1. ANASTACIO LAUREL vs.

ERIBERTO MISA
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

Facts:

The Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to
the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty
over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

Issue: Whether or not a citizen may be convicted for a crime of treason when the Government is occupied by the military forces of the
enemy during war.

Ruling:
Yes. The petition is denied.

A Filipino citizen owes absolute and permanent Allegiance

Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the
obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused
with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so
long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign.

Defense of suspended allegiance and change of sovereignty, not accepted

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and
may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what
may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military
forces of the enemy during the war.

Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code,
though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States,
exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of
the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the
Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the
provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution.
2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.JOSE LUIS GODINEZ
G.R. No. L-895 December 31, 1947
EN BANC
BENGZON, J.:

Facts:
Godinez was prosecuted and tried for treason.
He was a shipmaster in the Philippines coastwise trade before the Pacific War. After the Japanese invasion, he rendered services to the
Japanese Navy, as pilot in the Port of Cebu, bringing their ships into harbor and otherwise performing work connected with navigation.
He was paid monthly salaries. After a period of rest due to ill health, he was again engaged by the Japanese Army to do the same chores at
varying rates of compensation.

The prosecution's arguments is that such acts of cooperation demonstrates treasonable adherence to the enemy, making defendant guilty as
charged.

In his defense the accused swore that he had to serve the Japanese because he was required by them to do so, that he could not give any valid
excuses, that if he made any false statements he would be caught, and killed; and that even if he could escape, the many members of his
immediate family would be left to their ruthless ill-will.

The majority of the trial judges discounted this explanation saying, in effect, that the danger to the accused was not imminent. It is
contended, that appellant's help to the Japanese together with criminal intention to betray render him guilty of treason. Among these acts are
when Godinez:
1) Always showed his pro-Japanese sentiments.
2) Automobile carries a Japanese flag and on his left arm and was wearing a band with Japanese characters
3) Presented his respects to the Japanese officer in charge of the boat, handed to him a revolver which was examined by said
Japanese officer.
4) Had a Japanese flag placed on the door of his house
5) That when American planes were dropping bombs in Cebu City, the appellant who was in the lawn of his house said, more or
less, the following: "Those sons of the bitches of Americans (referring to the American aviators) are the gangsters of the United
States; they are drunk, they will go down".

Issue: Whether or not Godinez committed the crime of treason.

Ruling:
No. After considering all matters, the Court reaches the conclusion that defendant's disloyal heart or treacherous mind has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt

It is now undisputed that the mere governmental work under the Japanese
regime — and pilotage service may be considered in the same light — does not constitute per se indictable disloyalty.
3. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO MANAYAO
G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947

Facts:
Manayao convicted of the treason with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.

Manayao, a member of Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban
of the same municipality. Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets,
gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus
assembled included men, women and children — mostly women.

In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to
military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court;

and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of
treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid
to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and
simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4,
and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:

. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or
more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

xxx xxx xxx

(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless
subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites
(Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to
help Japan in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of allegiance
to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The members of the Makapili could have
sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely
and resolutely aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese constitution and laws, even if they
had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War the "National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to
Europe and fight on the side of the Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission — although the war ended
before this could be done — they surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or laws of the United States or any of its
allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.

Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan.

Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor
even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.

Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his
country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said constitution ordains:

"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.).

This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more immediately and peremptorily into play when
the country is involved in war. During such a period of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered
free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the patriotism and
intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not
declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him
even when his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by
deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.

It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts
charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship
and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him
from punishment.

But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the
criminal from their coercion. They would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise
himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country.
(Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)

696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be
held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian
Edition by Borchard.)

As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper to separately take into account against
appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime.
We likewise are of the same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing that "whenever
more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by
a band," the employment of more than three armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the
existence of a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the aggravating circumstance
of band to be considered.

As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a
superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for
Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code compliance with duties to
or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant could entail in
its potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.

The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that
therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury, is no less repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of
rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the
Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that
occasion even bent on more cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it — were the very ones who saved the little
girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on the day of reckoning.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder
committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance
considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty, convicting
defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of
the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in
accordance with the applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted, and
sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's
decision, and the costs. So ordered.
4. G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.

Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the
accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.

The information charged:

That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the
mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen
owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in
violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere
to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the
United States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as
follows:

That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to

assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said
enemy's war efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the
herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and
the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the United States
armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the
Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the
mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to
Law.

The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except
that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that
the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of
personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the
enemy. But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer,

"that the accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan,
Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and
that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period,
the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;"
"that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other
Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later
surrendered to the Americans."

Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of
treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part
in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred
to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one
specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the
defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet,
again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration
means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine
military chore, or just walking or eating.

We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his
will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the
purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to
accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance
with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to
eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with
the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies."

Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal
intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature
of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup.
Ct., 918.)

At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not
necessary that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against
his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at
the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though
an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the
enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that
he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the
enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage was
enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his kind
who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference
from that of enlisting in the invader's army.

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness
requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance
from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the
two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it.
We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of
authority.

Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:

In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the
same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and
 another witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it
has been intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr.
Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the
testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is
wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in
this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires
that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in
England.

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:

Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there
must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.

Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the
same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two
oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of
Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal
Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to
sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act,
movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by
the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court.
To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of
sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason
law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive."
This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that
where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the
court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any
moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods,
with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive,
flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing
as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness
to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a
literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American
government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the
objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of
the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed
against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's
Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered
the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon
which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be
considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence
is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was
warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to
render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The
provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but
because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated
of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By
extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be
understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as
the American forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

HILADO, J., dissenting:

Being unable to bring myself agree with the majority upon the application of the two-witness rule
herein, I am constrained to dissent.

As I see it, being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those areas of the
Philippines referred to in the information, was one single, continuous, and indivisible overt act of
the present accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to the Japanese invaders. That
membership was one and the same from the moment he entered the organization till he was
captured. The fact that he was seen on a certain day by one of the state witnesses being a
member of the Makapili, and was seen by another state witness but on a different day being a
member of the same organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was
different or independent from his membership on the other day — it was the selfsame
membership all the way through. A contrary construction would entail the consequence that the
instant defendant, if we are to believe the allegations and proofs of the prosecution, became or
was a member of the Makapili as many times as there were days from the first to the last.

T.E. Holland defined "acts" in jurisprudence as follows:

Jurisprudence is concerned only with outward acts. An "act" may therefore be defined . . .
as "a determination of will, producing an effect in the sensible world". The effect may be
negative, in which case the act is properly described as a "forbearance". The essential
elements of such an act are there, viz., an exercise of the will, an accompanying state of
consciousness, a manifestation of the will. (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d
ed., unabridged, p. 25.)

There can, therefore, be no question that being a member of the Makapili was an overt act of the
accused. And the fact that no two witnesses saw him being such a member on any single day or
on the selfsame occasion does not, in my humble opinion, work against the singleness of the
act, nor does the fact that no two witnesses have testified to that same overt act being done on
the same day or occasion argue against holding the two-witness rule having been complied with.

My view is that, the act being single, continuous and indivisible, at least two witnesses have
testified thereto notwithstanding the fact that one saw it on one day and the other on another
day.
G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.

C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.

REYES, J.:

We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed
by the People's Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what
the said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with murder robbery and rape."

The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended contains
the following counts:

1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3,
1945 in the city of Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did
then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become a member
of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military
organization knowing fully well that the aims and purposes of said organization are
among other to extend every aid and cooperation with said enemy in the prosecution of
her war efforts against the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of said enemy-sponsored
Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the enemy with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to them did go out on
numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and other
elements and other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.

2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and
May 3, 1945, and the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the
accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial
Forces with treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in violation
of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join
the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the
command of a T. Yushida, performing the function and duties of an informer spy
and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military police and did during
the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with treasonable
intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did in company with
other member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend guerrilla as
they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise commit acts
of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the cause of
the United States of America in the Philippines.

3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy
the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as
he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as a member of the enemy-
sponsored constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the
Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army did
then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a
so-called mopping up operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and
other element engaged in resistance against said enemy and as a result thereof
ten guerrillas were killed.

4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and
November 1944 in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court
the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably help in the a construction of air raid shelters for the protection of
Japanese soldier against allied air raids and did help in the acquisition of as he did
acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation against the expected landing of
America forces.

5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu
Philippines the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and
the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to
the said enemy in company with Japanese Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police
and other Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to
force the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla
officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla activities.

6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial
Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military Police
and other enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said
Francisco Larrobia strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently
bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a
guerrilla.

7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu,

Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy in his capacity
as chief undercover man for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with
Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then and there
willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of
being a guerrilla thereafter taking said Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and
thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa about the latter's firearms
in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of
their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on the face and body and
otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation.

8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of
Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable
intent to give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu
District and in company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese Military Police did then
and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona
and did investigate the latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas
Adlawan food procurement officer of the guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of
said whereabouts herein accused did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter
by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his stomach and with an empty
bottle inflicting wounds on his head and finally striking his mouth with a flashlight
splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.

9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu

Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese
Military Police Cebu District in company with other informers said Military Police, did then
and there apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and
treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as to the whereabouts of her husband
Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division Cebu Area Command and when
said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's whereabouts herein
accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the arms strike her
on the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and
otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.

10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of
Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial
Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort said
enemy in company with five Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese
Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his capacity Military Police for the
Cebu District did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan Unadia on suspicion of being
guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike said Victoriano Primacio
and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said Victoriano
Primacio and Juan Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said
person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and Juan
Unadia have not been heard of ever since then.

11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man
informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a
USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile designs of said enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man,
informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn company with
Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a guerrilla.

13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he
did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously and treasonably
apprehend and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the
Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did question and investigate said
Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said
Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia
Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing, severely beat her and otherwise
torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to her
aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese
Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said
headquarters in compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever since.

14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable to give as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in his capacity as
chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu District
and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did
question the latter as the whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence
operative, and, in the course of said investigation, the accused did hang said Pedro
Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron pipe thereby inflicting
several wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla
whereabouts.

15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity
as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police
of the Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese
informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
apprehend and arrest Marciano Alejandro, Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing
said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said Jose Rada on the
charge that said person had contact with guerrillas.

16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as an informer and spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for
the latter's guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy.

17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu,
Philippines, particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent
to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, as member of the enemy-
sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the general
mopping up operation conducted by the Japanese Army under the command of
Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to Minglanilla for the
Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting said
enemy.

18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military Police,
Cebu District, in company with the member of said Japanese Military Police under the
command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest, maltreat and torture Martin Francisco
and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls naked, raping them, and,
did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said Martin Francisco:

2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch

P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring

on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.

19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an informer to the enemy
and in company with soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the purpose
of apprehending guerrillas and as a result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of
Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was captured.

20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man,
informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a
baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in
an effort to extract confession of the latter's connection with guerrillas.

21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort
to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of the
Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the Japanese Military
Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
 feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and
Braulio Padilla and did tie up the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds
on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as consequence of said
maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.

22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give,
as did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer, spy
and undercover man of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did and
there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado
and "John Doe" her husband, on suspicion that said persons were cooperating
and helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita Delgado and her
husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused did
torture them by hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.

23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as member of
the enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol,
a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to the said enemy.

By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the
information. But he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court
erred:

1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1)

voluntary surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as
witness by the CIC in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military
commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and saved the lives of many
civilian and from death in the hands of the Japanese;

2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant

on the strength of the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him;

3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and

unnecessary cruelty;

4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason
with murder, rape and robbery;

5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.

Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should
not have been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery,
and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein
alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which
the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general charge,
they can not be used in combination with treason to increase the penalty under article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should,
therefore, be held guilty of treason only.

Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand,
his admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof
that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender cannot be invoked (People vs. Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p.
166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)

The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his
countrymen have not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be
considered as mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.

There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he would
not be sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied
by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying appellant'
motions for reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in
connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on
the merit of the same."

There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their
nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty."
(People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in the information show that appellant in
committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel
to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting
them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous
act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and then
abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the
complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two aggravating
circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this
said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.

But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts
unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason
and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and
other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as
aggravating circumstances of ignominy will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal
objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The
atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the
term of the above paragraphs.

For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are
adsorbed in treason characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and other
accompanying crimes should be taken in to consideration for measuring the degree and
gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed.
Were not this the rule treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its
perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity
and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the
Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to which the culprit has exposed his
exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his
deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code just penalties to the
perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the
system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the case
of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment with
the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency
and in furtherance of the law's aims.

The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to
exceed P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and
unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since five member of
this court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only
be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.

Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of
treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this
instance de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor,
JJ., concur.