
In this section I want to explore some of the main ideological components

of educational research, primarily in mathematics education (but also in
science and technology education), that are at play in the ideological and
dominance effects discussed above. There are four main components I
shall discuss. These are the commodification of knowledge and manageri-
alism, the idea of progress and progressivism, individualism, and the myth
of universal academic standards in educational research.
The commodification and

fetishization of knowledge
In order to analyze its role in the knowledge economy it is necessary to look

more closely at the concept of knowledge. To philosophers, knowledge is
justified true belief, although further subtleties and caveats are required for
a definition that would satisfy them. Beliefs are held by people but philoso-
phy mostly concerns itself with propositional knowledge, that is knowledge
that can be represented sententially as a sequence of propositions. From
this disembodied perspective, knowledge consists of justified claims. To
social scientists and educational researchers, beliefs are more than claims.
It is not just that beliefs are located in individuals or groups, as opposed to
being impersonalized expressions of claims. Rather it is that to hold beliefs
is to be committed, to a greater or lesser extent, to their contents. Beliefs
are representations of information in the form of assertions or claims to
which persons have some commitment or ownership. This brings in the
basic “stuff ” of knowledge, namely information. Information consists of
signs or semiotic expressions, some of which are in the form of representa-
tions or models of elements of external or experienced reality, thus having
a modeling function. However, some information, although still represen-
tational, consists of signs at play in a semiotic field.12 This includes all of
the various media used for communication and entertainment.
Thus there is a hierarchy of forms of “knowledge.” At the bottom level
is plain information, which is the raw product of the knowledge economy.
At the next level are beliefs which are more than information because there
is commitment or ownership. At the top level is knowledge in the strict
sense, comprising justified beliefs or claims. The ascent of these levels
typically adds value or represents added value in the knowledge economy,
for information is used to build beliefs (e.g., through advertising), and
complex and expensive research procedures are used to validate claims
(e.g., in medical research).
There is one further form of knowledge, embodied or tacit knowl-

edge that is held by persons individually or situated in social practices.
This includes all the various forms of professional expertise and skill that
persons develop through their practices. Evidently, skilled personnel with
this type of knowledge are an important part of the resources involved in
the knowledge economy. Such humanly embodied knowledge, or to put it
better—knowledge production or knowing capacities—are very important
in the social use and functions of knowledge, even if backgrounded and
neglected in traditional epistemology.
In any discussion of knowledge it must be acknowledged that there are
opposed and competing epistemologies at play, which I shall characterize
as modernist and postmodernist. Modernist philosophical perspectives
see knowledge as objective, abstract, depersonalized, value-neutral and
unproblematically transferable between persons and groups. Such perspec-
tives are central to much of modern epistemology and since the time of
Descartes, and can be traced back to Plato. This epistemology serves the
knowledge economy well in one central respect, for it supports the view
that knowledge can be disembedded from its contexts of production and
is readily transferable and marketable as a commodity. It also supports the
notion that the research methodologies and standards employed in math-
ematics, science and technology education are universal and applicable
across the world, irrespective of their origins. This helps to support the
domination effect discussed above.
The objectification and commodification of knowledge that follows from
the modernist epistemology and is necessitated by the knowledge economy
that exploits it, reflects a set of values. These valorize the measurable
outputs of knowing over those that are less easily measured. They pri-
oritize knowledge products over knowing processes, the cognitive domain
over the affective domain, and value knowledge and the intellect over
feeling and being. From the point of view of the knowledge economy, this
is perceived to be necessary. But from the perspective of education, this is
much more problematic. Both perspectives see knowledge as a means to
an end, but these ends are very different. The knowledge economy aims at
profit, whereas education aims at social and personal growth and develop-
ment, and objectivized indicators of this should not overpower, dominate
or replace what they are meant to stand for.13
Where do these values come from? During modernity, the scientific
worldview has come to dominate the shared conceptions widely held in
society and by the individual. This worldview prioritizes what are perceived
as objective, tangible, real, and factual over the subjective, imaginary or
experienced reality, and over values, beliefs, and feelings. This perspec-
tive rests on a Newtonian-realist worldview, etched deep into the public
consciousness as an underpinning “root metaphor” (Pepper, 1948), even
though the modern science of relativity and quantum theory shows it to

be scientifically untenable. In postmodernity this viewpoint has devel-
oped further, and a new “root metaphor” has come to dominate, namely
that of the accountant’s balance-sheet. From this perspective the ultimate
reality is the world of finance, that is, money, and other related measur-
able quantities. In particular, knowledge is commodified and fetishized as
a quantifiable and marketable entity. It is no longer seen as indissolubly
tied in with human knowing. Thus in education and research it is the hard
measurable outputs that are valued, not the softer processes and human
dimensions of knowing.
Elements of this critique of the values of modernity are well antici-
pated in the work of Marcuse (1964), Young (1979), Skovsmose (1994),
and Restivo, Van Bendegem, and Fischer (1993). The way the balance-
sheet model and its associated mechanisms work is as follows. Much of
the working of modern society is regulated by deeply embedded complex
mathematized systems, including taxation, welfare benefits, industrial,
agricultural, and educational financing, the stock markets, banking, and so
forth. Such systems are automated and carry out complex tasks of informa-
tion capture, policy implementation, and resource allocation. Niss (1983)
named this the “formatting power” of mathematics and Skovsmose (1994)
terms such socially embedded systems “realized abstractions.” The point is
that complex mathematics is used to regulate many aspects of our lives, with
very little human scrutiny and intervention, once the systems are in place.
Although mathematics provides the language for these systems, the
overt role of academic mathematics in this state of affairs, that is, that which
we recognize as mathematics per se, is minimal. It is management science,
information technology applications, accountancy, actuarial studies, eco-
nomics, and so forth, which are the sources for and inform this massive
mathematization on the social scale. Underpinning this, at both the soci-
etal and individual levels, is the balance-sheet metaphor, for economic or
market value is the common unit in which virtually all of the activities and
products of contemporary life are measured and regulated.
There are two overall effects. First, most of contemporary industrial-
ized society is regulated and subject to surveillance by embedded and
part-hidden complex mathematical-based systems (“black boxes”). These
are automated through the penetration of computers and information
technology into all levels of industry, commerce, bureaucracy, institutional
regulation, and more generally, society. The computer penetration of
society is only possible because the politicians’, bureaucrats’, and business
managers’ systems of exchange, government, control, and surveillance
were already quantified and in place before the information technology
revolution. Knowledge already had a central use in controlling society and
the population (Foucault, 1976).
Second, individuals’ conceptualizations of their lives and the world

about them employs a highly quantified framework. The requirement for
efficient workers and employees to regulate material production profit-
ably has necessitated the structuring and control of space and time, and
for workers’ self-identities to be constructed and constituted through this
structured space-time-economics frame (Foucault, 1970, 1976). We under-
stand our lives through the conceptual meshes of the clock, calendar, work
timetables, travel plans, finance, and currencies, insurance, pensions, tax,
measurements, graphical, and geometric representations, and so forth.
This conceptual framework positions individuals as regulated subjects
and workers in an information controlling society/state, as consumers in
postmodern consumerist society, and as beings in a quantified universe.
Knowledge frameworks are now inscribed into our very beings, rewrit-
ing our subjectivities and our existential selves. What we have seen in the
past 25 years is the growth and tightening of these nets to encompass
professionals, first teachers and civil servants, then doctors, lawyers, and
academics.
The commodification and fetishization of knowledge, and performativ-
ity and managerialism throughout education and employment in general,
are just some of the products of these ideological shifts. They also have
profound implications for the nature and processes of education. For the
commodified view of knowledge entails that it can be disembedded from
its cultural context and conveyed without loss of meaning. But to assume
that signs and knowledge tokens carry their own full meanings with them
has damaging consequences for education, where transmission models of
teaching presume that knowledge can be “handed over” or “delivered” to
learners (Seeger & Steinbring, 1992). The power of constructivist learn-
ing theories in education is that they acknowledge that individuals must
recreate meanings afresh, based on their idiosyncratic preexisting meaning
structures and experiences (Steffe & Gale, 1995).
Postmodernist epistemologies extend these insights and embrace the
multiplicity of coexisting meanings, perspectives, and systems. Knowledge
is viewed as socially and culturally embedded, value-laden, and not trans-
ferable across contexts without significant transformations and shifts in
meaning. Explicitly represented knowledge is understood semiotically in
terms of signs and texts that draw upon the meanings historically formed
and owned by groups and individuals. As signs travel there will often be
shared or preserved elements of meaning, depending on the proximity
and interactions of the donor and recipient cultures, but there will also
always be differences and nuances of interpretation. To create readings or
interpretations of signs requires persons to invoke and marshal their own
meanings, understandings, and interpreted experiences.
Just as postmodernist epistemologies see the meaning of information as

located in cultures, so too is the commitment to and ownership of beliefs;
and the validation of knowledge claims depending on communities of
knowers and researchers. Likewise, the value of experts and knowledge
workers will depend on their role and positions within knowledge-oriented
institutions and projects. Gibbons et al. (1994) describe the production of
knowledge in postmodernity as falling into two modes. Mode 1 knowl-
edge production comes from a disciplinary community and its outcomes
are those intellectual products produced and consumed inside traditional
research-oriented universities. The legitimacy of such knowledge is deter-
mined by the university, the academics working within the knowledge area,
and the academic journals that disseminate the knowledge. Typically aca-
demic research in mathematics, science, and technology education would
fall in this category.
In contrast, Mode 2 knowledge is the identification and solution of prac-
tical problems in the day-to-day life of its practitioners and organizations,
rather than centering on the academic interests of a discipline or commu-
nity. Mode 2 knowledge is characterized by a set of attributes concerned
with problem-solving around a particular application and context.
1. The different knowledge and skills of the practitioners are drawn

together solely for the purpose of solving a socially (including
industrial, commercial, and technological) motivated problem, and
hence are integrated and transdisciplinary rather than restricted to
single academic discipline or area of study.
2. The trajectory follows the problem-solving activity, and the context,
conditions, and even the research team may change over time ac-
cording to the course of the project.
3. Knowledge production is carried out in an extensive range of
formal and informal organizations including but extending well
beyond universities.
4. The focus on socially motivated problems means there is social ac-
countability and reflexivity built in from the outset of the project.
The key point made by Gibbons et al. (1994) is that the “know how”
generated by Mode 2 practices is neither superior to nor inferior to Mode
1 university-based knowledge, it is simply different. As well as different
projects, there are different sets of intellectual and social practices required
by Mode 2 participation compared with those likely to emerge in Mode 1
knowledge production.
Mode 2 knowledge production may be newly recognized in postmodernity,
although it has antecedents stretching as least as far back as Aristotle’s
(1953) recognition of Techne (applied or technological knowledge). Its
recognition is a central part of postmodern epistemology (Lyotard, 1984;

Rorty, 1979). However, it is also a central part of the new knowledge
economy where knowledge and experts are classified in terms of their
functionality and marketability, rather than their foundational basis and
disciplinary categorization. In this sense the global knowledge economy
is postmodern. For in the knowledge economy one feature stands out:
the marketability of knowledge is the prime factor, and this marketability
does not discriminate between different forms of knowledge except in
terms of value, price, and ease of sale. From this perspective there is no
discrimination between the qualitative results of interpretative paradigm
research and the hard quantitative results of scientific paradigm research
except insofar as it affects price and marketability. For example, since the
1990s politicians have utilized the qualitative results of focus group research
to evaluate the impact of policies, just as they have used the quantitative
results of survey research for a much longer period. The market is neutral
to qualities such as these except according to how it impacts on economics.
But having said this, as is indicated above, marketability has a profound
impact on what types of knowledge are valued.
Thus ironically, postmodern epistemology does not provide a concep-
tualization of knowledge that leads it way from the knowledge economy.
Instead it delivers it directly to the marketplace. However, there are ways of
using the reconceptualization of knowledge to offer a more democratic and
socially responsive approach to research in education. For example, the
Mode 2 knowledge production category provides a useful way of describ-
ing “bottom up” projects initiated by teachers, activists, and or concerned
citizens. Examples can include environmental or antiglobalization activi-
ties (e.g., Klein, 2000), peoples’ education movements (e.g., Freire, 1972;
School of Barbiana, 1970) and the development of ethnomathematical and
multicultural materials for teachers (e.g., Mathematical Association, 1988;
Wiltshire Education Authority, 1987). Such projects can follow from what
Habermas (1971) characterizes as the critical interest, namely, the desire
to change society for the better.14 This provides the basis for the critical-
theoretic paradigm in educational research, the central feature of which is
the desire not just to understand or to find out, but to engage in social cri-
tique and to improve or reform aspects of social life. Thus it involves critical
action research on social institutions, and interventions aimed at social
reform and increasing social justice. In particular it aims at the emancipa-
tion, empowerment, and the development of critical consciousness among
the participants and the others targeted. What distinguishes this type of
research is that social and institutional change is primary and knowledge
is secondary. It is thus Mode 2 type knowledge production because it does
not seek primarily to satisfy academic standards, but to solve real problems.
The critical-theoretic paradigm is often associated with action research

among the “teacher-as-researcher” movement, with teachers working to
change their teaching or school situations to improve classroom learning
(Carr & Kemmis, 1988/1986). However, in my view such action research
balks too often at addressing social justice and oppression in society to fit
comfortably under the critical-theoretic paradigm. In contrast, activism by
environmentalist, antiglobalization, human rights, and gay rights organi-
zations may be a better fit. One of the most successful strategies of such
groups is to construct Mode 2 knowledge and deliver it to the media with
sufficient impact to sway public and political opinion, and thus to help initi-
ate social change.15 In education, Mode 2 knowledge production is typically
involved in development projects that prioritize social change and empow-
erment over publishable research. What characterizes such projects is the
deep commitment of the researchers and activists involved, who measure
their successes in terms of social changes and not in terms of knowledge
capture or production. Such approaches either reject the commodification
and fetishization of knowledge by the knowledge economy or subvert it in
order to pursue their own ends.
Progressivism and the Idea of Progress
Modernism originated with the philosophers of the seventeenth and eigh-

teenth century Enlightenment who believed in the ultimate power of reason
to reveal truth, and through rationality to advance society toward the “good
life.” This movement subscribed to the values that prioritize the cognitive
and intellectual over feeling and being discussed above. But it also led to a
further ideology, namely progressivism with its fetishization of the idea of
progress. Rational thought, it was believed, would solve all the problems
of life and lead to enlightened living and happiness for all. Reason and
knowledge especially in the areas of science and technology would provide
the means for this continued and continuous improvement.16 In the 19th
and 20th centuries many of the key theories that underpinned modern
thought were based on the idea and assumption of continual progress.
However another notion became entangled with this, namely that prog-
ress was automatic, and stemmed from the natural order of things as well
as from the application of conscious thought. Hegel and Marx’s theories
of history both assumed the inevitability of social progress, without the
application of reason. Darwin’s theory of evolution is underpinned by the
idea of biological progress, that is, the survival of the more “fit,” through
the elimination of the least “fit.” The Eugenics movement of the late the
nineteenth and early twentieth century believed in the perfectibility of the
human race through selective breeding.17 Educational and psychological
theorists including Herbart, Spencer and Piaget assumed that ontogenesis

and phylogenesis unfold in a sequence of stages, and that later phases are
in some measure more complete than or superior to earlier phases of this
development.
The problem with the idea of progress is that what is perceived in some
rational, scientific or technological way to be more developed is also seen
as superior to, or more complete than, the less developed. Thus rural or
tribal societies are deemed to be inferior to industrialized, technological or
urban societies. Such perceptions provided justifications for the conquest
and colonialization of many countries, for they were being enlightened;
being given knowledge to deliver them from their ignorance, their “unde-
veloped state.” These perceptions continue to provide a justification for the
exploitation of “developing” countries. These ideas also underpin racism,
which saw and continues to see the yellow or brown skinned peoples of
countries in the East or South as less “developed” and hence as inferior.18
Such conceptions persist in many overt and covert ways. The very terms
I have used, “developing” countries versus “developed” countries have
the unintended connotation that “developing” countries are inferior and
“developed” countries superior.19 After all, “developed” includes in its
meanings: to be further down the road of progress, and nearer to fulfill-
ment and perfection. Several of the effects I have identified above, such as
the domination and ideological effects serve to reinforce this fetishization
of progress and the implicit devaluation of “developing” countries in the
East and south. Some philosophers and social theorists have gone so far
as to announce “the end of history” and “the end of ideology,” a teleologi-
cal notion that human and social development were somehow destined to
reach the “final” state that we are reaching after the fall of communism,
dominated by global capitalism and Western ideology (Fukuyama, 1992).
But this “final state” with its fetishization of progress is far from perfect
(nor is it inevitable). The progress of rationality applied in society, tech-
nology and industry has led to a disregard for and despoliation of the
environment. The underlying Western model of the good life is that of
consumerism, where progress is measured in terms of the consumption and
acquisition of more material goods. Furthermore, consumerism depends
on “the myth of consumer inadequacy” according to which relief from this
state of inadequacy can only be obtained by purchases and further con-
sumption, and even this relief is only temporary (Collis, 1999).
Even in education we see constant innovation, with bigger and better
electronic resources (calculators, computers, data projectors, electronic
whiteboards, etc.) and the associated software, viewed as necessary but
year-on-year absorbing disproportionate financial resources.20 These tools
have undoubted benefits, but how often do we see a reasoned analysis of
their costs and benefits set against the possibility of more and better paid
teachers, books, broader forms of inservice training, and other education
resources?
Overall, one of the by products of progressivism and the fetishization of
the idea of progress is to overvalorize the products, position, and power of
the industrialized Western “developed” countries. This ideology views the
“developing” countries of the South and East as primitive and inferior. This
leads to a continuation and justification of the historically unequal relations
between the countries on the economic, cultural, and intellectual domains.
It leads to hubristic overvaluation of the educational and research tradi-
tions of the anglophone West and supports the ideological and dominance
effects identified above.
Individualism
One of developments of postmodernity has been a “social turn” in the

way many leading edge researchers conceptualize learning in mathemat-
ics, science, and technology education (Atweh, Forgasz, & Nebres, 2001;
Lerman, 2000). However for all of this utilization of social concepts in
educational theories, the dominant ideology of research in the “developed”
countries of the North remains firmly individualistic. Educational research-
ers typically choose their own personal research specialism and style, and
work individually, on projects of personal preference. They may form tem-
porary alliances or research groupings, but these usually have their own
stratified hierarchy from principal researcher to research assistant, with
their own incipient individualism. In addition, educational researchers’
careers are generally concerned with competing and being rewarded indi-
vidually on high status written output, not on any social impacts or other
measures that might be valued more highly outside of the academic world.
Most educational researchers are positioned somewhere along a scale
that encompasses teachers researching for a higher degree, teacher edu-
cators conducting research, and university researchers teaching and
supervising others’ research. In each case the person’s main function is
as a teacher or supervisor, so that pursuing their own individual research
interests is a subsidiary rather than their main breadwinning activity, even
if they are evaluated on their research performance. Alongside this major-
ity activity there also exists a parallel career course for contract researchers
who work on funded projects full time. However, this second string of
research workers is a much smaller group, and most of the researchers
involved work on projects initiated by government or other agencies, or
in a minority of cases, projects initiated by the principal researchers them-
selves, but constrained by the requirements of the funding agencies.
Thus in education research agendas are primarily set by researchers

themselves, albeit with some accountability to their employers. But this is
usually for the quantity and quality of their research output, and not for
its content. Thus the dominant aim of researchers in mathematics, science
and technology education in countries of the North is to satisfy themselves
and their peers. This is a manifestation of individualism, in which individu-
als pursue their own agendas semiautonomously, competing for rewards
and esteem.
I should make it clear that I am both a willing participant in, and a ben-
eficiary of, this system. I am able to pursue whatever writing and research
projects take my fancy, and provided that my output is held in esteem by
local and international peers, I am rewarded by my employing university
for my efforts. Furthermore, I have and would strongly resist any attempts
to control or direct my research efforts, because of my strong desire to
pursue my own interests, preferences and research agendas. Thus in my
own professional life I am a product and supporter of an individualistic
work pattern. I like to think that the research directions I pursue, mostly
philosophical and theoretical, are the best deployment of my skills and
talents. Nevertheless, I feel no compulsion to address what some might
see to be the most compelling problems or useful issues that concern the
teaching and learning of mathematics in my region or country. I make no
claim to be exempt from the ideology of individualism, indeed it is deeply
inscribed in my personal and professional being.
Despite the so-called “social turn” in some researchers’ conceptualiza-
tion of learning, constructivism remains the leading theory of learning
among education professionals. This sees students as knowing subjects who
are individual sense-makers; who understand the classroom and contexts
independently; who have isolated and independent inner lives of thought,
which emerge into the outer public arena as speech or actions. This view
of the knowing subject is an expression of the both of the ideologies of
individualism and educational progressivism (Ernest, 1991). But there are
major weaknesses in this position.
First of all, there is the sentimentalization of the knower. Knowing is not
always the sweet sense making of untrammeled reason and intelligence
that modernism and progressivism would like to portray. Knowing is also
about fighting for psychic survival in the face of emotional and other forms
of threat, it is about interpreting hidden coercive meanings underlying
the literal spoken word of a teacher or another. Knowing is about deviant
scheming to compensate for personally sensed deprivations or inadequa-
cies. Knowing is about the desire for forbidden objects of gratification
approached covertly under a patina of acceptable behavior and discourse.
Knowing is in the mind of the eagle as it sights and takes its prey. Knowing
and the knowing subject should not be sentimentalized.
A second area of weaknesses concerns the politics of education. A focus

on the activities and immediate surrounding context of the knowing subject
ignores structural inequalities in terms of class, gender, race, and so forth.
It ignores the dominant ideologies of schooling. Ultimately it also ignores
the fact that the main obstacle to individual sense-making and self-realiza-
tion is the active opposition to the political empowerment of the learner as
a democratic citizen by most forms of institutionalized education.
Third, there are theoretical weaknesses with an individualistic form
of constructivism, as well as with other philosophies that prioritize the
individual over the social. The Western ideology of individualism that char-
acterizes modernity backgrounds the essentially social and communitarian
nature of humanity. But knowledge and indeed all forms of everyday life
and functioning could not exist without that quintessentially social con-
struction of humanity, language. While it may be possible to give a plausible
if superficial account of the knowing subject in individualistic terms, this is
not possible to do so to any depth for the feeling subject. For our feelings
are inescapably tied in with our interpersonal relations starting with our
parental/caregiver experiences. Our biological beginnings are within the
body of another, and our development into persons can only be fulfilled
through mutual loving relations with others. We are not isolated and self-
contained individuals but social beings that are part of communities and
indeed are formed through our very sociality.
Both the emphasis on individual choice for researchers and the indi-
vidual as the essential unit for the conceptualization of education, are
expressions of the ideology of individualism. This has long dominated
Western thought, and is emerging most sharply in the “free market” or
“market-place” metaphors of recent social policy. The dominant ideology
of individualism is based on a model of the individual as an isolated ratio-
nal being with an independent perception of reality, and which acts on the
basis of its own rational analysis and thought. This model emerged in the
17th and 18th century enlightenment and is epitomized most starkly in
Leibniz’s Monadology, a philosophy of independent and unrelated coexist-
ing entities. In addition, the values of liberty and freedom have been much
vaunted from the days preceding the French Revolution to the current
temporary world domination by one superpower, the United States of
America. These forground and valorize not only the meaning of freedom as
liberation from oppression, but also the meaning of freedom as being free
from social constraints and responsibilities. Admittedly this latter freedom
of individual action has limits in the relevant legal framework. However,
freedom in this sense, expressed in the actions of corporations on the
global scale, is able to circumvent and manipulate many of the laws and
limits to actions experienced by individuals nationally.
Individualism combined with the workings of the “free market” provides

the basis for the ideology of consumerism. This sees human beings as
agents in the material world working, accumulating and expending
wealth, and owning and consuming material products and “experiences.”
Although a small minority of concerned and principled citizens in Western
industrialized countries try not to participate in this globalizing universe
of consumption, most, like myself, have consumerism inscribed deeply
within our subjectivity.21 We enjoy the benefits of modern industrialized
society including almost unlimited access to power, heat, water, housing,
transportation, material possessions, electronic appliances, media
products, shopping, food, and other luxury goods and experiences. In
the postmodern era, Descartes’ cogito, “I think therefore I am,” the dictum
which helped initiate the modernist era of individualism, has been replaced
by “I shop therefore I am,” as the artist Barbara Kruger vividly expresses it
(Baudrillard, 1988). “One’s body, clothes, speech, leisure pastimes, eating
and drinking preferences, home, car, choice of holidays, and so forth, are
to be regarded as indicators of individuality of taste and sense of style of
the owner/consumer” (Featherstone, 1991, p. 83).
However, the ethos of consumerism and many of the products involved
embody values that conflict with those of a range of cultures and creeds
located in countries around the globe. For example, the increasing sexu-
alization of popular music, fashions in clothing, visual media, and indeed
childhood, is unacceptable to many cultures valuing modesty, including
some subcultures in the Western world. The social construction of persons
as consumers through such influences is also problematized by nontradi-
tional critical perspectives as well, which see their impact on subjectivity
and personal identity as negative. Furthermore, consumerism is not sus-
tainable, for not all world citizens can consume resources as wastefully
as Western consumerism requires, which is already a major cause of the
current environmental and ecological problems.
McBride (1994) has offered a powerful critique of how individualism is
the hidden ideology of much of modern school mathematics. She argues
how the emphasis on individual choice, and on mathematics as underpin-
ning rational choice, permeates school mathematics texts, and represents
a perspective whose strategy is to deny or conceal the historical, social,
cultural, political nexus in which all knowledge making and practices take
place. Thus even school mathematics is complicit in promoting and sus-
taining the ideologies of individualism and consumerism.
From the perspective of research, there are alternate ways of conceptual-
izing the issues. In a country with severe social problems, or a serious lack
of resources, or both, in short, a “developing” country, it can be argued
that solving social problems is far more urgent than satisfying individu-
alistic researchers. One answer to the problem of how to evolve a new

style of researching in mathematics, science and technology education in a
“developing” country, is to work in coordinated research teams on shared
problems of social significance. Rather than let an individualistic ideology
drive research and education, resources can be directed at teams working
on socially relevant research projects. This should take research projects
closer to the critical research paradigm. For the critical research has the
virtue of being concerned to improve some aspects of the social context,
situation or institutions. Although most educational research is concerned
to improve schooling indirectly, critical paradigm research has the advan-
tage of specifying this goal up-front, and not being concerned to try to
leave the situation being investigated undisturbed.
The disadvantage is that there are often hidden institutional sources of
resistance to change, such as teacher and pupil ideologies, institutional
structures, and so on, which may prevent the desired progress. If there is
no progress, and there is little of the validated knowledge that research in
the other two dominant educational paradigms seek to find, then there
may be no worthwhile outcome for the energy and time invested. However,
if social change and improvement is the overwhelming goal, then this is a
gamble worth taking.
Despite the widespread ideology of individualism, the “social turn” in
research in mathematics, science, and technology education (Atweh et
al., 2001; Lerman, 2000) has done more than focus on social theories
of the teaching and learning. It has also foregrounded ethical, cultural
and political dimensions of educational research in a way unheard of two
decades ago. In mathematics education, conference series on the Political
Dimensions of Mathematics Education and Mathematics, Education and
Society, and on Ethnomathematics are regular features of the interna-
tional research scene. These have legitimated the prioritization of social
justice issues and research and education for social change, and provided
vehicles for the politicization of a generation of younger researchers. Thus
revealing ideological dimensions of research in mathematics, science and
technology education does not serve to validate individualism but to prob-
lematize it and other hidden assumptions and values.
The myth of universal academic standards in

educational research
In postmodernity, one of the main currents of thought is “incredulity toward

metanarratives,” a critique of universalist explanatory frameworks or epis-
temologies (Lyotard, 1984). A suitable case for treatment in this respect is
the myth of universal academic standards in educational research, espe-
cially in mathematics education. In this area the received view is that there
are universal, reliable and consistent academic research standards applied
at the highest levels, and that all of the leading refereed international
journals and international conferences in education subscribe to and apply
the same standards of rigor in the evaluation of submitted papers. I shall
challenge this and label it a myth. It is a myth which helps foster unity and
integration in the international research community, but it also sustains the
domination and ideological effects discussed above.
There are, of course, dissenting voices. Most notable among these are
researchers who label themselves as postmodernist, such as Patti Lather:
Postmodernity “is a time of the confrontation of the lust for absolutes, [to]
produce an awareness of the complexity, historical contingency, and fragil-
ity of the practices we invent to discover the truth about ourselves.” (Lather,
1992, p. 88). “Positivism is not dead. What is dead, however, is its theoretic
dominance and its “one best way” claims over empirical work in the human
sciences” (Lather, 1992, p. 90). Gergen (1999) and Denzin (1997) have
referred to the “legitimation crisis” following the rejection the absolute
authority of science whose standards and epistemological modus operandi
other disciplines have to aspire to and emulate. Donmoyer (1996, p. 19)
writes about the problems of taking over the editorship of an international
educational research journal and observes: “There is little consensus in the
field about what research is and what scholarly discourse should look like.”
It is worth noting that a similar received universalist view also prevails
among researchers in mathematics, although a growing minority of math-
ematicians, philosophers and social researchers reject this as a myth. Those
supporting the view that there are universal academic standards in math-
ematics often argue that mathematical papers present new mathematical
truths and their warrants, usually in the form of proofs. Since mathematical
truths are absolute and universal, they claim, so too are the standards for
truth. Those arguing against this universalist view point to the historically
shifting and incomplete standards of proof and truth in mathematics. Some
also argue that mathematical truths, like the concepts of mathematics, are
social constructions (Ernest, 1998; Hersh, 1999; Tymoczko, 1986). Without
reiterating the complex arguments for and against these positions, the
point I wish to make is that even in mathematics, where claims to truth and
objective standards for the validity of knowledge are perhaps the strongest
in all fields of enquiry, there is fierce controversy over their universality.
Hence the claims for the universality of standards in mathematics educa-
tion must be that much weaker.
In order to question their claimed universality it is helpful to ask what
academic standards in educational research might be, and which aspects
of research reports they foreground and evaluate. To this end I shall dis-
tinguish three features of academic papers relevant to acceptance: their
content, knowledge production strategies, and textual features. In addition, the

social and organizational features of the refereeing process are also likely to
impact on the judgments made. Further features could be distinguished
but these enable some of the most salient points to be discussed.
A wide range of criteria are used for judging research papers. For
example, a typical detailed scheme includes the following ten evaluation
criteria:
1. Significance of themes,
2. Relevance of themes,
3. Clarity of thematic focus,
4. Relationship to literature,
5. Research design and data,
6. Data analysis and use of data,
7. Use of theory,
8. Critical qualities,
9. Clarity of conclusions,
10. Quality of communication (Learning Conference, 2005).
Using specific criteria shapes the evaluation of papers but it cannot elimi-
nate the subjective, situated element in the judgments. Such a practice
merely provides a structure, distributing the application of subjectivity
over a range of prespecified categories. All evaluative judgments applied
to creative knowledge productions depend on the experience and expertise
of the referee, acquired in the social practices of evaluation, but exercised
through the application of individual agency. Even then “your colleagues
are there too, looking over your shoulder, as it were, representing for you
your sense of accountability to the professional standards of your com-
munity” (Wenger, 1998, p. 57). Final judgments as to the acceptability of
a paper are made by editors or committees, who coordinate several such
reports and apply further procedures in cases of disagreement. Thus ulti-
mately the rulings are intersubjective and socially constructed, building on
the subjective judgments of experts but also transcending them through
social agreement.
1. The content of a paper includes the particular theme or topic area
treated and the subdomains of enquiry explored or interrogated by the
research questions and objectives. It also includes the theories used, the link
to base disciplines and the interdisciplinarity of the inquiry. All academic
disciplines and fields of study, including research in mathematics education,
can be expected to shift their boundaries and contents to some extent
over time. This will naturally impact on judgments of appropriateness and
relevance of submissions, and thus will affect the standards applied as well
as which research community is called on to make such judgments.
For example, the International PME Group organizes annually what

is widely recognized as the leading international research conference in
mathematics education.22 Each year an international committee includ-
ing local organizers is constituted to select papers for presentation at the
international venue chosen for that year. In 1989 the Paris conference com-
mittee rejected all papers on teacher beliefs as not being relevant to the
field of psychology of mathematics education. This led to disquiet among
the delegate membership because this topic area was an emerging subfield
which now is a major strand of research in the domain. From 1990 (and
before 1989) such papers have been accepted, provided they passed the
same “quality threshold” procedures as other papers. This demonstrates
graphically that judgments of relevance to the subfield are variable.
A rejoinder might be that quality judgments need not be affected by the
relevance issue. However, in my view such judgments cannot be separated
completely from issues of quality, since acceptability can only be based on
the knowledge and experience of the gatekeepers. As Kuhn (1970) has
argued for the physical sciences, knowledge of a field depends on famil-
iarity with a range of paradigmatic examples, such as papers, arguments,
applications of methods, and problem solutions. So referees making judg-
ments about new examples beyond their range of familiarity might well be
influenced by their willingness to accept novelty. They are required to make
a creative act of evaluation which may vary from person to person. Referees
deeply entrenched in different external base disciplines (e.g., psychol-
ogy, mathematics, philosophy, sociology) might make different judgment
calls from each other, based on their experiences of these fields, as well as
from referees whose discipline is mathematics education. As Wenger (1998,
p. 254) points out: “At boundaries things can fall through the cracks—over-
looked or devalued because they are not part of any established regime of
accountability.”
Lerman (2003) analyzed changes within the field of mathematics educa-
tion by looking at the papers accepted for PME conferences, and papers
published in two of the leading research journals in mathematics education
JRME (Journal for Research in Mathematics Education) and ESM (Educational
Studies in Mathematics) over the past 15 years. Lerman and colleagues
(2002) found a shift in underlying theories and methodological bases over
the period in ESM research papers, with many more drawing on social
theories (social constructivism, Vygotsky, social interactionism, etc.). The
percentage of papers employing social theories rose from 9% in the early
years of the period to 34% in the later years. Lerman (2003) also notes that
since 1990 there has been a marked drop from 24 to 6% in the proportion
of purely “empirical” papers for PME that do not explicitly use theoretical
frameworks. Those that draw on the traditional areas of mathematics and
psychology have also diminished (by about 12% for papers in both PME
and ESM). Thus there are shifts in the subject area, as well as in the knowl-
edge demands on referees in making judgments.
2. The knowledge production strategies in a paper include the research meth-
odology and methods employed. In broad terms, three overall “families”
of knowledge production strategies might be distinguished, although finer
distinctions would also be revealing. Papers from within the interpretative
research tradition are typically exploratory, constructing an interpreta-
tion of the inferred meanings of the research subjects, as represented in
qualitative data. Papers from a scientific research perspective typically are
hypothetico-deductive, testing generalizations against data that is quanti-
tative or classified according to a preconceived framework, although they
may do this more or less formally. There are also theoretical, conceptual,
philosophical or critical papers which clarify concepts or reflect on theo-
ries, policies, and practices without presenting new empirical data. These
represent three subtraditions in social science research (Habermas, 1971)
and there are different criteria for judging the quality of papers in each of
them. Furthermore, different referees will have different levels of experi-
ence and expertise in these different families and are likely to differ in their
judgment calls too. There have also been shifts in journal recognition and
acceptance of these three types too, and it is noted that over the past 15
years JRME “moves from an initial emphasis on quantitative to qualitative
… achieving a more balanced use of methods” (Lerman, 2003, p. 6).
It might be claimed that the same criteria are employed in making judg-
ments about research papers following all three paradigms. Gage (1989)
claims that the struggle for supremacy between their proponents, the
“Paradigm Wars,” are over. However, many authors argue that what is pre-
sented as consensus is in fact the domination of the field by proponents of
the modernist myth of the universality of research criteria (Denzin, 1997;
Gergen, 1999; Lather, 1991, 1992). Donmoyer (1996) questions whether
a consensus over research evaluation criteria exists. Anderson and Herr
(1999, p. 15) assert that the “New Paradigm Wars” are still being waged
and complain that “we can’t use current validity criteria to evaluate prac-
titioner research.” So differences in knowledge production methodologies
and research paradigms seem to provide a strong argument for rejecting
the myth of the universality of research evaluation criteria.
3. Textual features of the papers encompass the rhetorical dimension
including forms of argument and persuasiveness of the discourse and the
rigour of the reasoning, as well as the organiszation and presentation of
the text. The structure and organization of texts is the area that is most
susceptible to explicit prescription, and there are very detailed standard
guides available (American Psychological Association, 2001; University of
Chicago Press Staff, 2003). However, judgments concerning the rhetorical
dimension depends on how persuasive the reasoning is perceived to be by
referees, and the same arguments about the background and expertise of
referees rehearsed above apply here.
4. The social and organizational features of the refereeing process play
a constitutive role in the social construction of acceptance decisions, as
is also discussed above. For example, from the early 1990s PME confer-
ences required that full papers be submitted in January for the following
Summer’s conference. This was a shift from previous practice in which
only a one page abstract was required. Clearly different standards are at
work in scrutinizing a finished paper from accepting a one page summary.
The rigour of the process is increased, since it is not enough for authors
to promise some contents in an abstract. Instead the final paper must be
submitted and be judged academically worthy in terms of all of the criteria
discussed here.
Overall, I am arguing for the relative and changing nature of research
quality criteria in the field of mathematics education. I believe the same
holds true within all disciplines and fields of study, as I suggested in the case
of mathematics, but I will not pursue this generalization here. My claim
is that every learned journal and international conference has different
(that is, nonidentical) enacted standards for the acceptance of submissions,
which share only a “family resemblance” (Wittgenstein, 1953). Although
there are shared features, to a greater or lesser extent, standards differ and
are a function of the different communities of scholars serving as gate-
keepers with their own situated practices and expertise. In the preceding
discussion I have illustrated how the experiences, expertise and disciplin-
ary background of individual referees impacts upon and helps to shape
their judgments, creating divergences and differences as well as shared
features and resemblances. In particular, their membership of a range
of different communities of practice, including experiencing the roles of
student, teacher, researcher, author, referee, editorial board member, and
so forth, will shape their evaluation practices. In these social situations
working consensuses over acceptability are achieved, although sometimes
conflicts over standards occur, and these will normally lead to new resolu-
tions and occasionally even to shifts in standards.
The myth of the universality of research standards in mathematics edu-
cation may serve a useful function, in helping to sustain the notion that
there is a unique field of study called mathematics education. As such
it helps to create the illusion of the existence of a unique international
mathematics education research community, when what actually exists is a
complex set of interlocking and interacting but different and distinct prac-
tices and communities located and dispersed globally. The myth also helps
to encourage the mathematics education research community to strive
toward greater consistency and reliability in its research standards and
practices. In other words it expresses an aspiration which may be unachiev-

able, rather than an actual attainment.
However, if research quality standards are function of the differing prac-
tices and needs of different research communities, contexts, and countries,
there is the issue of whose interests they serve. Since the standards and
values are a function of their geographical and historical location, namely,
the early 21st century Anglophone West, they serve the interests of this
dominant research culture. Thus they are a part of the ideological effect
and support the dominance effect discussed earlier. This raises a further
question. Should not different criteria for judging research quality be
applied as is appropriate for different contexts? Just as in education, where
assessment standards vary as a function of the aims and objectives of the
curriculum they assess, so too standards for research papers should reflect
the aims and social purposes underlying the research and its context? While
this does not mean that research standards for conferences or publications
in, say, countries of the South should be set at a lower level (whatever that
might mean), it might be the case that more emphasis is placed on com-
munity oriented research. Research is required to be ethical in all research
traditions, and it might be that a broadened concept of ethics including
community responsibility should be applied.
Such a dialogue is already taking place outside of research in math-
ematics education. In discussing the evaluation of educational research,
Kincheloe and McLaren (1994) reject the criteria of validity, reliability,
and objectivity as they are understood and applied in scientific paradigm
research. Instead they propose the notion of “catalytic validity” introduced
by Lather (1986) as more appropriate term for describing the criteria for
establishing rigour in the study of the social world which is characterized by
extreme complexity and unpredictability. This description of the contextual
features resonates with the call to reconceptualize research in “mathemat-
ics, science and technology education in contexts of rapid change, conflict,
poverty and violence” (Vithal, Setati, & Malcolm, 2004, p. 3; Vithal, Setati,
& Malcolm, 2007). Lather defines catalytic validity as “the degree to which
the research process reorients, focuses and energizes participants toward
knowing reality in order to transform it” (Lather, 1991, p. 68). This, it is
claimed, is a more rigorous test of validity, because it not only seeks to
understand the world, but it also seeks to move those it studies to under-
stand the world and the way it is shaped in order for them to transform it.
Thus there more at stake in the challenge to the “ “one best way” approach
to the generation and legitimation of knowledge about the world” (Lather
1992, p. 87) than merely the issue of research criteria. It also concerns the
problem of how to mobilise knowledge production, educational research
in particular, so as to have a major impact on society and social structures
of power and domination.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored some of the ways in which the globalization
and the global knowledge economy impacts on mathematics, science and
technology education research. In particular, I have explored some of the
imbalances between “developing” and “developed” countries created and
sustained by the global knowledge economy. The major effect is economic,
the inflow of funds to “developed” countries in return for the export of
knowledge and expertise. There is also a recruitment effect, that is, the
“brain drain” of many of the most skilled personnel from “developing”
countries. I also described the appropriation effect in which knowledge
gathered locally in “developing” countries is appropriated for gain. I have
also tried to show that none of these effects are simple and purely exploit-
ative; that there are complex eddies and countercurrents as well as the
main flows of globalization. By considering the subjectivities and agencies
at play I have tried to reveal some of the complexities involved. I have
illustrated this with reflections on my own role as an agent of the knowledge
economy located in the dominant research culture.
However, my main focus has been on critiquing the dominance and
ideological effects. The dominance effect is enacted through the way that
research institutions, organizations and publications from Northern and
“developed” countries, typically anglophone, dominate the international
research community in mathematics, science and technology education,
both in terms of power and prestige. This helps to sustain the ideological
effect, whereby all researchers including those in “developing” countries
are subject to and internalize the ideological and epistemological presup-
positions and values of this dominant research culture. I have identified
four components of the ideological effect. First, there is the reconceptual-
ization of knowledge and the impact of the ethos of managerialism in the
commodification and fetishization of knowledge. This is probably the most
important ideological dimension that characterizes the postmodern knowl-
edge economy, with clear and direct impacts in education and research.
Second, there is the ideology of progressivism with its fetishization of the
idea of progress. This helps sustain imbalanced and racist views of the
value of different nations and the worth of different peoples and races.
Third, there is the further component of individualism which in addition
to promoting the cult of the individual at the expense of the community,
also helps to sustain the ideology of consumerism. Fourth is the myth of the
universal standards in mathematics education research, which can delegiti-
mate research strategies that forground ethics or community action more
than is considered “seemly” in traditional research terms. This is the final
capstone of the system that keeps the dominance effect in place.
In the words of Bacon (1597/1997) “knowledge is power,” and my aim in

providing this critique of ideology in mathematics, science, and technology
education research and its globalization is to provide researchers with a
means of gaining power and control over some of the hidden dimensions
of social and educational research and its methodology. An awareness of
the roles of the commodification of knowledge, managerialism, progressiv-
ism and individualism in the culture of educational research enables them
to be revealed, scrutinized from an ethical perspective, and countered.
Awareness of the lack of universal standards is also empowering in enabling
researchers to develop and rely more on their own critical judgments, and
to select their avenues of publication pragmatically. Thus far from showing
that educational research for social change and betterment is hopeless, I
believe that revealing some of the countervailing ideological currents offers
a basis for wiser and more informed action.
Acknowledgment
This chapter is a version of the chapter Ernest, P. (2007). “Globalization,

Ideology and Research in Mathematics Education,” that first appeared in
Vithal and colleagues (2007).
Notes
1. Globalization shares a number of characteristics with internationalization

and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, although I prefer to
use “globalization” to emphasize the erosion of the nation state or national
boundaries, which is especially important in the growing emergence of a
global educational research community.
2. Below, in discussing the concept of progress I shall problematize the terms
“developing” and “developed” countries. However, for the moment I shall
simply use these problematic terms to avoid cumbersome circumlocutions,
but put them in “scare quotes” to show that the terms are used with reserva-
tions.
3. This is well known in pharmacology where, for example, teams of ethnobot-
anists and pharmacognosists visit the Amazon basin, interview indigenous
people about pharmacologically active plants and take samples of the plants.
They then return to their “developed” countries of origin where the active
substances are extracted, manufactured, marketed and sometimes even pat-
ented, by “Big Pharma,” multinational pharmacology corporations whose
net profits are in the billions of dollars.
4. The abbreviations used here and elsewhere stand for: Adults Learning Math-
ematics (ALM), Congress of the European Society for Research in Mathemat-
ics Education (CERME), East Asia Regional Conference on Mathematics Ed-
ucation (EARCOME), International Study Group on the Relations between

the History and Pedagogy of Mathematics (HPM), International Congress
of Mathematical Education (ICME), International Organization of Women
and Mathematics Education (IOWME), Mathematics, Education and Society
(MES), Political Dimensions of Mathematics Education (PDME), Program for
International Student Assessment (PISA), the International Group for the
Psychology of Mathematics Education (PME), Southern African Association
for Research in Mathematics, Science and Technology Education (SAARM-
STE), Second International Mathematics Study (SIMS), Third International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).
5. Researchers from “developed” countries do make guest appearances at such
regional conferences. However, in addition to the individual’s benefits in
having more international papers and publications for their curriculum vi-
tae, there is also a growing tourism effect. As with tourism, travel to exotic loca-
tions even if for professional reasons is a consumer good in itself.
6. My basis for these criteria is a combination of the principle of the respect for
the value of different cultures (Ernest, 1991) and Marx’s idea, expressed by
Rawls (1972) in his theory of justice, that where persons receive less than the
value of their contributions they are being exploited.
7. I am stressing the positive features that emerge from the knowledge econo-
my to provide a balanced view, bearing in mind the critique of the domina-
tion and ideological effects that follows below.
8. Contrary to the impression it gives, etymologically the country’s name does
not derive from a hubristic reference to former imperial greatness, but re-
sulted from the amalgamation of separate monarchies and countries (Eng-
land, Scotland, Wales) into an enlarged, that is, “greater” Britain in 1603.
However, as the first impression shows, the name is culturally double-coded
with residual connotations of colonialization and imperialism.
9. As a White, heterosexual, middle class origin male I have not experienced
the pain of having to overcome stereotyped expectations imposed on me,
or the oppression of classism, sexism, racism and homophobia in society.
However, as somebody who did not arrive in the U.K. until 1951 at the age
of seven with non-British parents (Swedish and Jewish-American) I did expe-
rience the feeling of being an outsider for many years, especially in the very
conformist Britain of the 1950s.
10. But see Sriraman and Steinthorsdottir (2007) for an interesting critique of
the concept of critical thinking.
11. The handbook titles for the modules of these courses are: 1: The Psychol-
ogy of Mathematics Education, 2: The Mathematics Curriculum, 3: Math-
ematics and Gender, 4: Mathematics and Special Educational Needs, and 5:
Research Methodology in Mathematics Education. These handbooks also
treat assessment (in 2), philosophy of mathematics (in 3) and language in
mathematics education (in 4). As the students are midcareer education pro-
fessionals two main themes were deliberately omitted (mathematical content
areas, and pedagogy and teaching resources such as ICT) although they do
figure incidentally and in some student initiated assignments.
12. All semiotic expressions or signs have a basic representational function

whether from a neo-Saussurian or Peircean perspective. In the former case
there is the signifier-signified pairing in the sign, in which an expression
designates a content. Peirce’s theory is similar but introduces a third com-
ponent (the interpretant) which carries some of the meaning. Some signs
purport to model some aspect of reality, which I have termed the modeling
function, whereas other only refer to other signs and sign-systems.
13. Although I am an academic with a lifelong commitment to research and
publications I must acknowledge that knowledge is not an end in itself but
just a means to a greater end, namely that of human happiness. Of course
the full achievement of this end necessitates banishing the global causes of
unhappiness, such as hunger, poverty, disease, oppression, injustice, and so
forth, which are political problems and issues (to which globalization is con-
tributing). The pursuit of knowledge, which is one of the privileges of the
academic life, is for those involved, like myself, a source of happiness. But it
must be acknowledged that the pursuit of knowledge (and the happiness it
brings) is only possible when its material conditions are supported. In terms
of Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, only when our physiological needs,
safety and security, and social needs are satisfied, can we seek to develop
the self-esteem, prestige and self-fulfillment that come from the pursuit of
knowledge and the most beneficial forms that the academic life can take (but
which managerialism and performativity are eroding). But this satisfaction
in turn presupposes forms of social organization that produce surpluses to
support the lifestyles of academics. Our social critiques depend on the divi-
sion of labour and the privileging of some classes (including intellectuals)
which are their targets. Part of the ingenuity of the global capitalist system
that produces such surpluses is that it is able to exploit, incorporate and
hence subvert anger, protest, and rebellion. Thus the Punk youth movement
of 1976, despite its anger and rejection of the bourgeois forms of life, music,
and fashion ultimately served to inject new blood into the development and
marketing of music and fashion. Likewise academic critiques, such as this
chapter, are something to both be marketed as part of the global knowledge
economy, as well as performing a safety-valve function for dissent. They al-
low writers and readers to channel their outrage in ways that do not destabi-
lize the system, and hence serve to sustain it. Just as mathematics has been
able to incorporate and “tame” the study of uncertainty and chaos through-
out its history, so too global capitalism is able to appropriate and market
critiques and dissenting voices, from posters of Ché Guevara to the records
of Bob Dylan and the films of Michael Moore (Klein, 2000).
14. This is the third of three types of interest that drive research. The other two
types of interest distinguished by Habermas are the desire to predict and
control (technical, scientific interest), the desire to understand (practical,
interpretative interest). These form the basis of the scientific and interpreta-
tive research paradigms in education, respectively (Bassey, 1990–1991; Er-
nest, 1994; Schubert, 1986). However, these last two paradigms firmly locate
the educational research process as types of Mode 1 knowledge production.
I am also quite clear that I as a researcher also work exclusively in Mode 1,
writing materials that are aimed at publication, rather than committing my

time and energies to Mode 2 knowledge production for social reform proj-
ects driven by the critical interest.
15. Not surprisingly it is not only social justice and environmentalist groups that
use these strategies. There are also right wing think-tanks and commercial
pressure groups funded by industry and commercial interests, and even
by covert government agencies, which seek to change public opinion and
policy. In Ernest (1991) I documented the powerful impact of New Right
think-tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies on British educational and
social policy in the 1980s (Gordon, 1989; Himmelfarb, 1987; Lawlor, 1988).
Recently it is claimed that American neoconservatives have similarly ma-
nipulated popular opinion to justify the “War on Terror” and the invasion of
Iraq (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005).
16. There were dissenting voices such as Vico (1744/1961). His cyclical theory
of historical development does not support the incrementalist features of
progressivism that view historical progress as secured, ratchet like, against
forced retreat. Herder also rejects the idea that human history is a linear
progression (Sundaram, 1998).
17. This rational position was of course the basis for the monstrous 20th century
doctrines of “racial purity” and “ethnic cleansing.”
18. I am not inverting the received values to claim that tribal knowledge, includ-
ing ethnomathematics or ethnoscience, is superior to or even comparable
to scientific knowledge. Instead I would argue that all such knowledge and
belief systems should be viewed in the context of their own cultural spheres.
Knowledge and belief systems are much more than rational instruments for
achieving material ends. They are the cultural “glue” that binds peoples
into communities and helps to shape identities. However, the commodifica-
tion of knowledge coupled with rationalism and the ideology of progressiv-
ism denies these vital noninstrumental functions of knowledge and belief
systems. My plea is instead for mutual understanding and respect between
alternative worldviews.
19. Even without the negative connotations of the terms “developing” or “un-
derdeveloped,” “development” itself, in terms of what it means and how it is
measured, is problematic. Standard measures such as gross national product,
equate “development” with growth in production and consumption of goods
and services. Such growth is not automatically good as is assumed by many
in “developed” countries, or those who aspire to “development” (UNESCO,
2002).
20. Not surprisingly technological companies like Casio and Texas Instruments
are the biggest sponsors of international conferences in mathematics educa-
tion where researchers enthused with the latest electronic innovations and
the ideals of technological progress act as unpaid marketers and promoters
of these goods.
21. I like to believe that I can maintain a critical disengagement from the ideol-
ogy of the Western society which I inhabit. But I must also acknowledge that
this, in the form of consumerism, in turn inhabits and shapes me. I may have
internalized academic research ideals and a critical intellectual stance which
enables me to distance my ideal self, if not my actual self, from consumer-

ism. But this leaves open the question of the extent to which my judgment is
subverted and compromised, and the extent to which my critical stance is a
way of dealing with the conflict between my lifestyle and ideals. It also raises
the question of whether my academic stance is part of the appropriation
effect, that is, appropriating and making cultural capital out of a critique
of the system which in practice I uphold and which sustains my privileges.
22. Traditionally most research in mathematics education drew on psychology as
the underlying discipline, and this is reflected in the title of PME. However,
over the past two decades research from a broader range of perspectives
has been reported at this annual conference, and there have been moves to
change the constitution and the focus of the group to reflect this broadening
disciplinary base.
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chapter 4
SCRIPTING THE WORLD IN

MATHEMATICS AND ITS
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Keiko Yasukawa, Ole Skovsmose, and Ole Ravn
Introduction
Mathematics is a language, a formalism, a school discipline, a research

area, an engineering tool, a logic for reasoning, a social practice. Math-
ematics can be applied, but it can also be claimed to be pure; it can be
dynamic, but it can also be frozen; it can inform and illuminate, but also
hide and obscure. So what is this “it” that can be so many different things?
We can try to describe the nature of mathematics from many perspectives.
One might think that if we observe mathematics from different, for
example, sociological, philosophical, and educational angles, we will come
to understand what “it” is, and how “it” may function. However, this idea is
not quite adequate because we cannot assume that the different perspectives
focus on the same thing. So, instead we could argue that the perspective we
choose determines, at least in part, what it is we are observing.
In this chapter, we investigate mathematics as an active constituent of
society. Like language, mathematics is intimately linked to ideology and

82â•‡â•‡K. Yasukawa, O. Skovsmose, and O. Ravn
power: it affords us with a perspective, and in this way creates part of our
life-world. We refer to this constructive aspect of mathematics as “math-
ematics in action”.1 It follows that if mathematics is “active” in society, there
are also ethical implications concerning its actions, particularly where they
interact with relations of power.
In order to understand the nature of the relationship between math-
ematics and power, we need to examine not only the technical features of
mathematical problems and solutions but also the context in which they
arise, how and why people interact with, produce, and interpret mathemat-
ics, and how the influence of mathematics extends beyond the immediate
context in which it emerges and shapes people’s values and beliefs.
We will argue that mathematics can be understood as “language”: as a
discourse, where we use the term discourse to mean a frame for seeing,
interpreting, designing, and acting. We also see discourses as dynamic
because it is itself shaped by the processes arising from within its own
frame. Mathematics often carries an image of a universal language free
of ideological and ethical issues. We argue, however, quite the contrary:
when we consider mathematics in action, we come to address actions that
are informed and shaped by mathematical reasoning and mathematically
derived information, and like any action they also require ethical con-
siderations. Indeed we cannot think of any action in society operating in
an ethical vacuum. In the next sections, we will outline what we mean by
mathematics in action.
Dimensions of mathematics in action
We will illustrate that mathematics is involved in the production, enactment

and legitimization of designs and decisions, and that power relations are
established through scripts produced in the language of mathematics. We
will identify and examine four different dimensions of these scripts.
First, through modeling processes mathematics is thought to be a pow-
erful language for description. Mathematical models can facilitate everyday
communication as well as a specialized discourse about otherwise elusive
ideas, phenomena or systems. However, it is questionable, as we will argue
below, whether mathematics can ever fully describe a given reality.2 Second,
we suggest that inscription is part of scripting the world mathematically.
An inscription provides a means for building in a particular lens which,
according to certain priorities, makes us see not only what exists but also
what could come to exist. Thus, mathematics has the power of inscribing
particular ideologies into visions and imaginations. Third, mathematics
provides a means for prescribing3 certain actions and attributes authority to
Scripting the Worldâ•‡â•‡ 83
particular human and nonhuman actors; their actions are authorized and
legitimized by what is written in the mathematical scripts.
Mathematics in this prescriptive role becomes a tool for calculating what
to do. Finally, we talk about subscription in relation to mathematics in action.
To subscribe to a mathematical script means that an institution, a group or
an individual applies or accepts the legitimacy of a certain mathematical
model in a given setting as a tool for decision making. In many cases one
is forced to subscribe, and often one does so without knowing it. When one
becomes ready to assume mathematical scripting as being the principal
and most effective way of dealing with a problem, we witness what we could
call “presubscription.” A whole set of potential practices may, through a
presubscription, be preconfigured mathematically, even before they in fact
start operating. This dimension of mathematics in action deals with the
choice to use a mathematical script in the first place, as a means to act in
the world.
These aspects of scripting—describing, inscribing, prescribing and sub-
scribing, represent ways of seeing, believing, deciding, and doing; they
represent ways of acting in and on the world, and we see them as four
dimensions of mathematics in action. As in other forms of actions, these
ways of scripting reality can have different qualities. They can be doubt-
ful, unselfish, risky, dominating, or dangerous. They can have any quality,
but they cannot maintain any sublime neutrality or objectivity by virtue of
their mathematical basis. We find that an analysis of a mathematical script
brings us directly to considering the ethical dimension of mathematics. In
the following sections we will also discuss ethical issues that emerge in each
of the four dimensions of mathematics in action.
Mathematics in action: description
Mathematics is a powerful resource for describing what is, what might be,
and what could be. Mathematics affords a language for modeling aspects
of the world. These models might describe an aspect of the material world,
for example the average rainfall at different times of the year in differ-
ent parts of the world; an aspect of a piece of machinery, for example of
a motor in an automobile; an aspect of the social world, for example the
growth or decline in levels of unemployment; the performance of a socio-
technical system, for example an economic model of water recycling; or
aspects of the virtual world, for example the traffic flow over the internet.
An example of a mathematical model is the budget for an organizational
unit such as a household, a university department, or a state. The budget
provides a picture of what has been and what could be. At the university, a
departmental budget is developed based on historical and current financial
data on income and expenditures and shows, among many things, how
much could be spent on wages for different categories of staff; on travel
and conferences; on office equipment and printing; and how much income
could be expected from different sources, for example, student fees;
research grants; and commercialization of innovation. On the basis of the
budget, members of the department can see what they can and cannot
do in the following financial year. The mathematical model also provides
a picture of what the department must do in order to retain a particular
balance of income and expenditure for the following year; for example,
it might have to increase the number of research grants by at least 10
per cent to keep up wage increases and increased travel and equipment
costs. The budget enables the people in the department to imagine what
their working conditions are going to be like in the year covered by the
budget. Furthermore, comparing the year’s financial accounts, based on
the actual income and expenditure, with the budget provides a picture of
new possibilities or restrictions. Thus the budget is a tool for both reflection
and imagination.
But budgets and income-expenditure statements are not the same as the
working lives or conditions of the members of the department. They do
not provide a complete picture of the phenomena they model. A depart-
mental budget does not show, for example, that 60% of the journal papers
that were written by department members were done on the weekends,
or that academics have to buy their own stationary because the budget no
longer allows for such expenses. It does not show the real income from
the research grant because 15% of it was taken off by the central university
offices for administrative costs, and so on. Mathematical models provide
part of the picture of reality, and on that basis allow us to imagine a partial
picture of what could be in the future. However, what is not shown in the
picture is often forgotten even if they are (in some way) essential features
of reality.
Mathematical models of other kinds also provide descriptions, but
again, they always provide a “partial description.” This is revealed for
example in a map of a city or a floor plan of a house. A map is a scaled
version of the physical reality, and as we scale up the map, you see more of
the details of what is there, and as you scale it down, you see less. However,
even if we map in a 1:1 relation to reality, the map is far from identical
with reality. Maps are partial in terms of spatial dimensions compared to
the realities they are describing; they are two-dimensional representations
of three dimensional spaces. A map is a snapshot of a dynamic physical
configuration taken at a particular point in time.
Mathematical models can be partial in other ways as well. For example,
a risk assessment based on the probability of a risky event occurring—say
a car accident, and the cost of the damages, including hospital bills if there
is an injury and the repairs or replacement of the car—is a mathematical

description of a risk linked to driving a car. But such a risk assessment is
limited, not only in what it regards as possible consequences but also in
time. It does not, for example, consider the longer term psychological
trauma that the accident victim might face, the cost to the environment
of getting rid of the damaged car. Thus mathematical models have both
spatial and temporal, as well as other kinds of limitations.
One could in fact argue that what we refer to as describing a given phe-
nomenon through mathematics is a deceitful use of words. The normal
“description” metaphor with respect to mathematical modeling is too
simple to capture the process taking place when mathematics is put into
action. A description is only partial. However, we should not even assume
that any part of reality is represented in a mathematical model. It might be
more adequate to think of a mathematical description as a reformulation,
a rescripting of selected elements of reality.
Mathematical descriptions are powerful but also inherently deceptive:
they present aspects of reality which can be confused with reality itself.
They include some features and not others of what is being modeled; and
they are used—sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously—to
imagine, evaluate and create new realities. This means that the notion of
mathematics having the ability to produce descriptions is problematic if it
is underpinned with the assumption that there exist some principal simi-
larities between the real phenomenon and the mathematically described
phenomenon.
It might appear commonsense that “picturing” is a neutral activity. A
photo reveals things as they are, and photos can be used in documenting
an episode. However, this is only part of the story. A photo is taken from a
particular perspective; it includes some things and excludes other things.
A photo is framed, and framing gives another significance to what was
being photographed by eliminating what was surrounding it, and putting a
boundary around what is preserved “of that moment” in the photo. More-
over, the photo can eliminate the original colors if taken in black and white
or given new colors and emphasis with the application of different kinds
of photographic techniques.
Such considerations also apply to pictures provided through mathematical
modeling. Any such modeling means including some aspects and excluding
others of reality. Something becomes celebrated as important while other
things are deemed insignificant. In this sense mathematical modeling
includes a framing. Furthermore, like a black and white photograph, a
mathematical model leaves out something due to the very nature of the
description. A mathematical model excludes everything that cannot be
measured and expressed as numbers. Measures of size, position, speed,
acceleration, as well as abstract measures such as means and standard
deviations, probabilities, and risks can be formulated; many things that

once might have defied mathematization, for example obesity, intelligence,
happiness, progress now have one or more measures associated with them
so they also can be included in mathematical descriptions. However, such a
description can only be adequate if the complex phenomenon in questions
can be fully reduced to number. Most often it cannot. Any mathematical
description imposes a strong framing of what is described.
An important ethical dimension of any description concerns what it
includes and what it excludes. The very process of mathematical descrip-
tions comprises powerful ways of prioritizing. They provide a grid on
which reality is mapped. Any process of inclusion and exclusion includes
an ethical challenge: Whose reality counts, and whose reality does not?
Moreover: Who has access to the description? Who has the power to
impose the inclusion-exclusion processes that accompany any mathemati-
cal description? One can argue that a photo is a most democratic form of
description: putting aside likes and dislikes, anybody that has access to the
photo will be able to see some connections between the photo and what was
photographed. However, who can seriously make such connections from a
mathematical description to what the model has been created to describe?
It is meaningful to only the few who have knowledge both of the relevant
mathematics and the phenomenon and the object that is modeled.
In most budget statements, there would be some kind of formula
behind each number that is shown. The faculty budget for wages might,
for example, include the various percentage pay rises that are due during
the year, allowances for leave that staff might need to take, and increases
in wages for some staff who are expected to be promoted during the year.
The travel expenses might have been set to reflect a prior agreement that
had been reached between one professor and the dean about the profes-
sor’s travel to an international conference and the budget needs to at least
cover that amount. These calculations may be revealed in some cases, or
they may not be revealed at all. However, even if they are revealed, the
underlying calculations are entangled with the politics of the department
and academia generally. The mathematical discourse that characterizes a
particular description is not independent of other types of discourses of
the field; they interact to form a metadiscourse of power.
By describing material and social phenomena within a mathematical
discourse, decisions are made, implicitly or explicitly, to include those who
are within this particular discourse community and to exclude those who
are not. An ethical position is taken by virtue of this choice of language.
A script assigns authority to those who master, and indeed author the
script and to those who have easy or exclusive access to it. In this sense a
mathematical script can be discussed in terms of a holy script: Who has
the power to write, read, interpret, and draw implications from the script?
Mathematics in action: inscription
When a person is describing an object or a phenomenon, they are not

only representing aspects of what they are looking at, but they are also
describing aspects of themselves. Their perspective constitutes part of the
description. As a consequence some of our formulations in the previous
section need to be reconsidered. We have talked about reality as an entity
that could be separated from a description of reality. But reality is also con-
stituted through the process of description and the choice of perspectives.
A perspective is afforded according to one’s position, but the notion of
position can be understood in many different ways. It need not only refer to
one’s physical position, but also to one’s historical, social, cultural, and ide-
ological position. We could also talk about a conceptual positioning, and, as
a consequence, the grammar (or discourse) one uses in a description might
come to shape part of the world. Thus, the grammar of mathematics may
imply that a certain “order of things” becomes imposed on or included in
a description. In The Order of Things, Foucault (1973) emphasizes that the
order of what we experience is not simply inherent in material or natural
objects. Order is also imposed on things. It is also “that which has no exis-
tence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language”
(p. xx). We can see mathematics as providing a grid, which entails a certain
order of what we are addressing. In The Order of Things, Foucault also makes
the following observation:
The fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its

schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy
of its practices—establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical
orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.
(p. xx)
Mathematics can be seen as being part of a fundamental code of culture.

Therefore we should not be surprised that mathematics could govern
schemas of perception as well as techniques, values, and hierarchies of
practices, and in this way establish an order that extends beyond those
who are actively engaged with mathematics. This brings us to the notion
of inscription.
By inscription we refer to all the elements of a positioning, which are
encoded in a description and in this way are “gridding” reality. A positioning
can refer to the choice of tools or media used for the description. As a
consequence a description refers, on the one hand, to elements of an object
which is described, and, on the other hand, to the subjective elements of the
person creating the description, that is, to the positioning of the describer.
Thus, inscription is part of the process creating a description. Certainly
an inscription need not be seen as an individual act. Social, economic,
cultural or ideological priorities can be inscribed in a mathematical model.

In particular, a broad range of fundamental codes of culture or particular
world views can be inscribed through mathematics.
In his study of the emergence of technological artifacts, Latour (1987)
identifies “inscription” of goals and values of human actors involved in
the technological development as a critical stage in the design process. In
the production of mathematical models, there is also a stage of inscription
where values held by model makers about what is important and what is not
becomes embedded in the model. Thus, depending on the values held by
the script writers, different scripts will emerge, and different inscriptions
will be completed.
The budget, as a primary representation of what an academic depart-
ment does and could do, is increasingly based on a business model of
academic work. The finance of the department dictates and defines what
is the legitimate, efficient, and effective way of doing things, rather than
the other way around where the way things ought to be done dictates what
the budget needs to look like. Thus if wide and critical scholarship, dem-
ocratic decision making, equitable distribution of resources were to be
foregrounded, a different sort of a script might emerge. In this latter sce-
nario, the financial “bottom line” might not be set in advance. Decisions for
conference attendance might be made on the basis of the scholarly value
of the conference rather than simply on the basis of what is affordable.
Inscribing these values into a mathematical model may be more difficult,
but a department working on the basis of these values is not inconceivable
and would be different to that working on the basis of an economic business
model. Another obvious example from the academic world would be the
focus on the number of publications achieved by a scholar. Even the most
productive scholars would probably admit that quality is not the same as
quantity. However, when one models the amount of research time allocated
per year to each scholar as a function of the number of publications from
this person, one effectively inscribes certain values into the model. Reward-
ing many speedily written articles rather than fewer deeply considered
ones that make new scholarly contributions represent the inscription of
different kinds of values into the budget or workload models.
Not only social but also physical and natural phenomena can be seen
in different ways depending on the descriptive tool one chooses. Also in
such cases “reality” will be constructed according to a particular format that
reflects the principal tool of description. In our chapter, “The Mathematical
State of the World: Explorations into the Characteristics of Mathematical
Descriptions” (Christensen, Skovsmose, & Yasukawa, 2008), we analyze how
Lomborg (2001) in The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of
the World measures the “real state of the world” in the global environmental
debate. We see the measurement provided by Lomborg as a paradigmatic
case of inscription. In particular, the measurements that Lomborg utilizes

explicitly differ from what a large number of other researchers in the field
of study would welcome as satisfactory measurements of the “state of the
world.” A mathematics-based description makes it possible to highlight
certain elements, and to ignore others. The case of Lomborg displays how
different statistical approaches—that inscribes different values in the math-
ematical reasoning—can lead not only to different conclusions but rather
to opposing views. The Lomborg environmental case was accompanied by
a widespread political discussion where politicians sided with one or the
other in the debate. In that way the results of the scientific process come to
reflect inscribed political priorities.
Mathematics as a language allows many kinds of positioning to be
inscribed in a model. The “grammar” of mathematics influences what can
be inscribed and what not. A construction standard for buildings is based
on scientific knowledge and experiments. However, there are other factors
such as environmental, aesthetic and economic factors that influence what
is accepted as the standard. Built into it, say in an area with frequent earth-
quakes, are decisions made on some cost-benefit analysis of the collapse of
the building—for example, how many lives might be lost; what is the cost
of the insurance pay-out; or what is the cost of rebuilding. There are layers
of scripts involved in the production of such a standard. This is in turn
an inscription of an ethical position. In general, mathematical scripts can
have written and inscribed within them, ethical positions on fundamental
questions about human dignity and the value of a human life.
According to utilitarian principles, ethical standards for actions can
be expressed in terms of “pleasure” and “pain.” The formulation of this
utilitarian interpretation of ethics in Western philosophy was claimed to
make ethical considerations free from the heavy burden of religious ideas
and assumptions. Instead of thinking about the “right action” in term of
religious obligations, utilitarianism located the ethical discourse within a
human domain. We as human beings can determine which actions are right
or wrong in terms of how they affect us: do they cause pleasure or pain,
and in what amounts? In order for a utilitarian principle to be brought into
operation, rather than remaining as a philosophical idea, pleasure and
pain have to be measured. And we could ask: Why not interpret pain and
pleasure as costs and benefits that can be expressed mathematically? And as
soon as this step is taken there is no end to the models that can be brought
into operation. However, “to measure” includes a range of inscriptions, So
even though the utilitarian approach might have left some assumptions
behind, it operates within a range of other assumptions.
Cost-benefit analysis can be used in the analyses of impact, first of all the
financial impact. We can think of economic decision making in small com-
panies, big companies, international companies; we can think of actions
concerning a national economic policy. However, should the cost–benefit

analysis also take into account the burden of the policy on the poor and
unemployed, or on the rich shareholders? We can think of local impact,
or of global impact. Should the costs of the financial crisis be contained
within the countries most responsible or shared globally? We can think of
decision making in medicine. Medical or health economics is a rapidly
growing discipline and one of its foci is evaluating the cost of different
medical treatments and care. Should the cost be borne by the state or the
individual? And how should benefits be measured—in terms of extended
life-expectations, quality of life, productivity loss for employers and the
economy due to ill-health, or something else?
A mathematical inscription provides a way of seeing, believing, and
doing. The way one frames a discussion through a particular cost-benefit
analysis defines what is taken into consideration and what is left out; it
defines the way decision making is carried out. Mathematical inscriptions
are taking place in the most ethically-sensitive contexts. There is nothing
neutral about mathematical inscriptions.
Mathematics in action: prescription
Mathematical models are used to make decisions, to prescribe certain

actions. For example, on the basis of a variety of economic data, models
can be developed that calculate the risks of investment for foreign compa-
nies working in particular Third World countries. Decision about possible
investments—how much, in what, and for how long—can then be based
on these numbers. Statistics on the results of international tests of chil-
dren’s mathematical performance might show that a certain country has
performed poorly, so the state might introduce policies to make schools
“work harder” to ensure that the children perform better in the next
round of tests. Mathematical models help to write a script for what and
how people should perform. Mathematical models also provide a script of
how machines and other nonhuman actors should perform, for instance in
terms of reliability of computer controlled devices and energy efficiency of
household appliances. Mathematics writes a powerful script for prescrib-
ing actions.
What makes the scripts powerful is not just the severity of the pre-
scription itself, but the legitimacy with which the prescription is issued.
Although neither the numbers nor the values inscribed within the model
are always visible, mathematical scripts give the illusion of objectivity and
indifference to ideological orientations. The models or scripts are pre-
sented as a given: as a prescriptive “black box” that is not intended to
be opened. Opening it, however, might uncover the human judgements,
values, errors, fetishes that had informed what was written into it. The
idea of mathematical model as a “black box” is akin to Latour’s (1987)
characterisation of technological artefacts. Latour describes the process
of technological development as a series of complex negotiations between
actors who bring different interests and visions, but one which leads to a
“black-boxing,” where the history of the development is rendered invisible,
once the negotiations are completed.
Let us consider a different example from construction engineering.
What standards would be appropriate for ensuring the structural stability
of a certain building? Let us consider the case of constructing earthquake-
proof buildings, as we have already briefly referred to. How should the
engineers achieve a balance between, on the one hand, something that is
“reasonably safe” and, on the other hand, something that is “reasonably
cost efficient?” What does it in fact mean to balance such different forms
of reasonableness? Such a balancing act seems to presuppose an ability
to make a measurement of “reasonableness,” but how can one measure
“reasonable safety” and how can one find a unit for measuring “reasonable
cost efficiency?” These considerations bring us to consider the notion of
risk. How can we conceptualize a risk? Here mathematics brings a power-
ful perspective to the situation. A risk, R(A), associated to an event, A, can
be expressed as R(A) = P(A)xC(A), where P(A) refers to the probability that
the event A will take place, and C(A) refers to the severity of the conse-
quences of the event A taking place. If the event A indicates the collapse of
a building, then we can imagine very many different calculations in order
to estimate both P(A) and C(A). But the first “magic” is that the idea of risk
is assumed to be mathematizable, and that the two numbers, P(A) and C(A)
can be estimated.
An estimation of P(A) might be based on statistics of say, previous
occurrences of earthquake of different magnitudes, the number of similar
constructions being submitted to and collapsing under an earthquake of
particular magnitudes. How then can we estimate C(A), or the severity of
consequences of the event A in fact taking place? There are in fact many
different factors to consider, the price of building a new construction being
one of them. However, people could be killed or injured because of the col-
lapse. How does one estimate the severity or the costs of this? What is the
price of a person? One can look at the estimate as a question of insurance:
how much money must be paid in case a person gets killed? Or one could
consider: what is the average value of the productive output of an average
person during their estimated remaining working life? Using such lines of
analyses, one can get an estimation of R(A).
The general point is that there is no obvious and accessible entity which
can be considered “the risk” of an event that is detached from the act of
modeling the risk. The very modeling shapes the constitution of the risk.
Thus, the risk symbolized with R(A) is characterized as a product of a prob-

ability, P(A), a number between 0 and 1, and the cost, representing the
severity of the consequences, C(A). In other words, a risk is a price less than
C(A), or at most equal to C(A). When such an inscription has taken place,
we are able to formulate a statement about what to do and not to do, and
we can produce detailed analyses of questions like: Should the building be
made safer? How should we, for example, “measure” the lives of people in
different countries and regions? Could it be that the value of a person in
the United States should be estimated differently to the value of a person
in Mexico, considering, say, the insurance payouts? The modeling of risks
opens a space for analysis of such questions, and therefore a space for
decision making. And if we were able to retrace the origins of some of the
decisions that have been made, we may find that highly disputable assump-
tions are hidden behind the carefully constructed calculations.
Many decisions and policies about how things “need to be” are derived
from mathematical scripts. This is how the prescriptive function of math-
ematics operates. Such prescriptions can be based on mathematical
processes such as cost-benefit analyses and risk estimations; in many cases
the prescriptive use of mathematics combines more than one of these pro-
cesses. One kind of prescription takes the form of norm-setting, including
establishing the assumption that in case a phenomenon falls outside the
stipulated norm, actions need to be taken. We can think of many examples
from medicine where decisions are based on a diagnosis that draws on
calculated norms. Any norm-setting using mathematics is based on what is
mathematizable—that is, describable in numerical forms and relationships.
However, in enacting this norm-setting one is not only dealing with the
variables that have been mathematized, but implicitly one is also applying
the values and beliefs that guided the mathematization.
Prescription has to do with decision making, and when mathematics is
brought into operation certain forms of justification is formulated. Math-
ematics provides a particular structure to the nature of justification for
instance by enveloping the discussion in a discourse of objectivity and
neutrality. Our principal point is that any form of prescription is in need
of ethical consideration. No prescription is objective or neutral, including
any mathematics-based prescription.
Boltanski and Thevenot (1999) argue that in many situations where
there is a dispute, people resort to what they call a “regime of justification”
to argue and try to resolve it. The regime of justification is based on the
principle of equivalence: what is being experienced is or is not “equivalent”
to what it should be (payment for labor, rights to inheritance, speaking
order in a meeting, etc.). Mathematical scripts are very effective resources
for resolving arguments about equivalence. Indeed, Boltanski and
Thevenot argue that disputes can be resolved with reference to a regime of
justification (not always mathematical regimes) because in many instances

there are initial agreements4 before the dispute arises that are based on
devices and instruments (budgets, contracts, etc.) that allow equivalences
to be argued when a dispute emerges later on.
We see mathematics as a powerful “regime of justification”, that often
eludes ethical questioning. We find this situation to be a most problematic
feature of the prescriptive use of mathematics.
MATHEMATICS IN ACTION: SUBSCRIPTION
An “efficient” mathematical model is one that is generalizable and can be

applied to a number of different related problems. As an analogy, one could
think of the automated production line. When a mathematically configured
conveyor belt has been put in operation, it will continue to function, even
after one has forgotten about the purpose and goal of its original installa-
tion. Automated mathematically-based decision making turns into part of
an everyday routine. Mathematical algorithms can establish routines and
industrial regimes; they can make certain decision procedures automatic.
Many construction or design processes are guided by mathematical rela-
tionships and models. In such cases mathematics in action becomes part
of the wider shared social reality (see Yasukawa, Skovsmose, & Ravn, 2012).
We refer to the nonreflective stance to a mathematical script as subscrip-
tion. The very notion of “subscription” appears to include an element of
free choice, but in many cases one is “doomed” to subscribe. Mathemat-
ics takes part in the structuring of our social sphere, and in this way it is
lived out in reality. Mathematical prescriptions materialize as technologi-
cal artifacts and systems of all forms of industrial fabrication, as well as of
hierarchies of practices which, as mentioned earlier, Foucautl examined in
The Order of Things (1973).
Returning to our example on the departmental budget one could
imagine that rather than thinking about the scholarly value of a research
initiative, academics may come to think about research in terms of pro-
spective research income. Instead of thinking about education as both a
source of individual and social empowerment, academics might begin to
subscribe to the idea that courses, knowledge and skills are commodities
that they can “sell” at the highest price and deliver at the lowest expense
to their “customers.”
The propensity of many Western societies to use mathematical reason-
ing in an increasingly widening sphere of their lives is not entirely a new
phenomenon.5 The quantification of the social world, and in particular, the
increasing commodification of social life—learning, caring, healing—have
been criticized as part of the broader critique of neoliberalism. Why have
we been experiencing what appears to be this increasing mathematiza-

tion of society in recent years? This is of course a very hard and complex
question but also an important one that takes seriously the concern about
subscription to mathematical models in a broader sense. We are using math-
ematical modeling more and more to support political decision making in
all spheres of our life. Once produced, mathematical models are easy to
implement because one only needs to pay attention to numbers and codes.
Mathematical models can be implemented as algorithms on computers,
that is, it is easy to routinize the scripts written in mathematics. And once
the script turns into routines, it becomes even more difficult to question.
We subscribe to mathematics in this broader cultural sense on a large
scale. What we have defined as subscriptions can in this sense become
infectious. When this occurs we shall talk about a “presubscription” to
mathematics. This is the situation where a person or a social entity sub-
scribes to the idea of using mathematical modeling for future actions in
relation to areas of decision making that have not hitherto been subject to
mathematical reasoning.
We could reconsider the example from the department budget above.
Today, in many Western universities, everything that an academic does is
expected to be accounted for and justified in terms of some workload for-
mulae that might be expressed in terms of research outputs and student
load. An academic’s work can be measured in terms of numbers, such as
number of courses, number of staff and research students they supervise,
number of committees they are members of, and number of publications
they produce. And it can be strictly measured if they meet the standard.
As a consequence, one could try to standardize the number of articles
they have to write in order to be a top-researcher instead of a mediocre
researcher. Such a system of ranking is an example of presubscription to
mathematical rationality.
When mathematical modeling becomes pervasive, we at the same time
subscribe to the general process of making our life world measurable and
calculable. It appears ideal for many politicians to apply the “regime of
justification through numbers” to silence critique or hide the real decision-
making process that takes place when the mathematical model is put into
action. Let us take a look at an example from education.
Denmark has, with some variation, done not so well in international
scores on mathematical skills among children in primary school. Many
efforts have been made to counter the bad exam results in the interna-
tional competitions in mathematics. Among these efforts is the publication
of the average performance of students at each school in Denmark. The
government’s public and mathematical description of the state of Danish
schools has inscribed in it a number of values: that all schools should in
principle be able to produce the same results irrespective of the diverse
social contexts of the schools, including, for example, the levels of wealth
and educational attainment of the parent community of the schools, the
working conditions of the teachers, the degree of cultural and linguistic
diversity of the student community. Prescriptive actions that can be taken
on the schools according to this model are easily imagined.
But let us focus on how subscription to the mathematical model is in play
here. First, it is a major step to subscribe to the international competition in
mathematics as if this very limited and highly specific test could ever give
us any clear picture as to the state of Danish schools. It is much more likely
that Danish pupils are not thoroughly or exclusively taught the competen-
cies favored by the international test system, as may be the case in other
nations. Second, it is clear from the Danish case that having subscribed to
the quantitative international model for determining how well the school
system is doing, the responses to change the situation are influenced by
these measures. Seemingly, the consequence is locating the problem in
the Danish school system and introducing more refined and pointed
measurements that will eventually force teachers to conduct mathematics
teaching in accordance with the international test system. Subscribing to
the demands of measurability and “teaching to the test” may risk losing
less quantifiable kinds of learning like creativity, deep understanding of
concepts, social awareness of the role of mathematical modeling in society
and other kinds of learning that are not addressed in the international
examination regime.
Subscribing has to do with one’s world view or one’s perspective. Kuhn
(1970) refers to the notion of paradigm, when he describes how a scien-
tific community subscribes to certain standards and assumptions when
addressing scientific issues. Naturally, one can subscribe to standards and
assumptions which reach far beyond scientific investigations and one can
talk about, not paradigms, but discourses. For instance, one can subscribe
to certain ways of looking at particular groups of people, particular groups
of problems, particular ways of treating people and problems, and so on.
There are many ways of subscribing to discourses.
When mathematics is imbued in descriptions, inscriptions and prescrip-
tions, particular priorities and justifications are brought into operation. The
world becomes viewed from a particular perspective. When one addresses
environmental problems in terms of cost-benefit analyses, one subscribes
to a certain discourse about environmental issues. When one addresses
how to evaluate academic productivity in terms of standards that can be
expressed mathematically, one subscribes to a whole range of particular
priorities. When one provides certain measures for decision making about
whether on not to recommend an abortion, one subscribes to a certain
standard with respect to the nature of justification of the most fundamental
ethical decision—life or death. In all such situations one subscribes to the
idea that a discourse referring to measures provides an adequate frame

for addressing the issues in question.6 However, this is far from a neutral
assumption. The very act of subscribing to such a regime of justification
includes an ethical position.
Conclusion
Instrumentalists who view that technologies are simply tools used by people
to serve their purposes, and as such are in themselves value-neutral, may
argue a similar case for mathematics. Technological determinists who
believe that technologies acquire a momentum of its own once they are
“released” may argue the same about mathematics. For both instrumental-
ists and determinists, discussing the ethics of mathematics in action would
be pointless—for the instrumentalists, it would not have meaning, and for
the determinists, it would be a futile exercise. Understanding mathematics
in action in terms of scripts enables us to uncover the ethical dimensions
of the role of mathematics in generating human imaginations and socio-
political practices.
We find that the discussion of mathematics in action in term of descrip-
tion, inscription, prescription and subscription might bring the discussion
of both mathematics and mathematics-based technology into a new the-
oretical framework. We find that mathematics can be interpreted as a
powerful technology.7 (Naturally we do not claim that mathematics is only
a powerful technology.) As such mathematics can be part of very many
different actions. Many discussions in social theorizing concern the role of
technology in social development. Thus, it has been assumed that technol-
ogy provides an open “frame” within which social priorities and economic
interests can be acted out. According to such an interpretation techno-
logical development reflects other forms of social development. It has,
however, also been argued that technological development demonstrates
its own powerful determinism, which conditions all other forms of develop-
ment. In particular, the discussion of the development of information and
communication technologies has often been formulated as if they provide
a basic format of other developmental processes.
Our observation is that the investigation between social and technologi-
cal development can be reformulated when mathematics in action becomes
interpreted as a principal technological feature. Furthermore, as soon as
we see mathematics as connected to action we enter an ethical domain.
We have tried to illustrate this by emphasizing how the four aspects of
mathematics in action—description, inscription, prescription and subscrip-
tion—are all entangled with ethical issues. We do not, however, make a
point of trying to maintain a hard distinction between these different forms
of scripts, nor of maintaining principal distinctions between different sets

of ethical implications. Our aim is first and foremost to provide a terminol-
ogy which might help to clarify the nature and scope of mathematics in
action. In this way we try to rework a social analysis of mathematics from
being of interest only to the philosophy of mathematics into being of prin-
cipal relevance to the investigation of technology and to social theorizing
in general.
Acknowledgment
This is an edited and updated version of this manuscript, which was pub-
lished in Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal No. 26 (December 2011).
Notes
1. The notion of mathematics in action has been developed in Ole Skovsmose

(2005), Skovsmose and Yasukawa (2009), and in Christensen, Skovsmose,
and Yasukawa (2008). See also Skovsmose (this volume).
2. It is also uncertain in what sense we use “reality” in this formulation. Any
“reality” may be constructed through a description and a perspective, so in
what sense can we talk about reality as being an external object to a descrip-
tion? We will return to this question several times in the following.
3. In Davis and Hersh (1988), the authors have also used the terms description
and prescription in their taxonomy of functions of applied mathematics.
They identified prediction as a third function.
4. This “initial agreement” is a form of subscription, which we are going to ad-
dress in the next section.
5. Narrow scientific or technological rationalism in the field of Science and
Technology Studies has been the subject of critiques that have led to new
ways of understanding science and technologies as human endeavours. See
for example Latour (1987), Latour (1990), Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (1997),
Winner (1980), and MacKenzie and Wajcman (1999).
6. See also Christensen and Skovsmose (2007).
7. Yasukawa has examined the consideration of mathematics as technology in
Yasukawa (1998). Porter (1995) provides case studies of how mathematics
operates as a technology of distance and objectivity.
References
Bijker, W. B., Hughes, T. P., & Pinch, T. (Eds.). (1997). The social construction of techno-
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Christensen, O. R., & Skovsmose, O. (2007). Mathematics as measure. Revista
Brasileira História de Matemática. Especial No. 1 Festschrift Ubiratan
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ed.). Buckingham: Open University Press.
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bility. Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Sense.
Skovsmose, O., & Yasukawa, K. (2009). Formatting power of “mathematics in a
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raman (Eds.), Critical issues in mathematics education (pp. 255–281). Charlotte,
NC: Information Age.
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Yasukawa, K. (1998) Looking at mathematics as technology: implications for
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chapter 5
THE SCOPE AND

LIMITS OF CRITICAL
MATHEMATICS EDUCATION1
Paul Ernest
INTRODUCTION
In the past 25 years these is one scholar above others who has brought criti-
cal mathematics education (CME) into prominence in our field, and that
is Ole Skovsmose. Starting with his 1985 paper he asked why mathematics
education (ME) not only ignores critical education but why, at that time, it
also seemed incompatible with it (Skovsmose, 1985). Although there were
already social, political, and social justice issues (especially gender) on
the agenda (e.g., Bishop, 1988; D’Ambrosio, 1985; Fennema & Sherman,
1977; Howson & Griffiths, 1974; Mellin-Olsen, 1987; Sells, 1978), no-one
had yet explicitly linked critical theory (CT) and the Frankfurt school with
ME in the Anglophone research literature.
Since then Ole Skovsmose has gone on to develop his ideas of CME
in many books and papers. The wide range of connected ideas he treats
in these publications is illustrated by a list of some of the key terms in
his titles. These include: aporism, applications, citizenship, competence,

critical, democracy, dialogical, formatting power, globalization, knowledge,

mathemacy, mathematical archaeology, meaning, modeling, philosophy,
political dimensions, project work, reflective, responsibility, society, social
functions, technology, theoretical framework, uncertainty. These terms
highlight the emphasis on both epistemological issues and social contexts
and issues concerning mathematics, with a special emphasis on education
and social critique/social justice.
Although CME has a number of godparents like Ubi D’Ambrosio, and, in
Scandinavia, Bent Christiansen and Stieg Mellin-Olsen, it is not exaggerat-
ing too much to call Ole Skovsmose the father of CME.2 So it is an honor
and a pleasure to pay homage to him, and to try to add a few thoughts,
following on in his footsteps.
CME is by now well established and recognized worldwide with strong
followings in Europe, North America, and countries of the south such as
Brazil and South Africa. It is central to the concerns of conferences such
as the Political Dimensions of Mathematics Education series, and the con-
tinuing series Mathematics Education and Society. It features regularly in
lectures and papers in most of the international conferences in our field,
such as the International Congress of Mathematical Education, which in
1988 in Budapest featured a whole day devoted to social issues, some of
which were pertinent to CME.
Given this history it is now time to take stock of CME and to consider
what progress has been made in conceptual terms. What is CME, and what
is its scope and limits? Reflexivity is one of the ideas raised by Ole Skovs-
mose (2004). My aim here, as someone who subscribes to its principles, is
to be reflexive about CME, to turn its critical gaze on itself.
THE SCOPE OF CRITICAL MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
The first question to be addressed is: what is the scope of CME? Taking
ME as unproblematic for the moment, the question is then, what is critical
mathematics education? What work does the adjective “critical” do or add
when appended to ME? How does it change, refocus or even enlarge the
scope of ME? To address this it is first necessary to consider the meaning
of criticality itself.
The word “critical” has several meanings. First, a situation or problem
is critical when the situation or problem is at a point of crisis, a turning
point where conditions may deteriorate or improve dramatically, or where
action is needed to guide events in one direction or another. Second, critical
remarks or criticism is the expression of adverse, negative or disapproving
comments or judgments. Third, to critique is to analyze the merits and
faults of something, typically a cultural product, possibly to uncover and
The Scope and Limitsâ•‡â•‡ 101
evaluate its hidden dimensions of meaning, and social and cultural signifi-
cance. These differing but interconnected meanings can be traced back to
Ancient Greece.
Both “crisis” and “critique” are derived from the Greek word krinein, which
refers to “separating,” “judging” and “deciding.” A “critical situation” or a
“crisis” brings about a need for action and involvement, i.e., a need for cri-
tique. (Skovsmose, 2004, p. 3)
The word “critical” was adopted by the Frankfurt School of social phi-
losophers in naming their philosophical approach CT.3 This school was
originally founded 1923 in Frankfurt, during the crisis in Germany fol-
lowing World War I that led to the rise of Hitler and Nazism. There they
developed critical conflict theory drawing on the philosophy of Marx and
Hegel, and on the psychoanalytic theory of Freud. Their theoretical stand-
point was based on a commitment to egalitarian social justice values. It was
a utopian perspective that presupposed the perfectibility of human society,
and it viewed functionalism as an ideology as opposed to a rational, given
“truth,” as some perceived it.
Applying these ideas to ME we have first the notion of crisis: that society
and the teaching and learning of mathematics within it are at a point of
crisis, at a critical point. Ubiratan D’Ambrosio (2008) links the critical state
of the world with mathematics and ME in a powerful statement:
Survival with dignity is the most universal problem facing mankind. Math-
ematics, mathematicians and mathematics educators are deeply involved
with all the issues affecting society nowadays. But we learn, through His-
tory, that the technological, industrial, military, economic and political com-
plexes have developed thanks to mathematical instruments. And also that
mathematics has been relying on these complexes for the material bases
for its continuing progress. It is also widely recognized that mathematics is
the most universal mode of thought. Are these two universals conflicting or
are they complementary? It is sure that mathematicians and math educa-
tors, are concerned with the advancement of the most universal mode of
thought, that is, mathematics. But it is also sure that, as human beings, they
are equally concerned with the most universal problem facing mankind, that
is, survival with dignity. (p. 37)
So the critical state of society provides an overarching concern for

any CME worthy of its name: how to contribute most effectively to the
improvement of the human condition, and how to address the universal
problem facing humankind as identified by D’Ambrosio, namely survival
with dignity?
The second meaning of critical concerns criticism, the expression of
adverse, negative or disapproving comments or judgments. This then
enters into CME in its responsibility to offer values-based criticisms of

society, mathematics and the social practices of ME, most notably the
teaching and learning of mathematics. This cannot be separated from
the function of critique, which in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of mathematics, society, ME, and their complex interrelationships must
necessarily offer criticism. This then raises the specific question, what prob-
lems or areas of concern do CME address, or more broadly, what problems
should it address?
In my view there are four main domains to consider. First, if CME is
to offer a values-based critique it needs to clarify the assumed or base
values from which it begins its critique. What values or ranges of values are
presupposed by CME? Second, if CME is to critique mathematics itself it
needs to address epistemological issues about philosophies, theories, and
perceptions of mathematics. What is mathematics, what philosophies of
mathematics are there, and what presuppositions underlie these views and
philosophies of mathematics?4 Third, in some ways the central force of
the critique of CME is directed at society and social problems and issues,
so a critique of society and of the role of mathematics in society is neces-
sary. Fourth, CME is ultimately directed at ME. Thus CME is concerned
with critiquing the practices of the teaching and learning of mathematics,
including the central institutions in which the teaching and learning take
place, but not neglecting the informal and culturally distributed practices
by means of which mathematics is taught and learned outside of formal
institutions. However, as well as these primary areas of study of ME com-
prising the practices involved in the teaching and learning of mathematics,
ME is also a field of study, an academic discipline, and it is the business
of CME to critique this secondary object of study as well (Ernest, 1998a).
What is the present state of the ideas, theories, research and publications
in ME and what should it be?
Do the four domains of values, epistemology, social theory, and ME
exhaust the scope of CME? Not necessarily; this is just a first listing of the
most obvious domains involved. It might be that ontology, for example,
is significant enough to require separate critical attention from CME.
Another candidate might be economics, given the deep implication of
mathematics in the economic perspective of the world and indeed in the
contribution of Marx’s philosophy to CT, not to mention the international
credit and banking crisis beginning in 2008–09. However I shall be satis-
fied with the four domains outlined above for this chapter. But my analyses
must always remain tentative in case the domains listed prove inadequate
for accommodating all of the problems of and issues for CME.
According to this analysis CME has four main domains of operation
and application. These are values (ethics), epistemology, social theory, and
education, but not surprisingly there is overlap between them. It might
be seen as arbitrary whether to treat the societal place of mathematics as

one of epistemology or social theory, especially if social constructivism is
advanced as a philosophy of mathematics, with its emphasis on the social
construction and warranting of mathematical knowledge (Ernest, 1998b).
Within each of these domains and any issues identified within them, there
is a need for critical examination, especially of received views, ideologies,
power hierarchies, institutions, social-structures, and the combination and
interplay between them, along what Foucault terms the knowledge–power–
money axis.
A further step in this analysis would be to identify particular questions,
problems and issues that fall within these four domains. However, I shall
leave this project for another occasion and move on to exploring the limits
of CME.
THE LIMITS OF CRITICAL MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
In the spirit of reflexivity I want to push CME to the limit. It is clear that
CME depends on critique, on a critical attitude. So what does this mean
when applied to CME itself? In the spirit of reflexivity I want to offer this
critique of CME focusing on the first two parts of its name as headings:
namely critical and mathematics. Doubtless the third term, education could
also be foregrounded in such a critique, but I shall leave that for a future
paper, although I make a few remarks to this end in my conclusion.
Criticality
There is a long and honorable tradition of criticality in philosophy.

There was very relevant work on reason, dialogue, dialectics, and criti-
cism by the Ancient Greeks. Later, in initiating modernism in philosophy,
Descartes’ use of doubt puts critique center stage in epistemological meth-
odology. Criticality was first explicitly headlined in philosophy in Kant’s
major works A Critique of Pure Reason/Practical Reason/Judgement. The most
influential of these is the Critique of Pure Reason, an investigation into the
structure and limitations of reason, which attacks traditional metaphysics
and epistemology. However, the main targets of these books and the earlier
work mentioned are philosophy and philosophical theory itself. Clearly
the idea of discussion, proposing ideas and claims, followed by argument,
rebuttal, and critique, is as old as philosophy itself. However, CT does not
just depend on the use of criticality, but its deployment in a wide ranging
philosophical critique of society and social structures. Although there are
anticipations, this project was given pride of place in the work of Karl
Marx, the grandfather of CT, and of course fully developed in CT itself.
The criticality I wish to discuss here is not the general broad sense as
evidenced throughout philosophy, but the modern political project within
philosophy that critiques society on an ethical basis in terms of democracy,
social justice, and freedom. According to Foucault (1992) this project is
motivated by an attitude or ethos which places importance on explor-
ing and going beyond whatever it is that limits our freedom, however that
freedom is defined (Osberg, 2008).
The Frankfurt school chose the term “critical” as the central descrip-
tor of its philosophical approach because they wanted to critique society
on an ethical basis, and use the new insights granted by Freud’s theories.
Criticality used in this way implies the facility of being able to discriminate
between good and bad in society, being able to identify what Marx termed
“false consciousness.” The use of this formulation immediately places the
critic in a superior position as a person with the ability to tell truth from
falsehood, right from wrong, what is beneficial from what is detrimental.
In other words this posture presupposes that the speaker has an epistemo-
logically or ethically privileged standpoint and judgment. When critical
theorists and Marxists speak of “false consciousness” they are presupposing
that their own consciousness is correct and their models of reality are true
representations. This is both epistemologically and socially problematic.
As Osberg (2008) puts it:
Within this framework, the only way in which the subaltern classes can come
to recognize the “true” workings of power is through outside intervention,
e.g., through some form of education. This is the motivation behind critical
pedagogy (see, e.g., Freire 1996). An insurmountable problem with critical
pedagogy, however, is that it is paternalistic. The “father figure” (i.e., the
“all knowing” educator) has to somehow get the “children” (i.e., working
class adults) to “see” what is “really” going on, a relationship which is itself
hegemonic. (p. 138)
This sits ill with postmodern epistemological humility, according to

which all of our knowledge is tentative and according to which there is no
royal road or privileged access to truth. Who is entitled to say their vision
is the true one? Certain sections of society through their power legiti-
mate particular historically formed discursive formations and discursive
practices, creating a “regime of truth,” but these are contingent and not
logically necessary or empirically true (Foucault, 1972). So one of the out-
standing problems of CT is the assumption of an Archimedean fixed point,
a “God’s eye view” from which epistemological and ethical certainties can
be determined.
Does this make the language of criticality a metanarrative that imposes

a new rationality, at best a rationality of “questioning with a conscience,”
at worst, a holier than thou critique within philosophy and social theory?
Is criticality reinstalled as the replacement for rationality, despite the post-
modern critique of reason from the enlightenment through to modernism?
This is one of the dangers attached to the overvaluation of criticality.
Beyond philosophy, criticality is a much prized feature of academic
writing. All journal papers and chapters in the sciences, humanities, arts, as
well as social science research, including ME, are expected to display criti-
cality. I am expected to write in the “critical style” in this chapter. Criticality
is also the sine qua non of higher level study in our field at undergraduate,
masters and doctoral degree levels, and I would not expect to award higher
grades to students who did not display it in their work. .
Not all in academia accept the automatic privileging of criticality as
Cohen (1993) argues:
I propose to withdraw the automatic “cognitive advantage” of university

critical writing, on the grounds that no such advantage is warranted: our
writings are outfitted for the grooves of “reason,” “society,” “need”—each
of which is a cosmos of mythology unto itself. In making this withdrawal, I
am more or less expressing “no confidence” in the essential activities of the
modern university. (p. x)
The elevation of criticality to the highest level cognitive skill has a

theoretical basis in psychology and assessment theory. Bloom’s (1956) tax-
onomy of educational objectives of the cognitive domain places evaluation
at the highest cognitive level above the creative functions of analysis and
synthesis. Evaluation is primarily about judgments of quality and worth,
including, as it is defined, the abilities of discrimination between differ-
ent concepts and ideas, and the assessment of the value of theories and
representations. These are the functions of being able to think critically,
showing that criticality is positioned at the highest level in terms intellec-
tual demand and complexity of judgment, within this framework.
Thus there is a dominant metanarrative of criticality in academia. One
might even say the criticality is fetishized. It is part of our morally self-
justified perspective in CME. We in CME are after all the “good guys,”
the committed ones who care, who are not deceived by the instrumental-
ism of some of our colleagues. It is us in CME who are fighting for social
truth and social justice. The criticality in our position, in our CME, is our
shield against being deceived in our work. Is it not the essential capacity
that enables us to discern the manipulations, deceptions and exploitation
around us in society? But to be a critical academic often means to stand
above, beyond or outside of the social problems and issues we judge. It can
mean to be dispassionate and disconnected, lacking commitment to the

struggles we advocate or endorse.
Despite its elevation and fetishization, or perhaps because of it, there is
a tradition of thought that rejects criticality as being of the highest intel-
lectual level. The role of the intellectual whose role is to exercise criticality,
that of the critic, is seen by some to be parasitic in the arenas of music,
theatre, painting, and other creative arts. For in these pursuits, the prac-
tice is one of engaged creation, made up of artists pursuing their creative
vision. On their backs sit parasitic critics who are judgmental without being
creative, and through these activities making and breaking careers accord-
ing to their own whims.
Such a perspective does not see criticality as the highest form of intellec-
tual functioning. It does not accord the high status to criticality that much
of modern thought does. One of Bloom’s closest associates Krathwohl,
repudiates criticality in favor of creativity. Anderson and Krathwohl (2001)
challenge the positioning of evaluation as the highest level of cognitive
thought. Instead they suggest a revised taxonomy of the cognitive domain
which is the same as Bloom’s (1956) original except for the addition of a
new top category “creating,” which is about being able to create new knowl-
edge within the domain. This echoes artists’ views of the role of critic as
secondary, following on from committed creation in the arts.
Such an unfavorable perspective on criticality is not new. Kierkegaard
(1962) argues that philosophical reflection has undermined commitment
in the West. He notes and regrets the victory of critical detachment over
involved commitment. According to Dreyfus (1993, p. 2) “His whole work
was devoted to the question: How can we get meaning and commitment
back into our lives once we have gotten into the passionless, reflective atti-
tude we are now in?”
Building on the insights of Kierkegaard, Heidegger develops his own
complex metaphysics of being. This is based on the idea that our under-
standing of ourselves and our world presupposes something that cannot
be fully articulated, a kind of knowing-how rather than a knowing-that.
At the deepest level such knowing is embodied in our social skills, how
we interact with and share experiences and practices with others, rather
than in our concepts, beliefs, and values. Heidegger argues that these
cultural practices can make our lives meaningful only insofar as they are
and stay unarticulated. Critical reflection is necessary in some situations,
but it cannot and should not play the central role that it has in the Western
philosophical tradition. What is most important and meaningful in our
lives is not and should not be accessible to critical reflection. The more
our know-how is formulated and objectified as knowing-that, the more it
is available and called up for critical questioning, the more it loses its grip
on us (Dreyfus, 1993).
Thus from this perspective, while criticality has its place and value, it
should not dominate our thought or being. It must never be the be-all and
end-all of our being, whether as professionals or as human beings. It is
by no means an untrammeled good. Much of our professional judgment
and professional practice is based on “knowing how it is done” rather than
explicit rules or procedures that can be applied thoughtfully or mechani-
cally. Even in mathematics judgments as to the correctness of a published
proof or a student’s written solution to a problem are based on implicit pro-
fessional “know how” acquired from practice (Ernest, 1999). Kuhn (1970)
makes this point forcibly for all of the sciences. According to his account,
at the heart of a scientific paradigm are examples of accepted reasoning
and problem solving. It is the skilful following and application of examples
rather than the use of explicit rules that constitutes working in the para-
digm.5 Criticality is not an ultimate good. It is a means to an end, namely
that of moving toward better theories and a better and more just society.
When it becomes an end in itself, when it is fetishized, then it can be an
obstacle to both creativity and to progressing toward a better society.
Mathematics
In looking critically at the role of mathematics I want to ask what might

be to many a surprising question. How does mathematics itself limit,
restrict or stunt the good effects of ME or CME? This may be surprising
because most of us in ME and CME normally assume that mathematics is
intrinsically valuable. I shall not rehearse the arguments that epistemologi-
cal and philosophical distortions in views about the nature of mathematics
can cause such negative effects. I leave such arguments to one side as me
and others have pursued them extensively elsewhere (Ernest, 1991, 1995,
1998b; Powell & Frankenstein, 1997; Skovsmose, 1994). A fallibilist critique
of traditional philosophies of mathematics is a recognized contribution
within CME.
Instead I want to throw down a more radical challenge. It is usually
assumed without question that mathematics is a good thing, and that the
teaching and learning of mathematics is one of the goods of society. It
provides useful, self-enhancing and marketable skills and certification
that further people’s life chances. Mathematics provides fulfillment or
the means to fulfillment in employment and through people’s economic
well-being. Mathematics offers learners an enriching way of seeing and
understanding the world, as well as constituting a major connecting strand
in human culture. Lastly, mathematics provides learners with an essential
component for functioning as critical citizens in modern society, especially
when they are adults, and is an essential adjunct of modern democracy.
All of these claims are true, to some extent, especially when the teaching
of mathematics is done well, or better, inspirationally. I have argued for
all of these aims and outcomes as have many others in ME and CME. But
none of these claims addresses the deeper, more fundamental question. Is
mathematics edifying or damaging to the human spirit and more widely
for society? Is the mathematical way of thinking and seeing society and the
world around us one that enhances or degrades the human spirit? This is
the radical challenge that I throw down for ME and CME.
As mathematics educators we take it for granted that it is a good thing
to devote resources to mathematics, and that the teaching and learning
of mathematics deserves a privileged place in the education of all from
kindergarten to the end of statutory schooling. When mathematics is privi-
leged in its place and weight in the curriculum, or in the allocation of
resources, as it usually is, we assume that this is right and proper, that
mathematics merits this treatment. After all we (we being mathematics
educators and critical mathematics educators) all love mathematics as the
language of unrivalled intellectual power, beauty, and applicability. Some
see it as the language of the universe, or God’s language, others as the
“Crest of the Peacock” (Joseph, 1991) or the jewel in the crown of human
cultural achievement. Indeed a strong case can be made that it deserves
such epithets.
In addition, mathematics is the subject in which we all excelled, the
subject that now rewards us handsomely with well paid academic jobs.
Western academics are probably in the top 5 to 10% of the best paid
workers, and as such are undoubtedly in the top 3 to 5% of earners world
wide. We have no needs or reasonable wants that cannot be met in terms
of food, housing, possessions, lifestyle, consumption, travel, and future
security. We can easily own copies of most of the great works of literature
and painting in our own private libraries, and many of the great works
of music and film in the Western cultural tradition, as well as many more
frivolous cultural products. We are not rich within our own society, but still
live like the princes of earlier times, with material resources beyond the
dreams of avarice of 50% of the world’s population. Our problems are not
where the next meal or drink will come from, but how to avoid overeating
and the obesity epidemic in the West. In our area of work we are virtually
all extremely privileged, and our bounty is a by-product of our commit-
ment to our field.
Is everybody so well rewarded by their involvement with mathematics
throughout the years of schooling? No. Can there be any element of self-
serving in our endorsement of ME? No, of course not. We promote what
we truly love and believe in, and our prosperity is merely a desirable but
accidental by-product of our enthusiasm, prowess, years of study and the
high regard that our society holds us in. After all, mathematics underpins
economics, science, technology, computers, communications technology

and so many of the innovations and so much of the infrastructure of the
modern world. Hence mathematics is a thing of great practical import and
a thing of great beauty, and as such it is both intrinsically and extrinsically
valuable.
Not everybody shares this vision. The romantic poet William Blake
depicted Newton in his famous eponymous painting as someone scrab-
bling in the dirt with his mundane geometry and physics, his gaze turned
downwards instead of uplifted toward a vision of heaven. Blake’s Proverbs
of Hell (1975, p. xviii) include the following:
The hours of folly are measur’d by the clock; but of wisdom, no clock can
measure.
Bring out number, weight and measure in a year of dearth
By these dicta he means that we only need to measure when there are
reasons to control and ration resources. We only need to obey the clock
and the timetable when there is a mundane necessity for regularity. We
only need to count and calculate in our lives when engaged in mundane,
instrumental thought. Human being, joy, wisdom are degraded when sub-
jected to the calculative reasoning that knows the price of everything but
the value of nothing (to paraphrase Oscar Wilde). One might continue in
this vein to ask: where is the space left in modern Western living for the
celebration of the self, the joy in the other, and the development of the
bottomless well of the spirit?
The vision I want to develop is that subjection to mathematics in school-
ing from halfway through one’s first decade, to near the end of one’s second
decade, and beyond if one chooses, as we in ME have done, shapes, struc-
tures, and transforms (perhaps even deforms) our identity and spirit. I
do not claim that mathematics itself is bad. But the manner in which the
mathematical way of seeing things and relating to the world of our experi-
ence is integrated into schooling, society, and above all the interpersonal
and power relations in society results in what I claim is the degradation
of the human spirit. This is a contingency, an historical construction, that
results from the way that mathematics has been recruited into the masculin-
ized systems thinking (Baron-Cohen, 2003) and separated values (Gilligan,
1982) that dominates western bureaucratic thinking. It also results from
the way mathematics serves a culture of having rather than being (Fromm,
1978).
The ancient Greeks were careful to separate out the geometrical think-
ing of pure mathematics, with its edifying, poetical connotations, from the
logistical thinking of calculative mundane applied arithmetic of commerce
and business. Of course this was to protect the high minds of the slave
owning classes from the lowly practical thinking of the servants, slaves, and
merchants. But this separation was in vain and since the times of Renais-
sance mathematics in Italy, if not before, right the way through modern
times, there has been a fusion of these two dimensions of mathematics.
Not always in schooling, however. The British Public Schools of the past
150 years tried to keep mathematics pure and unsullied by practical con-
cerns for the children of the ruling elite.6 At the same time the universal
elementary education brought into Victorian Britain in 1870 included only
simple and practical arithmetic (and reading and writing) to produce the
new generation of clerks needed by the growth of business and commerce.
Table 5.1 illustrates the arithmetic mandated for all schools. This is speci-
fied in six hierarchical levels called “standards.”
Table 5.1.â•… The Six Standards for Arithmetic

Subject Arithmetic
Standard I Form on blackboard or slate, from dictation, figures up to 20;
name at sight figures up to 20: add and subtract figures up to 10,
orally, and from examples on blackboard.
Standard II A sum in simple addition and subtraction, and the multiplication
table.
Standard III A sum in any simple rule as far as short division (inclusive).
Standard IV A sum in compound rules (money).
Standard V A sum in compound rules (common weights and measures).
Standard VI A sum in practice or bills of parcels.
Source: Maclure (1965)
The Standards shown in Table 5.1 are unambiguously practical in their

orientation. There is no fancy mathematics to elevate the mind, just practi-
cal social arithmetic. No wonder working class Blake (already dead nearly
a half century) regarded the subject as mundane and antipoetical.
Elsewhere (Ernest, 2008) I have indicated some of the ways in which
mathematics shapes the way we perceive the world. As I and others have
noted, the mathematization of modern society and modern life has been
growing exponentially, so that now virtually the whole range of human
activities and institutions are conceptualized and regulated numerically. In
modernity and its aftermath the scientific worldview has come to dominate.
This worldview prioritizes what are perceived as the objective, tangible,
real, material and factual over the subjective, imaginary or experienced
reality, and over values, beliefs and feelings (i.e., objects over persons and
relationships). This perspective rests on a Newtonian realist worldview,
etched deep into the public consciousness as an underpinning “root meta-

phor” (Pepper, 1948), despite the fact that relativity and quantum theories
have shown it to be untenable.
In late modernity or postmodernity this viewpoint has developed
further, and a new root metaphor has come to dominate, namely that of
the accountant’s balance sheet. From this perspective the ultimate reality is
the world of money, finance, and other associated quantifiables, including
the financial value attributed to any object, activity, transaction or practice.
Primary qualities of the objective, tangible, real, and factual are still valued
over secondary qualities of subjectivity, values, and feelings but now all
are judged by what one might term their numerical shadows; that is, their
market or financial value. Processes, including teaching and other personal
services, are valued, but only in terms of the “value added” between their
inputs and outputs, based on the accountant’s ideal image of the factory.
It has been argued that the computer spreadsheet has helped to extend
the grip and power of this new root metaphor because once the relations
between variables are embodied in cell defining formulas (representing
process outcomes) then alternative futures can be mapped and compared
through the attribution of different initial values to variables (Naughton,
2009). Alternative futures can be judged, literally, by the “bottom line,” that
is, their financial outcome under this scheme. Possible changes to condi-
tions of employment, rates of pay, or productivity can all be imagined and
compared with respect to this bottom line. Furthermore, the beauty—or
is it the horror?—of such a metaphor is that it is not restricted in use to
the traditional market domains of manufacturing, commerce, and finance.
Through the attribution of measures of input, output, and productivity it
can be applied to all services including medicine, care provision, educa-
tion, and schooling, and even to warfare, to ascertain their bottom lines in
a literally heartless way. For example, Bloomfield (1991) uses the phrase a
“fetish of calculation” to describe the way a new quantitatively orientated
management information system has transformed medical practice in the
U.K. national health system. This is just one example from a new literature
on the sociology of calculation that studies how calculation is dominant in
modern social life, such as the central role of calculative practices in trust
relationships in the U.K. retail sector (Free, 2008).
The spread of the market model through governance or managerialism,
is well known. Many aspects of modern society are now regulated by deeply
embedded complex mathematical systems, usually automated, that carry
out complex tasks of information capture, policy implementation, manage-
rial scrutiny, and resource allocation. Niss (1983) named this the formatting
power of mathematics and Skovsmose (1994) terms the systems involved
realized abstractions. Most of contemporary industrialized society is subjected
to surveillance and regulated in this way, achieved by the penetration of
computers and information and communication technologies into all levels

of industry, commerce, bureaucracy and institutional regulation. This pen-
etration of society is only possible because the politicians’, bureaucrats’,
and business leaders’ systems of exchange, government, control, and sur-
veillance were already quantified, as they were in a more rudimentary form
5,000 years ago giving rise to the birth of mathematics (Høyrup, 1980).
However, a less remarked outcome is the inscription of this overarching
worldview in the identity and subjectivity of modern citizens. Individuals’
conceptualizations of their lives and the world about them are through a
highly quantified framework. The requirement for efficient workers and
employees for the profitable regulation of production, motivates the struc-
turing and control of space and time, and for workers’ self-identities to be
constructed and constituted through this structured space–time–econom-
ics frame (Foucault, 1970, 1976). Thus we understand our lives through
the conceptual meshes of number, measures, calculation, and mathemat-
ics more generally. This discourse and way of seeing and being positions
individuals as regulated subjects and workers in an information controlling
society and state, as beings in a quantified universe, and as consumers in
postmodern consumerist society.
One of the most important ways that this is achieved is through the
universal teaching and learning of mathematics from a very early age and
throughout the school years. The central and universal role of arithmetic in
schooling provides the symbolic tools for quantified thought, including not
only the ability to conceptualize situations quantitatively, but a compulsion
to do so. This compulsion first comes from without, but is appropriated,
internalized, and elaborated as part of the postmodern citizen’s identity.
We cannot stop calculating and assigning quantified values to everything,
in a society in which what matters is what counts or is counted.
The high penetration of everyday life, the media, and other dimensions
of culture by quantitative and calculative thought cultivates and reinforces
the development of quantified identities in modern citizens. This is now so
widespread and universal that it is not only taken for granted and invisible,
but is also seen to be necessary and inevitable, despite being a contingent
social construction. We see the world and all the dimensions of our experi-
ence through the conceptual frameworks of number, calculation, shape,
structural pattern, probability, and in terms of inert objects, mechanical
processes, and material or symbolic transformations. My argument is that
in these ways mathematics is deeply implicated in this degradation of
human identity and the human spirit.
Mathematics as presented in education is usually, although not neces-
sarily, a vehicle for separated values, characterized by Gilligan (1982) as
focussing on and preferring rules, abstraction, objectification, imperson-
ality, disconnected impartiality, dispassionate reason, and analysis. This
perspective tends to be atomistic and object-centered. It is contrasted with

the holistic and relational (person-centered) focus of connected values.
According to Gilligan’s theory separated values are stereotypically mascu-
line values that although occurring in both men and women, are dominant
in many social constructions of masculinity.7 Irrespective of the gendered
aspect of the theory, mathematics as most widely presented in school and
society embodies the characteristics of these separated values.
Separated values have come to dominate many of the institutions and
structures in Western society, and men have been encouraged to develop
and express these values as overriding parts of their identity. Women who
wish to succeed in the world of politics, business, commerce, and even
academia have also been encouraged to develop and express these sepa-
rated values, often at the expense of connected values. In fact, in much of
modern Western society, especially in the Anglophone world, connected
values centered on personal relationships, human connections, empathy,
humanism, caring, feeling, involved or holistic outlooks are often regarded
as soft, weak, unprofessional, and something to be outgrown with maturity.
Even doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers, and others in human and caring
professions are encouraged and rewarded for suppressing this part of their
selves.
In their place, separated values taken to their limit underpin modern,
masculinized scientific rationality which unchecked has become a monster,
developing ever more horrific means of mass killing via the arms trade,
feeding wars, despoiling the environment, arrogantly interfering with
human and animal genes, treating experimental and domestic animals
as insensate objects, following psychopathic behaviors in multinational
corporations (Bakan, 2004), and pursuing fiscal and trade policies which
condemn much of the world to abject poverty and misery.
There are even ways of calculating whose lives are worth saving by
medicine, and whose are not, making calculations in a new unit of quan-
tification: QALYs (Quality of Added Life Years). The rationale for this is
that a method is needed for the allocation of limited resources to a large
pool of persons needing treatment. However, the subjection of human
compassion, of the alleviation of suffering and illness in very rich societies,
to cost-benefit analysis is inescapably degrading to the human spirit, for it
forces caring professionals to objectify and treat persons as objects and not
as fellow human beings.
Of course my list includes extreme examples of what happens when
decision making is purely driven by separated instrumental rationality,
which has already been subjected to critique by CT.8 Perhaps what is most
alarming is that most persons would not be shocked or outraged by this.
We are now so used to the economic, instrumental model of life and human
governance, that most will merely see it as an unquestionable practical

reality, real politik, simply a necessary evil.
My argument is that mathematics has played a central role in normal-
izing these ways of seeing. From the very start of their education children
are schooled in instrumental and calculative ways of seeing and being. The
development of mathematical identity in schools requires that from the age
of five or soon after, depending on the country, children will:
1. acquire an object-oriented language of objects and processes,

2. learn to conduct operations on and with them without any intrinsic
reasons or sense of value (deferred meaning),
3. decontextualize their world of experience and replace it by a delib-
erately unrealistic and very stylized model composed of simplified
static objects and reversible processes,
4. suppress subjectivity, experiential being, and feelings in their math-
ematical operations on objects, processes, and models,
5. learn to prioritize and value the outcomes of such modelling above
any personal or connected values and feelings, and apply these
outcomes irrespective of such subjective dimensions to domains
including the human “for your [their] own good” (Miller, 1983).
King (1982) researched the mathematics in 5–6 year old infant class-
rooms. He found that mathematics involves and legitimates the suspension
of conventional reality more than any other school subject. People are
colored in with red and blue faces. “A class exercise on measuring height
became a histogram. Marbles, acorns, shells, fingers and other counters
become figures on a page, objects become numbers” (King, 1982, p. 244).
In the world of school mathematics even the meanings of the simplified
representations of reality that emerge are dispensable.
Most teachers were aware that some children could not read the instructions
properly, but suggested they “know how to do it (the mathematics) without
it.” ... Only in mathematics could words be left meaningless. (King, 1982,
244)
It is no mere coincidence that the instrumental understanding (Mellin-

Olsen, 1987; Skemp, 1976) that is so much discussed in ME as a problem
issue in the psychology of learning mathematics is a form of instrumental
reasoning.
Elsewhere I have explored the development of mathematical subjectivity
and identity and how these and the semiotics of mathematics require such
characteristics, including decontextualization, stripping away of subjectivity,
forbidding the use of indexicals, and any references to contexts or persons,
either self or others (Ernest, 2003). Of themselves these characteristics are

not bad. Thousands of years of mathematical history show that they are not
necessarily linked to the degradation of society or human beings. But in late
modernity, perhaps the past century, these characteristics have been used
as a vehicle for new values, new ways of conditioning persons to serve new
exploitative ends. Instead of the wage slaves of the industrial revolution,
in late modernity, and postmodernity capitalism requires (and produces)
mind slaves that necessarily see everything in quantitative and calculative
terms, both on the supply (production) side and the demand (consumption)
side, as the economists put it. Thus in postmodernity, when we attribute a
value to something, whether it be an object, a service or even a person, it
is now usually a calculated value rather than a felt value. In any evaluation
of worth it is increasingly difficult to leave out perceptions of magnitude
according to some measure, and this is most often based on cash value as a
measure of worth.9 To the extent that such calculative thinking is dominant,
our values, and evaluations have been diminished, taking the human spirit
one step further away from humanity, toward degradation.
There are further theories that I wish to draw on to deepen and
extend this argument. For example, Baron-Cohen (2003) proposes his
empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory. This characterizes two basic brain
types, the E brain that is predominantly hard-wired for empathy, and the
S brain that is predominantly hard-wired for understanding and building
systems. Systemizing is the drive to analyze and explore a system, to extract
underlying rules that govern the behavior of a system and to construct
systems. The systemizer intuitively figures out how things work, or what
the underlying rules are controlling a system. Systems can be as varied as
a pond, a vehicle, a computer, a mathematical equation, or even an army
unit, to use his examples. They all operate on inputs and deliver outputs,
using rules.
In the E brain, empathizing is stronger than systemizing. In the S brain
systemizing is stronger than empathizing. Baron-Cohen (2003) also posits
the balanced B brain in individuals who are equally strong in their system-
izing and empathizing.10 He has constructed tests to determine brain types,
using statements such as the following: “When I read the newspaper, I
am drawn to tables of information, such as football league scores or stock
market indices,” and “In maths, I am intrigued by the rules and patterns
governing numbers.” Agreement with these is indicative of an S brain.
This very brief account of a complex theory fails to do it justice. However,
although it is open to a number of theoretical and methodological criti-
cisms it is a useful descriptor of the kind of thinking (S brain thinking)
that mathematics, as it is commonly taught and used, promotes. Unlike
Baron-Cohen (2003) who argues that such brain differences are biological
in origin, I am claiming that elements of modern culture in the West are
emphasizing and exaggerating such systematizing interests and ways of

thinking, together with separated values, through their institutionaliza-
tion, promotion, and recruitment for a bureaucratic consumerist society.
Furthermore, my claim is that the teaching and learning of mathematics
in schools and colleges is implicated in this culture.
Erich Fromm (1978) offers a critical view of modern Western society with
its emphasis on having instead of being.
The dream of being independent masters of our lives ended when we began
awakening to the fact that we have become cogs in the bureaucratic machine,
with our thoughts, feelings, and tastes manipulated by government and in-
dustry and the mass communications they control. (p. 2)
Fromm (1978) goes on to argue that there is a pathological modern

emphasis on status, wealth, or possessions, all extrinsic markers of having or
of ownership, and that this is part of the sickness of the modern condition.
In his words, we have become marketing characters “based on experienc-
ing oneself as a commodity, and one’s value not as a ‘use value’ but as an
‘exchange value’ ... his value depends on his success, depends on his sale-
ability, depends on approval by others” (James, 2008, p. 47).
These having and exchange values emphasize objects and prioritize them
over what he proposes to be of real or intrinsic value, namely human being,
the sources of contentment, growth, caring, connections, and empathy, in
short, personal and social development. An emphasis on having underpins
the modern culture of consumerism, and of course the foregrounding
of having, of ownership, as essential to human happiness, is of necessity
accompanied by its opposite, namely that of being lacking. For what you do
not yet own, what you aspire to have, you lack. So the culture of having by
necessity constructs an identity of lack and deficiency.11 Inescapably tied up
in having/lacking is quantification. But quantification, as an overarching
scheme for interpretation associated with having, involves the perception
of all things as objects to be counted, added, subtracted, divided, multi-
plied, accumulated, and possessed. It is difficult to imagine the existence
of the having mode of being without a deeply embedded quantitative and
calculative mode of thinking; that is, without a training in mathematics.
Thus mathematics is necessary, if not sufficient, for the having mode of
being, as is the instrumental reasoning of which it is a part.
Martin Buber’s (2000) ethical theology similarly hinges on a contrast
between objects and persons. Buber emphasizes the I-Thou relationship
between persons as mutually respectful human beings, as opposed to the
I-It relationship in which we own, make or otherwise interact with objects as
things. The problem of values that I am describing emerges when humans
see and treat persons in an I-It relation, viewing them as insensate objects
to be used. As such they can be manipulated, operated upon, used to

serve one’s interests, and otherwise treated in ways that are disrespectful
when applied to any sensate being, let alone human beings. Buber is also
concerned about the seeing and treatment of the world at large. Rather
than being something deserving of respect, awe, and reverence, the world
becomes just another object to be exploited or used to serve any purpose.
As Heidegger (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 54) puts it, even “the world now appears
as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought.” As we know this
attitude has lead to the despoliation of the environment, extinctions, and
threats to the survival of many species, and is leading us toward an ecologi-
cal and environmental disaster of catastrophic proportions.
Overall, my claim is that mathematics is implicated and complicit in the
degradation of the human spirit through its role in conditioning people
from an early age to have an operational, object-orientated, systematiz-
ing, separated, having, calculating, and I–it relationship with the self, with
other persons and with the world. Mathematics is the essence of instrumen-
tal reason, with its focus on means to ends and not on underlying values.
Written mathematics came from rulers, traders, and their clerks control-
ling and keeping track of taxes, tribute, and trade in Mesopotamia around
5,000 years ago. Mathematics was invented as the science that controlled
materials at a distance, using human agents to act out its imperatives of
accumulation (addition, multiplication), taking (subtraction, division), and
creating semiotic surrogates for its shares of the spoils (answers to calcu-
lations). Mathematics is the semiotics of object control. Once invented
mathematics does not have to be used this way, but when mathematics is
combined with power it is always the language of imperatives, of symbolic
control. Mathematical symbols are surrogates for controlled objects, symbol
manipulations represent (or originate in) the actual hands-on manipula-
tions of objects. Power elites use mathematical discourse as a text, a script
specifying the actions that subjects must act out. Through its imposition
by the powerful, mathematics is the ultimate technical science that oper-
ates on signs and things, and teaches its users just to follow its orders, not
to question, or when mathematical mastery is achieved, to question only
in and about issues of narrow, technical virtuosity, located in hermetically
sealed, and hence value-free compartments.
Mathematics is more richly studded with imperatives than any other
school subject (Ernest, 1998b; Rotman, 1993). Mathematical operations
require rigid rule following. At its most creative mathematics allows choices
among multiple strategies, but each of the lines pursued involves strict rule
following.12 Mathematics is very unforgiving too. There is no redundancy
in its language and any errors in rule following derails the procedures and
processes. The net result is a social training in obedience, an apprentice-
ship in strict subservience to the printed page. Mathematics is not the only
subject that plays this role but it is by far the most important in view of its
imperative rich and rule-governed character.
Overall, I claim that throughout its complicity in teaching a separated,
object-orientated way of seeing the world, experience, and human beings,
through its training in rule following and often unquestioning obedience
to imperatives, mathematics inculcates a way of seeing and being that helps
degrade the human spirit. It focuses on objects rather than on people,
feeling, empathy, caring, and being. It supports the spreadsheet metaphor
that values everything in terms of its bottom line. It has been recruited into
the postmodern Western project of consumerism, with its emphasis on
having rather than being, lacking rather than becoming. It dehumanizes
all that it represents and transforms the outlook, values, identity, and sub-
jectivity of all who study mathematics in the ways indicated above. Kelman
(1973) argues that ethical considerations are eroded when three conditions
are present: namely, standardization, routinization, and dehumanization.
Since the nature of mathematics and its cooption into governance and
consumerism promotes these conditions, the concomitant erasure of ethics
is no surprise.
Of course a major part of the project and indeed the duty of CME
is to counter the cooption of mathematics into consumerism. Fromm,
whose critique of having over being is drawn on above, is a member of the
Frankfurt School, as are the critics of instrumental reasoning. Since I am
drawing on the insights of CT to critique CME it may be the case that
we in ME and CME have not yet sufficiently learned from the insights
of CT, and are complicit in promoting instrumental reasoning through
ME, despite our commitment to the ideals of CME. Perhaps we need to
renew our understandings of CT and apply it more vigorously to ME. The
overtly espoused goals of CME are to make the teaching and learning of
mathematics empowering and liberating, rather than imprisoning and
restrictive. But I have not seen a critical discussion of the role of mathemat-
ics in deforming identity so as to promote a quantitative, calculative, and
object-centered outlook. Perhaps even as critical mathematics educators we
may be complicit in promoting this outlook.
Finally, I need to reiterate that mathematics and ME are not of necessity
involved in the degradation of the human spirit. Mathematics as a disci-
pline is 5,000 years old and postmodern consumerism is only a century or
less old. This alone demonstrates their independence. However, the low
level statutory imposition of mathematics universally is much more recent
than the discipline itself, and coincides with the growth of late capitalism
and consumerism. The spread of the values that I have decried, and the
growth of bureaucratic, surveillant, and controlling governments is more
recent still. Putting all these together we have the state of affairs that I have
strongly critiqued. Whether this would be possible without mathematics is
something I doubt. Whether the majority would be better off as human

beings if they were not subjected to mathematics, leaving aside the benefits
of scientific advance and technology, is a question that I cannot answer.
But it is by no means certain that the answer must be in the negative.
Nor is it a priori certain to me that survival with dignity, the critical issue
facing humankind described by D’Ambrosio (2008) earlier in this chapter,
is enhanced for all by universal ME as we now have it.
The challenge for CME is to retrieve and reshape school mathematics so
that it is empowering for all peoples and also edifying for the human spirit
of all. This task may also necessitate the reshaping of schooling as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Education is the institutionalized process whereby we turn the enthusiasm

and readiness to learn of the young child into the achievements and pre-
paredness for adulthood of adolescents and late teenagers.13 In education
we turn promise into reality, and we have more time and opportunity to do
so than ever before in the history of humankind. Despite these increased
opportunities, or perhaps through them, school education still serves as a
powerful fractional distillation device that separates off different sectors of
the population for different rewards. The most decisive factor determining
such rewards remains social class or socioeconomic status. Students emerge
from this distillation device with different levels of cultural capital, and this
is convertible into life chances. CME has the overriding aim of combating
these divisive, class-reproductive effects. Nevertheless, all of us in educa-
tion are in some way complicit with the system that distributes prizes along
the lines of cultural capital. In ME and CME we enjoy theorizing from
our ivory towers, but rarely get our hands dirty on the frontlines of social
struggle, or even at the chalkface. We may write risky thoughts, as I aspire
to have done here, but the greatest threat to us is rarely more than a raised
eyebrow, rather than a raised fist or a lost job.
From the perspective of CME as an academic specialism, it is enlighten-
ing to compare it with Critical Management Studies (CMS), which faces
similar dilemmas as us in business schools. Reedy (2008) acknowledges
the impotence of scholars in reforming corporate management, or even in
resisting it, a task that given the overriding profit motive in business, would
seem far harder than our reform agenda for education.
There is not much evidence that the majority of CMS academics consistently
act to mobilize opposition to corporate management. With honorable ex-
ceptions, it is not evident that risks are taken by resisting authority. Mostly,
those of us in CMS accommodate ourselves, albeit uneasily, with our host,
the university business school. The publishing of critical articles in academic
journals, or their presentation at conferences, almost exclusively for an audi-

ence of other academics, is difficult to take seriously as a form of activism,
particularly when it is usually pursued as part of a conventional academic
career path. It is also difficult to identify the sort of organizational structures
that would constitute CMS as a movement as opposed to a dissenting aca-
demic interest group. (Reedy, 2008, p. 62)
Most CMS academics remain willing, if sometimes ambivalent, participants

in the hierarchical systems of titles, celebrity, and preferment that are pecu-
liar to university life. Despite this awareness, CMS academics are still por-
trayed rather heroically as dissenters ... activists ... or even hell-raisers and
muck-rakers.... It is clear from this that for many CMS academics the identity
of radical outsider is a highly attractive one despite their participation in
professional careers. (Reedy, 2008, p. 65)
CMS does not tend to turn the gaze of its formidable theoretical insight into
critiquing its own formation, despite its justifiable criticism of the claims to
expertise and superiority implicit within managerialism. (Reedy, 2008, p. 68)
The dangers for and impotence of reformers in all areas is something

of which we must be aware. Those of us in CME must be continually on
our guard against complacency. CME must not be reduced to mere critical
pedagogy, understood narrowly as nothing more than teaching technique,
the means to an end that may not question its ends. Critical pedagogy
understood this way can itself become a form of instrumental reason, a pal-
liative mode of teaching that pats itself on the back for its moral superiority
without challenging the received order. For as Gur-Ze’Ev (2005) points out,
critical pedagogy has failed to meet the emancipatory challenges it set for
itself, becoming part and parcel of normalizing education. And Gur-Ze’Ev
is not even restricting his remarks to the narrow domain of critical peda-
gogy that I have specified here. Osberg (2008) expands on this idea of the
normalizing function of critical pedagogy:
The ultimate goal of critical pedagogy is to bring about a “critical Utopia” ...
in which everyone operates according to the same order of rationality which
is itself beyond critique and presumed to be universally good. In this regard
critical pedagogy can be shown to have not “done away” with the socialising
function of schooling so much as replace one (“bad”) social agenda with a
different (“good”) one. (Osberg, 2008, p. 152)
To resist such dangers CME must turn its critical gaze on itself reflex-
ively, it must “turn the gaze of its formidable theoretical insight into
critiquing its own formation” (Reedy, 2008, p. 68). We must continue to
think of ourselves as Bourdieu’s (1998) “critical intellectuals,” providing
counterdiscourses to those of ME and enabling others to better resist and

transform current education practice. This is something that Ole Skovs-
mose has done throughout his career, and continues to do (Skovsmose,
2004). My own modest contribution here is to hold the taken-for-granted
concepts of criticality and mathematics up for scrutiny, and to ask if they
are unquestionably good. However much more work needs to be done,
both in theory and practice if we want to pursue D’Ambrosio’s goal of
“survival with dignity” for all.
NOTES
1. This chapter is dedicated To Ole Skovsmose.

2. Another seminal contribution is that of Frankenstein (1983).
3. The word “critical” was also adopted by Karl Popper to describe the philoso-
phy of science that he first developed in 1920s and 1930s Vienna (also, co-
incidentally at the same time as the Frankfurt School, during the post-World
War I crisis), and which was published in his 1934 work Logik der Forschung
(Popper, 1959). He terms this philosophy “critical fallibilism,” and it main-
tains that all scientific theory and knowledge is falsifiable. While he did not
extend his fallibilism to include mathematics, as is well known his protégé
Imre Lakatos (1963–64) made that extension (Ernest, 1998b).
4. I acknowledge Badiou’s (2008) claim the philosophy of mathematics is not a
branch of epistemology but has an equal independent existence as a realm of
thought. But I use the term epistemology loosely here to cover philosophical
theorizing about knowledge in general.
5. Karl Popper, Kuhn’s rival in twentieth century philosophy of science, placed
critique, in the form of falsification, conjectures, and refutations, at the heart
of his philosophy. However, like the rest of his Logic of Scientific Discovery
(Popper, 1959), this operates only in the contexts of justification and not in
the more creative contexts of discovery, where new theories are generated.
Over that realm, like his other rival Wittgenstein (1922), he draws a veil of
silence.
6. In school geometry of the mid-late nineteenth century only ungraduated
straight edges were permitted, as opposed to graduated rulers. The latter
were regarded as low objects of practical value that besmirched the pure
Euclidean geometry of straight edge and compass(es). Children of the elite
had no need of such low practical skills as were represented by measuring
instruments. Do I hear echoes of Blake here?
7. Reviews of empirical evidence do not support any easy dichotomization of
male and female values, with differences in ethical views much greater with-
in than across sexes (Bradbeck, 1983). However, Larrabee (1993) suggests
that there are significant differences by late adolescence and adulthood, and
Hoffman (1977) found that girls were more likely to be empathetic than
boys in exhibiting emotional reactions to another’s feelings. These reports
are quite dated, and should be treated with caution given the changes in,
for example, sex-stereotyping in society and sex-differences in mathematical

performance over this period. Mendick (2007) is critical of the reification of
gender differences based on minor reported differences in measures of per-
formance. Any generalized accounts of such cognitive differences between
the sexes runs the risk of reinforcing stereotypical views of gender differ-
ences as essential or natural, when in fact most gender differences are simply
social constructions.
8. Mathematics is a central part of instrumental reason/rationality, a mode of
thought critiqued by critical theorists including Adorno, Fromm, Habermas,
Marcuse, and Horkheimer. Instrumental reason is the objective form of ac-
tion or thought which treats its objects simply as a means and not as an
end in itself. It focuses on the most efficient or most cost-effective means to
achieve a specific end, without reflecting on the value of that end. It is seen
as the dominant form of reason within modern capitalist society, leading to
the destruction of nature, the rise of fascism and bureaucratic capitalism,
and the reduction of human beings to objects of manipulation (Blunden,
n.d.).
9. What I am describing is commodity fetishism, in which capitalist societies
promote a way of thinking where everything, even social relations, are ob-
jectified in terms of money. This is first conceptualized in The Fetishism of
Commodities and the Secret Thereof in Karl Marx’s Das Kapital (Marx, 1976).
10. Baron-Cohen (2003) links this to sex differences in brain types, calling the
S brain the male brain, and the E brain the female brain. He argues that
this theory does not stereotype the sexes, because the three brain types are
distributed across each of the two sexes, but with a higher proportion of boys
and men (girls and women) having an S type or male brain (E-type or female
brain, respectively). He also argues that the theory may help an understand-
ing of the neurological conditions of autism and Asperger syndrome, which
appear to be an extreme of the male (S) brain.
11. Consumerism depends on the myth of consumer inadequacy according to which
relief from this state of inadequacy can only be obtained by purchases and
further consumption, and even this relief is only temporary (Collis, 1999).
James (2008) goes on to argue that the widespread culture of having (which
he terms Affluenza) and its necessary corollary of lacking is manifested in
widespread emotional distress, indicated by the incidence of depression,
anxiety, substance abuse, and impulse disorders. Emotional distress is most
widespread in the Anglophone West, namely the United States, Australia,
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada (in order of prevalence).
12. Mathematical problem posing, although not that common in school or re-
search mathematics, allows the selection and construction of problems to
be solved, adding a further creative dimension to mathematics beyond that
indicated in the text.
13. I am referring here to mainstream childhood education. I acknowledge, of
course, that there is education outside of this age bracket (e.g., adult return-
ers to education, lifelong learning) and outside of the standard institutional
framework (e.g., informal learning, professional learning).
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chapter 6
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

Equity, Social Class, and Mathematics
Robyn Jorgensen (Zevenbergen)
INTRODUCTION
Unlike the United Kingdom where overt class distinctions have permeated
public thinking and educational discourse, in Australia there is a consider-
able reluctance to consider issues of social class, however defined. In most
presentations I undertake, I am at pains to articulate the importance of
social class, and most particularly working-class, and the ways in which
students are marginalized in the study of school mathematics as a conse-
quence of their social background. While the term socioeconomic status
(SES) does not appear to be as antagonistic, it fails to address the most
salient aspect of social disadvantage—culture. I make a clear distinction
between social class and SES since the former has strong links to culture,
whereas SES is a statistical measure that has economy as a central construct.
The latter denies the power of culture when considering choices and deci-
sions made by people. I draw heavily from the work of French sociologist,
Pierre Bourdieu, to theorize social class.

128â•‡â•‡R. Jorgensen
The antagonism that I have experienced by participants in many of the

sessions I have conducted to the use of terms relating to class is palpable.
It is as if there is a great resistance to talking about social class as if it does
not exist. By rendering it invisible, it does not exist. Yet, on so many mea-
sures, students who come from particular backgrounds are more at risk of
failing school mathematics than their more socially, culturally, linguistically,
geographically and economically endowed peers. This chapter discusses
the obvious, the elephant in the room: the failure of so many Australian
students who come from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. The intent
of the chapter is to reinvigorate the debate regarding the nexus between
social divisions and performance in school mathematics, and to find ways
to alleviate this issue. There have been diversions from this important issue
caused by neoliberal agendas that have taken the spotlight off issues of class
and diverted them to other agendas. In the meantime, the class differences
have remained firmly in place. Class is the biggest predictor of educational
success. Conservative agendas and governments have gained a foothold in
education to the extent that tackling issues of equity have been superseded
by agendas of quality and accountability as if such agendas would alleviate
social inequities. Rather than focus on issues of definition or relationships
of power, as has been the case with some other approaches, this paper
draws on the critical paradigm to discuss the effects of social class in and
on school mathematics.
By referring to this chapter as the “Elephant in the Room” I want to
make explicit what has been avoided or limited in contemporary educa-
tional debate, policy and research. Silencing or ignoring social class has
significant ramifications for those most immediately affected. Failure to
engage with the issue but focusing on academic debates of terminology
or theoretical posturing only takes away from the action needed to stem
the tide, and to enable young learners to engage with the pure beauty and
power of mathematics, to be successful in the study of mathematics, and to
enjoy the benefits of being numerate and able to undertake positions in the
workplace that command high rewards, fiscal as well as personal.
WHAT IS SOCIAL CLASS?
While there is considerable tension as to a firm definition of social class, I

take advantage of Bourdieu’s position on class as being a construct created
by sociologists to explain a particular phenomenon rather than there being
real categories. For Bourdieu (1985, p. 198)
Classes [are] sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, in being
placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have
The Elephant in the Roomâ•‡â•‡ 129
every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore

of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances. The “class on
paper” has the theoretical existence which is that of theories…. It is not re-
ally a class, an actual class, in the sense of a group, a group that mobilizes
for struggle; at most it is a probable class, inasmuch as it is a set of agents
which will present fewer hindrances to efforts of mobilization than other sets
of agents.
He goes on to expand this when he argues:
This “class on paper” has the theoretical existence which belongs to theo-
ries: as the product of explanatory classification … it allows one to explain
and predict the properties of things classified—including their propensity to
constitute groups. (p. 232)
Using Bourdieu’s position to construct a notion of class, it becomes

possible to understand class as the embodiment of culture into what is
referred to as a class habitus. This habitus, within Bourdieu’s theoreti-
cal project, is defined as a “system of durable, transposable dispositions
which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified
practices” (Bourdieu, 1979, p. viii). Using this approach to understanding
class, it becomes possible to think about groups of people that share similar
dispositions, similar attributes, similar habitus. This similarity, and hence
difference from others, is what makes the construct of class a powerful one,
albeit a construct for which it is difficult to create a neat definition. The
classed habitus provides a lens for viewing the world and interacting with
the social world.
In my own case, coming from a very strong working-class tradition, I
feel more at ease when I enter schools in economically or socially chal-
lenged areas than when I enter more affluent, independent schools. This
is because my habitus aligns more with the former and less with the latter,
hence allowing me to feel more at ease, more familiar, in one than the
other. While I have come to learn the nuances of the more affluent cultures,
it is not second nature to me. Within Bourdieuian terms, my primary (work-
ing-class) habitus has had to be reconstituted to align with the middle-class
cultures of the higher education sectors, and, along with the roles that I
undertake in a professorial capacity, I am compelled to work with the more
affluent sectors of society—in schools, industry, business, government—so
I need to have access to their ways of being and acting. Thus, my primary
habitus has been reconstituted to account for these changes. However,
there remains a comfortableness when I enter those fields where there is
a working-class presence. Part of the purpose of schooling is to support
learners to engage with the middle-class value system represented in the
schooling system. Such engagement requires, for those students who are
successful, an alignment with these values. For working-class students, this

alignment may mean a reconstitution of their primary habitus in order to
be successful. The task of teachers, within this framework, becomes one of
reshaping the habitus of learners so that they can align with the field. In
order to do this, they need to be cognizant of the cultural differences and
develop means by which such changes can be facilitated.
Habitus is a key construct in Bourdieu’s theoretical position. It describes
how culture is internalized so as to form particular ways of seeing and
working in the social world. Social class is a particular embodiment of
culture that shapes the predispositions of people to engage in particular
activities. Economic capital, as per the SES measures, is limited in its capac-
ity to explain social phenomenon. Consider the classic example of a person
who wins large sums in Lotto—their SES may change considerably with the
injection of millions of dollars but their predisposition to purchase goods
from particular stores, to live in particular areas, to undertake particular
activities or sports, remain unchanged. As such, the culture of participants
remains relatively robust. This is where Bourdieu’s notion of class as a clas-
sificatory category holds greater power than a SES measure. While some
things, such as financial assets, may change, the dispositions which are part
of the habitus remain unchanged. Bourdieu (1990) explains it thus:
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions or exis-

tence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, struc-
tured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as
principles which generate and organize practices and representations that
can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a con-
scious aiming at end or express a mastery of the operations necessary in
order to attain them. (p. 53)
The linking of class and habitus becomes important in coming to under-

stand how marginalization works in and through school mathematics. By
adopting this theoretical position, the notion of class becomes a useful
tool for explaining the differential access to school mathematics for some
groups of students.
The primary socialization of the child in the years prior to formal
schooling create particular dispositions and ways of seeing and acting in
the social world—the habitus. The differences between social groups in
their social practices create different opportunities for the construction of
the primary habitus. This creates the opportunities for the construction
of a class habitus. As I have argued in much of my work, particularly
around language, the socialization practices of the home create very
different habitus for students. If one considers Walkerdine and Lucey’s
(1989) work on mother-child interactions, which found that there were
very classed differences in language use, or Brice-Heath’s (1983) work on
the differences in language interactions between home and school, it can

be seen that familial socialization creates particular habitus that can align
(or not) with the practices of schooling (or in Bourdieu’s terms—the field).
The structuring practices of the field of school mathematics will recognize
and reward particular ways of being, talking and interacting, and particular
knowledge systems. These are part of the habitus, so those students who
enter the field of school mathematics will be in better or worse positions
depending on how well that habitus aligns with the practices of the field.
In this way the embodiment of the home culture into a familial habitus
becomes a form of capital that can be exchanged within the field. Bourdieu
(1983) refers to this as cultural capital—that is, forms of culture that are
now operating as forms of capital within a given field. In this case the field
is school mathematics.
By way of example, consider the working-class child who has been
exposed to the restricted code (Bernstein, 1982) of the working class.
This linguistic code has particular nuances that are part of a working-
class culture. The impact of this code in accessing aspects of the field of
mathematics was illustrated through the comprehensive assessment studies
of Cooper and Dunne (1999). These studies showed that the working-
class students may have incorrectly answered questions on national testing
protocols and hence were deemed as scholastically inferior to their middle-
class peers who performed better on the same test items. What the study
highlighted was not that the working-class students did not know the math-
ematics, but that they misread the question and hence identified the wrong
register for responding and were deemed to be incorrect. The habitus of
the students provided particular lens for responding to the questions and
inadvertently positioned students according to their social background.
SOCIAL CLASS AND SCHOOL MATHEMATICS:

NATIONAL TESTING
While Australia has resisted reporting school performance on national

testing in league tables, the federal government initiated the My School
website (ACARA, 2010) which documents every school in Australia. The
Rudd government, under Gillard as education minister, argued strongly
for public accountability around schools and performance. A profile of
each school is displayed as is their annual results on the national literacy
and numeracy test (NAPLAN). Every student in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 are
expected to undertake these tests unless there are special circumstances
that justify otherwise. Teachers are given strict instructions on the admin-
istration of the tests. Tests are returned and marked externally. Schools are
provided with individual reports. Schools can compare their scores against
the national average and against statistically similar schools.
ICSEA1 indicator is a measure used by Australian Curriculum, Assess-
ment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) to enable comparisons of schools.
It is a school-based measure of relative advantage based on amalgam of a
range of factors and has been outlined in the fact sheet in the following
way:
ICSEA uses Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and school data to create
an index.... The variables that make up ICSEA include socio-economic char-
acteristics of the small areas where students live (in this case an ABS census
collection district), as well as whether a school is in a regional or remote area,
and the proportion of Indigenous students enrolled at the school. (ACARA,
2010)
Schools in the middle range score an ICSEA mark of 1000, with a stan-
dard deviataion of 100. for each standard deviation from this mean, the
score alters by 100. There is a significant tail in the spread of ICSEA scores:
some schools that are attended by many students living in very poor condi-
tions have ICSEA scores in the 400s; while the scores of schools attended
by students from more affluent families are clustered within 2 standard
deviations, that is, not many scores are above 1,200. Those schools with
ICSEA scores in the 400–600 range were predominantly in remote indig-
enous communities. These data confirm the PISA report that indicated
that while Australia may perform well on international measures, we have
a significant tail in terms of equity.
For the purposes of this paper, to assess whether there was a reflec-
tion of some measure of social disadvantage and performance in school
mathematics, a range of schools in Queensland, New South Wales (NSW)
and the Northern Territory (NT) were selected. Queensland and NSW
were selected as these states have large cities (Brisbane and Sydney), large
regional centres, rural towns and a range of contexts within which Indig-
enous people live. Northern Territory was also included as it has large
portions of Indigenous people living in very remote settings. It also has
some of the lowest ICSEA scores in Australia. Keeping the sampling con-
fined to these three states enabled a sample of the types Australian schools
to be included. The schools were selected on their ICSEA data to see if
there was some relationship with the NAPLAN scores. These data were
plotted to illustrate the strong correlation between the two variables (see
Figure 6.1 for Year 5 data, and Figure 6.2 for Year 9 data). Only the data
from Years 5 and 9 were used as, in all jurisdictions in Australia, Year 5 is
in primary school and Year 9 is in secondary school. This is not the case
for Year 7, which is in primary school in some states and secondary school
in other states.
Figure 6.1.â•… Numeracy result against ICSEA score for Year 5, 2009 NAPLAN.
Figure 6.2.â•… Numeracy result against ICSEA score for Year 9, 2009 NAPLAN,
The two scores of 0 in the Year 9 graph (Figure 6.2) indicate that there
was either not enough students sitting the test at these schools or that those
who sat the test did not complete enough of the test to produce a result that
could be used. Both of these scores came from remote Aboriginal schools.
From the data presented here, which is intended not to be comprehen-

sive but rather illustrative, it can be seen that there is a strong correlation
between social background (as represented through the ICSEA score) and
achievement (as represented through the numeracy score on the NAPLAN
test). Such a correlation suggests that there is strong relationship between
advantaged backgrounds and high achievement and conversely between
disadvantaged backgrounds and low achievement. Rather than see this as
a reflection of the “natural order,” in the remainder of the paper I seek to
challenge the myth of ability and in so doing argue that the practices within
the field are creating learning spaces that reify social differences.
In the following sections, I discuss some of the practices that contribute
to the observed correlation. I conclude by offering some ways forward.
CREATING SPACES FOR

LEARNING SCHOOL MATHEMATICS
As I have argued elsewhere (Zevenbergen, 2005) the mathematics learn-

ing environment creates spaces for students to internalize dispositions
about themselves as learners of mathematics. This internalization comes
to constitute their mathematical habitus. When these experiences are posi-
tive, there is a great potential for the students to identify with the subject.
However, the converse is also the case. When the experiences are negative,
there is less chance of developing a mathematical habitus that will predis-
pose the learners to engage with and continue in the study of mathematics.
Greenfell ( 1998) proposed that the discussionf habitus in this way sees it as
a methodological construct that allows for the development of understand-
ing of the dynamic structure between the social reality and the individual.
As such, it becomes possible to theorize the constitution of a mathematical
habitus through the structuring practices of school mathematics. In turn,
habitus provides a lens through which students come to view and interpret
their relationships with school mathematics.
Three Blind Men and the Elephant
A plethora of research on aspects of systemic failure has sought to estab-

lish why the sustained marginalization of working-class learners has been
resistant to change, but there has been no real attempt to link these litera-
tures in order to develop a full description of a mathematics pedagogy of
failure. It is very much like the metaphor of the three blind men feeling
different parts of an elephant—its trunk, its leg, and its tail—to try to
develop an image of what an elephant might look like. Similarly, trying
to ascertain the full picture of why school mathematics fails working-class

students requires a holistic understanding the multiple causes.
Ability Grouping
Mathematics, unlike other areas of the curriculum, is often seen as a

highly structured trajectory where there is a linear step-by-step process
in the learning of particular concepts. Such a belief manifests in practice
whereby students may have to repeat considerable work until they appear
to have grasped a concept before they are exposed to more complex work.
This lock-step approach to curriculum design and planning is a dominant
view in school mathematics. However, research (O’Toole, 2004) has ques-
tioned the linearity of mathematics learning to propose that mathematics is
more about networks. This approach has identified growth points as critical
concepts that must be learned, but the order in which they are learned is
of little consequence. This emerging research throws a serious challenge
to many of the assumptions that have underpinned curriculum design and
implementation. However, as Gutierrez (1998) has shown, mathematics
departments and teachers of mathematics are perhaps the most resistant
to change. The power of the belief that mathematics is hierarchical in its
foundations remains at the core of much mathematics teaching.
Cahan and Linchevski (1996) cite findings from the U.K. where 80%
of mathematics teachers thought it inappropriate to have mixed-ability
groupings whereas, in contrast, 16% of science teachers and 3% of English
teachers held the same view. These data suggest that there is something
inherent in mathematics teaching that supports the use of homogenous
grouping. Similar work by Ruthven (1987) reported that ability grouping
in mathematics was the dominant mode of classroom organization but was
not well used in other curriculum areas such as science and social studies.
These studies highlight the difference between mathematics and other
curriculum areas.
In her in-depth studies of ability grouping in mathematics, Boaler
(1997; Boaler, William, & Bown, 2000) has highlighted the experiences of
students in the United Kingdom and United States. The detailed studies
undertaken by Boaler highlight the very different experiences for students
in the high- and low-set2 groups. She has argued strongly that there is no
advantage for any student when ability grouping is used and that even the
high-set groups can be disadvantaged due to the quick pace and overly
high expectations of teachers of the students. Conversely, the experiences
of the students in the low-set groups are quite impoverished.
In undertaking a study of ability grouping in Australia, I (Zevenbergen,
2003, 2005) found that the structuring practices in high and low streamed
mathematics classrooms created very different opportunities for construct-

ing mathematical habitus for learners. The high-ability groups provided
a much richer learning environment for learning deep mathematics, with
teachers who were experienced, assessments that matched what students
had learned and hence allowed students to achieve high grades, and a
positive learning environments. This was in stark contrast to the student
reports of the low-ability groups. In these classrooms, students reported
that they were offered a very limited curriculum, that there were significant
behavior problems in the classrooms and that the teachers did not appear
to believe that the students could learn mathematics. These very different
practices were internalized by the students so as to create very different
opportunities for students. The structuring practices of the field—assess-
ment, ability grouping, curriculum—work to construct a mathematics
habitus for the learners. This habitus has internalized the practices so that
they are part of the identity of the student. In turn, the dispositions toward
mathematics that are part of the habitus, shape and interpret experiences
in school mathematics. It was found that the students in the higher ability
groups had a strong sense of themselves as learners and this shaped how
they engaged with mathematics. In contrast, the students in the lower
streams developed a sense of themselves that was not contiguous with the
field and, in many cases, set them outside the field. In most cases, these
students could not wait to stop their study of school mathematics as they
saw themselves as failed students.
While these studies have not explicitly drawn out the connections to
social class, Michael Apple argues strongly that the students in the low
groups are most frequently students from the working-class strata, and
the upper groups most often contain students from the dominant social
groups. Through critical examination of the practices of ability grouping,
it can be found that the practices create very different environments for
constituting mathematical habitus. The internalization of the practices
of the differentiated classrooms creates a false sense of students’ sense of
themselves as learners of mathematics in ways that are quite coercive, such
that students perceive that the differentiation represents a natural order.
Unsurprisingly, this “natural order” aligns strongly with the social strata
of the wider society.
Differentiated Mathematics
Aligned with, but different from, ability grouping is a more generic

offering that has come into practice. The mathematics curriculum offered
to students is differentiated and students are able to select the forms of
mathematics that they take. Within Queensland, for example, there are a
number of different offerings in the senior years of schooling—the final 2

years before going to University or other tertiary education. Three subjects
are offered that count toward the final score for university entrance—Maths
A, Maths B, and Maths C. Maths A is a very basic level of mathematics,
with Maths B the subject that is recommended for most studies at Univer-
sity level, while Maths C is the subject that is recommended for students
wanting to go into engineering. Teese and Polesel (2003) refer to these
clusterings of mathematics as terminal, preparatory, and advanced options
respectively. Aside from the university-bound offerings, there is a vocation-
ally orientated offering in mathematics that does not attract a university
score. This subject is one that students undertake if they want a subject that
it is not difficult and is very applied.
Teese and Polesel (2003) found that in the past two decades there was an
increase in the number of working-class students undertaking mathematics
at the senior levels, but the real concern was the type of mathematics being
studied. Working-class boys frequently exit school before Year 12, and
working-class girls freuqnetly choose no mathematics in their final years
of schooling. However, when they did take mathematics, working boys were
as likely to take a preparatory maths (for university study) or a terminal
mathematics (that did not lead to any further study). When working-class
girls took mathematics, they were more likely to take a terminal maths.
Teese and Polesel concluded that, at the Year 12 level (preuniversity),
Terminal mathematics greatly increased the access of working-class girls to

senor school mathematics and extended mathematics as an element of aca-
demic culture to a wider section of the population. (p. 59)
They claim that “working-class and lower-middle-class students are twice

more likely than upper-middle-class students to take no mathematics at all”
(p. 104). While participation rates are one element of equity considerations,
the quality of learning for students must also be considered. As Teese and
Polesel also argue, “without quality, progress towards equity is meaningless”
(p. 53). In the working-class suburbs of many Australian cities, or rural
areas of regional Australia, there are insufficient students undertaking the
advanced levels of mathematics to create a viable class so they are compelled
to drop the subject/s and take other options (usually outside mathematics),
thus curtailing access to many professions, particularly engineering. This
has been quite a concern to “engineers without borders”3 who are running
programs in disadvantaged schools to show the power of mathematics to
solve everyday problems and help alleviate many issues. This approach
has been developed to show the importance of mathematical applications
to real problems and so to motivate disadvantaged students to the study
of mathematics.
Functional Mathematics
Mathematics is often touted as being an important life skill. It is needed

for functioning in the worlds beyond school. The functional discourse
pervades much of the justification for school mathematics. Mathematics is
often taught in a context as if the knowledge has an intrinsic connection
to the worlds. Unlike other curriculum areas where the discipline is taught
in its own rights, mathematics is often justified on the grounds of its func-
tionality. Shakespeare has no intrinsic application to the world of students;
art and music are taught for their own sake, and so on. This begs askance
as to why mathematics is so unique: Why can’t mathematics be taught as
an endeavor to understand the beauty, the power, the relationships and
interconnections? The magic of Fibonnacci’s sequence, or of simultaneous
equations, are lost on students who never get to experience the beauty of
mathematics.
For many disadvantaged students, the functionality of mathematics is
even more poignant. The impoverished curriculum that is the diet of many
working-class students denies them access to the powerful ideas that are
part of the majesty of mathematics. The mythology of ability that per-
meates much teaching to disadvantaged students results in a curriculum
centred on basic skills and rote-and-drill pedagogy. This approach denies
access to the power of mathematics. In his comprehensive studies of curric-
ulum, Dowling (1991, 1998) showed how curriculum for the social classes
was highly stratified and that the working-class students were exposed to a
highly functional and practical series of text books.
In their comprehensive study of senior years curriculum Teese and
Polesel (2003) argued that many of the new subjects have a stronger appli-
cation to their offerings and that this appeals to students. However, they
also contend that there is considerable status in the “academic” subjects
and that, ultimately, these are the subjects that have kudos. Ensuring selec-
tion of the high-profile mathematics is what opens the door to success.
Teese and Polesel reported a greater propensity for working-class students
to take the more practical/functional mathematics subjects and for middle-
class students to take the more academic forms of mathematics.
In her studies of research mathematicians, Burton (2001, 2004) high-
lighted that the ways in which mathematicians worked were the antithesis of
school mathematics. She reported that mathematicians talked with peers,
had insights, used simpler ideas when working on new ideas or unknowns
and relied on intuition. She questioned whether the ways of working in
school mathematics needed to be altered to align with the ways of working
as mathematicians. While questioning the general epistemological foun-
dations of contemporary mathematics teaching, Burton’s work raises even
deeper questions as to how many mathematics classes were of this form for
working-class students.
Language and Mathematics
Bernstein’s (1982, 1990, 1996) seminal work with language draws atten-
tion to the different codes of language used by different social classes.
While his work has been criticized as portraying the working-class as deficit
by his use of the term “restricted” to refer to their language, this was not
his intention. His work powerfully showed the subtle ways in which the
language structures of classes shaped their ways of thinking and working
(or habitus) and that this provided very different access to ways of working
mathematically. Using his framework, Cooper and Dunne (1999) showed
that both middle-class and working-class students performed equally as
well as each other on national testing when the items tested esoteric prob-
lems. These types of problems are the “pure” mathematics questions such
as 6+8 = _ where there is no context to the problem. Conversely, and
counter to many commonly held assumptions, when the task was located in
a word problem, and typically an everyday problem, middle-class students
performed better than working-class students. This was due to the working-
class students (mis)recognizing the problem as an everyday problem rather
than a mathematics problem. In so doing, they gave a practical answer
rather than the mathematical answer. Many problems in mathematics are
posed in this format and create difficulties for students to recognize the
appropriate discourse in which to respond (Zevenbergen & Lerman, 2001).
However, recognizing the appropriate discourse—mathematics or practi-
cal—is not explicitly taught to students. When Cooper and Dunne (1999)
undertook follow-up interviews, they found that the students were more
than capable to give the correct response when it was clear that they needed
to use a different discourse than the everyday discourse. As such, it was
not a difficulty with the mathematics but a misrecognition of the ways of
working in school mathematics and a matter of being able to identify the
appropriate discourse for the response.
Bernstein’s (1982, 1990, 1996) work with language has been impor-
tant in recognizing that even though students may have English as their
home language, there are quite different registers of English that shape
the language use of different social groups. Walkerdine and Lucey’s (1989)
work with mothers interacting with their children showed that middle-class
mothers used the signifiers “more” and “less” in their interactions with
their children. However, working-class mothers were more likely to only use
the signifier “more” in their interactions. The effect of this is significant. In
thinking about the early years of schooling, many mathematical concepts
are taught using comparisons—which number is more, which number is

less, which number is 2 more than 3, which number is 2 less than 6. The
same situation applies for concepts in other strands of the curriculum.
Limited (or no) familiarity with the term “less” creates a very restricted
learning experience for working-class students, while their middle-class
peers have full access to the teaching episodes. Through such subtle and
coercive processes, middle-class students have greater access to learning
in school mathematics, and are thus positioned more favorably as learners
within the discipline.
QUALITY PRACTICES:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACCESS AND SUCCESS
What has permeated much of the educational discourse in mathematics

is the myth of ability, which assumes that working-class students’ lack of
success results from an innately inferior ability. This false consciousness
helps to preserve the status quo. In terms of equitable mathematics edu-
cation, the myth of ability needs to be debunked. However, examples of
sustained success of such debunking are limited. Some years ago a col-
league, Mike Askew, and I tried to compile an international collection of
examples of teachers “teaching against the grain” and of international
case studies of successful (and sustained) teaching of mathematics in disad-
vantaged classrooms. However, the project ended prematurely as we were
unable to access enough cases. There are pockets of good practice, but little
evidence of sustained outcomes. This is not to say that successful teaching
of mathematics in disadvantaged classrooms does not happen, as it does;
rather, the aim is to highlight the difficulties in achieving such successes
and the paucity of cases.
Perhaps one of the most significant projects that has brought about
change for disadvantaged learners is Boaler’s (Boaler, 2006, 2008; Boaler
& Staples, 2008) account of Railside in California. This was a school with
large proportions of Hispanic, Afro-American, low-income and Asian stu-
dents. All students would be classified as working-class. This school was the
poorest-performing school in the state of California, but with the rollout
of a whole-school reform “Complex Instruction” (Cohen & Latan, 1997),
in a few years, the school performed above state average. The approach
adopted key research findings into one comprehensive program. First,
it must be noted that it was a whole-school program and all staff were
involved in its rollout. This created a system-wide approach across the
school and where staff could all work on a common approach. Fundamen-
tal to the approach was the belief that all students could learn complex
work, so curriculum was not watered down but offered a very rich and
complex set of knowledge and understandings. Group work where students

became responsible for each other’s learning underpinned the pedagogy.
Teachers developed activities that promoted deep learning and engage-
ment of the students. Teachers’ role changed dramatically from being the
bearer of knowledge to one of a sage on the side. The role was dramati-
cally different from that most often found in mathematics classrooms. The
activities fostered interaction and negotiation. At the end of the lessons,
students had to report to the group with their learning. The group would
then engage in deep dialogue about what was being presented, with ques-
tions about what was being offered by the group. This may have been to
clarify, or even extend, the group’s learning.
My observation of these lessons was that the approach fostered deep
learning and the students had not only an amazing command of the math-
ematics, but also a true collaboration with their peers. Boaler (2008) has
argued that this supportive and intellectually engaging environment also
brought about significant changes in students’ tolerance of various cultural
groups. By learning how to interact in a supportive, non-threatening envi-
ronment in the classroom, they also learned social skills for working with
diverse groups. Boaler’s extensive accounts of Railside have highlighted
the elements of quality practice that appear to be instrumental in bringing
about deep learning and social change, particularly for the most disadvan-
taged social groups.
Boaler’s (2008, 2006) work highlights the practices needed within the
field of mathematics education if there is to be greater equity for students
from disadvantaged background. Boaler’s thick descriptions of reform
pedagogy highlight what is possible when there is a commitment from
schools and a willingness to challenge current orthodoxies. However, it is
not a case of one cap fits all. In adopting Boaler’s work in a remote area of
Australia (Jorgensen, Grootenboer, & Sullivan, 2010), we found that there
were some elements of the reform pedagogy that are culturally conflictive
with the local context. For example, in many remote Aboriginal contexts,
interactions are culturally bound so the format of the reform pedagogy
was in conflict with the cultural norms of these cultures (Jorgensen, 2010).
This creates some tension as to whether there is a priority around cultural
respect or the need to create bridges between two cultures and move learn-
ers into a new learning space that may offer better learning opportunities.
EQUITY: WHAT ELEPHANT?
If there were equity in school mathematics, then it would be the case that
there would be no correlation between achievement, however measured
or identified, and the background of the students. Such a statement could
be interpreted to mean that ALL students would achieve equally. However,

such a position fails to account for many subjective dimensions of the
habitus. Most particularly, interest or passion would have a strong bearing
on success. If all students were to achieve at the same level, then the same
could be said for other curriculum areas. However, if I take myself as an
example, I am not sure that I want to excel in music or table tennis or
drama. This orientation to particular areas of interest will play some role in
influencing outcomes, particularly as students get older and gain a stron-
ger sense of themselves. However, this sense of self (habitus) is not totally
of the individual’s construction. As I have argued earlier in this paper, the
practices within the field of mathematics education can shape this habitus,
as with other experiences in school and out of school.
I would contend that true equity outcomes would be very random with
no correlation between background and outcome (see Figure 6.3). While
there is some sense that equity might mean that all students achieve at
similar levels, I am not convinced of this argument. Some students may
not be interested in the study of mathematics, just like I am not especially
motivated to achieve in music or sport. Fostering learning in an area that
a student may not be interested in may not be productive or enjoyable. As
such, a more random spread of outcomes may be indicative of a more egali-
tarian education system. One would hope that the poorest child, or the
new migrants with limited English, or the student from a rural area, could
achieve well in mathematics (or any discipline area). Regardless of back-
ground, all students should have opportunities to create a robust habitus
that predisposes them to enjoy mathematics, see the power of mathemat-
ics, be able to participate in mathematics and be successful in the study of
mathematics should they desire. Current practices are failing miserably to
achieve such an outcome.
The stratification of students based on their social backgrounds con-
tinues in contemporary education even after it has been long noted as a
serious educational issue. For more than four decades this correlation has
been noted and it has remained relatively impervious to change.
There are exemplars of how some schools or individual teachers have
managed to teach against the grain. As I have illustrated in this chapter,
Railside School has been very successful in addressing educational differ-
ence. However, there are too few examples. Part of the difficulty is that
the correlation between SES and mathematical achievement remains an
unrecognized problem for many educators who have bought into the myth
of ability. Changing this ideology remains a challenge. Believing that every
student can learn mathematics, a rich mathematics with deep understand-
ings, remains the challenge. In another study (Jorgensen, Grootenboer,
Niesche, & Lerman 2010), it was illustrated that teachers’ equity beliefs
may be quite strong, but these may not be lived out in their actual practice.
Figure 6.3.â•… Equitable outcomes in mathematics.
As many schools in disadvantaged areas seem to have a large number of

early-career teachers, more professional development in how to work in
these contexts is needed. The paucity of exemplars of successful schools
may also be an indication that while teachers and schools have good inten-
tions to redress educational disadvantage, they are unaware of how to enact
such beliefs.
While Railside School provides an outstanding case of teaching against
the grain, more cases need to be developed, documented and shared with
the educational community. Identifying the elements of best practice in
such circumstances needs to be undertaken but with due recognition that
each circumstance may be slightly different from the next. Practices that are
sustainable in challenging circumstances are called for, along with associ-
ated professional development and on-going support.
NOTES
1. Index of Community Socio-Educational Advantage developed by

the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority.
2. Boaler uses the term “set” to refer to ability groupings. This is com-
mon in the U.K. literature.
3. Engineers without Borders is an organization of engineers who
work on projects in developing areas. They are also concerned with
attracting diverse learners into engineering. They undertake a
range of programs to support school students to engage in activi-

ties to support and motivate learning in mathematics and science to
prepare for the study of engineering post school.
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chapter 7
CONNECTING THE NOTION OF

FOREGROUND IN CRITICAL
WITH THE THEORY OF HABITUS
Tine Wedege
PREFACE
The dialectics between individual and structure is an important issue in any

sociomathematical study of students’ learning conditions in mathematics
education. On the basis of a conception of learning as action and intention-
ality as a basic element in any action, Skovsmose introduced the notion of
the student’s foreground as an element in critical mathematics education.
The intention is to make visible learning obstacles as a political in stead of
an individual phenomenon based only on the student’s social and cultural
background. In this paper, a discussion is initiated to reestablish the sig-
nificance of students’ background by integrating the notion of foreground
with Bourdieu’s theory of habitus as systems of dispositions as principles of
generating and structuring practices and representations.

148â•‡â•‡T. Wedege
INTRODUCTION
In mathematics education research, the grounding questions concern

people’s cognitive, affective and social relationships with mathematics.
Conditions for students to learn mathematics is one of the key issues to
be studied whether the focus is learning environments established in the
mathematics classroom; for example didactical situations (Brousseau, 1986)
or landscapes of learning (Alrø, Skovsmose, & Valero, 2007); or the focus
is students’ motives for learning mathematics; for example motivation
(Wæge, 2007) or instrumental and social rationale (Mellin-Olsen, 1987). In
sociology, the grounding questions concern the connection between people
and society or, from a philosophical point of view, the dialectics between
individual and structure. In a sociomathematical study of learning condi-
tions, this dialectics is an overarching theme because the societal context
for teaching, learning and knowing mathematics is taken seriously into
account (Wedege, 2010b).
In a recent overview of the sociomathematical research field it is stated
that students’ positioning may cause structural disadvantage for learning
mathematics:
It has long been recognised that neither education systems in general nor
mathematics education in particular is neutral in terms of learners’ position-
ings with respect to class, gender, “race,” ethnicity and global position. With
respect to each of these (and other) positionings, some learners are systemi-
cally, structurally disadvantaged. (Povey & Zevenbergen, 2008, p. 152)
Skovsmose (2005) has pointed out that learning obstacles are often
identified in students’ social and cultural background and thus, in his
understanding, “individualized.” Skovsmose’s countermove is to introduce
the notion of students’ foreground but I find it important analytically to
connect people’s motives for learning—or not learning—mathematics to
their lived lives in order to investigate the dialectics between individual
and structure. During my first reading of Skovsmose’s (1994) “Towards a
philosophy of critical mathematics education,” I wondered why he did not
have any reference to the Bourdieuan concept of habitus when the term
“dispositions” and the meaning attached to this term through his defini-
tion of foreground point in the same direction: “Dispositions are grounded
in the social objectivity of the individual, and simultaneously produced by
the individual, partly as a consequence of the actions performed by the
individual” (p. 180), and the future of different social groups of students
“is present in the dispositions of the students” (p. 191).
The purpose of this chapter is to initiate a discussion about the possibil-
ity of integrating locally a concept of foreground in the theory of habitus.
I will do this by presenting and discussing the compatibility of the notion
Connecting the Notion of Foregroundâ•‡â•‡ 149
of foreground in critical mathematics education respectively the concept of

habitus in Bourdieu’s sociology. As a part of this, I will try, in an analysis of
a narrative interview, to link habitus and foreground of a Swedish student
in vocational education.
THE NOTION OF FOREGROUND
Intentionality was the pivotal point when Skovsmose (1994) introduced

the notion of foreground in his book “Towards a philosophy of mathemat-
ics education” where three notions are interconnected: learning as action,
dispositions and intentions. His point of departure is that knowledge devel-
opment or learning is an act and, as such, it requires indeterminism: the
acting person must be in a situation where choice is possible. To be an
action, an activity must be related to an intention. A person acting must
have some idea about goals and reasons for obtaining them. Skovsmose
sees learning as caused by the intentions of the learner, thus, he does not
see enculturation and socialisation as learning. Dispositions are seen as
resources for intentions: “Intentions are grounded in a landscape of prein-
tentions or dispositions” (p. 179). As Skovsmose does not see the background
(the socially constructed network of relationships and meanings which
belong to the history of the person) as the only source of intentions he
divides the dispositions into a “background” and a “foreground.” He finds
the foreground equally important and, in 1994, defined it as
the possibilities which the social situation makes available for the individual
to perceive as his or her possibilities.... The foreground is that set of possi-
bilities which the social situation reveals to the individual. (p. 179)
Skovsmose stresses that the background as well as the foreground are inter-
preted and organized by the individual. However, at first, the foreground
of a person was defined as the opportunities in future life made available
to her/him by society. In 2002,1 Skovsmose clarifies the functioning of the
individual:
By “foreground” of a person I understand the opportunities, which the so-

cial, political and cultural situation provides for this person. However, not
the opportunities as they might exist in any “objective” form, but the oppor-
tunities as perceived by a person. (p. 6)
In this chapter, the notion of foreground is presented as the pivotal

point in the introduction of learning obstacles as a political phenomenon.
And foreground becomes the key word in one of the principles for the
pedagogy of critical mathematics education. “Third, critical mathematics
education must be aware of the situation of the students. (...) A way of

establishing this awareness is to consider not only the background of the
students but also their foreground” (Skovsmose, 2006, p. 47).
Foreground is introduced—and used—by Skovsmose (1994, 2005,
2006) as a notion not as a concept; that is, an element of a theory. But
students’ foregrounds have been investigated empirically in two doctoral
thesis whish have fleshed out the notion (Baber, 2007; Lange, 2009). In the
publication Inter-viewing Foregrounds, Alrø, Skovsmose, and Valero (2007)
have continued the work by giving a “conceptual definition” of students’
foregrounds. They stress that the concept allows linking two of the key
conceptual elements of educational theory, learning and meaning, and
that foreground is a concept emphasizing the sociopolitical nature of edu-
cation and learning. It is actually the notion of dispositions—defined by
Skovsmose (1994) as preintentions—which disappeared from his writing
(2005, 2006), that links foreground with learning. Alrø, Skovsmose, and
Valero point to the basic principle in the theory of learning-as-action, which
presupposes the person’s readiness to find motives for engaging in action;
that is, the person’s dispositions:
Dispositions can be seen as the constant interplay between a person’s

background and foreground. The background of a person is the person’s
previous experiences given his or her involvement with the cultural and
sociopolitical context. In contrast to some definitions of context which see
background almost as an objective set of personal dispositions given by one’s
positioning in different social structures, we consider background to be a
dynamic construction in which the person is constantly giving meaning to
previous experiences, some of which may have a structural character given
by the person’s positioning in social structures. The foreground, as previously
defined, is also an element in the formation of dispositions. The person is
all the time finding reasons to get engaged in learning activities not only
because of the permanent reinterpretation of his or her background, but
also because of the constant consideration of his or her foreground. That is,
the person connects previous experiences with future possible scenarios for
action (Alrø, Skovsmose, & Valero, 2007, pp. 7–8)
The authors see a person’s dispositions as readiness to engage in intentional

practice or action and they associate them selves from understanding the
background as decisive. However, the awareness is present of students’
positioning resulting in structural and systematic disadvantages, as well as
advantages, in mathematics education. “Dispositions,” which are objectively
rooted but mediated by the individual, thus expressing a subjectivity
(Skovsmose, 1994, p. 179), is the term making it relevant to think about
connecting foreground and habitus. However, the very idea of integrating
foreground and habitus is based on the central place of action in both

frameworks and the related critique of structural determinism.
THE THEORY OF HABITUS
“Socialization” is a key term— and concept— in sociology meaning

the process of internalizing or of incorporating norms, traditions and
ideologies which provides people with habits and dispositions necessary
for participating within their culture and society. Like this, socialization is
one of the mechanisms ensuring the reproduction of the society. In Danish
and Swedish, a distinction is made between socialization as a process
(socialisering) and socialization as a result (socialisation). Using the term
“habitus,” Bourdieu has conceptualized the result of socialization.
Many theories of socialization are based on a fundamental dichotomy:
out there in society there are norms which are internalized in the individual.
In Bourdieu’s sociology people are most often agents in the etymological
meaning of the word (in Latin agens, agere, meaning act). His project has
consisted in combining studies of human experience with studies of the
objective condition under which the same people live (Broady, 1991). Thus
instead of “internalization,” Bourdieu (1980) employs the term “incorpora-
tion,” and the theory of habitus is incompatible with the idea of people as
“bearers” of social structures and norms. In his work, according to Broady
(1991) there is no direct, unmediated influence from social structures and
norms to individuals. At this point, it is notable that Bourdieu’s notion
of socialization is consistent with the idea of social background in critical
mathematics education as presented above.
Habitus is the concept developed and employed by Bourdieu for a system
of dispositions which allow the individual to act, think and orient her or
himself in the social world. People’s habitus is incorporated through the
life they have lived up to the present and consists of systems of durable,
transposable dispositions as principles of generating and structuring prac-
tices and representations:
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of exis-

tence produce habitus, systems of durable and transposable dispositions, struc-
tured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as
principles generating and organising practices and representations which
can bee objectively adapted at their aim without presupposing the conscious
aiming at goals and without the express mastery of the operations necessary
to attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being, by no
means, the product of obeying rules they are collectively orchestrated with-
out being the product of the organising action of a concert leader. (Bourdieu
1980, pp. 88–89, my translation)
The term “dispositions” is only defined implicitly by Bourdieu. Accord-

ing to the dictionary it means “ability to,” “instinct,” “taste,” “orientation,”
and so on; but, as it appears from the definition of habitus, it is not a case of
innate, inherited or natural abilities. To make this visible, I have chosen to
translate “disposition” into the Danish word tilbøjelighed (English: inclina-
tion). The term “system” stands for a structured amount which constitutes
a whole. Habitus (as a system of dispositions) contributes to the social world
being recreated or changed from time to time when there is disagree-
ment between the people’s habitus and the social world. The dispositions
which constitute habitus are “durable” (French: durables). This means that
although they are tenacious, they are not permanent. Bourdieu (1994) has
discussed precisely these two matters in an answer to attacks on him by
critics for determinism in his theories.
There are several reasons for importing habitus as an analytical concept
in mathematics education and trying to connect foreground with the
habitus theory:
The theory of habitus has to do with other than rational, conscious consid-
erations as a basis of actions and perceptions, and it provides a theoretical
starting point for criticism of the ideology of inherited abilities. Habitus is
durable but it undergoes transformations. Dispositions point both back-
wards and forwards in the current situation of the individual. The concept
of habitus aims at an action-orientation anchored in the individual and can
simultaneously explain non-actions. (Wedege, 1999)
I would claim that the notion of foreground, developed and belong-

ing in critical mathematics education can be integrated as a theoretical
element with habitus in a problematique of mathematics education. Bour-
dieu (1994) emphasizes that the theory of habitus is not “a grand theory,”
but merely a theory of action or practice. The theory has to do with why we
act and think as we do. It does not answer the question of how the system
of dispositions is created, and how habitus could be changed in a (peda-
gogical) practice.2
There is no sense in seeing habitus as the result of an isolated peda-
gogical activity (a product of learning). However, it is fruitful to employ
the concept of habitus in the work of descriptive analysis about the condi-
tions for people learning mathematics, precisely because habitus is formed
through impressions and acquisition either directly, where the objective
structures are experienced and leave traces, or indirectly, when we are
exposed to and engaged in activities that make impressions (see Wedege,
1999).
Bourdieu has not studied people’s sense of doing mathematics (French:
le sens de pratique mathematique) and, thus, he has not developed a concept
of “mathematical habitus,” a notion introduced by Zevenbergen in a study

of implications of ability grouping in school (the middle years). Zeven-
bergen (2005, p. 608) proposes that when the practice of ability grouping
“is enacted in mathematics classrooms it can create a learning environ-
ment that becomes internalized as a mathematical habitus.” However, this
structuralistic interpretation of habitus is neither compatible with the
understanding of the dialectics between individual and structure in criti-
cal mathematics education nor in the work of Bourdieu. Furthermore,
Zevenbergen presents the mathematical habitus as a product of school
mathematical practices alone. The data from interviews with 96 students
from six schools serving upper-, middle- to working-class families were
explored in terms of gender, school and year level, not in terms of social
class. Thus, I do not find that this notion of mathematical habitus resonates
with the sociological theory of habitus.
LINKING BEN’S FOREGROUND FOR LEARNING

MATHEMATICS WITH HIS HABITUS
As a part of an essay, one of my students, Jonas Lovén (2010) did a nar-

rative interview with a male student at the vocational program at higher
secondary school in Sweden. The purpose of doing a mathematical life
history interview was to test the analytical power of combining the concept
of habitus with the notion of foreground. Carrying out the interview, Lovén
followed the methodology of the narrative biographic interview as devel-
oped by the German sociologist Fritz Schütze (Andersen & Larsen 2001).
The interview with Ben, as Lovén has named the student in his essay, was
taped and transcript and they have both approved my use of the transcript
for further analysis. The disadvantage of this procedure is, among other
things that I did not have the opportunity to follow up the interviewee’s
narrative. But the advantage of a young Swedish teacher student as inter-
viewer is a reduction of the built-in asymmetry in any inquiry and hence a
diminution of what Bourdieu (1993) has called symbolic violence. However,
the mere fact that Lovén has a position as a future mathematics teacher and
as such has been a trainee in the mathematics classroom of Ben seems to
have an impact on his discourse when he—as an interviewee—answered
the question about mathematics in his life, in a very favorable way.
The initial question put by the interviewer is, “Could you please tell
about mathematics in your life? Quite simply—you may begin precisely
where you want to and try to recount what comes into your mind” (lines
6–7). Ben seems to join the mathematics teacher discourse of “mathemat-
ics is everywhere:”
One uses math, yeah, every day—in principle. (I: Mmm) Yeah, where is it
(Pause) Yeah, it does not work without math—nothing works. It is some-
thing you have to know and just carry on. Start in an early age. (Pause) Yeah
... (Pause). (I: Yes, precisely.) Yeah, later on it is often in the shops; these
unreliable shop assistants and so on. It is fantastic being able to think and
to do the sums rapidly. If they take one or two Krona from you. Not much
—maybe, but.... Quite often I am surfing on my mobile. Then it is good to
calculate how much the cost is a minute if you do not have free surf. Which I
do not have. Then I have to calculate a little, and eh ... you are on Facebook
every day so.. So it is good to know it ... that the money does not flow away
just like that. What more can one tell? Yeah a great hobby, I am playing golf.
(lines 41–63)
And Ben continues by telling about the scoring in golf and again about
not being cheated, this time by his father. Ben’s narrative takes off when
he was “a little boy” just at the school start with supportive parents at
home: “At that time, it was very cool. Everything was pretty simple, at
the beginning. But after some years. Everything new is difficult. (Pause)”
(lines 12–13). A central figure in Ben’s narrative is his grandfather, who
also supported him in mathematics. He is introduced like this: “Even my
grandfather [helped me]; he is a genius in mathematics. So already as a
small kid I started to calculate” (lines 17–18, [my insertion]).
“Yes, OK, I ... Yeah, one has been doing mathematics for 11 or 12 years
now,” Ben states (line 32). School mathematics has been a part of his lived
life over a long period and, together with the social interaction in out-
of-school situations, influenced the socialization process resulting in his
dispositions for doing mathematics today and tomorrow. In Ben’s bio-
graphic narrative about mathematics, two persons are important: First his
grandfather, who supported him also by serving as a great example, and
second Magnus, who owned a store where he had a job as a 15-year-old.
Together they did a piece of joinery:
I think that it was much fun. Then I decided to aim for joiner and to apply
for this vocational school to be a joiner, but later on you circle around—you
have to try everything from construction work to house painting. And I fell
for the sheet metal work.... New exciting stuff, and more great challenges
and I have nothing against solving difficult problems (lines 134–139)
Ben tells that he had some difficulties with mathematics in Grade 9

but the grandfather helped him and later on his uncle, who is graduate
engineer and has a “sharp brain.” “Unfortunately,” Ben just passed in
mathematics at the end of lower secondary:
... but I knew that I could do better and then I came here in August 2009 and
started with the mathematics here. And I do not find it difficult at all because
it is mostly repetition from lower secondary.... But when you are in the work-
shop it is not only 1 +1 = 2. As I told you before it is diameter multiplied by
pi. And how many degrees you have to twist a disc wind.... It is cool, really
cool. (lines 145–150)
In Ben’s narrative, the link between his habitus and his foreground for
learning mathematics is obvious. His lived life resulting in habitus acts as
the background for the interpretation of his future life (foreground). When
Ben at the end of the interview is asked if he has any plans for a higher edu-
cation, he refers to the fact that many of his friends have already left school:
... and mathematics above all because they think that it is damned boring.
But I have nothing against it. I am doing fine. It is showing up at the test,
you have to learn, it’s just like that. Yes ... no, I do not care what others are
thinking. It is my life.... I do not think that university is something for me.
In fact, I have never been considered it, I think ... No ...” (lines 263–270).
In the Swedish society, the possibility of a higher education is available

for Ben but this is not a part of his foreground.
INTEGRATING FOREGROUND AS A CONCEPT IN

THE THEORY OF HABITUS
With this chapter, I hope to initiate a discussion of possibility and potential

of connecting the notion of foreground as a theoretical element in Critical
Mathematics Education with the theory of habitus. I have argued for the
compatibility and the connecting strategy suggested is integrating locally,
that is, some elements from one theoretical structure are integrated in a
more elaborated theory, and the aim is theory development (see Wedege,
2010a).
At first, the notion of students’ foregrounds was based on anecdotic evi-
dence (Skovsmose, 1994). Later it is given a conceptual definition based
on qualitative empirical studies (Alrø, Skovsmose, & Valero, 2007). Broady
(1991) has argued that the key concepts in Bourdieu’s sociology should be
regarded as research tools or condensed research programs. They get their
full meaning when they are set in motion as tools in investigations. The
notion of foreground has inspired research within critical mathematics edu-
cation. I claim that the concept of students’ foregrounds locally integrated
in the theory of habitus should be regarded as a research tool and I see the
possibility of further theoretical development based on a combination of
future large scale quantitative studies and qualitative studies in mathemat-
ics education.
When theories are imported from sociology, psychology, anthropology,

and so on into mathematics education they are adapted and reconstructed,
in time. The concept of habitus has guided some studies in mathematics
education (e.g., Gates, 2003; Wedege, 1999; Zevenbergen, 2005). I hope
that local integration of foreground, which originates from the “home-
brewed” theory of critical mathematics education, into the theory of habitus
can strengthen both concepts as research tools in mathematics education.
Notes
1. The article “Foregrounds and politics of learning obstacles” was published

2002 in a preprint: Publication no. 35, Centre for research in learning math-
ematics, Roskilde University.
2. Note that at the end of the 1960s, the term “habitus” achieved a central
place in Bourdieu’s terminology, where it is presented as product in the
pedagogical activity in the book La Reproduction (Bordieu, & Passeron, 1970)
about the function of the educational system in social reproduction. Here, a
durable formation and habitus achieve equal status (pp. 46–47). Several ref-
erences in educational literature refer to this work and thus deal with habitus
as a result of formal education.
REFERENCES
Alrø, H., Skovsmose, O., & Valero, P. (2007). Inter-viewing foregrounds (Working
Papers on Learning 5). Aalborg, Denmark: Aalborg University.
Andersen, A. S., & Larsen, K. (2001). Det Narrative Livshistoriske Interview: Introduk-
tion til Fritz Schützes Teoretiske og Metodologiske Arbejde [The narrative life story
interview: Introduction to Fritz Schützes theoretical and methodological
work]. Roskilde: Småskrift nr. 11, Livshistorieprojektet, Roskilde University.
Baber, S. A. (2007). Interplay of citizenship, education and mathematics: Formation of
foregrounds of Pakistani immigrants in Denmark. (Doctoral thesis). Aalborg,
Denmark: Department of Education, Learning and Philosophy, Aalborg
University.
Bordieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1970). La reproduction: Eléments pour une Théorie du
Système D’enseignement [Reproduction in education, society and culture]. Paris,
France: Les Éditions de Minuit.
Bourdieu, P. (1980). Le Sens Pratique [The logic of practice]. Paris, France: Les Édi-
tions de Minuit.
Bourdieu, P. (1993). Comprende [To understand]. In P. Bourdieu et al. (Eds.),
La Misère du Monde [Weight of the world ](pp. 1388–1421). Paris, France:
Editions du Seuil.
Bourdieu, P. (1994). In other words. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
Broady, D. (1991). Sociologi och Epistemologi: Om Pierre Bourdieus Författarskap och

den Historiska Epistemologin [Sociology and epistemology: On Pierre Bordieu’s
works and the historical epistemology]. Stockholm, Sweden: HLS Förlag.
Brousseau, G. (1986). Fondements et méthodes de la didactique des mathéma-
tiques. Recherces en Didactique des Mathématiques, 7, 33–115.
Gates, P. (2003). Excavating and mapping the social landscape of beliefs. In P.
Valero & O. Skovmose (Eds.), Proceedings of the Third International Mathematics
Education and Society Conference, Helsingør, Denmark, 2002 (pp. 317–325).
Roskilde, Denmark: Centre for Research in Learning Mathematics, Roskilde
University.
Lange, T. (2009). Difficulties, meaning and marginalisation in mathematics learning as
seen through children’s eyes. (Doctoral thesis). Aalborg, Denmark: Department
of Education, Learning and Philosophy, Aalborg University.
Lovén, J. (2010). “Ja man har ju hållit på med matematik i 11 eller 12 år nu”—En Elevs
Matematiska Livsberättelse Utifrån Begreppen Habitus och Förgrund (Examensar-
bete) [“Well, one has been working with mathematics for 11 to 12 years by
now”: A student’s life story on mathematics based on the concepts of habitus
and foreground (Essay)]. Malmö: Malmö Högskola, Lärarutbildningen.
erelands: Kluwer.
Povey, H., & Zevenbergen, R. (2008). Mathematics education and society: An over-
view. In M. Menghini, F. Furinghetti, L. Giacardi, & F. Arzarello (Eds.), The
First century of the International Commission on Mathematical Instruction (1908-
2008): Reflecting and Shaping the World of Mathematics Education (pp. 277–288).
Rome, Italy: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana.
Skovsmose, O. (2005). Foregrounds and politics of learning obstacles. For the Learn-
ing of Mathematics, 25, 4–10.
Wedege, T. (1999). To know or not to know—mathematics, that is a question of
context. Educational Studies in Mathematics Education, 39, 205–227.
Wedege, T. (2010a). Connecting theories in mathematics education: From bricolage
to professionalism. Nordic Studies in Mathematics Education, 15, 59–78.
Wedege, T. (2010b, March, 20–25). Sociomathematics: A subject field and a research
field. In U. Gellert, E. Jablonka, & C. Morgan (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth
International Mathematics Education and Society Conference, Berlin, Germany
(pp. 449–458). Berlin, Germany: Freie Universität Berlin.
Wæge, K. (2007). Elevenes Motivasjon for å Lære Matematikk og Undersøkende Matema-
tikkundervisning [Students’ motivation for learning mathematics and inquiry
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of Mathematical Sciences, Norwegian University of Technology And Science.
Zevenbergen, R. (2005). The construction of mathematical habitus: Implications
of ability grouping in the middle years. Journal for Curriculum Studies, 37,
607– 619.
chapter 8
THE HEGEMONY OF
ENGLISH MATHEMATICS
Brian Greer and Swapna Mukhopadhyay
In reading The Hegemony of English by Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari

(2003), we were struck by how many of the statements therein retain sense
and force when “English,” “language” or “language teaching” is replaced
by “mathematics” or “mathematics education.” Accordingly, we present
here a selection of quotations from their book, relating them to themes
common to hegemony in the two domains. In so doing, we follow the
example of Jean Lave and Ray McDermott (2002) who, for extensive sec-
tions of Marx’s 1844 essay Estranged Labor, replaced “labor” by “learning,”
with results that make excellent sense; in other parts, the transposition
was less direct. Lave and McDermott commented (2002, p. 23) that “in
evaluating the theories of political economy available in 1844, young Marx
unwittingly wrote a quite devastating critique of the theories of learning
available in 2002.” Likewise it is fascinating and significant—but surpris-
ing only at first sight—that an analysis offering insights into the largely
concealed ideologies underlying mainstream mathematics education is
provided by a book that is about English and the teaching of English.

160â•‡â•‡B. Greer and S. Mukhopadhyay
DENIAL OF IDEOLOGY IN THE ACADEMY
Much of the introduction of The Hegemony of English is concerned with the

“ideology of no ideology” reflected, for example, in:
... the almost total absence of courses in the required curriculum that would
expose students to the body of literature dealing with the nature of ideology,
language mathematics, and ethics. Such literature would provide students of
language mathematics and language mathematics education with the necessary
understanding and critical tools to make linkages between self-contained
technical studies of language mathematics and the social and political realities
within which this technical approach to language mathematical studies often
takes place.
Thus, the very curriculum selection and organization in language mathemati-

cal studies favor a disarticulated technical training in preference to courses
in critical theory, which would enable students to make linkages with, for
example, the status and prestige accorded to certain dominant languages
mathematical practices (the languages of the colonizers academic mathematics)
and the demonization and devaluation of the so-called uncommon or mi-
nority languages non-academic mathematical practices. (Macedo, Dendrinos, &
Gounari, 2003, pp. 1–2)
(Here, and throughout, we follow Lave and McDermott in striking

through certain words and adding replacement text, which we have put
in italics). The last statement brings to mind the declaration by Freire
and Macedo (1987, p. 122) that “the intellectual activity of those without
power is always characterized as non-intellectual.” The simplistic distinc-
tion between academic and non-academic is more precisely expressed by
Barton (2008: 10) as that between “near-universal, conventional math-
ematics” (NUC-mathematics) and “[systems] for dealing with quantitative,
relational, or spatial aspects of human experience” (QRS-systems). We can
also transpose in the reverse direction—for example, in this statement by
Apple (2000, p. 243):
It is unfortunate but true that there is not a long tradition within the main-
stream of mathematics language education of both critically and rigorously
examining the connections between mathematics language as an area of
study and the larger relations of unequal economic, political, and cultural
power.
We do not see the translatability from one domain to another exempli-

fied by the above quotations as accidental, but rather as reflecting two
manifestations of a common underlying state of affairs, namely the dis-
inclination by many academics to accept responsibility for the human
The Hegemony of English Mathematicsâ•‡â•‡161
consequences of their work, hiding under the cloak of ideological neutral-

ity and scientific objectivity, thus revealing:
… the very ideology that attempts to deny its own existence through a false
claim of neutrality in scientific pursuits in language mathematical education
studies. (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, p. 2)
Back in 1969, the historian and political activist Howard Zinn wrote an
essay called “The Uses of Scholarship” (reprinted in Zinn, 1997) in which
he wrote of academics being entangled in a cluster of beliefs:
... roughly expressed by the phrases “disinterested scholarship,” “dispas-

sionate learning,” “objective study,” “scientific method”—all adding up to
the fear that using our intelligence to further our moral ends is somehow
improper. (pp. 502–503)
And Said (1994, p. 311) commented that:
How [the moderns Western norm for scholarship], with its supposed de-
tachment, its protestations of objectivity and impartiality, its code of politesse
and ritual calmness, came about is a problem for the sociology of taste and
knowledge.
In most university mathematics departments, there are few if any courses

that deal with the social and political, as opposed to intellectual, history of
mathematics. Moreover, they typically present a Eurocentric narrative, as
exemplified by the following quotation from Kline (1953, p. 27):
Mathematics is a living plant [that] finally secured a firm grip on life in

the highly congenial soil of Greece and waxed strong for a brief period. In
this period it produced one perfect flower, Euclidean geometry. The buds
of other flowers opened slightly and with close inspection the outlines of
trigonometry and algebra could be discerned; but these flowers withered
with the decline of Greek civilization, and the plant remained dormant
for one thousand years. Such was the state of mathematics when the
plant was transported to Europe proper and once more embedded
in fertile soil.
More recently, the construction of a counternarrative has been under-

taken by scholars such as Joseph (1992) and Powell and Frankenstein
(1997). Further, we are aware of very few university courses that deal with
the implications of the (often hidden) ways in which uses of mathematics
influence our lives (“mathematics in action,” as Skovsmose [2005] phrases
it). Two examples can be found in Davis, Hauk, and Latiolais (2009). In one,
a university professor introduced courses on environmental mathematical
modeling and environmental statistics. These were allowed as alternatives

to traditional applied calculus and introductory statistics courses. In the
second case, a first-year liberal arts mathematics course included the topic
of consumer price index (CPI) and the calculation of inflation rate as rela-
tive change in CPI. Students went beyond direct mathematical operations
on formulae to focus, for example, on the life-quality inequities arising
from an economic inequity in cost-of-living allotment.
In school mathematics, increasing attention to mathematical mod-
elling at least opens the possibility of studying the social and political
ramifications of mathematics in action (Mukhopadhyay & Greer, 2001) and
there are some notable examples, including the “socially response-able”
approach developed by Atweh (e.g., Atweh & Brady 2009) and the work
of Gutstein (2007). An excellent earlier example is Nobre’s (1989) analysis
of the “Animal Lottery” in Brazil that embedded mathematical analysis of
odds within a discussion of the related societal issues. Nobre commented
that “having the mathematical elements to understand society in his hands,
the student begins to see society with other eyes, thus being able to inter-
fere with it and ceasing to be just a spectator” (p. 177)—in other words,
to use the words of Freire taken up by Gutstein, not just to read, but also
to write, the world—with Freire, in turn, echoing Marx on whose tomb is
inscribed his declaration that “the philosophers have only interpreted the
world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”
Methodological fundamentalism
Appealing to scientific rigor and objectivity is instrumental in sustaining

the myth of ideological neutrality. Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003,
p. 3) quote Paulo Freire (1985, p. 103) on this pretence:
The over-celebration of methodological rigor and the incessant call for

objectivity and neutrality support their false claim of a scientific posture
through which “they may try to hide” in what [they] regard as the neutrality
of scientific pursuits, indifferent to how [their] findings are used, even un-
interested in considering for whom or for what interest [they] are working.
Thus:
In their blind embrace of linguistic mathematical neutrality, most some lan-

guage educators and sociolinguists mathematics educators allow their programs
to be plagued by the constant debate over scientific rigor and methodologi-
cal refinements, a debate that often hides language mathematics education is-
sues of a more serious nature. (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, p. 17)
Note that in the above, we replaced “most language educators and

sociolinguists” by “some mathematics educators.” The term “sociomath-
ematician” is not widely used, as compared with “sociolinguist,” however
“sociomathematics” has been characterized by Wedege (2010, p. 452) as:
• a subject field combining mathematics, people, and society

• a research field where problems concerning the relationships be-
tween people, mathematics, and society are identified, formulated,
and studied.
As examples of what could be meant by “sociomathematics”—broadly

interpreted—that come immediately to mind, we can cite Hacking’s (1990)
history of the development of probability theory in Europe, Urton’s (1997)
The Social Life of Numbers, a study of Quechuan mathematics, and the work
of Restivo (e.g., Restivo, 1993; Restivo, Van Bendegem, & Fischer, 1993).
Thus:
It is important to note that there are a handful of sociolinguists sociomathema-

ticians and language specialists mathematicians whose work embraces impor-
tant questions of ideology, class, race, gender, and the intersection of these
factors with the very language mathematics under study. (Macedo, Dendrinos,
& Gounari, 2003, p. 4)
Examples of mathematicians of this stripe are less easy to find, but we

can cite Davis and Hersh (1986), and mathematicians working within the
ethnomathematics perspective, such as Ascher (1991). Restivo (1993, p. 4)
refers to Dirk Struik (a Marxist and a mathematician) as one of the founders
of the sociology of mathematics, and Struik (1948) wrote extensively on
Marx’s deep explorations of mathematics, in particular calculus (the
attempt to mathematically describe change), from the viewpoint of dialectic
materialism.
Note also that, in the quotation above, we changed “most language
educators and sociolinguists” to “some mathematics educators,” reflecting
the fact that there has long been a healthy skepticism among mathematics
educational researchers about methodological rigidity (Hans Freudenthal’s
scorn for unreflective use of statistical and psychometric methodologies
comes to mind immediately). In recent decades, approaches to research
have diversified considerably, particularly by the increasing use of inter-
pretational methodologies drawing on disciplines such as anthropology,
sociology, semiotics, and psychoanalysis. Depending on ones perspective,
these explosive developments can be welcomed as liberatory or bemoaned
as anarchistic.
Currently, there is considerable pressure to conduct educational research

within a methodological straitjacket—most notably, but by no means exclu-
sively, in the United States. This development is epitomized by the report
of the National Mathematics Advisory Panel (U.S. Department of Educa-
tion, 2008) set up by George Bush (Greer, 2008, 2012) that is redolent
with what Cobb and Jackson (2008, p. 573) termed “experimentalism as
an ideology that holds that only studies conducted using this methodol-
ogy constitute a trustworthy basis for making recommendations to policy
makers and practitioners.” To update Wittgenstein, “whereof one cannot
do controlled experiments, thereof one must be silent.” Macedo, Dendri-
nos, and Gounari (2003, p. 72) make the point that operating within an
ideology makes it impossible to consider certain questions:
… if the results that are presented as facts were originally determined by a

particular ideology, these facts cannot in themselves illuminate issues that lie
outside the ideological construction of these facts to begin with.
In particular (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, p. 73):
An empirical study that neglects to incorporate into its design the cruel real-
ity [of many students’ lives] … will never be able to explain fully the reasons
behind the poor performances of these children.
Having described the wretched conditions of a school he saw in South

Africa in 1996, Skovsmose (2005, p. 20) asked the pointed question: “How
is it that the research in mathematics education has not noticed the hole in
the roof?” “Schools that shock the conscience” (Oakes, 2010) also exist in
California, a state sued in 2000 for its failure to provide adequate schools
for its students. The plaintiffs presented evidence of the inadequacy of
educational provision for poor and minority students. The state responded
with “a vigorous defence” (Oakes, 2010, p. 57). Most tellingly, their first
line of argument, as characterized by Oakes (2010, p. 57) was that:
… a particular school resource—i.e. qualified teachers, instructional mate-

rials, or buildings—is only essential, if there is evidence that the resource
has an independent and positive effect on students’ achievement [i.e. test
scores]. Further, evidence of this independent effect is only credible if pro-
duced by research using a narrow range of methods, preferably experiments
or econometric statistical analyses.
Thus, it is only legitimate to conclude that the presence of rats in a school

has a detrimental effect on children if there is a controlled experimental
study that shows that such a variable affects test scores.
Academic hierarchy
Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari remark that (2003):
… many language mathematics education programs remain housed within lit-

erature mathematics departments (p. 20)
The above statement holds in the United States, at least. There is con-
siderable variation, of course, but as a generality it can be stated that
mathematicians tend to look down on mathematics educators and the
field of mathematics education. For example, a publication by a mathema-
tician in a mathematics education journal or book is regarded as having
minimal importance. This status differential has major repercussions when
mathematicians become involved in the politics and policy of mathematics
education (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2004, pp. 19–20):
The asymmetrical power relations between literature mathematics and lan-

guage mathematics education studies reproduce the false notion that anyone
trained in literature mathematics is automatically endowed (through osmo-
sis) with the necessary skills to teach the language in which the literature
is written mathematics. This position precludes viewing language mathematics
teaching as a complex field of study which demands rigorous understanding
of theories of language acquisition learning mathematics coupled with a thor-
ough knowledge of the language mathematics being taught and its functions
in the society that generates and sustains it.
It is entirely appropriate for mathematicians to take an interest in, and

offer guidance on, school mathematics education, and their input has
often been extremely beneficial. However, in other cases they have enjoyed
undue influence, with distinctly harmful effects. The “New Math” move-
ment in the 1960s, albeit taking a variety of forms in different countries,
was heavily influenced by mathematicians. Hans Freudenthal (1991), who
was instrumental in resisting its effects in the Netherlands, commented that
“New Math’s wrong perspective was to replace the learner’s insight with
the adult mathematician’s” (p. 112). In California, in the 1990s, a group of
university mathematicians staged a kind of ideological coup and installed a
conservative mathematical framework for the state that replaced the exist-
ing progressive framework—that had not been in place long enough for
any kind of meaningful evaluation (Schoenfeld, 2004). Mathematicians, in
alliance with methodological fundamentalists, scientists, and psychologists
of various kinds, dominated the recent National Mathematics Advisory
Panel in the United States (Greer, 2012) and have been accorded con-
siderable power in the ongoing preparation of a “Common Core State
Standards” in mathematics for the United States.
Cultural invasion
Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003, p. 17) use Freire’s term “cultural
invasion” in discussing the increasing dominance of English, with
particular attention to the English-only educational policy in the United
States and the linguistic domination of the European Union by English (see
Phillipson, 1992, 2009). We have not attempted to make direct substitutions
in the following quotations that are illustrative of what the authors mean
by cultural invasion:
Even the empty slogan “English for all children” is disingenuous in that
it never tells those most affected by the proposition what the cost will be.
The cost is generally the abandonment of the student’s native language and
culture. (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, p. 9)
… how the learning of English, a dominant language, imposes upon the

subordinate speakers a feeling of subordination, as their life experiences,
history, and language are ignored, if not sacrificed. (Macedo, Dendrinos, &
Gounari, 2003, p. 16)
… an assault of non-English-speaking students’ cultural and ethnic identity,

which is inextricably related to their language. (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gou-
nari, 2003, p. 25)
A major reason for not making substitutions here is that language is

more fundamentally part of cultural identity than mathematics. Further-
more, the prominence of English in parts of the world is not comparable
with the worldwide dominance of what Barton (2008, p. 10) calls “near-
universal, conventional mathematics.” Nevertheless, mathematics is far
from insignificant in relation to cultural identity. Reverting to translation
mode “(Maceco, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, p. 31):
... conservative educators continue to disarticulate language mathematics

from its social and ideological context by conveniently ignoring the follow-
ing facts:
First, meaning carried by language mathematics can never be analyzed in an
isolated fashion…
Second, language mathematics cannot exist apart from its speakers users.
Linguistic imperialism (Phillipson, 1992, 2009), particularly as exercised

through education (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000) has been, and is, a central
aspect of colonialism, neocolonialism, and internal colonialism (which is
how Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003, p. 30) characterize language
policies in the United States in relation to minorities). Again, direct substi-
tutions do not seem appropriate in the following quotations:
… the present neoliberal ideology in the guise of globalization has promot-

ed language policies aimed at stamping out the greater use of national and
subordinate languages.… These policies are consonant with a colonial leg-
acy that had as its major tenet the total deculturation of colonized peoples.
(Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, pp. 14–15)
In essence, the colonial educational structure seemed designed to inculcate

the African natives with myths and beliefs that denied and belittled their
lived experiences, history, culture, and language. (Macedo, Dendrinos, &
Gounari, 2003, p. 15)
However, mathematics has also played a significant role in cultural inva-

sion. For example, Zaslavsky (1973) was a pioneer in drawing attention,
not just to the intellectual/cultural richness of African mathematics, but
also to its suppression under colonial rule. Bishop (1990) was quite explicit
on this point in his paper “Western Mathematics: The Secret Weapon of
Cultural Imperialism.” Urton (2009, p. 27) commented that the title of
Bishop’s paper “must surely be one of the most provocative in the recent
literature concerning the history of mathematics and the nature and status
of mathematical practice.” Urton himself provides a very detailed analysis
illustrating Bishop’s argument, in relation to the European invasion of
the New World, and in particular to the imposition of Spanish accounting
methods on people of South America, displacing the highly-developed
cultural practices already in place. However, to our knowledge (and we
would welcome any suggestions), there is no counterpart for mathematics
of the very profound analysis of the role of culture, specifically literature,
in both reflecting and reinforcing the world-views of both colonizers and
colonized under imperialism written by Said (1994).
Although the age of colonialism in the original sense is largely past, it
has been replaced by others forms, ideological, military, economic, with the
result that (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, pp. 15–16):
… the neoliberal ideology, with globalization as its hallmark, continues

to promote language policies mathematics education discourse and curriculum
which package English standard academic mathematics as a “super” language
discipline that is not only harmless, but should be acquired by all societies that
aspire to competitiveness in the globalized world economic order.
The remorseless pressure toward increasing use of English (or any other
dominant language—the phenomenon is by no means limited to English)
leads to great tension between the natural desire for the economic, politi-
cal, and other benefits that it offers and the need/desire to maintain one’s
own language and cultural identity. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000, p. xxxiii)
makes the crucial distinction between additive and negative learning of a

dominant language that is not one’s own:
It is subtractive dominant language learning (where for instance English is

learned at the cost of the other tongues, not in addition to them) that kills
other languages.
And of course, it need hardly be said that people who speak a dominant
language as their mother tongue are intellectually enriched by learning
other languages, and knowing about other cultures in general, includ-
ing their mathematics. (The first author, who is Irish, grew up speaking
English, learning a little Irish at school; Irish is a naturally spoken language
in only a few small areas. The second author, who is from Calcutta, grew up
speaking Bengali and still speaks, reads, and writes in it, learning English
first at school, and later Hindi).
A somewhat comparable tension exists between learning NUC-
mathematics in school and QRS-systems, generally learnt in nonschool
environments (using the terms of Barton [2008], introduced earlier). The
complexity of this dilemma, as described by Atweh and Clarkson (2001,
p. 87), is illustrated by a number of contributions at a conference when the
president of the African Mathematical Union (Kuku, 1995) “warned against
the overemphasis on culturally oriented curricula for developing countries
that act against their ability to progress and compete in an increasingly
globalized world.” Thus, there is a tension in that “an understanding of
NUC-mathematics and a world-language such as English … [represent]
access to communication, further educational opportunities, employment,
and development” (Barton, 2008, pp. 167–168). On the other hand, Barton
(2008) echoes the persistent message of, among others, Moschkovich
(e.g., Moschkovich & Nelson-Barber, 2009) that multiculturalism, and
multilingualism in particular, should be treated as a source of intellectual
richness rather than a problem; thus students’ access to different forms
of mathematics should be additive rather than subtractive (or, indeed,
multiplicative rather than divisive). Within mathematics education, there are
a number of approaches that allow for coexistence of academic mathematics
and other forms of mathematical practices. For example, Gutstein (2006)
argues for a balance among community, classical, and critical knowledges,
which all have mathematical components, Civil (e.g., 2007) appeals to the
use of “Funds of Knowledge” that students possess within their homes and
communities, Lipka (e.g., Lipka, Yanez, Andrew-Ihrke, & Adam, 2009) has
for over 25 years been leading a research program on incorporating into
curricular material the mathematical aspects of Yupik cultural practices.
Final comments
Why are we able to take many sentences of the book by Macedo, Dendri-
nos, and Gounari (2003), and transpose them so readily into the domain
of mathematics education? The primary reason, we have argued, is the
dominant ideology that plays out in both arenas (see, in particular, Chapter
5 of Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003). Within, and to varying degrees
beyond, the United States, the dominant power bloc within educational
politics has been characterized by Apple (2000, p. 244) as “conservative
modernization”:
This power bloc combines multiple fractions of capital who are committed
to neoliberal marketized solutions to educational problems, neoconserva-
tive intellectuals who want a “return” to higher standards and a “common
culture,” authoritarian populist religious fundamentalists who are deeply
worried about secularity and the preservation of their own traditions, and
particular fractions of the professionally oriented new middle-class who are
committed to the ideology and techniques of accountability, measurement,
and “management.” Although there are clear tensions and conflicts within
this alliance, in general its overall aims are in providing the educational
conditions believed necessary both for increasing international competitive-
ness, profit, and discipline and for returning us to a romanticized past of the
“ideal” home, family, and school.
Among the preoccupations of this alliance within the United States is

a vehement antipathy to multiculturalism, manifest particularly in the
English-only policy for school education, an emphasis on the great books
of American and English literature, and a monolithic and inflexible view
of mathematics.
Another prominent characteristic may be described as the ideology of
certainty. Thus (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003, p. 122):
If we take a closer look at neoliberal discourse, we will realize that it is deeply

rooted in a language of universalism and inevitability that “naturalizes” its
premises.
Mathematics, of course, lends itself most readily to such an ideology

through Platonist epistemology (Ernest, 1991). Further, in the dominance
of the neoliberal apparatus, Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003) point
to a “crisis of critique,” namely “a hypnosis of dissident discourses … a
degradation, trivialization, and closure of meanings that shut down any
and all questions” (p. 110).
While the focus of this chapter has been on parallels between the teach-
ing of language and the teaching of mathematics, these also cross and
interact, of course. Barton’s (2008) book on language and mathemat-

ics raises many interesting questions about such interactions within and
across cultures and their implications for education, for example when he
describes attempts to bridge cultures by designing culturally appropriate
linguistic extensions of Maori to encompass content of academic/school
mathematics such as positive and negative numbers, discrete and continu-
ous quantities, and gradient.
The question is of obvious and great importance for children for whom
their mother tongue differs from the language of learning and teaching,
whether because they are immigrants or members of minority linguistic
communities (Civil, 2012; Setati & Planas, 2012).
To return to Lave and McDermott, their analysis of the third part of
Marx’s essay, on the alienation of labour, convincingly presents a parallel
set of conclusions about alienation of learning. Thus, they write (Lave &
McDermott, 2002, p. 20) “There is reason for supposing that learning in
schools might also be a commodified and alienated practice.” And they
continue by quoting Marx (1986/1867, p. 677):
… a school-master is a productive worker when, in addition to belaboring

the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground to enrich the owner
of the school. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory
instead of a sausage factory, makes no difference to the relation.
A dominant thread running through this chapter is that school educa-

tion is too often an alienating experience for learners. In language, this
often takes the form of suppression of the child’s language, which is part of
a general denigration of their cultural knowledge, including that relating
to mathematical practices. In mathematics, all too typically, what is taught
in school makes no connection with the lived experiences of the students,
or with the social and political—and intellectual—issues of importance to
them personally, to their communities, to humankind in general. It doesn’t
have to be like that.
Acknowledgments
We thank Panagiota Gounari and Ole Skovsmose for helpful comments on

a draft of this chapter.
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Zaslavsky, C. (1973). Africa counts. Boston, MA: Prindle, Weber, & Schmidt.
Zinn, H. (1997). The uses of scholarship. In The Zinn reader: Writings on disobedience
and democracy (pp. 499–507). New York, NY: Seven Stories Press. (Original
work published 1969)
chapter 9
SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND

DIFFERENT MATHEMATICS
LANGUAGE GAMES
A Study at a Brazilian
Agricultural-Technical School
Ieda Maria Giongo and Gelsa Knijnik
SUMMARY
This chapter discusses the disciplinary processes and resistance movements

of knowledge produced at an agricultural technical school focusing on
mathematics education developed in its curriculum. The theoretical frame-
work of the chapter is based on Michel Foucault’s thought and Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s (2004) ideas presented in his book Philosophical Investiga-
tions. The analysis of the data—constituted by a diversified set of school
documents, interviews with teachers and students of that school and by
direct observations of classroom activities—showed: (a) the existence of
two mathematics practiced in that school: the mathematics of the subject

176â•‡â•‡I. M. Giongo and G. Knijnik
of Mathematics and the mathematics of the technical subjects, both linked

to the school form of life and engendering language games constituted
by rules which shaped specific grammars; (b) a strong family resemblance
between the language games associated with the mathematics of the techni-
cal subjects and those associated with the peasant form of life in southern
Brazil, as well as between the language games of the subject of mathematics
and those which shape academic mathematics.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents results of a study performed at an agricultural-tech-

nical school in the southernmost state of Brazil. The purpose of the study
was to discuss disciplining processes and resistance movements that were
produced at that institution, focusing on its school curriculum, especially
mathematics education (Giongo, 2008).
The theoretical framework that supported the investigation included
Michel Foucault’s thought and the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein (2004)
in his work Philosophical Investigations. The data consisted of: school docu-
ments; mathematics copybooks and tests; handouts used by the teacher in
mathematics classes; written material produced by the students in the tech-
nical subjects; notes taken during the observations of two consecutive weeks
of classes on technical subjects; interviews (taped and then transcribed)
with three teachers, one student and a former student of the institutions
and testimonies given informally by teachers of that institution. Data anal-
ysis pointed to disciplining processes and resistance movements which
operated on school knowledges. It was also possible to show the existence
of two mathematics practiced at that school: the mathematics of the subject
of Mathematics and the mathematics of the technical subjects, both con-
nected to the form of school life and engendering language games that
were constituted by rules that shaped specific grammars.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first is this introduction.
In the next we show the theoretical framework that supported the investi-
gation, followed by the analytic exercise implemented. Finally, in the “(in)
conclusions,” we synthesize and problematize some results of the study.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this section is to spell out the analytic tools that gave
support to the study. These tools were sought for in the thought of Michel
Foucault and in the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein (2004) that correspond
to the later phase of his work, especially the ideas from Philosophical
School Curriculum and Different Mathematics Language Gamesâ•‡â•‡ 177
Investigations (PI). According to Knijnik (2007), the consistency of operating

with these theoretical perspectives can be achieved by means of the concept
of language adopted by both philosophers and their nonmetaphysical
positions toward knowledge.
Indeed Wittgenstein, differently from what he proposed in Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (1968), when he sought to answer “what is language?”,
in his work of maturity expresses that “we must not ask what language
is, but rather how it functions” (Condé, 1998, p. 86). When operating
this theoretical displacement, Wittgenstein indicates that it is no longer
possible to talk simply in language, but rather in languages, that is, “a
huge variety of uses, a plurality of functions or roles that we could see as
language games” (Condé, 1998, p. 86). In this way, the meaning of a word
emerges as we use it in different situations. Therefore, the same expres-
sion, in different contexts, will mean something else. In Wittgenstein’s
words: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI, #43). As we
can observe, Wittgenstein abandons any essentialist concept of language.
Indeed, if the meaning of a word is determined by they way we use it, use
can be understood as something that determines a practice and not “as the
expression of a metaphysical category” (Condé, 2004, p. 48).
Thus, the theoretical production of maturity of Wittgenstein, and some
of his interpreters such as Condé (1998, 2004) and Glock (1996), allows
the inference that language games and the rules that constitute them are
strongly imbricated by the way we use them. This means that language
games should be understood as immersed in a form of life, strongly amal-
gamated with nonlinguistic activities. Glock argues that, “a form of life is a
culture or social formation, the totality of communal activities into which
language-games are embedded” (p. 125). Indeed, since meaning is given
by use, the meaning can change at every use we make of the words. “What
we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”
(PI, #116), to the friction of “rough soil.”
These ideas lead us to the notion of form of life as “the intertwin-
ing of culture, world-view and language” (Glock, 1996, p. 124). In this
intertwining, the meanings we give words are mediated by rules that are
conceived in our social practices. A set of such rules constitutes a grammar
that, as indicated by Condé (2004, p. 170), is very important to analyze
modern rationality, because it “guides” the interactions between the dif-
ferent language games. Underlying the emphasis in learning to operate
with the rules of grammar, Condé says that Wittgenstein means “grammar
and language games as a rationality that is forged from the social prac-
tices in a form of life and that is no longer based on ultimate principles”
(p. 29). When one abandons the idea of a single, natural, reason-producing
structure, it is possible to understand rationality as an “invention,” a “con-
struct” (p. 29). It is this “construction” that will allow language to articulate
itself inside a form of life and establish which rationality will indicate to
us what we should accept or not. It is important to highlight that the phi-
losopher’s notion of “family resemblance” also points to the possibility of
interconnections between different language games belonging to the same
form of life or to different ones.
Thus, when pointing out that two language games have family resem-
blances, this does not refer to an identity between the games. It is
emphasized that both have similar aspects and that they are distributed
by chance, without a supposed uniform repetition. These ideas point to a
nonessentialist theoretical perspective which is shared by the poststructur-
alist positions.
This nonessentialist perspective is at the foundation of Foucault’s formu-
lations on how the disciplining and resistance of knowledges constitute the
subjects. Analyzing the close relationship between the “progress of lights”
and the disciplining of knowledges, Foucault discusses that throughout the
18th century there was,
un immense et multiple combat, non pas donc entre connaissance et igno-

rance, mais un immense et multiple combat des savoris les uns contre les
autres—des savoirs s’opposant entre eux par leur morphologie proper, par
leurs détenteurs ennemis les uns des autres, et par leurs effets de pouvoir in-
trinsèques [an immense and multiple battle, but not one between knowledge
and ignorance, but an immense and multiple battle between knowledges in
the plural—knowledges that are in conflict because of their very morphol-
ogy, because they are in the possession of enemies, and because they have
intrinsic power-effects]. (Foucault, 2003, p. 179)
The philosopher shows that during that period the State intervened,
directly or indirectly, with four procedures:
D’abord, l’élimination, la disqualification de ce qu’on pourrait appeler les

petits savoirs inutiles et irréductibles, économiquement coûteux…. Deuxiè-
mement, normalisation de ces savoirs entre eux, qui va permettre de les
ajuster les uns aux autres, de les faire communiquer entre eeux, d’abattre
les barrières du secret el des délimitations géographiques et techniques….
Troisième operation: classification hiérarchique de ces saviors qui permet,
en quelque sorte, de les ememboîter les uns dans les autres, depuis les plus
particuliers et les plus matériels, que seron en meme temps les savoirs subor-
donnés, jusqu’aux formes les plus générales, jusqu’aux savoirs les plus for-
mels…. Et enfin, à partir de là, possibilité de la quatrième operation, d’une
centralization pyramidale, que permet permet le contrôle de ces savoirs, que
assure les sélections et qui permet de transmettre à la fois de bas en huat les
contenus de ces savoirs, et de haut en bas les directions d’ensemble et les
organizations generals que l’on veut faire prévaloir [First, by eliminating or
disqualifying what might be termed useless and irreducible little knowledges
that are expensive in economic terms: elimination and disqualification, then.

Second, by normalizing these knowledges; this makes it possible to fit them
together, to make them communicate with one another, to break down the
barriers of secrecy and technological and geographical boundaries. In short,
this makes not only knowledges, but also those who possess them, interchan-
geable. The normalization of dispersed knowledges. Third operation: the
hierarchical classification of knowledges allows them to become, so to speak,
interlocking, starting with the most particular and material knowledges,
which are also subordinated knowledges, and ending with the most general
forms, with the most formal knowledges, which are also the forms that enve-
lop and direct knowledge. So, a hierarchical classification. And finally, once
all this has been done, a fourth operation becomes possible: a pyramidal
centralization that allows these knowledges to be controlled, which ensures
that they can be selected, and both that the content of these knowledges can
be transmitted upward from the bottom, and that the overall directions and
the general organizations it wishes to promote can be transmitted downward
from the top]. (Foucault, 2003, p. 180)
Again, following Foucault’s ideas, it should be mentioned that the analy-

sis of enunciations “can only refer to things said, to sentences that were
truly pronounced or written” (Foucault, 1995, p. 126). It is not a matter
of asking what would supposedly be “hidden” in the enunciations, but
rather of analyzing “how they exist, what it means to them that they have
expressed something, that they have left traces … what is to them the fact
that they appeared—and no other in their place” (p. 126).
In this sense, the Foucaultian perspective also became outstanding in
this analysis, enabling us to identify the rules that shaped the language
games which shaped the mathematics subject and those that constituted
the mathematics of technical subjects in the curriculum of the school
studied. Further, on examining the language games that institute these
two mathematics, we conjecture that there might be a strong family resem-
blance among the language games associated with the peasant form of life
of the south of the country, discussed by Knijnik (2007), as well as among
those associated with the mathematics subject. Finally, spelling out a school
mathematics education divided into two mathematics—the mathematics
subject and the one of the technical subjects—enabled understanding the
mechanisms of disciplining and resistance of school knowledges.
In brief, on the one hand Wittgenstein’s philosophy of maturity, denying
the existence of a universal language, enabled us to question the notion of a
universal mathematical language. This allowed us to argue, from the philo-
sophical viewpoint, about the existence of two mathematics practiced at the
school studied, here called “the mathematics of the Mathematics subject”
and the “mathematics of the technical subjects.” Foucault’s formulations,
on the other hand, enabled us to analyze these different mathematics in
their “ties with the production of power-knowledge relations and with con-
stituting true regimes” (Wanderer & Knijnik, 2007, p. 3).
DATA ANALYSIS
Based on the theoretical framework presented in the previous section

and the data produced by the before mentioned fieldwork, the analytical
exercise pointed to the rules that mark the mathematics subject, which
emphasized formalism, abstraction and asepsis. As shown in one of the
interviews given by the mathematics teacher, she considered formalism the
most important aspect in the subject she taught. She assigned a different
value to the students who followed “a model” in solving the exercises:
look at the difference ... I see that most of those who have an average above
50 [do all the exercises according to the model], each exercise, I correct all
of them, so they write it correctly ... it is a habit of theirs.
Formalism was also expressed in the definitions of operations with

complex numbers, or in classifying the numerical intervals, as well as in
spelling out the methods to solve linear systems. In the handouts written
by the teacher, there was the same order of presentation: first, the concept
was presented; then there was an exercise, usually solved by her, and after
this, long lists of similar exercises which, as she emphasized in one of the
interviews, were to be solved in the sequence in which they were shown.
The exercises preferentially use terms connected to academic mathematics,
expressed, among others, by using the letter “x” and “y” in the equations,
to explain the rules and methods to solve them. It should also be empha-
sized that writing also prevailed in the grammar of mathematics subject. As
another teacher interviewed explained, “one can even solve [the problems]
directly [without using the rule of three, ‘in one’s head’], but they [the
students] do not manage to solve them.” They “understand them better.”
In the test and handout exercises analyzed, integers were also used
recurrently, like the one that appears in the handout exercise: “The height
of a parallelogram is 10 cm. The size of the base is equal to double the
measure of the height. Calculate the area.” There was a high incidence
of values that besides being integers were multiples of 10, in an asepsis
perspective that excludes what sociologist Bauman (1998) referred to as
the “dirt,” which might contaminate the curriculum of the mathematics
subject. It can be inferred that banning the “dirt” from the mathematics
subject was also anchored in the preservation of formal writing that school
mathematics “borrows” from academic mathematics, marked by formal-
ity and abstraction (Knijnik, 2007, p. 4). This “borrowing” mentioned
by Knijnik may be thought of as indicating that these language games

are multiple and varied, and do not have, as was clearly emphasized by
Wittgenstein, an invariable common property, but only resemblances that
present themselves as “family resemblances.”
The analytic exercise also pointed to the existence of another mathemat-
ics practiced at that school. This mathematics—here called “mathematics
of technical subjects”—used approximation olhômetro (which can be loosely
translated from Brazilian Portuguese as “by eye,” an expression used by
students and teachers to refer to estimation) and orality. Indeed, differently
from the asepsis, formalism and abstraction present in the mathematics of
the Mathematics subject, the students used different rules when they were
asked to solve problems connected to farm work in the technical subjects.
In one of the classes on animal husbandry that was observed during
fieldwork, the students were asked to calculate the amount of feed needed
for the pigs in a 5-day period. Immediately, they mentioned that it would
be necessary to “separate the sums” because the daily consumption of each
lot was different from that of the others. Although the students were careful
with the “order” of writing, so as to obey the multiplication algorithm, the
calculator was used throughout the process. While they mixed the ingre-
dients they unanimously remarked that when preparing the feed, they
use the “more or less technique,” that is, they round off the values found,
usually upwards. They argued that this “upwards” was necessary because of
possible losses, ranging from accumulating feed in the machine—impos-
sible to remove—to waste in transport from the feed room to the chicken
coops and pigpens. The teacher ratified the students’ position: on discuss-
ing the differences between “calculation in the Mathematics subject” and
the animal consumption, she said that the former [referring to calcula-
tion] “is dry, it does not take the variables into account”; on the other hand, in
consumption there are “a number of variations” that have to be taken into
account.
This episode, among so many others observed in fieldwork—such as
calculating the amount of feeders needed on a chicken farm, and determin-
ing their area—showed that, more than obeying the rules dictated by the
mathematics of the mathematics subject, the mathematics of the technical
disciplines was amalgamated to the daily practices of production and sup-
ported by a grammar whose rules included rounding off and estimating.
The teacher clearly stated: “everyone does this.”
Oral calculations, “calculating in one’s head,” were also part of the math-
ematics practiced in the technical subjects. Indeed, in one of the practical
classes, in which it was necessary to make 150 kg of feed with a proportion
of 70% of corn and 30% of concentrate, one student remarked that “there
is nothing very difficult in this mathematics,” explaining verbally: “If there
were 100 kilos, there would be 70 [kilos of corn], since its 150 kilos, it is
70, plus 35, which makes 105 kilos of corn.” Likewise, in calculating the
concentrate, he explained: 30% of 150 = 30 [30% of 100] + 15 [30% of 50]
= 45. The calculations produced by the student, as well as others observed
in the fieldwork, allow inferring that, the percentage taught in the class
on the mathematics subject was used only as a strategy to determine the
amount of feed components.
In brief, we can say that the language games practiced in the technical
subjects do have family resemblances with the peasant mathematics, marked
by the rules of orality and approximations discussed by Knijnik (2007) and
Wanderer (2007). However, even producing breaks with the rules engen-
dered in the Mathematics subject, resemblances can be observed between
their language games and the mathematics in the mathematics subject.
On several occasions in technical classes, the teacher referred to the
importance of “taking up again” some basic concepts of the mathematics
subject, including, rule of three, percentage and geometry—according to
him, “the pillars that matter” in solving any problem. This positioning
agreed with what the vice director said, when he emphasized that:
there are parts of mathematics that one hardly or almost never uses”
[referring to the equations] and “it is at the time of doing it, that one needs
to apply mathematics that uses geometry, for instance, calculating the
surface of areas. One has the geometrical figure, one has to have the formula
for this, you know. One has to have basic knowledge.
His statement leads us to think that teachers and students, in the techni-
cal classes on agricultural techniques, also used rules associated with the
mathematics of the mathematics subject stating that “use in practice” will
determine “which mathematics” is necessary to train the agricultural tech-
nician, during the explanation the vice director used rules that are usually
present in the classes of the mathematics and in the handouts we examined.
In summary, mathematics education practiced at that school used lan-
guage games of different mathematics. Furthermore, the language games
conceived in the mathematics of the mathematics subject showed that
they strongly resembled the language games of Academic mathematics.
The mathematics of the technical subjects, even while maintaining a more
intense family resemblance to the peasant mathematics language games,
also presented a resemblance to those that instituted the mathematics of
the mathematics subject of that school.
Data analysis also led us to conclude that the shaping of this complex
network of language games, with family resemblances (even though with
a variable intensity) to the language games of other mathematics, oper-
ated through the selection and hierarchization of knowledges, producing
movements of discipline and resistance. There was a tension between these
selection processes and hierarchization. As the mathematics teacher said,

the contents, on the one hand had to be applicable—“because they need
them in the technical area”—and on the other, they had to be used to foster
reasoning, since, in her words, “if you take mathematics, only the one you
use in daily life, your brain will become limited to this, and that will be the
end.” Furthermore, although the teacher said that she only allowed using
the calculator in the third year, some students utilized it in the technical
classes as a tactic to “get out of ” calculations that often involved fraction-
ing integers.
When we discussed the mathematics education practiced at a Brazilian
agricultural technical school, we focused on processes that disciplined,
standardized and hierarchized the school knowledges. These ideas make it
possible to think about issues involving the school curriculum, its subjects
and the mathematics that institute them. In the next section we will show
some of these issues.
FINAL WORDS
The discussion about the mathematics of the mathematics subject and of
the technical subjects intended to understand the more variegated hues
of this set of knowledges that has been called “school mathematics.” This
allowed showing the immanent character of the school curriculum, as
opposed to the transcendence with which it has often been considered,
making it possible to “render suspect” the ways in which the field of math-
ematics education has participated in these processes.
It should be recalled that such mechanisms were already present during
the classical Greek and Roman periods, when the contents to be taught
were arranged in different areas (Gallo, 2007). According to the author,
at the time, the different areas—or subjects—underwent changes that cul-
minated in a double organization: the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and
philosophy) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and
music). The author believes that this concept of education and curriculum
presupposes the understanding that the world and reality are constituted
by an assumed totality that could not be completely covered by man. Thus,
it became necessary to divide the knowledges into areas which should “be
studied, learned and articulated in an encyclopedic view” (Gallo, 2007,
p. 2). This educational process would imply “the loss of the totality of igno-
rance so that, through analysis (which in turn means division into parts)
knowledge will be enabled and finally the totality will be recovered, now as
wisdom” (Gallo, 2007, p. 2) [author’s italics]. The advent of the Modern
Age caused the faster proliferation of subjects and specializations. New
areas arose and were later subdivided, and then led to others, in a continu-
ous specialization process.
In his analysis Gallo also emphasizes that philosopher and mathe-

matician René Descartes used the image of a tree to describe the set of
knowledges. In this image the roots would represent original knowledge;
the trunk, philosophy, that would support the whole and the branches, the
different “scientific” subjects that would be subdivided by the branches.
According to the author, even with this idea of segmenting and subdivi-
sion, the image of the tree “always refers back to totality, since there is a
single tree, and, beyond knowledge of the parts, we can reach knowledge of
the whole” (Gallo, 2007, p. 3). The author also states that this “essentially
modern movement of division into subjects” fostered a specialization of
knowledges and that, in this process “different sciences are created and
new knowledges proliferate” (Gallo, 2007, p. 3). The author argues that
in the schools this movement is reproduced in the process called “self-
learning,” where the curricula are increasingly specialized and subdivided.
Based on the research developed at the school studied, we came to believe
that the mathematics that circulated in the subject of mathematics and in
the technical subjects was imbricated in the specialization and subdivision
mentioned by Gallo. At that institution they appeared to be reinforcing
the specific rules of the different mathematics, in a process that at the limit
blurred the family resemblances between the language games that consti-
tute these mathematical differences, strengthening the fragmentation of
their school curriculum.
What meanings can we attribute to this fragmentation? Would it be nec-
essary to go beyond it by means of a “reconnection of knowledges?” Gallo
does not hold the position that the “solution” to this fragmentation is a
supposed “rescue of totality.” Indeed, he argues that even the substantial
scientific and technological progress no longer allows certain problems
to be solved by specialization, and that at school the students no longer
manage to “perform the logical operation to recover totality, articulating
the knowledges that they have learned in an isolated form” (Gallo, 2007,
p. 3). However, when he emphasizes that, on feeling this “loss” of totality,
science and education appealed to the opposite movement, that is, inter-
disciplinarity—in epistemological terms already during the nineteenth
century, and in pedagogy in the mid-20th century—the author questions
whether interdisciplinary practice would be able to “rescue” the totality “or
whether it would only manage to place patches on pieces created by the
division into subjects … resulting in a quilt which, ultimately, will never
again be the same fabric as before” (Gallo, 2007, p. 3).
The author mentions that, according to this concept, even with complex
and with multiple aspects, reality was considered to be one and uniform.
As opposed to the image of the tree, Gallo uses the Deleuzian metaphor—
inspired by Nietzche—of the rhizome, to allude to the philosophical
position that considers reality as multiplicity and difference. From this
perspective, “there is no reconnection of knowledges” (Gallo, 2007, p. 5),

since “what has never been connected can never be reconnected” (Gallo,
2007, p. 5).
Since Gallo’s positions do not show the ways to “overcome” curricular
fragmentation, they go against the flow of as yet hegemonic perspectives in
the field of Education interested in finding “the solution” to the problems
we face in our daily work as teachers. This chapter—as well as the research
that engendered it—also wants to be in a position of going against the
flow: it did not attempt to find answers to the questions faced today by
mathematics education in agricultural-technical education. The study had
an eminently analytic purpose. We consider that our analysis had a local,
circumscribed dimension. It was one of many possible readings of the
mathematics education practiced at that school.
Even so, our analysis could highlight issues concerning the politics of
knowledge. It showed the existence of different mathematics in the school
curriculum of an Agricultural Technical School of southern Brazil. It allows
us to think about some elements that contribute to peasant students’ failure
in schooling processes. If the mathematics of the mathematics subject is
only one among other mathematics taught in the school form of life, if there
we can identify other mathematics, which have strong family resemblances
with peasant mathematics, we can go deeper into our understanding about
how to enlarge the mathematical world of students of nonhegemonic
groups—like the peasants who attend to the school we studied. To enlarge
it without suppressing their outside school mathematical practices, the
language games that do not belong to the mathematics of the mathemat-
ics subject. And we must say: this enlargement does not refer only to the
mathematical world. It can help prevent prejudices and discrimination
against “the others,” those whose everyday mathematics language games
are marked by rules that are neither formal nor abstraction.
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chapter 10
ETHNOMATHEMATICS AS
A HUMAN RIGHT
Karen François
SUMMARY
This chapter considers the field of enquiry called ethnomathematics and
its role within mathematics education. I elaborate on the shifted meaning
of “ethnomathematics.” This “enriched meaning” impacts on the phi-
losophy of mathematics education. Currently, the concept is no longer
reserved for the so-called “nonliterate” people, but also includes diverse
mathematical practices even within Western classrooms. Consequently,
mathematics teachers are challenged to handle people’s cultural diversity
occurring within every classroom setting. Ethnomathematics has clearly
gained a prominent role, within Western curricula, becoming meaningful
in the exploration of various aspects of mathematical literacy. I discuss this
enriched meaning of ethnomathematics as an alternative, implicit philoso-
phy of school mathematical practices.
Introduction
Until the early 1980s, the notion “ethnomathematics” was reserved for the
mathematical practices of “nonliterate”—formerly labeled as “primitive”—

188â•‡â•‡K. François
peoples (Ascher & Ascher, 1997). What was needed was a detailed analysis
of the sophisticated mathematical ideas within ethnomathematics, which it
was claimed were related to and as complex as those of modern, “Western”
mathematics. D’Ambrosio (1997), who became the “intellectual father” of
the ethnomathematics program proposed “a broader concept of ‘ethno,’ to
include all culturally identifiable groups with their jargons, codes, symbols,
myths, and even specific ways of reasoning and inferring.” Currently, as a
result of this change within the discipline of ethnomathematics, scientists
collect empirical data about the mathematical practices of culturally dif-
ferentiated groups, literate or not. The label “ethno” should thus no longer
be understood as referring to the exotic or as being connected with race.
This changed and enriched meaning of the concept “ethnomathematics”
has had its impact on the philosophy of mathematics education. From
this point on, ethnomathematics became meaningful to every classroom
since multicultural classroom settings are generalized all over the world.
Every classroom today is characterized by diversity (ethnic, linguistic,
gender, social, cultural, etc.). Teachers in general but also mathematics
teachers have to deal with the existing cultural diversity since mathemat-
ics is defined as human and cultural knowledge, like any other field of
knowledge (Bishop, 2002). The shifted meaning of ethnomathematics
into a broader concept of cultural diversity became meaningful within the
community of researchers working on the topic of ethnomathematics, mul-
ticultural education and cultural diversity. Where for example the topic was
absent at the first two conferences of the Conference of European Research
in Mathematics Education (CERME 1, 1998; CERME 2, 2001), the topic
appeared at CERME 3 (2003) as “Teaching and learning mathematics in
multicultural classrooms.” At CERME 4 (2005) and CERME 5 (2007) the
working group was called “Mathematics education in multicultural set-
tings.” At CERME 6 (2009) the working group now was called “Cultural
diversity and mathematics education.” Since then, and in line with the
theoretical development of the concept of ethnomathematics, there has
been an explicit consideration of the notion of cultural diversity.
Dealing With Cultural Diversity in the Classroom
Ethnomathematics applied in education had a Brazilian origin, but it

eventually became common practice all over the world. It has been extended
from an exotic interpretation to a way of intercultural learning that is
applicable within any learning context. Dealing with cultural diversity in
the classroom is the universal context within which each specific context
has its place.
Ethnomathematics as a Human Rightâ•‡â•‡ 189
The meaning of the ethno concept has been extended throughout its
evolution. It has been viewed as an ethnical group, a national group, a
racial group, a professional group, a group with a philosophical or ideo-
logical basis, a sociocultural group and a group that is based on gender or
sexual identity (Powell, 2002, p. 19). This list could still be added to but
since lists will always be deficient, all the more because some distinctions
are relevant only in a specific context, we use the all-embracing concept
of cultural diversity. With respect to the field of mathematics, and in line
with Bishop’s (2002) consideration on mathematics as human and cultural
knowledge, there appears to be a change in the meaning of ethnomath-
ematics as cultural diversity within mathematics and within mathematical
practices. This view enables us to see the comparative culture studies
regarding mathematics that describe the different mathematical practices,
not only as revealing the diversity of mathematical practices but also to
emphasize the complexity of each system. In addition there is interest in
the way that these mathematical practices arise and how they are used in
the everyday life of people who live and survive within a well-defined socio-
cultural and historical context. Consequently there has to be a translation
of this study to mathematics education where the teacher is challenged to
introduce the cultural diversity of pupil’s mathematical practices in the cur-
riculum since pupils also use mathematical practices in their everyday life.
This application exceeds the mere introduction in class of the study
of new cultures or—to put it dynamically—new culture fields (Pinxten,
1994, p. 14). These are the first “ethno mathematical” moves that were
made, even before dealing with cultural diversity arose. Diversity within
mathematical practices was considered as a practice of the “other,” the
“exotic.” It was not considered relevant to mathematics pupils from a West-
ernized culture. That is why the examples regarding mathematics (and
adjacent sciences) are an enquiry of all kinds of exotic traditions such as
sand drawings from Africa, music from Brazil, games such as Patience
the way it is played in Madagascar, the arithmetic system of the Incas or
the Egyptians, the weaving of baskets or carpets, the Mayan calendar, the
production of dyes out of natural substances, drinking tea and keeping tea
warm in China, water collection in the Kalahari desert, the construction
of Indian arrows, terrace cultivation in China, the baking of clay bricks
in Africa, the construction of African houses. The examples are almost
endless (Bazin & Tamez, 2002). Notwithstanding the good intentions of
these and similar projects, referring to Powell and Frankenstein (1997) I
would like to emphasize that these initiatives may well turn into some kind
of folklore while originally intending to offer intercultural education.
However, I also stress that I am not advocating the curricular use of other
people’s ethnomathematical knowledge in a simplistic way, as a kind of
“folkloristic” 5-minute introduction to the “real” mathematics lessons.

(Powell & Frankenstein, 1997, p. 254)
In line with the empirical research by Pinxten and François (2007) on

mathematical practices in classroom settings, one can verify many appro-
priate examples of pupils’ mathematical practices that may be used in
class, not as some kind of exoticism but as the utilization of a mathematical
concept. Starting from pupils’ mathematical knowledge, and their every-
day mathematical practices, is a basic principle of the new orientation
toward realistic mathematics education and the development of innovative
classroom practices (Prediger, 2007).
The question remains how one can move from a teacher-centered
learning process toward a pupil-centered learning process where pupils’
mathematical practices can enter the classroom? (François & Van Bend-
egem, 2007). Cohen and Lotan (1997) describe how cooperative interactive
working can be structured and they also explain the benefits of interactive
learning in groups to deal with diversity. For that purpose the complex
instruction theory (as a specific variant of cooperative learning) was devel-
oped which they implemented in education. Meanwhile this didactical
approach has had an international take-up in Europe, Israel and the United
States and it has been elaborated to the didactics of cooperative learn-
ing in multicultural groups (CLIM) (Cohen & Lotan, 1997, p. vii). This
teaching method has been tested in a number of settings, in distinct age
groups and with regard to different curricula (Ben-Ari, 1997; 193 Cohen &
Lotan, 1997, p. 137; Neves, 1997, p. 181). The acquisition of mathematical
content was also part of this research. Complex instruction is a teaching
method with the equality of all pupils as its main objective. It tries to reach
all children and tries to involve them in the learning process, irrespective
of their diverse backgrounds (François & Bracke, 2006). In order not to
peg cultural diversity down to a specific kind of diversity, in this context
Cohen and Lotan (1997, p. 3) speak of working in heterogeneous groups.
Heterogeneity can be found in every group structure. Even a classroom is
characterized by a diverse group of pupils where every pupil has in some
way his or her everyday mathematical practices. If pupil-centered learning
is taken seriously, teachers are challenged to deal with the present mathe-
matical practices while teaching mathematics. This way, ethnomathematics
becomes a way of teaching mathematics where cultural diversity of pupils’
everyday mathematical practices are taken into account (François, 2007).
Ethnomathematics in Every Classroom

The extended notion ethnomathematics as dealing with pupils’ everyday
mathematical practices has equality of all pupils as its main objective. Eth-
nomathematics becomes a philosophy of mathematics education where
mathematical literacy is a basic right of all pupils. The teaching process

tries to reach all pupils and tries to involve them in the learning process of
mathematics, irrespective of their cultural diversity. All pupils are valued
and treated as equal. This notion of mathematics for everyone fits in with
the ethical concept of pedagogic optimism that is connected with the
theory of egalitarianism. This ethical-theoretical foundation on which the
project of equality within education is based, assumes that the equality is
measured at the end of the line. As reported by the justice theories of John
Rawls (1999) and Amartya Sen (1992), pupils’ starting positions can be
dissimilar in such a way that a strictly equal deal will prove insufficient to
achieve equality. A meritocratic position—which measures the equality at
the start of the process—thus cannot fully guarantee equal chances (Hirtt,
Nicaise, & De Zutter, 2007, pp. 61–84). An egalitarian position starts from a
pedagogic optimism and it needs to take into account the diversity of those
learning in order to give equality maximum chances at the end of the line.
By extending the notion of ethnomathematics to cultural diversity and
mathematics education, the distinction between mathematics and ethno-
mathematics seems to disappear. Hence the critical question can be raised
whether the achievements of ethnomathematics will not then become lost.
On the contrary, the distinction between ethnomathematics and math-
ematics can only disappear by acknowledging and implementing the
achievements of ethnomathematics in mathematics education. The issue
of the distinction between ethnomathematics and mathematics has been
raised before within the theory development of ethnomathematics (Setati,
2002). Being critical of the dominant Western mathematics was the basis
out of which the discipline of ethnomathematics has developed and now
the time is right to also raise the critical questions internally, within the field
of ethnomathematics itself. What exactly distinguishes ethnomathematics
from mathematics? Setati raises this question in a critical review on the
developments within ethnomathematics as a theoretical discipline that is
dissociated and distinguished from mathematics (Setati, 2002). Setati sees
mathematics as a mathematical practice, performed by a cultural group
that identifies itself based on a philosophical and ideological perspective
(Setati, 2002, p. 31). Every mathematics teacher is supposed to use a series
of standards that are connected with the profession and with obtaining
qualifications. The standards are philosophical (about the way of being),
ideological (about the way of perceiving) and argumentative (about the way
of expressing). Both mathematics and ethnomathematics are embedded in
a normative framework. So the question can be raised as to whether the
values of mathematics and ethnomathematics are indeed that distinctive.
It cannot be denied that ethnomathematics is based on an emancipa-
tory and critical attitude that promotes the emancipation and equality of
discriminated-against groups (Powell & Frankenstein, 1997). This general
idea of emancipation can also be found in the United Nations Educa-

tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) view of education.
Moreover one can see in its mission a tight connection with socioeconomic
development, with working on an enduring and peaceful world, while
respecting diversity and maintaining human rights. Education here is obvi-
ously connected with the political factor.
UNESCO believes that education is a key to social and economic develop-

ment. We work for a sustainable world with just societies that value knowl-
edge, promote a culture of peace, celebrate diversity and defend human
rights, achieved by providing education for all. The mission of the UNESCO
Education Sector is to provide international leadership for creating learning
societies with educational opportunities for all populations; provide exper-
tise and foster partnerships to strengthen national educational leadership
and the capacity of countries to offer quality education for all. (UNESCO,
1948)
Taking into account these general stipulations one can conclude that
the explicit values of the general education objective connect to the values
of equal chances for all pupils which are central within ethnomathematics.
Consequently the expansion of ethnomathematics as a way of teaching
mathematics which takes the diversity of pupils’ mathematical practices
into account can be justified. There is a kind of inequality in every group
and the real art is to learn to detect the boundaries of inequality and the
boundaries of cultural diversity. Instead of a depreciation of the concept
“ethnomathematics” this extended notion could mean a surplus value in
situations where heterogeneity and cultural diversity are less conspicuous.
Within ethnomathematics education two aspects are highlighted. First
there is the curriculum’s content. Often this is the first step when imple-
menting ethnomathematics. Besides the mathematics that can be found
in the traditional curriculum, there will now be additional space to be
introduced to more exotic or traditional mathematics practices. Powell
and Frankenstein (1997) also emphasize this aspect in their definition
of the enrichment of a curriculum through ethnomathematics. Stressing
other mathematical practices offers the opportunity to gain a better per-
ception in the own mathematical practice and its role and place in society
(D’Ambrosio, 2007a, p. 33). It also offers the opportunity to philosophize
and critically reflect on the own mathematical practice. In language teach-
ing it goes without saying that it is better to learn more than one language.
It broadens the outlook on the world and offers a better adaptation to
dealing with other people in this globalized world. Knowledge of several
languages is undoubtedly an advantage and besides it broadens the knowl-
edge of the mother tongue. This comparison could even be extended to
the mathematics education where knowledge of mathematical practices of
several cultural contexts and throughout time proves to be advantageous.

A second aspect within ethnomathematics is the didactics, the way that the
learning process is set up. Here an interactive and cooperative approach
is crucial (César, 2009; Cohen & Lotan, 1997). The two aspects obviously
have mutual grounds. An interactive approach results in contents being
defined also by the learning with an active participation in the learning
process. This aspect is strongly emphasized by researchers who investi-
gate the integration of so-called traditional groups within the academic
context. This is expressed as one of Graham’s key questions in his enquiry
into mathematics education for aboriginal children: what do the children
bring to school? (Graham, 1988, p. 121). With the extended notion of
ethnomathematics as cultural diversity and mathematics education and
with the emphasis on dealing with pupils’ everyday mathematical prac-
tices, ethnomathematical practice is now closer to the social environment
of the pupil and disconnected from its original (exotic) cradle. Both the
theory and practice of ethnomathematics have opened eyes and broadened
minds. It immediately answers the question as to what exactly could be of
benefit to the “highly-educated countries”—with their outstanding results
in international comparative investigations—regarding ethnomathematics
as it originally developed, as a critical and emancipatory theory and as a
movement that aimed to give all pupils equal chances (Valero & Skovsmose,
2002). In a final section about ethnomathematics I would like to link math-
ematics education, politics and human rights.
Ethnomathematics as Human Right
D’Ambrosio, who is the mathematician and educationalist of the mathemat-

ics on which ethnomathematics is based, situates mathematics education
within a social, cultural and historical context. He can also be considered
the first to explicitly link mathematics education and politics. Mathematics
education is a lever for the development of the individual, national and
global well-being (D’Ambrosio, 2007a, 2007b). In other words the teach-
ing and learning of mathematics is a mathematical practice with obviously
a political grounding. D’Ambrosio advances the political proposition that
mathematics education should be accessible to all pupils and not only to
the privileged few. This proposition has been registered in the OECD/PISA
report, which is the basis for the PISA-2003 continuation enquiry.
Mathematical literacy is an individual’s capacity to identify and understand

the role that mathematics plays in the world, to make well-founded judge-
ments and to use and engage with mathematics in ways that meet the needs
of that individual’s life as a constructive, concerned and reflective citizen.
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2004,
p. 37)
This specification of mathematical literacy clearly implies that this form

of literacy is a human right for every child, such that the child gets a chance
to participate to the world in a full, constructive, relevant and thoughtful
way. This proposition recurs later in the essays of Alan J. Bishop where he
demonstrates the link between mathematics, ethnomathematics, values
and politics (Bishop, Clarke, Corrigan, & Gunstone, 2006, p. 7).
Mentioning mathematics education and values education in one and the
same breath does not sound unambiguous because mathematics is undeni-
ably perceived as nonnormative.
It is a widespread misunderstanding that mathematics is the most value-

free of all school subjects, not just among teachers but also among parents,
university mathematicians and employers. In reality, mathematics is just as
much human and cultural knowledge as any other field of knowledge, teach-
ers inevitably teach values. (Bishop, 2002, p. 228)
It is predominantly within D’Ambrosio’s ethnomathematics research

program that the link of mathematics and mathematics education with
values is extended to the political domain. According to D’Ambrosio still
too many people are convinced that mathematics education and politics
have nothing in common (D’Ambrosio, 2007a, p. 27). He challenges this
cliché. In his recent work D’Ambrosio (2007a, 2007b) takes as his starting
point the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where articles 26 and
27 highlight the right to education and to share in scientific advancements
and their benefits.1 This declaration concerning education is further
developed and confirmed within the UNESCO’s activities by means of
the World Declaration on Education for All in 1990 and ratified by 155
countries. Finally the declaration has been applied in mathematical literacy
in the OECD/PISA declaration of 2003. D’Ambrosio regrets that these
declarations are not well-known by mathematics teachers since they play a
key role in the emancipation process. In line with the World Declaration,
“mathematics education for all” implies a critical reflective way of teaching
mathematics. According to D’Ambrosio, this way of teaching does not
receive sufficient opportunities. Following Bishop (1997) he criticizes the
technically-oriented curriculum with its emphasis on technique and drill
and where history, philosophy and critical reflection are not given a chance.
D’Ambrosio develops three concepts to focus on in a new curriculum
regarding the usage of the international (UNESCO) emancipatory
objectives—literacy, matheracy and technoracy.
Literacy has to do with communicative values and it is an opportunity to
contain and use information. Here both spoken and written language is
concerned but so are symbols and meanings, codes and numbers. Math-
ematical literacy is undoubtedly a part of it. Matheracy is a tool that offers
the chance to deduce, to develop hypotheses and to draw conclusions from
data. These are the base points for an analytical and scientific attitude.
Finally there is Technoracy which offers the opportunity to become familiar
with technology. This does not imply that every pupil should or even could
get an understanding of the technological developments. This elemen-
tary form of education needs to guarantee that every user of a technology
should get to know at least the basic principles, the possibilities and the
risks in order to deal with this technology in a sensible way or deal not at
all with it.
With these three forms of elementary education, which can be developed
throughout the ethnomathematics research program, D’Ambrosio wants to
meet the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights that relate to the right
to education and the right to the benefits of the scientific developments.
Conclusion
This paper considered the shifted meaning of ethnomathematics and
its role within mathematics education. Ethnomathematics is not longer
reserved for so-called nonliterate people; it now refers to the cultural
diversity in mathematics education. Mathematics teachers are therefore
challenged to handle pupils’ diverse everyday mathematical practices. In
line with the UNESCO (1948) declaration on education and the OEDC
(2004) declaration on mathematical literacy, ethnomathematics clearly
gained a more prominent role. Within Western curricula, ethnomathemat-
ics became meaningful to explore as an alternative, implicit philosophy of
school mathematical practices. The extended notion of ethnomathematics
as dealing with pupils’ cultural diversity and with their everyday math-
ematical practices brings mathematics closer to the social environment of
the pupil. Ethnomathematics is an implicitly value-driven program and
practice on mathematics and mathematics education. It is based on an
emancipatory and critical attitude that promotes emancipation and equal-
ity (Powell & Frankenstein, 1997). Where the so-called academic Western
mathematics still is locked in the debate on whether it is impartial or value-
driven, the ethnomathematics’ purposes stand out clearly right from the
start. The historian of mathematics Dirk Struik postulated the importance
of ethnomathematics. He validates ethnomathematics as both an academic
and political program. There mathematics is connected to its cultural
origin as education is with social justice (Powell & Frankenstein, 1999,
p. 418). D’Ambrosio even puts it more sharply: Yes, ethnomathematics is
political correctness (D’Ambrosio, 2007a, p. 32).
The implication for research is threefold. First, research has to reveal the
(explicit and implicit) values within mathematics, mathematical practices
and mathematics education. Second, research has to investigate thoroughly
the use and integration of pupils’ mathematical practices in the curricu-
lum. Third, pupils’ daily mathematical practices have to be studied.
Note
1. Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free,
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of
the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Par-
ents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to
their children. Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author. (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization. 1948)
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chapter 11
NEGOTIATING CRITICAL
PEDAGOGICAL DISCOURSES
Contexts, Mathematics, and Agency
Annica Andersson and Paola Valero
Introduction
Mathematics education counts in society. However, society does not

necessarily count in mathematics education. This disjunction challenged
Annica during her years working as a mathematics teacher in Sweden’s
upper secondary schools. Relating society and social issues to her school’s
mathematic curriculum became a central concern to her practice in
Ericaskolan,1 a Swedish school offering an upper secondary 3-year social
science program. As part of Annica’s doctoral studies, she entered into
collaboration with Elin (a fellow mathematics teacher) in order to introduce
elements of a critical pedagogical discourse into the classroom. While
continuing to follow the compulsory national curricular framework, the
new pedagogy introduced project blocks that, in addressing the mandated
mathematical curriculum, also permitted changing some key elements
in the activities and relationships among participants. In this chapter, we

200â•‡â•‡A. Andersson and P. Valero
explore the possibilities and limits when imagining and implementing

a new pedagogical discourse that is heavily inspired by the concerns of
critical mathematics education, and that intends to bridge the gap between
students’ experiences in society and the mathematics classroom.
Negotiating Pedagogical Discourses
The term pedagogic discourse has been broadly discussed in Basil Bern-
stein’s work, and has been recontextualized to mathematics education by
different authors to refer to the ways in which knowledge and values are
transmitted inseparably in the classroom (Lerman & Zevenbergen, 2004).
With Bernstein’s framework as inspiration, this type of research has offered
a discussion of how mathematics education and power are connected in
society (e.g., Dowling, 1998; Jablonka & Gellert, 2010). We have chosen
not to adhere entirely to this tradition, but to use the term pedagogical
discourse in a different sense. A pedagogical discourse in mathematics educa-
tion is the complex set of language formulations, together with the systems
of reason that emerge when people engage in the social practice of math-
ematics education. Drawing on Valero (2010), the pedagogical discourse
of mathematics education operates not only in classrooms, but is also both
present and simultaneously constituted within a large network of social and
political meanings. Participants in the mathematics education network of
practices construct these social and political meanings at given moments in
history. The pedagogical discourse, then, can be seen to be equally operat-
ing within classrooms and schools as it is within educational policy. In the
case of this paper, we foreground the elements of that discourse as they are
brought to life in the relationships between Elin, Annica, and the students
in their classrooms; we have elected to background the larger context for
this discourse as it interacts within other spheres of practice.
There are many possible pedagogical discourses vying for a place in the
classroom; these vary from the established and dominant traditions of the
teaching and learning of mathematics (Lampert, 1990), to their construc-
tivist, ethnomathematics- and modeling-inspired counterparts (Jablonka
& Gellert, 2010). We find inspiration in critical mathematics education
(Skovsmose, 1994, 2010; Skovsmose & Nielsen, 1996), understood here as
a series of concerns about mathematics, its role in society, and its potentiali-
ties in education. A critical pedagogical discourse, as we understand it in
this paper, acknowledges existing practices and introduces—through col-
laboration with teachers—different possibilities in classroom organizations
and practices, with the aim of generating new possibilities for students’
learning.
Negotiating Critical Pedagogical Discoursesâ•‡â•‡ 201
In order to describe the new critical pedagogical discourse, we want to

use Skovsmose and Borba’s (2004) and Vithal’s (2003) models to discuss
researching critical mathematics education. Skovsmose and Borba propose
three “situations” as analytical tools for exploring what is, what is not, and
what could be in the mathematics classroom (Figure 11.1). The current
situation (CS) describes the situation prior to the attempt to alter the peda-
gogical discourse, and attempts to problematize the current state of affairs.
The current situation is then reimagined through consideration of new
theoretical alternatives, or on the grounds of new experiences. This new
vision is labeled the imagined situation (IS) and can be clearly related to the
teacher’s (Elin’s) experiences with and aspirations for her teaching; it is also
supported by Annica’s experiences and readings in critical mathematics
education and ethnomathematics (Andersson, 2007, 2010, 2011a, 2011b;
Andersson & Valero, 2009). Out of this imagined situation develops an
arranged situation (AS) as the actualized alternative to the current situation.
Skovsmose and Borba underline how the alternative situation differs from
the imagined situation: “in general, an arranged situation is a practical
alternative that emerges from a negotiation involving the researchers and
teachers, and possibly also students, parents and administrators” (p. 214).
As we will show, the arranged situation was not only constrained by nego-
tiations between the direct participants; it was also framed by structural
and practical limitations, such as students’ schedules and the mandatory
framework imposed by the national curriculum and examination system.
In analyzing the move toward a critical pedagogical discourse in this
paper, we will describe the three situations as they unfolded. However, we
also want to emphasize in this chapter the qualities of the process, what
Skovsmose and Borba (2004) labeled pedagogical imagination, practical orga-
nization and explorative reasoning (p. 215). First, the relationship between the
current situation and the imagined situation, labeled pedagogical imagina-
tion (PI) has to do with “conceptually exploring educational alternatives”
(p. 216), with sensitivity for the sociocultural and sociohistorical school
situation, but without taking the current situation as given. The qualities
of the pedagogical imagination are discussed in terms of cooperation, dis-
cussions, and negotiations. Second, the relationship between the current
situation and the arranged situation, labeled practical organization (PO),
denotes the pragmatic or more realistic version of the imagined situation.
The qualities of this process are discussed in terms of cooperation and
negotiations in the wider school context. However, considerations have
to be made in relation to the teacher and students; in addition, issues
such as curriculum, examinations, students’ schedules, and staff relation-
ships need to be acknowledged. The third process designates the analytical
strategy used to reflect upon the imagined situation based on observations
from the practical organization and arranged situation. This analytical
process, labeled explorative reasoning (ER), is understood by Skovsmose and

Borba as a strategy for analyzing educational possibilities yet to be real-
ized. However, we also see those already realized possibilities as important
to our purpose in identifying possibilities and limits when imagining and
implementing a new pedagogical discourse.
Source.â•… Skovsmose and Borba (2004, p. 216).
Figue 11.1.â•… A model of critical research indicating what processes it might include.
The Current Situation at

Ericaskolan and in Elin’s Classes
Ericaskolan is a Swedish upper secondary school situated in the center of

a middle-sized city, serving students from throughout the city, its suburbs,
and from the countryside. Academic subjects at this school are theoretically
focused, thus preparing students for future university-level studies. The
social science program is the largest program at the school, and within
the program students have the possibilities to orient their studies toward
social science subjects, languages or journalism. The students choosing the
social science track usually decide to take this program because they need
to enroll in a program that offers them the strong theoretical base they
will need in university-level coursework, even if they do not have clarity
on which subject or profession they would like to pursue at the moment.
Because of Ericaskolan’s reputation for focusing on the social sciences,
many of the students choose the school precisely because they have not
enjoyed mathematics, natural sciences or technical subjects, and thus see
this particular program as an option to escape these subjects’ further study.
Nevertheless, even if the students have enrolled in a “social science”
high school, Sweden’s national curriculum mandates all students must
pass at least two mathematics courses. The Mathematics A course—the first

compulsory course for all high school students in Sweden—is conceived of
as follows by the Ministry of Education:
a core subject course.... The course builds further on mathematics from the
compulsory school and provides broader and advanced knowledge in the
areas of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statistics and the theory of functions.
Pupils with widely different academic orientations study the course. The
structure is modified and the problems chosen based on the pupils’ academic orienta-
tion. The course provides general civic competence and constitutes an integral
part of the chosen academic orientation. (Swedish Ministry of Education, 2000,
emphasis added)
Such a declaration of intention opens the possibility for teachers and

students to connect mathematics teaching and learning with civic compe-
tence and, thereby, with social issues of interest for social science students.
The students in the two participating classes were between 15 and 16
years old, and would soon reach the national age of adulthood (age 18).
They would then become recognized by society as competent citizens and
expected to take on adult responsibilities. However, connecting mathemat-
ics to civic and social issues was not often what happens in these classes. A
recent report of the Swedish Ministry of Education on teaching practices in
Mathematics A courses documents the persistence of traditional practices
(i.e., the teacher dominates the instruction). Students report such instruc-
tion as meaningless and even “stupidizing” [sic] (Schools Inspectorate,
2010, p. 8). The teacher-centered approach reduces students’ choices to a
binary: to participate in a didactic mathematics education or not. Students’
engagement in this curriculum usually has meant following the instruc-
tions of the teacher and the textbook. Yet mathematics textbooks are full
of exercises far removed from students’ reality (Andersson & Ravn, 2012).
Responsibility for time and planning lie exclusively with the teacher, and
the authority in the classroom resides with the teacher and the textbook.
In other words, the ministerial intentions for the education of these future
citizens in this course are not being realized.
This general situation in most Swedish Mathematics A classes resonated
with what has also tended to be the case at Ericaskolan, and with the way
Elin was used to running her classes. It has also become part of the expecta-
tion of the students who, coming from lower secondary school, have already
experienced the “tradition” of mathematics education. To give an example,
Annica asked her students, “Raise your hand if you have experienced team
work and project work in your prior mathematics education.” Only three
students out of 46 raised their hands. These 46 students had completed
9–10 years of compulsory education representing dozens of schools and
classrooms from around the country. Of the three students who reported
engaging in group work they described it as having “solved problems or

working through past national test questions in pairs.”
The Pedagogical Imagination
In addition to bringing societal issues into the mathematics classroom,

it became important to establish an environment that provided students
possibilities for different experiences with mathematics. In particular,
Annica took seriously the ministerial intention of making Mathematics
A contribute to students’ “civic competence.” Therefore, the students’
achieving agency in/through/with mathematics became a driving inspiration
to change the pedagogical discourse. To achieve this aim, we followed Biesta
and Tedder’s (2006) ecological understanding of agency, in which “agency
should not be understood as a capacity or possession of the individual,
but as something that is achieved in particular (transactional) situations”
(p. 27). This implies that an individual’s agency presupposes situations in
which becoming agentic is made possible.
To transform our mathematics classrooms required a different way of
talking and behaving for all participants. It also required a new way of
distributing power and responsibility between the researcher, the teacher,
and the students. In other words, a new pedagogical discourse was neces-
sary. The following question emerged: how could mathematics education
be arranged so as to be both informed by social issues and to create a
classroom discourse in which students’ intentions, experiences about and
reflections on their learning of mathematics would be fully integrated?
The Mathematics A course topics and content were nonnegotiable; they
were mandated by the national mathematics curriculum. The students had
to participate in a national test in the end of the course, which required
that the curriculum was covered by the end of the course. However, task
contexts, including contexts expressed in textbooks exercises and through
pedagogical projects (Wedege, 1999), were open to discussion. In fact, task
contexts were actually encouraged by the national curriculum’s guidelines.
The curriculum for mathematics in the social sciences stated that math-
ematics education should be “linked to” and “of importance for everyday
life and [students’] chosen academic orientation” (Swedish Ministry of
Education, 2000). We therefore felt supported in our plan to connect math-
ematics teaching to social issues through the Ministry of Education’s own
recommendations.
During the projects’ design process, concerns for mathematics educa-
tion raised by Skovsmose (e.g., 1994, 2005) inspired Annica’s thinking.
First, concerns formulated as relating mathematics to citizenship and the
preparation of students to become an active part of political life required
understanding mathematics as a tool for identifying and analyzing critical
features in society. Skovsmose (2005) also argued that mathematics must

be seen as both a tool for critique and also an object of critique. These
concerns persuaded Annica to rethink mathematics educational pedagogy
in ways that offered possibilities for project work, rather than only working
from traditional textbook exercises. Importantly, mathematics textbook
work was not excluded from the reimagined classroom; rather, textbook
calculations would be used only when students judged them as useful.
Project work has become understood as a learning milieu where stu-
dents, in pairs or groups, work together on more complex tasks or activities
over a period of time (Skovsmose, 2001). Annica aimed for these proj-
ects to be designed within contexts relating to society, so as to allow for
critical discussions and reflections with reference to the students’ lives.
Therefore students were proposed spaces to decide on what were interest-
ing contextual topics within the societal/mathematical framework. Critical
researchers such as Frankenstein (2008), Gutstein (2006), Gutstein and
Petersen (2006), and Skovsmose (2001, 2005) guided Annica’s thinking
in how project work contextualizing societal issues could be practically
organized. Annica’s plans included mathematical content development
and teaching through critical projects and critical discussions, both of the
learning of mathematics and of mathematics per se. Varying the ordinary
mathematics teaching with projects—in collaboration with other school
subjects, if possible—became a goal during the course redesign.
Second, concerns about epistemology were considered. Educational
practices were understood in terms of acting persons and not as a transfor-
mation of a body of knowledge. Awareness that classroom communications
reflect power relations thus became important. Annica wanted to take
students’ reasons for engaging in mathematics education (foreground/
background/intentionality) seriously (e.g., Skovsmose, 2005). This way of
working resonated with the critical mathematics classroom practice sug-
gested by Ernest (2002) in the following way:
The aims of critical mathematics require the use of questioning and deci-
sion-making learning styles in the classroom. Teaching approaches should
include discussions, permitted conflicts of opinions and views but with jus-
tifications offered, the challenging of the teacher as an ultimate source of
knowledge (not in their role as classroom authority), the questioning of con-
tent and the negotiation of shared goals.... Also the learners should be given
the chance to pose their own problems and initiate their own projects and
investigations at least some of the time. (p. 8)
These issues made Annica consider both potentials and limits for a
pedagogical discourse of mathematics that takes students’ empowerment,
reasons for participating, and so on seriously. Annica started to imagine
a different discourse in mathematics education. However, as pointed out
by Ernest (2002), “the approach must also honestly and openly address
the instrumental and life goals of the learners themselves, both in terms
of needed skills and in passing exams” (p. 8). Examination issues became
vital to address as the students’ course grades mattered for university
admissions. The students’ performance on the end-of-year national tests
also mattered. Given these considerations, Annica and Elin had to take
care that the objectives stated in the national curriculum were attainable
for all grade and ability levels. Projects became designed to give all stu-
dents’ opportunities to reach the curriculum’s stated goals. Elin created
special evaluation rubrics with “Achievable objectives for this project” and
“Requirements for each grade level.” The outcome of these rubrics was
threefold. First, the rubrics helped to demonstrate to all actors in the math-
ematics education network (such as the headmaster, parents, and students)
that due consideration had been given to the transparent and meaningful
evaluation of students’ work. Second, this means of evaluation made it
easier for students to achieve personal agency within an assessment frame-
work. Students’ received opportunities to decide individually on personal
learning objectives to reach within each project. Third, the transparency of
evaluation enabled Elin to assist all students to pass the course based upon
the students’ chosen examination levels.
We need to stress that the national mathematics education curriculum
limits the possibilities offered by project work. The tensions originating
from students’ need for success on the national tests at the end of the
course placed constraints on promoting effective critical mathematics
project work in ways that became obvious during the teaching sequences.
We also need to acknowledge the limitations to our hopes for more dem-
ocratic and student-empowering pedagogies for the same reasons. Our
classroom organization still imposed an external power and evaluation
framework on students and this clearly restricted the ways we wanted to
push matters of agency and empowerment. These power relations are
important to recognize when initiating socially responsible teaching (Atweh
& Brady, 2009). The pedagogy became a balancing act with negotiations
undertaken in almost every lesson in relation to the students’ wishes, their
and Elin’s responsibilities, and the curriculum’s and national tests’ bound-
aries. Some of these negotiations are exemplified in connection to the
different teaching sequences described below.
The pedagogy was developed and implemented in two Mathematics A
courses in collaboration with Elin, the responsible mathematics teacher at
Ericaskolan. At the start of this research project Elin had identified why she
wanted to change her teaching, and she received support from the school
organization to proceed as she had indicated. Thus, she had a substantial
degree of ownership of the process. Annica provided theoretical perspec-
tives described earlier that grounded the research; Elin complemented
these ideas with her school-situated knowledge and her personal teaching
ideas, hopes, and concerns. Annica and Elin discussed during a couple
of months different options on how to build up the different teaching
sequences and decided how to cooperate within the new and different
classroom discourse. Annica and Elin agreed on a coaching and mentor-
ing role for the researcher (Kram & Ragins, 2007). Initially, the research
project and the teaching preparation were joint activities; however, when
Elin asked for support or when her time was restricted, Annica took on
additional planning responsibilities. Otherwise, Elin retained control of
making the final decisions related to the content of the curriculum and
examinations. Annica’s role was one of encouragement and support. She
was also responsible for the monitoring of the project and ensuring that the
research goals were achieved. The collaboration became very strong and
Annica increasingly participated in the implementation of the pedagogical
discourse beyond the scope of what had been originally planned. In the
classrooms, Elin was the teacher and the authority. She chose to position
Annica as both a researcher and as an assisting teacher (although without
any examination obligations) and placed her in a desk at the back of the
room. This allowed Annica to frequently participate in the lessons, interact
freely with students and answer questions they had.
The Arranged Situation and the Process of

Practical Organization
The following section explores three carefully chosen teaching sequences
where project work was conducted. The projects have been chosen in a way
that illuminates three different methods for conducting project work. The
three projects are situated in larger school and societal contexts to provide
reasons for the projects’ development and the challenges that arose during
the design process. In this way we aim to illuminate different aspects of
what occurred in the classrooms and the negotiations taken in transform-
ing pedagogical discourses during a teaching semester.
The episodes are structured in the following way. First, the projects are
outlined as they were presented to the students. (The students received
instructions in Swedish; here we provide an English translation of the texts.)
Next, the societal background of the teaching sequence and the negotiations
and reasoning that made up Annica and Elin’s development of the teaching
sequences is described. Finally, an explorative reasoning section introduces
the voices from participants, casting light on some of their perceptions of
the processes and the possibilities and limits experienced. The students’
comments are taken from a class blog, evaluation forms, e-mails, interviews
and informal conversations, as well as from their personal logbook written
during the last project. The students’ voices are chosen in a way that repre-
sents the diversity of reasons the students had come to dislike mathematics
or mathematics education or whose well-being had been negatively affected
by their participation in prior mathematics education.
The teaching sequences are presented in chronological order to illus-
trate how Annica and Elin (referred to as “we” in this section), together with
the students, started off with small steps and then made the projects larger
in scope as the semester progressed. In this way all participants learned
how to work within a different pedagogical discourse in the teaching and
learning of mathematics.
Project 1: “Making Your Dreams Come True?”
The first project was presented to the students in writing as follows. In

addition they also received evaluation rubrics for all projects.
Box 11.1 Making your dreams come true?

Reflect on something you would like to do, experience, or buy—for yourself or others—
that costs so much that you need to borrow the money to cover the expenses. You need
to find out how much money you need to borrow to finance the project and what interest
a bank expects you to pay. We suggest the following: the interest and mortgage is paid to
a bank once a year and you pay back the loan within five years. If this is not possible for
you we can discuss this one-on-one.
1. How much will you be paying in interest costs per year? In total over the 5 years?
2. How much do you need to amortize (pay back to the bank) per year?
3. What did the total cost add up to?
4. Was it worth it? Why/why not?
We also suggest you discuss related issues, such as what you personally might borrow
money for. How do you find out the boundaries for high or low interest costs? How do
you find out if a loan offer is good or not?
Achievable mathematical objectives in this Mathematics A project:
1. Be able to formulate, analyze and solve mathematical problems of importance to
everyday life and a chosen academic orientation.
2. Deepen and extend understanding of numbers to cover real numbers written in
different forms.
3. With and without technical aids, be able to judiciously apply knowledge of different
forms of numerical calculations linked to everyday life and an academic orientation.
The above stated goals imply that you are able to write fractions and decimals numbers
as percentages (and vice versa), to be able to calculate percentages with a factor of change
(förändringsfaktor), be able to calculate repeated percentage changes, have knowledge
about the differences between percentage and percentage units, and know how to
calculate interest rates.
Societal Background and

Critical Mathematical Content
In Sweden, an increasing number of young people (age 18–25 years old)

experience financial difficulties after taking “quick-money loans.” These
loans are often offered to young people through text messages on mobile
phones and promise loans that can be received within ten minutes. These
loans typically come with high interest rates, and the companies usually
do not perform credit record checks. According to government statistics,
25% of young persons (age 18–25) who took these loans already had
unpaid debts for collection with the Swedish Enforcement Authority. Of
these young people, 16% took new text loans to pay back prior loans. 64%
regretted their loans and said that if they had needed to wait 24 hours or
more for their money they would not have taken the loan in the first place
(Konsumentverket and the Swedish Enforcement Authority, 2007). If young
individuals end up on police registers for not paying back debts, it usually
decreases their possibilities of receiving bank loans for further studies or
for a mortgage later in life. These were the reasons why we regarded this
topic as potentially critical for students. We offered possibilities in this
project to discuss with the students how to act, negotiate, and think when
dealing with situations requiring money.
The topic was introduced through a whole class discussion on how loan
companies use advertising to attract young people and about the possibili-
ties and risks associated with ”quick loans” (i.e., mobile text loans offers).
Even students as young as 16 recounted borrowing money from friends
and parents and had found it difficult to pay back. The critical discussions
raised concerns about when and when not to borrow money, different bor-
rowing conditions, and how to find out about different borrowing options.
We talked about predatory lending practices, how companies pursue young
people to borrow money and how to read the “fine print.” As part of their
project work, students had to either visit banks or search the Internet to
find out the smartest options for their group and demonstrate an ability to
read the lending conditions carefully.
Explorative Reasoning
The first group work in Mathematics A’s two classes occurred early in the
semester; the students had known each other and their teacher for only three
weeks. During the project’s planning process, Elin grew concerned with the
students’ low self-esteem in regards to their mathematics education, as this
was their first year at Ericaskolan. Elin cared that both she and her students
felt confident in their ability to achieve the national curriculum’s goals.
Despite the research objectives and openness of the students’ project, she
argued that the students had to complete and hand in textbook exercises
for assessment, in addition to the project presentations. This resulted in
a mix of old and new mathematics discourses, which at one point became
problematic for the relationships between some of the students and Elin
(Andersson, 2010, 2011a). Reflecting back on this decision at the end of
the semester, Elin said:
I would not do the percentage project again in the way that they had to hand
in exercises from the book as well [as the project presentation]. But we had
that discussion before we started and then I chose to bring in the textbook
part to make sure they felt that they did something. It was a control point for
me. (Elin, interview)
Consequently, when preparing the ensuing projects, Elin excluded pre-

scribed textbook exercises. The textbooks became present in a different
way. Elin gave the students opportunities to decide for themselves (with
supervision when requested) what they needed to read or work on from
the textbook in conjunction with their project-based work. Alternative text-
books were offered on the front table for students to borrow if they required
a textbook that explained mathematics in a way that suited a particular
student well.
This way of organizing the mathematics teaching, along with the new
pedagogical discourse, represented new experiences for the students. The
students’ blog comments indicated that this project-based method felt
different from their previous experiences with mathematics. They seemed
to appreciate the new possibilities to decide how they would learn. Rosie
(who said she had not reached the goals she had wanted in her previous
mathematics education and had experienced mathematics as a meaning-
less subject) wrote in her evaluation: “I think this was fun because one could
decide upon a topic and that means that one works with something one is
interested in” (Rosie, written evaluation rubric, October 2009).
When introduced to a different discourse in mathematics education, the
students called for instruction and supervision of both of the mathematical
content and of how to work in teams to develop a mathematical project.
Zizzi, a girl who described herself as someone who had “never had a real
interest in mathematics, and I have never been encouraged enough to get
the interest either” (Interview, October 2009), explains the importance of
learning the skills to work on projects:
This was really meaningful and it was good to take personal responsibility for
planning and for our own labor. But this is new; we have to practice this way
of working. (Zizzi, blog comment)
Even if the students were enthusiastic about the activity and experiencing
new possibilities for making personal decisions and taking on additional
responsibilities, Elin had to pay attention to these issues when initiating
investigation work. Skovsmose (2001) confirms our experience:
Any landscape of investigation raises challenges to a teacher. A solution is

not to rush back into the comfort zone of the exercises paradigm, but to be
able to operate in the new environment. The task is to make it possible for
the teacher and students to operate in cooperation within a risk zone, and to
make this operation a productive activity and not a threatening experience.
(p. 130)
Malin, a girl who described herself as having “mathematics anxiety,”

pointed to an issue that needed to be recognized when conducting group
work in mathematics. Early during the project she wrote: “This was OK.
Something new and interesting and a good task because it was real, realistic.
It can be good for me later on in life” (Malin, blog comment, September
18, 2009). Although, a week later she concludes after a bank visit:
This was a good exercise because we had to find out stuff ourselves and thus
become independent. I tried to calculate the interest rates but realized we
have to be better and more efficient to help each other with the mathematics tasks in
the group. I will try to get the others to be better at that, so we help each
other . (Malin, blog comment September 23, 2009)
In her later comment we interpret her statements as worrying about

reaching the mathematical goals in relation to the collaboration in the
group. In this case, Elin acted and supported Malin with extra mathematics
discussions. The blog became useful not only for research objectives and for
students reflections on their learning; it also turned into an instrument for
the teacher to become aware of what was going on in the groups. Elin also
made some critical reflections about the mathematical content. She noted
that to make the project more authentic the interest calculations should not
have been simplified to annual calculations in the way suggested, a decision
grounded in time constraints. As we wanted the students to be investiga-
tors, a role that was new for them, we allowed time for critical discussions,
information seeking, and planning for project presentations rather than
conducting repeated interest calculations. However, the students did
annual “interest-on-interest” calculations for the project presentation and
thus showed they had acquired the mathematical knowledge to perform
these calculations. Elin regarded this as acceptable.
Sandra was a girl who disliked mathematics. She did not want Annica to
interview her because she did not want to spend more time connected to
mathematics than was absolutely needed. However, Annica was welcomed
to read her blog, evaluation forms, and logbook. Given her strong feelings
toward mathematics, we regarded her following comment as interesting:
I think mathematics has been a little more fun than usual.... To plan the time
and content made me feel it was related to me. I feel the project has been
meaningful and looking at mathematics from different perspectives (vända
och vrida på matematiken) was positive. But I would have liked to have some
more time for explanations from the teacher as mathematics is difficult for
me (Sandra, evaluation form, October 2009)
Summing up the first project, the students seemed to acknowledge the

task context of the project as related to their lives and realistic. They also
seemed to enjoy being able to plan and take responsibility for their time
and labor distribution within the groups, as pointed out by Zizzi, Malin,
and Sandra above. No student indicated the opposite. At this moment, the
possibilities of achieving agency appeared to be appreciated by students
who were engaged in ways their previous experiences with mathematics
education would never have suggested.
Project 2: “The Newspaper Flyer Workshop” on Critical

Mathematical Argumentation
The second project was presented to the students in writing as follows.
Box 11.2 Newspaper flyers/headers with mathematical

argumentation
The task for you today is to work in small groups to create a number of newspaper
flyers that impact people, engage them, and open up their curiosity, reflections and/or
emotions—with mathematical content! The goal is to acquire insight in how powerful
numbers can be in advertisements and media contexts.
There are 54 articles in “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” See http://www.unicef.
org/photoessays/50351.html We invite you to choose the one that interests you most and
focus on it. Search and find information addressing these special children—information
you consider important and want all people at the school learn about. You might want
to start a debate; it might be positive information, maybe information on the article that
is not followed—or something else. Reflect on how to present the numbers to get the
message on your news flyer expressed in the best way.
We suggest you make at least three or four different flyers that address the convention
you have chosen to focus on. The idea is to find out how the numbers can be exposed in
the smartest way for the purpose of your flyer. Try different variations and show the ones
you are most proud of to the class so we can have a critical discussion. Then we will post
them in school and see others’ reactions.
(Box 11.2 continues on next page)
Box 11.2 Newspaper flyers/headers with mathematical

argumentation (continued)
Achievable mathematical objectives in this project:
1. Be able to formulate, analyze and solve mathematical problems of importance for
everyday life and students’ chosen academic orientation.
2. Deepen and extend students’ understanding of numbers to cover real numbers written
in different forms.
3. With and without technical aids, be able to judiciously apply knowledge of different
forms of numerical calculations linked to everyday life and students’ study orientation.
4. Be familiar with how mathematics affects our culture in terms of architecture, design,
music, or the arts, as well as how mathematical models can describe processes and forms
in nature.

Inspired by Frankenstein’s (2008) work on numerical information and

quantitative argumentation we invited the students, in a cross-class setting,
to attend a full-day workshop in critical mathematical argumentation.
Frankenstein explains the need for developing students’ understanding in
the following passage:
Changing the form can help us make sense of quantities whose significance
we cannot grasp. Changing the form through basic calculations can allow us
to feel the impact of those quantities through better understandings. Fur-
ther, knowing the most effective form in which to present those quantities
in arguing for creating a just world is an important skill to teach in a critical
mathematical literacy curriculum. I would go so far as to argue that knowing
the most meaningful quantitative form in which to express information is
necessary in order to understand what’s going on. (p. 262)
The framing contextual topic of the project became the United Nations’
54 articles on the “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” The reason for
this choice was that during a 2-week period the students had been engaged
in a “Human Rights” cross-subject project in school. Despite the project’s
interdisciplinary goal, mathematics had not been invited to participate,
and Elin experienced mixed emotions about this. The only mathematics
students used in the “Human Rights” project was to conduct a survey,
which (from Elin’s point of view) had very low expectations in terms of
statistical content or rigor. Elin felt the marginalization of mathematics
was problematic as mathematics was not seen as important enough to be
acknowledged by other subjects’ teachers. She argued that the message
sent to the students was that mathematics is what you do in mathematics

classrooms and is unrelated to other subjects or the outside world.
Consequently, we decided to challenge the “Human Rights” school project
in a subtle way. The students were invited to a mathematics argumentation
workshop with the purpose of learning different ways of representing
numbers and to consider why we choose particular mathematics
representations over other possibilities. They were also invited to discuss
the placement of mathematics in arguments. We wished to provide them
with mathematical tools to present their arguments in the “Human Rights”
project and thus give them possibilities to improve their performance on
the project through the use of mathematical knowledge.
The context for the mathematical argumentation day became the UNI-
CEF’s Convention on The Rights of the Child as it connected well to the
“Human Rights” project’s context. There were other reasons for deciding
on this topic. First, Ericaskolan’s school values referred to the UNICEF
convention articles. Second, the context connected clearly to the citizen-
ship-building and democratic education objectives stated in the national
curriculum. Finally, it gave us opportunities to discuss mathematics as a
critical tool to make an internationally recognized political document more
meaningful.
Ericaskolan’s administration renamed our proposed mathematics argu-
mentation workshop “math day” on the students’ schedules without
explanation. Calling a whole-day mathematics workshop a “math day”
was not a smart idea. Many students called the upcoming day “stupid,”
“silly” or “meaningless.” Some students told us about feelings of anxiety
the day before. Elin noticed that there were a greater number of dentist
and doctors’ appointments on this day than on a usual school day. Petra,
a student identifying herself as a “true math-hater” (interview) described
her feelings as follows:
First I thought, a whole day of mathematics, I can’t do it; I just can’t be
there the whole day. But when I got there it was actually quite fun and now,
afterwards, I read and look in the newspapers in a different way. So I actu-
ally learned something and that was really unexpected of a math day. (Petra,
interview, October 13, 2009)
We were also surprised by the number of students who did not recognize
what we did as mathematics. Zizzi commented in this way:
A math day, how fun could that be, and why did you call it a math day?
We worked on posters, we sought out information, we rewrote mathematical
stuff for the greatest effect, but that is not mathematics! It was a really good
day, but definitely not math. (Zizzi, interview, October 14, 2009)
An interesting observation from this line of reasoning was that, when

studying the non-mathematics subjects’ curricular objectives, the students
also reached goals in computer science and there were clear possibilities
to reach rhetorical and argumentation goals in language, citizenship, and
democracy-building objectives. That is, these links could have been made
if teachers at this school recognized mathematics as a subject worth col-
laborating with.
During this project the students’ general comments seemed to indicate
that math day’s critical content—rather than achieving agency—was what
had made the day interesting and worthwhile.
Project 3: The Statistical Project: “Students’ Ecological

Footprints on Earth”
The third task became a cross-subject collaboration between mathe-
matics and environmental science on the contextual topic of ecological
footprints. An ecological footprint
accounts for the flows of energy and matter to and from any defined econo-
my and converts these into the corresponding land/water area required from
nature to support these flows. This technique is both analytical and educa-
tional. It not only assesses the sustainability of current human activities, it
is also effective in building public awareness and assisting decision-making.
(Wackernagel & Rees, 1996, p. 6)
The project ran intensively for three weeks during mathematics and
science lessons, with a whole day reserved during the fourth week for dis-
playing students’ works through PowerPoint presentations, papers, posters,
discussions and interactions. The students got a detailed introduction on
ecological footprints at the beginning of the project, where Per-Erik, the
environmental science teacher, Elin, and Annica participated. The project
was presented to the students in writing as follows.
Box 11.3 The average Ericaskolan pupil’s ecological

footprint:  or ?
The idea with this project is to commence a statistical investigation at the school. The
goal is to find out how many earths we need to live in the way a student here lives today.
We suggest you choose a topic you find interesting (e.g., food, travelling, housing,
energy, consumption or anything else you are interested in). The communal objective
is that we are all in it together. In the end, we will compare our results and together
find out the ecological footprint we, as students at this school in Sweden leave on Earth
(http://www.minplanet.se).
(Box 11.3 continues on next page)
Box 11.3 The average Ericaskolan pupil’s ecological

footprint:  or ? (continued)
Below is a suggested working process you can follow and some advice along the way:
Study the course goals and assessment criteria carefully so you gain knowledge and
decide personally on which assessment level you want to work and how.
Construct interest groups of three persons and formulate questions within a topic area
that grasps your attention. If needed, you can find inspiration on www.minplanet.se. The
questions have to be prepared and formulated in a way so they give you possibilities to
reach the goals you wish. We teachers will be happy to supervise you in this work before
you conduct your survey. The reason for this is that we want you all to get as strong
data as possible to be able to reach the objectives in both subjects (mathematics and
environmental science).
The chosen population needs to be representative for the students at the Ericaskolan as
we want to calculate the ecological footprint each student at our school makes.
We invite you to account for your findings with a presentation in class and as a written
document (e.g., a PowerPoint presentation, a poster, an article, or your personal choice).
The examination includes
a) One part where your results are shown and commented upon using proper
mathematical notation.
b) One part where your results are manipulated in a way that they make an impact as you
have intended. You need to take a stance and write it up together with your manipulated
diagrams.
c) A written test in environmental science.
Materials at your disposal: different mathematics and environmental science books,
logbook, articles, a time planer and computer programs (e.g., Excel, PowerPoint and Star
Office). If you need other things please let us know.
As teachers we will work as supervisors during the project. This indicates that it is your
responsibility to get our attention if you need whole class or individual information,
explanations, feedback, materials etc. 
Achievable mathematical objectives in this project:
Mathematics A
1. Be able to formulate, analyze and solve mathematical problems of importance for
everyday life and a chosen academic orientation.
2. Be able to interpret, critically examine, and with discrimination, illustrate statistical
data, as well as be able to interpret and use common coordinates.
3. Be accustomed when solving problems to use computers and graphic calculators to
carry out calculations and use graphs and diagrams for illustrative purposes.
Mathematics B
1. Judiciously use different types of status indicators for statistical material, and be able
to explain the difference between them, as well as be familiar with and interpret some
measures of dispersion.
2. Be able to plan, carry out, and report a statistical study, and in this context be able to
discuss different types of errors, as well as evaluate the results.

A large number of headlines during this autumn semester were related

to news reports from COP 15, the UN Conference on Climate Change in
Copenhagen.2 This meeting attracted speakers from around the world,
including the President of the United States, Barack Obama, and other
heads of state. The school, while situated in southern Sweden, was none-
theless affected by this conference in numerous ways and we decided to
use the themes of the Copenhagen meeting (climate change and climate
sustainability) for a statistical project scheduled for the same time as the
conference. The environmental science teacher was about to start a project
on sustainable development and ecological footprints, so we codeveloped
these projects together.
The project was designed and introduced as a “three-stage rocket.” The
students first decided on working groups and chose a topic within the
ecological footprint area. They then designed the survey in parallel with
gathering information about the topic. The second part of the project was
to conduct the survey, and report it in a descriptive way. However, we also
invited the students to take a stance in relation to their chosen topic and
use the statistical information they had gathered to create an argument for
their view. We hoped these suggestions would help students consider differ-
ent ways to represent their data and learn how to manipulate (rather than
fake) diagrams and statistical information in the service of their arguments.
These experiences would help them understand how the (re)presentation
of statistical information in newspapers and advertisements affects our
personal judgments.
The third step was an afternoon session in which all the different col-
lected information was summarized into an ecological footprint website,
“My Planet”, with the goal of finding the sizes of Ericaskolan’s students’
ecological footprints. (For those interested, if we all lived the way that Eri-
caskolan’s students did, we would need approximately 4.6 Earths to survive.
Energy and transport were the students’ largest areas of consumption—
perhaps not surprising for Sweden). During this session we discussed and
compared data from different countries (e.g., a person in Bangladesh had
the smallest footprint; on the other hand, a person from the United States
of America had the largest). These findings permitted critical examinations
of issues related to humans’ different ways of living and consuming.
Students, teachers, and the researcher all realized the possibilities of con-
tinuing the ecological footprint project further—either in a global direction,
or in a more local way. The global approach, entering into issues of sustain-
ability, fairness, responsibility, economy, and so on, appeared to have no
limitations. Locally, the students saw rich possibilities for influencing the
school to become more sustainable for the good of the school community.
Concrete information from different groups showed, for example, that stu-
dents did not know where the recycling bin was located or whether the fruit
sold in the café was organic or not. The students proposed writing letters
to influence school leaders to make more environmental and ecologically
sustainable decisions. Such discussions created energy and vibrancy in the
classrooms; the students wanted to initiate change and influence climate
sustainability in their school and their communities. However, these plans
did not fit into the school system’s scheduling, curricula, and labor distri-
butions; thus it became impossible for us to push the project’s boundaries
further and create large-scale changes at school or to take a more global
approach. Disappointingly, in this respect, the ambitious plans became
just another “school project;” however, the topic still seemed to possess
rich possibilities for expansion. To realize the project’s possibilities in the
future, they would need to be planned and decided in such a way before-
hand, together with school leaders and teachers.
How did the students experience this project? An excerpt from Sandra’s
logbook highlights some aspects of the students’ perspectives:
During the project I have learned about different diagrams. For example,
I did not know about histograms before the project. I think it has been re-
ally interesting with manipulated diagrams and results—now I will be more
observant when reading newspapers! What surprised me most though was
how important a role mathematics plays when talking about environmen-
tal issues. With the support of mathematics we can get people to react and
stop.... I am so interested in environmental questions and did actually not
believe that math could be important when presenting different standpoints.
I have probably learned more now than if I had only done calculations in
the book. Now I can get use of the knowledge in the project and that made
me motivated and happy! I show my knowledge best through oral presenta-
tions because there you can show all the facts and talk instead of just writing
a test. To have a purpose with the calculations motivated me a lot. (Sandra,
logbook)
Sandra’s account indicated that she first changed her attitude toward
mathematics during the project; and, second, improved her performance
during the projects. Sandra related mathematics to a context that made
sense to her and helped her achieve agency in her learning. Sandra per-
formed, together with her friend, a very well-prepared presentation and
carried out an interrogation of both mathematical and environmental
issues. On the basis of the assessment criteria, she passed “with distinction.”
Sandra told us that she never had received a grade better than passing on a
written mathematics test in her life. Her success on this project seemed to
confirm that that she shows her knowledge best through oral presentations.
This leads to the third reason for choosing Sandra’s evaluation: her aware-
ness of and reflections on her learning. During those teaching sequences
when the students worked on projects, their reflections on their learning
experiences changed in character. Initially they used adjectives such as fun,
interesting, difficult, and different to describe the work. However, as the
semester went on, students increasingly demonstrated increasing meta-
cognition of their learning styles. This phenomenon occurred even as they
did not receive any feedback on their blog comments or their evaluations.
These tendencies toward increased reflection and awareness of the learn-
ing process emerged in different phases and at different stages in different
students, yet taken as a whole appeared to indicate a trend among Elin’s
students.
To conclude the ecological footprint project, we noticed that the stu-
dents advanced in their reflections on how to conduct project work, on how
to use mathematics and on their learning of mathematics. The qualities
of the students’ comments changed during this time. During this project,
both the critical context and the possibilities to make personal decisions
appeared to have lasting impacts on the students’ engagement and sense
of accomplishment.
What Occurred After

the Researcher Left the School?
The students were expected to take the national tests at the end of the
spring semester and this goal influenced the organization of teaching for
the remainder of the semester. During this time Elin varied her teaching
between textbook work, a larger geometrical project and smaller peer col-
laboration exercises. However, Elin stressed the following:
during all lessons focusing on textbook work, through the semester, I gave
them opportunities to do smaller group work tasks or to collaborate around
different activities and problems, even when we were preparing for the na-
tional tests. (Elin, interview, July 24, 2010)
Henrik was one of the students who decided to conduct a geometry

project. He wrote about himself and his prior experiences of mathematics
education before he started at Ericaskolan in the following way:
I have always disliked mathematics in general; it has never felt meaningful.

The problem was not that I did not understand mathematics; I usually picked
it up very quickly. The problem was rather that I could not write down the
mathematics, I became tired very quickly. It was also tiresome that I did
not experience any meaningfulness; I could not relate the knowledge to
something I would need in the future. Just sitting down, focus, do the same
tasks again and again felt meaningless. (Henrik, personal letter, August 2009)
After the geometry project Henrik wrote:
I finished the Tetra-Pak project some time ago but got response from my
teacher yesterday. That was a fun project to do, and I got a good grade on
it as well. It was interesting to do a report in mathematics, that with math-
ematics you can solve a problem. My question was formulated: Why is a milk
packet shaped in the way it is and what calculations has Tetra Pak performed
to create such a good product?
I feel I got an answer to the question. The milk packet is simple but has
complex consumer requirements. The packet has to be sustainable, be small,
cheap to produce and consumer friendly. It was groovy to design my own
small milk packet with the same shape as the larger 1-liter packet but con-
taining only 1 dl. (Henrik, e-mail, May 14, 2010)
However, an e-mail received after the national test illustrated the contrast
between his experience of project work and the national test:
I am very happy with the semester and feel I have achieved as best as I could.
The most interesting and instructive parts were the projects and theme
works. Then, it felt really realistic and meaningful, because we not only
worked with facts but actually used it to create something new and creative.
I took the national test last week, and that is really not my favorite and I
performed quite bad—and felt that I lost some of my interest and motivation
for mathematics. (Henrik, e-mail, June 5, 2010)
In Sweden, national tests are compulsory, but not punitive. Rather, they
are provided as a support for the teacher when assessing a student’s yearly
progress (Swedish Ministry of Education, 2000). As Henrik performed very
well during the other parts of the course he received a higher grade than
what his performance on the national test would have, alone, indicated.
The transparency and foresight of the teacher’s assessment supported her
when determining students’ final grades.
Henrik’s story also indicates that when he was engaged he performed
well during the project sequences; this resonates with Sandra’s story above.
However, Henrik’s story also reminds us of the vulnerability that lingers
even when the pedagogical discourses change. In his case, his national test
performance discouraged him and confirmed his prior negative experi-
ences with mathematics.
Further Explorative Reasoning and

Concluding Comments
The analytical framework offered by Skovsmose and Borba (2004) sup-

ported our thinking when we tried to understand the reasons for why the
arranged situations unfolded as they did during the teaching semester.
Through emphasizing the different processes between the current situa-
tion and the arranged situation, and between the imagined and arranged
situation, we were able to foreground the elements of the new pedagogi-
cal discourse as they were brought within the relationships between Elin,
Annica, and the students in the mathematics classrooms. The analytical
framework helped to provide a deeper understanding of the concerns that
must be acknowledged when moving between discourses in mathematics
education. The complex issues that arose during the processes of peda-
gogical imagination and practical organization of the different teaching
sequences were issues that in some cases supported our work, and in other
cases created boundaries around the ways we wanted to develop the new
pedagogical discourse. Situating the projects in the sociocultural back-
ground of the school and acknowledging what occurred at certain historical
moments in the school and in society clarified why specific decisions were
taken at particular times. Our underlying assumption is, through this way
of reasoning, we open up the pedagogy itself to scrutiny and critique.
We found inspiration for the discourse movement in critical mathematics
education, understood as a series of concerns on mathematics, its role in
society, and its potentialities in education (Skovsmose, 2010). A critical
pedagogical discourse as imagined and arranged in the described context
acknowledged existing practices at Ericaskolan and introduced, through
collaboration with Elin and the students at Ericaskolan, different possible
organizations of the classroom practice, with the aim of generating other
possibilities for students’ learning. The critical pedagogy was realized as a
pedagogical discourse connecting mathematical contexts to social/societal
concerns while appreciating students’ possibilities for achieving agency
both in relation to their mathematics learning and to their success within
a classroom’s task context. Thus, the students became responsible for
their learning of mathematics. This was a very different way of organizing
mathematics education in Sweden (Schools Inspectorate, 2010). To make
this transition, student initially required supervision on working and
learning mathematics through projects and teamwork. However, students
soon responded to the new mathematics pedagogy and became very
engaged in the curriculum during the project sequences. Students who
did not usually participate or achieve well in mathematics observed the
difference in both their engagement and their results. Their achievement
of agency (Biesta & Tedder, 2006) differed in different situations and within
different individuals. Concerns about relating mathematics to citizenship

and as understanding mathematics as a tool for identifying and analyzing
critical features in society were addressed but could have been pushed
further if opportunities had been provided. The shared experience of
teachers, students, and researcher learning how to work together, however,
needs to be recognized. It would have been exciting to have explored and
pushed the boundaries further with this group of students and their teacher
if given a longer period of time.
To change the social practice of mathematics education and move
between pedagogical discourses required support from different nodes of
the mathematics education network at different historical moments. Valero
(2010) wrote:
If mathematics education practices are seen as the network I proposed, the

aim of the research field would be to provide insight into not only how each
single node of the network operates constructing the meaning and signifi-
cance of mathematics education, but also into how different nodes intercon-
nect at particular historical moments. (pp. LXXII–III)
The different nodes Valero referred to are understood as different rela-

tionships that we needed to establish in order to proceed with changing the
teaching organization during the semester. The importance of an ongoing
dialogue with school leaders became apparent when scheduling needed
to be negotiated. Dialogue also became an issue when investigation work
together with other school subjects was to commence. At particular his-
torical moments, the negotiations worked in our favor (e.g., the ecological
footprint project, in which both the mathematics teacher and the environ-
mental teacher took advantage of opportunities for collaboration). This
partnership benefitted all participants and fitted within the time allocated
for the teachers, the school day, and happened to coincide with a major
related event in society (i.e., COP 15). At other times, nodes in the network
hindered us, as when the relationships with the teachers responsible for
organizing the school-wide “Human Rights” project limited the potential
impact mathematics would have in the project’s goals. Our experiences
indicated that classroom and school-wide changes in pedagogical discourse
were possible and that a critical pedagogy could lead to improving stu-
dents’ achievement in, engagement with, and reflections on mathematics
education. Through locating the experiences in the sociocultural context
of the school, we gained an understanding of the complex situations and
processes that needed to be addressed to realize the imagined situations.
This is a case study where Annica had the opportunity to collaborate
with Elin, a teacher who, with support, wanted to transform her peda-
gogy. In some significant ways, these research situations in two different
classrooms were different from regular classrooms. While few accounts
such as this lend themselves to direct application to other mathematics

classrooms, there are reasons to suggest that experiences from this setting
are potentially transferable. From an analytical standpoint, addressing the
immediate context of teaching and learning in the mathematics classrooms
(in this case bringing societal issues into the classrooms and opening up
possibilities for students to achieve agency) ought to be a valuable teach-
ing concept when necessarily adapted to suit other sociocultural contexts.
NOTES
1. All names of the participants in the research are pseudonyms.

2. Please see http://climatecongress.ku.dk/ for detailed information of the
congress.
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chapter 12
CRITICAL MATHEMATICS
EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF “REAL-LIFE EDUCATION”
Helle Alrø and Marit Johnsen-Høines
Learning Conversations in Mathematics Practice (LCMP) is a research

project that aims at developing the concept of the “learning conversation”1
as a didactical concept and as a tool for describing and facilitating learning
processes in mathematics.2 The project is engaged in collaborative inquiry
processes involving pupils, teachers, student teachers and didacticians.3 It
includes a study of the communicative characteristics of prevailing educa-
tional practices in the field of mathematics teaching and learning, and of
the professional development of mathematics teachers. Thus, the learning
conversations are directed towards different kinds of learning and different
kinds of learning outcomes.
The LCMP project is oriented towards collaborative inquiry and
activities, especially those related to the critical aspects of mathematics
education. Thus, several subprojects investigating LCMP focus on criti-
cal mathematics education, mathematical literacy, and the stimulation of
pupils’ and student teachers’ critical mathematical competencies (Alrø
& Johnsen-Høines, 2010; Johnsen-Høines & Alrø, 2012; Hansen, 2010,
Rangnes 2010).

228â•‡â•‡H. Alrø and M. Johnsen-Høines
The LCMP project, and therefore the participating student teachers and
didacticians from Bergen University College, are connected to a school
development initiative called “Real-Life Education.”4 This initiative seeks
to establish a close link between mathematics education in lower-secondary
school, and local industries in which mathematics is used. This chapter dis-
cusses “Real-Life Education” in the light of critical mathematics education.
We follow a group of student teachers as they prepare for their teaching
practice in mathematics,5 which is to involve collaboration between an
urban school and an offshore company. The student teachers are planning
for the second and third weeks of their 3-week period of practice in lower
secondary school (level 8). To some degree they know the class and their
teacher. They have taught the class for 1 week, and they have had their first
meeting with representatives from the offshore company.
The student teachers want the pupils to gain insight into real mathemati-
cal problems related to real workplace activities; they also want them to
take an inquiring approach, and to work critically with mathematical data
and with their own way of using mathematical data. In other words, they
want to stimulate the pupils’ critical competencies in learning mathemat-
ics. This is the focus of their collaborative conversations among themselves
and with the pupils.
In this chapter, we refer to a conversation in which the student teach-
ers are preparing for the “Real-Life Education” course, discussing the
possibilities and limitations within this framework. The subject of this con-
versation is critical mathematics education and what it takes to carry out
such a course. The student teachers would like to introduce the course as
a landscape of investigation (Skovsmose, 2001), and they wonder how to
invite pupils to participate into the field, and how they could support the
pupils’ work without taking control of the task (Mellin-Olsen, 1989). The
conversation itself can be seen as an element in the critical mathematics
education of the student teachers, who are preparing the course as part
of their teacher education. From this perspective, we examine the way the
student teachers critically investigate and reflect on issues related to their
teacher role in the “Real-Life Education” course. Particular attention is
paid to the role of inquiry and to intentions in relation to both teaching
and learning.6
Methodological approach
The “Real-Life Education” teaching and learning initiative is intended to
improve and maintain links between education and industry. This means
that mathematics is supposed to be taught and learned in and between
different learning contexts: the school and the workplace. The initiative
is expected to have an impact on the pupils’ attitudes towards their learn-
ing and on the use they make of mathematics. In addition, it is assumed
Critical Mathematics Educationâ•‡â•‡ 229
that workplace experiences will have an impact on the way mathematics is

communicated.
At the research level, an aim of the LCMP project is to develop learning
communities (Jaworski, 2007; Wells, 1999; Wenger, 1998) as a basis for
achieving “Real-Life Education.” A learning community is based on prin-
ciples of inquiry and collaboration, and it is a context for the professional
development of all the project participants (student teachers, teachers and
didacticians). Such a community of inquiry (Jaworski, 2007, p. 128) is an
emergent rather than an established form of practice. Jaworski emphasizes
the notion of “critical alignment,” which states that “in order to move ...
from a community of practice to a community of inquiry, participants will
engage in exciting practices, aligning to some extent with those practices,
but in a questioning and inquiry mode.” (Jaworski, 2007, p. 129) This cor-
responds with what the student teachers have in mind when preparing for
the collaboration with an offshore company.
In the “Real-Life Education” practice project, the pupils are supposed
to learn mathematics by moving within and between different learning
contexts in school and in the company. The pupils are invited to actively
participate and to take ownership of and responsibility for their activities.
Thus, from a sociocultural learning perspective, the pupils participate in
social and individual activities (Vygotsky, 1978) from which they learn.
According to Lave and Wenger (1991), learning is participation in
practices and not limited to the individual learning processes of the
participants. Further, Lave (1999) and Dreier (1999) claim that learning is
development through participating in and between different practices. The
lines drawn between classroom and workplace in the sketch below illustrate
that learning is taking place in as well as between the different contexts.7
We call this movement the pupils’ learning loop (Johnsen-Høines, 2009b,
2010). It is in these loops between the two contexts that the student teachers
organize various learning activities.
Figure 12.1.â•… Learning loop—pupils.

As part of their practice teaching, the student teachers are challenged

to develop new and alternative designs for teaching, in collaboration with
teachers, didacticians and representatives from the designated workplaces.
This collaboration is facilitated by the framework of teacher education in
mathematics at Bergen University College (BUC).
A key concept in the whole project is the empowerment of all the par-
ticipants. Thus, the student teachers want to keep empowerment in mind
when designing the course.
In the recorded conversation referred to below, the teacher students
are at the stage of discussing ideas and “trying out” didactical approaches.
Some of the urgent issues they discuss are: the relationship between
mathematical subjects in the workplace and mathematics at school; the
organization of different courses; the documentation of the mathematics
learned through real-life experiences; and the critical aspects of learning
mathematics outside school.
The empirical data of the LMCP project are generated and investigated
in interactions involving student teachers, schoolteachers, and didacticians
who were engaged in collaborative inquiry. All participants are expected to
be active throughout the entire process: developing and sharing insights,
expounding perspectives, exploring issues, and searching for didactical
options as well as critically evaluating the various possibilities. Such edu-
cational collaboration is characterized by a dialogical approach developed
by Alrø and Skovsmose (2002), in which they stress that dialogue is a con-
versation of inquiry:
Entering an inquiry means taking control of the activity in terms of owner-

ship. The inquiry participants own their activity and they are responsible for
the way it develops and what they can learn from it. The elements of shared
ownership distinguish a dialogue-as-inquiry from many other forms of in-
quiry where, for instance, an authority sets the agenda for the investigation
and the conversation. (p. 119)
In teacher education this methodological approach has implications

for the way analysis is jointly undertaken, which is coined in an analyti-
cal model called “subject based reflective conversation” developed and
described by Johnsen-Høines and Lode (2007, pp. 314–315) and John-
sen-Høines (2009a, pp. 53–54; 2010, pp. 112). In this model the explicit
intention of the group of student teachers, schoolteachers and didacticians
is to participate in and reflect upon teaching and learning conversations.
The analyses of teaching and learning processes developed through collab-
orative conversations are seen as data for further analysis and investigation.
At the stage when the data for this chapter were collected, the participants
were used to a research practice that included recording of conversations,
and also to listening to recordings of earlier conversations and using these

as references.
A conversation excerpt taken from such a collaborative meeting between
four student teachers, a schoolteacher,8 and two didacticians constitutes the
data for analysis and discussion in this chapter. The analytical approach to
the conversation is interpretative in the sense that the conversation is vid-
eotaped, transcribed, analyzed, and interpreted. The analytical approach
operates with a broad understanding of language as combination of words,
body and voice. The analysis draws upon pragmatics (Austin, 1962; Searle,
1969; Wunderlich, 1975) and focuses on the participants’ use of language
and production of meaning considering the particular conversational
context. This qualitative approach takes as its starting point what is actually
being said and done. As the use of language is the data to be analyzed, this
is what is quoted and referred to as documentation when interpreting what
is going on in the educational conversation. In this way data can be expli-
cated and interpretations challenged from other research perspectives.
giving pupils a challenging task
In order for the pupils to get an idea of the importance of mathematics in

society, the student teachers wanted them to work with real mathematical
problems in the company context. In addition, they considered that the
importance of the task for the company would influence the pupils’ learn-
ing of mathematics. So the students challenged the company to provide
them with genuine tasks that would allow the pupils to use mathematics
in a real-life context, and to solve problems of vital importance to the
company. In this way, they planned that the pupils would learn from expe-
rience that the use of mathematics has consequences in real life. These were
(some of) their intentions-in-teaching.
The student teachers had chosen statistics as a main focus for the
pupils in their collaboration with the company, and they wanted to give
the pupils some rudimentary knowledge of statistics before they met with
the company. To this end, they developed a short school-based module,
which introduced fundamental statistical concepts by applying them to the
pupils’ everyday life activities in sports and play. However, this module did
not succeed in engaging the pupils’ interest in statistics, although they were
told that it would be very useful for them when they would start working
with the company. The student teachers discussed how they could inspire
the pupils to become more engaged, to develop ownership and to take
control of the learning activities (in accordance with Mellin-Olsen, 1987,
1989). They argued that perhaps it was not sufficient to work with statistics
related to the pupils’ own activities. They then asked the representatives of
the company to describe tasks for the pupils that would also be meaningful
for the company: “There must be something they can investigate that you
need more information about?”
Some days later, when the pupils paid their first visit to the company,
the director welcomed them saying:
Statistics is the Alpha and Omega for us. We’d just as well close down if we
buy too little metal of the various sorts needed to produce the valves that
have been ordered or that we expect to be ordered. We have to have an over-
view of our production and stock.... We have expanded so fast that we have
not developed good enough systems.
The manager concluded with a plea: “We want you to help us!”
The student teachers recognized the manager’s introduction as a turning
point for the pupils’ motivation. He told them how fast the company had
grown, and how they were striving to keep track of stock and deliveries.
They needed an overview of the market and the suppliers and competitors,
as well as an estimate of the internal health care, environment and security
requirements of the company.9 The pupils were divided into groups and
given different tasks. One group was asked to provide an overview of the
stock in trade and carry out a systematic registration; another group was
asked to provide an overview of competing companies in Europe, and of
suppliers and trading companies. The student teachers decided to follow
the progress of one group each.
The manager’s speech served as point of reference for the pupils regard-
ing the tasks. The pupils could interpret the challenge as a reference to
statistics, as an important form of knowledge, and as an industrial tool that
is used to get a specific job done. They could also interpret the challenge
as an expression of the manager’s confidence in their capability and dili-
gence. Thus, the manager’s approach may have influenced the intentions
in learning and in teaching by situating the tasks in a discussion of necessity
and functionality.10
Intentions in learning and intentions in teaching

The student teachers considered it important for the pupils to demonstrate
intentions in learning. They want the pupils to zoom-in on the mathemati-
cal activities of the school-industry collaboration, and to make decisions
based on their choices. According to Skovsmose (1994), pupils’ intentions
are crucial to a productive teaching-learning process:
A condition for a productive teaching-learning process is that a situation

is established where students are given opportunities to investigate reasons
and goals for suggested teaching-learning processes, and by doing so, to
accentuate their own intentions and to incorporate some of them as part of

their learning process. (p. 184)
Intention means having a purpose and voluntarily striving for

something. Intentions cannot be forced upon someone else, because
“Intentional orientation must be performed by the person himself or
herself ” (Skovsmose, 1994, p. 184). Intentions come from within, and may
originate in various kinds of dispositions related to the subject and/or to
former experiences (Skovsmose, 1994, p. 176). Nevertheless, they may be
closely connected to what is going on in the current situation; for example,
to the subject, environment, energy, challenge, and other participants.
Since intentions in learning mean engaging in activities with the purpose
of learning, involvement is required. Such involvement can be seen in an
educational situation when pupils or students take an active interest in the
processes of zooming-in on the issue, the other participants and the context:
“A zooming-in indicates a search for shared perspectives. It indicates a wish
for ownership, and it represents action” (Alrø & Skovsmose 2002, p. 44).
Thus, pupils’ intentions in learning are demonstrated by taking ownership
and being willing to choose and make decisions related to the learning
activities. In addition, intentions have to do with empowerment in terms of
being able to set goals, make choices, and make decisions, as well as with a
willingness to communicate intentions, and to listen to and recognize the
intentions of others.
Critical mathematics education is not possible if the participants do not
have the intention to learn and the intention to reflect in a critical way
on what is learned; “Critical learning presupposes intentions in learning.
Critique presupposes ownership” (Alrø & Skovsmose, 2002, p. 232). An
important focus of the student teachers’ intentions in teaching is that the
pupils learn to be critical. Thus, they discuss different teaching approaches
that will help the pupils to develop their critical capacity. This discussion,
however, is complex and reveal several dilemmas:11 how to handle the
tension between a given task and the pupils’ autonomy and choice making;
how to develop pupils’ critical thinking capacity when time is limited;
and how to achieve empowerment so the student teachers dare to take
risks simultaneously as learners and as teachers? The fact that the student
teachers focus on themselves both as learners and as teachers makes the
dilemmas more visible. It is certainly not simple to develop a critical teach-
ing approach, and this is their aim.
Openness and choice making

After the first meeting with the company, the student teachers meet with
the practice teacher and didacticians in order to plan the “Real-Life
Education” course. In the excerpt referred to below, they discuss their
expectations for the course and for the pupils’ learning; in other words
they discuss their intentions in teaching. The active participants in this
exchange are the student teachers (Mari, Liv, Trine, and Arne) and the
practice teacher (Otto); the didacticians are silent in this excerpt.12
They start the conversation by discussing how to organize the pupils
in groups. An important organizing principle seems to be the pupils’ own
interests and choices. This in turn is considered important for the pupils’
ownership, motivation, engagement and attitude toward collaboration,
all of which can be characterized in terms of empowerment. Neverthe-
less, consideration of practical and social arguments leads them to decide
against organizing the groups on the basis of the pupils’ choice and inter-
ests. Here the student teachers find themselves in a dilemma, torn between
what they want for the pupils and what practical circumstances allow. They
do not feel quite comfortable about this decision and they continue to
discuss the importance of choice.
They feel that the company has formulated the tasks, and the groups
of pupils should be free to carry out their investigations. Their questions
are: how do we create opportunities for choices; do the pupils have enough
basic knowledge to make interest-based choices; and to what degree is it
possible for the groups to develop ownership and to “solve the tasks”? The
tension between a task that is given and the opportunity to make choices
becomes an important issue.
In this discussion, Trine thinks that choice making is difficult to achieve
within the framework of her group. The groups may not have “equal
opportunities to make choices.”
Mari: They have various options within the topic given—what could
you possibly look at within the topic? Could you consider
the production of different valves or different prices...? I
think this is not only a topic, it is data. For instance, you can
choose valves made out of titanium. Choice making can be
considered in more than one way. They are not obliged to
handle things in a specific way. They are supposed to choose
their own focus of analysis.
Trine: The groups do not have equal opportunities to make choices.
Arne: It depends on how you think.
Trine: Yes, please tell me, won’t you?
Arne: What do you think is the topic of the group?
Trine: ... it’s about how we proceed. For instance, I could say that
one group should find forges and that another should find
competing companies. But it is about collaboration, how to
organize and how to follow up.
Arne: So—it’s going to be rather open.

Trine: It’s going to be rather open, indeed. This group is rather
fixed, but at the same time it is really exciting. I actually
think that it is really open, because they need to make a lot of
choices.
Arne: Yes, I agree that it is really open and that they need to make a
lot of choices.
Liv: I think that here there is ... a collaboration on ... how to find
forges and this is certainly open. Competing companies and
so on. The subject, though, is kind of given, with no choice.
But an exciting subject ... they have to decide what they want
to investigate for the company. Forges, production of valves,
trading companies. In Europe. In England.
The student teachers are discussing how the topic can be “rather open,”
but at the same time “rather fixed.” They emphasize that the topic is “really
exciting” and “really open,” and that the pupils have a “lot of choice.”
Trine is actively challenging the rest of the group by reflecting the tension
between “fixed” and “open.” Her fellow students enter the discussion by
questioning what choice making could mean for the pupils themselves.
Their movement between fixed and open gives an impression of inquiry
and uncertainty as they ask each other for help by questioning and listening.
However, when the four of them focus on the importance of the tension
between fixed an open, they seem to discuss the task at different levels: The
manager’s frame of the task defines the challenge as a specific problem to
be solved. Mari claims that within this task, which “is not only a topic, it is
data,” the pupils have “various options within the given topic,” and they
will have to “choose their own focus of analysis.” So from this perspective,
choice making is related to specific issues within the topic that the pupils
may develop an interest in and want to shed light on. However, a discus-
sion of “how to proceed” includes processes and methods to be chosen,
and as Trine puts it: “collaboration, how to organize and how to follow up.”
Although the company manager has clearly stated the task, there are no
predefined procedures, so the pupils have to define possible options and
solutions themselves. The pupils will have to define and to solve tasks, the
answer to which is unknown beforehand. The student teachers, however,
see the pupils’ choice making as a key for creating engagement. This
issue is discussed in terms of how the student teachers should organize
for learning. So Mari is quite right when stating that “choice making can
be considered in more than one way.” The student teachers are consider-
ing how the processes of pupils’ choice making might conflict with “fixed
frames” and influence their intentions in learning.
The collaborative communication of the group of student teachers

makes their intentions in teaching evident. They intend to organize the
work in such a way that the pupils become enthusiastic learners, work on
real and important issues, experience mathematics and mathematics-in-
use as essential knowledge, and become critical and see the importance
of openness and choice making. These are intentions in teaching that the
student teachers developed during the inquiring conversation; these are
also the students’ own intentions in learning. They are being educated as
teachers, and they intend to play an active role in their own professional-
ization as teachers. Thus, the conversation can be seen as a mutual inquiry
into what this could mean in this specific situation.
Critical learning is time-consuming
The critical aspects of teaching mathematics are important elements in

the intentions in teaching of the student teachers. The task given by the
company is quite ambitious and in itself time-consuming. In addition,
developing a critically inquiring mode presupposes time for concentration
and dialogue. They are faced with the dilemma of how to organize the
groups for a critical approach within the very short period of time avail-
able for the course. They challenge each other to reflect upon this issue,
asking whether it would be possible to focus on the importance of being
critical, and what the implications of critical learning would be. They agree
that it is about encouraging the pupils to be questioning and “critical to
mathematics.”
Arne: It is about being critical to mathematics.

Trine: We have two weeks left, and we still haven’t agreed what we want
them to learn, right?
Arne: The critical aspects, yes.
Trine: Yes, what are we going to do during the next weeks so to speak.
Liv, say something, please.
Liv: ... What I am thinking of doing in my group is posing critical
questions related to what they are doing. Would that make
them reflect critically? What if we ask them during the process:
have you considered all of the aspects; which have you and
which haven’t you included? What if we manage to question
them like that?
An important teaching intention of the student teachers is that the

pupils learn mathematics during the course, and that they become critical
to mathematics and the use of mathematics as well. However, this appears
to be rather time-consuming, and they are under time pressure. As Trine

puts it, there are only “two weeks left, and still we have not agreed what
we want them to learn.” Having been invited to take the floor, Liv suggests
that they ask the pupils to pose “critical questions related to what they are
doing” and to consider what else would “make them reflect critically.” For
instance, the student teachers could challenge them by asking questions
like: “have you considered all of the aspects; which have you and which
haven’t you included?” It would even be possible to tell the pupils that
being critical of themselves and of their own process would constitute a
criterion for evaluation, as Liv suggests later in the conversation.
Arne: Different kinds of questioning?

Trine: Yes that we question ...
Otto: And it is good to do this in different ways, different approaches...
Trine: What do you mean by “different ways?”
Otto: If you discuss ways of questioning, without deciding good or
bad ways. That you decide how you want to question.
Trine: Gathering data is splendid, but isn’t it better if they get as
much help as possible to do so, and then get some time to
systematize and reflect on the material they have? What are
they going to find out? If you consider the producers of valves,
where did you begin? In England? Then you have said how
many producers of valves in Italy: By choosing a country you
have squeezed by 80 percent. Are all producers represented
on the internet? How much do you overlook because.... Is it
important to pay attention to that?
In this extract the student teachers touch upon questioning and the
importance of different kinds of questioning. Trine actually illustrates what
this could mean by posing a critically challenging question: “What do you
mean by ‘different ways?’â•›” This allows Otto to elaborate on his opinion that
there should not be a normative approach to “good or bad” questions, but
that, in general, it is important to consider “how you want” to ask “different
kinds” of questions. This is an example of the student teachers engaging in
the same kind of inquiring, critically challenging dialogue that they want
for the pupils to have during the course.
Trine is still worried about the disposition of time and the pupils’ focus
during the course. She considers all of the work phases important—col-
lecting the data, obtaining an overview and presenting the data—and
suggests that critical aspects could be included throughout. The student
teachers want for the pupils to develop a critical perspective on statistics
in particular, and they recognize that it would be impossible to allow for a
strong focus on each phase. Trine suggests that they “give as much help as
possible” in the phase of “data collection.” This would leave some time for
reflection and critique in another phase. This can be seen in contrast with
the argument she raised earlier in the conversation: that the meaningful
context for learning could be diminished if the pupils did not participate in
the whole process. So here they are stuck in another dilemma. The student
teachers want to take the responsibility for preparing the critical activities
for the pupils when learning mathematics. Thus, a crucial element in their
intentions-in-teaching is for the pupils to become critical to how mathemat-
ics is used and communicated.
The company wanted a geographical overview and one group had to
decide how to start and how to limit the search for data. An easy begin-
ning would be to obtain an overview of the forges in England, for instance.
However, approximately 80% of the forges in Europe are situated in Italy
and these are not as easy to find; if they do not include Italian forges, they
will miss 80% of the data. In addition, the producers vary in size, which
raises the questions of what impact that has, and how such data should be
handled. Many small companies in the Netherlands might be of less impor-
tance than two large companies in France. They need to consider what the
consequences are of the choices to be made. These are important questions
for Trine and the pupils to deal with. How do they obtain the overview that
allows them to see such implications?
Trine: In this way they are going to become critical of their own data
collection. Is this an important focus of theirs? It is an im-
portant competence to be able to predict where to find data.
And when they have collected data, how to present them? In
figures and tables? In a diagram? If you choose a table, does
that work with a huge amount of data? I think it is possible to
be critical to several aspects.
Trine sums up the discussion so far by stating that reflective statistical

questions related to the pupils’ own data collection could be an “important
focus of theirs” and that “... it is possible to be critical to several aspects.”
The student teachers then start a discussion about statistics that is
motivated by the tasks they were given by the company, as well as by the
didactical choices to be made about which aspects of statistics may be rel-
evant for the pupils. This issue is further related to their teaching, as they
have agreed on critical learning as the most important aim.
Arne: It also depends on the size of the companies. For instance,

many companies in the Netherlands may be less than two
companies in France.
Trine: Here you touch upon something very important. Statistics.

They are going to learn something about statistics.
These utterances indicate that the student teachers are facing a dilemma:
the need to choose between a focus on the pupils learning of mathematics
(statistics) or on their learning to be critical towards mathematics and
the use of mathematics. It might be rather time consuming to do both.
However, learning statistics could imply learning statistical concepts and
tools for analyzing and presenting data critically, and it could also mean
being critical to the use of these tools and to discuss the modelling processes
and the results. The student teachers seem to consider critical reflection
as it is implemented in statistical knowledge. Their intentions in teaching
and learning underlie their discussion about what statistics is or might be.
This conversation is about the pupils’ learning and the student teachers’
learning. By moving between mathematical and critical mathematical
issues, the student teachers intentions in learning and teaching can be
revealed, challenged and developed. This can also be perceived the other
way around; their intentions in learning and teaching will influence their
theoretical knowledge of mathematics and mathematics education.
Critical questioning and risk taking

Critical competence in mathematics education includes the ability to criti-
cally reflect on mathematics and mathematics in use. In order to help
pupils critically reflect on different aspects of a task, the (student) teacher
may challenge pupils; for example, by asking what they think and what
are the consequences of this way of thinking. This subject is touched upon
in the student teacher conversation, when they express their discomfort
regarding such an inquiring attitude:
Liv: Sometimes I am afraid to ask the pupils: “What do you mean?”

or “What do you think?”
Trine: Me too.
Liv: Because—it sounds stupid, I’m sure—but I am afraid of hurt-
ing the pupil, if I don’t understand what he means, right.
Arne: Of being too critical?
Trine: Yes, of being too critical by asking questions for which we
don’t have an answer.
Liv: Yes, it is a challenge to dare to ask such questions.
Arne: It is the way of asking. To ask with a positive energy.
Liv: Yes, and if I still think he is on a dead end, then I am afraid
of exposing him.... But I want to know what he is getting at.
Trine: Yes, you want to be positive, and then you are afraid that it
may turn out to be negative for the pupil.
The student teachers are “afraid” to ask pupils what they think, because
they do not want to “hurt the pupil” or “expose” him by being “too critical.”
Nevertheless, they are very interested in “what he is getting at.” They are
not at all comfortable with posing critical questions, because it results in a
dilemma. On the one hand, challenging the pupils like this is an important
intention in teaching; on the other hand, they experience it as a challenge
for themselves “to dare to ask such questions.” Thus, posing challenging
questions may be equally challenging for questioner and answerer. Arne
suggests a solution to the problem: “positive energy,” which involves posing
questions in a positive way that does not discredit the pupil.
Once again, the student teachers are expressing their concern about risk
taking. For them, inquiring conversations with the pupils are associated
with risk taking because of their unpredictability. Inquiring questions are
open-ended—nobody knows the answer to such questions beforehand. So
they may appear “too critical by asking questions for which we don’t have
an answer.” As student teachers, they want to listen to the pupils and find
out what they think in order to make them reflect critically. But what if the
pupil does not understand, or is on a “dead end.” You risk hurting the
pupil if you do not understand what he is getting at. Furthermore, you risk
losing face as a teacher if you do not have an answer to your own questions.
It is a matter of how to proceed. Such questions are discussed in the context
of the student teachers’ intentions in teaching: How should they respond in
order to stimulate for critical learning? Furthermore, when they challenge
the pupils, this might put them in a risk zone (Penteado, 2001) that they
have not initiated themselves. The student teachers might have established
a challenging and risky situation for the pupils that does not correspond
with the pupils’ intentions in learning. This discussion touches upon an
ethical dilemma as regards choice making and risk taking.
Risks of failure
The student teachers’ intentions in teaching are made up of different kinds

of intentions. One intention would relate to fulfilling the task set by the
company: the pupils are to collect, systematize, and present information.
Another intention would relate to the pupils’ learning about statistics and
statistical methods: they are to learn to use data collection/analysis tools,
and to gain critical insight into statistics and the use of statistics. In addi-
tion, they are to learn to collaborate with others. These intentions may be
related to each other; for example, it is necessary to have some knowledge
about statistics in order to handle statistics critically, and it may be nec-
essary to have critical insight in order to collect and present data to the
company. All of these intentions are included in the curriculum. Some of
the dilemmas in the movement between such different intentions in teach-
ing and learning are revealed in the following conversation, in which the
student teachers discuss success and getting results.
The student teachers are discussing the different tasks of the groups,
and Trine raises a problem:
Trine: And this group is like really exciting, but there may be a risk
that there will be little or no outcome. I think the subject is
the most exciting, but what if they don’t reach a result? At the
same time, the subject implies a risk for the pupils and what
they are left with. Is it possible to motivate them based on
what they now know about the company?
Trine is worried about the outcome. She refers to the task given by the
company: “what if they don’t reach a result?” The comment on “what they
are left with,” however, probably refers to learning in general and to what
the pupils are left with in their minds. The purpose of learning is broader
than simply solving the tasks set by the company. On one hand, the solu-
tion of these tasks is important to the company and the pupils are supposed
to learn mathematics by solving these tasks. On the other hand, real-life
mathematics can also be considered a learning context and a tool for the
pupils’ learning activities. Such diverse intentions may serve to support
learning, but they may also be in competition.
Trine reflects on yet another issue when she asks if it is “possible to moti-
vate them based on what they now know about the company.” Previously,
the student teachers have considered it important for the pupils to have
enough information about the company to engage in the task, take own-
ership, and become empowered to develop intentions in learning within
the framework of the given task. They need sufficient information both in
order to solve the task and in order to utilize it as a context for learning.
The practice teacher and Arne are oriented towards the company’s tasks
in their responses:
Otto: Is this dependent on getting a result?

Arne: It has to be closely related to practice and to reality.
In this respect it may be an advantage that they do not
know what is going to be the result. It may appear when
you formulate what we are going to look for and see
what we find. They can document how they have been
working and with whom they have been in contact.
Trine: Yes, but I am not sure how to present it to them,

how to introduce it.
Mari: They really get an idea of how to collect real data.
Indeed, not everybody gets this opportunity.
Trine: But this ... what am I going to say, if they do not
find anything at all ...
Otto: Can you make sure that it does not flop?
Trine: No, certainly not.
Liv: No, certainly not.
Otto: Maybe you can have some supporting strategies, if
you don’t think they are getting a result. Maybe you
could have some data ... that you might help them
find ...
Mari and Arne: For instance you might find something in England.
Trine: Yes, but that would mean me rescuing ...
Otto: How important are results? If they do the best they
can, they will succeed with regard to marks. I also
think it is important for the pupils that, even if we
don’t succeed, they have still done a great job for
which they get credit.
The question posed by the practice teacher indicates that he does

not think success “is dependent on getting a result.” He seems to think
of success in terms of the pupils’ learning (statistics, critical reflection,
inquiry). In this perspective, the company’s task is a context of learning
more than an independent activity. An alternative perspective is repre-
sented by Arne and Mari’s references to learning being close to practice
and to “real data”; the pupils are supposed to collect real data and docu-
ment what they find. Mari argues that the pupils “really get an idea of how
to collect real data. Indeed, not everybody gets this opportunity.” Trine
points out a dilemma: the pupils have been given a real task because up to
this point, the student teachers have considered it important to stimulate
their intentions in learning. If the most important intention changes to
what pupils learn in the process, how would the student teachers commu-
nicate this? They could hardly say to their groups that solving the company
task is no longer important as long as they learn something.
This dilemma illustrates how school mathematics and real-life
mathematics communicate through different practices (Rangnes, 2011;
Wedege, 2006). Mathematics in school is directed towards pupils’ learning.
In this context, the description of general mathematical knowledge is
fundamental for the flexible and critical use of mathematics. The pupils are
expected to document knowledge acquisition, for example through tests.
In addition, tools for learning are defined in order to meet the curricular
goal, and intentions in learning emerge within this discursive frame. In
contrast, real-life mathematics is directed towards results, which are judged
in terms of the utility value for the company. The task is to be solved
using mathematical tools. The description of the pupils’ role as that of
consultants can be seen as an example of this approach. In collaboration
with the student teachers, the pupils are to examine data and present them
to the company. The manager has entrusted them with a job, which they
are going to be paid for if they do it well. This company discourse has
consequences for the pupils’ intentions in learning.
Otto is referring to the result of the enterprise when he asks if they can
“make sure that it does not flop?” Trine and Liv do not think they can,
because the task involves risk taking; there is always a risk that the task
pupils’ solution may prove to be a flop. They may also be considering the
task in connection with the pupils’ learning and the fact that this may be a
“flop” as well. Otto refers to the company task when suggesting that they
have some “supporting strategies” in reserve. Trine’s unfinished utterance:
“Yes, but that would mean me rescuing ...” might be interpreted as the
dilemma of feeling caught between different intentions. They might be
able to construct data to fulfil the intention for the pupils to learn statistics,
but this would go against their intention for the pupils to take on the role
of consultants. This would be contrary to the manager’s invitation and the
information given to the pupils about the task, as well as to the intentions
in teaching, which the student teachers had agreed upon earlier in the
conversation.
Otto emphasizes that one of the intentions of school mathematics is
closely linked to evaluation and to obtaining good marks: “If they do the
best they can, they will succeed with regard to marks.” It is evident here that
the discussion is moving between questioning the “result” in the context of
what is important for the company and what is important for the pupils’
learning. The pupils could receive good marks without achieving adequate
“results” for the company. Even though they agree on such issues, the risk
of not succeeding is bothering the group. There is always a risk it might
flop.
When discussing the meaning of “results” in the context of the “Real-
Life Education” project, the group moves between the task-based discourse
of the company and the curriculum- and assessment-based discourse of
the school. Mathematical literacy and critical learning is legitimized by
the Norwegian curriculum and the didactical discussions of the student
teachers can be seen as based on the principles described there. However,
the fact that the curriculum places a strong emphasis on definite learning
outcomes that are also connected to assessment, favors a discourse in which
an explicit focus on critical learning might be difficult to develop. Even
though this group of student teachers have been discussing meaningful

learning and pupil empowerment, as well as the importance of owner-
ship and engagement in line with the curriculum, the discussion reveals a
tension between the traditional curriculum-based discourse and the inves-
tigative, collaborative discourse based in critical learning as developed by
this group in the context of “Real-Life Education.”
Landscapes of investigation
In critical mathematics education, teaching and learning of mathematical

facts and skills is necessary but not sufficient. Other competencies become
important, other learning conversations are required and other ways of
organizing for learning are necessary. Landscapes of investigation (Alrø &
Skovsmose, 2002; Skovsmose, 2001) can lay the foundation for such new
directions.
The teacher can introduce a landscape of investigation as a field encom-
passing many possible ways of exploring mathematical issues within the
chosen topic. This is an open approach that appeals to inquiry and to a
contemplative attitude: “Could it be that...”; “How come...”; “What if....”
Exercises are not given beforehand, and the idea is to motivate pupils to
identify their own interests within the mathematical topic that they want to
explore. The teacher cannot force pupils to carry out such an inquiry; he
or she can only invite pupils to get involved in a process of investigation,
i.e. take ownership and become active participants in the inquiry. So in
order for the pupils to join such inquiry activities, they have to accept the
invitation and summon up their intentions in learning.
In the student teachers’ preparatory conversation, they discuss how to
invite pupils to collaborate in exploring real-life issues in the offshore
company. They are laying the foundation for the pupils to investigate an
unknown field of information, including mathematical operations. They
are setting a scene for a process of inquiry cooperation (Alrø & Skovsmose,
2002), in which they are going to work as consultants. Learning is expected
to take place through such processes. At the university college, the students
have spent some time working with landscapes of investigation as a didacti-
cal approach. The student teachers pause in the discussion for a while to
reflect on whether their teaching introduction could be presented in terms
of a landscape of investigation. Thus, they express their intentions in teach-
ing by reflecting on the features of landscapes of investigation.
Trine: I just thought of “landscapes of investigation.” Did we have

situations where we could take this further? Is it possible to
introduce this, or do we have to? Is it possible to introduce
“landscapes of investigation”? I’m thinking of bringing it into

the open, to make open tasks—it merges together. What is
the difference between open tasks and “landscapes of inves-
tigation”? Can we possibly claim that we invite them into a
“landscape of investigation”? That we are undertaking an
invitation?
Arne: Maybe this is piling it on?
Mari: We do want to.
Liv: Yes.
Arne: This might be stretching it a little too far.
Trine asks whether they might be introducing a “landscape of investiga-

tion” and whether this is actually what they want to do. She describes the
landscape of investigation as open and she invites for discussing demar-
cations as regards so-called open tasks. Her tone of voice indicates an
exploratory attitude, and she is not quite sure if it is a landscape of inves-
tigation they are striving for. The response of the group is also somewhat
cautious about naming their approach in terms of landscapes of investiga-
tion: “Maybe this is piling it on?”; “This might be stretching it a little too
far.” However, Liv then illustrates this approach with an example from her
group.
Liv: I think what we are going to do in my group, should the pupils

seize on it, is that they get tasks and make tasks that suit them
well. What they want and what their interests are. And what fits
into it as a landscape of investigation.... The question is if you
are going to seize on what emerges. What is your attitude as
a teacher? How are you going to react to spontaneous ideas?
Liv’s emphasis on the pupils’ interests corresponds with earlier discus-

sions in the group about pupils’ choice making. This can be seen as one
feature of a landscape of investigation: it allows pupils to initiate an inquiry
because they are interested in the mathematical content. They may become
interested in getting to know more, thereby showing intentions in learning.
Spontaneity is seen as an important feature. It is important to “seize on
what emerges” when, as a teacher, you get a glimpse of the pupils’ inten-
tions and ideas. Mari confirms and reflects upon this issue in the following
extract, raising the dilemma that student teachers in teaching practice do
not know the pupils as well as the class teachers.
Mari: It becomes still clearer to me, with regard to “landscapes

of investigation,” that this goes hand in hand with feeling
confident and being familiar with the group of pupils—it is

exciting and frightening. To feel confidence in oneself and
in the pupils seems still more important to me in connec-
tion with landscapes of investigation. This kind of punctures
everything. Not that you shouldn’t do it, but it is difficult to
practice. Especially with pupils whom you don’t know well. I
think it is very closely linked to knowing the pupils.
Trine: Then you are thinking of it as rather big.
Mari: Yes rather big, to let go of all inhibitions. It sounds great and
I think it is great stuff. But I think it is important to have
some weight, before you prepare (to jump) without a para-
chute.
Arne: As I have understood (landscape of investigation), it is a situ-
ation with professional contact. You don’t keep going for an
hour or two only. You are going to have something to work
with continuously. So what we are going to introduce is sup-
posed to encourage the pupils to contemplate and to find out
about things—and we may help them find new things that
they want to find out.
Mari: It is adjusted to your own level. You always contemplate, you
always investigate at your own level, when the contemplation
is your own.
Mari describes a risky dilemma. It might be fruitful to invite the pupils

into a landscape of investigation, but an important precondition may be
that teacher and pupils know each other well. Preparation and implemen-
tation may require a thorough knowledge of the pupils, which the student
teachers do not have. She wants to run the risk by thinking “rather big”
and “let go of all inhibitions.” On the other hand, she hesitates, stating that
it might be necessary to “have some weight, before you prepare (to jump)
without parachute.”
Arne stresses some of the qualities of a landscape of investigation that
suit their intentions in teaching well: “You don’t keep going for an hour or
two only” and it is supposed to “encourage the pupils to contemplate and
to find out about things.” This is supported by Mari, who emphasizes the
importance of investigation based on pupils’ contemplation. However, the
student teachers seem to be a little ambivalent about inviting the pupils
into a landscape of investigation. On one hand, they wonder whether this is
actually too ambitious and risky; on the other hand, it is what they actually
want to do and are about to do.
In relation to the student teachers’ own learning and their inten-
tions in learning, it might be relevant to reformulate a question that was
posed earlier in the conversation: Is it necessary to get a result in order to
succeed? This is implicit when the practice teacher raises the question of
whether it is possible to introduce some but not all aspects of a landscape
of investigation.
Trine: Yes, but this is a little limiting. Not that this would be wrong,
but it is going to be very safe, really safe.... I want to experi-
ence difficulty. I mean, trying out the ideal situation in order
to find out that it doesn’t work all the time. I feel that we
are handling it the other way around. We try out only a few
aspects of the ideal thing, but this puts limits to our inten-
tions. I would like us to try it out instead. “Let’s see, oh no,
this didn’t work and that didn’t work.”
Arne: But what do you want the most?
Trine: In particular, to be directed to the question if there is some-
thing the pupils want to seize on.
When the student teachers reflect upon what they want to achieve for
themselves, they refer to their own intentions in learning. Trine wants
“trying out the ideal situation in order to find out that it doesn’t work all
the time.” She wants to learn by doing and trying out, even if everything
does not work. A limited version of a landscape of investigation does not
appeal to her since this might not be as challenging as she wants it to be.
Thus, she accepts that she might not succeed in organizing a landscape of
investigation, but is willing to run this risk in order to learn. This means
that the pupils may run into difficulties so that the student teachers may
learn. Thus, the student teachers’ intentions in teaching may constitute a
field of tension between the pupils’ intentions in learning and their own
intentions in learning.
More dilemmas in
critical mathematics education
At the very first meeting, the manager stressed the great importance of
statistics for the company: “Statistics is the Alpha and Omega for us,” he
said, “without statistics we fumble in the dark.” In the course of the project,
groups of pupils have helped each other throw light on different statistical
aspects of their data. For example, they have sorted out different kinds
of valves, and they have prepared an overview of the materials in stock.
They have shared ideas and calculations in their discussions of the use
of mathematics in this specific context. They have also experienced how
complicated real data can be, and how it is sometimes necessary to simplify
things and peel away irrelevant elements and information. “This provoked
discussions and decision making that would never appear when working
with a text book,” one of the student teachers claimed after the course. So
in this respect, the project has supported the pupils’ critical reflections on
the use of mathematics in a real-life context.
The challenge given by the manager and the fact that they were expected
to articulate their results, made the pupils take the task very seriously. At
the end of the course, a dissemination activity in front of company rep-
resentatives was planned, in order to develop the pupils’ communication
skills and support their learning. Having completed the task, the pupils
had to present the results critically for the company, explaining how they
had come to realize the importance of accuracy; and how they had made
certain choices in order to produce an overview that they thought would be
sufficient. In addition, they discussed the consequences of their decisions
for the results and what they had learnt, and they asked critical questions
of the company. The company representatives praised and acknowledged
their work.
With regard to the critical aspects of the use of mathematics, it is impor-
tant to discuss to what extent student teachers and pupils played the role
as consultants, who work for the company for free. This may have positive
as well as negative implications. In this context, the use of mathematics
includes the use of the pupils’ competences and knowledge of mathemat-
ics. When pupils use and develop their mathematical competencies and
knowledge in order to analyze, for example stock in trade and investment
requirements of the company, it has consequences for the operations of the
company which is making use of them. The replacement of professional
support with unprofessional may be of importance. Furthermore, student
teachers and pupils may feel important and needed, because they are
doing a real job and solving real problems for the company. The company
was so satisfied with their work that the manager even offered to pay them
a (symbolic) fee. However, this might have made them focus on the com-
mercial interests of the company, which might in turn have restricted their
interest in thinking critically. Success can be measured in terms of product
orientation: results count. In this respect a reflective critical approach to
teaching and learning may be stimulated and seen as important, but it may
be considered less valuable as well. The student teacher group navigated
their way through a field of dilemmas that made them challenge their
intentions in teaching and learning—not in order to learn how critical
mathematics education should be, but in order to become critical, reflective
and innovative teachers.
We do not know to what extent the company made use of the pupils’
work. They might have given the task because they were really in a need for
the results and wanted to make use of these in case the pupils did a good
job. The task might have been a current task that they already were about
to solve themselves as a professional company. However, they might also

have formulated the task in order for the pupils to experience the use of
mathematics in real life. They might have given the task in order for them
to learn. They listened to the pupils. They appreciated their work. The
pupils got a reward for solving the task. The perspectives of the student
teachers were acknowledged by the company. Do we have to know if the
company really made use of the results?
acknowledgmentS
Thanks to the research fellows in the LCMP project, Gert Monstad Hana,
Ragnhild Hansen, Inger-Elin Lilland, Beate Lode, and Toril Eskeland
Rangnes for sharing empirical data and theoretical discussions.
NOTES
1. Learning conversation is used as the translation of the Norwegian

Læringssamtalen.
2. LCMP is financed by The Research Council of Norway (NFR) and Ber-
gen University College. Marit Johnsen-Høines is the research leader. Ref:
Læringssamtalen i matematikkfagets praksis (LIMP) http://www.hib.no/fou/
limp.
3. The schoolteachers who participate in LCMP are both the children’s math-
ematics teachers and the student teachers’ tutors (trainers). The didacticians
are teacher educators and researchers in the field of mathematics education.
4. In Norwegian praksisnær undervisning. The schools are situated in Fjell, one
of the three municipalities participating in the initiative “Real-life Educa-
tion.” The initiative is administrated by Gode Sirkler AS (www.godesirkler.
no).
5. That is, the practicum (student teaching) is an integrated part of their study
in mathematics/mathematics education.
6. The importance of intentionality in learning is stressed by Skovsmose (1994).
See also Hana, Hansen, Johnsen-Høines, Lilland, and Rangnes (2010).
7. The notion of “learning as taking place in and between different practices
refers to that learning is going on when the organized activities are going on,
but afterwards as well, and also when the learners are on their way into an
organized learning activity.” This issue is elaborated on in Johnsen-Høines
(2010).
8. The teacher is the tutor of the student teachers and the teacher of the pupils.
9. This situation is described further in Haugsbakk (2012) and Lilland (2012).
10. The student teachers’ discussion on intentionality, necessity and functionality
also refers to the pupils’ “rationale for learning” and “control of knowledge,”
as developed by Mellin-Olsen (1987, 1989).
11. A dilemma arises in a situation where a choice must be made between at least
two possibilities, neither of which seems to be optimal since choice making is
combined with risk taking. People in a dilemma have to balance advantages
and disadvantages. See Sletteboe (1998): “The defining attributes were en-
gagement, equally unattractive alternatives, need for choice and uncertainty
of action.”
12. The excerpts are from a 3-hour-long conversation and we have selected a
few sequences and quotations that highlight important issues concerning
teaching and intentions in learning related to critical mathematics educa-
tion.
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chapter 13
THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICS

IN POLITICS AS AN ISSUE FOR
MATHEMATICS TEACHING
Mario Sánchez Aguilar and Morten Blomhøj
Introduction
In May 2007 the first author of this chapter arrived from Mexico to
begin his doctoral studies at Roskilde University in Denmark under the
supervision of the second author. Coming as an outsider to Roskilde Uni-
versity, there were many glaring particularities of this University such as:
the project-based study programs in mathematics and science, the focus
and the critical perspective on mathematical modeling, and the approach
to research in mathematics education. Therefore, it was natural to take
inspiration from the Roskilde experiences with teaching mathematical
modeling, and from Danish research related to the teaching and learning
of modeling, in the design of one of the online in-service courses devel-
oped as part of his PhD project. This chapter is a spin off from that work.
The focus is on the analyses of some examples of mathematical models
used in the Mexican society of today, and we seek to justify why and illus-
trate how such examples can be included in mathematics teaching and in
mathematics teacher education.

254â•‡â•‡M. S. Aguilar and M. Blomhøj
THE DANISH FOCUS ON MODELING AND CRITICAL

At Roskilde University (founded in 1972), from as early as 1975 the regu-
lation for mathematics teacher-education for the upper secondary level
included as one of its main aims that the teachers should be able to teach
mathematical modeling to their students in such a way that the role and
function of mathematics in society would be demystified (Roskilde Univer-
sity, 1975, p. 1). Mogens Niss (1977), who was the main architect behind the
program, explains how this program should be seen as a cure against what
he describes as the crisis of mathematics instruction. A crisis which accord-
ing to him aroused because of an imbalance between, on the one hand, the
societal developments toward a high technological society with a need for
mathematical competency in the wide population as well as a quest for criti-
cal citizenship in relation to the use of mathematics in society; and on the
other hand an abstract and isolated mathematics instruction—especially at
upper secondary level—oriented toward a mathematical elite and without
connections to the use of mathematics in society. A few years later, this
discussion together with other developments actually led to the inclusion
of models and applications in the Danish upper secondary mathematics
curriculum. Facilitated by a Danish research initiative called Mathemat-
ics Education and Democracy (Nissen, 1993), this period also marked the
beginning of a strong trend in Danish mathematics education research
focusing on the role and function of mathematics in society. The overall
objective was to understand how mathematics teaching could contribute
to the development of a democratic society (Niss, 1994, p. 376). Mogens
Niss has followed this path in some of his research (Blum & Niss, 1991;
Niss, 1994, 1996). Also, another internationally well-known Danish profes-
sor, Ole Skovsmose, has focused his research on the role and function of
mathematics in society and on the related issue of investigating the condi-
tions—actual and possible—for a critical mathematics education (Alrø &
Skovsmose, 2002; Skovsmose, 1994, 2000, 2004).
In this chapter we describe some of the ideas and concepts developed
by Mogens Niss, Ole Skovsmose, and others, and illustrate them with some
examples of the current use of mathematics in politics in Mexico. We think
that their theoretical ideas can be used to analyze cases of societal use of
mathematical models and how they can be transformed and incorporated
into mathematics teaching.
THE MEXICAN CONTEXT

The examples that we will present in this chapter are taken from the
Mexican sociopolitical context. Mexico is a developing country trying to
establish a democratic, just, and inclusive society. The Mexican educational
The Role of Mathematics in Politicsâ•‡â•‡ 255
institutions play a determining role in the establishment of such kind of

society. These institutions should prepare the future citizens to actively
participate in the decision making that affects and defines the social reality
of Mexico.
In particular, the mathematical education that is provided in the Mexican
educational institutions should pay special attention to the sociopolitical
uses of mathematics. There is evidence showing that mathematics plays
an important role in shaping the social reality of Mexico. An example of
this is the “marginalization index” (see SaÌ†nchez, 2009, 2010), which is a
measure based on a mathematical model, used by the Mexican govern-
ment to define the municipalities in Mexico that are in need of resources
to promote social development (building hospitals, schools, etc.). However,
although mathematics plays an important role in shaping the social reality,
the mathematics education that is provided in Mexico does not seem to
acknowledge this role.
For instance, in the article SaÌ†nchez (2007), the perception of the role of
mathematics within the Mexican educational system is discussed. In par-
ticular, it was intended to provide a modest answer to the question: “What
is the justification for teaching mathematics in Mexico?” This question is
embedded in the more general problematique concerning the problem
of justification in mathematics education (Ernest, 1998; Niss, 1996). The
above question was addressed by looking into the official records of the
Mexican Ministry of Education. One of the documents that to some extent
provide an answer to the previous question is the so-called “Foundations
of the curriculum for the reform of the lower secondary education.”1
The document states: “[Mathematics are useful] to cope with fractions,
to plot functions, to calculate angles, probabilities and perimeters. But
also to encourage abstraction in order to facilitate reasoning, develop the
argumentation, and introducing to the proof ” (Secretaría de Educación
Pública, 2006, p. 9, author’s translation).
Other official documents from the Ministry of Education that were
found in this survey portray mathematics as a tool that helps students to
understand the physical phenomena around them (see SaÌ†nchez, 2007).
Thus, the official justification for teaching mathematics is to provide
students with mathematical understanding, but it is not discussed how
the students’ understanding of mathematics is relevant to Mexican society
in general. Moreover, mathematics is presented to the students as a topic
that is important to study and understand because it will help them to
learn more mathematics. At best, mathematics is presented to the students
as a topic that will help them to understand other school topics such
as physics and chemistry. Mathematics is not presented to the students
as a tool that can be used for prescribing their political and economic
reality.2 We believe that this perception of the role of mathematics is not
specific to the educational institutions. It is common to find mathematics

teachers who are not aware of the connections between mathematics and
the configuration of social reality, and therefore they do not address such
connections in their teaching.
This lack of connections between mathematics and society (as presented
in the Mexican educational system) has consequences. For example, there
is a risk of making students interpret mathematics as a school subject that
exists and is only relevant within the school. This situation tends to produce
a poor image of mathematics in the students. Another consequence is that
the school curriculum does not encourage teachers to relate mathematics
to other subjects. This also contributes to the creation of a restricted image
of mathematics in the students.
If we share the idea presented in Skovsmose (2000) about the need for
educating “our youth, our citizens, so that they begin to understand and
critique the formatting power of mathematics in society,” then more work
is needed to change the general perception about the role and nature of
mathematics. Part of our contribution as mathematics educators to support
such a change may consist of designing mathematical activities for the
classroom, aiming at explicitly illustrating and analyzing such formatting
power. We think that, in order to prepare students to identify and evaluate
sociopolitical applications of mathematics, it is essential to show them and
discuss with them real instances of such applications. We claim that such
activities could be based on authentic applications of mathematics within
the political systems of our societies. In the next section we present the
arguments for considering the use of mathematics in politics as a useful
resource for the mathematics classroom.
WHY study THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN POLITICS?
We present two arguments for the advocation of the use of mathematics

in politics as a resource for mathematics teaching. Firstly, to show how
mathematics is applied within the political context can have an important
motivational value. There is research indicating that the study of authentic
and contemporary applications of mathematics can arouse a great interest
among students. An example of this can be found in the empirical research
reported in Jankvist (2009), where modern histories of applications of
mathematics are used to motivate and change students’ conceptions about
mathematics. In this regard the author states:
The fact that the history is a newer and fairly recent history of mathematics
seems to make it easier for the students to relate.... Concerning the history
of modern applications of mathematics some students may find it more in-
teresting to work with such a history, and possibly even more so if they rec-
ognize elements from everyday life. (p. 11)
Although this study refers to the use of history of mathematics in the

classroom, it is a case that can be used as an analogy to illustrate the moti-
vational value that the use of mathematics in contemporary politics could
have for the students. Such examples might be easy to relate to aspects of
students’ daily life. However, we have other reasons to believe that the use
of mathematics in politics would be interesting and motivating for math-
ematics students and teachers.
When the video “government and mathematics” was published on
YouTube (see Sánchez, 2010), several comments from “ordinary” citizens
were received. Many of these citizens thought that the topic addressed in
the video was interesting and they even recommended it to other people.
An example of this is the comment posted on the social network Twitter,3
which can be literally translated as: “Interesting video http://youtu.be/
I1s2exbD5T0?a how politicians govern us with limited mathematical
models (via @dontriana).” The author of the post is promoting the video
among his contacts in the social network, but he in turn received the recom-
mendation on the video through another user of the network. We consider
this process as a manifestation of the interest that certain people had in
the content of the video.
We think that this video was interesting for the viewers because its
content can be easily related to the social reality experienced in Mexico.
Thus, we argue that a mathematics teaching that is detached from the
social reality experienced by a country can appear demotivating for the
students. Similarly, a mathematics teaching that has strong links with the
social reality may be more attractive and motivating for the mathematics
students.
The second argument for considering the application of mathematics in
politics as a resource for mathematics teaching is that politics is a context
that can be useful to explicitly illustrate the formatting power of mathemat-
ics. In other words, it is a context that can help us to make evident how
mathematics can be used to legitimize and justify political decisions that
directly and significantly affect the social dynamics of some communities
and the lives of their inhabitants.
It is important to explicitly illustrate and study these kinds of applica-
tions of mathematics, because they can serve to nourish a sense of civic
awareness in the students and teachers toward the use of mathematics by
politicians and government institutions. We think that such kind of activi-
ties could contribute to prepare students and teachers to identify, evaluate,
and respond critically to the consequences of such use of mathematics. Fur-
thermore, we believe that the discussion of such mathematical applications

can enrich students’ perceptions about the nature and role of mathematics.
Nevertheless, we are aware of the fact that locating instances of appli-
cations of mathematics in politics is not enough for using them into the
classroom. Teachers need to have some sort of guiding regarding the
aspects they should focus on when discussing this kind of applications
of mathematics in the classroom. We claim that mathematics education
research can guide us about the aspects that could be the focus of atten-
tion when using the applications of mathematics in politics as an aid for
the development of mathematics teaching. This point is elaborated in the
next section.
HOW TO INTEGRATE THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN

POLITICS INto MATHEMATICS TEACHING?
Whenever mathematics is used in politics to describe, predict or even pre-

scribe reality there is always some type of mathematical model involved
(Niss, 1994, p. 369). Even the most simple statistics presuppose assump-
tions and choices about what to count and how to represent the results.
Mathematical models used in politics or in societal administration vary
greatly in function and complexity, and in mathematical content and rep-
resentation. Therefore, there is a need for theoretical ideas that can guide
and structure the analysis of the use mathematics in politics and society;
but there is also a need for didactical ideas that can support the transposi-
tion of such analyses into mathematics teaching practices. In this section
we present some examples of such ideas that have already been tried out
in practices of mathematics teaching in the Danish context. We do not
claim by any means to cover the area of mathematics education research
relevant for including the use of mathematics in politics in the teaching of
mathematics.
Despite the great variation of mathematical models used in politics, they
can all be discussed according to their role in the context or contexts where
they are being applied. One very general categorization of the models used
in politics is the division in descriptive, predictive and prescriptive models
(see, for instance, Davis & Hersh, 1986, p. 120).
A mathematical model is descriptive when it is used to represent and com-
municate the current state of a situation. A predictive mathematical model is
used to anticipate or predict what the future state of a situation or problem
will be, based on a model of the system in the current state. Predictive use
of mathematical models is common in relation to societal decision making
where it is important to be able to predict the effects of possible political
regulations in often very complex societal systems. Models in economi-
cal planning, traffic planning, environmental planning, and planning of

energy supply and production are all examples for mathematical models
that are used by the political or administrative systems to predict the possi-
ble effects of changes or regulations in these systems. Mathematical models
are also used in society to define systems that actually shape the political
or social reality in which we are living. Such use of mathematical models is
characterized as prescriptive.
There are plentiful examples of recently reinstated prescriptive mathema-

tization: exam grades, IQs, life insurance, taking a number in a bake shop,
lotteries, traffic lights ... telephone switching systems, credit cards, zip codes,
proportional representation voting.... We have prescribed these systems, of-
ten for reasons known only to a few; they regulate and alter our lives and
characterize civilization. They create a description before the pattern itself
exists. (Davis & Hersh, 1986, pp. 120–121)
Of course, not all of the examples mentioned in Davis and Hersh’s quote
belong to the domain of politics and many of them are integrated in tech-
nological systems. However, many of these mathematized systems—which
are, in fact mathematical models—have a political and societal impact. Just
to make sure it is the functions of models that are characterized here—not
the models themselves—the same mathematical model can have different
functions in different contexts.
If we want to analyze and discuss applications of mathematics in politics
with students, a first possible approach is to let the students experience
and discuss concrete examples of mathematical models used in society in
relation to these three categories (descriptive, predictive, or prescriptive).
In our experience it is possible and motivating for students from second-
ary level and above, as well as for mathematics teachers, to work with these
categories and even find examples within each category by themselves.
The students do not need to understand completely the mathematical
structure of the models in order to work with them in relation to this cat-
egorization. The function that a model plays can be analyzed through the
context in which it is used, and therefore such activity can be organized at
different educational levels. Even though this sort of discussion is somehow
general and not strongly related to the internal mathematical structure
of the model, it can be very useful for enriching the students’ image of
mathematics and its applications. For most students and even for some
mathematics teacher it appear as a surprise that mathematical models are
widely used in politics and in relation to societal issues, and the models can
play different roles and even sometimes prescribe parts of the political and
economic reality we are living in.
Skovsmose has deeply analyzed the roles and functions played by math-
ematical models in society both from a philosophical point of view and
through analyses of concrete cases of societal applications of mathematical

models (see, for instance, Skovsmose, 1990, 1994; Skovsmose & Yasukawa,
2004). In this research it is established that mathematics through modeling
and models exerts a formatting power in modern societies. Furthermore,
this formatting power of mathematics constitutes a major challenge for
mathematics education research and for the practice of mathematics
teaching. In order for mathematics teaching to contribute to the general
education in favor of democratic societal developments, mathematics
teaching needs to address the role of mathematics in society and politics.
During a Danish research initiative in 1998–2004, a number of research
and developmental projects with experimental teaching were carried out
to investigate how this challenge can be met in mathematics teaching at
lower secondary level (Skovsmose & Blomhøj, 2003, 2006). Findings from
analyses of authentic applications of mathematical models were used to
structure courses of lessons that aimed at including a political dimension.
Examples of such a finding, relevant for mathematics teacher education,
are the following four types of general side effects in relation to the use of
mathematical models in a technical or societal investigation or decision-
making process (Skovsmose, 1990, pp. 128–133). In our translation and
rephrasing, these are:
1. A reformulation of the problem in hand in order for it to be suit-

able for analysis by means of a mathematical model.
2. A delimitation of the group of people engaging in the public
discussion about the problem in hand to those who are able to
understand the model and its role in the decision process—Ole
Skovsmose calls this group the base of critique.
3. A shift in the discourse away from the political and societal reality
toward quantitative claims and arguments related to the model—
the model becomes the object for the discourse.
4. A delimitation of the possible solutions or the alternative political
actions taken under consideration to those that can be evaluated in
the model.
The point here is not that the use of mathematical models should be
avoided as a tool in political and societal decision making because of their
side effects. Mathematical modeling is an indispensable part of a modern
technological society. The point is that the use of mathematical models in
society is neither good nor bad nor neutral by any means. Therefore, it is
important that mathematics teaching in general education contributes to
the development of a critical awareness of and a competence to analyze
the possible effects of the use of mathematical models in decision-mak-

ing processes. Even though the detection of such effects does not need to
be closely related to the mathematical structure of the model involved, a
mathematical modeling competency is a prerequisite for conducting such
analyses. Hence, it is mathematics as a subject where we need to address
the educational challenge related to the formatting power of mathematical
models in society, and therefore these issues must be included in math-
ematics teacher education.
General discussions about types of mathematical models and their func-
tions in politics could serve to nurture and broaden teachers’ and students’
images of mathematics and its applications. Analyses of the inner math-
ematical structure of an authentic model might be a way of approaching the
study of mathematical applications in politics, which is easier to integrate
in the practice of mathematics teaching. Such analyses can be structured
according a general model of a mathematical modeling process (see Figure
13.1). A concrete case of modeling can be analyzed with respect to one
or more of the six subprocesses included in a modeling process, namely:
problem formulation, systematization, mathematization, mathematical
analysis, interpretation/evaluation, and validation. For example, we can
discuss with the students the assumptions underlying a model and what
are their implications. Such kind of discussion refers to the systematiza-
tion subprocess. It is also possible to discuss the role of the variables and
parameters within a mathematical model: What do they represent? How
are the values of the parameters estimated? and What are their effects on
the models results? This is one way of addressing the subprocess of mathe-
matical analysis. It is also important to discuss with students the subprocess
of interpretation/validation through questions like: On what ground can
the model be validated? Is it possible to obtain an alternative interpreta-
tion of the modeled situation? or Does the model adequately capture the
situation in hand? These questions are relevant within the discussion of the
interpretation/validation subprocess.
The point here is that the students could get acquainted with a model of
a modeling cycle as a tool for analyzing the process behind models used in
relation to particular political decisions. Examples from the project work
at Roskilde University are found in Blomhøj and Kjeldsen (2010), and Niss
(2001). Such an approach is of course relevant only for students that have
previous experiences with the modeling cycle as a tool for supporting their
own modeling activities.
Last but not least, the students’ work with authentic societal and politi-
cal problems can serve as a motivation and as a means for the learning of
important mathematical concepts and methods.
Figure 13.1.â•… A model of a mathematical modeling process. The modeling process

is interpreted as being composed of six subprocesses.
SOME DIFFICULTIES IN STUDYING THE USE OF

MATHEMATICS IN POLITICS
Locating instances of applications of mathematics in politics and discuss

them in the mathematics classroom is not a straightforward task. Based on
our experience, we have identified some obstacles to this activity.
The first difficulty that we have faced is that the information is not
easily accessible. Even though politicians and government institutions
make use of mathematical calculations to present reports, make decisions,
and put forward arguments, the mathematical techniques, and models
used for carrying out these calculations are not always explicit or directly
accessible. To locate those unrevealed mathematical tools it is necessary to
perform extensive searches into the records and websites of the govern-
ment/political institutions, and even make direct information requests to
the government offices.
We have found that newspapers and news broadcasts are also useful
resources where examples of politicians and institutions using mathematics
can be found. It is useful to create an archive with articles, graphs, inter-
views, and the like, to then select the material that could be discussed with
the students. Further on, we will present examples that suggest how this
type of material could be used in the mathematics classroom.
Another difficulty relates to the complexity of the mathematics being

applied. In some cases we located mathematical models that are used by
the government agencies to carry out different calculations. However, the
mathematics involved in those models was too complex to be discussed
with all the students. There are at least two ways to cope with this situation:
One way is to try to reduce the complexity of the mathematical model
that we want to discuss with the students. This can be achieved by focusing
only on some components of the mathematical model. In fact this was the
strategy that we followed when we discussed with a group of teachers the
mathematical model used by the Mexican government to locate Mexico’s
most marginalized municipalities. Since this was a group of teachers with
a heterogeneous mathematical background (some of them were primary
level teachers, while others were working at the university level), it was
necessary to focus only on a small part of the model. This was a procedure
that made the discussion mathematically accessible to everyone. In the next
section we will show the aspect of the model where we focused the analysis.
However, we are not suggesting that the examples of applications of
mathematics in politics that are mathematically complex should be always
simplified or even avoided. Another possibility for addressing this situation
is to use such examples in preparing students who will study mathematics at
a higher level. We believe that the education of the future mathematicians,
economists, engineers, and other specialists could be enriched by analyzing
and discussing the advantages, limitations and consequences of applying
such mathematical models in social contexts. In the next section we present
some authentic examples taken from the Mexican sociopolitical context. We
think that these examples are worthy to be used in mathematics teaching.
A FIRST EXAMPLE: THE MARGINALIZATION INDEX
We have referred to the marginalization index throughout this article. The

marginalization index is a measure that is used by the Mexican govern-
ment to determine which are Mexico’s most marginalized municipalities.
This measure is calculated by using a mathematical model. We discussed
part of this model during an in-service course on mathematical modeling
for teachers. This experience is reported in SaÌ†nchez (2009). Our aim was
to discuss this model in order to illustrate one of the arguments that have
been provided to include mathematical modeling in the school curriculum.
Here we refer to the “critical competence argument” presented in Blum
and Niss (1991). The argument is based on considering mathematical
modeling as a means to “enable students to ‘see and judge’ independently,
to recognise, understand, analyze and assess representative examples of
actual uses of mathematics, including (suggested) solutions to socially sig-

nificant problems” (Blum & Niss, 1991, p. 43).
The mathematical model measures nine socioeconomic indicators for
each municipality in Mexico, however, it was complex to discuss all of
them with the teachers. Complex because the mathematics required for
understanding the structure of the model could be very demanding for
some teachers. Therefore we decided to focus the discussion on only one
socioeconomic indicator.4 The one aimed at indicating the percentage of
the employed population with an income less than or equal to twice the
minimum wage. This indicator is calculated by using the following formula:
Pi sm≤2
Ii 0 = x100
Pi0
Where:
Pi sm ≤2 is the part of the employed population who receives less than two
minimum wages.
Pi0 represents the total of the employed population.
During our discussion with the teachers, we emphasized that this part of
the model is inadequate to detect all the sources of wealth in a community.
For instance, if we go through the definition of “employed population” that
is used in the model, we will find that the definition considers as employed
all those persons aged 12 or older who have worked at least one hour, one
week before the interview is conducted,5 even when they have not received
payment for their work. This definition, which is part of the model, has
consequences. One consequence is, for example, that the model could
yield a small number, which means that in the locality where the model
was applied only few people earn twice the minimum wage or less. But
the number does not say anything about the children below the age of 12
who are working. In other words, the model does not acknowledge child
labor and exploitation. This is a variable that should be considered in the
marginalization index because Mexico has a large number of children who
work, often without receiving any remuneration for their work.6 Those
children are of course marginalized, but the model will not detect them.
There are other sources of wealth that could be omitted by the margin-
alization index. In the official document where this part of the model is
introduced, there is a footnote explaining that when the data are collected
in order to introduce them in the model, many people, especially those
with the highest income, tend to omit information about their income. In
the Mexican context it is not difficult to identify municipalities where the
majority of the employed inhabitants are involved in the production and
commercialization of drugs or other illegal activities. It can be expected
that these people will omit information about their incomes. Thus, the
above-presented component of the marginalization index could label a
community as poor and therefore marginalized, when in reality it is a

wealthy community, but the wealth has been produced illegally by the drug
trafficking or other illegal business.
We believe that this activity contributed to the professional development
of the mathematics teachers who participated in the course. Some of them
discovered the role that mathematical modeling can play in government’s
decision making. Some teachers found that mathematics can inform deci-
sions that affect the lives of hundreds of people, but not necessarily in a
positive way. Some of them even expressed interest in bringing such kind
of examples of applications of mathematics to their own classrooms.
These kinds of models can be also discussed with mathematics pupils.
The marginalization index is an example of a descriptive and prescriptive
model. It helps to describe the welfare level of Mexican municipalities,
but it also indicates where the resources for social development should
be targeted. In addition, internal reflections can be arranged around the
operation of the model, for example: What are the variables of the model?
What do they represent? How do they affect the final result produced by
the model? What are the assumptions that underpin the model? On the
other hand, external reflections can also be encouraged. For example those
addressing the consequences of the model like: What aspects of reality that
the model attempts to capture are not adequately represented? What are
the consequences of such limitations of the model?
We claim that such discussions can help make the students aware of the
possible consequences of the application of mathematics in social contexts.
Such discussions would sustain a mathematics education that promotes the
application of mathematics with responsibility and ethics.
A SECOND EXAMPLE: USE OF MATHEMATICS IN

POLITICAL DISCOURSES
As previously mentioned, newspapers and news broadcasts are important

sources of information where examples of how mathematics is used by
politicians to substantiate reports and justify arguments can be obtained.
Let us take as an example the media coverage of the so-called war on
drugs. This “war” is a campaign of prohibition initiated by the government
of the United States.7 Since its inception in the 1970s, the Mexican govern-
ment has supported this campaign despite the devastating effects that this
fight has had on Mexican society. Over the years the Mexican government
has reported on the outcomes of this fight in Mexico. The Mexican sociolo-
gist Luis Astorga has pointed out that mathematical calculations have been
used in a misleading way to substantiate some of these reports:
The authorities have sometimes used misleading ratings for their statistics
[...] For example, in the National Program for Drug Control 1989–1994 there
is a criterion which makes equivalent 1 hectare of eradicated poppy to 1 kilo of
destroyed heroin. Thus, an area that is planted with poppies and eradicated
is plotted as ‘destruction of opium and heroin’, those are substances that
never existed but only as a possibility or in a small proportion regarding the
total represented. The graphic illusion is based on the assumption that if all
conditions had been optimal for the extraction of raw materials and further
processing, then what was presented would be true. The problem is that this
hypothesis is not explicit and it is presented as real, creating in the naive
reader the intended effect by the act of statistical illusion. (Astorga, 2005,
p. 128, our translation)
In newspapers and news broadcasts we have found other instances of

the use of mathematics to justify the war on drugs in Mexico. One such
example is the interview with the current President of Mexico, Felipe
Calderon, carried out by journalist Wolf Blitzer for the American news
channel CNN. The interview was carried out during Calderon’s state visit
to Washington in May 2010.
Calderon has been heavily criticized for his decision to deploy federal
troops (policemen, soldiers, marines) in the streets of Mexico to combat
drug traffickers. This strategy has generated a huge and ever-increasing
number of deaths, among which hundreds of innocent civilians are esti-
mated to be included.8 Despite the criticism, Calderon has not changed his
strategy for fighting against drug cartels.
During the interview, the President Calderon was asked about the inse-
curity caused by the drug war in Mexico. In response, he used statistical
arguments to depict Mexico as a safe country. These arguments are shown
in the following transcript of an excerpt from that interview:
Transcription of a CNN Interview, Broadcast May, 20109

(From minute 3:20 to minute 5:21)
Wolf Blitzer: Americans love visiting Mexico whether Cancun or other
places. Why you don’t look in the camera and tell Americans why travel,
tourism, visiting Mexico is safe and they need not worry, because a lot of
Americans right now you know they are worried.
Felipe Calderon (FC): I know but first, Mexico is a lovely country ...
WB: That’s true.
FC: ... and second Mexico is a country who is
passing ... is having a trouble but we are
fixing the trouble, we are facing the prob-
lem and we will fix it. Third, if you analyze
for instance the figures, you need to put in

a context this problem of crime in Mexico.
The rate of homicides for 100,000 people in
Mexico is 12 homicides per 100,000 people.
If you analyze any other country, for instance
if you prefer fly to Jamaica or Dominican
Republic you need to understand that the
rate of homicides there is 60 homicides per
100,000 people or Colombia is 39 or Brazil is
23 the double than Mexico.
WB: So you are saying it is safer visiting—if you
are tourist—Mexico than some of these other
countries.
FC: According with these data yes, and even let
me tell you that if you feel safer here in Wash-
ington DC, Washington DC has 31 homicides
per 100,000 people which means the triple,
almost the triple homicides than Mexico,
according with the proportion of the popula-
tion. And I don’t want to deny that we have a
problem. Yes. But we are facing that problem
and we are using all the resources of the state.
That problem is not focused on the places
that Americans use to visit like Cancun or
Vallarta or Baja or Los Cabos. Those places,
some of them even are safer as vary cities ...
as several cities in Europe or other places,
so visit Mexico you will help us and we will
working for ... to make Mexico a safer country
in favor not only the tourist but also our own
families.
These kinds of speeches can be used to organize mathematical discus-

sions in the classroom. It is relevant, for example, to discuss how the rate of
homicide can be classified as a descriptive model, but it is also relevant to
have external reflections on the model addressing how well it captures the
levels of violence experienced in Mexico. For example, since the statistical
data used by Felipe Calderon correspond to the entire country, they are
not adequate to represent the violence at the local level. Such statistical
data hide the fact that there are cities such as Ciudad Juarez, where it is
estimated that in 2009 there was a homicide rate of 133 per 100,000 inhab-
itants. These statistics do not indicate the high level of violence involved in
the homicides. They do not reveal that many of these murders have been
preceded by abductions, torture, rape and mutilation. They do not reveal

who the victims of such murders are, which include children, journalists,
students, high-ranking government officials, among many others.
FINAL COMMENTS
Politicians and government institutions use mathematics to underpin

their proposals and arguments and in decision making related to social
problems. Skovsmose (1990) has warned us about some of the effects that
are produced when mathematics is incorporated into the discussion of
nonmathematical problems. For instance, the original problem is refor-
mulated into a different kind of discourse (a mathematical discourse). As a
consequence, the group of people who could participate in the discussion
of the problem and its solution becomes smaller and has a very specific
composition. It would be integrated only by those citizens with certain
mathematical knowledge, able to discern and criticize the use of mathemat-
ics in the discussion.
It is our responsibility as mathematics educators to provide our students
with a mathematical education that could enable them to take an active and
critical participation in the society. A mathematical education that prepares
them to identify, analyze and assess the applications of mathematics in the
solution of social problems. We believe it is worth discussing with the stu-
dents examples such as those we have shown in this article. This because
that kind of examples illustrate some of the consequences that may result
from the application of mathematics in such contexts. We believe that this
type of mathematical education would positively affect their education as
citizens. It is, however, necessary to promote these ideas in the classroom.
We need more enthusiastic teachers and researchers willing to conduct
experiments and empirical research reporting the type of results that this
approach of mathematical education can produce.
Notes
1. This document makes reference to the national reform of the lower second-
ary education in Mexico that started in 2006 and remains in force.
2. Here we refer to the formatting power of mathematics. For a discussion on
the concept, see Niss (1983) and Skovsmose and Yasukawa (2004).
3. See http://twitter.com/loronegro/status/10692832802
4. The nine indicators are: percentage of illiterate population, percentage of
population without complete primary education, percentage of population
without toilet or drainage, percentage of population without electricity, per-
centage of population without access to piped water, percentage of private
homes with a level of overcrowding, percentage of population living with

a floor made of soil, percentage of population in localities with fewer than
5,000 inhabitants, percentage of the employed population with income less
than or equal to twice the minimum wage.
5. The data entered into the model are collected through population censuses
based on interviews with the residents of the municipalities.
6. One of the last studies in this respect estimates that in 2002 there were 1.1
million boys and girls aged between 6 and 11 working in Mexico. See Insti-
tuto Nacional de EstadiÌ†stica, GeografiÌ†a e Informática (2004).
7. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Drugs
8. The attorney general’s office of Mexico estimates that 47,515 drug-related
killings have been committed during Felipe Calderon’s term. See http://nyti.
ms/A19yoC
9. The interview extract has been transcribed faithfully and may include actual
grammatical errors made by the speakers. The full version of the interview
is available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/05/19/mexico.president.visit/
index.html
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chapter 14
AND CITIZENSHIP
IN CAPITALISM
Critical Dimensions
Maria Nikolakaki
INTRODUCTION
When we consider education for a citizen, we usually mean civic education.

If we start to think a bit harder, we can refer to history and geography or
even literature. Seldom do we think of mathematics as part of citizenship
education. In capitalism, though, mathematics education has been essen-
tial to the cultivation of the citizen.
Mathematics education spread with capitalism. Quantification and the
need for measurement were intensified with the expansion of commerce.
Modernity, along with the construction of nation states, created the need
for citizenship. Education has become a means to achieve this goal, and
mathematics education has become a basic element in school programs.
“Political arithmetic,” during the early phases of capitalism, had to do

274â•‡â•‡M. Nikolakaki
with the recording of the national resources with the intention of having
a rational policy (Swetz, 1984) and assessing the value of the democratic
institution (Kamens & Benavot, 1992).
Since the early 1980s, neoliberal capitalism has eroded all sections of
human creativity. Therefore, it is necessary for citizens to be critical and
to comprehend these changes that are leading to the dehumanization of
society (Nikolakaki, 2012). Critical citizens will resist the greed and mer-
cilessness of neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, mathematics education is an
important tool for that.
This chapter addresses the historical connection of mathematics educa-
tion and citizenship in capitalism. Further, this investigation traces how
mathematics education has contributed to the construction of the desired
citizen. In the three parts of this article, I first examine the emergence of
the need for mathematics in Western society. In the second part, I analyze
the role of mathematics education in modernity for the construction of
the citizen of the nation state. Finally, I propose that neoliberal capitalism
has created the need and the urgency for citizens who are more critically
literate in mathematics.
THE EMERGENCE OF
THE NEED FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
During the Dark Ages, the purpose of education was religious and moral
cultivation. The educational programs in the feudal times in Europe were
especially oriented to classical studies, and education was mainly based on
the teaching of the trivium: logic, oratory, and grammar. Only few young
people received training in mathematics, and at that time mathematics
consisted of the quadrivium, namely arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and
music. Most students only acquired a few elements of arithmetic knowledge
because only arithmetic was essential for everyday dealings (Goodson,
1994).
Roman numerals were useful to express quantities, but they could not
be used for arithmetic operations. To calculate with Roman numerals, the
slate or the abacus was used. The Arabic numbers became known in Europe
during the 10th century through North Africa and Spain, but they were not
widely in use until the 13th century. When Leonardo de Pisa returned after
traveling in Egypt and Syria, he wrote an essay about this amazing system
that made arithmetic operations possible (Exarhakos, 1998).
The reaction to the new arithmetic system was resistance. In fact, in 1299
in Florence, Italy, a law was enacted against the use of Arabic numbers
because it was thought that the calculations could be distorted. As Swetz
(1984) has pointed out, this prohibition shows that the function of written
Mathematics Education and Citizenship in Capitalismâ•‡â•‡ 275
numbers in the Dark Ages in Italy during the first period of modern trade
was the recording of exchanges and not the creation of a body of easily
accessible information.
During the Dark Ages, the educational programs in Italy served the
establishment of the Christian community. In a basic school, the subjects
taught were oratory (writing and reading), as well as simple arithmetic with
Roman numerals. Children started lessons at the age of 5 or 7 years and
finished at the age of 11 or 12. If a student wanted to be taught arithme-
tic between the ages of 12 and 15 years, he had to attend a Latin school.
In Latin schools the teaching of arithmetic was related mostly to theory
without social applications, as part of the classical subjects. Alternatively,
students could go to a reckoning master, who taught arithmetic for com-
mercial application. The students of these “special teachers” came from the
newly established bourgeoisie (Swetz, 1984).
During the 14th century, special arithmetic schools appeared. They
were known as scuola d’abbaco and were intended for those who wanted to
be instructed in trade arithmetic. The existence of such schools emphasizes
the importance of mathematics itself as well as the importance of being
able to calculate when one worked in the trade business. One of the first
books printed in the west was an arithmetic “textbook,” Treviso Arithmetic.
In 1478, this book used Indic and Arabic numbers and showed operations
for the solution of trade problems. The publication of this book indicates
how necessary it was to acquire arithmetic skills to cope with everyday chal-
lenges revolving around the proper application of numbers (Swetz, 1984).
Thousands of university students in Italy were already in contact with
the new arithmetic system from the 13th century, but it was only with the
intensification of the trade activities and the spread of printing presses
since Johannes Gutenberg’s 15th-century invention that this knowledge
was transferred to the common person. Therefore, mathematics, from
a theoretical and scholastic activity, was commuted to a professional and
trade level because of the rapid development of “merchandise capitalism.”
During the 15th century, the use of mathematics in Italy started to be
regarded as an occupation and not just a novelty or a carrier of the neo-
platonic mysticism as had been the case during the Dark Ages. In addition,
mathematics was not solely available to the few academics or nobles under
the cover of a mystic cloak, nor were mathematical symbols and techniques
vague fabrications of evil.
In Germany the best known arithmetic teacher was Adam Riese (1492–
1559) from Annaberg, who wrote a series of teaching books in arithmetic
including, for example, Arithmetic with the Pencil and Arithmetic on Lines.
Ulrich Wagner wrote the first printed German book in arithmetic in 1482
in Bamberg (Goodson, 1994).
In the late 16th century the mathematicians stopped being occupied

with basic enumeration and turned to other issues, such as the theory of
numbers and logarithms. This period indicates a transition of the west to
new intellectual patterns. The Enlightenment’s premise consisted of an
emphasis on prognosis, the sciences, and reason. The existential meaning
of the human role in society changes. Man is no longer considered a passive
viewer but an active protagonist in his life and environment. The founda-
tions of capitalism are to be laid in this era. However, many years were yet
to pass for mathematics to be established as knowledge, not only accessible
but also necessary for all human beings (Yeldham, 1936).
In England, the Arabic numbers became popular during the second
half of the 16th century. From the 16th century on, the use of arithmetic in
trade was the only reason for its study. Because of this persistent practice
and belief, the necessity of teaching arithmetic in schools was out of the
question (Lawton & Gordon, 1978). Mathematics, on the one hand, was
a higher subject of great antiquity, one of the four quadrivial arts. On the
other hand, arithmetic was increasingly associated with the education of
the poor and other low status people—artisans, clerks, and tradesmen—
who needed some knowledge of arithmetic to carry out their occupations
(Aldrich & Crook, 2000). Arithmetic was considered vulgar because only
those men dealing with trade actually learned it. Charles Godfrey, a man
of Cambridge, would say three centuries later about this subject:
There is a ruling class in England, which is interested in sports and literature

and does not know or realize that this Western civilization, in which they are
parasites, is based on Applied Mathematics. This problem can be faced and
the place to overcome it is in schools. (cited in Howson, 1982)
As arithmetic knowledge spread, calculation and measurement had a

practical application not only in trade or navigation but in political thought
as well. A new word, pantometry, was found in the dictionaries of the 17th
century in England. Pantometry means that the measurement of all things
can be described with one word. People started to have disagreements over
the real height of mountains and the number of days that had passed since
the world’s creation. Some people acquired barometers and thermometers
in order to measure the temperature. The Swedish mathematician and
astronomer Anders Celsius (1701–1744) had invented the thermometer.
According to Celsius, the boiling point of water was 0 degrees, whereas
100 degrees signified its freezing point. After his death in 1744, the mea-
surement method was changed in that 0 degrees Celsius (or centigrade)
indicate the freezing point of water and 100 degrees its boiling point.
Celsius’s method of measuring temperature is still in use throughout the
world in practical as well as scientific applications. As the idea of having
books of accounts passed to governing, it led to political arithmetic, namely

to the recording of national resources with the intention of having rational
policies (Swetz, 1984).
Numbers create a sense of unity and finality. They count and calcu-
late, they reveal the proportions and correlations, and they predict results.
Quantitativeness was regarded as an effective method of analysis and an
incomparable explanatory tool. During the chaotic and disorderly years of
the Dark Ages, quantitativeness seemed to be an effective way of enforcing
order in the world. Along these lines, the needs of an emerging middle
class were associated with measurement and counting.
MODERN MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
The expansion of arithmetical knowledge during the 17th and 18th centu-
ries coincided with the creation of the nation state and the establishment
of a bourgeois class, though the bourgeoisie was not necessarily familiar
with mathematical principles. The wide circulation of “ready reckoners”
during these centuries shows the lack of arithmetic skills among the mer-
chants. Between 1889 and 1937 the pharmaceutical company Beecham’s
Pills Limited distributed over 45 million copies of Beecham’s Help to Scholars
in England. This pocket-sized booklet was packed with tables and formulae
to encourage proficiency in currency calculations, multiplication, division,
factor, geometry, and measurement work (Aldrich & Crook, 2000).
Cohen (1982) claims that, on the one hand, trade activity helped arith-
metical knowledge to be widely known, but, on the other hand, it restricted
it. The writers of arithmetic books thought, according to Cohen, that arith-
metic was too difficult for the lower class. They tried to simplify arithmetic,
but they made it incomprehensible. Those who dealt with arithmetic,
emphasizes Cohen, did not come from the lower class. Since they did not
deal with trade, the lower class never received adequate mathematical
instruction because knowledge of math was not deemed necessary for the
lower classes’ occupational activities.
The idea was that everything needing moderation was countable. Even-
tually, this approach led to practical measurement along with practical
calculation. However, why were some items more readily counted than
others? In the 17th century, they counted not only what was essential and
practical, but also what had to be certain and specific (Nikolakaki, 2000).
For centuries, mathematicians gained success after success in explaining
the world and empowering human kind within it. Explanations of building,
music, navigation, and so on were intrinsic to the development of number
theory, algebra, and geometry and were overwhelmingly successful.
Mathematics uncovered truth after truth and its method was the road to
the truth (Bailey, 2000).
Arithmetic was associated with trade activities to such a great extent that
it was cut off from traditional mathematics in people’s conscience, creating
two categories: superior and inferior mathematics, noble and vulgar, theo-
retical and practical. This mathematical distinction would lead to a further
separation of the nature of mathematical knowledge itself and would raise
the question about its specific function: skills or understanding, operations
or theory? This pendulum swing would be a source of conflict in many
educational reforms in mathematics and would bring up this troublesome
question: what kind of mathematics is essential for pupils? (Goodson, 1994;
Stajzn, 1995).
Practical or low mathematics was taught in basic education, the level of
education reserved for the masses. Thus, it was ensured that basic math-
ematical skills would be transmitted and that this necessary knowledge for
everyday life and for trade would be usable. By like token, in higher educa-
tion, theoretical and higher mathematics would be needed and taught for
the development of science and technology.
Gradually, mathematics became more and more detached from its rela-
tionship with the real world. Rigor became an overriding concern, and
the creation of a unified systematic logical structure was the goal. In turn,
this process created its own contradictions or paradoxes, and attempts to
resolve them produced not one mathematical perspective but many and
continued the separation of mathematics from reality. Values, therefore, lie
not only in the application of mathematics but also in the kinds of truths
it deals with (Bailey, 2000).
However, teaching mathematics in primary education did not start
until the 19th century. A reason for not teaching mathematics in primary
education was that it was thought to be too difficult for young children
(Yeldham, 1936). Only with the emergence of new learning theories in the
19th century was it possible for children younger than 10 or 12 years to
be taught mathematics. The psychological theories formulated during the
18th and 19th centuries led to this liberalization in mathematics education.
Beginning with a philosophy that referred back to Plato and Aristotle, the
theory of faculty psychology claimed that the development of particular
intellectual abilities or mental functions justified the teaching of arithmetic
in basic education. This theory, which was developed by Christian Wolff
(1679–1754), a German philosopher and mathematician in Psychologia
Rationalis, established that the mind consisted of different parts that could
be reinforced through suitable exercise. In his view, arithmetic would rein-
force will and logic (National Council of Teachers or Mathmatics [NCTM],
1970).
When the middle class started to rise under the providence of capital-
ism, the need for a nation state gradually emerged. In modernity, with the
creation of the nation state, a need for the cultivation of citizens’ conscience
or the construction of citizens evolved. To this end, citizens were obliged
to be educated and the state was responsible for providing the education.
The foundation of public schools and the need to construct logical citizens
gradually established the teaching of arithmetic (Popkewitz, 2002).
The United States was the first country to introduce arithmetic in the
educational system. Two main reasons triggered this goal: the connection
of this subject with the ideology of progress and the recognition of the
rational citizen as the main political factor in the new state (NCTM, 1970).
At the beginning of the 19th century, numbers were connected with the
idea of social progress. It was assumed that because the democracy was
for personal and social prosperity, it had to be periodically measured and
assessed. One way to measure the value of the democratic institutions was
the use of political arithmetic. Numbers were considered to be objective
since they have no subjective value elements, and they were more convinc-
ing arguments than opinions or rhetoric. The ability of arithmetic not only
to produce progress but also to measure it explains why arithmetic held this
position in the educational system (Kamens & Benavot, 1992).
In France, after the French Revolution, the introduction of arithmetic
was connected with the principles of the French Revolution, the culture and
the consolidation of the nation/state, the creation of new political attitudes,
the propulsion of devotion to the state, and finally with the creation of a
common civil society. These arguments provided the rhetoric, and arithme-
tic was introduced in the school system in France by Napoleon Bonaparte.
Furthermore, he made the national education system mandatory in 1806,
and the subjects to be taught were reading, writing, and arithmetic (Bailey,
2000).
Mathematical knowledge and ability never held a superior position in
the school program in any educational system. The traditional Muslim
schools in North Africa in the Middle East or in the Persian Gulf empha-
sized reading and learning the Koran by heart, as well as contemplation on
religious ceremonies. Mathematics, if it existed, held a secondary place as a
subject (Massialas & Jarar, 1983). In Japan, arithmetic was suitable only for
the trade class. Even in the mid-20th century, some nations only devoted
little time to mathematics (Morocco, India, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg,
South Arabia). Furthermore, even where mathematics was taught, it never
held the position linguistic and literary subjects had.
Ramirez and Boli (1987) claim that many educational reforms followed
periods of political defeat or financial crises. Belgium, after a financial
crisis in the 1830s, introduced arithmetic in primary education in 1842.
The dissolution of the Swedish Empire and the martial defeat of Germany
in 1806, of France in 1833, and of China by Japan in 1895 led to educa-

tional reforms and the introduction of arithmetic in primary education.
England, after its humiliation in the Great (European) Exhibition in 1895,
was forced to introduce the teaching of arithmetic. The timeline for the
introduction of arithmetic in primary education in different countries is
shown in the following chart.
Table 14.1.â•… The Birth of Mathematics Education in Primary Schools

Countries Year of Introduction of Arithmetic in the Educational System
Prussia 1794
Russia 1802
Holland 1806
France 1806
Denmark 1808
Canada 1828 (Ontario)–1850 (Quebec)
Italy 1834
Belgium 1842
Portugal 1854
Spain 1857
England 1861
Japan 1872
Australia 1873–80
China 1905
India 1835
Egypt 1848
Brazil 1879
Serbia 1899
Iraq 1920
Iran 1930
Source: Meyers, Kamens, and Benavot (1992)
By the end of the 19th century, questions emerged about the efficiency
of the educational system in less developed countries in comparison with
the educational system of the more developed countries. The school system
in the better developed countries served as a model for their less developed
counterparts. Gradually, the connection of the teaching of arithmetic with
the construction of the rational, productive citizen was taken for granted
in the international educational ideology. Until the beginning of the 20th

century, most countries had already included mathematics in their educa-
tional programs. According to Kamens and Benavot (1992), this greater
emphasis on math was the result of an increasing understanding that
national progress would be assured by creating rational and productive
citizens, who wanted to be active members of the state and of the nation.
Therefore, relevant subjects, such as mathematics, had to be included in
the school curriculum. In other words, the teaching of modern subjects,
such as mathematics, was related to national progress and success. There-
fore, as new links were created between the nation and the individual and
as new definitions for citizens were articulated, public schools (basic edu-
cation) and modern subjects were considered essential means for the new
citizens’ social life.
This belief was even more strengthened during the 20th century.
Kamens and Benavot (1992) claim that there were disagreements about
the content of basic education. However, according to them, there were no
disagreements about the necessity of teaching mathematics with an inclu-
sion of a different kind of political arithmetic. Thus, the construction of
a clear and definite educational policy for mathematics has become nec-
essary once again. In the context of neoliberal capitalism and under the
shadow of globalization, the role of mathematics education is, on the one
hand, to contribute to the humanization and democratization of society
and, on the other hand, to foster economic prosperity for the citizens
instead of multinational companies and conglomerates that constitute the
markets. To understand all the devastating effects and consequences of
neoliberal capitalism, a critical mathematics education is needed. Paul
Ernest (2010) has observed that: “This involves critically understanding the
uses of mathematics in society: to identify, interpret, evaluate and critique
the mathematics embedded in social, commercial and political systems and
claims, from advertisements, such as in the financial sector, to government
and interest-group pronouncements.”
In today’s capitalist society, there is a basic dualism as far as mathematics
education is concerned: because of the connection between technology and
mathematics, no modern society can exist without teaching mathematics
although the majority of people in it can survive with understanding only
basic math (Gellert & Jablonka, 2009). In other words, the task of doing
mathematics has been simplified because of computers and because of
the means of ready data and arithmetical facts. Even so, the importance
of mathematics is greater than ever. Therefore, there is a contradiction
between the mathematization of society and the de-mathematization of its
members’ needs (Keitel, 1989).
The teaching of mathematics today does not assist citizens in gaining
awareness since most citizens are not able to comprehend the connection
between political life and numbers. Most people are satisfied with only little
knowledge and understanding of mathematics. They are cut off from real
life and neutralized as claimers of powers by not understanding the full
consequences of neoliberal capitalism. A political arithmetic for the people
is needed. Its goal has to be to contribute to and to grow conscientization
and denial of oppression and manipulation.
We are living through New Dark Ages (Nikolakaki, 2012), and only
knowledge can give light to the darkness. The politicians and the media
are keen on hiding information, masking it, and misinforming people.
Citizens are shown only a distorted part of the picture, and thus they live
their lives manipulated. A remathematization of society is needed, and
mathematical literacy has to include new important elements to assist the
citizens of neoliberal capitalism not only to survive but also to resist oppres-
sion and manipulation. This remathematization will take the form of a new
political arithmetic and hence the form of a critical mathematics educa-
tion, with “critical” being used as in critical pedagogy. Only this time, the
math-educated citizens will understand how markets are robbing society
of a meaningful life and what citizens have to do so that society can take
back its power.
What critical mathematics education might be in teaching terms needs
to be researched and cultivated by mathematicians around the world? For
example, in order for citizens to analyze how they have become victim-
ized by current policies, more knowledge of economics is needed. If the
members of society are to take control of their existence, then they have to
have the knowledge to understand what those who run neoliberal capital-
ism are doing. This knowledge also has to become common knowledge and
not knowledge of a few who battle against neoliberal capitalism. As Paul
Ernest (2010) claims,
Economics is applied mathematics and this is the main language of politics,

power and personal functioning in society. Every citizen needs to under-
stand the limits of validity of such uses of mathematics, what decisions it
may conceal, and where necessary reject spurious or misleading claims. Ul-
timately, such a capability is a vital bulwark in protecting democracy and the
values of a humanistic and civilised society. (p. 23)
Not only do the citizens require some skills in mathematics when shopping
to obtain happiness like Mr. Micawber to live so that income exceeds expen-
diture—but also to protect themselves from the unscrupulous. Knowledge
of math is also a protection against partial truths so prevalent in political
slogans.
On a second level, mathematics education is essential for people not
only to understand but also to resist. Political arithmetic in the 21st century,
under the guise of the New Dark Ages, should not only be about under-
standing mathematics and economics but also emphasize the growth of
citizens’ awareness of capitalism’s consequences on society and explain how
enslavement is produced.
Very useful to this analysis is Paulo’s Freire concept of conscientization.
As Paulo Freire has emphasized, conscientization focuses on achieving
an in-depth understanding of the world, allowing for the perception
and exposure of social and political contradictions. Conscientization also
includes taking action against the oppressive elements in one’s life. Math-
ematics is a useful tool for the conscientization of citizens, enabling them to
realize that the ability to calculate quantities and percentages is crucial for
increasing a person’s choices. Furthermore, understanding and applying
math skills is empowering in that these skills lead to awareness and libera-
tion from indoctrination or prejudice. A critical mathematics education is
needed in a time when society is under siege by banking conglomerates in
order to foster understanding of how injustices are produced and inequali-
ties enlarged and to prevent them from happening in the future. A critical
mathematics education can also inform how resistance can be organized.
As Keitel and Vithal (2009) remark: “Competencies to evaluate mathe-
matical applications and ICT, and the possible usefulness of its problematic
effects, now seem to be a necessary precondition for any political executive
and for real democratic participation of citizens.” Mathematics, along with
other disciplines, has to tell us much about the human condition, in par-
ticular of how we stand with regard to the nature of different kinds of truths
and the character of meaning, and in not taking either truth or meaning
for granted. Mathematics education is an important means in cultivating
the inner self, by reason and rigor.
These observations, though, lead ultimately to more questions. What is
the role for mathematics education in preparing the critical active citizen?
In what ways is mathematical literacy useful to people? What would be the
major contribution of mathematical literacy to society today? Socrates, so
long ago, gave for the usefulness of mathematics the following answer: “I
think that Mathematics owes its success to the methods, to the high logic
rules, to the struggle for the whole truth without the least reconciliation,
to the use of the basic principles and axioms, to the avoidance of any inner
contradiction.” Socrates continues, talking to himself: “Very well, but why
do you think, Socrates, that this method of thinking and discussion can be
used only for the study of numbers and geometrical shapes? Why can’t you
persuade your fellow-citizens to adapt the same high logic rules to every
social section, for example, to philosophy and politics, to the discussion of
everyday problems in public and private life?” Socrates’ belief is still timely.
CONCLUSIONS
Mathematics is a significant part of human experience, and for millennia

math has enthralled those with the skill to do it and fascinated those who
can appreciate it. Without it, there would be no complete understanding
of what we mean by being proved true, nor could there be a grasp of the
range of aesthetic experiences open to humanity (Bailey, 2000).
The study of mathematics education in capitalism has revealed that
it has a strong connection with citizenship, and mathematics education
changes according to the socioeconomic environment. Hence, what are the
necessities for critical mathematics education for today?
Critical mathematics education today not only has to do with dealing
with mathematical numbers or operations but also with comprehending
the political and practical use of numbers. At the very least it has much
empowering usefulness for critical citizenship. As Paul Ernest (2010) has
pointed out,
Contrary to popular belief, mathematics is a political subject. Mathematics

should be taught so as to socially and politically empower students as citizens
in society. It should enable learners to function as numerate critical citizens,
able to use their knowledge in social and political realms of activity, for the
betterment of both their selves and for democratic society as a whole. (p. 23)
Neoliberal capitalism has led humanity to a crisis unknown so far in

human history when all of human rights are endangered. Humanity is
facing one of the biggest challenges that have ever appeared, leading
people around the world to enslavement and misery. Therefore, the role of
mathematics education has to include the cultivation of critical active citi-
zens. When the financial system has grown to become around 1,000 trillion
dollars and the real economy of the world is about 60 trillion dollars, and
a conglomerate of the ruling elite plays roulette with the world economy,
constituting what Cornelius Castoriadis (2005) named a “planetary casino,”
citizens will question such a factor and resist its presence. Mathematics
education has to undertake this new mission.
Through the lens of such an approach the form of mathematical literacy
supported is for mathematical paideia. Mathematical paideia contributes
to the creation of cultured personalities and the formation of active citi-
zens. It is a great challenge for education in the 21st century to broaden
the already existing educational models in order for citizens to negotiate
their educational and other needs. If this goal is achieved, we will be able to
lead humanity towards the Aristotelian POLIS, in which all people partici-
pate in the governance of the state, and a third democracy can be realized.
Cornelius Castoriades (2005) supported that “Society is self-instituted.
The difficulty is for this to be conscientized.” Mathematics education can

contribute a great deal to society’s conscientization.
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perspective. In S. Bramall & J. White (Eds.), Why learn mathematics. London,
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Bailey, R. (2000). Teaching values and citizenship across the curriculum: Educating chil-
dren for the world. London, England: Kogan Page.
Castoriadis, C. (2005). Figures of the thinkable. Retrieved from http://www.notbored.
org/cornelius-castoriadis.html
Cohen, P. C. (1982). A calculating people: The spread of numeracy in early America.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Ernest, P. (2010). The social outcomes of learning mathematics: Standard, unintended
or visionary? Paper presented at the 2010 Australian Council for Education
Research Conference, Australia. Retrieved on August 24, 2015, from http://
research.acer.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=research_
conference
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Lang.
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London, England: George G. Harrap.
chapter 15
Are there viable

connections between
mathematics, mathematical
proof and democracy?
Dennis F. Almeida
The curriculum is at the heart of the education and training system. In the
past the curriculum has perpetuated race, class gender and ethnic division
and has emphasized separateness, rather than common citizenship and
nationhood. It is therefore imperative that the curriculum be restructured
to reflect the values and principles of our new democratic society (Depart-
ment of Education , 1997, p. 1)
Introduction
This chapter aims to answer three interconnected questions.
• What is mathematics and mathematics education in the context

of South Africa? And what implicit connections are there between
mathematics education and democracy?

288â•‡â•‡D. F. Almeida
• What is democracy?
• Can the school curriculum be engineered so as to make mathemat-
ics a tool of democratization?
The questions “What implicit connections are there between mathe-

matics education and democracy?” and “Can the school curriculum be
engineered so as to make mathematics a tool of democratization?” have
been interrogated by leading mathematics educators such as Skovsmose
(1990), Ernest (2000), and D’Ambrosio (n.d.) in the recent past. These
two questions, save for an explicit reference to mathematical proof, are
also explicitly present in the South African secondary school mathematics
national curriculum policy statements (National Curriculum Statement,
2003; Revised National Curriculum Statement, n.d.).
The second question—“What is democracy?”—has been asked countless
times since the coining of the term by the ancient Greeks. Democracy has
been continuously yearned for by peoples under the yoke of oppression.
The word “democracy” occurs five times and the word “democratic” occurs
10 times in the South African Revised National Curriculum Statement
Grades R–9 (Schools) (Revised National Curriculum Statement, n.d.). So it
appears that the second question does not need asking in South Africa as
the concept of democracy has vibrant currency. Nevertheless it is pertinent
to ask if the concept of democracy has been understood and applied in a
mass participative sense both in South Africa and elsewhere in the world.
This is especially so as it has not been that long since democratic rights
have been afforded to the majority of the peoples in Africa and elsewhere.
To underline the need for such a discussion there is anecdotal evi-
dence that the founders of the concept of democracy in ancient Greece
asked themselves the question “Who should have democratic rights?” and
appeared to answer it as follows: “The rich and powerful should have these
rights, but certainly not the slaves.” The history and evolution of democ-
racy evidences many strata of people—women, those without property,
black people, and so on—disenfranchized and not afforded democratic
rights. From a personal perspective I recall that in the late 1970s and early
1980s, when the antiracist movement in the United Kingdom was at its
height, middle-ranking police officers would materialize seemingly out of
nowhere in peaceful demonstrations, home in on selected individuals and,
in no uncertain terms and under threat of deportation, warn them to desist
from this democratic right to protest.
Additionally I argue that democratic rights are to be endowed not only
on individual human beings but also on individual nation states in the
wider arena of the global parliament. We are a long way from that, as this
report indicates:
Viable Connectionsâ•‡â•‡289
Governments, whether elected or not, without reference to their own citizens

let alone those of other nations, assert their right to draw lines across the
global commons and decide who gets what. (Monbiot, 2009)
This is not a description of the colonial nations carving up Africa, Asia,

and America for themselves in the manner of the treaty of Tordesillas,1
but a commentary by George Monbiot of the U.K. Guardian newspaper
on December 19, 2009, of the behavior of the developed nations at the
recent Copenhagen summit on the global environment who proposed and
insisted on solutions that were beneficial to them but not to the develop-
ing nations.
If all of this seems too political then I seek refuge in the position taken
in the South African education policy statement:
Mathematics is ... a purposeful activity in the context of social, political and

economic goals and constraints. It is not value-free or culturally-neutral.”
(Revised National Curriculum Statement, n.d., p. 21)
For the record, this chapter is a development of an article constructed

by my colleague Jose Maria Chamoso and myself (Almeida & Chamoso,
2001) on possible connections between mathematics teaching and learn-
ing and democracy. That article stemmed from my brief involvement in an
EEC Comenius Project on mathematics teaching and democratic education
undertaken by mathematics teachers from four European countries and
which was strictly restricted to the European arena. It is my contention that
such zonal restrictions in discussing the nature and practice of democracy
are misguided. I believe that one cannot talk about democracy if there
is a focus only on a proportion of the constituency or of the planet. Fur-
thermore the global nature of our existence on the planet suggests that a
discussion on democratic themes in mathematics requires an international
perspective and that this international perspective requires an acknowledg-
ment and understanding of the colonial past with a view to future progress.
This is epitomized by the quotation by Monbiot (2009) above and sup-
ported also by D’Ambrosio (n.d.):
It is an undeniable right of every human being to share in all the cultural

and natural goods needed for material survival and intellectual enhance-
ment. This is the essence of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to which every nation is committed. The educational strand
of this important profession on the rights of mankind is the World Decla-
ration on Education for All (UNESCO, 1990) to which 155 countries are
committed. Of course, there are many difficulties in implementing United
Nations resolutions and mechanisms. But as yet this is the best instrument
available that may lead to a planetary civilization, with peace and dignity for
all mankind. Regrettably, mathematics educators are generally unfamiliar

with these documents.... It is impossible to accept the exclusion of large sec-
tors of the population of the world, both in developed and undeveloped na-
tions. An explanation for this perverse concept of civilization asks for a deep
reflection on colonialism. This is not to place blame on one or another, not
an attempt to redo the past. Rather, to understand the past is a first step to
move into the future. (para. 237)
These words correspond strongly with the words of the 1996 constitution
of the Republic of South Africa and which are reproduced in the section
“The Constitution, Values, Nation building and the Curriculum” of Revised
National Curriculum Statement (n.d.): “Heal the divisions of the past and
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamen-
tal human rights” (p. 7).
Now that I have claimed the importance on examining the concept
and nature of democracy, I will defer my discussion on this issue until a
preliminary enquiry on what mathematics and mathematics education is in
the context of schools and its potential in promoting an implicit sense of
democratic culture. This is at odds with the implicit absolutist’s prescrip-
tion for mathematical activity, which insists on definitions first before the
constructing mathematical knowledge, but I posit that one can give a better
definition of a concept by giving examples and nonexamples.
What is mathematics and mathematics education

in the context of South Africa? And what implicit
connections are there between mathematics
education and democracy?
By mathematics we mean, of course, school mathematics, which is a recon-

textualized and reformulated subset of academic mathematics and which
consists largely of medieval developments (numbers, algebra, geom-
etry). The principal aims of school curricula across the world appear to
be twofold: the inculcation of quantitative literacy to enable the learner to
manage their future working lives and, then, the academic empowerment
of those that want to further their mathematical or scientific education.
We must accept that academic mathematics is principally about extending
the boundaries of knowledge and/or solving practical problems from the
scientific, military, and economy sectors. However, there is a connection
between school mathematics and academic mathematics that is relevant
here; and this stems directly from a failed philosophical project in the
academic domain that sought to establish mathematics as a self-coherent,
self-justified, and immutable body of knowledge—we see this from the
work of Plato, the Hilbert program, and the French-led Bourbaki group.
Viable Connections 291
However, this project was rent asunder in 1931 when the logician Godel
proved that it was impossible for mathematics to prove its own consistency.
The position that academic mathematicians (are forced to) adopt now of
their discipline is that it involves mathematiziation: to mathematize is to search
for and describe patterns, to generalize, to make predictions, to revise
conjectures, and to prove. That is, “mathematics is what mathematicians
do” (Grugnetti & Rogers, 2000). Saunders Mac Lane, one of the foremost
pure mathematicians of the last three decades, specifies that mathematizi-
ation involves the flow of “intuition, trial, error, speculation, conjecture,
proof ” (Mac Lane, 1994).
This process for the construction of mathematical knowledge is the
connection between academic and school mathematics. For in classrooms
across the U.K. one might find a flow diagram similar to the one below for
investigations (Almeida, n.d.).
Figure 15.1. Classroom poster to guide pupils in mathematical investigations.

Of course academic mathematicians delve deeper, use more abstrac-

tions, and have greater formalities at the proof stage. However, besides the
formalisms, there is undoubted the commonality in the flow:
Describe patterns > generalize > to make predictions > test predictions > revise
conjectures > justify, explain, prove
The end point of this flow is important: mathematics is not just about
identifying what is true or what works but also about explaining why it
is true or why it works and convincing others that it is true and that it
works. That is, mathematics is intrinsically about proof and the community
acceptance that it is a convincing proof. It is worth repeating that doing
mathematics, for both professional mathematicians and for school pupils,
involves making generalizations and conjectures and then trying to justify
and proving these in the sense of an explanation of the phenomena. Proof
is a means of explaining and of convincing the community that a proposal
about mathematics is true and getting their agreement after a period of
interrogation of the proof argument. This has a democratic flavor.
A caution about proof activity in the classroom needs to be made at
this point. In the classroom the teacher and pupils may seek explana-
tory proofs of the conjectures that the sum of two odd numbers is always
an even number, that the sum of the three angles in a triangle is always
180 degrees, and so on. In academic mathematics they seek the proof of
the Goldbach conjecture that every even number is the sum of two prime
numbers and the four color theorem that just four colors are required to
distinguish all regions in any map. However, there is a difference between
the level and type of proof required in the two domains. The abstract
formalisms in academic mathematical proofs involve a higher order of
thinking than those available to many primary and secondary learners. At
the fundamental level there is evidence that concrete-operational learner
is not capable of abstract reasoning and deduction (Semadeni, 1984). The
prototypical proof-practices of a pupil in the mathematics classroom may
be naive and based on analogy with their real experiences: proving by mea-
surement as in science experiments, proving by weight of evidence, and so
on. However, it is important for the teacher to consider such prototypical
proofs are legitimate proofs because the learners consider their arguments as
a proof—it is the democratic thing to do. Of course the teacher is respon-
sible for carefully developing pupils’ proof practices by careful whole-class
questioning to higher levels of proof activity—proof by counterexample,
proof by a generic example, proof by thought experiment—as dictated by
the intellectual levels of the pupils. An attempt to foist academic proof or,
for that matter, proof by thought experiment on learners not ready for this
level will most likely fail. Two column formal deductive geometry proofs
were tried out in U.K. classrooms in the 1960s but lack of appreciation of
this type of proof by and failure in examination questions by even able stu-
dents led to their abandonment in the early 1970s (Bell, 1976). Evidently
the mathematics educators of that era had paid little attention to similar
episodes in the history of mathematics. For example Augstin Cauchy, in
the early nineteenth century, established the generalized calculus on firm,
rigorous foundations utilizing a coherent method of analysing infinite
processes. However his attempts to foist the new rigor on undergraduate
students backfired spectacularly:
Cauchy’s students rioted violently in protest against his work and his teach-
ing. From their point of view, Cauchy’s rigor was an assault on the humane
mathematics that had been touted by the revolutionaries of the 1790s. The
students argued that although Cauchy brought rigor to calculus, he did so at
the cost of reasonableness. (Richards, n.d., para. 32)
Thus we are forced to conclude another democratic principle here: that

of treating pupils’ sense of argumentation, reasoning, and reasonableness
as legitimate. This is true of engineers and scientists who have their own
empirical proof methods. And pupils, like engineers and scientists, will also
construct their own samizdat or activity involving informal proof practices:
nobody wants to be seen as failures. The sentiments of Cauchy’s students
find support in mathematics education by Cobb (1986) who argues that
unless the formalisms of mathematics are commonly agreed upon there is a
possibility that they will be viewed as the ‘arbitrary dictates of an authority’.
Given the identifications of democracy in inculcating proof practices
we need to consider the wider mathematics curriculum in which quantita-
tive literacy features. The way a mathematics curriculum is influenced and
constructed is important. Researchers have found that the mathematics
curriculum has been variably influenced by five political interest groups:
The Industrial trainer group, Technological pragmatists, humanist math-
ematicians, progressive educators, public educators (Ernest, 2000). Table
15.1 (from Ernest, 2000) gives the aims of each of the interest groups.
Looking at these descriptions on the five interest groups who could
potentially influence a mathematics curriculum, it seems it is only the
Public Educators who have democratic education and inculcation as an
explicit aim. So it is a surprise to read that the Public Educators may have
had the least influence on the mathematics curricula worldwide (Ernest,
2000). However recent reforms in the U.K. mathematics National Cur-
riculum suggest traces of their influence. In the description of the key
concepts in the now-defunct Qualifications and Curriculum Development
Agency (QCDA) website, we find that a general statement about KS3/4 is
that “Mathematics equips pupils with uniquely powerful ways to describe,
analyze and change the world” (though what changes are intended is not
Table 15.1.â•… Types of Mathematics Educators

Interest Group Mathematical Aims
1. Industrial trainers Acquiring basic mathematical skills and numeracy and
social training in obedience (authoritarian, basic skills
centered)
2. Technological pragmatists Learning basic skills and learning to solve practical
problems with mathematics and information technology
(industry and work centered)
3. Old humanist Understanding and capability in advanced mathematics,
mathematicians with some appreciation of mathematics (pure
mathematics centered)
4. Progressive educators Gaining confidence, creativity and self expression through
maths (child-centered progressivist)
5. Public educators Empowerment of learners as critical and mathematically
literate citizens in society (empowerment and social justice
concerns)
clear), and one of the aims is to recognize “the rich historical and cultural
roots of mathematics.” The statements in the South African mathemat-
ics education policy documents however suggest strong influence of the
Public Educator ideology and the statements, unlike those by the QCDA,
are unambiguous and with clear intent.
The National Curriculum) expects the learner … interpret data to establish

statistical and probability models and to solve related problems with a focus
on human rights issues, inclusivity, current matters involving conflicting
views, and environmental and health issues. (National Curriculum Statement
2008, p. 7)
And,
• Mathematics provides powerful conceptual tools to:

• Work toward the reconstruction and development of society.
• Develop equal opportunities and choice.
• Contribute toward the widest development of society’s cultures,
in a rapidly changing technological global context. (National
Curriculum Statement, 2008, p. 7)
The South African mathematics education policy documents, in fact, go

further. They implicitly perceive the need to view mathematics as an inter-
cultural, international enterprise recognizing the fact that South Africa is
a multicultural nation and that the contribution of each of the constituent
elements needs to be acknowledged and studied in a democratic tradition.
This is part of the ethnomathematics perspective envisioned by D’Ambrosio
n.d.) which aims to restore cultural dignity to all peoples on the planet and
to empower them with the intellectual tools for responsible and democratic
citizenship. It is a program that offers the possibility of “more favorable and
harmonious relation between humans and between humans and nature.”
There are specific directions to this effect in the South African National
Curriculum documents:
Learners in Grades 10–12 come from the many cultures that make up the
school-going population of South Africa and must be made aware of the
mathematics that is embedded in these cultures. The local environment, for
example, local artefacts and architecture, should be studied from a mathe-
matical perspective. Ethnomathematics in South Africa and beyond contrib-
utes to the growing body of knowledge in this area. (National Curriculum
Statement, 2008, p. 9)
Contexts should be selected in which the learner has to count, estimate and
calculate in a way that builds awareness of other Learning Areas, as well as
human rights, social, economic, cultural, political and environmental issues.
For example, the learner should be able to compare counting in different Af-
rican languages and relate this to the geographical locations of the language
Groups. (Revised National Curriculum Statement, 2002, p. 62)
In these statements we also evidence the humanist perspective where

cultural values, preferences, and interests of the social groups account for
the dynamic of the creation of mathematical knowledge. This view is sup-
ported by Grugnetti and Rogers (2000) who explain that mathematical
ideas are transmitted by individuals in a culture and thus mathematical
concepts and processes are/may be different in different culture (e.g., the
Babylonian base 60 as opposed to the base 10 in the Indo-Arabic number
system), and so the a priori acultural existence of mathematics is untenable.
Thus we witness in these statements of the bold program of ethnomathematics
envisioned by D’Ambrosio (n.d.) which aims to restore cultural dignity to
all peoples on the planet and to empower them with the intellectual tools
for responsible and democratic citizenship.
It can be argued that the recognition and study of multicultural
mathematics is naturally implied by the ethnomathematics program and,
furthermore, is essential for healing the past in many developing nations.
I reiterate here the words of D’Ambrosio (n.d.) mentioned earlier:
It is impossible to accept the exclusion of large sectors of the population of

the world, both in developed and undeveloped nations. An explanation for
this perverse concept of civilization asks for a deep reflection on colonial-
ism. This is not to place blame on one or another, not an attempt to redo the
past. Rather, to understand the past is a first step to move into the future.
(para. 237)
What is democracy?
In the discussion on mathematics and mathematics education I made refer-
ences to democracy on the basis of an implicit or common understanding.
It can be proposed that this, in turn, is usually founded on an instinctive
feeling about human rights and a sense of justice—it has something to
do with personal freedoms. This is comparable to the way we sometimes
get the general meaning of a word not by its definition but by noticing its
usage. However I argue that this vague perception is insufficient for the
purposes of identifying how mathematics education can fully assist the
inculcation of democratic principles in learners.
It is pertinent here to point out that mathematics education for all as a
basic right has a short history—perhaps no more older than 60 years—and
this is why all national curricula go to nontrivial lengths to explain what
they mean by mathematics education. Similarly the idea of democratic
rights for all adults without restrictions based on property ownership, race,
gender, and so on is also that young. It would not be stretching the mark to
say that the world is still grappling with exactly what democracy means or
entails. The centuries-old question: “Who should have democratic rights?” still
has currency. The question “What are democratic responsibilities?” seems to be
sidelined in many countries. It is therefore necessary to understand what
democracy means in practice for adult citizens so that it may be possible to
identify how mathematics teaching in schools can best help pupils prepare
to become active and influential participants in the democratic process.
From a reading of history there broadly appears to be three different
conceptions of democracy. The first—one that addresses the individual—
derives from ancient Greek traditions in which (selected) citizens are
required to participate in discussions about public affairs. It was expected
that all proposals and policies would be interrogated by the citizens till
some form of consent and compromise was reached, for that is the way
sound equitable judgements could be made that would have maximum
positive effect on the community. Indeed it was considered to be the duty
of all (selected) citizens to participate in public affairs. There is anecdotal
evidence that Pericles, a Greek statesman in the fifth century bc stated:
We alone, regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harm-
less person, but as useless. Whilst few of us are original in our thinking, we
are all sound judges of a policy. In our opinion, the greatest obstacle to ac-
tion is not discussion, but the lack of knowledge gained by discussion before
action is taken. (as cited in Hannaford, 1998, p. 181)
Alas, not many countries in the world have followed Pericles edict in
making it a duty to not only vote in elections of representatives but also
participate in local government.2 There are around 18 nations who make
it compulsory for citizens to vote in national elections and I know of none

that make it compulsory for citizens to participate in the local council,
assembly, or parliament. The instances of national elections with poor
electorate turn out are also testimony to poor democratic responsibility.
The second conception—one that addresses constituent groups in a nation
state—is the one that is practiced in modern times and is derived from
the model in the United States: government of the people, for the people, and
by the people. In this model the citizens elect a representative to participate
in discussions about public affairs for a period of several years before the
said citizens judge whether or not the representative has done a satisfac-
tory job. In this model the citizens largely abrogate their duty to participate
in discussions about public affairs in between elections—they are useless
according to Pericles.
The third conception is about democratic freedoms and respect for the indi-
vidual. All citizens have equal rights and freedoms. These freedoms are well
known: freedom from oppression, freedom of expression, freedom from
hunger, freedom to worship, etc. This conception is about what democ-
racy does but not how it should be delivered. It is assumed that the first
two conceptions will deliver these freedoms. It is also assumed that in all
conceptions there are periodic, transparent, and honest elections of repre-
sentatives who serve the people but in the first conception the citizen is duty
bound to attend the regular local council meetings.
In terms of the commonly accepted notions we can therefore set down
the key features of democracy as a political tradition as shown in Table 15.2.
The key point in Table 15.2 is the last, for, in the absence of the Pericles
vision, it sets out the democratic responsibilities of the citizen.
Table 15.2.â•…Democracy as a Political System

Democracy as a political system
Democracy is a system that is based on a set of moral axioms endowing each citizen with
defined and undeniable rights. This includes the right to vote.
Representatives for local or national parliament are elected by the citizens.
Elected representatives treat all citizens as equal partners in governance.
All the policy statements of elected representatives are open to scrutiny and debate.
The policies of elected representatives are confirmed as satisfactory only by the free
understanding and majority consent of citizens.
Source: Adapted from Hannaford (1998).
I would like to make one additional point with respect to a viable demo-
cratic tradition for the 21st century: one cannot talk about democracy
if you restrict the audience to only a proportion of the constituency or

of the planet. I argued that the global nature of our planet requires an
intercultural, international democratic perspective and that this perspec-
tive requires an acknowledgment of the colonial past with a view to future
progress. This implies that multicultural mathematics and the history of
mathematics need to be considered in the classroom.
I will assume that we agree that a democratic tradition is necessary and
beneficial for the organization of any society. However we also need to
briefly identify some weaknesses in the democratic tradition that could
potentially be addressed by mathematics education. We need to do this for
the sake of objectivity and because we want to avoid these mistakes in the
classroom. One of the ways that the government or elected representatives
convince the citizens that their policies are the correct ones is by producing
reports which include a mass of numerical and statistical data. There are
many instances where this data is misleadingly summarized. An example of
this was a graph showing a dramatic fall in the unemployment rate in the
U.K. in the early 1970s: the difficulty with this was that the vertical axis scale
was stretched by a very large factor compared with that of the horizontal
axis and, in fact, the fall of unemployment was statistically insignificant.
The critical awareness—commonly called quantitative literacy—to realize
something was amiss seemed to be missing among a large section of the
adult voting population at the time (and may still be). In effect the elected
representatives were able to pull the wool over the eyes of those that elected
them. We can point to the U.K. government’s financial deregulation policy
in the 1980s which fuelled easy to obtain endowment mortgages without
impelling lenders to explain the risks—these risks became manifest 15
years down the line and led to many hundreds of thousands of people
losing substantial amounts of money. More recently the government
claimed (BBC, 2000) that new the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000
“is about ensuring equality for everyone regardless of their skin color, their
surnames or other irrelevant factors” (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
2000). This is not supported by a mass of statistical data on employment,
but the label “multicultural and fair society” is still bandied about.
There are now more than two million people from black and minority ethnic
groups in London—nearly 29 per cent of the total population. Forty-six per
cent of England’s black and minority ethnic population live in London....
Only 18 per cent of managers and senior officials and fewer than 21 per cent
of professionals are from black and minority ethnic groups.... There is a high
degree of occupational concentration. For instance, nearly 58 per cent of all
cashiers and checkout operators are from black or minority ethnic groups, as
are 54 per cent of nursing auxiliaries and assistants, 49 per cent of chefs and
cooks and 48 per cent of care assistants and home carers. (Kenny & Field,
2003, Summary section)
So a weakness of the current democratic tradition is the lack of so-called

quantitative literacy among the electorate so as to be able to judge the perfor-
mance of the elected representatives. Critical quantitative literacy should be
part of all mathematical national curricula. As Alan Schoenfeld (2001) says:
(quantitative) literate citizenship calls for making a plethora of informed

decisions ... about the nonsense spewed by politicians. (para. 53)
To enable them to make these informed decisions in later civic life,

pupils must be encouraged to look critically at information and teacher
explanations—they must have critical quantitative literacy. We must, at all
costs, avoid convincing pupils about mathematical results on the basis of
our higher knowledge and expertise—it is because the teacher said so—for
then they are likely not only to learn superficially, if at all, but also criti-
cally accept inadvertent errors and misconceptions in text books and later
from politicians.
Can the school curriculum be engineered so as

to make mathematics a tool of democratization?
Let me now turn to the issue of how mathematics education can possibly
assist with democratic education. As I said earlier, pupils in the mathemat-
ics classroom are, at their level, mathematicians in that they do some of
the things that mathematicians do—namely examine data and patterns,
speculate on these, formulate conjectures after generalizing from patterns
observed, and attempt to explain and prove these conjectures. There is
evidence that pupils do not generally all engage in the latter activity of
explanation or justification of conjectures using the logic of mathematics
(Almeida, 2001)—this is generally left to the teacher to provide. Neverthe-
less the arguments, explanations, justification, and proofs that the teacher
provides are not to be accepted by pupils without interrogating the rea-
soning and asking for clarifications and examples. As pointed out earlier,
unless there is agreement by the pupils that the proof is understood and
serves as an explanation of the conjecture then it will be construed as arbi-
trary dictates of an authority. And this is not what we want to happen—we
want the way that mathematics is taught to engender democratic values.
We, as teachers, need to give pupils explanations of statements even
when they are erroneously considered as sacrosanct truths in mathematics.
Let us consider some of these statements in the context of a middle ability
mathematics class of 11-year-olds:
• The sum of two odd numbers is an even number

• The sum of the three angles in a triangle is always 180 degrees
• 0.99999... = 1
• The shortest distance between two points in a plane is a straight
line.
We want to motivate learners into a culture of interrogating explana-

tions and proofs till there is whole class community acceptance. A way to
inculcate such a culture is to invite the class to consider an explanation
which they can interrogate at their level of plausibility and then follow this
up with one that involves a different, perhaps higher level of proof. The
aim is to invite participation by pupils in the discussions about the proof,
to identify the strengths of the proof, to challenge its shortcomings, to see
how to improve the proof.
Here are some suggestions for the two sets of proofs for the statements
above:
• The sum of two odd numbers is an even number
I. In a calculator add up 20 sets of pairs of different odd numbers.

What kind of number is the sum in each case? Odd or even?
II. An even number is always in the two times table—it can be repre-
sented by two equal arrays as a 2Â€× something rectangle. An odd
number is not in the two times table—it can be represented as a
2 × something rectangle with 1 × 1 square appended to it:
Two odd numbers can be represented as two different such 2Â€× some-
thing rectangles with a 1 × 1 square appended to it and the two appended
1 × 1 squares can be joined up to make two equal arrays: an even number:
• The sum of the three angles in a triangle is always 180 degrees
I. Ask the class to draw several triangles, measure their angles and
compute the angle sums.
II. Ask the class to construct, using pencil and ruler, any triangle
of their choice. Then instruct them to make two exact copies of
this triangle by careful cutting on two sheets of paper, then label
the three angles correspondingly as A, B, and C. Label the three
congruent triangles as T1, T2, and T3. Draw a straight line on a
sheet of paper and place angle A of triangle T1 on the paper in
such a way that one side making angle A lies on the drawn line.
Next, place angle B of T2 so that its vertex is coincidental with
that of A and its side coincidental with that of T1. Finally, place
angle C of T3 so that its vertex is coincidental with that of B
and its side coincidental with that of T3. The three angles lie on
straight line and so add up to 180 degrees.
• 0.99999... = 1
I. 1/3 = 0.3333333... What do we get if we multiply both sides by 3?

II. Instruct the class to use calculators to work out what decimal
numbers are produced by 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 4/9, and 5/9. Using only
the following five answers and no further calculations ask them to
conjecture the decimal representations of 6/9, 7/9, 8/9, and 9/9:
• The shortest distance between two points in a plane is a straight line
I. Take a rubber band. Cut it so it is no longer a band. Place two

thumb tacks A and B on a sheet of paper on a desk at a distance
slightly greater than the length of the rubber line. Tie the rubber
line to the thumb tacks A and B and draw a straight line AB. Now
stretch any point of the rubber line sideways to a point C. So we
have triangle ABC. Which is longer—AC + CB, or AB?
II. Ask the pupils to figure out the quick way to get from one corner
flag of a football ground to the diagonally opposite one. (See
diagram on next page
The aim here is not to provide proofs on a plate for learners, but to
offer explanations that can invite the critical attention—even doubt—of
learners. When I once offered the first explanation above for why the sum
of two odd numbers is an even number (“In a calculator add up twenty sets
of pairs of different odd numbers. What kind of number is the sum in each
case? Odd or even?”) an 11-year-old was not convinced, arguing “There
might be some really big odd numbers for which that rule will not work.”
And it is at this point there will be a need for an explanation that uses the
structural properties of odd and even numbers—this is where the second
explanation might come in. Each of the subsequent explanations offered
above can potentially raise critical doubt in pupils who may ask for a better
explanation. The important point is that there has been
community discussion about the proof, the identification of the strengths

and weaknesses of the proof, challenges to the validity of the proof, and
perhaps the needs for an improved explanation.
As I proposed earlier, if there is prototypical proof activity by pupils
using simple reasoning such as naive empiricism then the teacher should
consider such proofs as legitimate at the level of the learners. It is incum-
bent for the teacher to treat pupils as equal partners in the teaching-learning
process not just with proof activity but generally. Mistakes and misconcep-
tions should not be ignored as the errors of an intellectual inferior but
should be analyzed in a diagnostic way to understand the reasoning of
the child behind the nonstandard conception. For example, when a pupil
adds two fractions by adding the numerators and the denominators it
may be due to not realizing that the algorithm for multiplication cannot
be extended to another arithmetic operation—it may be that the teacher
did not emphasize that the algorithm applies for multiplication but not
for addition. Another related example is when a pupil divides the numer-
ators and the denominators when dividing two fractions. This is not a
mistake: the rules permit this but more often than not the teacher may
think this a misconception. Were a class discussion to ensue on this issue
it would become clear that this method of dividing two fractions is correct
but impractical—this algorithm works fine when dividing 8/15 by 2/3 as
it produces the correct 4/5 but when applied to the division 4/18 by 3/10
produces the odd looking,
_
1.3/1.8
In this example it is possible that both pupils and teacher will have
discovered something anew. The teacher and pupils were, arguably, equal
partners in the teaching-learning process—and this is a characteristic of dem-
ocratic activity. There are other possible cases. Another example is row
subtraction going from left to right rather than right to left.
Critical thinking is indispensible not only in the investigations of mis-
conceptions but in general in mathematics. As argued earlier, pupils should
be encouraged to look critically at information and teacher explanations so
as to enable them to make these informed decisions in later civic life. This
is most clearly evident in statistics where there are opportunities to critically
analyze data from a sociological and democratic perspective. In fact the
South African curriculum statements are explicit about this:
The Subject Statement for Mathematics Grades 10–12 expects the learner …
to interpret data to establish statistical and probability models and to solve
related problems with a focus on human rights issues, inclusivity, current
matters involving conflicting views, and environmental and health issues.
(National Curriculum Statement, 2008, p. 7)
In this way pupils can become familiar with the critical thinking needed
to be active democratic citizens in later life—they can critically interrogate
the policy proposals of elected representatives. Bopape (n.d.) gives relevant
examples of such activity in South African classrooms, but argues that to
have a successful program of critical statistical education in South Africa
will require a reorientation in teaching methods. I have adapted the fol-
lowing from the Teaching Tolerance website3 to give a flavor of the critical
thinking of South African pupils envisaged by Bopape in undertaking such
mathematical activity (see Table 15.3)
The view that addressing controversial issues in the mathematics—or
any other—classroom may cause unnecessary delays in the delivery of the
set curriculum or may be disruptive may have substance but should be
countered. What is more important: quantity of information or quality of
knowledge? Indeed such problematization in the classroom is an added
advantage for the inculcation of critical thinking on real world issues (Shan
& Bailey, 1991). This is because pupils can be further encouraged to criti-
cally challenge explanations, rules, analyses of data be they noncontextual
numerical or statistical within the discipline and rules of mathematics.
There are preconditions for this, of course, such as the use of effective
questioning techniques and appropriate management of class discussion
by the teacher.
Table 15.3.â•… Exemplar Statistics Activity to

Encourage Critical Democratic Thinking
Mathematically relevant inputs from historical and multicultural sources

are, as we have seen earlier, part of the directives of the South African
National Curriculum. These inputs are necessary so that both teachers
and pupils—the citizens of tomorrow—can develop the necessary multi-
cultural and international perspectives in mathematics. This perspective
is necessary to restore cultural dignity to all peoples on the planet and to
empower them with the intellectual tools for responsible and democratic
citizenship. These multicultural and historical inputs may be disputed by
absolutist mathematics educators and those who subscribe to the Industrial
Trainer mathematics education aims. Certainly in the U.K. multicultural
mathematics—also known as antiracist mathematics—was dealt a fatal blow
in the late 1980s by the conservative Prime Minister who in her address to
the Conservative Party4 conference in 1987 who stated:
And in the inner city where youngsters must have a decent education if they
are to have a better future that opportunity is all too often snatched from
them by hard left education authorities and extremist teachers. And children
who need to be able to count and multiply are learning anti-racist math-
ematics whatever that may be. (Thatcher, 1987)
To prevent reactionary criticism I would advise the inputs to be wide

ranging, made mathematically relevant, and globally representative. For
example they may include numbers and symbols in different cultures
and languages, African finger counting, ancient number words used

by Lincolnshire shepherds, Chinese arithmetic, Hungarian topological
problems, geometry in Islamic and North African art, and Vedic
mathematics.
Brief concluding points
In my exposition on mathematics education for schools, I had stressed

the importance of critical thinking by pupils in discussion of proof in the
classroom and in dealing and interpreting numerical data be they noncon-
textual or related to their own realities and existence. Teachers, too, have
to be critical or critically reflective about the way they teach mathemat-
ics in dealing with pupils’ mistakes and misconceptions. The teaching of
mathematics has to encourage pupils to think critically. Critical thinking
is inseparable from the democratic process. There are, of course, other
similarities between mathematics education and democracy which I have
implicitly or explicitly already made here.
To make the analogy with democratic values more explicit I now connect
up Table 15.2 with corresponding statements about mathematics education
that are self evident or have identified in this chapter.
Table 15.4.â•… Parallels Between Mathematics

Education and Democracy
Principles in Mathematics Education Democracy as a Political System
Mathematics is a system of knowledge Democracy is a system that is based on

built up from a set of basic principles. a set of moral axioms endowing each
This also applies to numeracy which citizen with defined and undeniable
follows the axioms of the number rights. This includes the right to vote.
system, arithmetic, and statistics
Teachers of mathematics should treat Elected representatives treat all citizens

the students as equal partners in the as equal partners in governance.
teaching–learning process.
All the explanatory arguments of All the policy statements of elected

teachers of mathematics should representatives are open to scrutiny
be open to scrutiny and debate. and debate. The policies of elected
Mathematics teachers’ arguments are representatives are confirmed
only confirmed as satisfactory by the as satisfactory only by the free
self understanding and the consent of understanding and majority consent of
their students. citizens.
I have attempted in this chapter to answer the three questions posed at

the outset is the following way:
• Mathematics and mathematical proof in the context of schools has

to do with the promotion of democratic culture.
• Democracy means more than the right to vote. It also means a
responsibility to actively and critically participate in the decision
making process that guides and governs society. It also means
extending the vision of democratic participation to all constituents
in the global community.
• The school mathematics curriculum can be engineered so as to
make mathematics a tool of democratization.
To support the last conjecture I have shown how mathematical justifica-

tions, explanations, and proofs can be used in the classroom to engender
critical thinking in pupils. How misconceptions in pupils work and think-
ing can be a tool to encourage critical thinking in pupils. How directed
analyses of statistical data can be a tool for the inculcation of critical think-
ing of real world issues. For all of this to happen there has to be a paradigm
shift in mathematics teaching. There will be little room for an absolutism
perspective of mathematics—which views the subject as value and culture
free—and little room for transmission mode teaching which suggest to
pupils that mathematics is abstract, rule ridden and without explanation,
value and culture free. Instead a progressive method of teaching embracing
a constructivist philosophy should be used.
Acknowledgment
This chapter is based on a plenary talk given by the author at the Associa-
tion of Mathematics Education of South Africa (AMESA) in March 2010.
Notes
1. The Treaty of Tordesillas established in 1494 in the town of Tordesillas, Spain.

This treaty established a boundary line dividing the world between Spain
and Portugal. This line was approx 480 kilometers west of the Cape Verde
Islands—everything East of this line “belonged” to Portugal, everything
West “belonged” to Spain. Further details at: http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/
ev.php-URL_ID=22294&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.
html
2. There are, however, 19 countries that enforce compulsory voting in some or

all exceptions: Argentina, Turkey, Greece, and Australia are among them.
See http://www.aec.gov.au/pdf/voting/compulsory_voting.pdf
3. See http://www.tolerance.org/sites/default/files/general/tt_unequal_
unemployment_09_h2.pdf
4. The Conservative and Unionist Party, more commonly known as the Conser-
vatives, the Conservative Party, or Tory Party is a conservative political party
in the United Kingdom.
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chapter 16
THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY

IN MATHEMATICS AND
M. Sencer Corlu
INTRODUCTION
The notion of democracy is critical to disclose the social significance of

mathematics and mathematics education. Democracy refers very gener-
ally to a method of group decision making, which involves equality among
the participants and takes advantage of many sources of information
(Christiano, 2006). The definition of democracy concerns mathematics
and mathematics education in twofold. First, mathematics can be consid-
ered as a democracy when different groups of people have the equal right
and opportunity to contribute to and benefit from mathematics. Second,
mathematics education is a democracy when all aspects of mathematics
have the equal right to reflect their share on mathematics education. The
notion of democracy contributes to the understanding of mathematics and
mathematics education as products of the human intellect.
Mathematics and mathematics education have developed together
throughout the history of mankind as products of the human intellect.

312â•‡â•‡M. Sencer Corlu
At certain periods, the continuous interaction between mathematics and

mathematics education had supporting effects on our lives. At other times,
they had conflicting outcomes. Although, mathematics and mathemat-
ics education have mostly contributed to our welfare by acting within the
limits of democracy, there were also times that they were despotic in their
endeavors. Mathematics and mathematics education have mixed histories
of democracy and despotism.
In this chapter, I followed a historical approach. I critically analyzed
the history of mathematics and mathematics education from the perspec-
tive of democracy. The views presented in this paper were supported by
the existing arguments in the critical mathematics education literature,
including studies that focused on the use of mathematics or mathematics
education for social justice and the role of values in mathematics or math-
ematics education (Ernest, 2007a, 2007b; Frankenstein, 1987; Gutstein,
2006; Skovsmose, 1994). In this chapter, I investigated how and when
mathematics emerged as the universal language and the effect of universal-
ism on mathematics education.
SYNOPSIS OF THE BEGINNING
Starting with the Quadrivium of Boëthius during the early medieval period,
mathematics established itself as a core subject in European schools. The four
elements of the Quadrivia were pure (arithmetic), stationary (geometry),
moving (astronomy), and applied (music) number (Kline, 1953). The study
of number prepared students for a more serious challenge in philosophy and
theology. From this perspective, the primary focus of the Quadrivia was the
mathematics of stasis, which was a derivation of Aristotle’s quantity concept
(Evans, 1975). Because the students at the Quadrivia were practicing to
prescribe the current states of number (that is, pure, stationary, moving,
or applied), the ancient problem of universals, as it is applied to number,
did not become a prominent issue in medieval Europe.
UNIVERSALITY ISSUE BEFORE ALGEBRA
Europeans in medieval times changed their understanding of mathematics

with the arrival of algebra through Arab merchants. European merchants
were the first group of people in the continent to realize that counting,
measuring, locating, designing, explaining, and playing—the six universal
behaviors in which mathematics can be observed (Bishop, 2001)—were
performed in radically different ways by different cultures. As trade flour-
ished with the East, a need emerged to recognize the different methods
The Pursuit of Democracy in Mathematicsâ•‡â•‡ 313
used in doing mathematics. This change in understanding mathematics

as a social tool helped businesses to grow. Mathematics was a social tool
that required people to speak a variety of mathematical languages to com-
municate with business partners, to establish effective interpersonal social
processes, and to reach judgments according to the norms of their social
class. Mathematics in Europe evolved to be used for a socially constructive
purpose by becoming a descriptive study rather than prescriptive (Ernest,
1991). Thus, universality of arithmetic did not become an issue in this
period of time. Europeans could see that some common problems of math-
ematics were solved differently across the world.
INTRODUCING ALGEBRA
Al-Khwarizmi published his book, Kitab al-Jabr wa-l-Muqabala, The Com-

pendious Book on Calculation by Completion and Balancing, to reform the
medieval mathematics. Replacing the mathematics of stasis, the mathemat-
ics of change was born with al-Jabr. This new way of computing started to
spread across the old world. Al-Khwarizmi’s algorithmic thinking methods
included mechanical rules that described the arithmetical processes once
and for all. Although the early uses of algebra did not include symbols,
algebra fit into the definition of generalized arithmetic and emerged as
a solution to the problem of universals in regards to arithmetic (Peikoff,
1991). Unlike the European elites who had previously been only interested
in civitas dei (Kline, 1953), al-jabr was a reflection of the early Islamic
thought that encouraged scholars to unite civitas dei and civitas mundi,
as well as practicality and theory (Gandz, 1938). Al-Khwarizmi’s al-jabr
democratized mathematics education by combining practical and theoreti-
cal mathematics.
With the help of algebraic thinking, mathematics became more than a
type of commercialized knowledge at the hands of merchants in the middle
ages or a subject of abstract reasoning among the elites of the medieval
ages. Mathematics was not only composed of the sum of statements of
action, or the sum of statements of logic. Empowered by algebra, math-
ematics transitioned into the sum of statements of equivalence, and thus
was perceived as the study of balance and reunion.
UNIVERSALITY IDEA WAS BORN
During the decline of the Islamic civilization after the 16th century, the
democracy in mathematics was suspended. The balance between the theory
and the practice was eradicated. Mathematics was under the influence of a
purist ideology and the significance of the practical side of the equilibrium
was being ignored (Ernest, 2007b). Mathematics lost its characteristics to be
the study of balance between practicality and axiomatic thinking. What was
achieved through algebra was lost and the notion of reunion was abolished.
As European merchants extended their business to the new world
(similar to Arab merchants who had arrived in Europe), they carried their
knowledge to the natives of the Americas. For example, the earliest non-
religious book published in the Americas was an arithmetic book (as cited
in D’Ambrosio & D’Ambrosio, 1994). In this book, the indigenous peoples’
way of doing mathematics was explained to the conquerors. A century
later, this book was out of circulation and was replaced by European books,
explaining European arithmetic to these indigenous peoples. D’Ambrosio
and D’Ambrosio (1994) claimed that the notion of mathematics as a univer-
sal language emerged during this colonial era despite the past experiences
with the Arab merchants that showed mathematics was not universal. Thus,
mathematics as a discipline was not the reason behind the universality idea,
but the ideology that developed during the colonial age dictated a despotic
way of doing mathematics.
It is exciting to imagine how Native American mathematicians could
contribute to the pursuit of democracy in mathematics and mathematics
education. They might have brought new ways to do and undo mathe-
matics with the knowledge of algebra. Symbols that represent quantities
could have been adapted before Descartes and Euler. Transferring natural
language into the language of mathematics would not be a problem for
students today. Universality idea imposed one certain way of doing and
undoing mathematics, which was not open to the contributions of other
cultures.
MODERN TIMES AND THE FUTURE
Mathematics is no longer believed to be the language of the universe

(Wiest, 2002). Mathematics is widely understood as a “symbolic technol-
ogy” (Bishop, 1988, p. 82)—a way of using signs, techniques, procedures in
practice that provides peoples of the world with the equal opportunity to
contribute to and benefit from it. Mathematics is democratic in the sense
that universality idea is dismissed. Mathematics education still has a lot
to achieve to be democratic. Students need a mathematics education that
allow them to learn practical, axiomatic, and problem-solving aspects of
mathematics. For example, using symbols to represent unknown quantities
makes the representation of many complex problems easier, although it
makes some problems more difficult to solve. An example is where students
are asked to find the least whole number when divided by 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
7 leaves a remainder of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 0, respectively. Approaching this

problem using symbolic representations does not provide students with
an elegant solution. Mathematics education should foster critical thinking
skills that allow students to choose the best possible solution to a problem.
The democratic mathematics education facilitates the learning of all
components of mathematics. The democratic mathematics education at
modern schools combines the traditions of Quadrivia, merchant math-
ematics, and algebra. A democratic mathematics instruction teaches all
of the five components of school mathematics; conceptual understand-
ing, procedural fluency, building strategies, reasoning, and disposition
(Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001). These activities are presented in
meaningful contexts where students are required to think about their own
thinking and to develop their own methods to solve real-life problems.
Each of these five components is equally indispensable in developing
mathematical competency and none of them is favored to the detriment
of the others. The democratic mathematics education does not foster only
reasoning or calculation, but aims to build the skills to integrate both.
The democratic mathematics teacher should create a peaceful environ-
ment in a mathematics class where each student is given the opportunity to
develop their own best strategies. In a democratic mathematics classroom,
the role of the teacher is to create a culturally-relevant peaceful learning
environment. The teachers, who are willing to listen to the voices of their
students, accept alternative points of views, suggestions, and divergent
solutions rather than imposing their own methods. These teachers use
various methods to teach and relate their instruction to the interest and
culture of their students. In contrast, despotic teachers would like their stu-
dents to learn mathematics in the same way they were taught. Such teachers
impose a single best solution with minimal interaction or teamwork and
with a focus only on the ends/results. The democratic mathematics educa-
tion foster meaningful interactions among students, between the teacher
and the students, or among students working in teams.
CONCLUSION
Mathematics is a tool to understand the people with whom we share the

planet (Barta, 2001) and create healthy connections among different cul-
tures. A democratic mathematics may provide us with the opportunity to
foster mutual understanding between students who meet in today’s multi-
cultural classrooms by coming from different backgrounds (Barta, 2001).
Given that children today live with another worldview than those implied
in the mathematics curricula (Pinxten & François, 2007), students need a
culturally-relevant mathematics education so that mathematics can truly
makes sense to students rather than to educators themselves. From this per-
spective, the culturally-relevant mathematics should not be understood as
the mathematics of traditional peoples (Ascher, 1998; D’Ambrosio, 2001).
Mathematics is a noble science that may lead us to the eternal, non-
changing, and value-free truth. However, neither mathematics nor
mathematics education is eternal, nonchanging or value-free. Both are the
outcomes of human intellect and shaped by the intensity of the collective
feelings of individuals of a culture. Thus, the importance of mathematics is
based on the unity of the universe; however, mathematics is the expression
of human understanding of that unity (Whitehead, 1938).
Mathematics and mathematics education are like the wings of a bird;
they need both of their wings to fly—a good teaching of the power of
theory and an inspiring demonstration of practicality. Teachers are respon-
sible for creating such a classroom culture that will not only foster a mutual
understanding of different mathematics as it is done by students from
various cultures, but also a deep appreciation of the mathematics as it was
done in the past. Such a mathematics education may contribute to the
democracy in today’s multicultural mathematics classrooms.
REFERENCES
Ascher, M. (1998). Ethnomathematics: A multicultural view of mathematical ideas.

Belmont CA: Chapman and Hall/CRC.
Barta, J. (2001). By way of introduction: mathematics and culture. Teaching Children
Mathematics, 7, 305–311.
Bishop, A. J. (1988). Mathematical enculturation: A cultural perspective on mathematics
education. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwe.
Bishop, A. J. (2001). What values do you teach when you teach mathematics? Teach-
ing Children Mathematics, 7, 346–349.
Christiano, T. (2006). Democracy. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of
philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/
democracy
D’Ambrosio, U. (2001). What is ethnomathematics and how can it help children in
schools? Teaching Children Mathematics, 7, 308–310.
D’Ambrosio, U., & D’Ambrosio, B. (1994). An international perspective on research
through the JRME. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 25, 685–696.
Press.
Ernest, P. (2007a). Values and social responsibility of mathematics. Philosophy of
Mathematics Education Journal, 22. Retrieved from http://people.exeter.ac.uk/
PErnest/pome22/index.htm
Ernest, P. (2007b). The philosophy of mathematics, values, and Kerala mathematics.
Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, 20. Retrieved from http://people.
exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/pome20/index.htm
Evans, G. R. (1975). The influence of Quadrivium studies in the eleventh- and

twelfth-century schools. Journal of Medieval History, 1, 151–164.
Freire’s epistemology. In I. Shor, (Ed.), Freire for the Classroom: A Sourcebook for
Liberatory Teaching (pp. 180–210). Portsmouth, NH: Boyton/Cook.
Gandz, S. (1938). The algebra of inheritance: A rehabilitation of Al-Khuwārizmī.
Osiris, 5, 319–391.
for social justice. New York, NY: Routledge.
Kilpatrick, J., Swafford, J., & Findell, B. (2001). Adding it up (Report of the Math-
ematics Learning Study Committee, NACS). Washington DC: National
Academy Press.
Kline, M. (1953). Mathematics in Western culture, New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Peikoff, L. (1991). Objectivism: The philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York, NY: Meridian.
Pinxten, R., & François, K. (2007). Ethnomathematics in practice. In K. François
& J. P. Van Bendegem (Eds.), Philosophical dimensions in mathematics education
(pp. 213–227). New York, NY: Springer.
Skovsmose, O. (1994). Towards a philosophy of critical mathematical education. Boston,
MA: Kluwer.
Whitehead, A. N. (1938). Importance. Lecture One In Modes Of Thought. New York,
NY: Macmillan.
Wiest, R. L. (2002), Multicultural mathematics instruction: Approaches and
resources. Teaching Children Mathematics, 9, 49.
chapter 17
FUTURES AT STAKE
Children’s Identity Work in
the Force Field of Social
Valorization of School Mathematics
Troels Lange
Introduction
School mathematics education is submerged in a discursive field of social

valorization. Being a significant part of children’s lived experience, it
provides an arena for children’s identity work. Kalila was a 10/11-year-
old girl living in Denmark. In interviews, she articulated her experiences
with learning school mathematics in a way that showed how these were
an integral part of her developing identity. She believed mathematics was
important to fulfilling her dreams for her future. Experiences of struggling
were labeled as boring. They threatened her hopes for her future. These
were implications Kalila faced in her encounters with the social practices
of school mathematics education.

320â•‡â•‡T. Lange
School Mathematics in
a “force field” of social valorization
Teaching and learning of school mathematics can be conceptualized as a

social practice. According to Fairclough (2003), social practices are “inter-
mediate organizational entities” mediating between the potential of social
structures and actual events.
Examples could be practices of teaching ... in educational institutions. Social

practices can be thought of as ways of controlling the selection of certain
structural possibilities and the exclusion of others, and the retention of these
selections over time, in particular areas of social life. (pp. 23–24)
The remarkable stability and world-wide occurrence of certain features

of mathematics classrooms (Alrø & Skovsmose, 2002), captured in the
notion of “traditional” mathematics teaching, is the “retention over time”
of a “selection of certain structural possibilities” by this particular social
practice. Examples could be the importance given to multiplication tables
long after the use of calculators reduced the need for instant recall or the
use of homework despite its problematic impact on children’s families and
limited documentation of positive effect on students’ academic achieve-
ment (Lange & Meaney, 2011).
As a social practice, school mathematics has a high status, often being
a gatekeeper to further education. Being “good at maths” is closely
associated with being “bright,” “intelligent” and other highly valued
attributes (Bartholomew, 2002; Ernest, 1998). Consequently, mathematics
is a subject that causes strong negative emotions in people, as documented
by research on the affective domain in mathematics education (e.g., Leder
& Grootenboer, 2005). However, this valorization (Abreu & Cline, 2007;
GorgoriÃ³ & Planas, 2005) of school mathematics achievement is not
an assessment of some inherent quality but rather the result of human
agency operating within a discursive field. The latter notion emphasizes
that a discourse by definition supports some ways of talking and hampers
others, thereby attributing value to some phenomena. The field quality of
discourses may be metaphorically illustrated with a physical analogy. As
gravitational and magnetic fields define directions in the physical world,
a discursive field assigns what is “up” and “down,” “along” and “against,”
“good” and “bad,” thus constituting what could be termed a force field of
social valorization. The force field affects students and teachers’ actions,
interactions, their perceptions of themselves and others by facilitating some
communicational moves and hindering others. It shapes backgrounds
and foregrounds of students and their dispositions to engage in learning
mathematics (Alrø, Skovsmose, & Valero, 2009; Skovsmose, 2005). Hence,
Futures at Stakeâ•‡â•‡ 321
being “good” or “bad” in mathematics is inscribed in a sociopolitical nexus

beyond an individual’s control. The force field of this discursive world is
inescapable for students and teachers in the same sense that we cannot
escape the gravitational field. Yet, the participants in school mathematics
education are social agents that have “their own ‘causal powers’ which
are not reducible to the causal powers of social structures and practices”
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 22). Therefore, while always affected by it, people may
talk or think in ways not aligned with the valorizations of the discursive
field (e.g., Lange, 2007).
The force field of social valorization “materializes” in various ways. For
example, the PISA surveys distribute students’ performances across “profi-
ciency levels” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD], 2004). Facts emerge from these distributions that feed into the
discourse of school mathematics and contribute to the construction of
social realities (Jablonka, 2009), such as “mathematical learning difficul-
ties” or “mathematical disability” (see Magne, 2001, for a comprehensive
list of terms) which need to be tackled through national educational poli-
cies and school and teacher practices.
There are reasons to believe that schools and school mathematics
produce students with special educational needs (Engström & Magne,
2004; McDermott, 1993; Scherer, 2008) and that the foundation for “their”
special needs are ingrained from their first years at school (e.g., Engström,
2003; Thejsen & Hvid, 1999). School mathematics discursive practices
operating within a force field of social valorization constitutes perfor-
mance in school mathematics as personal attributes of being good/bad,
ability, proficiency level, and so on (Valero, 2007). Children’s experiences of
meeting expectations, normality, and valorizations affect their perception
of themselves (Hannula, Maijala, & Pehkonen, 2004; Wiliam, Bartholomew,
& Reay, 2004). They work on their identity as they interpret, narrate, and
come to terms with their experiences. Consequently, it can be assumed that
their identity building bears the marks of the force field of social valoriza-
tion that pervades school mathematics education.
identity As a research tool
In mathematics education research there is a growing body of literature

utilizing the concept of identity (e.g., Bishop 2012; Black, Mendick, &
Solomon 2009; Boaler & Greeno, 2000; Grootenboer, Smith, & Lowrie,
2006; Ingram, 2008; Lerman, 2006; Sfard & Prusak, 2005; Stentoft &
Valero, 2009, Wiliam, Bartholomew, & Reay, 2004). Like others, Grooten-
boer, Smith, and Lowrie (2006) advocated its use in mathematics education
research as a unifying concept. For them, identity connected elements in
the learning environment that participants brought with them, such as

emotions, cognitive capacities and life histories. Lerman (2006) described
identity “as a way of capturing a fuller sense of the process of development
in mathematics classrooms” (p. 6) and quoted Lave and Wenger (1991)
for stating that learning and a sense of identity are inseparable. Sfard and
Prusak (2005) argued that identity “is a perfect candidate for the role of
“the missing link” in the researchers’ story of the complex dialectic between
learning and its sociocultural context” (p. 15).
For identity to be a research tool (Gee, 2001) in understanding the
relationship between a child’s experiences of school mathematics and the
force field of social valorization it needs an operational definition. While
carefully taking ontological and epistemological issues into account, Sfard
and Prusak (2005) “equate identities with stories about persons” (p. 14).
Thus, they construe “identity-making as a communicational practice and
thereby reject the notion of identities as extra-discursive entities that one
merely “represents” or “describes” while talking” (p. 16). The definition
takes people’s experiences and their visions of experiences to be different
categories—identities are “discursive counterparts of one’s lived experi-
ences” (p. 17). However, they explicitly were not claiming “that identities
“faithfully recount” the identity-engendering experiences; ... we consider
the very idea of “conveying an experience” to be not only unworkable but
also conceptually untenable” (p. 17). Yet, identity stories are not created
from scratch. They are a melting pot of social stereotypes, categories, and
narrative genres (Bruner, 1996; Goodson & Sikes, 2001; Sfard & Prusak,
2005) and thus will reflect the force field of social valorization pervading
mathematics education and its impact upon individuals.
Sfard and Prusak (2005) conclude their epistemological and ontological
discussion with a definition of identities as collections of stories:
In concert with the vision of identifying as a discursive activity, we suggest

that identities may be defined as collections of stories about persons or, more
specifically, as those narratives about individuals that are reifying, endors-
able, and significant. The reifying quality comes with the use of verbs such
as be, have or can rather than do, and with the adverbs always, never, usu-
ally, and so forth, that stress repetitiveness of actions. A story about a person
counts as endorsable if the identity-builder, when asked, would say that it
faithfully reflects the state of affairs in the world. A narrative is regarded as
significant if any change in it is likely to affect the storyteller’s feelings about
the identified person. The most significant stories are often those that imply
one’s memberships in, or exclusions from, various communities. (p. 16f)
Institutional descriptions of “who one is”—for example, tests, special

needs teaching, and so on—provide reifying narratives. The authority
of schools put considerable pressure on the individual to endorse such
narratives as significant and thereby move them from stories floating

around to being identity narratives.
In order to link learning and its sociocultural context, Sfard and Prusak
(2005) distinguished between actual and designated identities. Actual iden-
tities are stories about the current state of affairs whereas designated
identities are stories presenting a state of affairs, which is expected to be
the case, at least in the future. Designated identities are not necessarily
desired but are giving direction to one’s action. A gap between actual and
designated identities is likely to cause feelings of unhappiness unless it can
be closed by learning. “Learning is our primary means for making reality in
the image of fantasies ... [and] is often the only hope for those who wish to
close a critical gap between their actual and designated identities” (p. 19).
Building on the work of Sfard and Prusak (2005), I take identity work to
be the effort invested by the identity builder in identifying, that is, in the
process of creating identity narratives. Through identity work, children’s
lived experiences with learning mathematics at school in general, and of
being in difficulties with school mathematics in particular, are reified into
significant and endorsable stories. Created from stories floating around in
the sociopolitical context, these identity narratives are imprinted with the
social valorization of school mathematics.
In this chapter, I investigate a 10/11-year-old child’s identity work in the
social practice of school mathematics. The child struggled with learning
mathematics in a Danish folkeskole, a comprehensive public school for 7- to
16-year-olds. Children “at the edge” often become quite reflective about
the normality to which their belonging is questioned (e.g., Højlund, 2002)
and so have much to contribute to understandings about mathematics
education.
It is often by studying the “deviants” defined as such by a particular society

that we reveal the characteristics and complexities of the “normal”—which
are rarely recognized or justified as anything other than natural.... By study-
ing who gets counted as “black,” we learn how “whiteness” is a color too—
and not just an absence of color. (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 71)
THE DATA, their collection, AND ANALYSIS
I interviewed 10- to 11-year-old children in a Danish Year 4 class and

observed their mathematics lessons for almost a school year on a more or
less weekly basis. While observing I tried to position myself as “the least
adult” (Højlund, 2002; Hygum, 2006) by sitting among the children and
refusing to take on teacher authority when children called for this (Lange
& Meaney, 2010). The observations of their mathematics classes served as
background for the interviews and provided opportunities for informal

conversations. I explained my presence by saying that I wanted to learn
from them what it was like to be in Year 4, learn mathematics and some-
times find it difficult.
The interviews resembled semistructured life world interviews (Kvale
& Brinkmann, 2009). Hence, the prompts and questions were initiating,
circular, supporting, and clarifying in order to explore the children’s life
world related to school, teaching, learning, mathematics, leisure, friends,
and interests (Andenæs, 1991; Doverborg & Samuelsson, 2000; Goodson,
2005; Goodson & Sikes, 2001; Kampmann, 2000; Kvale & Brinkmann,
2009). The notion of life world (German: Lebenswelt) originates from
continental European philosophy and seems to be similar to what Sfard
and Prusak (2005) termed lived experience.
Three rounds of interviews were conducted during the school year. In
the first, 19 out of 20 students participated in one of the three group inter-
views. In the second and third rounds, approximately half of the students
were interviewed in pairs or alone with some students participating in
both. These children included those who I had observed were struggling
with mathematics. The interviews lasted from 30 to 45 minutes and were
audio recorded. They took place either in a meeting room adjoined to the
staffroom or in a classroom used for special purposes, and usually during
the maths lessons.
Children’s identity work in school mathematics is complex. Therefore, I
focus on one child who I call Kalila. She participated in all three rounds of
interviews. Here, I focus on her individual interview because it contained
particularly rich descriptions of her identity work. Where appropriate,
data from the other interviews with her and with other children are used
to support ideas in the main interview.
To capture Kalila’s identity work, the quotations are lengthy, and are in
Danish together with a literal (albeit somewhat normalized) translation in
English.
To render the analytical process transparent, I use Kvale’s (1984) three
levels of interpretation. The first level, meaning condensation, is a summary
of what the interviewee said in a language accessible to them and within
their horizon of understanding. The second level, “common sense” inter-
pretation, may transcend the interviewee’s understanding while remaining
within a “common sense” context of understanding. It can include general
knowledge about the interviewee’s statements, address their form, and
read “between the lines.” At the third level of interpretation, the interview
is interpreted within a theoretical framework, which in this chapter is the
narrative definition of identity drawing from Sfard and Prusak (2005). The
interpretation is likely to transcend the interviewee’s self-understanding
and a “common sense” understanding.
Identity work
Kalila was “at the edge” of several societal norms as she struggled with
learning mathematics, whilst carving out identity positions encompassing
her minority background in the harsh Danish public discourse on Muslim
immigrants (Lange, 2008b). She was also reflective. To set the scene for the
analysis of her identity work, I indicate the identity stories that were float-
ing around in the social practice of Kalila’s school mathematics.
In the everyday school life of Kalila and her classmates, gender, eth-
nicity, generation (child/adult), and position at school (student/teacher)
constituted major binary identity categories. In Bateson’s (1972) terms,
they were differences that made a difference and therefore named by the
children and the adults around them. They were some of the resources that
Kalila drew upon in her identity work. This backdrop of identity references,
italicized below, ran as follows.
Kalila was in a Year 4 class of 20 children with equal numbers of girls and
boys. According to the official Danish demographical terminology, she was
a descendant because, whilst she was born in Denmark, her parents were not
(Danmarks Statistik, 2007). She lived in an apartment with her family of
six children of which she was the fourth. Her father had a shop and her
mother worked at home. In the official educational terminology, she was a
bilingual student because her mother tongue was Arabic. Immigrants and their
children are a minority in Denmark. In this particular class, half of the chil-
dren were descendants of immigrants from the Middle East and the other
half were ethnic Danes. The children themselves talked about Arabs and
Danes, sometimes Muslims and Christians, while the teachers mostly talked
about bilingual and monolingual students.
My observations began in the second week of the new school year.
The children were re-establishing their social dynamics after the summer
holiday and adjusting their identities to the changes involved in moving up
to become a Year 4 class, and physically moving from the green corridor of
the beginner’s level (Year 0–3) to their new classroom in the blue corridor of
the middle level (Year 4–6). From being the older of the youngest students,
they were now the younger of the middle group of students. Moving into the
middle level also meant having new Danish and mathematics teachers.
Telling yourself in
a force field of social valorization
The interview opened with the question “What have you been doing
today?” Kalila responded by telling me that they had had English, swim-
ming, and history for 2 hours, which she felt was rather boring. She got up
at 6 o’clock, which was unusual but was because she looked forward to swim-
ming. In history lessons, it was boring to watch a video and write down what
was good and what was famous about Copenhagen [capital of Denmark].
They had also been told about bombs in Copenhagen and Aalborg some
years ago [during World War II] and she did not like to hear about bombs.
It was boring. So far, they had only learned about Denmark in history.
Swimming was fun because you did something. You swam to the deep end
and moved your feet in a certain way. She could swim, and dared to jump
from the “silver things” [starting blocks]. Not everybody in the class could
swim well. Some stayed by the edge and did not dare to jump in the water.
The next question in the interview (given below1) brought to the surface
Kalila’s identity work when she was facing the fact that her most liked sub-
jects, the practical/physical, were not the high-ranking academic subjects.
101 Troels Ok. Hvad for nogle fag kan du ellers Okay. What other subjects do you
godt lide? like?
102 Kalila Jeg kan godt lide matematik og I like mathematics and Danish. Even
dansk. Også selvom det ikke er _ jeg if it is not _ I mean not like, more
mener ikke sådan her, mere sådan, like, reading and the like. Is it not
læse og sådan noget. Er det ikke that kind of subjects you are thinking
sådan nogle fag du mener? of?
103 Troels Nå jamen, jeg spørger sådan set hvad Well okay, I am asking what subjects
for nogle fag du bedst kan lide af alle you like the best of all the subjects
dem der er that are
104 Kalila Ok, så kan jeg bedst lide håndarbejde Okay, then I like best needlework and
og svømning og sådan noget. Det er swimming and the like. That is more
mere sådan noget for mig, synes jeg like something for me, I think
109 Troels Hvad er det du godt kan lide ved What is it you like about it?
det?
110 Kalila Jeg synes det er sjovt I think it is fun
111 Troels Du synes det er sjovt You think it is fun
112 Kalila Ja, for i håndarbejde der laver vi Yes, because in needlework we do
mange forskellige ting, så skal man sy many different things, then you sew
og man skal lave det og sådan noget. and then you make this and things.
Og i idræt der – der leger man leg And in physical education you – you
og sådan noget. Det er rigtigt sjovt. play games and things. That is really
Og i svømning der svømmer man og fun. And in swimming you swim and
sådan noget. Det er rigtig sjovt. things. It is really fun.
113 Troels Det vil sige man gør nogle ting That is you do things?
114 Kalila Ja Yes
115 Troels Og det gør man ikke i dansk og And you don’t do that in Danish and
matematik? mathematics?
116 Kalila Nej, men det er ellers – jeg kan ellers No, but otherwise it is – otherwise I
godt lide de fleste fag.... like most subjects. ...
119 Troels ... Hvad kan du godt lide ved dansk ... What do you like about Danish and
og matematik? mathematics?
120 Kalila Altså, matematik der er det sådan Well, mathematics there it is
nogle gange, altså, altså jeg kan ikke, sometimes, well, well I cannot, I just
jeg synes bare sådan det er ok think it is like okay
121 Troels Det er ok? It is okay?
122 Kalila Ja, altså der ikke sådan noget der er Yes, like there is not like something
dårligt ved det. that is bad about it
In summary, Kalila liked mathematics and Danish (line 102). However,

she liked needlework and swimming the best; these were more for her
(104). She liked the activities in these subjects and physical education as
well because you did or made something (112–114). This was not the case
in Danish and mathematics. Besides that, she liked most subjects (116–118)
although mathematics was only okay (120–122).
In a “common sense” interpretation, it is notable that Kalila distin-
guished between two kinds of school subjects, one of which included Danish
and mathematics (102). The subjects she did not mention in the first place
but which she liked the most, needlework, swimming, and physical educa-
tion (104, 112), belonged to the other kind.
The general school discourse in Denmark distinguishes between so-
called academic subjects involving books and reading (the Danish term is
boglig—“bookly”), and the nonacademic, practical/creative subjects. The
former group is traditionally held to be more important, intellectual, and
prestigious. Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD) Program for International Student Assessment
(PISA) surveys have defined and propagated the notions of “literacy,” “math-
ematical literacy” and “science literacy” (OECD, 2004). Thus, in national
and international public discourse relating education and economic wealth,
these three school topics are positioned as the most significant. By implica-
tion, other school subjects are ascribed lesser importance. Kalila seemed to
have absorbed this valorization since she interpreted my question as only
concerning the academic subjects (102). It may be that she presumed that
as a mathematics teacher and interested in their mathematics learning I
held the same valorization.
There are other marks on Kalila’s narratives from the force field of social
valorization. She was identifying herself when saying that needlework and
swimming were “more like something for [her]” (104), and that she liked
the creativity, physical activity, and play that characterized these subject
(109–113). She did not experience these in Danish and mathematics (115–
116). Nonetheless, she also identified herself as a positive student who liked
most subjects (116), although she had nothing to say about mathematics
except that is was “not bad” (120–122). Hence, Kalila’s lived experience,
the school subjects she felt was “more for her” were positioned as “low” in
the discursive field. It devalued what she liked, her joy, and what she felt
allowed her to express herself. Consequently, Kalila’s identity work was
uphill because her identity narratives were unaligned with the force field
of social valorization.
Fashion designer as designated identity

Some 20 minutes later, I asked if there were an education that Kalila would
like.
328 Kalila Altså, ja. Jeg har to. Jeg kan ikke Well, yes. I have two. I cannot really
sådan rigtig vælge. Det er bare helt choose. It is just quite clear. It is
klart. Det er designer designer
330 Kalila eller sådan bare en der har sådan en or just someone who has a clothes
tøj ligesom HM og sådan noget like H&M [a chain of clothes stores]
and things
333 Troels Er det også tøj du gerne vil designe? Is it also clothes that you would like
to design?
334 Kalila Ja det er tøj. Indtil videre vil jeg Yes it is clothes. For the time being I
gerne være designer mest would like the most to be a designer
338 Kalila Altså jeg kan godt lide at tegne tøj You see I like drawing clothes and
og sådan noget. Og jeg synes jeg er things. And I feel I am good at
god til at tegne tøj (ja). ... Hvis jeg drawing clothes (yes). ... If I should
nu skulle tegne tøj. Oh den er flot draw clothes. “Oh that one is smart.”
den der. Så bliver man jo ved ik’å Then you go on and then you get
og så får man jo fantasi ved tøj. Hvis imagination by [about] clothes. If
... vi leger lige du er en kone og du ... we play right now that you are a
godt vil have sådan en rigtig pæn woman and you would like a really
nederdel. Den skal være ... åben her pretty skirt. It should be ... open here
for eksempel. Så skal man jo kunne for example. Then you must be able
tegne den. Og jeg vil ikke være sådan to draw it. And I do not want to be
en der selv syr det. Jeg vil bare sådan one that sew it. I will just draw it
tegne det
341 Troels Kan du godt lide at finde på (ja) med Do you like to invent (yes) with
tøj? clothes?
342 Kalila Ja. Der skal man også have en rigtig Yes. There you also must have a really
god uddannelse. good education
Kalila wanted to be a fashion designer or have a clothes shop (328–334).

She liked drawing clothes and felt she was good at it (338). She would
work for a long time on a drawing, and used her imagination. Kalila only
wanted to draw and invent clothes, not to sew them (338–339). To become
a fashion designer would require a good education (342).
In the next part of the interview, we talked about the school subjects
Kalila saw as important. Danish was “very, very, very” important; mathemat-
ics and needlework, too. Swimming was not really important. Mathematics
was important because if you had a shop you needed to add amounts and
give change. You needed to know the numbers on the cash register. To have
a shop, you needed a good education.
From a “common sense” point of view, one may notice that, like the
other children in the class (Lange, 2008a), Kalila referred to everyday
money transactions in shops when exemplifying why mathematics was an
important part of a good education.
Using the theoretical framework, Kalila’s designated identity was to
become a designer of clothes, or alternatively, to have a clothes shop. Her
vivid description bears witness to its significance. This is further evidenced
a little later when she said she wanted to go to design school when she fin-
ished school and in the group interview two months earlier where she also
had expressed her wish to become a designer. She was consistent in seeing
“a good education” as the gateway to this future and for this mathematics,
with Danish and also needlework, were important subjects.
Earlier in the interview, Kalila described more immediate designated
identities such as doing her weekly worksheets.
312 Kalila ... Altså det der er godt ved ... You see, what is good about
matematik det er at hun er begyndt mathematics is that she [the
med at give os sedler hver torsdag teacher] has started to give us slips
så skal vi have dem udfyldt til næste [worksheets] every Thursday. Then
torsdag (ok). Så ved hun hvor bedre we must have them filled in by the
hver uge hver uge hver uge. Altså next Thursday (ok). Then she knows
hvor bedre man bliver efter uge efter how better every week every week
uge efter uge. every week. That is how better you
get after week after week after week
313 Troels Hvad er det, du siger det er godt? (ja) You say that is good? (Yes) Why is
Hvorfor er det det? that?
314 Kalila Fordi så retter hun det jo. Og så Because then she corrects it, you
siger hun du får en næste uge der er see. And then she says you get one
sværere. Når man kan det så ved man next week that is more difficult.
jo at man har arbejdet, at man har When you can do it then you know
arbejdet hårdt på det, fordi man har that you have worked, that you have
taget sig mere sammen (ok). Hvis nu worked hard on it, because you have
det der (peger i bordet) er nemmere pulled yourself more together [made
end det man får næste gang og man an effort] (ok). If this (points at the
ikke kunne det og der kommer en table) is easier than that you get next
der er sværere og så jeg godt kan time and you could not do it and
den næste uden fejl. Så ved man there comes one that is more difficult
jo at man har prøvet og prøvet og and then I can do that next one
arbejdet rigtig godt. Man har taget without errors. Then you know that
sig sammen (ok). Ja you have tried and tried and worked
really well. You have pulled yourself
together (ok). Yes
320 Kalila ... Man skal også være klar over at ... You must also realize that if
hvis nu ikke får lært noget her i you do not learn here at school
skolen ik’å og man først kommer and you enter [Year] 8, 9. You get
i ottende niende. Man får jo education that is up to yourself
uddannelse det er op til sig selv
321 Troels Mm. Så det er op til en selv om Mmm. So it is up to oneself if you

man får en uddannelse? get an education?
322 Kalila Ja. Altså hvis jeg bare kun Yes. You see, if I only dodge look
snydekigger så der til eksamen så [crib] then at exam then you
kan man jo ikke kigge på hinanden cannot look at each other (no).
(nej). Så kan, altså så bliver man Then you can, then you get, like,
jo, sådan, hvorfor, altså, ”hun why, like “she does not know a
kan man jo ikke en skid for det shit for [about] this. How has she
her. Hvordan har hun så kunnet then been able to fill in these
udfylde de her fordi det er jo de [worksheets] because it is the same
samme _ det jo de samme opgaver. _ it is the same problems, you see.
Hvorfor kunne hun så ikke det?” Why could she then not do it?”
Så kan de jo regne ud at man har Then they can figure out that you
kigget på en eller anden, kigget have looked at someone, looked by
ved sidekammeraten the one next to you
323 Troels Så man kan ikke snyde sig til det? So you cannot get it by cheating?
324 Kalila Man snyder faktisk ikke læreren. Actually, you do not cheat the
Man snyder sig selv (ok, ja). Fordi teacher. You cheat yourself (ok,
at når man snyder sig selv så er det yes). Because when you cheat
fordi at, så er det sig selv der ikke yourself then it is because that,
får en uddannelse. then it is yourself that does not get
an education.
Kalila liked that the teacher gave them weekly worksheets because each
week they became more difficult. The teacher corrected them and knew
that Kalila got better week by week. When Kalila could do the worksheets,
she knew she had tried, worked hard, and pulled herself together (312–
314). If she copied someone else’s worksheets, it would be disclosed at the
exam in Year 9. She would only be cheating herself because she would be
the one that did not get an education (320–324).
Kalila had a clear “learning theory”: To achieve in mathematics, she
had to do her weekly assignments and learn the multiplication tables. In
the group interview 2 months earlier, Kalila explicitly linked the latter to
getting an education (Lange, 2008a). Therefore, she had to pull herself
together and work hard with mathematics, listen to the teacher, and not
cheat by copying answers from others. To verify not only her learning but
also her effort, she relied on an external source: the teacher’s corrections.
One might say that Kalila’s designated identities were temporally
layered: designer (shop owner) → design school → good education →
mathematics → multiplication tables and weekly assignments → listen
and pull herself together. Clearly, she thought of learning as a means of
bridging the gap between her actual identities, being a 10-year-old “Arab”
girl in Year 4 enjoying and being good at drawing clothes, and her desig-
nated identity of becoming a designer. The discursive field showed up in
Kalila’s adherence to the sociopolitical narrative of education, including
mathematics, as gatekeeper to the future.
Being good is fun—being bad is boring
In this section, Kalila’s identity work illustrates how experiences described

as “fun” were linked with being good and having a future, and, conversely,
how experiences described as “boring” were connected with being bad and
having no future. Asked about things she particularly liked or disliked about
mathematics, Kalila first spoke about recent physical activities. She disliked
jumping up and making a line on the wall as high as possible. That she
found boring. In contrast, she liked to run up and jump five jumps. That was
really fun. I then asked her if she liked doing sums on paper, which she did:
134 Kalila Ja for jeg synes, altså når man er god Yes because I think, really when you
til noget så er det, så er det rigtigt are good at something then it is,
sjovt. Når man for eksempel er dårlig then it is really fun. When you for
til noget så synes man sådan ”ah det example are bad at something then
er ret kedeligt” og sådan noget, at you think like “ah it is rather boring”
man ikke vil lave det for man kan jo and things, that you don’t want to
ikke finde ud af det, så nytter det jo do it because you cannot work it out.
ikke noget når man ikke kan finde Then it is of no use when you cannot
ud af det. Så når man ikke kan finde work it out. So when you cannot
ud af det og man prøver og prøver work it out and you try and try and
og man ikke kan så nytter det jo ikke you cannot then it is of no use. Then
noget. Så får man jo heller ikke lært you don’t get [it] learned either
når man ikke kan when you cannot
137 Troels ... prøv at forklare det lidt mere ... try to explain a little more
138 Kalila Altså for eksempel hvis der sidder en Like for instance if there is one in
i klassen som ikke er god til at læse the class who is not good at reading
(ja) ja. Og hun prøver og prøver og (yes) yes. And she tries and tries
prøver (ja). Altså hvis man nu skulle and tries (yes). Then if you should
læse noget og man kunne ikke (ja). read something and you could not
Så er det jo heller ikke særlig sjovt (yes). Then it is not particularly fun
(nej). Så vil man jo ikke læse (mm either (no). Then you don’t want to
ja). Og hvis det er sådan at man kan read (hmm yes). And if it is so that
godt læse så synes man det er sjovt you can read then you think it is fun
“Aj jeg vil blive ved med det. Aj det er “Eh I want to go on with this. Eh
spændende. Hvad kommer der efter this is exciting. What comes next?”
det?” og sådan (mm) and such
139 Troels Så det er træls når man ikke synes So it is a drag when you don’t think
man kan? you can?
140 Kalila Ja og det er så, aj, så synes man ikke Yes and it is so, ay, then you don’t
det er spændende at læse (nej, nej, think it is exciting to read (no, no,
hmm). En gang der lånte jeg så en hmm). Once I borrowed a book from
bog fra biblioteket. Det var ret sådan the library. It was rather like a little
lidt svært. Åltså jeg kunne forstå hvad difficult. Like I could understand
den handlede om. Jeg kunne læse det what it was about. I could read it but
men jeg kunne ikke forstå det I could not understand it
143 Troels Ja ok. Og så blev det kedeligt eller Yes okay. And then it was boring or
hvad? what?
144 Kalila Ja så kan jeg bare ikke lide at læse Yes then I just don’t like to read
In summary, Kalila thought it was fun when she was good at something
(134). That excited her, and she wanted to do more (134). If she was bad at
something, it was boring (134). Then she did not want to do it (134). When
she could not do something even if she tried, it was of no use and she could
not learn what she should (134). Once, she borrowed a book that was too
difficult for her and then she did not like to read (138–144).
At the “common sense” level, the activities that Kalila liked the best
and the least in mathematics both involved physical activities. From what
she told me earlier about liking swimming and physical education (112),
you could expect her to have liked both. However, her different reactions
could be because she felt unsuccessful—“bad”—in the first and successful—
“good”—in the second. Prompted by my question about how she liked to
do sums, she explained the logic of liking and not liking (134). When you
do something you are “good” at, then it is “fun.” If you are “bad” at it, then
it is “boring.” She qualified the two sets of experiences, good/fun and bad/
boring. The words linked to bad/boring were “cannot,” “not understand,”
“difficult,” “not exciting,” “do not want to do,” “of no use,” “trying and
trying” and “not learn” (134, 138, 140, 144). In contrast, “can,” “want to
do,” exciting,” and “curious” were linked to good/fun (138). In the two
other interviews, she also linked “quick” to good/fun (Lange, 2008a). Thus,
Kalila provided a rich description of two different sets of experiences with
learning and exemplified them consistently across physical activities, math-
ematics (134–136), and reading (137–144).
At the theoretical level of analysis, the use of personal pronouns indi-
cated identity work. Until the story about reading (137–144) Kalila used
the impersonal “you” (“man” in Danish). Then the pronouns started to
change until finally she used “I,” which made it clear that she had trans-
formed her lived experience into narrative form when speaking. On one
hand, Kalila generalized her own story and presented it as a common expe-
rience. On the other hand, she circled around whose story it was before
disclosing that it was her own. The circling suggests that it was difficult to
tell the identity story “I am not good at reading.”
Kalila’s experience of activities, swimming, jumping, multiplication

tables, reading, and so on, as being fun or boring were linked to the evalu-
ation of her being good or bad at them rather than by qualities particular
to these activities. It was fun to be good and boring to be bad. Bahia,
another child, put it succinctly in the group interview: “What is good about
mathematics it is when you know it” (Lange, 2008a). Therefore, what
Kalila described in relation to reading most likely pertained equally well
to mathematics. She wanted to be good at school and resented being bad,
in particular in the subjects that she saw as important for her education.
The dichotomous groups of descriptors above describe emotional, mas-
tering and normative facets of Kalila’s experiences. I take words such as fun,
boring, exciting, and don’t feel like to be discursive counterparts to emotional
reactions. The words can, cannot, (not) understand, and (not) learn relate
to experiences of mastery. Finally, difficult, quick, and good, implicate the
evaluation of experiences against a social norm embedded in the force
field of social valorization. Sorting Kalila’s words into these categories pro-
duces Table 17.1. Because Kalila saw education as the prerequisite to the
future she wanted (becoming a fashion designer), the last category there-
fore shows the consequences for her designated identity that she linked to
being good or bad.
Table 17.1.â•…Kalila’s Terms for Describing Mathematics Learning.

(Words In Italics are Implicated by
Their Antonyms, But Not Used by Kalila)
Terms in “Good” and Terms in “Bad” and
Facet of Experience “Fun” group “Boring” Group
Emotion Fun Boring
Exciting Unexciting
Curious (“what comes next”) Incurious
Feel like Don’t feel like
Want to do Don’t want to do
Of use Of no use
Trying successfully Trying in vain (“try try try”)
Mastery Can (know/able) Cannot (not know/able)
Understand Not understand
Learn Not learn
Norm Easy Difficult
Quick Slow
Good Bad
Consequences Education No education
“Future” “No future”
Each term in a group implicates or resonates with all the others in the
same group. This suggests that the word “boring” can be understood as a
“common denominator” for all of the other terms in this group. “Boring”
was the “default” word used by Kalila and the other children to describe
unpleasant experiences, such as hearing about bombs in history lessons or
being unable to honor expectations. One reason for this could be that for
children of this age it is difficult to express their emotions and experiences,
that is, produce narrative counterparts of their lived experience, and that
they therefore resort to a general descriptor.
Another reason could be that children can share experiences of being
bored. “Boring” blames the activity and not the person. When something is
dismissed or labeled as boring, it is understood that ability is not the issue;
that one could if one wanted. To share and deal with some of the other
facets connected to “boring” required a safe and supportive emotional
environment, such as the interview. Mathematics is fun when you can do
it; boring when you cannot. Boring means that you have tried and not
succeeded, and now you do not want to try anymore because it feels of no
use. Another child, Maha, said that she did not like mathematics when she
did not know what to do, and nobody came to help her, and she just sat
and waited and waited (Lange, 2009). Hence, boring may indicate that the
child feels lost in an unpleasant situation with no possibilities of actions that
could change the situation. Thus, states of powerlessness may find their
narrative counterpart in expressions like “it is boring.”
In Kalila’s perception, bridging the gap to her designated identity
required her to get a good education. In her here-and-now perspective
that implied being good at school, in particular at reading and mathemat-
ics. The chain of words from fun via can/know to good is linked to education,
which is linked to a “future” of her liking. Conversely, the boring–cannot–
bad chain is linked to no education and “no future.” School, reading, and
mathematics education are not free choices for children in Western soci-
eties. They are givens. Children’s experiences of being powerless are not
self-chosen but imposed upon them with all of the authority of school in
general and reading and mathematics in particular.
Discussion
Kalila neatly illustrates the point made by Sfard and Prusak (2005) that
designated identities give direction to one’s action and that learning is
our primary means of closing a gap between actual and designated identi-
ties. Kalila’s designated identity directed her to make an effort in learning
mathematics and overcome the uphill battle involved in that endeavour.
The reasons behind her engagement in the learning of mathematics—
needing an education to become a fashion designer—dominated the
immediate meaning that she gave to mathematics. The spontaneous joy,

creativity, and space of agency she experienced in needlework she could
not conceive of being part of learning mathematics. Her main resource
for learning mathematics was her ability to pull herself together, but she
also trusted the teacher and listened to her, something the teacher often
told the students to do. Kalila might not pick up all the mathematical clues
that the teacher intended, but she listened when the teacher recycled strips
of the school discourse. For example, when Kalila explained the logic of
cheating, she recycled the teacher’s words. She also trusted the teacher to
guarantee her learning. The teacher’s acknowledgement proved to Kalila
that she had worked hard or knew a multiplication table (Lange, 2008a).
The school and the teacher let Kalila identify herself as a “normal”
mathematics learner, but in different ways. I never observed the teacher
publicly ranking the children according to her perception of their math-
ematical achievements. Children are not streamed in a Danish folkeskole
and at this school, special assistance for students was prioritized to reading.
Consequently, the category of “students with special educational needs
in mathematics” was not present in the practices and discourses. Thus,
although the teacher in conversations with me at times expressed a deep
worry for Kalila’s mathematical achievement, Kalila was not labeled as
being in difficulties in mathematics. The Danish teacher was also concerned
for her academic achievement. Literacy in Danish is a focus, especially in
the early school years and because Kalila was a bilingual student, her lin-
guistic skills in Danish were monitored by the school. Based on her reading
performance, she received special tuition in reading, together with two
other students in the class. I learned this from other children, not from
Kalila herself, which suggests that this was a sensitive narrative for her. In
the interview, her concern for her reading skills only surfaced after a long
circling around this issue and from the despair that emanated from her
description.
The inclusive and nonlabeling practices of the teacher and the school
contributed to Kalila upholding her actual identities of being among the
normal children and protected her designated identity, the present config-
uration of her hope for her future. This sustained her sense of belonging,
her trust in the teacher and her hope for her future, which gave her the
strength to continue trying to learn mathematics the way she thought it
should be learned. She could “pull herself together,” as she phrased it, in
order to do her mathematics homework, by learning her multiplication
tables and completing her assignments with a limited number of errors. In
other circumstances, Kalila could have been excluded from the normality
of the mathematics class community as she already was with reading where
the labeling as someone in need of extra and special teaching seemed to
cause her anxiety.
Conclusion
Kalila is only one child. Other children’s identity work will be different,
but on the other hand, Kalila’s identity work does not seem special. In this
class, other children’s use of boring resemble hers and all children seem
to subscribe to the narrative of the importance of school mathematics for
their future (Lange, 2008a). Students in Ingram’s (2011) research talked
similarly. As Sfard and Prusak (2005) stated, there often are family resem-
blances in how individuals react to the same situation. Hence, there is a
need for teachers and other adults to pay attention to how the stories they
tell about the importance of mathematics (generally to motivate students to
become more engaged) can result in distress. Children like Kalila, who are
struggling to fulfil societal expectations about performing in mathematics,
are not in a position to question notions of normality. Consequently, they
may face unchangeable long-term implications for their future that they
can expect to live out over the years ahead. The force field of social valori-
zation becomes a vortex to a black hole into which children, such as Kalila,
can be sucked and from which they cannot escape. Stories from children at
the edge, as Kalila was, show an awareness of what the norms are and what
needs to be done to stay within the boundaries of being normal.
Children who describe their mathematics lessons as boring cannot be
dismissed as simply being unengaged and who if they only tried would in
fact be able to learn. Expressing that a lesson is boring could be an indi-
cator that the child is struggling and is facing some serious implications
for their future. By blaming the tasks, they reduce feelings of inadequacy
about not meeting the performance expectations and of anxiety about the
consequences for their future. It is up to mathematics education research-
ers to listen to these stories and understand them for what they are, if
the prospects for these children’s identity work are to be improved in the
current force field of social valorization.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank Elizabeth deFreitas, Tamsin Meaney, and Paola Valero for
their feedback on earlier versions of this article.
Note
1. In the transcript, hyphens ( – ) signal pauses, commas (,) that the speaker
starts again on a sentence, underscore (_) inaudible words, and three dots
(…) omissions. Small sounds or comments by the listening person are indi-
cated by brackets ( ); they are only transcribed when the speaker responds to
them. The line numbers refer to the original transcript.
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About the Authors
Mario Sánchez Aguilar is associate professor of mathematics education

at the National Polytechnic Institute of Mexico. His research interest in-
cludes mathematics teacher education, the use of Internet in mathematics
learning, and the sociopolitical aspects of mathematics education.
Dennis F. Almeida studied undergraduate mathematics at University

College London obtaining a first. While working as a secondary school
teacher he obtained an MPhil in mathematics from Birkbeck College
London. He is currently the mathematics outreach officer at the University
of Sheffield and the South Yorkshire area coordinator of the Further
Mathematics Support Program. He has research interests in students’
development of proof practices, sociopolitical aspects of mathematics and
in the history of Indian mathematics.
Helle Alrø has a research interest in interpersonal communication and

learning in helping relationships: (mathematics) education, coaching, su-
pervision, conflict mediation, and so on. She is professor in interpersonal
communication at Department of Communication and Psychology, Aal-
borg University, Denmark; and professor II at Bergen University Colle-
ge, Department of Teacher Education, Bergen, Norway. She is leader of
the Center for Interpersonal Communication in Organizations situated
at Aalborg University. She has been coauthor of many books and articles;
within mathematics education especially together with Ole Skovsmose, for
example Dialogue and Learning in Mathematics Education: Intention, Reflecti-
341
342â•‡â•‡About the Authors
on, Critique (2002), and Marit Johnsen-Høines, for example Læringssamtalen

i matematikkfagets praksis I og II (2012, 2013).
Annica Andersson finished her PhD at Aalborg University in 2011. Since

then she has held a position as a senior lecturer at Stockholm University in
Sweden. Annica’s research focuses how students talk about experiences of
inclusion and exclusion, their engagement and agency, and their narrated
identities in relation to different levels of contexts that impact on math-
ematics education. Her focus concerns students’ learning and becoming in
mathematics education practices.
Morten Blomhøj, PhD, associated professor in mathematics education at

IMFUFA, Department of Science, Systems and Models, Roskilde Univer-
sity. Director of Studies for the International Bachelor Study Program in
Natural Science at Roskilde University. Research main areas are mathe-
matical modeling, ICT in mathematics teaching, systematic collaboration
between development of teaching practice and research in mathematics
education in in-service education. Editor for Nordic Studies in mathemat-
ics education (NOMAD) 2006–2011.
M. Sencer Corlu is an assistant professor in the Graduate School of Edu-

cation at Bilkent University. He received a PhD from Texas A&M Univer-
sity, specializing in mathematics education. His interests focuses on socio-
cultural perspectives of mathematics and science education.
Ubiratan D’Ambrosio is an emeritus professor of mathematics, State

University of Campinas (UNICAMP), São Paulo, Brazil (retired in 1994).
He received his doctorate in mathematics from University of São Paulo/USP,
Brazil, in 1963, with a thesis on geometric measure theory and the calculus
of variations. He was elected fellow of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, with the citation “For imaginative and effective
leadership in Latin American Mathematics Education and in efforts
towards international cooperation” (1983) and was awarded the Kenneth
O. May Medal of History of Mathematics, granted by the International
Commission of History of Mathematics, affiliated of the IUHPS and IMU
(2001), and the Felix Klein Medal of Mathematics Education, granted by
the International Commission of Mathematics Instruction/ICMI, affiliated
of the IMU (2005). He is currently professor of mathematics education
and history of mathematics at UNIAN/Universidade Anhanguera de São
Paulo, Brazil.
Paul Ernest studied mathematics, logic and philosophy at Sussex and

London University. He taught mathematics at a London comprehensive
About the Authorsâ•‡â•‡ 343
school for several years and is now emeritus professor of philosophy of

mathematics education at Exeter University, U.K. and visiting professor at
Brunel, Oslo and Liverpool Hope Universities. His main research interests
concern fundamental questions about the nature of mathematics and how
it relates to teaching, learning and society. His views have on occasion
provoked some controversy. His books include The Philosophy of Mathematics
Education, Routledge 1991, with over 1600 citations on Google Scholar,
Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics, SUNY Press, 1998, and
most recently The Psychology of Mathematics, Amazon Kindle, 2013. Paul
Ernest founded and edits the Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal,
located at http://people.exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/. Recent special issues have
treated themes including social justice in mathematics education, critical
mathematics education, and mathematics and art.
Karen François, PhD, is professor at the Center of Logic and Philoso-

phy of Science at Vrije Universiteit Brussel—Free University Brussels, and
director of the Doctoral School of Human Sciences at the same univer-
sity. She holds the degrees: Teacher Training in Sciences and Geography
(State University College, Ghent); master’s in moral sciences (University
of Ghent); Teacher training in moral sciences (University of Ghent); mas-
ter’s in women’s studies (University of Antwerp). She obtained her doctor-
ate in philosophy, 2008, Free University Brussels, with a dissertation in the
research field of philosophy of mathematics. Karen François is an active
member of the international research group Philosophy of Mathematics:
Sociological Aspects and Mathematical Practice and is an active member
of the Association for the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. She has
published international high-impact articles in the field of philosophy of
science and mathematics education.
Ieda Maria Giongo has a bachelor in mathematics and got her PhD in
education at Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Brazil. She works at
Centro de Ciências Exatas e TecnolÃ³gicas of Univates, Brazil. She super-
vises master students of the Mestrado Profissional em Ensino de Ciências
Exatas of this institution and researches in the areas of curriculum, math-
ematics education and ethnomathematics.
Brian Greer’s career trajectory led through mathematics and psychology

to mathematics education, now with an emphasis on cultural and politi-
cal aspects. Recently he coedited Culturally Responsive Mathematics Educa-
tion (Routledge, New York, 2009) and Opening the Cage: Critique and Politics
of Mathematics Education (Sense, The Netherlands, 2012). He is currently
working on a project funded by Oregon Department of Education on “Cul-
turally Responsive Elementary Mathematics Education,” and he is one of
the organizers of the Eighth International Conference on Mathematics

Education and Society, 2015.
Marit Johnsen-Høines has a research interest in language and learning

mathematics. From a Vygotskian and Bakhtinian perspective, she has fo-
cused on childrens’ use of language as a tool for learning, and on student
teachers’ communication and learning. She is professor in mathematics
education at Bergen University College, and professor II at Tromsø Uni-
versity in Norway. She is author of several textbooks for teacher train-
ing in mathematics education in Norway; she is in the board for TAN-
GENTEN, Journal for Mathematics in School, and she has been leader
of the research project Learning Conversations in Mathematics Practice
(2007–2012). Marit Johnsen-Høines and Helle Alrø (Eds.) Læringssamtalen
i matematikkfagets praksis I og II (2012, 2013).
Robyn Jorgensen (formerly writing under the name of Zevenbergen) is

professor of education, equity, and pedagogy at University of Canberra
(Australia). Her work has been focused on exploration the nexus between
equity in mathematics education and the practices within the field. Draw-
ing predominantly on the work of Bourdieu, she has developed a com-
prehensive body of work that critically analyses practices in mathematics
education. Over the past few years, her work has focused on indigenous
education. In 2009–2010, she took leave from the university to work in a
remote indigenous school where she was CEO and principal. She has been
chief investigator on 10 Australian Research Council grants, most of which
have explored how practice is implicated in the construction of social dis-
advantage. She is currently editor-in-chief of the Mathematics Education Re-
search Journal, and an editor for the Encyclopedia of Mathematics Education.
Her work constitutes a comprehensive account of issues around equity,
inclusion, social disadvantage, and mathematics education.
Gelsa Knijnik has a master’s degree on mathematics and a PhD in edu-

cation at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, where she
worked for 20 years at the Mathematics Institute. Since 1996 she is profes-
sor at the graduate program on education at Universidade do Vale do Rio
dos Sinos (Unisinos) and a CNPq (Brazilian National Research Council)
researcher. She supervises Master and PhD students and coordinates an
interinstitutional Research Group affiliated to CNPq, which develops proj-
ects on Education from a sociocultural perspective. She is editor of Revista
Educação-Unisinos and membership of national and international edito-
rial boards. She has published books, book chapters, and papers in well
known educational journals.
Troels Lange, PhD, senior lecturer in mathematics education at Faculty

of Education and Society, Malmö University, Sweden, works in teacher
education. He has previously been a teacher educator in Denmark and
Australia. Main research interests are children’s perspectives on school
mathematics, mathematics at preschool and young children’s learning of
mathematics within an overarching frame of the complexity of mathemat-
ics, social justice and the politics of mathematics education.
Swapna Mukhopadhyay is a professor of curriculum and instruction at

the Graduate School of Education, Portland State University, Oregon.
Heavily influenced by ethnomathematics, she teaches future elementary
teachers about mathematics education with an emphasis on mathematics
as a cultural construction. Recently, she has coedited Culturally Responsive
Mathematics Education (Routledge, New York, 2009) and Alternative Forms
of Knowing (in) Mathematics (Sense, The Netherlands, 2012). Her current
work includes a study of boat-builders on the Bay of Bengal, and lead-
ing a project funded by Oregon Department of Education on “Culturally
Responsive Elementary Mathematics Education.” She is one of the orga-
nizers of the Eighth International Conference on Mathematics Education
and Society, 2015.
Maria Nikolakaki is associate professor of pedagogy and education at the

University of Peloponnese, Greece. She received her doctorate from the
University of Athens (2000) and is widely considered to be a leading expert
on democracy and education. In addition to her PhD, Nikolakaki holds
two BA degrees and two MA degrees in education. She worked as a post-
doctoral researcher at the University of London and University of Wiscon-
sin (Madison). She has published extensively in the areas of neoliberalism
and critical pedagogy, mathematics education, citizenship education, and
lifelong learning. Her publications include the books: Critical Pedagogy in
the New Dark Ages (Ed.), Critical Perspectives in Educational Policy: The Chang-
ing Terrain of Power and KnowledgeÂ€(with Tom Popkewitz), The Modernization
of Mathematics Education in Greek Primary Schools, The Myth and the Reality of
Greek Education: Cross-curricularity and Team Teaching inÂ€Schools,Â€ Globaliza-
tion, Technology and Paideia in the New Cosmpolis (Ed.), Towards a School for All:
Cross-curricularity and Inclusion in Greek Primary Schools (Ed.), and Education
of the Pre-school Age. She has published more than 70 articles in journals
and conference proceedings.
Ole Ravn is a lecturer in educational and philosophical studies at Aalborg

University, Denmark. His research is primarily focused on philosophical
and cross-disciplinary perspectives on mathematics and science as well as the
design of university educations, with a special focus on problem-based and
project-oriented learning models. In particular, his research has addressed

the philosophy of mathematics, emphasizing the contemporary conditions
for knowledge and the sociocultural construction of mathematics.
Ole Skovsmose has a special interest in critical mathematics education.

He has investigated the notions of landscape of investigation, dialogue,
mathematics in action, students’ foreground, and ghettoizing. He has been
professor at Department of Learning and Philosophy, Aalborg University,
Denmark, but is now retired and lives in Brazil most of the time. He has
published several books including Towards a Philosophy of Critical Mathemat-
ics Education, Dialogue and Learning in Mathematics Education (together with
Helle Alrø), Travelling Through Education, In Doubt, and An Invitation to
Critical Mathematics Education, Foregrounds and Critique as Uncertainty.
Bharath Sriraman is a professor of mathematics at the University of Mon-

tana. He edits numerous book series which include Cognition, Equity and
Society with Information Age Publishing.
Paola Valero is professor of education in mathematics and science at Aal-

borg University, Denmark. She is leader of the “Science and Mathematics
Education Research Group” and director of the doctoral program “Tech-
nology and Science: Education and Philosophy.” She has been researching
the significance of mathematics as a school subject in modern Western
societies, and the constitution of it as afield where power relations are cen-
tral in generating inclusion/exclusion of different types of students. She
focuses on the development of theoretical understandings of mathematics
education linking learning to the broad social and political levels of edu-
cational practice.
Tine Wedege is professor at the Faculty of Education and Society, Malmö

University, Sweden, where she is working in mathematics teacher edu-
cation and is leading the research group in mathematics education. In
2005–2010 she was also Professor II at the Department of mathematical
sciences, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway. Until
2005, she was associate professor at Roskilde University, Denmark, where
she defended her doctoral thesis in 2000. Wedege has published more
than 100 scientific papers and reports in international journals, mono-
graphs and proceedings. She has edited a number of books and proceed-
ings. Moreover she has participated in the public and academic debate
on mathematics and mathematics education. Wedege is a member of the
editorial committee of Nordic Studies in Mathematics Education. Inter-
nationally, she has been engaged in the research forum Adults Learning
Mathematics, since 1994, for example as a member of the editorial board

of the ALM international journal.
Keiko Yasukawa is a lecturer in adult education at the University of Tech-

nology, Sydney. She has been interested in the politics of mathematics,
and its implications for mathematics education. She is interested in exam-
ining mathematics and numeracy as social practices, and has recently been
involved in researching numeracy and literacy practices in the workplace.
She is a member of the editorial team of Literacy and Numeracy Studies: An
International Journal of Education and Training of Adults.

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Critical

INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC.

Critical mathematics education : theory, praxis, and reality / edited by

Copyright © 2016 Information Age Publishing Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

Printed in the United States of America

1. Mathematics: A Critical Rationality?

2. Ethnomathematics: A Response to the Changing Role of

3. Mathematics Education Ideologies and Globalization

4. Scripting the World in Mathematics and

5. The Scope and Limits of Critical Mathematics Education

6. The Elephant in the Room: Equity, Social Class, and

7. Connecting the Notion of Foreground in Critical

8. The Hegemony of English Mathematics

9. School Curriculum and Different Mathematics Language

10. Ethnomathematics as a Human Right

11. Negotiating Critical Pedagogical Discourses:

12. Critical Mathematics Education in the Context of

13. The Role of Mathematics in Politics as an Issue for

14. Investigating Critical Routes: The Politics of Mathematics

15. Are There Viable Connections Between Mathematics,

16. A Historical Analysis of Democracy in Mathematics and

17. Futures at Stake: Children’s Identity Work in the Force Field

About the Authors................................................................................... 341

Mathematics is traditionally seen as the most neutral of disciplines, the

Critical Mathematics Education:

Recurring Themes in the Book Include:

• The natures of mathematics and critical mathematics education,

The present volume revisits an old theme in mathematics education,

Critical Mathematics Education:

The former characterizes mathematics as a pan-cultural activity character-

in areas such as mathematics, science, literacy, and so on, and in a broader

to questions within mathematics education. It not only theorizes the “criti-

Bishop, A. (1988). Mathematical enculturation: A cultural perspective on mathematics

“Mathematics” is an open concept with many possible meanings. In Philo-

Critical Mathematics Education:

use with only the name in common. As a consequence, perhaps we had

One basis for considering mathematics a divine rationality is found in

After enumerating these three laws, all having to do with mechanical

While the scientific revolution has symbolized what scientific progress

(1964/1991) points out problematic aspects of science.11 He finds that the

With this formulation we leave behind any assumption of mathemat-

When I refer to “social theorizing,” I do not have particular sociological

mathematics as part of significant social processes. Derrida does not provide

applications of mathematics will be for the sake of everybody.20 It might

Technology is advanced through imagination. Here and in the following I

As a paradigmatic example of such imagination, one can think of the

has reached a price-setting, which in turn takes the form of an algorithmic-

Hypothetical reasoning is counterfactual, as it takes the form: “if p then

There is no direct similarity-relationship between a real-life situation and its

According to a classic perspective in philosophy, justification refers to a

Although the particular details of such “elaborate formulas” for helping

of decision making into a process of calculation. This applies to military

A mathematical model can become part of our environment. Our life-

logical structure of preferences. Giddens might be quite right in claiming

Mathematics-based actions may erase responsibility. Let us again consider

Let us imagine the situation in an airport where a passenger gets bumped.

analysis. However, whatever we do, based on our empirical material, we

whole spectrum between horrors and wonders as well as stepping beyond

1. See, for instance, FitzSimons (2002).

8. This was what Descartes concluded in his Meditations (Descartes, 1641/1993).

Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: The human consequences. Cambridge, England:

Foucault, M. (1989). The archaeology of knowledge. London, England: Routledge.

The world’s civilization is anchored in mathematics. No one disagrees that

Copyright © 2016 Information Age Publishing Inc.