Legality of The Use of Force To Protect

LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT NATIONALS ABROAD
UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Jakub Ciesielczuk
LLM- Public International Law 2015/2016
Supervisor: Erik Koppe
Word Count: 13881

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2 - THE PROHIBTION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND PROTECTION

OF NATIONALS ABROAD 3
2.1 Introduction 3
2.2 Use of force to protect nationals abroad does not violate Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter 5
2.2.1 The scope of the ‘territorial integrity’ for the purpose of the Article 2(4) 5
2.2.2 Consistency of the use of force to protect nationals with the purposes of the UN
Charter 8
2.3 Use of force to protect nationals abroad does violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
but is nevertheless legitimate. 12
2.3.1 Subsequent reinterpretation approach 12
2.3.2 Second-tier criteria approach 13
2.4 Conclusion to the chapter 14
CHAPTER 3- RIGHT TO SELF DEFENCE AND PROTECTION OF NATIONALS

ABROAD 15
3.1 Introduction 15
3.2 Consistency of the use of force to protect nationals abroad with Article 51 of the UN
Charter 16
3.2.1 Member State for the purpose of the Article 51 16
3.2.2 Armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51 17
3.3 Use of force to protect nationals abroad and customary international right to self-
defence. 19
3.3.1 Principles of necessity and proportionality 19

3.3.2 Large scale operations to protect nationals abroad conducted after 1945 20
3.3.3 Rise of the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 23
3.4 Conclusion to the chapter 26
CHAPTER 4- EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 27
4.1 Conclusion to the thesis 27

4.2 Application of the findings to the Russian actions in Crimea in 2014/2105 28
Chapter 1 Introduction
After over a year of denying, Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted to the
presence of the Russian troops in Crimea and to the plan of Crimean annexation.1 Russian
armed forces crossed the Ukrainian border on the 28th of February 2014.2 However, Putin was
convinced that sending troops to the sovereign state does not violate general norms of
international law.3 At the meeting with media representatives, which took place in Novo-
Ogaryovo ( Russia) on the 4th of March 2014, Putin stated that deploying of Russian troops to
Crimea would be legal in the light of the international law. As the justifications for the lawful
use of force in Crimea by Russian Federation, Putin mentioned invitation to the use of force
by Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych, humanitarian intervention and the protection of
nationals abroad.4
According to the Russian representative to the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) Vitaly Churkin, Russian nationals and ethnic Russians in Crimea have been attacked.
During the UNSC meeting on the 1st of March 2014, Churkin claimed that Russian nationals
in Crimea were killed in result of the attempt of attack on the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea conducted by ‘unknown armed people from Kiev’.5 He
also emphasized that there was a continuing threat to Russian nationals in Crimea. 6 His claim
regarding the threat was linked with the attempt of the Ukrainian government to repeal the
2012 law ‘On the principles of the state language policy’, which would make Ukrainian the
sole state languages at all levels.7 However, the repeal bill was never adopted.8
1
Editorial ‘Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot’ BBC News (9th March 2015)
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226> accessed 20/05/2016.
2
S. Walker, H. Salem and E. MacAskill ‘Russian ‘invasion’ of Crimea fuels fear of Ukraine Conflict’ The
Guardian (1st March 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/28/russia-crimea-white-house>
accessed 20/05/2016.
3
Editorial ‘ Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine’ Official Internet
Resources of the President of Russia ( 4th March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366
accessed 20/05/2016.
4
Ibid.
5
UNSC, 7124th UNSC Meeting (1st March 2014) S/PV.7124 at 5.
6
Ibid.
7
Editorial, На Украине отменили закон о региональном статусе русского языка, Lentra.Ru (15th December
2015) < https://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/23/language/> accessed 1/05/2016.
8
Editorial, Проект Закону про визнання таким, що втратив чинність, Закону України "Про засади
державної мовної політики" Iportal.Rada. ( 6th February 2014 ).
< http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=45291> accessed 02/05/2016.
1
The protection of nationals abroad can be defined as a military intervention by one
state, into another state in order to protect the lives of its own citizens.9 Throughout the
centuries armed force were used to protect nationals abroad.10 However, the creation of the
United Nations (UN) has triggered debate as to whether the right to protect nationals abroad is
still applicable under the UN Charter.11 There seems to be two key arguments made in regard
to the protection of nationals abroad doctrine’s permissibility. Firstly, it has been argued that
use of force to protect nationals abroad is consistent with the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.12
Secondly, it has been claimed that protection of nationals abroad is legitimate exercise of a
state’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international
law.13
This thesis will assess the legal validity of the use of force to protect nationals
abroad under public international law. The research question for the thesis is: to what
extent is use of force to protect nationals abroad permissible under public international
law? The thesis will use two approaches to answer the research question, namely
analytical and practical. The analytical approach will focus on analysing certain UN
Charter provision, mainly Articles 2(4) and 51. The practical approach will focus on
analysing relevant state practice regarding use of force to protect nationals abroad. After
both of the analyses will be conducted, the findings will be applied to the recent events in
Crimea of 2014/2015. It will be evaluated to what extent the Russian military actions in
Crimea in the period of 2014-2015 can be justified using the protection of nationals
abroad doctrine.
Chapter 2 will examine to what extent use of force to protect nationals abroad is
permissible under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. First part of the Chapter 2 will analyse
the argument that use of force to protect nationals abroad is consistent with territorial
integrity or political independence of any state or with the purposes of the UN within
Article 2(4) and therefore it is permissible under the UN Charter. Second part of Chapter
2 will analyse the argument that despite the fact that the use of force to protect nationals
abroad does violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it is nevertheless legitimate. It will
9
T. Ruys, The‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 Oxford J. Conflict & Security 233, at 234 (2008).
10
H. Lauterpach (ed), Oppenheim’s , International law, at 309 (1995).
11
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
12
D. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, at 87 (1958).
13
R. J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals Abroad: Is consent the basis of legal obligation? 25 Tex. Int'l L. J. 209,
at 235 (1990).
2
examine two approaches which support that argument, namely ‘subsequent
reinterpretation’ and ‘ second-tier criteria’ approach.
Chapter 3 will discuss to what extent the use of force to protect nationals abroad
can be legitimate under the right to self-defence embodied in Article 51 of the UN
Charter and customary international law. The first part of Chapter 3 will analyse the
permissibility of the use of force to protect nationals under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The second part of Chapter 3 will examine the legality of the use force to protect
nationals abroad under customary international law.
Chapter 4 will apply the analysed law to the Crimean situation of 2014 and 2015.
It will evaluate to what extent the Russian military actions in Crimea in the period of
2014-2015 can be justified using the protection of nationals abroad doctrine. The Chapter
4 will also conclude the whole thesis.
Chapter 2 The prohibition on the use of force and protection of nationals abroad
2.1 Introduction
Before the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter specifically prohibited the use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, many attempts were
made to outlaw the use of force or more precisely to criminalize the war. The first attempts to
render the war illegal were done through passing the regulation for initiating and conducting
of the armed conflicts under the provisions of the Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907.14 After
the horrors of the World War I, the Covenant of the League of Nations15 was signed with the
primary aim to ensure peace and prevent outbreak of future armed conflicts.16 Given that the
USA was never a member of the League of Nations, while the Soviet Union, Germany and
France were members only for a short time, the League of Nations lacked power to enforce
the provisions of the Covenant and prevent the states from using force in their international
relations.17 In 1928 the Kellog-Briand Pact,18 also known as the General Treaty on the
14
International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907;
International Conferences ( The Hague) Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 18
October 1907, see also S.Heselhaus, International Law and Use of Force, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems
<http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c14/e1-36-01-02.pdf> accessed 14/04/2016.
15
League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919.
16
See Heselhaus, supra note 14, at 4.
17
Ibid, at 4.
18
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 94 L.N.T.S 57,
27 August 1928.
3
Renunciation of War was signed and consequently outlawed the war for the parties to the
treaty 19 and discarded it as an instrument of national policy between them.20 Despite being
regarded as a milestone in the prohibition on the use of force, the Kellog-Briand Pact lacked
any severe sanctions which could be imposed on the state using force.21 Moreover, the
wording of the provisions were only restricted to ‘wars’ which created many loopholes.22
Having in mind the failure of the League of Nations, the UN (created just after the end
of the World War II) aimed to establish an effective regime which would prohibit the use of
force and prevent the creation of the armed conflicts. Consequently, the primary purpose of
the creation of the UN, reflected in Article 1(1) of the UN Charter was ‘to maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace.’ The use of force by states is prohibited by
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which stresses that ‘All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.’
It has been argued that use of force to protect nationals abroad does not violate Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. It has also been claimed that even if it does, the use of force to protect
nationals abroad can still be legitimate. First part of the Chapter 2 will focus on the argument
that use of force to protect nationals abroad does not violate the territorial integrity or
political independence and is in line with some of the purposes of the UN within Article 2(4).
Second part of Chapter 2 will examine the argument that prohibition on the use force
embodies in Article 2(4) the UN Charter is not absolute and the use of force to protect
nationals abroad may be still legitimate. Two approaches which support that argument,
namely ‘ subsequent reinterpretation’ and ‘ second-tier criteria’ approach will be analysed.
19
See Heselhaus, supra note 14, at 5.
20
Art. 1 of the Kellog-Briand Pact
21
See Heselhaus, supra note 14 at 5.
22
Ibid, at 5.
4
2.2 Use of force to protect nationals abroad does not violate Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter
It has been argued that using force to protect nationals abroad does not violate Article
2(4) and therefore is not prohibited.23 The logic behind this argument is that only force
breaching Article 2(4) is illegal, where actions which are not covered by Article 2(4) are not
outlawed.24 Consequently, it has been argued that as the force used to protect nationals abroad
is not, in the terms of Article 2(4) directed to violate ‘territorial integrity or political
independence’ of the state, it is not illegal under the UN Charter.25 It has been stated that the
purpose of using force is not to challenge ‘territorial integrity’ or impact ‘political
independence’ of another state but to protect its nationals abroad.26
2.2.1 The scope of the ‘territorial integrity’ for the pourpose of Article 2(4)
The scope of phrase ‘territorial integrity’ and its purpose in Article 2(4) was discussed
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel case27 between United
Kingdom and Albania. The dispute between these two states emerged after British warships
were fired at by Albanian battery, while gathering evidence in the Corfu Channel. The
Albanian government claimed that their actions were justified, as the presence of the British
warships in their territorial waters without prior permission had violated Albanian
sovereignty.28 The British government, narrowly interpreting Article 2(4), argued that their
actions in Corfu Channel did not threaten the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of
Albania as the use of force were minimal and intended to obtain evidence of the minefield in
the Corfu Channel.29 The narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) was nevertheless rejected by
the ICJ. The Court held that although a minimum use of force was employed by British in
Corfu Channel it nevertheless constituted a violation of the Article 2(4).30
23
A. W.R. Thomson, Doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad: Rise of the non-combatant evacuation
operation, 11 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 627, at 636 (2012), see also L. Green, The contemporary law of
armed conflict, at 9 (2008); L. Henkin, How nations behave, at 145 (1979).
24
See Zedalis, supra note 13, at 221.
25
D. Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals’ in A. Cassese (Ed) The current Legal Regulation
of the Use of Force, at 40 (1986).
26
Ibid, at 41.
27
Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th ( Merits), 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports, at 4.
28
Ibid, at 33.
29
Corfu Channel Case, Pleadings, Vol. III. P 296; reprinted in D.J. Harris, Case and Material on International
Law, at 892 (2004).
30
See Corfu Channel, supra note 27, at 35.
5
Some controversies arose due to the fact that the language of the majority judgment in
the Corfu Channel case did not explicitly refer to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Instead the
Court held that the ‘United Kingdom violated the sovereignty’ of Albania.31 Judge ad hoc
Ecer in his Dissenting Opinion criticized the choice of language in the decision and
emphasized that given that the ICJ is a judicial instrument of the UN, it should have expressly
referred to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.32 In fact, the Court was also reluctant to refer to
Article 2(4) in its later decisions regarding the legality of use of force.33 It has been argued
that the choice of not expressly referring to Article 2(4) had been motivated by the fact that
the ICJ seeks to avoid controversy about its discretion to declare the existence of an act of
aggression and its potential consequences.34 In Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that the
determination whether or not act of aggression had place lies in the powers of the UNSC
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.35
However, despite the tendency of the ICJ to refrain from explicitly referring to Article
2(4), it has been argued that nothing in the ICJ jurisprudence supports the argument that
Article 2(4) should be interpreted narrowly and allow limited military actions which claim to
not violate the ‘territorial integrity’ of the state.36
This is also supported by the UN practice which can be illustrated by certain United
Nations General Assembly(UNGA) resolutions. The UNGA Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention 1965 strongly disapproves intervention in the internal or
external affairs of another state ‘for any reason whatsoever.’37 The UNGA Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Relations and Co-operation Among States 38 also
condemns the intervention to protect nationals. It states that ‘any form of intervention not only
violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which
threaten international peace and security’.39 The third principle of the Declaration uses even
31
32
Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th ( Merits), 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports, at 252-253 ( Judge ed hoc Dr.
Ecer, Dissenting Opinion).
33
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua ( Nicaragua v United States), Jurisdiction of the
Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judgment of 26 November 1984, 1984 ICJ Reports 392;
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 6
November 2003, 2003 ICJ Rep. 161; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, Judgment of 19 December 2005, 2005 ICJ Rep. 168.
34
C.Gray, The ICJ and the Use of Force ( for Tams and Sloan (eds) The Development of International Law by
the International Court of Justice, at 18 (2013).
35
See Nicaragua, supra note 33, paras. 89, 90, 94.
36
See Gray, supra note, 34 at 10.
37
UNGA A/RES/20/2131 at 11.
38
UNGA A/RES/25/2625.
39
Preamble to the A/RES/25/2625.
6
stronger language than Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention as it states that it is a
duty of the state not to intervene in internal or external affairs of any other state for, for any
reason. It it worth noting, that the Declaration is now part of the customary international law
as determined by the ICJ.40
Rejecting the narrow interpretation of the Article 2(4) seems to be in line with the
travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter, which indicates that the phrase ‘the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state’ was not intended to be narrowly interpreted
but conversely, it was included as a mean of protection for small states against the abuse by
powerful states.41 It can be argued that academic debate also supports that conclusion. Despite
the fact that some scholars seem to accept the exception to the prohibition on the use of force
under Article 2(4) for the sack of state‘s right to protect its nationals abroad,42 majority of
them reject that argument.43
Furthermore, the actions of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in Entebbe, Uganda
illustrate the reaction of the states to the application of the doctrine of the protection of
nationals abroad and claim that such an intervention for protection of a state’s nationals does
not breach the ‘territorial integrity’ of a state under Article 2(4).44 The IDF’s operation in
Entebbe took place after an Air France passenger jet with many Israeli citizens was hijacked
and redirected to Uganda. The duration of the military operation on Ugandan territory was
limited to approximately 90 minutes.45 It led to rescue of hostages and deaths of a few
Ugandan military and hostage takers.46 After the operation, the Israel has stated that the
operation did not violate Article 2(4), as it was intended to protect Israel’s own integrity and
its national interests and not to violate ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of
Uganda.47 The USA has stated that such an operation which is in breach of the Article 2(4)
may be nevertheless legitimate if it is conducted ‘in the context of the protection of nationals
threatened with injury’.48 France emphasized that the violation of the Uganda sovereignty by
Israel was not intended to impact the territorial integrity or the independence of Uganda, but
40
See Nicaragua, supra note 33, at para.191.
41
UN Charter travaux preparatoires, vol. 2, at 36; see also B. Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary, at 118 ( 2002).
42
O. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, at 1628 (1984).
43
C. Gray, International law and the use of force, at 483 (2008); see also N. Lubell, Extra- Territorial Use of
Force Against Non-State Actors, at 27 (2010); J. Currie, Public International Law, at 470 (2008).
44
See Thomson, supra note 23, at 636.
45
W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe 3–5, at 103 (1976).
46
Ibid. 99-125.
47
U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1939 (July 9, 1976).
48
O. Schachter, The Right of State to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, at1630 (1984).
7
to protect endangered individuals.49 Despite France and the USA explicitly agreeing with
position taken by Israel, overwhelming majority of the states considered the Israeli action to
be violation of Article 2(4).50
Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that even minimal use of force to protect
nationals abroad by one state will violate Article 2(4) as it will be in breach of ‘terriorial
integrity’ of another state. The Article 2(4) should not be interpreted narrowly as to allow for
exceptions to use of force, other than right to self-defence. This conclusion is supported by
ICJ’s judgment in Corfu Chanel case and the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter.
Majority of the scholars also accept that reasoning.
2.2.2 Consistency of the use of force to protect nationals with the purposes of the UN
Charter
Apart from the prohibition on the use of force against territorial integrity or political
independence, Article 2(4) also prohibits force employed ‘in any other matter inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations’. Therefore, it can be argued that the permissibility of
using force to protect nationals abroad will depend on whether the force employed to fulfill
such an intention is inconsistent with the purposes of the UN embodied in Article 1 of the UN
Charter.51
There seems to be no consensus as to whether the use of force has to be inconsistent

with all of those purposes or with any single purpose in order to be prohibited under Article
2(4). It has been argued that because of the use of the word ‘the Purposes’ rather than ‘a
Purpose’, in Article 2(4) the use of force must be inconsistent with all the purposes listed in
Article 1 to be prohibited.52 Therefore, the use of force which is consistent with at least one of
the purposes enumerated in Article 1, cannot be prohibited by Article 2(4).
However, such a literal reading of Article 2(4)’s final clause has been highly
contested. It has been stated that during the San Francisco Conference, the Commission I
working on the draft of the Article 2(4) noted that ‘ the unilateral use of force or similar
49
U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1943d mtg, at 7, UN Doc. Sp/PV. 1943 (1976).
50
U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1940th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1940 (1976). Guyana claimed that the operation
constituted a breach of Article2(4), id. paras. 80–81, Yugoslavia said that the operation was a ‘flagrant violation
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent and non-aligned country’ , where Mauritius deemed
the Israeli action aggression, id. para. 70.
51
52
Ibid, at 223.
8
coercive measures is not authorized or admitted ’ by Article 2(4). 53 In the Commission’s
report it has been also emphasized that apart from the right to self-defense ‘use of force
remains legitimate only to back up decision of the organization.54 It is crucial to mention that
Commission’s statement was unanimously decided to be included in the report to the Plenary
Session of the Conference. Given the statement of the Commission and unanimously adoption
of its report, it can be argued that the unilateral use of force which is consistent with one of
the purposes of the UN Charter, is nevertheless prohibited by Article 2(4).
Nevertheless, there are some opposition voices who claim that despite the fact that the
use of force does not need to be inconsistent with each and every purpose of the UN to be
prohibited by Article 2(4), the use of force which is consistent with at least one of the
purposes may be nevertheless legal.55
Before analysing that argument, it it necessary to assess whether or not protection of

nationals abroad is inconsistent with all the purposes of the UN. The protection of nationals
abroad seems to be inconsistent with UN purpose of ‘ maintaining international peace and
security’ through ‘collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace’
embodied in paragraph 1 of the Article 1. According to that purpose of the UN, members of
the UN are not meant to take unilateral military actions to deal with threats to the peace
caused for instance by violations of the rights of one’s nationals located abroad, rather the
member states should act collectively.56 The unilateral use of force by one state against
another to protect nationals abroad would be also arguably inconsistent with the purpose of
development of ‘friendly relations among nations’ included in the 2nd paragraph of the Article
1.57
However, the use of force to protect nationals abroad may be consistent with purposes
included in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 1. Paragraph 3 of the Article 1 lists among other
purposes ‘promotion and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms’ ,where paragraph 4 provides the last purpose which is ‘ harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common ends.’ It could be argued that a state which is using
force to protect its nationals whose right are being violated, is actually protecting their human
53
Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O Docs. 400 (1945).
54
See Doc. 885, supra note 53.
55
Reisman & McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect Ibos, in R.B. Lillich (ed) Humanitarian
Intervention and the United Nations, at 167-78 (1978).
56
See Bowett, supra note 12, at 154.
57
However, that is disputable as one can claim that maltreating of one’s national abroad already have negative
impact on the friendly relations.
9
rights and consequently is promoting respect for basic fundamental freedoms.58 Moreover,
such an action could encourage other states to respect and protect human rights and have a
positive impact on the UN’s attempts to harmonize nation’s attitude towards observance and
protection of fundamental freedoms.59 To sum up, the use of force to protect nationals abroad
seems to be consistent with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Article 1 of the UN Charter, but it is
nevertheless inconsistent with paragraphs 1 and 2.
Given the above analysis it can be argued that the use of force to protect nationals
abroad can cause conflict between the purposes of the UN, namely between ‘collective
maintenance of peace and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’.60 It has been
stated that the protection of human rights is a primary aim of the UN, therefore it can prevail
over maintenance of peace.61 In line with that argument it has been stated that the unilateral
use of force to protect human rights can be regarded as a substitution for collective measures
aimed to prevent or eliminate threat to the peace caused by the violation of those rights. 62
However, that argument does not seem to be persuasive. The historical background to
the establishment of the UN clearly indicates that the UN was created in response to the
failure of maintaining global peace, which caused the deaths of millions of people all around
the world.63 In fact, the first purpose of the UN listed in the Article 1 of the UN Charter is to
‘to maintain international peace and security’. It has been argued that all other purposes of the
UN are meant to serve the primary purposes of maintaining of international peace and
security.64 Furthermore, the UNGA in Declaration on the rights of people to peace stated that
‘the principal aim of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and
security’.65
It is even harder to accept the argument that unilateral use of force to protect human
rights can be regarded as a substitution for collective measures aimed to prevent or eliminate
threat to peace caused by the violation of those rights. Firstly, the argument gives the
impression of being totally contrary to the notions of the collective security promoted by the
58
59
Ibid, at 223.
60
See Reisman, supra note 55, at 167-78.
61
62
See Reisman, supra note 55, at 167-78.
63
S. Amrith & G. Sluga, New Histories of the United Nations,” Journal of World History 19 (3): 251–274
(2008), see also preamble to the UN.
64
F.Cede, & L. Sucharipa-Behrmann, The United Nations: Law and Practice, at 23 (2001).
65
UNGA A/RES/39/11.
10
UN.66 The UNSC was created with primary aim to take action in response to threats to
international peace and security.67 It has been argued that violating the rights of foreign
nationals threatens international peace and cause the international problem. 68 Therefore, it
should be address by collective action under the supervision of the UNSC.
Analysis of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter which address the issue of human
rights may also shed some light on the potential conflict between collective measures to
maintain the peace and unilateral use of force to protect human rights. Article 55 urges
member states of the UN to promote ‘ universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms’, where Article 56 requires states to ‘ take joint and separate action
in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55’. One can argue that the use of word ‘seperate’ in Article 56 indicates that unilateral
military force to protect rights of nationals abroad is not prohibited.69 The problem with this
argument lies in the fact that there is no certainty that Article 56’s reference to the word
‘action’ covers military action. Assuming it does, it need to be emphasized that the Article 56
explicitly declares that such action must be ‘in cooperation with the Organization’. Therefore,
it clearly suggests that the use of the word ‘action’ does not envision the unilateral action.
The preparatory work to adoption of the Article 56 also supports that conclusion. During the
drafting of Article 56 at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, the Committee Three rejected
the Australian proposal to include the following text of the Article 56 ‘ ...separate and joint
action and cooperation with the Organization and with each other’.70 The Committee Three
was aware of the potential impact of the phrase ‘with each other’ on the unilateral use of force
and decided to qualify the ‘separate action’ by the phrase ‘in cooperation with the
Organization’.71
Given the intention of the drafters of the Article 56 and its plain meaning, it is fair to
conclude that the Articles 55 and 56 does not provide states with discretion to unilateral use of
force to protect human rights of its nationals abroad. Therefore, it supports the argument that
the violations of human rights of foreign citizens should not be address by unilateral action
but the collective measures should be taken.
66
G. Wilson, The United Nations and Collective Security, at 123 (2014).
67
See Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
68
69
Ibid, at 227.
70
Doc. WD-18, II/3/A3, 10. U.N.C.I.O Docs. 382 (1945).
71
11
2.3 Use of force to protect nationals abroad is in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter but is nevertheless legitimate
It has also been argued that the use of force to protect nationals abroad does violate
Article 2(4), but nevertheless can be legitimate. This argument relies on two approaches,
which have been labelled as the ‘ subsequent reinterpretation and the ‘ second-tier criteria’.72
The subsequent reinterpretation approach acknowledges that the UNSC is authorized to
address violations of rights of nationals abroad.73 Nevertheless, it emphasizes that because of
repeated inability of the UNSC to act effectively or to act at all, the unilateral use of force
prohibited by the UN Charter should be reconsidered.74 The second-tier criteria approach
maintains that legality of the unilateral use of force to protect nationals abroad depends on its
‘reasonableness’ within the framework of relevant context.75
2.3.1 Subsequent reinterpretation approach
The weakness of the subsequent reinterpretation approach is that nothing in the UN

Charter seems to suggest that the prohibition on the use of force is qualified by UN’s ability to
address the violations of human rights.76 The prohibition on the use of force applies regardless
of the inability of the UNSC to take action due to the veto of permanent members.77 The 1974
Definition of Aggression also supports the argument that the prohibition on the use of force is
not conditioned upon the effectiveness of the UN. The 1974 UNGA Resolution defines
aggression based on Article 2(4), except that the definition covers only ‘armed force’.78
Therefore, if the unilateral use of force to protect nationals abroad is in breach of the Article
2(4) as discussed earlier, then it also should be regarded as aggression under the 1974
Definition, given the nearly uniform language used in both documents.79 It is also worth to
mention that in the Corfu Channel case discussed above, the ICJ held that the existence of
defects in the UN Charter does not entitle states to not obey the prohibition on the use of force
and intervention.80 Given the state practice reflected by resolutions of the UNGA, the ICJ
72
R. B. Lillich, Humanitarian intervention and the United Nations, at 61-62. (1973).
73
See Art. 42 of the UN Charter.
74
R.B, Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA, L. Rev. 352, at 344-46 (1967).
75
E. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 Am, J, Int’l L. 415, at 437-39 (1969).
76
D. Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict ‘Humanitarian Intervention’
Reexamined, 17 Willamette L. Res. 859, at 890 (1981).
77
Ibid at 891.
78
UNGA A/RES/29/3314.
79
80
12
judgment in the Corfu Channel case and the fact that nothing in the UN Charter indicates that
ineffectiveness of the UN may allow states to use force unilaterally, it seems reasonable to
conclude that subsequent reinterpretation approach is not applicable.
2.3.2 Second-tier approach
The legality of the use of force to protect nationals justified by the second-tier
approach has also been contested. There is noting in the UN Charter that would indicate that
the legality on the use of force by states should be analysed on case-by-case basis.81
Contrarily, the drafters of the UN Charter intended to make a prohibition on the use force
embodied in Article 2(4) of the absolute character.82 During the San Francisco Conference in
1945 the proposal to alter the first of the ‘Purposes’ of the UN as embodied in Article 1(1) for
‘maintenance of international peace and security in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law’ was rejected.83 If that qualification have been adopted, it would have
required analysis of many contextual factors to determine whether or not use of force was
inconsistent with principles of justice and international law.84 Nevertheless, it was rejected
and the prohibition on the use force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter should be regarded
as an absolute. Moreover, Article 5 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression states that ‘[n]o
consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military,or otherwise, may
serve as a justification for aggression.’ It implies that use of force to protect nationals abroad,
an act which is considered as illegal by Definition of Aggression, cannot be legitimise by the
reference to the ‘surrounding circumstances’.
This is also supported by the decision of the ICJ in Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. The Court held that despite the clear illegality of
holding American citizens as hostages, the American attempt to rescue these people was not
legitimate.85 The Court implied that regardless of the motive, even if it is the rescuing its own
citizens from being kept as hostages, the prohibition on the use of force should be considered
as absolute.86 In Nicaragua case, the ICJ was very reluctant to accept that the use of force
might be legal when based on legitimate humanitarian considerations.87 Despite the fact that
81
82
Doc. 742, I/1/23, 6 U.N.C.I.O Docs. 318 (1945).
83
Doc. 742, I/1/23, 6 U.N.C.LO. Docs. 318 (1945).
84
85
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment 1980 I.CJ. 3,
Judgment of 24 May 1980, 1980 ICJ Rep 3, at para. 93.
86
Ibid, para. 93.
87
See Nicaragua, supra note 33, at para. 246.
13
the Court did no explicitly refer to the humanitarian intervention, the ICJ held that ‘the use of
force by the United States could not be the appropriate method ... to insure respect for [human
rights].’88
2.4 Conclusion to the chapter
It has been argued that using force to protect nationals abroad does not violate the
Article 2(4), as the force used is not directed to violate ‘territorial integrity or political
independence’ of the state. Such a narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) was nevertheless
rejected by the ICJ in Corfu Channel The decision in Corfu Channel case seems to be also
supported by travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter, which also rejects the narrow
interpretation of the phrase ‘territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. The
reaction of the international community of states to actions of the IDF in Entebbe also
supports that line of reasoning. The 90 minute long rescue operation to protect Israeli
nationals has been heavily condemn by states as the violation of territorial integrity of Uganda
and consequently violation of the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Therefore, it has been
concluded that that even minimal use of force to protect nationals abroad by one state will
violate Article 2(4) as it will be in breach of ‘terriorial integrity’ of another state.
It has also been argued by some that the legality of using force to protect nationals abroad
will depend on whether the force employed to fulfill such an intention is inconsistent with the
purposes of the UN embodied in Article 1 of the UN Charter. In fact, the use of force to
protect nationals abroad seems to be consistent with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Article 1 of the
UN Charter, but it is nevertheless inconsistent with paragraphs 1 and 2. Consequently, the use
of force to protect nationals abroad can arguably cause conflict between the purposes of the
UN, namely between collective maintenance of peace and promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights. It has been however concluded based on the drafting history of the UN
Charter, the provisions of the Charter and UNGA Declaration on the rights of people to peace
that collective maintenance of peace prevail over promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights. The analysis of the Articles 55 and 56 seems also to support that conclusion.
It has also been claimed that the use of force to protect nationals abroad breaches
Article 2(4), but nevertheless can be legitimate.The supporters of that argument provide two
approaches to argue for their claim, namely ‘subsequent reinterpretation’ and the ‘second-tier
88
14
criteria’ approach. The first approach stresses that because of repeated inability of the UNSC
to act effectively to address the violations of rights of nationals abroad, the unilateral use of
force should be legal. However, based on state practice reflected by resolutions of the UNGA,
the ICJ judgment in the Corfu Channel case and the fact that nothing in the UN Charter
indicates that use of force is not conditioned upon the effectiveness of the UN, it has been
concluded that subsequent reinterpretation approach is not valid. The second approach states
that legality of the unilateral use of force to protect nationals abroad depends on its
‘reasonableness’ within the framework of relevant context. Again, after the analysis of the
drafting history of the UN Charter, state practice reflected by the UNGA resolutions and the
ICJ decision in Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran and
Nicaragua it has been concluded that second-tier criteria approach is also not applicable, as
the prohibition on the use of force embodied in article 2(4) of the UN Charter is absolute.
Chapter 3 Right to self-defence and protection of nationals abroad
3.1 Introduction
It has also been argued that the protection of nationals abroad can be justified based on
the inherent right of self-defence embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51
provides the right to self-defense, which can be defined as the permissible military reaction by
a state in response to an armed attack conducted by another state.89 Article51 provides that
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’ Using
force as a self-defence by the state is the only circumstance where the state is allowed to use
force and not being regarded as an ‘aggressor’ under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.90
Importantly, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case held that Article 51 does not cover the whole
concept of the self-defence. The Court elaborated that the customary law right to self-defence
already existed before the adoption of the Article 51 and still applies.91 The Chapter will
discuss two issues. Firstly, it will analyse whether the use of force to protect of nationals
abroad can be justified based on right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Then the same question will be asked but in relation to customary right to self-defence.
89
T. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 439, at 464 (2000).
90
R. P. Chatham, Defence of Nationals Abroad: The Legitimacy of Russia’s Invasion of Georgia, 23 Fla. J. Int'l
L. 75, at 85 (2011).
91
15
3.2 Consistency of the use of force to protect nationals abroad with Article 51 of the UN
Charter
3.2.1 Member State for the purpose of the Article 51
In order for a state to be entitled to use force under the Article 51, the ‘armed
attack...against a Member State’ needs to take place. The question arises to what extent attack
on nationals abroad can be regarded as an attack against a Member State. It has been argued
that in Article 51 and other UN Charter provisions ‘Member’ refers to territorial and
governmental entity of a state. 92 Article 3 emphasizes that ‘Members’ of the UN shall be
‘states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International
Organization at San Francisco’.
Based on that reasoning it has been stated that attack on the nationals who are outside
the territory of the member states does not trigger the right to self-defence under Article 51. 93
However, the Definition of Aggression implies that the Article 51 has some extraterritorial
scope by stating that ‘an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air force or
marine and air fleets of another State’.94 Furthermore, the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case
implicitly stated that there is a possibility of an armed attack to take place outside the
boundaries of the state. The Court held that mining of the US ship outside the American
territorial waters could potentially be regarded as an armed attack under Article 51. 95
This conclusion is supported by Definition of Aggression which explicitly mentions

state’s foreign military bases and fleets as a legitimate targets of armed attacks. 96 The question
arises whether reasoning of the ICJ in the Oil Platform case applies to nationals abroad and
whether they can be treated in the same manner as military bases and fleets. The USA seems
to support such an argument which can be illustrated by the fact that the USA specifically
referred to Article 51 while conducting military actions in Iraq and Libya claiming that its
right to invoke Article 51 is based on deaths of US nationals caused by Libyan and Iraqi
92
93
C. Henderson, The Persistent Advocate and the Use of Force: The Impact of the United States upon the Jus ad
Bellum in the Post-Cold War Era, at 141 (2010).
94
See UNGA A/RES/29/3314Art. 3(d).
95
See Oil Platforms, supra note 33, para. 72.
96
A. Randelzoffer, ‘Article 51’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, at 788,
797 ( 2002).
16
military.97 It has to be nevertheless mention that the killed individuals in question had some
official status.98
Some argue that lack of any reference in the Definition of Aggression to ‘attacks
against nationals abroad’ successfully exclude nationals from the list of legitimate targets for
the purpose of the armed attack under Article 51.99 Against this argument it has been
maintained that the list of Article 3 in the Definition of Aggression is not exhaustive.100 Given
the scarcity and lack of clarity of the state practice regarding the question whether the
nationals abroad can be regarded as a legitimate targets for the purpose of the armed attack
under Article 51 it seems difficult to decide on that issue.101
3.2.2 Armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51
The right to invoke the Article 51 will nevertheless primarily depend on whether the
attack against state’s nationals alone can be regarded as an armed attack for the purposes of
Article 51.The phrase ‘armed attack’ included in Article 51 was neither defined during the
San Francisco Conference, nor by the UN Charter. There seems to be a disagreement as to
whether an armed attack occur with any use of force, even very minor, or whether an armed
attack need be a result of a more severe use of force.102 The ICJ in the Nicaragau case
provided a crucial insight as to what constitute an armed attack under Article 51. The Court
held that it is ‘necessary to distinguish [between] the most grave forms of the use of force
(only those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms’.103 In the Oil Platforms
case, the ICJ confirmed the importance of gravity threshold and distinction between ‘the most
and less grave forms’ of use of force.104
However, given that nor in the Nicaragua judgment neither in Oil Platforms case the
ICJ did not specify the conditions for fulfilling the gravity threshold for the armed attack
under Article 51, the whole concept remains unclear. The decision in Nicaragua has been
97
A. D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, Military Law Review, Vol. 126, at 89 (1989) , M.
Nash and M. Nash Leich (eds.), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1981-1988 at
3405 (1994).
98
Ibid, see Sofaer at 90.
99
See Ruys, supra note 9, at 237.
100
I. Corten, L'état de nécessité peut-il justifier un recours à la force non constitutif d'agression? at 614-615
(2014).
101
T. Ruys, Armed Attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter, at 199-211 ( 2010).
102
S. R. Ratner, Self Defence against terrorists: the meaning of armed attack, Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 270, at 6 (2012).
103
104
See Oil Platforms, supra note 33, at para. 51.
17
highly criticized by scholars. It has been argued that small-scale armed attacks should not be
excluded from the scope of armed attacks under Article 51105 and that the right to self-defence
should be triggered by any attack. It should be up to the state how to react to being attacked.106
Furthermore, it has be stated that the distinction proposed in Nicaragua deprives in certain
circumstances states from responding with defensive force under Article 51.107 It could be
especially harmful and disadvantageous for smaller states, for even small-scale armed conflict
might be crucial to their security.108 It is worth noting that even certain states like the USA
rejected the threshold established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua and maintain that any illegal
use of force constitutes an armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51 of the UN Charter.109
However, despite the academic criticism the decision in Niacaragua remains authoritative.
Given the high threshold established by the ICJ for armed attack, it has been argued
that the concept of armed attack does not cover attacks on the nationals abroad.110 In support
of that argument it has been stated that the attacks of nationals abroad alone do not pose a
serious threat to a state’s security and cannot consequently trigger the right to self-defence
under Article 51 of the UN Charter.111 Some disagree with that argument, claiming that the
citizens are inherent part of every state and the state would simply collapse without them. 112
Therefore, it would be incorrect to maintain that an attack on state’s nationals abroad cannot
be regarded as a grave attack in line the Nicaragua distinction.113
It nevertheless seems difficult to affirm with certainty whether the attack targeted
towards one state’s nationals abroad would trigger the right to self-defence under Article 51
of the UN Charter. Much would depend on the state practice and gravity of the attack.
However, as mentioned before the ICJ in the Nicaragua held that Article 51 does not cover
105
Y Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defence, in MN Schmitt and BT O’Donnell (eds)Computer
Network Attack and International Law, at 195 (2002).
106
E. Wilmshurt, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, at 14-15 (2005).
107
Ibid, at 16.
108
J. Kittrich, The Right of Individual Self-Defense in Public International Law, at 70 (2008).
109
A. D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, Military Law Review, Vol. 126, at 89 (1989).
110
M. Iqbal and S. Hassan, Armed and Ready, 158 New Law Journal, at 22 (2008).
111
Ibid, at 23.
112
TJ Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 American Journal of International Law 503, at 505
(1990).
113
J. Green, Passportisation, Peacekeepers and Proportionality: The Russian Claim of the Protection of Nationals
Abroad in Self-Defence’ in James Green and Christopher Waters (trs) Conflict in the Caucasus: Implications for
International Legal Order, at 60 (2010).
18
the entire concept of the self-defence and there is a customary international law attached to
the Article 51.114
3.3 Use of force to protect nationals abroad and customary international right to self-
defence
3.3.1 Principles of necessity and proportionality
Nowadays, it’s widely accepted that the law governing a state’s right to self-defence is
composed from both Charter provisions and customary international law.115 Customary
international law specifies framework within which a state acting in self-defence must
operate. States invoking right to self-defence need to follow principles of necessity and
proportionality. It is crucial to examine these principles, as the state practice which will be
discussed further indicate the importance of obeying principles of necessity and
proportionality in the claims of protecting nationals abroad.
These principles have derived from the Caroline incident, which provides that a state
claiming the right to self-defence is compelled to: ‘[S]how a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that . . . [it] did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it’.116
Simply put, the necessity principle provides that force should be used as a last resort option,
after a state has no non-forcible alternatives available.117 Proportionality principle limits the
level of the employed force by the state in self-defence so that the force used is not
excessive.118
It has been argued that the use of force to protect nationals abroad is legitimate under
customary international law.119 Customary international law is formed through two elements
114
115
See Nicaragua, supra note 33, at para. 176, see also J. Green and F. Grimal, The Threat of Force as an Action
in Self-Defense under International Law, 44 Vand J Transnatl L 285, at 298–302 (2011).
116
Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry S Fox (24th April 1841) in 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1841–42)
at 1129–39 (1857).
117
J. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary
International Law concerning Self-Defense, 14 Cardozo J Intl Comp L 429, at 450 (2006).
118
J Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, at 142 (2004).
119
19
namely: state practice and opinion juris as it was held by ICJ in North Sea Shelf.120 With
regards to state practice, many states invoked the right to protection of nationals as the
justification for their use of force in the past.121 It is beyond the scope of that thesis to analyse
all of the cases where the states invoked the protection of nationals doctrine. Therefore, the
thesis will focus on a few cases after adoption of the UN Charter in 1945.
3.3.2 Large scale operations to protect nationals abroad conducted after 1945
In 1956, the UK justified the Anglo-French intervention during the Suez crisis on the
basis of the protecting of their nationals. British argued that they need to protect their
nationals and are allowed to invoke the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, claiming that ‘self-defence undoubtedly includes a situation in which the lives of a
state's nationals abroad are threatened and it is necessary to intervene on that territory for their
protection’.122
A significant number of states criticized the Anglo-French intervention, claiming that

the British justification had no reflection in facts.123 It has been argued that British lives were
not immanently threatened. Furthermore, even if they would have been threatened, bombing
of Egyptian airports and protracted occupation of strategic positions along the canal were
disproportionate and went way beyond what was necessary for the protection of British
nationals. Vast majority of scholars also condemned the intervention and emphasizes that
Anglo-French intervention in Suez canal can be considered as a primary example of ‘ how the
right of forcible protection may be open to abuse’.124
In 1960 Belgian intervention took place in Congo, after mutinying Congolese soldiers
injured some Belgian residents. Belgium sent paratroopers to Congo to evacuate the
threatened Belgian nationals.125 The Belgian authorities stated that they had a right to use
force in Congo to protect its nationals from the injuries.126 They emphasized that the whole
operation is proportionate and focused only on the protection of threatened nationals.127 They
120
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v
Netherlands),Judgement, Judgement of 20 February 1969, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, at para. 77.
121
122
N. Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of
Humanity, at 78 (1985).
123
UN doc. S/PV.751. Opinions of USSR, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia and others.
124
See Ruys, supra note 9, at 239, see also Wingfield, supra note 81, at 98.
125
126
UN doc. S/PV.877, para. 18.
127
Ibid, paras. 28-30, 142.
20
reassured that as soon as the UN would effectively stabilize situation in Congo, the Belgium
troops would withdraw.128 In UNSC debates states like Italy, France or UK accepted Belgian
justification.129 However, states like Soviet Union, Poland or Tunisia condemned the Belgian
intervention, labelling it an ‘aggression’, which by using the doctrine of the protection of
nationals is a mere pretext to hide illegitimate military intervention aimed at influencing
Congolese internal affairs.130 Consequently, the UNSC adopted a number of resolutions in
which it stated that states should abandon all the actions which might affect Congo’s
territorial integrity and political independence. As the consequence, the UNSC insisted on
Belgium to withdraw its troops from Congo.131
Furthermore, the USA was involved in many interventions where the protecting of
nationals was invoked by the US authorities. In 1965 the USA intervened in Dominican
Republic after the country went into anarchy as a result of the rivalry between opposing
political sides.132 The US Ambassador to the UN claimed that ‘ In the absence of any
governmental authority, Dominican law enforcement and military officials informed our
Embassy that the situation was completely out of control, that the police and the Government
could no longer give any guarantee concerning the safety of Americans or of any foreign
nationals, and that only an immediate landing of United States forces could safeguard and
protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of citizens of some thirty other
countries.’133 After some period of time the Organization of American States adopted
resolution by which it established inter-American forces, which allowed the USA to increased
its number of troops on the island to over 22000.134 Despite the fact that US authorities did not
explicitly referred to the protecting of nationals, and the intervention at some stage could be
considered as a ‘regional peacekeeping’, according to scholars it illustrates the potential abuse
of the doctrine of the protection of nationals.135 It is necessary to stress that the USA explicitly
informed the UNSC that it could not allow ‘ the establishment of another communist
government in the western hemisphere.’136
The USA intervened also in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989. In both cases,
128
129
UN doc. S/PV.873 22-28 (especially paras. 121 (Italy); 130 (UK); 144 (France))
130
131
SC Res. 143 (1960) of 13 July 1960; SC Res. 145 (1960) of 22 July 1960.
132
See Ronzitri, supra note 115, at 28.
133
U.N. SCOR, 1196 mtg. para.14 (1965).
134
See Wingfield, supra note 89, at 62.
135
Ibid, at 63, see also UN doc. S/PV.2899 at 31-36.
136
21
the US authorities invoked the protecting of its nationals abroad as the right to self-defence
among other justifications for using force.137 In both cases the large-scale and protracted
interventions took place which according to scholars undoubtedly went beyond what was
necessary for protecting US citizens.138 Consequently, US interventions in Grenada and
Panama were heavily criticized by international community of states and scholars. 139
However, it has been claimed that states did not reject legality of protection of
nationals as the right to self-defence per se, rather they questioned the legality of measures
which were taken by states to protect nationals.140 Therefore, according to that argument the
interventions in Canal Suez, Grenada or Panama were not condemn on the basis that the USA
and UK invoked protection of nationals as a justification for the use of force but because their
actions were disproportionate and went beyond what was necessary to protect their
nationals.141 Consequently, it could be argued that American and British actions to protect
nationals were mere a pretext to interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign states, which is
a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 seems to support that argument.When Russia

justified the use of force in Georgia by claiming the right to protect nationals abroad, the
UNSC did not react.142 In fact, the criticism of Russian actions was expressed only after the
Russia’s actions were regarded to be disproportional and outside the scope what was
necessary to protect Russian nationals in Georgia.143
Therefore, according to that argument large-scale military operations could still be

regarded as legal as long as they would be in line with principles of necessity and
proportionality. In certain circumstances like for instance in Georgia, the size of population
would not be suitable for limited operation involving only small number of soldiers, in which
case a large-scale operation must be conducted.
137
138
R. Wedgwood, The Use of Armed Force in International Affairs: Self- Defense and the Panama Invasion, 29
Columbia J Transnat'l L, at 621-622 (1991); see also UN doc. S/PV.2900 14-15 (Finland), 22-23 (Malaysia
139
UN doc. S/PV.2487, UN doc. S/PV.2489; UN doc. S/PV.2491, see also UN doc. S/PV.2899, UN doc.
SIPV.2900 and UN doc. S[PV.2902, see also C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AJILl34-
135, (1984), see also D. F. Vagts, International Law Under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home
Examination', 78 AJIL 170 (1984).
140
141
Ibid.
142
A.Thomson, The Protection of Nationals Abroad Doctrine: Rise of the Non-Combat Evacuation Operation
11(3) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 627, at 654 (2012).
143
C.Waters, Russia, Georgia and the Use of Force, <http://jurist.org/forum/2008/08/russia-georgia-and-use-of-
force.php> accessed 16/06/16.
22
However, it is very difficult to accept such an argument. Based on the presented
analysis, it can be argued that the large-scale operations to protect nationals in practice always
interfered in the internal affairs of the states as in Panama or Egypt. Consequently, such
interventions are in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Even if interventions to protect
nationals abroad does not violate the principles of necessity and proportionality but interfere
with state’s internal affairs, it should be nevertheless considered as illegal.
3.3.3 Rise of the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
Furthermore, in the last three decades number of evacuation interventions increased

significantly.The states conducting these operations brought the protecting of its nationals as
the justification for a use of force.144 These interventions have common characteristic, namely
they were not reported to the UNSC and it seems as they escaped the international criticism
and attention.145 Majority of these intervention were conducted by France in various African
countries, for instance in Chad 1990146 or in the Central African Republic in 2003.147 Both
intervention focused on evacuating French nationals arguably without any interference in
internal relations. Compare to thousands of soldiers sent by the US government to Panama or
Grenada, France sent only up to 300 soldiers.148 Moreover, the operations in Chad or Central
African Republic did not intend to influence on or change the local government as it had place
in Panama or Grenada. Despite the fact the the number of soldiers is not the indicator of the
legality of the military operations, bigger armed forces are more likely to impact on the
internal affairs of the state.
` These limited military operations have become more and more popular among states
and have been labelled as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).149 It is emphasized
in the Canadian Joint Doctrine Manual on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations that these
operations are ‘fundamentally defensive in nature. They are not an intervention in the issues
in the host nation’.150 According to British Ministry of Defence, the NEOs are ‘limited
144
145
Ibid, at 251.
146
See Wingfield, supra note 89, at 75.
147
Editorial, ‘CAR Coup Strongly Condemned,’ BBC News (17th March 2003) <
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2853429.stm> accessed 25/05/2016.
148
149
150
Canadian Joint Doctrine Manual on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, (2003).
<http://www.cfdcdf.forces.gc.ca/websites/Resources/dgfda/Pubs/CF%20Joint%20Doctrine%20Publications/CF
%20Joint%2ODoctrine%20-%20B-GJ-005-307%20FP-050%20-%2ONEO%200ps%20-%20EN%20(16%200ct
%2003).pdf> accessed 24/05/2016.
23
intervention operations’,151 whereas the American Department of Defence refers to the NEOs
as ‘swift insertions of force, temporary occupation of an objective and a planned withdrawal
upon completion of the mission’.152 While the legal justification for conducting the NEOs
varies in many different military manuals, it seems that they all consider the consent of the
host nation as one of the legitimate ground.153 Furthermore, the UK explicitly mentions right
to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter as the basis for conducting the NEOs,154
whereas Australia refers to inherent self-defence to protect its nationals as the justification for
NEOs.155
As mentioned before number of the NEOs did not receive any comment from the
UNSC, as they have not been raised there.156 It triggered the argument that where large-scale
intervention like one in Grenada or Panama are almost always heavily condemn by states and
the UNSC, the NEOs might be acceptable under customary international law right to self-
defence. The documents mentioned before like state’s military manuals or official documents
of foreign ministries can be regarded as a reflection of an opinio iuris.157 However, for the rule
to become a customary international law, the sufficiently ‘extensive’, ‘uniform’ and ‘constant’
state practice is also required.158 It is generally accepted by scholars that, while there is not
sufficient state practice of the ‘extensive’ and ‘uniform’ acceptance of the crystallization of a
customary international rule which would allow states to conduct NEOs in the sovereign
states to protect their nationals, recent NEOs seems to be tolerable by international
community of states.159 It is necessary to stress that the fact that certain NEOs are ‘tolerated’
by states does not mean that they are legal.160
Nevertheless, it has been argued that given the increasing usage of the NEOs and the
151
Ministry of Defence Joint Warfare Publication 3–51, iii (2000),
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D0302742-2103-4C9D-9CE8 D6F2E6B1860F/0/20071218_jwp3_51_U_
DCDCIMAPPS.pdf>at 1, accessed 24/05/2016.
152
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Pub 3-07, at vii
(1997)<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/jp3_07_5.pdf> accessed 24/05/2016.
153
154
See Ministry of Defence, supra note 151, at 4A-1.
155
Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADDP 3.10, Evacuation Operations, at ch. 5 (2004).
156
See Gray, supra note 34, at 129.
157
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005, Volume
I: Rules, at xxxviii. The ICRC used numbers of military manuals when it analyzed the state practice of states for
the purpose of conducting study on customary international humanitarian law.
158
See North Continental, supra note 120, at para. 74.
159
F. Grimal, G. Melling, The Protection of Nationals Abroad: Lawfulness or Toleration? A Commentary,
Journal of Conflict & Security Law, at 543 (2012), see also Ruys, supra note 1, at 271.
160
Ibid, Grimal. at 545.
24
fact that these operations receive very little of international criticism, one should abandon
broad concept of protection of nationals and substitute it with much narrower concept of ‘non-
combatant evacuation’.161 Arguably, the NEOs provides less room for potential abuse. Most of
the conducted NEOs were strictly limited to the evacuation of the nationals.162 It has been
argued that for the NEOs to be consider legal in future when sufficient state practice and
opnio iuris will emerge, certain rules should be followed.
First of all, it has been claimed that in general NEOs require the consent of the host
state.163 Receiving of the valid consent from the state would qualify NEOs as ‘interventions by
invitation’. It can be argued that, it would not breach Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and
would have a positive impact on effectiveness of the operation.164 It has been also claimed that
in the situations of break down of law or order, collapse of the government or unwillingness
of the governmental authorities to protect foreign nationals, the NEOs may exceptionally be
conducted without host state’s consent in order to ensure the safety of threatened citizens. 165 It
has been stated that under such exceptional circumstances, the legal basis for the carrying out
of NEOs is a ‘special application of right to self-defence, enshrined in Article 51 of the UN
Charter’.166 It has been also emphasized that the NEOs initiated without host state’s consent,
therefore based on the right to self-defence, must be reported to the UNSC.167 Failing to fulfill
that requirement would not only cause the breach of UN Charter provision but would also
strongly suggest that a state does not consider itself to be acting in self-defence.168
3.4 Conclusion to the chapter
It has been argued by many that the protection of nationals abroad is legitimate under
right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In order for a state to be
161
162
163
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP 3-68 on Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, (2007) available
at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-68.pdf> accessed 27/05/2016.
164
165
Ibid, at 268.
166
Ibid, at 268.
167
Ibid, at 269.
168
D.W. Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?,40 ICLQ 378, at 341
(1991).
25
entitled to the use of force under Article 51, the ‘armed attack...against a Member State’ must
occur. It has been concluded that given the lack of the consensus and scarcity of state practice,
it is difficult to answer with clarity whether nationals abroad can be regarded as a legitimate
targets for the purpose of the armed attack under Article 51. It is further complicated by the
fact that the UN Charter does not provide the definition of the armed attack. The ICJ in
Nicaragua held that distinction on the most grave and other less grave forms of the use force
is necessary. Only the most grave forms of the use of force constitute an armed attack for the
purpose of the Article 51. Given the high threshold for an armed attack established in
Nicaragua, some claim that attacks of nationals abroad alone do not pose a serious threat to a
state’s security and cannot satisfy the threshold. However, some oppose that view. It has been
concluded that because of the lack of consensus on that issue and not enough of the state
practice it is again challenging to reach a strong conclusion.
It has also been argued that the use of force to protect nationals abroad is legitimate
under customary international law. After creation of the UN Charter in 1945, there were many
cases of states invoking the protection of nationals doctrine with connection to right to self-
defence. Nevertheless, the large-scale operations that took place in Egypt, Panama or Grenada
were heavily condemned by international community of states and scholars.
On the contrary, NEOs which gained the popularity in 1990s and continue to being
conducted by states, seems to escaped international criticism and condemnation. The British
and Australian military manuals explicitly refer to the right to self-defence as the justification
for the use of force for the purpose of NEOs. However, it has been concluded that there is not
enough state practice to claim that NEOs are legal. It’s more accurate to conclude that they
are ‘tolerated’ by international community of the states. Nevertheless, because of the
intensified usage of the NEOs, little criticism from the international community of the states
and less room for potential abuse, it has been concluded that NEOs could substitute the broad
term of the protection of nationals. It has been found that, if the NEOs would follow certain
analyzed in the thesis rules, they could be regarded as legal in future.
Chapter 4 Evaluation and conclusion

4.1 Conclusion to the thesis
26
To conclude, based on the analysis provided it seems that the use of force to protect
nationals abroad is not legal under the UN Charter. The thesis addressed two key arguments
for the legality of the use of force to protect nationals abroad. Firstly, it has analysed whether
the use of force to protect nationals abroad can be consistent with the Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter. Secondly, it has examined whether protection of nationals abroad can be legitimate
exercise of a state’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary
international law.
It has been concluded in Chapter 2 that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is absolute and
the use of force for any reason is prohibited. It has been found in the thesis that the argument
that the use of force to protect nationals does not violate territorial integrity or political
independence of the state, is not persuasive. The same can be say about the argument that the
use of force to protect nationals abroad which is consistent with at least one of the purposes
enlisted in Article 1 of the UN Charter is legal. It has also been concluded that the prohibition
on the use of force embodied in Article 2(4) is not conditioned upon the effectiveness of the
UNSC to fulfill its duties. Two approaches which support this argument have been found to
be not applicable.
In Chapter 3 it has been concluded that because of the lack of clarity as to who or what
can be target of the armed attack and to what exactly constitute the armed attack for the
purpose of the Article 51 of the UN Charter, it is impossible to confirm that the use of force to
protect nationals abroad is legal under the right to self-defence embodied in Article 51.
Analysis of the state practice regarding the argument that the use of force to protect nationals
abroad may be legal under customary international law led to the similar conclusion. Many
large-scale operations conducted by states were heavily condemned by international
community of states and scholars. The limited NEOs seem to escaped the international
criticism, but despite the fact they might be tolerated they are not legal. The author of the
thesis believes that the limited NEOs have the best chance to become legal under customary
right to self-defence. The rules for the NEOs which were presented in the thesis should be
followed. The post-Cold war international community of the states is not prepared to tolerate
large-scale operations as one in Grenada or Panama. However, states and arguably UNSC
might tolerate and start to consider as legal, the limited evacuation operation which do not
interfere with internal affairs of the sovereign state but focus purely on the rescuing
threatened nationals. All of these conclusion will be applied to the Russian intervention in
Crimea, to illustrates it better.
27
4.2 Application of the findings to the Russian actions in Crimea in 2014/2105
The protection of nationals abroad seems to be the key Russian justification for use of
force in Crimea.169 This is illustrated my numerous political and UNSC statements mentioning
the ‘protection of compatriots’.170 It is also evidenced by the Article 61(2) of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation which states that Russian Federation ‘guarantee[s] its citizens
protection and patronage abroad.’171
However, as discussed above the whole doctrine of protection of nationals abroad is

highly contested. In line with analysis presented in Chapter 2, Russia could claim that its
intervention in Crimea did not breach Article 2(4) as it did not interfere with the territorial
integrity and political independence. In fact, when Russian armed forces crossed the
Ukrainian border on the 28th February 2014, there were involved in very little combat, if any
at all.172 Given the lack of military violence Russia could claim that its actions did not
constitute to the use of force for the purpose of the Article 2(4). However, as discussed in
Chapter 2 prohibition on the use force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is absolute. It is
generally accepted that Article 2(4) should be interpreted narrowly and every use of force
against sovereign state violets its territorial integrity and political independence.
Therefore, simple crossing of Russian soldiers through Ukrainian border constituted a

breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Russian’s soldiers actions in Crimea such as
blocking airports, military bases and communications channels further support the conclusion
that Russia violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Furthermore, as a result of Russian interference in
Ukrainian internal affairs, Crimea is now de facto part of Russia. In the effect of the Crimean
referendum, which legality and impartiality is still highly contested, Russia has annexed
Crimea.173 Therefore, it would be unwise and unreasonable to claim that Russian annexation
of Crimea could not be regarded as the use of force for the purpose of Article 2(4) of the UN
169
Transcript, ‘Putin defends Russian intervention in Ukraine, The Washington Post (4th March 2014)
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defends-russian-intervention-in-ukraine/
2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html> accessed 30/05/2016.
170
UNSC, 7124th UNSC Meeting (1st March 2014) S/PV.7124, at 5.
171
The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Adopted and came into force on 12th December 1993) available in
English at <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstEng2.shtml> accessed 30/05/2016.
172
S. Walker, H. Salem and E. MacAskill ‘Russian ‘invasion’ of Crimea fuels fear of Ukraine Conflict’ The
Guardian ( 1st March 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/28/russia-crimea-white-house>
accessed 1/06/2016.
173
N. Cwicinskaja, Legality and Certain Legal Consequences of the Accession of Crimea to the Russian
Federation, The 34 Polish Y.B. Int'l L. 61, at 23 (2014).
28
Charter. Even if we assume that Russian Federation has annexed Crimea purely to protect its
nationals, the annexation would sill be regarded as a breach of Article 2(4). As it was
discussed earlier, in Corfu Channel case, the ICJ held that even minimal use of force used
against sovereign states violates its territorial integrity and political independence and
consequently is in breach of Article 2(4). It can be argued that annexation is a very severe
form of use of force, which actually is in gross violation of territorial integrity and political
independence of the state. Therefore, it can be concluded that Russian actions in Crimea
constitute a clear breach of Article 2(4). As analysed and concluded in Chapter 2, the use of
force to protect nationals abroad also violates Article 2(4). Given that, it can be concluded that
the Russian justification for the use of force in Crimea to protect its nationals is not valid.
However, Russia could also claim that her actions were justified based on the right to
self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter or adjoining customary law regarding self-
defence. It is necessary to stress that Russian argument that the force employed in Crimea was
to protect Russian citizens did not meet with any response in UNSC meetings. It can be
argued, that Russian actions in Crimea could be regarded as legal if Russia fulfill the
requirements for invoking right to self-defence, namely armed attack, necessity and
proportionality.
As analysed in Chapter 3, there seems to be no consensus as to whether the attack on

the nationals alone can be regarded as an armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51. In
Nicaragua the ICJ held that only the most grave forms of the use of force would constitute an
armed attack. As stated in the introduction, Russia claimed that their nationals have been
targeted in the attempt of attack on the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea. Russian authorities also stated that there was a continuing threat to
Russian nationals in Crimea.174 The Russian claims of armed attack have not been generally
accepted by international community of the states. The UN High Commissioner on Human
Rights concluded that ‘It is widely assessed that Russian-speakers have not been subject to
threats in Crimea’.175 Many commentators saw the Russian justification of protection of
nationals abroad and claims of armed attack against Russian citizens as a pretext to annex
Crimea.176 However, assuming that Russians nationals were indeed killed in the attack on the
174
See Cwicinskaja, supra note 173.
175
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Ukraine (15th April 2014), at para 89.
176
A. Deeks, ‘Russian Forces in Ukraine: A Sketch of the International Issues’ Lawfare (2nd March 2014)
<http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/russian-forces-in-ukraine-a-sketch-of-the-international-law-issues/> at
Section on Consent, accessed 04/06/2016.
29
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the question would arise whether that would be enough to
consider attack as the most grave form of the use of force. Given the lack of consensus as to
what exactly constitute a grave use of force and scepticism towards the Russian claim of the
alleged attack on the Internal Affairs Ministry, it can be concluded that it would be difficult
for Russia to prove that the use of force employed against its citizens was of the sufficient
scale for an armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Even if Russia would be able to satisfy the threshold for the armed attack, it would
have to follow the principles of necessity and proportionality. The principles of necessity
requires states to go through all available for them options, before using force. It can be
argued that Russia went beyond what was necessary. It seems that Russia have not explored
other available means to protect its nationals in Crimea.177 Importantly, Russia did not try to
discuss and solve the problem of alleged thread to Russian nationals in Crimea with the
Ukrainian government.178 Therefore, it can be concluded that even if there had been an armed
attack on the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Russian response went way beyond what was
necessary as Russia had not reached out to other available means of protecting its nationals.
It seems that Russia also had not satisfied the principle of proportionality, which
ensures that the force used in response to the armed attack is not excessive. As mentioned
before, annexation is an severe use of force and is indisputably disproportionate to the alleged
attack on the Internal Affairs Ministry. In fact, it is disproportionate to any thread which
Russian nationals in Crimea could be exposed to. It can be therefore concluded that the failure
to satisfy the requirement of the proportionality is the final straw for the Russian claim of
protecting its nationals in Crimea.
Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that Russian actions in Crimea have not satisfied
the requirements for legitimate use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter or the
customary right to self-defence. There is little support for the Russian claim that the Russian
citizens have been attacked in Crimea. Furthermore, the Russian actions in Crimea seem to
violated both principles of necessity and proportionality.
177
J. Balouziyeh, ‘Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: An Analysis under the Principles of Jus ad Bellum’, Lexis
Nexis (4th of April 2014)<https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-
blog/archive/2014/04/14/russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-an-analysis-under-the-principles-of-jus-ad-
bellum.aspx#sthash.bann76YA.dpuf> accessed 03/06/2016.
178
30
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Legality of The Use of Force To Protect

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LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT NATIONALS ABROAD

UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.

LLM- Public International Law 2015/2016

Supervisor: Erik Koppe

Word Count: 13881

CHAPTER 2 - THE PROHIBTION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND PROTECTION

2.3.1 Subsequent reinterpretation approach 12

2.3.2 Second-tier criteria approach 13

2.4 Conclusion to the chapter 14

CHAPTER 3- RIGHT TO SELF DEFENCE AND PROTECTION OF NATIONALS

3.2.1 Member State for the purpose of the Article 51 16

3.2.2 Armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51 17

3.3.1 Principles of necessity and proportionality 19

3.3.3 Rise of the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 23

3.4 Conclusion to the chapter 26

CHAPTER 4- EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 27

4.1 Conclusion to the thesis 27

According to the Russian representative to the United Nations Security Council

There seems to be no consensus as to whether the use of force has to be inconsistent

Before analysing that argument, it it necessary to assess whether or not protection of

2.3.1 Subsequent reinterpretation approach

The weakness of the subsequent reinterpretation approach is that nothing in the UN

2.3.2 Second-tier approach

2.4 Conclusion to the chapter

Chapter 3 Right to self-defence and protection of nationals abroad

3.2.1 Member State for the purpose of the Article 51

This conclusion is supported by Definition of Aggression which explicitly mentions

3.2.2 Armed attack for the purpose of the Article 51

3.3.1 Principles of necessity and proportionality

A significant number of states criticized the Anglo-French intervention, claiming that

Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 seems to support that argument.When Russia

Therefore, according to that argument large-scale military operations could still be

3.3.3 Rise of the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

Furthermore, in the last three decades number of evacuation interventions increased

3.4 Conclusion to the chapter

Chapter 4 Evaluation and conclusion

However, as discussed above the whole doctrine of protection of nationals abroad is

Therefore, simple crossing of Russian soldiers through Ukrainian border constituted a

As analysed in Chapter 3, there seems to be no consensus as to whether the attack on

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