176 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO participation of the popular classes in polities. Without this par- ticipation, any “technical” formula for mass mobilization Will lead to mass manipulation, and pethaps to an increase in the accumulation of wealth, but will not bring about pol - velopment favoring the majority and increasing the quality of life. PART UL ‘THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL,174 [FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO ‘enjoying considerable autonomy visa-vis the political power cen- ters, In that circle, entrepreneurs do participate, on a quasi-cor- porative basis "This decision-making system, taken as a whole, is therefore both ‘tralized and accessible to the entrepreneurs. It between economy and p. against repression comes in economic developmer language of human rights is in this sense wanslated into GNP ‘growth rates, However, the system does own structure. important of political process as a whole. there is now the repre sive apparatus and the left-wing armed opposition groups, ther of these extremes seems capable of generating viable pol strategies and goals. Yet both can and do reciprocally con« the regime’s course. They are able to hold it in check circumstances. To the extent that they make a more pol they reduce the regime’ to absorb opposition groups. They lessen the regime's al generate policies satisfactory to those interested in “qualified” participation, that is, those who oppose the regime but would rather retain some diffuse influence than propose lear-cut policy alternatives. ainebaiaigitoct ba. ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 175 encies exist, they can be reversed? But I have no doubt that reversing them will require a vigorous reaction, wit id out. The regime may well be co fat forces opposed selves in strategic fat part of the popu: yenefi eights of its vision of the state cocratic process of fe country one step closer to a ‘democratic overture, It may well go only s0 far as stabilizing authoritarian regime. In any case, even those who talk about “opening up" toward democracy seem to conceive of this only in terms of broader and ‘asses in173 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO maintained and as long as a strong state is agreed upon as one of the major elements in the model | ‘To sum up: the regime is autocratic; its mode of organization itary bureaucratic. Ie does have a dynamic economic founda- "There are undoubtedly limitations in both respects. There | ate pote the regime has not solved. There are also economic limitations, for the model can be no more dynamic than the measure allowed by the dependentassociated development pattern. Aummonrransanise AND Democracy between an increased growth rate and encouraged the notion that they bear an intimate ry relation to each other. requisite for economi ine the whole argument nor ré no doubt, however, that authoritarian argument somet Nasserism. Ranged against find the remnants of cast groups without access to the government (part of the Left, , the church, and s0 on) iven this picture, briefly the argument quent defense of the politically democratic, economically depend ent-associated development model has been put forward by @ ilo Branco’s cabinet, Roberto de Oliveira ruage, model, and intention from such Scientists as Apter, Almond, and Verba, he 1 option appropr P consagrada) by the Revolution of 1964 tory democracy and a strong ex: ASSOCIATEDDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 178, ering that our society, at least in some regions, has already reached beyond modernization and has entered the phase of industriali- ice more, we have an argument @ sphere as strictly conditioned by the economi economic structure, there mu cion us now turn to a final qui coercion indicate that the Brazilian regime is not only bureau. totalitarian? Tendencies in that direct Once again, looking for an answer only at t do. iphasize the actual power balance instead, an important fact to be taken into account is the tendency for the older political (0 regroup themselves. They place them- selves around the stabilizing axis of the military and state bu- reaucracy, in the political parties consented to by the regime. to the centralizing and stabilizing tend- regime, as the nomination president has clearly shown. On perform the same ritual function as the national Congress, which. élects the president after the choice has been made somewhere else, Yet economic policy decisions do seem to be made in a circle 25. This quotation is from the article printed in the June 17, 1970, 0 Estado de Sto Paulo, p.5-170 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO the military. Now it was the army, as an institution, mak ‘own pressures initiated by the ultra sectors. ‘The scene was repeated once more during the Costa ¢ period — without, of course, public demonstrations of opp and protest —when attempts were made to ¢'reconstity the regime. These attempts originated witltin the cipula pala- ciana (the prt sr circle) and were apparently and increasiaigin 1966. “In a sense, However, the pi end of Costa e Silva’s period. The government, with some support ‘al parties, aimed ‘x chain of actions Dressures, economic policy decisions followed a relatively autono- mous course, Interest groups somehow got the governmental favors and decisions they needed and returned them in the f cof support, if not specifically to the governmental leadership, certainly to the regime i ‘Now, let us ask, what kind of regime is 1 succession, through the election of Médici, made i see quite clearly the way the system works. Dey pressures and despite the prestige enjoyed within the army by ‘Albuquerque Lima, the fundamental decision to put aside the latter's candidacy had the following features: sd to the upper stratum of the military bu- corporate representation. ‘ 3 is intended to prevent a crucial risk to the army _ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT. DEVELOPMENT mm he army itself And, most significantly, once the decision was made, it was ac cepted in the name of hicrarchy, discipline, and cohesion by the losers, even though they probably had a majority among the lower echelons. ‘Thus it was the armed forces, as an institution, that increas ‘ol the state, Thai bureaucracy state apparatus, ‘bureaucratic domination. T have emphasized relatively stable, and wi good reason, It is true that the regime has been able to generate elfective policies ‘ast into a more clearly entrepreneurial pattern. Adi hhas become more “technocratic.” And, more ba: reaucraticauthoritarian nature of the regime does not mean that fails to pursue the policies in which various social groups are ed bourgeoisie, but also the military as a group and the rising middle classes (that is, pro- fessionals and skilled white-collar workers) have benefited from them. As long as the economy maintains its present growth ¥: is even possible that some sectors of the lower strata (workers jn the more modern sectors, and so on) will share in the pros- perity. This, of course, is quite likely to the extent that the gov- ernment decides to pursue redistributive policies. The situation of these workers may be ameliorated even to the point of inereas- ing their relative share of the total income. ‘The overriding goal as conceived by the military is to in order to guarantee national security. ere is no direct and necessary conflict between is goal and the development model that is being put into prac- . The scheme even allows some room for nationalist pressures, as long of course as the “associated” nature of development is168 [FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO tion, on 1s act out a story that is rather the in- attempt to convert them is the Second to govern- an extent that the package bargain included military impos of the Conta e Silva candidacy ar succesor Why? Why is i fe Castello” Branco governing elite ons legality? Which forces pressured the president in this direction? Which opposed i¢? Perhaps by asking simple and straightforward questions like these, we can bring back into the picture the real nerve of the political process — ese groups and those located out- ir views felt and to change mind, for a moment, outlook that was ide found considerable support Branco government. The p few and J the polit! partir focised 3 the Revolution. in other words the Reval incide in the same persons. Both were anticommuni the other was more concerned. ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 169 accomplis were often sufi- In addition, there 8 of power, the “opposition.” Toward the anco term, it was made up of the MDB (the which had been created to act 28 the political party game) and of various remnants ‘of the pre-ighg regime and party s) After the election of Costa e Si trend became cleat, ciently vigorous to threaten a crisis situ vwas, outside the cf ‘a, a5 mentioned earlier, a army acted more and more as a corporate group, seeking to occupy the state apparatus, which had been ‘modernized by the Castello Branco governme: ‘were apparently partly responsible for the movement the Coste Silva Camm naacyy- icant feature of the period, however, is neither in economic policy on the arrdcho salari the wage lev official roles, because the latter was known to represent an op} site developmental model, namely, strengthening entrepreneus organization through as foreign capital. Rather, the is that, once more, the presi cratic opening” (abertura democr ‘The president sought to reac uation began to change, o| sxemplified by che ral4 166 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO In an eatlier study, Candido Mendes had described the Cas- Togic of the existing system.” 8 ‘The election sro eitimass the regime’s natural course, in the sense that Costa_e Brazilian Stale." Thus continuity was assured, despite eventual i joration and even despite the fac In short, despite features of the Cost —the ambiguity i ‘guarantees the necessary cont the power-lite model's applicability. Yet, according to the Cost tion of a Bonap: ‘Silvd government cou evale in the dire. ne ‘could the economic models followed by the Castello Branco government ASSOCIATEDDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 167 spring up from th direction would which was quite active as Incorporation of other ‘way of preventing a ista types! On yn would only make sense if it imy hopes are’ pinned. to the development ¢ has already been put into practice. Yet, as before, Candido Mendes did stress (probably 100 “power vacuum’ regime.®® What social misconceptions regardin; their roots in a much too serious reading of a1, After the name of Army Marshal Eurico Gasper Dutra, Vargas's war sinister under the Estado Novo and later president of Brazil (1946-30) ello Bran ep. pt.SENSE aa as 164 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO down wages, and at the same time to broaden the channels of accumulation. In the process it removed —even though some at tendled to work against the formulation etween the state, Iocal private enter- prise, and international trusts (ae Fracturry oF Power-Euite Mopers: CAnpio Menpes ‘To claim that a new economic power base i is again possible is not to say that political confi groups in power have ceased to exist. Even less does it mean ‘opposition forces have altogether disappeared. But here the more ambitious attempts to analyze the present Brai regime have failed, and once more this failure must be credited to an under ion of events. Or it may be opposite error rogram, More often than not, political changes either foreseen nor desired by the actors themselves, ‘And yet they must bear some relationship to the more basic, underlying structures and constraints. To make them explicit wherever possible is the task of political analysis, Thus, rather than inquire into the conscious purposes or mani- fest strategies of succeeding governments, we must attempt to ical forces, to trace the contours of the framework the outcomes of their Ds er ore eae eee eo ah ea ese aria he gacthes mayer eal erate aa Sean cae Ratti pete Coe 2 Mier the working ‘odelt of politcal develop- Sree pear desea ore ooeatcaeipe eT lene eerie ae aes ae SS enre ore Soe eat eee See eet sie Kiet eaesl page etait erase oe the members of the Superior War College, which a politica © modelos de poder no Bi ASSOCIATEDDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT. 165 a homogeneous group, and armed with an effe “doctrine of national secu and started to implement, a na model corresponded omic Talon. 3 iced by the castellistas, prevented personalization in ‘the se of power. The president had preserved for jum coercive capabilities, but he did not in fact apply ing himself to skillful use of threats rather than ac- it possible to avoid a thorough, conscious of i political ideology inspired by the was able to formulate, mnal development model. ‘That of a modernizing aytocracy, to Cindido Mendes, the power-lite type of regime, ed by Castello Branco, has two main character it refuses to broaden the scope of political compromise through incorporation of other groups into the limited circle of power holders. This maint irde’s own. and prevents it from being disfigured or diluted, Second, the regime rejects consensual legitimation, might achieve through fe seen a5 a specific type, with regard to its structure or mode of exercising power. It consciously adapted that pattern (o the task of instituting a democratic, technically reformed gov- structure. It sought to achieve this goal through stra- sd economic and political reforms. T! elf to the technocratic elite, TI Candido Mendes puts wade it possible for the castellistas to insulate themselves as a ruling group . . . from any obj determination, whether of class or any other social denominator, in order to retain exclusive access to the highest level of govern: ‘outside the country’s boundaries162 FERNANDO ENRIQUE CARDOSO esses themselves. In addi ts has produced a ynal primary items tion, the policy aimed at diversi reduction in the relative weight (almost exclusively produced by local entrepreneurs) in favor of industrial or semiprocessed minerals, both expressing the new ppatterns of association, Public enterprises funetion more and more ‘enjoying the same freedom and aiming il mo- ETROBRAS (the state ind local firms, although. jum, Association mechani terprise and private business. It has thus been possible to forge 2 modus vivendi, if not an effect political alliance, between functional middle-class groups (such fhe military, the technocracy, and the bureaucracy), despi the representatives of the inter- ernationalized bourgeoisie. enterprise and equal pendent, —no longer hold? Is anachronistic to go on thinking of the Empresa Pi (pul enterprise) as the moving force behind that model? And if what T suggest, as the political role, present and potent middle-class sectors? One answer suggest promptly: unless they confine them- that cannot be pected to offer any effec- hares, aim to make profs, and associate themselves with \dicators or conjectures (ke those of Morley in this yolume) concerning act 1 busines, or the evidence th tor €9 measure the intemationallzation of the ASSOCIATED DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 163 fndoubtedly those who believe that the native bourgeoisie in dependent couneie an cry through a bomgeissevolton, the latter term with the meaning it has as a descrip ench or Am wi va existing “structural obs scope and. meani occuring Tdo not fed to integrating ism, to associat But it faces an objective dependent economies does not complete mnomous technology’ therefore t0 the consequences of absorbing c at is not the mai ly develope: expansion, and self.rea must thus bear all Tabor-saving tech- ;plement outside ational a course, does develop the capital goods expansion of the consumer in dependent countries can hardly be Te was this limited transformatio economy thai pl Pn eee ae160 [FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO absorption of the modern sectors of the middle class them through selEnterest to the international bourgeo jis an important political fact. Can this situs curate, political an: ‘would be conceive as a continuum in which the only contrat between the dominant classes, harmoniously state, and the dominated classes, ex hardly a part of an ongoing society. It seems more accurate, how- ever, to underscore that the relative degree of stability achieved in the alliance among the military, the bourgeoisie, and the middle classes is the contrivance of a development model and a political regime in which their interests are balanced as against ‘more serious enemies. This balance could be achieved, quite ob- because their internal contradictions were not as antago- nistic as the threat of a development policy generally favorable to the popular classes. Let us come back to a question raised at the beginning of this chapter. Are we justified in inquiring about the possibly revolu: tionary economic consequences of the 1964 coup? Would it not seem more apt to describe it as a victorious counterrevolution? ‘The answer is not simpl movement, through conscious intention and by Terenting to note chat some of its main ince they regard the rue that, from 1963 10 could be described as pre- ¢ in partial decomposition, ation might have reached a point where cal system would have been unlikely that the final out- sntal social revolution, given the lack of adequate means to achieve it: clearly defined goals, of the leftwing groups nization to capitalize ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 16) national entrepreneurs was ‘caught up im a wal based on an economic foundasi nonrevolutionary, but also backward. structural anchorages of that all nonincorporation tmorgamized and system of produc jonship between the hegemonic world centers and the dependent economy was, and is increasingly being, restructured in accordance wi patterns of international economic organization. As em ae ee ee nL not preclude the possi lustrial and financial develop- ‘ment in the peripheral dependent state, The urban-industrial pole, which had been growing at a fast pace since the Kubitschek materials and agricultural products —still retain a major place in the economy. But even in these areas, new, associated forms of production involving international monopolies and local en: have appeared. Not even public enterprise is excluded from this new scheme of things, as attested by the mining con- sortia in iron and manganese. Other characteristically subordi- nated aspects remain, particularly foreign indebtedness and tech. nological dependence, and foreign firms have acquired greater control over the private industrial sector.¥¢ The internal market to emphasize 2 proces of figures to indicate concrete rer ‘hat the public enterprises ha158 [FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO and opening the nat investment and conné bureaucratic mode: bution of foreign government clearly intended to promise to restore nent. An il in theory woul jourgeais sectors represented jowever, the military did not | of course, share the goal of under their direct cos between the planning and control agencies of their counterparts in the armed forces, especial staff. Through these coord greater control over all the key economic ‘economic growth. the goals of central sion ofall forms of social protest. Making to catch up a capitalist accumul: suing what at one level can be seen as tl military have in fact placed the model of development on a sound, dynamic s, then, can be appropriately char- fet even here ‘The term ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT. 159 does refer, of course, to the maintenance of a class society, Buti des not preclude mobility. Mot x among those members of fits of development throt or public enterprises. ‘Thus an agreement has been reached between the Bray bourgeoisie and the state. The former has momentarily ity between the econé preneurs and the general ‘The system does have consider ‘opened up very promi this problem to be an even greater o course of development clo to the maintenance of Its chosen156 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO dynamic. Celso Furtado speaks of pastoralization and stagnation, while Jaguaribe describes the Brazilian fascist model as col ing to Jaguaribe, today's metropolis-colony relationships ‘an still be described in terms of an international division of labor in which the colony specializes in exporting raw mat and such a relationship must be seen as an obstacle to develop. . Viewing the Brazilian economy as nondynamic suggests that requires eco- smed correspondence sgime’s social basis — the agrarian oligarchy — and ing but the ea ae fe al operon Udetelopiger othe baa | font jomous development must be sought somewhere else. Among sible candidates, the middle class is the strategic in functional groups, specifically some sectors of the military or the governmental technocracy, both identified with the middle class in their social characteristics, come to be seen as charged with the re- lopment is not with lization at the expense of indi force the old division of labor some countries only manufactured goods. ively advance This proces an “nternationalization of the internal ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT. 159 ter was significantly controlled by the Tocal bourgeoisie and by the state. clear that both Celso Furtado and Hélio Jaguaribe are with this process. They have not, however, come to terms ith all of its implications, as one can perceive from 0n of the major political actors and the policies they s! ing to carry out, he model of associated-dependent development does have a dynamic character. It does allow rowth and social almost certainly have does not reduce inequ f contrary, it is based Gn concentration. of income and increas- is not to deny or obscure these \¢ associated-dlependent model of development, Instead, he must take them fully into conside assessments and identify the social gro\ able to carry through an alternative model In Furtado’s and Jaguaribe's analyses, the hope for an authen- nal paitern of development, once pinned on the ynalist entrepreneurs, is now pinned on the middle class, and particularly on the military sector of the middle class. How- ever, my analysis of associated-dependent development shows that the middle-class groups have, if anything, exerted pressure toward associated-dependent development, Rather than looking forward toward a “cay ‘without cay they have in practi zilian or foreign, while other investment areas are reserved for the state the role of the military in this process? What did they intend and what has actually happened? Is there any ity to the idea that they might themselves replace the de- pendent-associated, bureaucraticauthoritarian models of devel- opment and rule with other models as is occasionally suggested by such authors as Furtado and Jaguaribe? ‘The Castello Branco “project” was ly and economi liberal, though its liberalism was qualified, of course, by the cumstances of an underdeveloped country: a strong executi il party represent (appropriately purged to preve eesiies ESSE he EEE Wate d eombee oro amr kee eS 12, See Cardoso and Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina13. FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO 2. “State capitalism.” By means of a coup, power ¢ be controlled by the progressive sectors of the themselves together i is the state apy is presupposes 2 revolu- developm: chat had taken place, he seems to have ibe believes will ac. fascism.” Unfortu: to argue how unviable 1d the colonial-fascist model characteristics in the Brazil depends at least on the fol- ‘omy, but in order to preserve stabi depends on maximum use of coercion capabil 12, Close integration, political as well as economi swith the Western system as it is being structured by the United States 3. Reliance, under state supervision, on the market: control of the economy must be, as far as possible, in the hands of private economic uni did in fascist Italy and Ger- many-—economic development without changes in the social Structure. However, given che dependent character of the Bra dilian economy, the local bourgeoisie, unlike its German or Ttal- jan counterpart, would be unable to place the economy on dynamic growth plane, Te would also be impossible to establish fan appropriate coalition betwee and a Class party, which he sees as the p ‘model, Instead entrepreneurs ally Exabilidade social pelo color 9. Jaguartbe, “Bras 41, SPP. 89-4 ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 185 Hence the “colonial i ‘iption of In the Castello Branco government's economic policies and its aggravate the diset tion growth and the opening up of new employment ional levels, to such an extent that [ to prevent peasant immi the cities, where they would become explosive m: Secondly, “the dominant economy needs raw materi dependent economy . . . and cannot induce any dynamic effect on it . . . as long as the dependent Giey to prevent the social changes required for ment of such an oo ee which case, of course, some will I roles through the political par- II transform the rure and meaning of the regime. 1967, Jaguaribe believed that the first hypothesis ely. Now he seems to regard the second — the regime islf from within—as a better approximation of economic model now being developed is not (or is insufficiently) hid, pp. 43.44. See, for examy ‘de recentes 1:a5 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO 1, Fight for a return to formal democracy base, but tion to the by means of an ly national” development, which, of 10 attract some sectors of the middle class ‘The last alternative, authentically advocated by Furtado himsel Brasil [a project for Brazil) much influence among the dearly has also been no si return to democracy or toward the mobilization, state, There jer toward a massive op- are thus left the probable following from the kind of economic determini ing we have alluded to. In essence, it contends th: state's policies are strictly determined by which its power is based. In the Brazilian ‘chical 2 geoisie prevailing after the coup favor a pattern of development ‘both associated with anc ism. As a consequence, social pressures from the I Tocal entrepreneur resistance, which it the pressures from all these groups while presenting the Teast danger to its own integrity. The latter part of the chosen course of action implies keeping order, and particularly the hegemonic position of the armed forces. In fairness, it must be said on this kind of prognosis. He and economic differentiati ; more likely a model th: lly more dynamic and po- litically more flexible. That is why he then to speculation fon the chances of a pattern of development that would be eco- ined would make much 1. Celw Furtado, Un projeto para o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Eaithra Saga, 1968) ASSOCIATED DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 158 autonomous and politically more open. In the model hhe proposes, development would be based on the ability of the fueled by the middle class, to contain the excesses of inter: italism and promote development along national or ines. What he is really suggesting then is a return development model politically adapted a situation in which the other element of the coalition, popu has been wiped out. The new coal scheme that would broaden the market without endangering the accumulation process. Furtado's proposed development model found few powerful supporters. The key middleclass actors in the model — entrepreneurs and the sectors linked to the state—have cl a different path, as we shall see sl of course, an. anal existing to direct action. However, Furtado’s propé heavily toward - They neglect of the new model of associated-dependent development and place almost exclusive reliance o appeal must be attributed to version of @ national-devclopmentali assumptions that a politically capable middle class exists and that it would be interested in supporting of development. Before discussing in greater detail the issues raised by Furtado, let me turn to Hélio Jaguaribe, another important poli ¢ who has also explored the possibility of an authen mal route to development.* ional capitalism.” This depends on ince among, the progressive sectors of the national entrepreneurs, the ss, and the proletariat, under anFERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO 150 “Table 5. Total Output of Key Selected Goods in Brazil: ‘Average Annual Change, 1964-70 (in pereentages Type of Tosat Urban per capita good utp output Foods 18 =38 ‘Textiles on aa Glothes 18 49 ‘Automobiles 143 7 38 Sources: Based on data developed by IPEA (Brazilian Ministry of Planning) and ANFAVEA (The Asiociation of Brazilian Automobile Manufacturers Ged in Fernando Magalhaes, “El perverso ‘milagro econdmico brasileo, ‘Fororena Eanémizo (Santiago de Chile), no. 265 (November-December 197 . 20. ‘Table 5.4. Foreign Debt and Reserves of Brazil (Millions of U.S. dollars) Period Debt Revues 1963-64 3160 - 3372 3917 4403, 5.295, 000 Sounces: Banco Central de Brasil and Vit ( Gited in Fernando Magalhies, “El pervero ‘mil Panorama Faonimiee (Santiago), 20.265 (November-December 197 Aa of go Apsil 1971 Having thus sketched out some of the most useft and theoretical considerations for understanding the ext: dinarily complex and com has emerged Brazil, I will now examine in greater detail the works of the ‘major Brazilian analysts, whose interpretations are basical variance with ‘Tue Inpetexsinacy oF Economic Deterainist Movets: tions of Brazilian development since to draw fully the theoretical and empirical imp! dynamic interdependence between politics and economics. This ASSOCIATEDDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT interdependence is implicitly denied in the ing to describe th political voluntarism by the economic s process that T call avocateddependent developm they do not take into consideration the cal implications of the proces (Gelso Eustado, in his analy of the Bri rightly points out one peculiarity ation — would probably react in one ree ways: Tempos modemes, ed, Celw Furtado (Rio de Janeiro: Eaitora Paz e Tet 2908), pp. 1-35.148 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO ‘This the 1964 coup did immediately, through repression. The bourgeoisie paid a price. By accepting militar first in order to desttoy the influence of the workeis, Tt contributed to the creation of a situation in which rocess_proved_ impossible. In is attempt to contain the “pressure from below, the bourgeoisie supported measures that essentially destroyed own direct political expression. It is true that the bourgeoisie never ya_and pressure instru ments, Now, however, not only the political party system but all other forms of political action open to the bourgeoisie became dependent on contacts and alliances with the military and tech- nocratic groups that alone controlled the state apparatus. What- ever the long-range : bourgeoisie lost interes leverage to shape its more immediate political ie current Brazilian development model has caused great analytic confusion, As we shall see in greater detail later, some the economic interests of foreign cap- 1d that this means that there is no room 1g or national development in that the military leaders have acquired a ion of such great power that, free of external constraints or fernal contradictions, they can and have imposed levelopment model on Brazil. T will attempt to demonstrate here that these observers are mistaken in their assumptions about the high degree of autonomy \d internal coherence of the dominant economic and/or po- interests. They do not understand the dynamics of the seems that i¢ will go on functioning without repression those pressures may For an analys a assert that it entails s Sata a a view, changes qi E Pion ha ‘4 economies, the new internat ‘of labor puts a di Sere eee aa rt this factor, a reform ship b y and an underdeveloped jon that perpetuates. stagn: selling eonsumer goods to the g classes is consistent with, and indeed dependent upon, fi rapid economic growth in at least some crucial sectors implies, quite obviously, national market (the same thing hapy ionships among advanced economi also depends on technologie iarket connections that only mults American. Let me add at this point costs. The data generated during the Bra associated-dependent development support (ce table 53). generate morensig foreign Tmdebtetnes_146 FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO magazines, and television, much of whose revenue is dependent upon advertising. ‘The general consequences of these new trends in international increased interdependence in produc- national level, particularly if we look at the world economic system from the standpoint of influence fon decision centers, and (2) a modification in rns of dependence that yn, oF set constraints and to, the development policies of the countries located at the periphery st system.? It is true, as table 5.1 indi- that the state, public enterprises, and local capi retained some role and influence. But there has been a basic change in the main axis of the power system. of the productive system has shifted. The result of changes is that groups expressing the interests and modes of organization of international capitalism have gained dispropor- tionate influence. From the perspective of our argument, it does not matter greatly whether the industrial firms are owned out- by foreigners or are owned by Brazilians associated with wn corporations, for in either case th fependent country. —aromer crucial factor vwilitary_and_the technocracy, the populist model of development, fence as the new economic trend emerged, Given thelr Wolo Sintiy to The Hew holders of economic power, and the si of their policy ns, they have played an Gften decisive role in the creation of the presen ipopulis sectors of the military and technocracy have taken wh themselves not only the modernizing function in adminis- Jko much of the repressive function in the social and political realm. in the same process the older ruling sectors have lost thei ed. (CEPAL, ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 147 financial policies have f vantage in the new regime.* As a par he power groups and wed. "The generally rangement had served to expres of these changes, with particular reference to the ideo the whole process through which some seers xe- see my Ideologias de ls burgue rgentina y Brasil) (México: Siglo XXI, 197: ‘general remarks about the ght crisis, OF course, the picture ie very complex and could not be ade- thin the limits ofthis chapter.saan see uece aa [FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO ve Brazilian capital, and foreign cap- takings) were the main pro- growl ith Kubitschek’s policy of rapid indus ion of the urbin middle-class market for manufactured goods, a redistribution of influence began to take place. There ‘Was a noticeable change in the groups attempting to influence economic policy decisions, as well as changes concerning the con- Y{ tol of the investment process. The social bases of the populist regime (whether in its authoritarfan stage under the Estado Novo for in the later democratic periods under Kubitschek, Quadros, even the geograj purposes of our argument, the essen- ional capitalism became more inter- fe units such as factories and plants ico, and Argentina, all of ‘United States direct private investment has gone increasingly into the manufacturing sector. (See table 5.1.) In Brazil the level of foreign private investment in the dynamic industrial sectors has been so high and so sustained that the sta sector and national entrepreneurs clearly no longer nant role in such key decision-making centers as the capit goods and durable consumer goods industries. (See table 5.2) This growing industrial power of foreign-owned manufacturing firms which sell to the domestic market also means that foreign firms are the main advertisers in Brazil. According to a 1967 Visio article, for example, the twelve major advertisers in Brazil ‘measured by the accounts of the principal advertising agen- lys Overland, Sydney Ross, Volkswagen, Gillette, , Fleishman and Royal, Coca- 3 They thus have a great po- ‘on such as newspapers, weekly ‘2 Visto (Sho Paulo, September 197), cited in Fernando Magalbies, “EL pperverio ‘milagro econémico Bras parame Econémico, no. 255 {Gantiago, Chile, Noverber-December 19/4), P- Si ‘and Colgate Palm: ‘Table 5.1. United States Direct Investments in Manufacturing Total for Latin Other 4 Argentina Brasil Mexico Countries 1929 Fl 25 4 1 ‘in Each Economic Sector in Brazil, 1968 (In percentages) Foreign Setors Capital Infrastructure spa Tntermediate goods 346 Capital goods 726 Durable consumer goods 783 Nondurable consumer goods 53.4 70 aa - on : Unpublished rescarch study prepared by ADECIF in Rio de Jancira ‘and published in Jornal do Brasil, 20 Apri 1970. y5 Associated-Dependent Development: ‘Theoretical and Practical Implications FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO Almost everyone, victors a8 well ax vanquished, was taken by Surprise by the ens with : overthrown in 2904 and by the nature and ext ary rule In the impassioned aftermath of 1964 much the nature of the new quent Of the discussion concert regime revolved around able foreign observer, ‘Those who emphasize that n hhas many roots in the Estado Névo period are cot ‘central thesis of this chapter g6q is not simply a re cha iat became cecusting at an even me rapid rates Fureermore,T ontend that most analytic discussions concerning the nature and future fof the current Brazilian regime have neglected or incorrectly interpreted the implications of these changes and that al alysts do not take into account, either fhe dynamic, mutually shaping, interrelationship and economics. 1, It attempts to analyze the context in Cc emerged and to emphasize what is particular to it. stresses the dynamic process by which new forms of nat 1, This essay was already fon the changing pattern of Stepan shows the effects of the overall cha Institutions and consequently on the type of present. ue A (a See Dy. ‘socureontanme Seonett MATA lagheapla political power and new international econonite forces have inter- T call the new fd and resulted in the emergence of “associated-dependent development” in Brazi 2. It attempts to show that some of the m: i new regime, such as those found i ado, Hi give overly static, the economy an¢ elopment or on the side of excessive political voluntarism, which does take into consideration any economic constraints on pol consider internal contradictions 1e range of pos: development model and to offer shts both for people actively involved in politics sible futures for some usef and for anal “dae New Moves. oF “AsiocutenDerevoner Devecormnnr”s Pouimicat, aN Econonic IMPLICATIONS As I asserted before, the new bureaucraticauthoritarian po- litical regime is closely related to the changes in the pattern of economic developm \ce of political forces on which that development was based, During the Kubitschek administration (1g36-61) the older model of economic development was undermined and lost its force. That model, which had emerged in the 1930s — with the Volta Redonda steel plant, if one wishes to refer to a landmark and a symbol—gained momentum during World War II and became the predominant policy in the second Vargas government (1950-54). In essence that policy orientation concentrated on strengthening the role of as investor, particularly in the ion of heavy industry and in the formation of an infra- structure for the production of durable consumer goods. That policy orientation, as has now been well documented, a short-term response to practical pr of projections based on a nationalist ideology. Yet it had impor- tant effects on the style of economic development. It helped shape a development pattern in which, in descending order of